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Many countersniping experiences and lessons have emerged from Iraq, where U.S. and coalition forces are fighting a resourceful, dedicated sniper adver sar y. In addition to gleaning exper iences from Iraq veterans, weve incorporated into this chapter dozens of U.S. military reports, media articles, and even Iraqi insurgent accounts involving 16 terrorist sniper engage- NOT A CAREFULLY AIMED SHOT. This masked ments against U.S., Iraqi terrorist sniper fires at U.S. forces and appears about to flee. British, and Polish forces. A PROFILE: THE IRAQI SNIPER Before analyzing the Iraqi insurgent snipers other attributes, keep in mind that hes a terrorist first, whos capable of any kind of act to further his cause without regard to law or ethics or what a Westerner would consider morality. An inseparable seam connects him to his comrades who bomb public places and kill helpless hostages with little remor se. Ever y day he violates the Laws of Land Warfare by wear ing civilian clothes, assassinating civilians, continuing to shoot incapacitated soldier s and marines, escaping sniping incidents in ambulances, purposely firing behind a human shield of women and children, and operating from mosques. Expect no quarter from him and do not be surprised by his outrages. Explaining his motivation, one Iraqi sniper told the London Sunday Times, When I snipe at my target and watch him drop, I feel elated dizzy with ecstasy. I fall on the ground, shouting to God, calling Allah akbar, for God is indeed great. When their snipers kill one of us, we go to heaven as martyrs. But when we kill them they go to hell. Based on the threat they pose, Ive categorized Iraqs insurgent snipers into three

To assist U.S. forces and our Coalition allies in the War on Terror, any military, paramilitary, or police unit, or any individual member of such a unit, has the authors and publishers permission to reproduce and distribute this chapter. It may not be reproduced for sale, and please include this notice: From The Ultimate Sniper, copyright 1993, 2006 by John Plaster. Published by Paladin Press. 483

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classes: the potshot sniper, the trained marksman, and the one shot-one killsniper. The potshot sniper is a relatively untrained civilian who has acquired a scoped rifle. His zealotr y exceeds his ability, although hes reasonably deadly at 100 to 200 yardsabout two city blocksclose enough that he doesnt need to master range estimation, wind compensation, etc., to hit targets. Reminiscent of the Hitler Youth snipers who fought in the closing days of World War II, he got started with as little as a couple hours of instruction. Someone A rooftop Iraqi sniper takes aim at distant U.S. forces. else may even have zeroed his rifle for him, but After firing, hell flee, conceal his rifle, and blend into the all he needs to know is how to hold the populace. crosshairs on his target. Most potshot snipers will be captured or killed before they learn enough to be called sniper s, although believe for a second. Do you just suppose that experience alone eventually will elevate some to he attended a sniper course, perhaps outside that level. Ver y roughly, Id estimate this Iraq, which he would never have admitted to a foreign journalist? category constitutes half the snipers in Iraq. All these snipers watch U.S. forces and study Above him is the trained marksman, their tactics and techniques. They understand probably a former military or sport shooter who knows how to fire a rifle competently, but hes what a Quick Reaction Force is and how it not sniper-trained and lacks sniper experience. operates and have learned to fire and flee before He can hit dinner-plate-sized targets accurately a QRF can contain them for a cordon and at 200 to 400 yards, or smaller and partially search. Repeatedly, I found Iraqi insurgent exposed targets at closer ranges. If he absorbs media boasting that American cordons were not his experiences, he can be as deadly as a school- in place fast enough to prevent a snipers escape. trained sniper in a few months. The trained ARMAMENT AND marksman comprises perhaps EQUIPMENT 40 to 45 percent of insurgent sniper ranks. Iraqs snipers have a plentiful The smallest category is that supply of Soviet SVD sniper of the school-trained, fully rifles or the Iraqi-built version, qualified, one shot-one kill the al Kadesih rifle. Despite sniper, or those with enough being captured by the thousands experience from Chechnya or in 2003, Saddam Husseins elsewhere that theyve preinternal security and special viously qualified on the job. operations units earlier had They represent 5 or at the most cached stockpiles of such rifles, 10 percent of enemy snipers. enough to sustain the current One of Iraqs more accomlevel of sniping. An indicator of plished snipersallegedly with the al Kadesihs prestigious 23 killstold a British interviewer that he learned his skills A uniformed Iraqi Army sniper image is that Saddam had thouvia the Internet and by playing with the al Kadesih version of the hundredspossibly sandsof them gold-plated for videogameswhich I dont SVD sniper rifle.

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THE AFGHAN SNIPER Though allied forces have encountered a few snipers in Afghanistan, the enemy sniper effort there has not been anywhere near the scale of Iraq. Partially I think this is explained by terrain and typical engagement distances. The fight in Afghanistan is largely in mountainous country, away from urban areas and their shorter engagement distances. The Afghan Taliban, when they choose to fight, normally prefer to engage at 1,000 or more yards with mortars and heavy machine guns, rather than AKs or rifles. As well, I think culturally the Taliban whose members boast of their ignorance and rejection of the modern worldmay lack the education, sophistication In Afghanistan, a Northern and inclination to learn the ballistics and optical Alliance sniper scans the adjustments required for long-range rifle shooting. horizon for targets. This isnt to say that their ideological cousins, the al Qaeda terrorists, have no use for sniping. It has been documented that al Qaeda formally instructed snipers, confirmed by Nizar Trabelsi, a detainee at Guantanamo Bays Camp X-Ray who told FBI agents hed personally observed three-man teams in training. However, these teams were recruited and trained for attacks overseas, particularly inside the United States. Their graduation exercise simulated assassinating a U.S. Senator on a golf course. By early 2002, al Qaeda and its sniper teams had abandoned Afghanistan, leaving the Taliban behind to continue the fight against the Americans. In February 2005, the FBI apprehended Mohammed Kamal Elzahabi, a Lebanese citizen, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, who admitted hed been a sniper in Chechnya and had been an instructor at al Qaedas Khalden sniper training course in Afghanistan. Where his graduates are today is anyones guess. presentations. These gold rifles have become the wars most sought after GI souvenir. Depending on the source, the al Kadesih is comparably accurateor slightly less accurate than its Russian SVD cousin, probably in the realm of 2 MOA. I cannot say for cer tain because Ive not test-fired the al Kadesih. But clearly, this rifle in many ways is identical to the SVD, its most distinctive difference being the absence of a cheekrest. Some magazines have a palm tree stamped on them and are not interchangeable with the SVD. Ive not come upon a single incident of an Iraqi sniper using a bolt-action rifle, although one boasted to a journalist that he was purchasing a quality European bolt-action rifle.

Still in their protective wraps, these captured Iraqi al Kadesih sniper rifles will never reach a mujs hands.

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so I doubt that they have themhowever, there have been shots fired in well-illuminated areas after dark. As a rule, the Iraqi sniper does not have a radio, but sometimes he communicates via a cell phonewhich, if you think about it, is much less incriminating if hes stopped by security forces. Likewise, he carries no gear beyond his rifle and perhaps one spare magazine, both to remain flexibly mobile and to keep it simple to discard incriminating evidence when he must blend back into the population. While on an operation he often wears a black balaclava, a practice perhaps influenced by similarly attired Palestinian terrorists. Partially this ski mask generates a mystique, but more practically it also conceals his identity so he cannot be identified by Iraqi bystanders. Some Iraqi snipers further hide their identities behind a nom de guerre or code name. THE CHECHEN INFLUENCE While some Chechen fighters have infiltrated Iraq, in the area of sniping their influence has exceeded their numbers. During much of the past decade, Islamic radicals have fought Russian forces in the breakaway Chechnya Republic and learned a great deal about urban warfare, especially dur ing battles in the countr ys capital, Grozny. Their combat achievements have been significant, including

An American armorer deactivates a gold-plated al Kadesih sniper rifle so it can legally be brought home as a war trophy.

The Iraqi snipers maximum effective range is limited by the capability of his optics. The obsolescent Soviet-style PSO-1 scope found on most Iraqi sniper r ifles has a fixed 4x magnification, keeping his well-aimed shots to 400 yards or less. Beyond that range, a talented marksman can hit a human torso, but he wont be making precision shots. Further, because he lacks a spotter and spotting scope, the Iraqi sniper cannot effectively adjust his fire like a Western sniper. Ive not come upon a single Iraqi sniper engagement that involved a night weapon sight,

Unconcerned about the civilians that surround him, a Palestinian masked sniper fires at Israeli troops, much as some Iraqi snipers have done.

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THE EMERGING .50-CALIBER THREAT

Despite a U.S. protest, in 2005 the Austrian Interior Ministry issued an export license to famed gun maker Steyr to sell 800 .50-caliber sniper rifles to Iran. These high-quality, single-shot, bolt-action Model 50 HS rifles have an effecti ve range of 2,50 0 meter s, comparable to quality American .50caliber bolt guns. We asked the Iranians to give us a certificate stating that the end user of the weapons would be the Iranian In 2005, Iran received some 800 high-quality Steyr police, an Austrian government 50 HS rifles, despite the countrys history of arming spokesman explained, adding that the terrorist groups. Iranians would use it to protect the countrys borders and to combat drug trafficking. Thats not exactly how Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani saw it, telling reporters, Now our snipers can target the enemy in their armored personnel carriers and concrete bunkers. Iran, which has long supported such major terrorist organizations as Hezbollah and recently was caught smuggling an entire shipload of weapons to terrorists, insisted that the .50-caliber rifles were not intended for use in Iraq, despite its lengthy border with the neighboring country.

Chechen influence is suggested by this Iraqi terrorist video, which shows an SVD-armed sniper teamed up with RPG and AKs as a fighting group.

the January 2000 sniper killing of Maj. Gen. Mikhail Malofeyev, the commander of Russian forces in northern Chechnya. Chechen snipers affiliated with al Qaeda have become respected as subject experts and readily share their experiences, and perhaps

even conduct schools for allied combatants such as the Iraqi insurgents. It was the Chechens who first organized hunter-killer teams (fighting groups) by combining snipers with RPG rocketeers and machine gunner s for roving hit-and-r un attacksa tactic mimicked by Iraqs insurgents and quite likely inspired or instructed by Chechen veterans. Some Iraqi terrorist videos have featured an SVD-armed sniper alongside insurgents with RPGs and AKssimilar to a Chechen hunter-killer teamand such squads have been encountered in Iraqs more rebellious neighborhoods. Although not seen in Iraq, five-man teams with one sniper and four AK- or machine gunarmed gunmenhave been fielded by the rebels in Chechnyas rural areas. The sniper would stalk forward perhaps 500 metersor lie in ambush that far forwardand fire one wellaimed shot. Hearing this, his comrades would open fire to diver t attention and provide

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A Russian sniper in Chechnya, alert for possible Chechen gunmen.

covering fire for the sniper to escape from responding Russian forces. Given their expertise, its possible that some of Iraqs best insurgent snipersthe one-shot, one-kill typeshave been trained or advised by Chechens. Or some may actually be Chechens. SNIPER AMMUNITION The availability of quality ammunition could be a limiting factor for insurgent snipers. The most abundant 7.62x54R ammo is low-grade

ball rounds intended for firing in PK machine guns, which lack consistency and, thus, accuracy. However, a sniper has such a low expenditure rate that it doesnt require much ammunition to keep him supplied. An Iraqi urban sniper could operate for an entire year with the contents of a single ammo can. As is well known, before the 2003 invasion, Saddam had his elite units and internal security forcesthe nucleus of the insurgencycache ammo and weapons specifically for continued fighting. This fact, along with the availability of quality ammunition in neighboring countries, suggests that ammunition supply is not a significant problem for snipers. When snipers eventually are found to be firing chiefly ordinary ball ammoand one-shot kills declineit will be a strong intelligence indicator that the larger counterinsurgency effort is achieving success. SNIPER ATTACKS ON AMERICAN UNITS At some time, probably every American combat unit in Iraq must contend with an enemy sniper, but too often their counteraction does not eliminate their attacker. Montana National Guardsmen assigned to

Collapsed on the pavement after being hit by sniper fire, USMC GySgt. Ryan P. Shane (L) and an unidentified Marine were shot while attempting to rescue a third Marine in Fallujah. (Photo credit: USMC photo by Cpl. Joel A. Chaverri)

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Task Force Liberty manning a listening post at Al Huyway Jah had a single sniper shot narrowly miss a man. Though they returned fire and r ushed the snipers suspected fir ing position, they found nothing. As usual, an NCO noted, there are three other ways out of [his firing location] besides the side facing our trucks. He fired one shot, which left him plenty of time to get away from us before we engaged him. Especially, the Guardsmen were frustrated by the lack of cooperation by Iraqi bystanders. As usual, no one heard the sniper shot but heard the rip of the .50 returning fire, reported one infantryman. Recalling his predeployment countersniper training in Germany, a 1st Infantry Division soldier told Stars and Stripes, You could see the window open, you see the rifle and then you see the guy leaning out of the window. He shook his head. Here its not like that. They are very well hidden. When a sniper inflicts casualties and escapes unscathed, it can affect morale. After losing a fellow Marine to a sniper at a traffic control point, a young Marine confided to a Washington Post reporter, Having a sniper out there scares the hell out of me. Hes a pretty good one, too. Only three shots and he got one of ours. Here are some examples of the kinds of snipers American forces must deal with. The Opportunistic Neighborhood Sniper The neighborhood sniper operates mostly near where he lives, which usually is one of the more dangerous neighborhoods of Ramadi, Baghdad, Tikrit, Fallujah, or a dozen other Sunni triangle towns. Like kicking over a rock and finding a rattlesnake, U.S. forces encounter him when they penetrate his neighborhood. He sees the Amer icans as a convenient, opportunistic target right in his own backyard. Limited by his opticsa 4x PSO-1 scope he cannot selectively place a shot beyond 400 yards, but urban dead space reduces that further, to about 250 yards or less. He occupies a temporary hide atop a building of perhaps three or four storiesat least as high as the

buildings around him. Lacking a spotter and his spotting scope, the sniper will search for a target with his rifle scope. If hes a potshot sniper, he may expend his entire 10-round magazine before he flees; with more experience, hell carefully place one shot so hes certain of a hit, then flee. His opportunistic target could be a GI at the open hatch of a Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a dismounted patrol, perhaps a soldier standing beside a temporar ily halted HMMWV. If a military supply route (MSR) passes his neighborhood, the sniper may well take to engaging these, too, when presented the opportunity. This neighborhood sniper knows the area well and has planned his escape route, often using a rope to descend a buildings back side, beyond the sight and counterfire of those hes engaged. Early in the war these sniper s sometimes left behind their rifles, but SVDs and al Kadesih rifles are growing harder to replace; more likely hell carry his rifle a short distance, then ditch it in a preplanned hiding place. Operating against such a potshot sniper in 1969, I spotted him within 30 seconds of his shot, but already hed hidden his rifle, which I never foundthats how quickly such a shooter knows he must discard his weapon.

Iraqi neighborhood snipers, such as this one, opportunistically engage U.S. forces when they appear.

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The Vehicle-Borne Hit-and-Run Sniper Another kind of opportunistic engagement has been experienced at American traffic control points (TCPs). While U.S. servicemen are stopping and searching vehicles, a civilian automobile halts 300 or more yards awayfar enough for a sniperscope to offer an optical advantage. While the driver remains at the wheel, a sniper takes aim across the cars hood or top, fires one or two fast shots, then the car speeds away and immediately disappears into traffic. The troops operating the TCP take cover, so rarely do they even approximate a vehicle description. Unless a helicopter is already airborne and in radio contact with the TCP, its impossible to intercept the snipers vehicle. This kind of sniper might be apprehended during a routine vehicle search that also discovers his riflebut hes just as likely to melt back into the populace. Because the insurgents use radios or cell phones to alert their comrades whenever they spot a TCP, U.S. forces

have begun running flash TCPs, set up with no warning for short periods of time, in hopes of ensnaring vehicles carrying contraband. The Last-Stand Sniper Another type of insurgent sniper is one who has decided to occupy dominant terrain with no possibility of escape and die with his boots on, so to speak. Like suicidal Japanese snipers in World War II who tied themselves in trees and let Marines advance beyond them before opening fire, this sniper climbs into a minaret the tower beside a mosque from which a mullah calls the faithful to prayerwhere he intends to make his last stand. He will take with him as many enemies as possible. The most determined kind of sniper though likely not the most tactically adroitthe last-stand sniper is always ready to die, which yields its own kind of effectiveness. No matter the accuracy of counterfire, he cannot be forced from his position or suppressedhe can only be

When a determined Iraqi sniper atop a Fallujah minaret held up a Marine infantry company, tank fire brought down the entire tower.

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killed. On several occasions in or near Fallujah, such to-the-death snipers have held up U.S. forces for extended periods until, finally, antitank weapons or tank main guns blasted them from their barricaded FFPs. The Targeted Sniper Attack The insurgents best snipers are employed in carefully planned attacks against somewhat fixed targets, such as a soldier at a guard post, security personnel outside a public building, or a GI manning a guard tower at a U.S. base. We know that these operations involve their finest shooters because with uniformity, these are one-shot killsusually head shotscarefully placed to bypass the victims body armor. These usually are shoot and scoot attacks, but if the snipers first shot misses he may linger for a second shot. This pattern is clear with quite a number of incidents. In some instances, the sniper has been supported by a video cameraman who recorded the attack for later broadcast on Arab television or insurgent Web sites. Typical of these targeted sniper attacks were two incidents in Ramadi on 8 and 17 August 2004, which each killed a U.S. Marine. In both instances, they were manning a well-established observation post, and the victim was killed with a single shot to the head. The second victim was atop a seven-story building, not a very simple shot. The earlier victim, at Outpost Ghetto, was safely behind a 5-foot sandbag wall when he paused momentarily at a narrow opening to speak to a fellow Marine. Thats all it took. To succeed, such deliberate attacks are preceded by reconnaissance and surveillance to confirm the targets location, select FFPs, and determine stalking and escape routes. The best counter, it appears, is tactical awareness of this recon/surveillance stage and being alert to the presence of suspicious observersif theyre clumsy enough to appear suspicious. Because these deliberate attack snipers are not committed to a particular town or neighborhood, Ive dubbed them floaters who probably are centrally controlled by regional or city-level insurgent leaders.

Targeting U.S. Snipers There can be no question that Iraqi insurgents have especially targeted U.S. snipers. Besides being the number-one priority on an Iraqi terrorist Web site (see sidebar, page 492), Amer ican sniper s are despised for their effectiveness, so detested that insurgent propaganda frequently accuses them of heinous offenses such as killing women and Muslim holy mencrimes so despicable that any punishment is justified. Though most often these are opportunistic attacks, some appear to be focused on particular U.S. snipers. On 2 September 2004, one of the U.S. Armys finest rifle shots, a Specialist 4th Class whod previously been with Ft. Bennings Marksmanship Training Unit and aspired to make the U.S. Olympic r ifle team, was ambushed near Kirkuk. After his vehicle was halted by a roadside bomb, the veteran sniper stepped from his vehicle and was shot dead by an enemy snipers bullet to his head. He was slated to return to Ft. Benning to be an instructor at the U.S. Army Sniper School. Indeed, there has been at least one incident where an American soldier was targeted for assassination and, according to the Iraqi sniper who took the shot, he was paid the equivalent of $5,000 for killing him. This same sniper was also tasked to kill a particular U.S. Army officer, which he claimed to have accomplished. There have been a number of other incidents where Marine and Army snipers have been killed by insurgent snipers, usually picked off individually while operating in support of platoons and companies. Perhaps more troubling has been the growth of larger Iraqi countersniper operations intended to wipe out entire American sniper teams. The first of these Ive come upon occurred on 18 April 2004, in the al Rashid District, near the Baghdad airport. A three-man sniper team from the 1st Cavalry Division led by 1st Lt. Eric Johnson had waited for darkness to occupy an overwatch position in a building under construction. While observing from the fourthfloor rooftop for insurgents planting bombs

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IRAQI SNIPER TARGET PRIORITIES Iraqi terrorists often communicate via the Internet, posting messages and setting up temporary Web sites to convey information. In May 2005, an Iraqi terrorist Web site suggested seven duties or target priorities for that countrys insurgent snipers. Here is a literal translation of that posting, provided by the U.S. Army: 7 Duties of a Sniper Target enemy snipers and surveillance teams. Target commanders, officers and pilots, that is, to target the head of the snake and then handicap the command of the enemy. Assist teams of mujahideen infantry with suppressive fire. These teams may include RPG brigades or surveillance teams. Target U.S. Special Forces, they are very stupid because they have a Rambo complex, thinking that they are the best in the world. Dont be arrogant like them. Engage specialty targets like communications officers to prevent calls for reinforcements. Likewise, tank crews, artillery crews, engineers, doctors, and chaplains should be fair targets. a tank driver was shot while crossing a bridge, resulting in the tank rolling off the bridge and killing the rest of the crew Killing doctors and chaplains is suggested as a means of psychological warfare Take care when targeting one or two U.S. soldiers or [Iraqi] agents on a roadside. A team of American snipers [may be] waiting for you. They [may be] waiting for you to kill one of those agents and then they will know your location and they will kill you. In the event of urban warfare, work from high areas and assist infantry with surrounding the enemy, attacking target instruments and lines of sight on large enemy vehicles, and directing mortar and rocket fire to front-line enemy positions. Marine sniper position. These four Marines, too, had been on a surveillance mission, but the aggressive attack and heavy fire was more than they could repel. The insurgent attackers stripped their bodies, then videotaped them for foreign propaganda distribution. The next such incident again took place in Ramadi on 4 November 2004. This time an eight-man Marine sniper element was crossing a darkened street at 2:30 A.M. when, with no warning, a remote-controlled bomb detonated, killing two and seriously wounding several others, including the sniper platoon sergeant. The Marines had been en route to a surveillance position.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

along nearby Highway 8, Lieutenant Johnson noticed civilian vehicles converging. Cars were pulling up without lights, scooters were coming in and out, and 20 to 30 military-aged Iraqis appeared, he recalled. As Johnson told his radioman to call for a Quick Reaction Force, the ar r iving Iraqis suddenly opened fire, attempting to overrun the snipers. Johnson was shot three timesthrough one lung, his back, and his left arm. Friendly forces arrived, compelling the attackers to withdraw. Johnson was medevacked back to the States and survived. Two months later, in Ramadi, 20 miles west of Baghdad, a similar sudden assault by two dozen insurgents succeeded in overrunning a

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enemy agents. The simplest, most The most publicized attack on reliable way for a hostile American snipers came in August intelligence service to penetrate 2005, when two Marine sniper American militar y units is to teamssix menwere ambushed dangle an English-speaking and killed near Haditha, 140 miles interpreter before them. We had 14 northwest of Baghdad. In this case Special Forces SOG teams vanish I received a copy of the terrorist behind enemy lines and another 10 videotape that recorded the overrun and annihilated, some due ambush, so I was able to derive to compromise by enemy moles. considerable detail. Initially, the Interpreters are essential, but I Marines advanced as two threeurge readers, deny interpreters man teams through head-high sand dunes, about 25 meter s Despite serious wounds, 1st advance knowledge of operations, and apart. Then an insurgent pickup Lt. Eric Johnsons sniper keep them away from operational truck rolled to a stop at a nearby team fought off mass attack- maps and planning meetings. farmhouse, apparently within sight ers in Iraq. Other teams have PASSIVE COUNTERSNIPER of the Marines, who probably did not been so fortunate. MEASURES not notice a 120mm mortar pulled out and set up. When all was ready, it appears American forces in Iraq are practicing all the that insurgent machine gun fire pinned the Marines atop a sand dune, then the mortar passive counter sniper measures cited in pounded them with high-explosive rounds until Chapter 19, plus, as fitting, those learned in all were incapacitated. Its not clear in the Sarajevo. (See sidebar, page 495.) Unlike previous conflicts, however, U.S. videotape, but I suspect a final assault by insurgents ended the fight. Later, the masked military personnel are also benefiting from body insurgents videotaped a stripped body, then laid armor that protects wearers from even the out a display of captured gear and weapons powerful 7.62x54mm sniping round. Several beneath palm trees, including two M40A4 GIs have survived solid hits from this bullet Im aware of at least threeand come away with sniper rifles. What all these incidents have in common is little more than an ugly bruise. Its heavy, its hot that they were not chance contacts. The insur- in Iraqs summer heat, but it genuinely works. Modern Kevlar helmets, too, have saved a gents executed planned attacks or ambushes and knew where the sniper teams were positioned or number of lives and have proved more effective could accurately anticipate their routes. Clearly than the old steel pot ever was. U.S. Army SSgt. Chad Chapman would have been another onethese teams were compromised. The cause could be operational security shot kill for an Iraqi sniper, but the bullet struck OPSECmeaning the Americans had his Kevlar helmet, knocking him unconscious unwittingly telegraphed their punches or with no lasting effect. At least two other GIs repeatedly used the same positions or routes. have survived similar hits to Kevlar helmets. Equally, though, the cause could have been penetration by hostile intelligence, a major ACTIVE COUNTERSNIPER MEASURES problem we faced in my old covert warfare unit, As with passive measures, U.S. forces are MACV-SOG. In the Studies and Observations Group and the 5th Special Forces Group as a employing all the active countermeasures cited whole, there was such a continuing shortage of in Chapter 19. Additionally, dismounted interpreters that Vietnamese nationals often were patrols are run through areas in which a sniper hired without proper vettingand some were could approach or stalk toward a U.S.

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Living proof that body armor works, USMC LCpl. Richard Guillenavila shows where a snipers bullet struck his protective vest.

Fragments of the 7.62x54mm bullet intended to take the life of Lance Corporal Guillenavila.

This ACOG scope saved the life of USMC Sgt. Todd Bowers by stopping a snipers bullet in Fallujah. The scope was a gift from his father.

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COUNTERSNIPING LESSONS OF SARAJEVO During much of the 1990s, the city of Sarajevo, Bosnia, was the scene of unrelenting sniping by Serbian gunmen. Hidden in carefully selected dominant terrain in the surrounding hills or inside modern concrete buildings, these concealed riflemen took an almost daily toll of men, women, and even children to challenge the division of Yugoslavia into independent states. NATO and UN forces provided security assistance, to include countersnipers, who learned much from this Riddled by sniper fire, a NATO protracted urban fight. Here are their most important lessons: vehicle is halted along a Sarajevo 1. Intelligence support is critical, to include: a. Dead Space Analysis: Tracking bullet impacts and lines of fire helped identify safe routes and hazardous ones. This analysis also provided clues to likely Serbian Final Firing Positions, which could then be intensely observed. b. Periodic Photography: Regularly photographing buildings and high ground likely to be used by Serb snipers helped detect subtle changes, such as removed windows, firing ports cut in walls, and shifted barrier materials. c. Pattern Analysis: Detailed assessment of each sniping incident contributed to a larger mosaic that provided useful clues for future sniping incidents, such as times, locations, and methods. This analysis was best accomplished by directly involving countersnipers in the process to help interpret the raw data. 2. Passive measures are as useful as active measures: a. Identify Safe Routes: Shift civilian and military traffic away from the snipers direct fire to streets and alleys and areas into which snipers cannot observe or fire. b. Install Screens to Block Sniper Observation: Along hazardous routes or locations within the snipers field of fire, erect screens to block his observation. Such screens are not ballistically protective, composed usually of canvas or plywood. c. Employ Armored Vehicles: Even lightly armored personnel carriers and fighting vehicles offered sufficient protection against sniper fire. 3. Barrier penetration is absolutely essential: a. Sniper Positions Heavily Barricaded: Serb snipers deeply embedded themselves in rubbled buildings and/or elaborately positioned concrete blocks, timbers, and sandbags around their positions. b. 7.62mm and .300 WinMag of Limited Application: Although accurately placed, counterfire shots from standard sniper rifles often could not penetrate wellconstructed Serbian firing positions. However, accurate fire usually had a suppressing effect. c. Need for Overmatching: Only heavy rifles.338 Lapua Magnum and .50-caliber riflescould penetrate Serb barriers with reasonable consistency. d. Rifle Weight and Bulk Matters: Many NATO countersnipers preferred the .338 Lapua Magnum over the .50-cal. because it was lighter and easier to manipulate while climbing, running, and stalking.
street.

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installation, while dominating terrain is denied enemy snipers by occupying it or keeping it under surveillance. Much more so than the past, surveillance has become aerial. Both the Army and Marines are employing small unmanned aerial vehicles UAVsto search rooftops and likely sniper positions. The scale of this effort is astounding more than 1,000 UAVs are currently in use in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the U.S. Defense Department, looking for roadside bombs, snipers, and a host of other threats. Despite all these roving eyes in the sky, however, most countersniper engagements still result from the tried and trueU.S. snipers intensely surveilling for their Iraqi foes. Ive

U.S. Marines ready an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) in Fallujah to fly reconnaissance in support of the Marine assault and to watch rooftops for Iraqi snipers.

To obscure sniper observation, U.S. Marines in Ramadi burn a large smoke bomb.

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With a SAW machine gunner alert to return fire, a Marine raises a dummy head to attract sniper fire in Fallujah.

Hoping to attract a hidden snipers shot, a U.S. Army sniper raises a cleverly designed decoy head in Iraq. (Note .50-caliber sniper rifle in background.)

been quite impressed by the quality of lures and decoys fashioned by American countersnipers, as good as those waved over the trenches in World War I to attract fire from Hun sharpshooters. And the same old-fashioned techniques still work. A 1st Cavalry Division sniper, SSgt. Jeff Young, exploited the shifting rays of the setting sun to pinpoint an Iraqi sniper. We got lucky when the sun was going down, he told Stars and Stripes. It hit his scope at the right angle and we got a glare in our direction so we engaged it. Another Army sniper, Sgt. Randall Davis, twice defeated opposing snipers, engaging them from a rooftop in Samarra. Firing an M25 Designated Marksman Rifle, he patiently outwaited an Iraqi sniper who had fired on Americans three days earlier. When the Iraqi finally reappeared, Davis keen eyes picked him out of the shadows where he stalked. As the Iraqi raised up to fire his SVD rifle, one shot from Davis and it was over. In the second case, Davis eliminated an Iraqi sniper with a 750yard shot with a Barrett .50-caliber M107, thanks to his teams high-quality optics.

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technology employs a number of sensitive microphones linked to a computer, which pinpoint a muzzle blast by multiple reverse azimuths. Posted discreetly on buildings and light poles, these wireless, cigarette pack-size sensors hear the shot, then relay it to the computer, which instantly compares all these versions of the sound to calculate where the shot or ig inated. The principle is the same as the crack-bang technique discussed in Chapter 19timing the difference between USMC Abrams tanks blast an insurgent snipers position in Fallujah. hearing a bullets crack and the bang of its muzzle Marine snipers, too, have taken their toll of blast. Linked to a GPS, the computer precisely Iraqi gunmen. In Fallujah, Sgt. Sean Crane calculates data from several sensor locations, detected an Iraqi creeping along a rooftop, then then spits out a fairly exact location. saw him slide down a palm tree and pause for Originally developed to fingerprint Soviet his rifle to be handed down to him. From more submarines entering the North Atlantic by than two blocks away, Cranes shot hit the analyzing the cavitation noise of their Iraqis leg, then an immediate follow-up shot propellers, accoustic signature technology is dropped him. Scratch one Iraqi gunman, the damned impressivebut Im skeptical about Marines 11th kill. how well its current configuration will perform Its that kind of steady, patient, meticulous, real-world. In the midst of heavy fighting in day-in/day-out effort thats necessary to win the Fallujah, can it single out one snipers muzzle sniper war in Iraq. blast? Will it merely cause snipers to become shoot-and-scoot practitioners who displace so HIGH TECHNOLOGY IN quickly that theyre gone before theres time for THE COUNTERSNIPER FIGHT counteraction? An earlier acoustic gunfire sensor system, developed by Honeywell, was The countersniper fight can be assisted by tested a decade ago in Atlanta during the 1996 some surprisingly advanced technologies, Olympicsand it was already claimed that it though its still too early to estimate their worked. If it was truly effective, wed see it potential contribution in Iraq. heavily employed in Iraq, and it hasnt been. I Countersniping involves two sequential suspect that despite earlier claims, its still in steps: first, find the sniper; second, engage him. development and probably is being further Each step is now being addressed by cutting- tested, perhaps on a discreet basis in Iraq. edge devices. The other major sensing technology does The first step, finding the sniper, uses work and actually has a deployable system. The sensing technologies that either acoustically USAF BOSSBattlefield Optical Surveillance locate his rifles muzzle blast or acquire a Systemis the latest evolution of a laser-based reflection off his optics. Acoustic-signature acquisition technology that I first heard about

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Vehicles, which a manual noted can be set to scan a specific sector and then [automatically] engage and neutralize all telescopes and night vision devices it detects. After careful reconsideration, the U.S. government decided not to deploy a weapon that inflicted casualties by blinding enemy soldiers. (An opinion I share.) Thus, todays BOSS offers the detection and acquisition capabilities but not the blinding laserand that, alone, can be quite useful. As now mounted on a HMMWV, the system is too bulky and heavy to achieve much in most Iraqi neighborhoods, but a more por table ver sion installed on rooftops or perhaps towers could have some usefulness. The director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Dr. Anthony Tether, in announcing that laser-based antisniper systems were deploying to Iraq, realistically assessed their effectiveness. Theyre not going to be 100 percent solutions, he said, but when youre in a situation where you have no solutions, even a 25 percent solution is going to be great. Indeed, before you get too enthused, keep in mind that this technology detects optical reflections, not snipers. In a major urban area youd still have to determine what exactly the BOSS detectedan Iraqi kid playing with a kaleidoscope, a pretty girl looking at her face in a makeup compact, or an SVD-armed sniper aiming at you. The next generation of gunfire-detection technology offers considerably improved capabilities, with IR sensors that literally track a bullets flight and special laser radars that read atmospheric pressure disturbances created by a bullets passage. Both the Army and Marine Corps have USAF BOSS (Battlefield Optical Surveillance System), a mobile countersniper prototypes that incorporate these technologies, in tandem system, uses a laser to detect and illuminate hostile snipers. some 20 years ago, when the Soviet Union was developing a similar system. Just as radar operates by emitting a radio wave that reflects back to disclose an aircraft, the BOSS emits a brilliant flash of laser light that reflects off any optical lensa rifle scope, spotting scope, night vision goggle, antitank weapon sight, etc. A BOSS sensor detects this reflection, then pinpoints its location by computer analysis. Instead of just relaying this location, the BOSS takes the further step of automatically directing a visible laser beam to the spot to designate a threatening individual. Although the official BOSS description correctly notes that this laser will not harm eyes, in fact, similar U.S. and Soviet devices developed in the 1990s were not only capable of that but were intended to detect and neutralize a snipers optics meaning his eyesight. More por table ver sions of this laser neutralizing devicethe U.S. Armys Stingray and LCMS (Laser Countermeasure System)were so close to fielding in 1995 that they were addressed in a U.S. Army field manual. This technology is more advanced than most people realize, for Stingray already had been installed in some Bradley Fighting

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From a laptop computer inside this HMMWV, a Marine can so precisely control the TRAP 250s .50-caliber that he can hit a soda can at 100 meters.

with acoustic sensors and GPS locators. The Army Research Laboratory is even installing these countersniper systems on small radiocontrolled robots, and Id speculate that helicopter-mounted ones arent long in the future. Some of these prototypes probably will find their way to Iraq. High-Tech Engagements Something thats here r ight now and deployed to Iraq in 2005 is a very capable, remote-controlled firing unit for optically equipped r ifles, including the USMCs Designated Marksman Rifle, the Stoner SR-25, and the Barrett .50 caliber. Manufactured by Precision Remotes, the TRAP 250 System incorporates a stabilized cradle and video link that allows a remote operator to minutely

The TRAP 250 laptop computer view through a Unertl scope, with video zoomed to 80x.

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USMC Designated Marksman Rifle atop a Force Protection Cougar vehicle. The TRAP 250 System also can be pintlemounted or installed on a standard machine gun tripod.

manipulate the rifle and aim with impressive precision using an ordinary laptop computer. The TRAP 250s cradle is compatible with standard U.S. military pintle mounts as well as machine gun tripods, allowing it to be ground- or vehicle-mounted. Its sensitive, micrometer-like adjustments and 0.1 MOA resolution allow the operator to place a shot with considerable accuracy. During demonstrations, the company consistently shoots soda cans at 100 meters with the unit. Already the TRAP 250 has seen combat service with explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, where its precision fire has disabled Iraq mines. The USMC has a newer version that mounts atop the Force Protection Cougar vehicle, while the U.S. Army has incorporated it

on a remote-controlled robot under the SWORDS (Special Weapons Obser vation Reconnaissance Detection System) program. A number of SWORDS units have just deployed to Iraq, where theyll be tested in the most unforgiving environment of allreal combat. The day will come, I am sure, when all these sensing and acquisition and firing systems will be integrated, but I think they will supplementnot replacethe human countersniper. Because, always remember, the enemy sniper is a living, breathing, thinking human who will adapt to chang ing situations and new technologies. Ultimately, it will take another living, breathing, thinking human to outwit and eliminate him: you, the countersniper.