NOTES ON CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY II: FROM HUSSERL TO DERRIDA

Jayson C. Jimenez Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy 3-1

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EDMUND HUSSERL
On Method toward the Artificiality

he Husserlian Phenomenology speaks of a possibility of a selfless determination: in a way appeared unfinished in his later work as Empathy (by which his student Edith Stein expounded more as care and empathy). The Transcendental ego is close to the Buddhist term of sunyatta, the empty being or in Husserls own term, presuppositionless-presupposition. The term is quite in face of the contradiction to which will further explain Husserls contention on emphatic relationship of the Transcendental Ego. He decentered the Naturalistic Method by replacing via Phenomenological Method whereby the acceptance of the world as it is in the former is being replaced by phenomenological doubt of the latter. The replacement of the naturalistic method guaranteed a new approach in philosophic tradition (that seems to be deluded with metaphysical possibilities of the unfathomable x) in light of giving relevance to the object themselves not on the metaphysical things-in-themselves. What Husserl wanted to expose is the incurability of the Cartesian Cogito (I think) in the foreplay of things because there is a presupposition of an objective world or an objective self-capable of momentarily intuiting or certitude meanwhile for Husserl, he advanced the possibility of lived experience to which phenomena should be held into the limelight. For Descartes, the self (cogito) should be the starting point but for Husserl (as able representatives of Phenomenologists) the object should be the starting foundation (ego cogito cogitatum). The selfless-self is the eidos that emanates from presuppositions thru the method of phenomenological reduction or what known us the epoche. The reduction paves way for uncovering the real essence of things out of the veils of the phenomenon. Thus, Phenomenology is like an archeology that discovers and uncovers things until finding out the essences of things in the first place. Phenomenological reduction will result to residuum in terms of consciousness (some say its God). This is an artificial consciousness (because of the humanistic tendencies to perform such reduction which is non-natural in the first place) known to Husserlian Philosophy as the Pure Ego (that is, pure essence). The phenomenological project speaks thereof about the networks of Pure Egos thus bridging it will constantly make a web of computational beings capable of understanding each algorithms since a all pretenses undergone a re-programming or uploading. This Pure Ego insofar is emphatic to other Egos for the merit of selfless understanding among things. Empathy is simply an attempt far more irreducible to the extent of being a communist subject who understand the self then other self or other-other-self (apart from you) totally as beings of non-fixity otherwise a continuity of unveiling the secrets of reality.

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MARTIN HEIDEGGER
On Limit and Boundary of Philosophy

his reflection of Heidegger thought briefly of my present understanding of the philosopher is a perfect enunciation of his complicated and questionable system of founding his philosophic tradition. Martin Heidegger was skillful in weaving words that outlast my tireless imaginings to which one example is the end of philosophy. This end of philosophy was a gossip subject to validation when Heidegger rose from his tomb. It is not teleological. According to Heidegger, it is a completion (Vollendung) or a gathering to some extent of a singular universal subject, that is, Life itself. The end of Philosophy is also the end of Metaphysics which is a question of nothing or the forgotten-ness of the Being. This forgotten-ness is simply a murder of the ontological difference between Being and beings. For the entire history, we understood the Being of beings not the Being of the Being itself. In one of his seminars, he defined the ontological as onto-theo-logic in terms of its danger in Thinking represents Being in the horizon of metaphysics as being. However, there are contentions of Heidegger that Being is absent not of a Hegelian actualisation of a potential germ. In What is Metaphysics, the question of Metaphysics became a question of nothing (nihilism). This is an effort that help to reveal the true face of the Being concealed by the veils of ignorance. The concealment-unconcealment is an attempt, at least, that will cater Truth regarding the Being, that is, the Non-truth. This non-truth is the most common interpretation this paradox such that a grasp of reality is in the view. As Heraclitus would mention, Nature loves to hide. We hide no truths. This is a stepping stone for nihilism to come for Heidegger in which the question of nothing, through metaphysics should be answered. Heidegger, indeed, let the Being roll (seinlassen). While It gives, the possible unconcealing the truth henceforward shows the capability of Being to deconstruct (or for Heidegger, overcoming) Metaphysics via aleithea. This profound view helped the context of Being differs from beings. Thinking should come henceforward. Thinking is an effort to start a new place after an end. What lies ahead, he would have asked. He wanted to set philosophy into a new direction that will forge an invisible hand for humanity in coping the everydayness. What calls for us is to anticipate the end and welcome the new perspective through which we will all philosophize, that is, in veils of its opposite here paradox in the human decisions seems implausible. This context is often treated to the possibility of returning the Being to itself and honestly reifies its stature to its fixity. Thus, the merit of the Being is to differentiate itself from all beings: from the fathom of exact computation of logic and exact thinking.

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LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN
On Cure of Philosophy

he project of Wittgenstein is to clear the ruins of old Philosophy then establish a monolithic structure of Philosophy which will serve the right term of knowing and non-confusion of thoughts. This is a cure to the diseases of Western thought. Diseases that become endemic to that hemisphere since the time of Plato until Nietzsche whose thoughts refer to metaphysicality of things beyond the expectations of the human everydayness. In other words, for Wittgenstein, he regarded metaphysics in terms of its expressible language to the human kind) as a patient (rather than a criminal) whose matter chiefly concerns the public regarding the arising-confusion and lack of clarity by metaphysics. Heretofore, he regarded Philosophy as a therapy to the symptom of the mental illness of metaphysics that gives abstract answers to questions pre-supposed by man. Philosophy in his view was not designed to solve existing problems otherwise dissolve it. He saw language that briefly involves itself to the workings of everyday such that it is too busy to be in trouble. However, according to him, language sometimes goes into holiday and idle talk (in Heideggers standpoint) arise (philosophical problems in terms of mis-communications). Henceforth, Wittgenstein wanted to propose a cure to bring language to the ball game where its usual use should be in the stream (in Philosophical Wittgenstein). This game concerns mainly logic and other sciences that use language in its exactness where frames prevents vagueness. Wittgenstein wants a community of full understanding (a public world) that through language one would not put violence to other (via miscommunication). This frames shapes the forms of life which for Wittgenstein shapes the very foundation of a new philosophy (that may follow Francois Laruelles notion of non-philosophy because philosophy became deluded with dreams and expectations until an explosion should be held into account by most philosophers as soon as possible. I think non-philosophical discourse would be a therapeutic subject in terms that philosophy will never unchain itself to the irregularities of metaphysics or it could be another solution that it may determine the exact metaphysics. One is clear and distinct for Wittgenstein: that a problem shouldnt be solved otherwise dissolved. And dissolving philosophy would not advocate establishing it in its own X, however in a new form of Y). For the most part philosophy played its role to cure itself however incurability is sure in such times that it is delusional. Philosophy needs not itself to be a therapist. It needs an other (non-philosophy) whose expertise in analysing language is definitely able. Let philosophy talk and talk and talk. And in such analysis, a cure can be found.

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HANS-GEORG GADAMER
A Dialogic Interconnection and Cellular Community

or a man who lived for a century, became a student and teachers of various thinkers in history, Hans Georg Gadamer extraordinarily devised a field of philosophical thinking enmeshed with the idea of understanding, just a right understanding prior to and situative ontology or prior to any hermeneutical situatedness. This situatedness is a precursor to any forms of understanding to which common errors, mistakes and vagueness occurs to all participants and partners of a certain conversation. The ontological mode understanding is a laying bare of the structure in a conversation. From Heideggers ontology of concealment and un-concealment as complete paradox of truth and subjectivity, Gadamer wanted to interpret the unconcealment process of un-veiling the Truth as clearing all mental doubts and vagueness in any hermeneutic processes like reading or just simply having a coffee conversation. Particularly in his reaction to Heideggers Origin of the Work of Art, Gadamer thought of unconcealing Art (as for Truth) through a concept of play which underlies the basic ontological structure of conversing facts to reveal the truth meaninga careful dialogue to display the Understanding. This understanding performed by linguistic intercourse and dialogue meant to fuse several horizons which he called fusion of horizon. One thing is noticeably to this philosophy, this horizon is an axis (unlike in the phenomenology) where all points meet, it is an experience that de-subjectify all occurrences of false subjectivity (like the Cartesian Cogitos solipsism). Entering a dialogue insofar as Gadamers contention is concerned, will eradicate vague notions to a certain issue. It is not on a partners dominance that dictates the process of conversation but the issue or the matter itself (as it is guided by culture, good sense, judgment and taste) that clearly defines a specific dialogues conclusions. A dialogue is an exchange of symbolic messages that aimed at being deciphered by a conversant particularly extracting the essence of the meaning. As far as it is symbolize, it is a language that makes the message understood. However, Gadamer, did not agree (like Wittgenstein) to a private language instead we are being in language (like Heideggers words in the Letter on Humanism, Language is the house of Being). The discourse of the private language is an elitist one, for which even the discourse is a hype and a solution should be on the accord of having it universalized. Language is a universal hermeneutic experience. It involves the world and the whole community. In a nutshell, Gadamers project posed a forthcoming view of a cellular community that each functions is well-run by common understanding. It is on that cellular community to invent a language that will make the world well or enhance the present language but at least they should have in mind the presence of a world enmeshed with subjects of interconnectedness.

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HENRI BERGSON
Intuition and Evolution

nowledge is powera diminutive statement and yet with a loftier value over the system of philosophy. For the French philosopher Henri Bergson, knowledge is something that varies or for the most part can be perceived in various angles depending on the status of the observer to a certain degree of the given referential point. Evolution permits the perusal of such knowing. (Perusal in shades of a vital impulse that drives the whole mechanism of evolution). What can I perceive in this manner of exploration is that we are being shaped by two forces that decide and instigate the path toward a kingdom where God manifests itself. Darwinian evolution is a non-obliteration of the species. Given that some species varies from one form to another, their distinctness is not pre-determined as supposed by Christianity. However, Bergson went to the contrary. Indeed, he elaborated the existence of a vital impulse that drives the development of different species. This vital impulse determines what to do. It is a-rational. It is distinctively non-corporated to reason and its all forms. It is something that cannot be explained. How does one know? Knowing is a matter of intuition according to Bergson (which is sometimes true in process of guesting an immediate answer from the up-to-date gossips). Knowing is intuitive. Therefore intuition is power. Intuition understands the essence of things, free from all presuppositions of all machinated element of the sense. It is a bridge to all forms of knowledge by which human is an immediate and fixed observer. Intuition can differentiate several instance of duration (becoming) to which intellect cannot perceive. Intuition transcends the flow of conscious time (internal time consciousness in Husserlian Phenomenology) to which time does not know itself objectively. In such time that intuition tends to create its own concept of time, that is, the intuitive-self-conscious-time. By this thing, nothing is determined. Evolution is an open door. By evolution, Bergson wanted to stress the flow of morality and religion in sphere of the evolutionary world. Intellect only knows the first instances of any events (particular spatio-temporal durations like in reason) however intuition guarantees a rich emotional power, deprived of rationality. Morality is something that is being intuited (e.g. Humes approach) but on the other hand, Bergson means intuition as a direct route not from the heart but from the mental positioning in place of the object (one-ness with the object). Bergson has a say on the demands of the non-rationality of the contemporary philosophy but he insists the demand for a creative power where intuition plays a major role, to intuit the existence of God, the Morality and Religion as mutual source of understanding and completion.

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JOHN DEWEY
On Thinking and Artificiality of the Human Experiences

owards a reconstructed philosophy, John Dewey in some way has a semblance on Heideggers declaration of the end of philosophy in terms of valuing the neardeath of traditional metaphysics which succumbs to the idea of exaggeration of its theses. Like Wittgenstein, Dewey regarded philosophy in its symptoma mental illness which even Nietzsche pointed out as superstition and myth. Philosophy should seek for its practicality. A practical philosophy anchored in the promise of evolution whereby it sees man as biological organism that is capable of coping to the environment e.g. human intelligence with the aid of experience (occurring in habit and impulses) not in foundations of presume stories and fecundity of mind. He employed experience as a purpose of connecting dynamic biological organisms to the precarious environment in terms of survival and definite human cognition. He regarded philosophy in the traditional sense and in Bergsonian senseimpossible. This calls for a new philosophy that aims to save mankind from ignorance, and ambiguity. Both Heidegger and Dewey called Thinking as an entity that is not private to men but able to concentrate to the start of a new philosophy. For Dewey Thinking is an active intelligence, both doing and thinking. Thus, it is a cognitive act (for Dewey, it is an event) that is an instrument in solving problems raised by philosophy (instrumentalism). What calls for thinking is intelligence. Therefore, Thinking is also an activity that helps individuals to adjust in a dangerous environment. This Thinking and Intelligence could trace its origin from habits and impulses. These make Deweys work evolutionary and somewhat post-contemporary. Since intelligence comprises interconnected habits coming from impulses, the product of these interwoven process is experience. Intelligence, hence, is not naturally given to men. It is a by-product of experience artificially acquired by human to the environment they belong. They are capable of thinking and out of experienced impulses they will create objects that initiate development and evolution to the human race. Education is a form of thinking. Dewey advocated a reform in education that will inform the young of good unified communities (for there is no single community). It will remold the society and delete all bad habits (e.g. corruption). However, this education is experimental in a sense of its instrumentality and possible margin of errors. There is no perfect instrument that becomes successful on the first try. This much saying of going back to the core sciences in giving the society a practical philosophy. This is not greatly in connection to the post-singularity discourse, but Dewey has a gigantic say in the practicality of life in terms of ending the traditional philosophy (not off-putting, I guess) through claiming that we are practical subjects and our intelligence (through experience) is artificially acquired. The only thing needed is for him to claim with a sober voice, We are artificial intelligent beings.

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ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

Mysticism of Philosophy

ndoubtedly, Whiteheads philosophy lineate to the mystical tradition of a new metaphysics purely inclined to mathematics between the self and the universe. He was chiefly concerned to the ongoing search for the pattern of the universe where this search is called Philosophy. This pattern is a categoreal scheme which carefully relates man to the universe in an harmonious relationship. With this harmony in mind, Whitehead aims to have reconciliation to all things surrounded to us in such a way (a Bergsonian intuition might be a key) faith and imagination plays a major role. The universe, for Whitehead is the Being itself which he called God. Unlike Kierkegaards leap of faith, he wanted to eradicate the abyss or gap between the self and the God/universe so that an existential leap is not required however, in terms of imagination, a function which he greatly advocates, Whitehead wanted to perform a mental function which will basically entails a form of Faith.

In relation, for Whitehead the universe and man are overlapping fields which provoke oneness in nature. Imagination is the overlapping part. It is a betwixt in this relationship of man to the eternal idea where the Grand Choice takes place. There is a systematic interconnections guided by faith. However, even the proposed categoreal scheme is empirical in nature (meaning, speculative philosophy), there should be a firsthand role of imagination. It is like a poetic insight of a particular case where the factors can psychically be examined whenever facts missed the point. Any events, according to Whitehead are a unit of natural occurrences. It is on a mans bodily standpoint where an event can be recorded in reference of an object. This concept strikes to me like a relation of the body to all things in respect of the universe where man and all things are inclusion. Somehow this idea describes universe in many faces in respect to a particular standpoint of the I. It spells a dual-Copernican Revolution, two-overlapping universes that both possess a foci of the self where the observation took place. Whiteheads mysticism is in the very idea of the relation of man to the universe in terms of imaginative course. This imagination helps to understand every event possibly where eternal objects are involve. These eternal objects are nonspatio-temporal objects. Whiteheads eternal objects resemble the Platonic Forms where they are uncreated but eternally fixed. This eternal objects are belong to God, the limitation of all possibilities meaning, the end. Whitehead fell on the chasm of speculative philosophy, of metaphysics that clearly paved way for his mystic interpretations of philosophy. This mysticism, however, is his method to closely understand the self and the universe we are interacting with. Metaphysics has been killed in the contemporary thought, but its defenders, e.g. Whitehead seek to revive metaphysics in terms of a meta-metaphysical scheme that shall never be an imagination in eternity.

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GILLES DELEUZE
On Machination of Life

he cinematic experience of life utters the momentary events that man should suppose, especially on uttering the most Deleuzian statement on the continental traditionI am a Machine. Machine is not signifier for life. For Deleuze, Life itself is machinenote solely resting on bolts and nutsbut on the untimely spectacle of events that rigidly performs a function when become singular to other machineries. In other words, it is an interconnected Life-World of different intelligences, bounded by spatio-temporal adherences so as to become a becoming. Becoming in a sense like a cinema where the end is unpredictable (not because of movements but by time-images e.g. in the movie Memento). Striving for life sees no end. It is a continuous process of seeking for an endless horizon. The only way to become active is thinking the possibilities of a return or for Deleuze, a repetition that will take another form of imagery. Therefore, life is a machinic becoming The becoming of images is no less than likewise to producing virtual entities that is nearly-identical to the actual beings. These virtual images are are mere potentialities. However, we do not see such becoming/potentialities into view. We are only capable of seeing created being and imagination tends to work after (like watching movies that our imagination tends to simulate the next scene however, it is not yet the actual scene.). Thus, only simulations takes place, or for the more correct term, a simulacra. Everything is a simulacrum. It became a representation or virtual image of things as we perceive them. We see things not actually but virtually, meaning undergone several transformations in mental activity or in other words, simulations. Henceforth, life is not only machinic (actual) but also a simulated (virtual) in some form. What we simulate is the actual-to-come for humanity. Therefore, it is necessarily to deduct reality in terms of the exact judgment of virtual-actual correlation. Such that the performativity function lies in the present visible computation and the future non-visible computation of what is to come. Simulation happens whenever there is a attempt of escape from the present computation. Such that avoiding the usual reflexivity of time (thus making the machine untimely) and deterritorialising the event (the present visible-computation). Virtual Reality as what Ray Kurzweil mentioned will create a way where real is indistinguishable from the fake-image. Even travel simulation can be faked through nanotechnology. Nonetheless, for Deleuze, theres no need for any distinction such that mind is capable of creating a non-distinction; in other words it is what the futuristic Kurzweil lacks in the fundamental ontology of Deleuzes philosophy, that is, we are beings capable of cinematic roles in seeing future-in-itself, that we are machines-in-itself.

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EMMANUEL LEVINAS
I, Other, Third

isquietedness to the other provokes relationship. Loving the other is another. Why we see the Other as as mysterious rather than the usual embodied consciousness that we interact more often in functions of everyday? Other is vague, obscure and deeply anonymous. For Levinas, the Other is Infinity, what that cannot be satisfied nor at least fill in. The Other is your neighbor, your proximal responsibility in times of cataclysm. The I remain distant to Othera face that usually we are attracted or in some literature one feels disgusts. We tend to see the Other in its most sordid veils of murderers, rapists, abusers and most likely sinful. Nonetheless, why we see a responsibility for the Others survival? My relationship to the Other invokes a face-to-face relation not exactly on the premise of a masculine-feminine bond but on the erotic fecundity on matters of touch and sort of grasp. However this touch and grasp is a paradox in the Others face. This other is a Beloved (in Levinisian standpoint) that is, fragile, graspable, touchable, vulnerable or more precisely virginal to which every I should handle with care. Love is something that represents the femininity, so flimsy that even a tap (of a third term) could easily shatter. All assumptions that I-Other relationship is a love relationship (for Levinas). Or for more intense term, a sexual relation that permits a constant touch to every parts of the body that will permit a further chance or a realization for Others relevance. The Face-to-face bound will promote nihilism in true facts of two individuals becoming autistic to each others desire. Thus, sex should not be on the premise otherwise on the conclusion. Prolong touch (sex) I presume for the most part that an intervention will be always in the accord in face of the Third. This Third is another infinity to which the I-Other has a responsibility, a moral responsibility either in shades of the humanity or any collectivity to which a connection matter most. The Third permits a new relationship in terms of Friendship that will break the autism of two loving individuals. Is the other the Feminine? How about the Third? The answer to the former question is absolutely yes. The feminine alterity welcomes the intimacy of the same. She is hospitable, kind and well-hearted but behind such face is the ambiguous cameo where one easily does not dare to explore. The later speaks of anything either a thing, a sex or humanity to which will cater a necessary intervention to the I-Other bondage. The Third can be a father or a mother (who intervenes when there is a non-equal love relationship) or a child in terms of a Family (to which Levinas advocated the use of sex that is, establishing a family). For me, there is always two kinds of interventions: the Pre-Third (in case of parents, friends or any objects that became a pre-cursor of any relationships) and the Post-Third (usually the consequence or fruition of relationships). The marvel of Family as Levinas would call it encapsulates the transcendence. This family is an ethical unity which represents a primary sociality. What if the Other dies? For Levinas, if the death of the Other is seen, the Same also dies. For me, as a reader of Levinas, this death will entails a justice to come, a right time for measurement, comprehension and comparison of what the sexes done in the eyes of usthe Third.

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SIGMUND FREUD
The Talking Cure

y reading of Freud is a kind of repression to which the unconscious serves the locket full of unsaid and un-thought. Freud was a scientist, a therapist but his works implicated into several variations that became a preface in the field of Psycho-analysis. He is a man full of ambition and reverie on the status of this new form of science that help understand the domain of the unknown (as it is hidden to nothing). Thus, in my own sight, Psycho-analysis performs the greatest position in history, as a non-philosophical method. Why is it that I distinguished psycho-analysis from philosophy? Isnt that the former is brought to the latter or to put it in this way, the former was a product of the latter? One thing is sure for Freud, that both methods seek for the understanding of the Unconscious (hence, Psycho-analysis) and Absolute (hence, Philosophy). The remnants of the day auspiciously points psycho-analysis a cure (like Wittgenstein) to the endemic of Philosophical dreaming. For Freud, this field aims to erase the mental clouds that surround the conscious thinking of a patient. Mental clouds prevent the light to penetrate the consciousness, thus bringing you ignorance. Freud wanted to save mankind. The patient itself is the humanity. He wanted to cure the elitism and oblivion of philosophy in terms of creating a self-modeled world and mirroring itself to his identical (and yet corrupted) formation. This should be repressed then if possible, killed. Like Wittgenstein, he wanted to emphasize language as bridge to this feud of philosophy. Analyze every events, facts and evidences that forms a mental cloud until all was clear. Freud wanted to make things clear. However, he has an assumption of the Unconscious which is the venue of the repressed desires. The unconscious is like noumena however it is in linguistic arena (though unknown, the analyst is trying to interpret unconscious in language)this place for reservation of what is repressed. Is it possible that this unconscious that all we should be conscious of? To unlock problems that once haunts the nightmare of the humanity? Akin to something that helps to explains the interconnectedness of scenarios to identify the larger picture of a large philosophical puzzle? Psycho-analysis faced its grandest enemies during its flourishing. Freud defended this field to the extent that it will help mankind to discern the problem of every individual especially when it is connected to sexuality. Psycho-analysis is mainly a field that connects to sexuality however; the Lacanian Psychoanalysis shifted that concern and investigates the Freudian Thing, which marked Lacans return to Freud in his intellectual biography. The id is something that one must follow, in order to satisfy his/her desires. If not, a repression occurs and it will sublimate to the Unconscious but a return is sure to come.

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JACQUES LACAN
On Virtuality of the Other

he vuoi? What do you want? Jacques Lacan speaks. The repression of the id chiefly concerns the further possible return or in the Lacanian sense, subjectification of the repressed-subject so as to traverse the fantasy that underscores the symbolisation and recurrence of endless signification in the society. The subject is a supposed-to-know subject turned into Zizekian ontology a supposed-tobelieve subject. The so-called return reifies the fundamental ontological lack of being which is for me: a way to satisfy the mental obsession in the metaphorical sense of the Night (in German Idealism, Night is a metaphor of the core of the subjectivity by which Darkness is opaque) in the Kantian Universe. The traverse from the know to believe is a way to condone the discovery of the Other, a task that an analyst (as a subject) should perform. More often than not, the interpassive subject is never new to Lacan. He briefly explains the status of the Subject in terms of a spectator watching a Greek drama and a Chorus in the stage do the commentary (as such cries, woes, anger and praise) to a particular scene. The Chorus is a resonance of a social commentary by which the spectator should do; however, latter was repressed from doing so for some reason (theater rules) so he became a passive spectator and the other (Chorus) does the job for him. It is best explains in the context of the interactivity and it uncanny double, inter-passivity. The former involves a spectator who no longer stares at the screen (television) but actively enters the dialogic relationships through Virtual Community (like commenting on the latest threads in for the recent spectacle of Facebook-ing). On the other hand, the interpassive subject is being deprived of the object. Likewise, the object enjoys itself for the subject. One good example is saving a film to your flash disc. You dont have to watch the television for the computer is doing the task of storing your film for you (subject). The feeling that the movie is your video library satisfies you. Or in other example say, in pornography the couple is enjoying (objects) while you is not only doing it (watching) for solitary masturbation but you enjoy it that action takes place in behalf of me. What heretofore made the inter-passive subject excites? Or in other terms, who is the sole enjoyer of reading the latest threads in the cyberspace? For Lacan, the subject is happy through the Other. The Othersuspiciously reads, laughs, discovers, praise, and enjoys the doings of the subject with respect to the object. The big Other therefore opens the logic gates for the subject to enter and enjoy the rest of the spectacle of the cyberspace without subjectifying the intense drama of the real space and time consciousness. Thus, one avertedly transforms the spatio-temporal consciousness (reality) into a cyber-Real (for which Lacan comment on the outset or avoidance) consciousness by merely waking up to the gross dream. In other words, technology plays as the Other and the politicising arena for virtual formation of subjects as extension of our selves. The return thus, is a return into a new form to which the subject became a non-subject, that is, virtual.

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MICHEL FOUCAULT
On Panopticism and Invisible Mechanism

Disciplined societyincorporated by punishment (an invisible computational mechanism), a power, a knowledge rooted from history and superficially nonresistant agentsis a society dreamt by Foucault as he entailed historical conditions where we have gone-by; adding to the list is the possible make-up of the future history in the societys sojourn towards development. This form of society passed through ages. From the deep ancient society up to the contemporary social community (where networking sites and other virtual spaces are being used), the structure and power relations (and even biopowers, in case of LGBT) of the society differs, if not, static in a way that there is radicalization at certain amount. For example, before there is a high-cost of punishment but today it gets even higher in terms of pharmaceutical substance (in case of lethal injection). The more humane act of punishment, the higher cost it would be. This must be the episteme that should be into consideration whenever power is being thought in a particular discourse. Power is not a possession, otherwise a strategy that one should be playing into. In a society of superiority, power-knowledge is plausible. The one, who controls the power, controls the history and even controls the knowledge or discourse. Thus, Power-knowledge is viable in a disciplined society. The sustenance of a disciplined society is possible. From the inhumane torture of the 18th Century (while in Victorian era where homosexuality went underground because of punishment by the Monarchy), Panopticism was applied by Foucault that he saw as an economic, and powerful instrument to sustain the quest for a society he dreamt. Panopticon is the instance of an eye of the power. It is a guardian of every individuals in the society, reducing us to a possibility of becoming prisoners for the common good. We are afraid of the Panopticon. Is it existent? No. but on the basis of its instruments like signs, cameras or mere anxiety makes it a being. It is an invisible computational mechanism that reminds man that someone is here, watching you. Like George Orwells 1984, panopticon took the gender of a Big Brother (or for Lacan a Big Other which constantly haunt us or remind us of our unconscious desires), the guardian of a totalitarian society (opposite of Foucaults). Panopticon is invisible to us, it is like a specter that lingers to our skin, create an itch or a wound and somehow the only thing we can reply is to shout, scratch or react. It is being used to promote morality and ethical conduct especially on schools, hospitals, supermarkets and factories. By mere presence of us seeking for a hollow creature do make us a victim of this Panopticon. The only thing we could do is to stare at our back and check, but like most horror movies, nothing is out there. Thus, when we are anxious, we know how to be silent.

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JACQUES DERRIDA
On Poematic Experience of the Impossible

L
[Futile]

avenir. To come. It is sufficient to describe, at least, the method of Jacques Derrida in his Deconstructiona method not likewise of skeptic philosophic tradition but of humankind. To write further is anti-deconstructive. So writing after this text seems to be futile.

As Derrida puts it, Deconstruction never proceeds without love. Differance, supplement, and Deconstruction, all proceeding from the same direction so as to describe a gift, a mere interwoven-words (poem) to which the question further asked, To whom shall it be given? What deconstruction wants is not easy to tell. Deconstruction cannot even deconstruct itself. In some reading seminar, Deconstruction is justice. Or for the contrary! Deconstruction I the condition of necessary possibility that will in itself be impossible. Its unrecognizable and if recognizedit is totally deconstructed. Moreover, Derrida was saying that deconstruction is a gift, a poematic experience of giving in which the gift is not entitled for symbolic recognition for it will lose the mere presence as a gift. You are only permitted to give a promise for recognition, that is, to come. In writing a poem for example, Derrida lamented the very fact that it should be dictated by the heart, a demonstration of the demons-playing-in-the-heart. The poem, like deconstruction, is the impossible experience apocalyptic desire. Barren from us to presently indulge, poem is a break to poetry itselfa preparation for a gift to comea mere deconstruction of the structure of the poetics. Somehow, the gift to come should not appear as gratification of both parties, either the recipient or the giver. Like poem, it is not being written for somebody who might be thinking of receiving as such, or a poet writing it just to give to somebody directly as a presence, but for the most part, it should play the role of an ungiven-gift, meaning a gift not actually meant for giving to someone. The conditions of possibility of the gift only designate the impossibility of the gift. If the gift is being recognized as something quantifiable (or for Derrida, calculable) then it is the condition of possibility and also a non-gift. On the other hand, if it is incalculable, it is a mere presence of a gift. What makes deconstruction (even justice and other Derridean terms like secret, text and supplement) incalculable or cannot be comprehended as a gift is that, first and foremost, it is never available to us in present. Second it is L avenir. It is to come. Deconstruction is a kind of waiting for the impossible. Whenever one speak or lie, as Derrida would simply put, there ought to be a promisea promise of the unknowledgeable future that is, to comelike the coming of God that we should patiently wait, pray and hope like performative statements for the sake of l avenir. Hence, deconstruction is like a gift, a poematic experience (of the impossible), a promise, which Derrida never liked and a fortune that totally surprised him.