Toward a Realist Theory of State Action Author(s): Michael Mastanduno, David A. Lake, G.

John Ikenberry Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp. 457-474 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600522 . Accessed: 14/07/2011 10:12
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International Studies Quarterly (1989) 33, 457-474

Toward a Realist Theory of State Action

MICHAEL MASTANDUNO

Dartmouth College
DAVID A. LAKE

University California,Los Angeles of

G. JOHN IKENBERRY

PrincetonUniversity

The realities interdependence of dictatethatthe ability governments of to pursue domestic policies effectively influencedand constrainedby is developmentsin the international system.It is equally evidentthat the realizationof international objectives depends meaningfully domestic on and economics.Our purpose in thispaper is to lay the foundation politics fora Realisttheory stateactionwhich of and international domestic bridges politics.We proceed by positingassumptions about state objectivesand relevant theirpursuit. to we deducingstrategies First, examineconceptions of the statefound in classicaland structural Realism.Second, we present twomodelsor "faces"of stateactionwhichrelatethe goals of stateofficials in one arena to the strategies availablein the pursuitof such goals in the other. Third, building upon these two models, we put forthseveral hypotheses whichexplore the typesof challengesto the statethatarise in one arena thatmaytrigger we responsesin the second. Fourth, introduce in variations domestic and international structures predict choiceof the and made by the statesacross venues. Finally,a concludingsection strategy examinesthe implications thiseffort futureRealistinquiry of for and the studyof domesticand international politics.

Introduction
The growing interaction of international and domestic politics complicates the task of state officialsseeking to realize objectives in both realms. In both the advanced industrialand the less developed worlds, the realities of interdependence dictate that the ability of governments to pursue domestic economic policies effectivelyis influenced and constrained by developments in the international economy. The success of domestic policy relies increasingly on the global performance of the nation-state and on the ability of state officials to secure an accommodating
international environment.

note:The authors have decided to strike blow againstthe tyranny the alphabet byreversing order Author's a of the of the names. This is meant to underscore the equalityin the contribution each author made in writing thisarticle. The authors wish to acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by Jeff Frieden, Joanne Gowa, Peter Katzenstein,Robert Keohane, John Ruggie, Ron Rogowski,CrawfordYoung, and the Editors of ISQ. ? 1989 InternationalStudies Association

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It is equally evident that the realizationof international objectivesdepends meaningfully domestic politics and economics. Across much of the globe on of governments have come to rediscover significance the domestic the economyto or have soughtto restructure the pursuitof international power,and consequently is drivenbysuch reform effort clearly revitalize former. the Gorbachev's provocative ambitious1992 program. a realization, is, arguably, European Community's as the Two prominentmembersof the Americanforeignpolicyestablishment recently warnedthatthe weaknessesof the U.S. economywould be among the mostcritical and and urgentforeignpolicychallengesfacingthe nextadministration (Kissinger alike have begun to understand Vance, 1988). Likewise,scholarsand practitioners economiccooperation thateffective international depends notonlyon the external or to but interests actionsof states, on theirability manage,channel, circumvent and domesticpoliticalpressuresas well. Much of the recentworkin the fieldof international political economyhas been motivated the problemsof interdependence, by broadlyconceived.Yet, despitethe of criticaland growingsignificance domesticand international linkages,political them. successin conceptualizing explaining and scientists have enjoyedonlylimited and international As RobertPutnam (1988:427) recently noted,"domesticpolitics but have notyetsortedout the relations oftensomehowentangled, our theories are and remainlargelysepapuzzlingtangles."Indeed, international domesticpolitics In the ratefieldsof scholarly inquiry. the former, dominant paradigmof structural Realismhas tended to abstract fromdomesticpoliticsand to explain international outcomes-such as system economicopenness,or regimecreation-as a stability, the of function international of attributes, principally distribution power.Much of on the studyof domesticpolitics, the other hand, stillproceeds without devoting to relations. systematic attention international To be sure, in recent years politicalscientists have turned their attentionto and betweeninternational domestic realms.The different aspectsof the relationship on for the extensive literature foreign policystudies, example,has soughtto identify arena. The mostinfluential domesticsourcesof statebehaviorin the international work has highlighted the importanceof bureaucraticpoliticsin the conduct of networks state-society and and therelevanceof institutional relationforeign policy, of and economicpolicy.'Conversely, a shipsin theformulation performance foreign in has growing interest recently emerged,largely amongcomparativists, theinternaor This literature tionalsourcesof domesticpolitics, the "second image reversed." suchas economic has generatedrichinsights examining howinternational factors by size, trade dependence, and war shape domesticpoliticalstructures (Gourevitch, 1978; Almond, 1985; Katzenstein,1985; Rogowski,1987). While each of these studieshas made, and likelywillcontinueto make,important contributions, none and are comes to termswiththe factthatinternational domestic politics interactive. made in one arena spillsoverintotheother.Governments at hometo meet act Policy international challenges and abroad to solve domesticproblems,often simultathat address not only the neously.What are needed are conceptualframeworks betweendomesticand international impactof one on the other,but the interplay In thispaper,we propose one possibleframework. Because of itsunique position of at the intersection the domesticand international we political systems, place the interactions and stateat thecenterof our analysis.3 between international Although
' This is the task of the so-called "bureaucraticpolitics"literaturethatcame into prominencein the late 1960s. The seminal contribution Allison (1971) and, in the foreigneconomic policyliterature, is Katzenstein(1978). in Putnam's recent work (1988) is an importantcontribution thisregard. ' We definethe nation-state the territorial as unit. The state,in turn,is definedas politicians and administrators in the executivebranch of government. Our primaryfocus is on the goal-orientedbehaviorof politiciansand civil
2

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nationalpolitics takeplace at manylevels, our viewis thattheactivities choicesof and state officials, situated between these domains, are particularly important.4 We assume thatstateofficials have both international domesticgoals, and we are and interested thewaysthey in pursuedomestic goalswithin international the system and international goals within domesticsystem. the Our analysisis embedded within the Realisttradition the beliefthatinternain tionalanarchyand the pursuitof nationalpowerare centralto understanding both domesticand international politics.We focus on classicalRealismbecause of the fruitful implicit)conceptionwithinthis school of the state as an organization (if distinct from society and purposive character. thesame time, drawupon the in At we more formaland systematic analytic approach characteristic structural of Realism. Thus, our purpose in thispaper is to lay the foundation an explicitRealist for of theory stateactionwhichbridgesdomestic and international politics.5 Our taskis essentially integrative. Manyof thehypotheses developedbelowalreadyexistin the international relations literature-often "stylized as The framework forth facts." set in this paper, however,seeks to pull togetherotherwise disparatestrandsinto a coherent,theoreticalwhole. We proceed by positing assumptionsabout state objectives deducingstrategies and relevant their to pursuit. in First, orderto setforth the framework thatfollows, examineconceptions the statefoundin classical we of and structural Realism. Second, we presenttwo models or "faces"of stateaction whichrelate the goals of stateofficials one arena to the strategies in available in pursuitof such goals in the other.Third, buildingupon thesetwomodels,we put forth severalhypotheses whichexplorethetypesof challenges thestatethatarise to in one arena and may triggerresponses in the second. Fourth,we introduce in variations domestic and international and the structures predict choiceof strategy made by the state across venues. Finally,a concluding section examines the of implications thiseffort futureRealistinquiry for and the studyof domesticand international politics. Realism and the State: Classical and Structural Withinthe Realisttradition threearguments central(Keohane, 1983; Vasquez, are 1983; Gilpin, 1984). First,the international systemis dominated by sovereign nation-states, beholden to no higherauthority each thanitself. is, in otherwords, It anarchic. nation-states fundamentally are Second,therelations between competitive, of although this does not preclude the possibility cooperationin the pursuitof nationalinterests. witha system constituted, Finally, so nation-states behave purposivelyin the pursuit of power and materialwell-being. Despite these common existamongRealists, differences of arguments, important including conceptions the
servants as they respond to internal and external constraintsin an effortto manipulate policy outcomes in accordance withtheirpreferences.An underlyingpresumptionis thatthese preferences partially, not wholly, are if distinct fromthe parochial concernsof eithersocietalgroups or particulargovernment institutions, are tied to and conceptionsof the national interest the maximizationof some social welfarefunction. or See Ikenberry, Lake, and Mastanduno (1988:10).
4 The major and perhaps more widely accepted alternative to the Realist,state-centered approach developed here focuses not on the state as an organizationsituatedbetween the domesticand international politicalsystems, situation"and pursue theirdesires but on social groups whichdefinetheirmaterialinterests their"international by throughthe mechanismof the state.See Ferguson (1984), Gourevitch(1984), and Frieden (1988). There are many well-knownproblems with this society-centered alternative,including the inherent problems of choosing the appropriate level of interestaggregation and measuring the strengthof various domestic groups. Given these problems,we believe it is useful to propose a state-centered approach to studyingthe nexus of internationaland will be based on theirrelativeexplanatorypower. domesticpolitics.Ultimately, choice between alternatives the 5 It is important to underscore the partialnature of our enterprise.Because we focusonlyon strategies and goals which bridge the domestic-international divide, and self-consciously ignore other approaches or strategieswhich do not, we cannot and do not purport to have a complete theoryof state action.

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state.These differences particularly are evident betweentheolder,classicalRealism and the newer,structural Realism. with the sources and uses of Classical Realism has been concerned primarily to nationalpowerin international relations. These issues lead the analyst focuson of and as powerrelations betweennation-states wellas thecharacter government its in of relation society. to Within classicalRealism, exemplified theworks Morgenthau and Carr, one can identify notionsof the stateas an agent of the larger implicit nation.ClassicalRealistsfrequently of referto "statesman" who,as representatives the nation-state, predominantly are concernedwithmonitoring respondingto and of changesin theinternational system. Morgenthau describes tasks statesmen the (or in "representatives thenation")as follows: of "Theyspeakforit,negotiate treaties its name,defineitsobjectives, choose themeansof achieving them, and try maintain, to increase,and demonstrate power"(Morgenthau, 1985:118). The linesbetweenthe state, theone hand,and theeconomyand society, theother,are notboldlyor on on theoretically drawnin classicalRealistwritings. an implicit notionof thestatethat Yet is at once separatefromand interactive withsociety be detected. can There are twocritical components thisimplicit to classical Realist conception the of state. First,as suggestedabove, the state is distinct fromdomesticsociety.The or conceptis not simplythatof "government" aggregating respondingto societal interestsor demands. Rather, "statesmen"or "agents" of the nation-state are assumed to possess a realm of autonomousbehavior.The state'scentralmissionis and the conduct of foreignpolicy,and carrying out thattask is what legitimates differentiates statesmen fromthe restof society. Second, in the pursuitof foreign and economy material for resources and policy, statemustdrawupon thesociety the on the politicalsupport.In effect, state'sexternalpoliciesdepend critically whatit can extract In of the fromitsdomestic system. the pursuit foreign policy, statefinds itselfgivinggreat attentionto strengthening, shaping,and developingdomestic and political material resources. The sourcesof nationalpowerare many-political, and military. ability projectthispowerabroad hingesin important The to economic, in respects the deftness stateofficials cultivating on of publicopinion,educatingthe and institutions Morgenthau, citizenry, bolstering authority government the of (see 1985; Carr, 1962: Chapter 8). The classicalRealiststellus thatthe state'sexternal situation and capabilities. The power positioncannotbe divorcedfromitsinternal statesmanmust be an astute diplomat,but he must also be an able studentof domesticpolitics. It should be emphasizedthatwhiletheclassicalRealists on relyheavily notionsof the state and its relationsto society,these notionsremain implicit. There is no or attemptto analyze systematically theorizeabout the state'sabilityto marshall is itself onlypartial.Classical domesticresourcesor opinion.Moreover,the analysis Realistsacknowledgethat the nature of domesticpoliticsis vitalin sustaining or the limiting state'sinternational leave aside howinternational goals. Yet they policies be might used in the serviceof the state'sdomesticgoals. to Structural Realismrepresents attempt developmorerigorous an and deductive theoriesabout the international system and the constraints'on foreignpolicy.Far to moreso thantheirclassicalcounterparts, structural Realists sensitive thelevels are of analysis and theplacement their of within taskis to them.Theircentral arguments on delineatethe impactof the international structure international outcomes.The of is in structure theinternational of system understood terms an ordering principle, such as anarchy,and a particulardistribution power. These characteristics of constitute truly international sourcesof the behaviorof nation-states. Importantly, because theirconcernis withthe international sourcesof international outcomes, structural Realiststendforpurposesof analysis collapsethestateand nation-state to into one entity.With this mergingof the two concepts,domestic politicsand structures eliminated fromthe approach. are

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KennethWaltz'sanalysisis the strongest and mostprominent expressionof this Waltz evokes structural Realistapproach. In constructing international his theory, to the analogue of the market.The international system similarin structure the is in actors. market thatbothare systems createdthrough actionsof self-regarding the The system, Waltz argues, is the unintended yet inevitableand spontaneously of with generatedoutgrowth activities nation-states by concerned fundamentally international their own survival.Differenttypes of systemsgenerate different outcomes;Waltzargues,forexample,thatmultipolar systems tend to be less stable thanbipolarones (Waltz,1979). Otherstructural outcomessuch as Realistsaddress more proximate international perpolicycoordinationand regimecreationand maintenance. While motivated, economy, the haps,byhow developments theseareas affect domestic in the political focus is nonethelesson the international sources of international outcomes.The "theory hegemonicstability," example,represents attempt accountfor of for an to such outcomesas international in of economicopennessand regimestrength terms of the distribution economic capabilitiesamong the major powers of the system. that Giventhe powerand interests dominantstates, is hypothesized hegemony of it willlead to openness and stableregimes.6 In theirattempts explain recurring to patterns international of behavior,strucapproaches. turalRealists, and Waltzin particular, highly are critical reductionist of worldpolitics Waltzconcludesthat"itis notpossibleto understand simply looking by theory insideof states"(Waltz,1979:65). In itspure form, however, alternative the constructed structural by Realismdoes not require scholarsto look inside nationstatesat all. of In summary,structuralRealist theory treats the internal characteristics and in system nation-states given. Changes in the behavior of nation-states as of outcomes are explained not in terms of changes in internalcharacteristics are nation-states, in terms changesin thesystem but of itself. Because they interested in international directus causes and consequencesof stateaction,structural Realists do away fromdomesticpoliticsand therefore not provideus withthe equipment necessaryfor investigating relationship the between domesticand international self-consciously systems. In analyzinginternational politicsin a more systematic, overits theoretical a fashion, structural Realismconstitutes significant improvement classicalpredecessor.This progress,however,has been gained at the expense of to we of of someof therichness theearliervariants Realism.In whatfollows, attempt to Realist theorywiththe sensitivity state-society combine the rigor of structural relations found in classicalRealism. The Two Faces of StateAction on for largely The literature domesticstrategies the pursuitof domestic objectives, for of and thaton international the purview comparative strategies political studies, are of the thepursuit international Realism, already objectives, domainof structural well developed. Given our particularinterestin exploring the nexus between modelsof state and we international domesticpolitics, develop twocomplemenatry of for action.The first examinesdomestic goals; strategies the pursuit international
6 See Keohane (1980, 1984) and Krasner (1976, 1983). In After Hegemony, Keohane is criticalof the "crude" versionof hegemonic stability theory,in part for its inadequate attentionto domesticpolitics(1984:35). His own revisionand extension of the theory,however,focuses not on domesticpoliticsbut on international regimes and theirfunctionalattributes.
7 In theircriticalreview of the r-egimes literature,Haggard anid Simmons (1987) fauilt Realism for structtural nieglecting domestic politics.This nieglect ironic,since the early ver-sions what became the str-uictur-al is of Realist literature (e.g., Keohane and Nye, 1977) were concerned withdomesticpoliticsand the impactof interdependence on it. Putnam (1988) argues that domestic politicsfell out of focus as the literature came to emphasize regimes.

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the second,international strategies the pursuitof domesticgoals.8In combinafor tion, the models provide a framework understanding for why and under what and circumstances stateofficials their situated between domestic use unique position, international arenas, to achievetheirobjectives. The two modelsare unitedby the assumptionthat the state'sultimategoal is survival.From this we deduce more the international domesticgoals. Together,theseconstitute minimal and proximate relatedto survival. any Yet goals of thestate.Statesdo manythings onlytangentially state-whetherpre-capitalist, or capitalist, centrally planned,relatively autonomous, whollyautonomousfromsociety-must assure its survival(and thatof its nationstate)priorto pursuingotherobjectives.
International Goals and Domestic Strategies

Our first model acceptsthe Realistcontention thatthe proximate international goal of any stateis the acquisitionof power and wealth.Power and wealthare valued because theyprovide the means to insure both the state'ssurvivaland to pursue other goals withinan anarchic and competitive international system.Power, as Realistsremindus, is a currency withwhichto purchasesecurity and othervalued political goods. Wealth, JacobVinerand othershave argued,is a necessary as means to power,and the twoare in long-run harmony (Viner, 1948). The concernwithpowerand wealthcreatestwodomestic strategies statesmust all pursue. First, state officials mobilize resources and intervenein the economy to stimulate economicgrowth and enhancethewealthof society a whole.The state, as in other words, performsa role in the economysimilarto the "encompassing coalitions"identified Mancur Olson (Olson, 1982). It acts, following by Pareto's not but famous distinction, for the good of the community in the interests the of community.9 This strategy internalmobilization of can take two forms.A statecan directly controland allocateproduction or through planning, nationalization, othermeans. This is particularly a effective when the nation-state needs to undertake "big push" or GreatLeap Forwardto catch-up who have industrialized withcompetitors earlier in also tends to be mostefficacious the (Gerschenkron, 1962). Direct mobilization extensivegrowthphase of economic development.The state can also indirectly in of the intervene the economyto facilitate accumulation societalwealth.'0It can createmore efficient conduciveto technoproperty rights, providean atmosphere or logical innovation, dismantlerent-seeking coalitions, insulateitselffromsuch coalitions and Birdzell,1986). Mobilization (North,1981; Olson, 1982; Rosenberg is,
8 In these models, we put forth conceptionof the stateas an actorin both the domesticand international a realms (see also Ikenberry,Lake, and Mastanduno, 1988). The notion of the state as an internationalactor is widely accepted, perhaps because of the collectivenature of manypolicies in thisarena. As domesticpoliticsoftenfocuses on distributive redistributive or unifiedand autonomous statein thisrealm is certainly issues,the role of a relatively more constrained-and may be analytically problematic.Nonetheless,we argue vigorouslyfor the utility our of conceptionof the state as a domesticactor. Douglass North (1981) has examined the role of the state,oftenunder pressurefrominternaland externalcompetitors, setting in domesticproperty Levi (1988) has used a similar rights. framewor-k explor-e systems. to tax Stepan (1978) and Ti-imbei-ger (1978) provide accouints the efforts states of of to restructuretheir domestic societies. We believe that our own work also supports this conception. Ikenberry (1988) examines the state-ledpoliticsof Americanoil decontrolin the 1970s. Lake (1988) analyzesthe international and, in turn,statist originsof American tariff policyin the late nineteenthand early twentieth centuries.Both of these policies deal with quintessentially "domestic" issues. Mastanduno (1988) has examined American export controlsfroma state-as-actor approach, a policythatmore clearlybridges the domesticand international arenas. These studies do not demonstrateconclusively of the utility a conceptionof the state-as-actor domesticpolitics, in but theydo suggest that the approach is plausible and analytically fruitful. 9 Pareto is cited in Krasner (1978:12). 0 I'his general argument is presented by Polanyi (1957).

MICHAEL MASTANDUNO,DAVID A. LAKE AND G. JOHN IKENBERRY in an important sense, an investment in international power. By expanding

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the state helps create the resources necessary to sustain military expenditures, stimulate technological innovation, and otherwise expand the political and economic bases of power. But while generally beneficial, mobilization is not without costs. Direct mobilization requires an expensive administrativeapparatus and, over time, introduces inefficienciesinto the economy. In indirect mobilization, on the other hand, costs incurred in persuading non-state actors to expand production are probably more important. To the extent that mobilization reduces rents previously enjoyed by groups in society,it may also entail substantial domestic political costs to the state. resources from society for militaryexpenditures, foreign Second, the state extracts aid, contributionsto international organizations, propaganda, and other exercises of international power. Wealth provides the basis for international power, but it is not synonymous with power. The state must convert wealth into power by taxing, requisitioning, or expropriating social resources." States clearly differ in their abilities to make claims on national resources (see Lamborn, 1983). In authoritarian or totalitariancountries it is often possible to constructa command economy in which extractionoccurs through the state's direct control of the means of production. Even within democratic capitalist societies, states differ in their extractive abilities. Centralized and insulated states, it is often argued, are better able to extract social wealth than decentralized and constrained states (Krasner, 1977). While the form of extraction will differ according to the strengthof the state relative to its society,all states must still convert wealth into power. Like mobilization, extraction does entail costs and may generate discontent from affected societal groups. More importantly,extraction diminishes the present and futurewealth of the nation-state.Only if extracted wealth is redistributedby the state to societal groups with higher rates of marginal returns will extraction expand national wealth. Using extracted resources for international power purposes, on the other hand, consumes rather than produces wealth. Consequently, a trade-off exists between the two strategies of mobilization and extraction. Mobilization is the creation of wealth and an investment in power. Internal extraction is the creation of power and the consumption of wealth. As extraction increases, the state is likelyto redouble its effortsat mobilization, but the effectivenessof the latter may decline because 1) the sum of investable wealth is now lower and 2) incentives for future wealth creation are undermined by discouraging into the economy. These problems are less investmentand introducing inefficiencies acute in direct mobilization, yet that strategy by its very nature involves the introduction of greater economic inefficiencies.Extraction is necessary but costlyin its long-term effects on the nation-state's ability to compete in the anarchic international system. Therefore, states will seek an equilibrium between extraction and mobilization which satisfiestheir immediate power needs while enhancing the future power capabilities of the nation-state.12 DomesticGoals and International Strategies As noted above, the ultimate goal of the state is assumed to be self-preservation. While the survival of the state in the international arena requires the defense of the of sovereigntyand territorialintegrity the nation-state,domesticallyit demands that the state meet and overcome challenges from, and maintain the support of, societal
"A good discussion is found in Knorr (1975).
2 This dilemma is discussed in the context of statebuildingin the early modern period by Tilly (1985), Hirschman (1978), and North (1981).

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groups and coalitions. This is the case both for the state as an organization and for the incumbents who occupy dominant positions in the state apparatus at any given moment. In their effortsto maintain support and overcome opposition, state officials pursue two more proximate goals. First,they seek to acquire control over resources in order to cobpt or coerce challengers and reward supporters. Obviously, the greater the challenges confronted by state officialsto their power and authority,the more resources they will require. Second, state officials seek to preserve their legitimacy.An intangible asset of the state,legitimacyis the acceptance on the part of domestic groups of the state's claim to the exercise of decision-makingauthority.The greater the legitimacy enjoyed by state officials, the less they must rely upon coercive or compensatory strategies; conversely, as legitimacywanes the need for such strategies,and thus for control of the resources associated with them, becomes more pressing.' 3 In light of their domestic goals, the two most important international strategies state officials can pursue are externalextraction and externalvalidation. External extraction refers to state effortsto accumulate resources from outside its borders that can be of use in achieving domestic objectives. It may be direct, involving the transferof external resources to the state itself; or it may be indirect,involving the transferof such resources to domestic society,a portion of which, in turn, the state may extract. The effectiveuse of external extraction enhances the abilityof states to meet their domestic goals by increasing the resources available for coercion or compensation. Moreover, gaining access to externally-generatedresources may allow states to reduce internal extraction and thereby ease the domestic political pressure often associated withthis latterstrategy.Most formsof external extractionrelyeither overtly or covertly on coercion. Even the pursuit of free trade under American hegemony, an indirect extractive strategy which also improved the well-being of many countries, required that the United States alter the behaviors of other nation-states (Lake, 1988:50-52). Because of this reliance on coercion, relatively powerful countries are likely to be more successful in their attempt at external External validation refers to attempts by state officials to utilize their status as authoritative international representatives of the nation-state to enhance their domestic political positions. Like external extraction,this strategymay take a variety of forms. For new states (i.e., those that have come to power in the wake of internal revolutions), external validation involves firstand foremostthe quest for diplomatic recognition. Gaining the recognition of the international community appears to be an exceptionally powerful means for a nascent state to establish legitimacyin the eyes of its domestic population. That the refusal or withdrawalof diplomatic recognition is one of the most potent weapons used by states, short of militaryintervention,to undermine the domestic political position of others serves as testimony to the importance of this form of external validation. At a more basic level, scholars have noted the relationship between the evolution of the nation-state system with its international norms of sovereigntyand the consolidation of the state's claims over national territories(see Giddens, 1985; Ruggie, 1983; and Ashley, 1984). Here, the state'ssui generis domestic position as sovereign representativeof societyis dependent in some sense on the recognition of other states withinthe international system. It is difficultto generalize about the relationship between the pursuit of our two external strategies,extraction and validation. Clearly, they have the potential to be
13 We are referringhere to the Weberian argument concerning the organization of legitimateauthority. Systematicincentivesexist for rulers to organize power in ways that establish or preserve the legitimacyof government institutions decision-making. the modern period,the statehas found legal-rational and In authority to be the mosteffective method fortheorganizationof politicalpower. See Weber (1978, Vol. 1:212-16). For a recent discussion of this argumentand its bearing on the behavior of modern stateofficials, Schmitter see (1985).

extraction.

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mutually reinforcing. By participating in international organizations, elites in developing countries may enhance both their status at home and their ability to extract resources from advanced industrialized nation-states.The potential conflicts are equally apparent. Given the widespread acceptance of national self-determination since 1945, the practice of imperialism as an extractive strategy clearly detracts from a state's effortsat external validation. In summary, all states seeking to survive possess the international goals of power and wealth, from which the need for internal mobilization and extractionfollow,and the domestic goals of control over resources and the preservation of legitimacy, which suggest the international strategiesof external extraction and validation. This inventoryof state goals and strategiesprovides systematicreasons why states,seeking to advance their own interests,will move across the domestic-internationaldivide. The importance of these strategies and how and why they might be pursued is discussed in the following sections. Exploring the Two Faces of State Action: Challenge and Response Building upon the frameworkdeveloped in the last section,we now explore the types of challenges to the state arising in one arena that may triggerresponses in the other arena. We consider whether and how the state will respond domestically, first,to changes in its long-term international power and, second, to changes in the immediate securitythreats that it confronts. Next we examine possible international responses by the state to challenges to its domestic political stability.Because we are primarilyconcerned here with exploring responses across arenas, we do not attempt to analyze the full range of possible responses to any particular challenge. The propositions in this section refer to the responses of states irrespective of their particular domestic or international structural positions. In the next section we develop propositions that accommodate variations in these factors. HI: As thelong-term the powerof thenation-state declines, statewill increaseits internal A mobilization. detrimental shift in the power of the nation-state undermines the ability of state officials to achieve their international objectives. Faced with such a threat the state is likelyto respond on both domestic and international fronts.In the domestic arena, extraction mightbe an effectiveshort-runremedy,but over time it is likelyto undermine the economic and political bases of national power. Thus, to the extent state officialsperceive their decline of power to be enduring, they are more likely to respond in the domestic arena with mobilization rather than extraction. Mobilization, unlike extraction,has the potential to enhance the long-termpower of the nation-state by stimulating economic growth and investment. Historically, mobilization has been a common response by state leaders who fear that their national position, and thus their national security,is threatened by their relative backwardness (Gerschenkron, 1962). Stalin's strategyof rapid industrialization and the Mejii Restoration sought to enable Russia and Japan, respectively,to with elevate their international ranking and prestige and to compete more effectively the great powers of the West. More recently,the prominence that officialswithinthe European Community have given to the ambitious 1992 liberalization reforms reflectsa wide-spread concern that the nation-statesof Western Europe may be in danger of falling behind the technologically more dynamic societies of America and Japan, and represents an attempt to redress this imbalance over the long term.14

14 In theirquest for technologicalparity,European Communityofficials have placed considerableemphasis on indirectmobilization, specifically removal of all remainingintra-Community the barriersto the free movementof labor and goods across national borders. See "A Surveyof Europe's Internal Market,"TheEconomist, 9, 1988. July

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Proponents of industrial policy in the U.S. and economic reformin the Soviet Union share a similar concern over the relative economic decline of theirnation-statesand a belief in the desirabilityof alternative mobilization strategies. Similarly,failure to pay adequate attention to internal mobilization can be costly for the nation-state. Sixteenth-centurySpain paid dearly for neglecting its domestic economic base in pursuit of external extraction through the plundering of precious metals from the New World (Dehio, 1963:47). For reasons suggested below, late nineteenth-century Britain similarly relied primarily on international responses, such as portfolio investment,and therebyfailed to arrest its decline. In a well-known study Robert Gilpin warned that the postwar United States, by emphasizing a strategyof foreign direct investment,risked following a similar path (Gilpin, 1975). the its H2: As external security threats increase, statewillincrease internal extraction. More immediate threats to a nation-state's security arise when adversaries achieve unforeseen technological breakthroughs of military significance, or initiate direct militaryor economic confrontations.The immediacy of such challenges dictates that theybe met, if possible, in the short-run.In such cases, extractionenjoys advantages over mobilization. Extraction allows the state to gain rapid access to society's resources, which can be used to meet the threat to national security.15 States facing such threats may attempt mobilization yet simultaneously will be compelled to increase extraction,despite the potential long-termcosts to the economy of adopting this strategy. The most obvious examples of this domestic response involve the nation-state at war, or preparing for it. During World War II, Britain and Germany devoted half their economic resources to the militaryeffort,obviously a far greater proportion than either state had been accustomed to committingto defense during peacetime (Knorr, 1975:47). Similarly,postwar American defense spending reached its peak as a percent of GNP during the Korean war, not only to pay for American participation but also to prepare for what many U.S. officialsperceived as an imminent military conflictwith the Communist world. It should also be noted that states unwilling or unable to extract in the face of perceived securitythreatswill find their options to be severelyconstrained. The Johnson Administrationfaced thisdilemma over Vietnam, and its unwillingness to raise taxes decisively shaped the manner in which it conducted the war. and the extraction H3: As domestic politicalinstability increases, statewillpursue external validation. Political instability varies along a continuum from declining public support for state incumbents to revolutionary upheaval that threatens the integrity of the state as an organization. In response to such minor and major threats to their domestic position, states can draw upon a vast array of domestic strategies. We hypothesize that states will engage in international strategies as well, since such strategiescan enhance the abilityof the state to satisfythe proximate domestic goals jeopardized by instability. External validation can enhance the legitimacy or popular support of state officials.Leaders of unstable regimes in the developing world have attempted to use the New International Economic Order (NIEO) and the international exposure associated withit to bolster their domestic status (Krasner, 1985). Similarly,President Richard Nixon attempted to neutralize the impact of Watergate by engaging in highly visible diplomatic encounters with Soviet leaders. Partly in response to the

15 Lamborn, in his discussion of the constraints on the extractive capabilitiesof states,recognizesthe importance of the level of perceived external threat.See Lamborn (1983:131, 137-38).

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discontent generated by the socialist economic experiment, in the early 1980s French President Mitterand took a more interventionistrole in foreign affairs, notably in Africa. One might argue that at that time the Libyan and Iranian regimes empowered themselves domestically by provoking and confronting the United States. Finally, and at the extreme, states may even go to war to resolve domestic political problems (see Mayer, 1969). External extraction can be used to generate resources, which in turn can be used to reinforce the domestic position of the state. The resources provided by OPEC's dramatic reversal of the terms of trade enabled member states to reduce the burdens of domestic extraction and potentially coopt the sources of domestic discontent. Similarly,the French state has been able to extract considerable resources from the European Community through the common agricultural policy, therebysubsidizing farmers who comprise an important voting bloc (Zysman, 1978). Because states participate in both international and domestic systems,opportunities exist for solving problems that arise in one domain by taking actions in the other. Consequently, analysis that focuses exclusively on state action in only one domain risks being misleading or incomplete. Structural Realists, for example, make a theoretical commitmentto explain internationaloutcomes by reference to characteristics of the international system. The problem here is that states may respond to international events through domestic actions or, alternatively,domestic problems may intrude on international relations in ways that are not understandable in terms of the prevailing character of the international system. If Realists are interested in explaining state action, systematic attention must be paid to interaction between systems. Integrating the Two Faces of State Action: Strategies and Choices Drawing upon the two previous sections, we now introduce variations in domestic and international structures and predict the choice of strategymade by states. Our approach here differsfrom the one used in the last section. There we examined the determinants of state action and presumed that all states would respond in similar ways to domestic and international challenges. In this section, we pose constraintson state action which differacross states. In doing so, we attempta preliminarysynthesis of the two faces of state action. States differ in their domestic and international structural positions. Following Waltz (1979), by international structure we mean primarily the distribution of capabilities or power, defined as the abilityto influence the behavior of foreign state and non-state actors. While international power is clearly a continuum, we distinguish for analytical purposes between states which are internationally"strong" or "weak." Similarly,the structural position of a state in relation to its society varies along a continuum from decentralized and constrained by societal groups to centralized and insulated from society.'6 Important differences exist in the capacities of states to influence and shape the society and economy. In specifyingthe domestic structural capacities of states, scholars have focused on such institutional factors as the autonomy of administrative organizations and the presence or absence of policy tools. Again, for reasons of analytic convenience, we distinguish between "soft"
16 We have elsewherecriticized the weak state-strongstatedistinction developed by Katzenstein, as Krasner,and others. See Ikenberry,Lake and Mastanduno (1988:1-14). Foremostamong our pointsof contentionis that the concept of weakness and strengthdoes not tell us enough about the specificsources of state power and the instruments available to any particular state. We recognize, however, that the simple dichotomyis useful for comparativepurposes in a "first-cut" preliminary or explanation. Future work should, of course, seek to further refinethisdistinction even in its comparativeusage.

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(decentralized and constrained) and "hard" (centralized and autonomous)states." Softstatesmaydo little morethanregister demandsof societal the groupsor,at best, resistprivatedemands. Hard statesare able not only to resistsocietalforcesbut to actively reshapeaspectsof theeconomy and society.'8Mixedcases exist, course. of The smallEuropean statesexaminedby Katzenstein (1985) combinethecentralized of a decision-making hard states with highdegreeof societal penetration characteristic of soft states-albeit societal influencechanneled throughcentralizedpeak associations. The centralization thesestatesand societies of thattheyincline suggests towardthe hard end of our continuum. Their policyposturesalso tendto bear out this presupposition. While subtlety lost withany analyticsimplification, in is and individual cases subtledifferences maybe all-important, norietheless we believethat thisdistinction betweensoftand hard statesis usefulforcomparative purposes.
H4: Softstateswill relyon international to strategies a greater extent thanwill hardstates. hard states will rely on domestic Conversely, to strategies a greaterextentthan will soft

states.More restricted social actors,decentralized by and constrained statesare less able to mobilizeinternally extract and resourcesthantheirhard statecounterparts. Because theyare limitedin theirabilityto act at home, such stateswill tend to emphasizeinternational strategies the pursuitof stategoals and ultimately for for theirsurvival.Centralizedand insulatedstates,on the otherhand, have,a greater rangeof choicebetweenvenues.Whiletheymaystill internationally, choice act their of strategy be more weightedtowarddomesticstrategies will thanin softstates.
H5: Internationally weak stateswill emphasize domestic morethan will internastrategies tionally powerful states.Likewise, powerful stateswill emphasize international strategies more

than weak will states.Weak statesare moreconstrained theirability achievetheir in to goals throughinternational action. As a resultthey,more so than internationally powerfulstates,will focus theirattention internalmobilization on and extraction. More powerful statesare better equipped to extract resources from abroad,sincethe possession of wealth and power generallyenhances their abilityto accumulate further of increments it.
H6: Softstateswillrely internal on extraction a greater to extent thanwillhardstates. Hard stateswill relyon internalmobilization a greaterextent to than willsoft states. For reasons

similar thosedeveloped in H4, softstatesare less powerful to relative society to than are hard statesand theyimplement domestic withgreater strategies difficulty. They are less able to dismantlerent-seeking coalitionsor insulatethemselves fromsuch groups.Enactingefficient property rights mayalso be difficult groupsclamorfor as special favors.Faced withthis constraint, state is likelyto engage in greater the extractionto maintain or increase its international power. In effect,the state becomes another rent-seeking actor (Krueger, 1974; Buchanan, Tollison, and Tullock, 1980; Conybeare,1982; Olson, 1982). As we argued above, extraction is for necessary all statesto convert wealthintopower.Even hard states, a result, as will
17 Immanuel Wallersteinalso distinguishesbetween strongand weak states (1974). But in doing so he fails to separate internationaland domestic dimensionsof strength. we note, and as critics Wallerstein As of observe,the two spheres of state strength are not identical and, indeed, are frequently quite divergent(Zolberg, 1981).

'8John Zysman,who is interestedin the divergentabilitiesof advanced industrialstatesto become involved in industrial adjustment,focuseson threestructural elements:mechanismsof recruitment the nationalcivilservice, in the degree of centralizationwithin governmentcivil service, and the extent of independence from legislative oversight(Zysman, 1983:300). See also Katzenstein(1976; 1978), and Krasner (1978: Chapter Three). The term "softstate" comes from Myrdal (1968:895-900). See also Waterbury(1985). In a similarfashion,the term"soft regime" is used by Kahler (1985:368).

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extract social resources. Yet because they are better able to reshape society and insulate themselves from rent-seekers,hard states will engage in internal mobilization more than will soft states. H7: Internationally weak stateswill emphasize external validationmorethanwill stronger states. stateswill engagein external extraction a largerextent to Internationally powerful than will weak states. External extraction often requires an ability to influence other nation-states,to get them to do what they would otherwise not do. Internationally powerful states, with more capabilities at their disposal, are better able than weak states to implement this strategy. As a result, weak states-more so than strong ones-will resort to external validation, which typicallydoes not require coercive capabilities. Taken together these hypotheses yield a synthesis of the relationship between domestic and international structures and strategies. The synthesisis presented in Figure 1. Soft states rely on international strategies to a greater degree than do hard states (H4). If they are also internationallyweak, they will emphasize domestic strategies more than do strong states (H5). Thus we can expect soft,weak states to combine a reliance on internal extraction (H6) and external validation (H7). This is the strategic mix currentlyemployed by certain states in the developing world, and it leads to an unfortunate predicament. Plagued by the demands of rent-seekingcoalitions, state elites find themselves extractingresources from domestic societyfor redistributionto social claimants and to themselves (Bates, 1981; Levi, 1981). In seeking help from the international arena these states are forced by their subordinate position to rely primarilyupon multilateralbargaining in the United Nations (such as in the NIEO) and other forms of symbolic international politics to maintain domestic legitimacy. Being ill-equipped to mobilize resources domestically or extract resources internationally,these states are compelled to pursue strategies that tend to reinforce their domestic weakness and do littleto expand their international power. Internationally powerful, soft states, such as the United States, will emphasize a strategyof international (H4, H5) extraction (H7). Throughout the post-war period,
International Structure Weak Internal Extraction Soft External Validation Power-ful External Extraction

Domestic Structure I nternal

Mobilization

Internal
Mobilization

Hard

External Extractioni-

FIG. 1. Strategies and constraints.

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the United States has relied on a strategyof internationalextraction(albeit indirect) by creating and maintaining internationaleconomic regimes. American state officials constructed a free trade regime, renegotiated this regime to sanction non-tariff barriers to trade as the country'scompetititveposition began to wane, and created an international monetary regime based upon seigniorage and the dollar (Parboni, 1981). In short, American officialsconvinced other states to participate in international arrangements that reinforced and enhanced the global power of the United States. Yet, as suggested by the recent tendency of the U.S. to run large budget and trade deficitsand finance them with foreign capital, reliance on external extraction diminishes the incentives for state officialsto engage in internal mobilization,sowing the seeds for later decline. As was the case for soft,weak states,over the long run the strategicpreference of a soft,powerful stateworks to the detrimentof itscompetitive Hard states that are internationally weak will emphasize the domestic strategy(H4, H5) of internal mobilization (H6). Unable to coerce other nation-states,these states will turn inward and use their domestic strength to stimulate growth and the accumulation of national wealth to meet both internationaland domestic needs. Such a strategycharacterized late nineteenth-century Japan and the Soviet Union and China in the periods after their respective revolutions. Similarly, the postwar Japanese state provided a varietyof administrativeand economic incentivesdesigned to foster economic growth and international competitiveness. Finally, hard, internationallypowerful states have a wide range of strategiesopen to them but will rely more heavily than others on a combination of internal mobilization (H6) and external extraction (H7). France has sought to stimulate growthand enhance its technological prowess. As a mid-level internationalpower, it has also engaged in external extraction through its relations with the European Community and its export promotion strategies targeted at the developing world. The Soviet Union provides a second example. In the early postwar period it pursued internal mobilization through an extensive growth strategy, and external extraction in its relationship with Eastern Europe (Bunce, 1985). Having reached the apparent limitsof that strategyby the early 1970s, Soviet leaders sought to use economic links with the West for purposes of external extraction. They hoped, in vain, that technology transfer and subsidized credits could serve as a substitute for much needed decentralizing economic reforms in stimulating economic development. 19 For the purposes of our analysis, it is interestingto note that the current Soviet predicament stems not from the pursuit of internal mobilization but from the manner in which that strategyhas been pursued. Over the long run, direct state-led mobilization has proven to be a less effectivemeans to accumulate wealth than has indirect market-led mobilization. Not surprisingly,a central thrust of Gorbachev's current reform program involves the use of market incentiveswithinthe framework of a command economy. In this section we have examined how variations in international and domestic structuralpositions combine to affectthe strategicpreferences of state officials.The framework put forth is more comprehensive than that found in the existing international relations literature. The "domestic structures"literature,for example, holds the international position of states constant and predicts foreign economic strategy by varying state-societyrelations (Katzenstein, 1978). Such an approach cannot account for differencesin the strategiesadopted by stateswithbroadly similar domestic structures yet disparate international positions. Similarly,it would have difficulty explaining changes in strategythat took place in any given state over time,
19On U.S. attemptsto exploit the Soviet predicament,see Mastanduno (1985).

position.

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StructuralRealism, on the other hand, holds domesticstructure constantand predicts strategy based on international position. Such an approachis inadequatein in for accounting variations strategy or amongstates, within samestateovertime, the when international positionremainsconstantbut state-society relationsvary.By combiningthe two sets of variationsin an integratedframework, approach the outlinedabove offers greaterexplanatory power. Conclusion A generaltheory international of relations, others as havenoted,requires theory a of stateaction.20 Realismclaimsto providesuch a theory. as we have seen,classical Yet Realists, who appreciatethe multidimensional natureof stateaction,failto develop its logic in a rigorousfashion.Structural Realists,on the otherhand, collapse the distinction betweenstateand nation-state thereby and developonlypartof the logic of stateaction.It is ironicthattheRealisttradition placesthestateat thecenterof its but analysis failsto develop a comprehensive theoretical of appreciation itsnatureor logic. Since states are organizationsthat participatein both international and influenceactionsin the other.2'States may both respond to international events domesticactionsand attempt solvedomestic through to internaproblems through tionalactions.This is an observation analysts few woulddisagreewith one which but has yetto be systematically incorporated into generaltheoriesof international (or domestic)politics. The alternative framework to presentedin this paper attempts move beyond It Realisttheories. placesthestateat thecenter theanalysis of and developsa existing across domesticand international range of strategies, arenas, available to state in officials pursuit of their objectives.It also deduces, given the domesticand international structural position of the state,which strategy combinationof or the to strategies stateis likely pursue. By takingintoaccountboththedomestic and international constraints the state,and by articulating on both the domesticand international choicesavailableto thestate, are able to providea morecomprehenwe sive,integrated approach to the analysis statebehavior. of An adequate empiricaltest of the propositions generatedby this approach is beyondthe scope of the presentpaper. The illustrations should provided, however, be sufficient indicatethe potential to of for utility the approach. It yieldsinsights, example,into the problemof great-power decline. Our model suggeststhatsoft, powerfulstateswill be compelled,by the combined logic of theirdomesticand international to This is positions, pursuea dominant of extraction. strategy external so despite the fact that over the long run that strategy, when employedat the expenseofinternal tendsto erode thepowerthatgaveriseto it initially. mobilization, The modelcapturestheirony thatstates, pursuit wealthand power,undertake in of short-term thatdiminish theirlong-term to strategies ability acquireand accumulate thoseassets. This approach should also prove useful in exploringthe dilemmasof underis of development. Dependencytheorists argue thatunderdevelopment a function a nation-state's internationalpredicament-its position in the global division of labor-while theircritics emphasizeinternal such characteristics as the strength of
20 Keohane (1983) notes: "Understandingthe general principles stateactionand the practices of of governments is a necessary basis for attemptsto refinetheoryor to extend the analysis to non-stateactors." See also Gilpin (1981:15). 21 The

as its domestic structure remained the same and its international position shifted.

domestic political arenas, it is not surprising that the pursuit of goals in one arena

logic of this two-sidedimage is also explored in Ikenberry(1986).

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the state. Our approach combines the insightsof the two and moves beyond each of them by positing that soft,weak states are driven to pursue strategiesthat ultimately perpetuate underdevelopment, while hard, weak states have the potential to extricate themselves from that condition. The latter assertion is largely consistent with the "dependent development" school, which assigns a prominent role to the state and its abilityto bargain with multinationals in accounting for divergent paths of development (Evans, 1979). Finally, the model presented here is potentially useful in anticipating the broad shiftsin foreign policy that accompany changes in the structuralposition of a state. The Soviet Union prior to 1945 emphasized internal mobilization, while in the postwar period, as it acquired great-power status, it increased its emphasis on external extraction. Similarly, as soft states move from international weakness to strength,we would anticipate a shift from an emphasis on internal extraction and external validation to one on external extraction. In part, this consideration underlies the fear, shared by allies and adversaries, of contemporary Germany or Japan translating their formidable economic power into independent military strength.Alternatively, weak states move from hard to softdomestically,we would as expect them to place greater weight on external validation. One might explore, for example, whether the interestof the post-Facist democratic state of Spain in joining NATO and the EEC might serve as partial support for this hypothesis. These are simply some of the issues that might be explored in the context of this model. They can be understood essentially as suggestions for further research. Scholars have been increasinglyinterested in the relationship between domestic and international systems.Our contention is that a focus on the state and an appreciation of its dual environment provide a basis for developing a systematic theoretical understanding of that relationship. The framework developed here also suggests that international relations scholars and practitioners alike would benefit from increased attentionto state-society relations and, in particular, the ways in which the national economy is organized for the pursuit of international power. The conduct of foreign policy depends not only on relations between nation-states but also on supposedly "domestic" politics. References
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