The Opposite Attraction between Mars and Venus: Sustaining NATO for American and European Security

by Hannah-Sophie Wahle Submitted to: Advisor Prof. Stuart Gottlieb Director of Honors Thesis Colloquium Prof. Lee Quinby May 9, 2012

Wahle 2 NATO: Mars &Venus Contents

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 3 Theoretical Framework (Realism vs. Liberalism) and Concepts ................................................... 5 NATOs History from 1949 to the Present ....................................................................................... 9 Conflicts of Interest (U.S. vs. Europe) ............................................................................................. 16 Organizational Challenges ............................................................................................................... 20 5.1. 5.2. 5.3. 5.4. 6. 7. 8. 9. Unequal Burden Sharing........................................................................................................... 25 Expansion as a Means for Sustaining NATO ........................................................................... 34 NATO and the Nuclear Age....................................................................................................... 37 Separable, but not Separate: the European Failure for Independent Security ....................... 38

Endurance Explained through Realism .......................................................................................... 42 Balkan Case Study: NATOs First Test .......................................................................................... 45 Prospects for NATO ......................................................................................................................... 49 Conclusion ......................................................................................................................................... 52

Bibliography ............................................................................................................................................... 54

Wahle 3 NATO: Mars &Venus 1. Introduction The complex relationship between the United States and Europe resembles the relationship metaphor of Mars and Venus. Just as Mars and Venus are alike and deeply interconnected, the U.S. and Europe share a long history of similar ideals espousing a liberal world order. After World War II and throughout the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) evolved into one of the largest and most influential security institutions. NATO member states joined together in an alliance first to contain the threat of Soviet expansion and its communist ideals, and then later to integrate Eastern Europe into a more coherent Europe away from former Soviet control. However, an opposition also occurs for both as understandings are at times, mismatched. Faults in the organization have placed a shadow on cooperation from the beginning. During NATOs continued existence after the fall of Communism, there was not only a widening and deepening of unequal burden sharing but also divergences in objectives. Essentially the alliance split into American and European camps, which have still remained inseparable. This mutual interdependence, while moving away from each other, thus puts into question the efficiency of NATO. Understanding the origins of inefficiency and ideological divides will help to determine NATOs degree of sustainability or alternatively the strength of independent European solutions. This essay shows that if the transatlantic community seeks to retain its relevance in providing security for both sides, NATO needs to focus on revisiting its articles as well as establishing clear terms and structures appropriate for a larger NATO that can respond to increasing non-military threats. NATOs relevance will be preserved through taking this step before expanding further and beginning new missions throughout the world. Such

Wahle 4 NATO: Mars &Venus revisions will be three-fold: namely the rejuvenation of values, realignment of troops and resources as well as rapprochement of organizational structures. In order to show the steps and re-organization necessary for the continuing relevance, this paper will follow along six points. First, it will introduce the theories of Realism and Liberalism as well as define vital concepts such as security communities. Second, the historical part will provide a broad overview of some major events surrounding NATO and the changes NATO underwent in its organization from its founding in 1949 until 1989. This point will provide a closer look into the origin of NATO and will clarify its relevance and purpose. Third, this paper will determine the conflict of interests between the U.S. and Europe and the different objectives each one has been following. Fourth, the research will create a roadmap to the organizational challenges that have been present since NATOs founding and which have accelerated with the fall of Communism in 1989. Fifth, based on its origins and the arising problems, the paper will utilize the theoretical paradigm of Realism to explain the deficiencies and the reasons behind NATOs rocky path of endurance, expansion, and outreach beyond the traditional transatlantic community consisting of North America and the major European nations. Sixth, a case study on the Balkan War will show the procedures taken in NATO missions in general as well as the way specific disparities play out. Lastly, the paper will conclude by determining that NATO nevertheless retains a certain degree of relevance, but needs to consider major revisions in its organization to realign the expectations and goals between the U.S. and Europe in order to counter the global world in which threats become less military based and in which the role of global hegemony is shifting. At the beginning of the research, the project started under the assumption that NATO and transatlantic security changed completely with the vanishing of the Soviet common enemy. This

Wahle 5 NATO: Mars &Venus proved certainly true in regards to power relations as well as mission and goals. However, during the course of the research and primarily focusing the paper around the relationship between the U.S. and European members, it seemed more and more impossible to divide the pre and post 1989 eras simply into black and white. The points of contention as well as the points of dependence follow a certain red threat or Leitmotiv for the entirety of NATOs history. For example, French Gaullism, U.S. hegemony, European striving for independence and simultaneous fear of abandonment, unequal burden-sharing and forces of sovereignty were all evident likewise before and after the Fall of Communism.

2. Theoretical Framework (Realism vs. Liberalism) and Concepts Realists, especially Neo-realists, and Liberals, especially Liberal Institutionalists, drive the main debates within international security and will therefore provide the theoretical reference for this analysis. The leading scholars of Realism include Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer. According to Realist thought, which was prevalent during the Cold War, the international system is characterized by anarchy and sovereign states, which operate under balance-of-power objectives and do not grant each other complete trust. As states compete for security there is always a possibility for a state to be dishonest and disregard the alliances rules. Hence, it is crucial for countries to constantly advance their military capabilities. Furthermore, competition sparks a focus on relative gains compared to others, so that instead of cooperating for greater gains, states often focus on diminishing the other parties gains while attaining its own gains. Although not all Realists dismiss the functionality of institutions completely, the majority believes that maintaining them is extremely difficult and they are rather temporary set-ups to counter a common fear or threat, where the security of all parties is equally at stake (Baylis,

Wahle 6 NATO: Mars &Venus Smith and Patricia 2008). After the fall of the Soviet Union, most Realists therefore predicted the decline of NATO. On the other side of the spectrum Liberals, such as John Ikenberry and James Goldgeier, place confidence in institutions like NATO in order to promote cooperation and overcome competition. Liberal thought and Idealism especially gained momentum with the fall of the iron curtain in 1989 and the alleged development of a peaceful Europe. Especially with the growth of the European Union, the European nation-states increasingly started to integrate, which fosters the sharing of values and resources. Institutionalization of security specifically can determine cooperation between states as opposed to state interests being the main drive for policy. Specifically Liberal Institutionalism points out that institutions can facilitate peace and create an incentive for states to join as transaction costs decrease, information exchange becomes easier and trust can be better manifested (Baylis, Smith and Patricia 2008). The Democratic Peace Theory as a branch of Liberalism takes these ideas even further. It suggests that democratic states generally do not fight each other, but show a willingness to cooperate and promote Western democratic values. Therefore, institutions offer a platform for states to work together based on common values and lessen competition between states. Lastly, Constructivism is also greatly valued within Liberal thought as it stresses not only military issues, but also the importance of intimate relations among heads of states, which at any time could positively or negatively affect one countrys policy toward another (Wendt 1992). In explaining the continued existence of NATO, Realism offers the best approach to understanding the ways in which NATO and its members acted. Even though Realism is split itself among differing views and most Realists in fact predicted the demise of NATO, it was Realism that in the end kept NATO going. It is not entirely true that the end of communism

Wahle 7 NATO: Mars &Venus ushered in a new era of peace and cooperation. First, there have been consistent steps in order to increase cooperation in Europe starting with the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC) founded in 1950 a long time before the end of the cold war. Moreover, the enthusiasm for final peace was taken too high, because shortly after the end of the Cold War, the problems appeared to deepen as violent secessionist movements broke out all across former Yugoslavia. At the same time, there was the First Gulf War along with other contentions in the Middle East. Instead of reaching peace, most European countries approached each other with suspicion and national objectives in mind. After all NATOs endurance despite unequal burden sharing cannot be solely attributed to the pure goodwill of the other NATO members toward each other, but, as the remainder of the paper demonstrates, to the benefit NATO offers to the individual national interests. In addition to applying a Realist theoretical form and in order to sufficiently analyze the development and efficiency of NATO, it is important to clarify what structure and outcomes can be expected from a security community in the broader sense. This definition will lay the foundational reference for an evaluation of why NATO as an institution was founded, why it endured and what needs it could potentially meet in the future. The most commonly used definition can be traced back to Karl W. Deutschs extensive research on International Organizations. According to his understanding a security-community [] is one in which there is real assurance that the members of that community will not fight each other physically, but will settle their disputes in some other way. He further notes that if the entire world were integrated as a security-community, wars would be automatically eliminated (Deutsch, et al. 1957, 5). He distinguishes between amalgamated communities and integrated pluralistic communities. NATO can be categorized as pluralistic and being in the process of integrating,

Wahle 8 NATO: Mars &Venus since the national governments still exist and each make their own decisions in regards to NATO. Despite the absence of a single governing body for security, NATO members are very much economically and socially interlinked. For the purpose of this analysis, the paper will not take into account the different types of security communities, but instead base its arguments about NATO efficiency on the advantages or disadvantages of pluralistic security-communities. The North Atlantic community is a particular example not only of an interstate security community, but rather a comprehensive one, since wars between states as well as civil wars are nearly impossible. Once such a security community exists, the next step is defining what security actually entails. A shared understanding is essential for sustaining such a community and work towards the same goal. Security can pertain to individual, national or international levels. During the Cold War NATO largely focused on national security. Even though NATO is a multi-national institution, each member state raised concerns about their national security or made national concerns their reason for joining NATO in the first place. The rise of more liberal ideas after the Cold War brought more attention to the individual as well (Baylis, Smith and Patricia 2008). With the intervention in Kosovo and the ethnic cleansing, protecting the individual and securing civilians added to the concept of security and missions of NATO. At the same time international security also advanced into the foreground. While nation-states disintegrated to some extent through the building of the European Union, different actors in the international arena evolved into players, which may not belong to any state or have affiliations across different states. Examples include terrorist groups, but they could also be corporations fighting for natural gas or Information Technology groups conducting cyber-attacks. The increase in non-military threats and vanishing of clear enemies made international security the more relevant.

Wahle 9 NATO: Mars &Venus

3. NATOs History from 1949 to the Present The historical part of this paper will show the constant evolution NATO underwent and how NATO as an institution withstood the changes in membership and missions as well as the gradual growth and reach of its policies. The second part of the history will discuss the challenges NATO faced with the fall of communism after 1989. Even though the U.S. and the Soviet Union concluded several treaties on arms reductions, these took on a rather superficial role. The Soviet Union created the impression of cooperation, while especially building up its nuclear force. In addition, the spread of communism around the world, especially in Cuba and China, as well as the increasing European divide strained the patiences of NATOs endurance. In light of the shift of the paper it will be important to treat both the historical part of the pre and post 1989 history equally and then focus on specific instances to illustrate the inner workings of NATO. April 4th, 1949 marks the day when Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, Iceland, Italy, Canada, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty giving birth to the most complex and long-standing collective security alliance to date. From the initial 12 members NATO steadily grew. Greece and Turkey joined in 1952, the Federal Republic of Germany in 1955, Spain in 1982,
Figure 1: NATO Expansion

Wahle 10 NATO: Mars &Venus Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1999, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004 and Albania and Croatia in 2009, raising NATOs current count to 28 (A Short History of NATO n.d.). Lord Ismay, first NATO secretary general, coined the most compact summary of NATOs initial purpose. NATO shall keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down. The alliances main goal consisted of containing communism and protecting Western Europe from the Soviet threat. The creation of NATO also came along with the idea of the U.S. mission of securing an overall peace in the Western European states, which had been significantly weakened militarily and economically by World War II. In addition, binding Germany to the West and controlling its military development became one of the main side purposes of NATO. Since such grand goals demand a lot of time and effort, there was no implicit time limit set on the treaty. Rather the treaty asks for regular reviews to assess if NATO is still needed or if it should be amended in any way. At the center of the treaty and its 14 articles stands the most debated Article V. The signatories agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against all of them. (North Atlantic Treaty 1949) This article ultimately ties all the member states together and makes them liable to each other. Besides providing economic assistance through the Marshall Plan, the American presence thus offered a security guarantee against Soviet expansion while Europe found itself placed in the middle of the balancing act between East and West during the Cold War. In return for security, the European member states allowed the U.S. an input in designing the political structure of the post-World War II project of a rehabilitated and united Europe. The German question constituted a large part of this debate. Ideally Germany would be tightly monitored while simultaneously assuming

Wahle 11 NATO: Mars &Venus equal status in NATO. James Baker, Secretary of State under the George H. W. Busch administration significantly raised the stakes of the issue by putting officials and the public before the question whether they prefer an independent nuclear Germany or a controlled Germany integrated into NATO. When Germany finally joined NATO in 1955, the Eastern powers, including the USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, immediately formed the Warsaw Pact as a counterweight in order to preserve Soviet power. The Korean War in the 1950s additionally enlarged the global fight against communism. Even though mutual responsibility held the Atlantic alliance together, differences challenged solidarity among NATO members early on beyond the German question. The U.S.s military and economic superiority in contrast to Europes weakened position, led to deviations in questions of purpose, goals, strategy and resource contribution. While the U.S. carried a greater share, European members raised suspicions toward U.S. dominance. One of the first major conflicts was the Suez crisis in 1956. When former President of Egypt Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, which is one of the most vital trade routes up to date, France and England sought desperately to hold on to their colonial powers. At the same time, the United States did not grant any support to resolve the debate, which demonstrates the already present U.S.-European divide. While the inner-NATO disparities continued, the Soviet Unions launched Sputnik in 1957 and in that manner demonstrated its greater missile capabilities compared to the U.S., which accelerated the U.S.s fear of nuclear inferiority (Kaplan 1999, 67). This conflict and the separation of the U.S. and the European colonial powers came to a height when French President Charles de Gaulle withdrew from the treaty in 1966 (Kaplan 1999, 99). The withdrawal did not present a direct breach of Article V and was therefore a viable option for any member at

Wahle 12 NATO: Mars &Venus any time. All NATO-affiliated personnel and institutions were forced to leave France and the NATO headquarters moved to Brussels. The period of De Gaulles profound policies for a more independent Europe became known as Gaullism and has since carried through Frances foreign policy. However, instead of weakening and splitting NATO, these events in fact encouraged a revision of transatlantic policies to foster European participation. NATO headquarters as well as Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe (SAHPE) moved to Brussels to symbolize enhanced engagement. In addition, flexible response and high nuclear readiness became an integral part of NATO strategy. Notable initiatives include the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) and a Euro Group. These were expected to improve cooperation in planning of operations and the development of weapons. Nonetheless, Europes input in nuclear policy stayed limited, since the U.S. administration especially under Johnson hoped to coax the allies into believing they were now fully involved in the planning process. (Kaplan 1999, 134) In reality, the NPG focused more on educational and research aspects rather than on a participatory decision-making process. In 1967 the U.S. and Soviet Union even made an atomic pact, which replaced the U.S. strategy of massive retaliation with a more flexible response policy (A Short History of NATO n.d.). Instead of countering every attack with outright atomic means, flexible response offers better adjustability in situations of lesser threats. At the same time deterrence potential was kept at a level sufficient enough to scare away possible nuclear attackers. Another step for cooperation was the 1972 decision of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) to begin talks with members of the Warsaw Pact, including the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT I) between the U.S. and Soviet Union, and other European states that did not belong to either entity at that point. These were supposed to contribute to the Conference

Wahle 13 NATO: Mars &Venus on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In addition, talks on the reduction of ground troops in Central Europe took place, which is also known as Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) (Kaplan 1999, 116). However, since the Soviet Union kept upgrading their middle-range nuclear weapons, the new NATO strategy of flexible reaction became less realistic and did not have the effect as hoped for. Even within the alliance, political problems remained present. For instance, the conflict over Cyprus caused Greece to be the second country after France to leave NATO in 1974 (Kaplan 1999, 228). But, unlike France, Greece quickly rejoined in 1981. The growing imbalance of nuclear middle-range ballistic missiles during the cooperation talks eventually led to the NATO Double-Track Decision of 1979 (Kaplan 1999, 117). The aim was to advocate for cuts in medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles or if failed, an increase on the American side to guarantee Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). Mikhail Gorbachev, who became head of state of the Soviet Union in 1985, established a more cooperative political framework, which helped to cool the conflict between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Examples of these changes are the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) to build on the MBFR and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) between the U.S. and the Soviet Union concluded 1987 (Kaplan 1999, 155). As part of the general dtente between the two pacts, the latter treaty sought the removal of all nuclear groundlaunched ballistic and cruise missiles of intermediate range. Relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact seemed to slowly normalize, but challenges persisted. For instance, after a popular vote in 1986 Spain left NATO until 1997. 1989 is arguably the most significant turning point for NATO and the alliance it created during the Cold War. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the unification of Germany

Wahle 14 NATO: Mars &Venus the three main points Lord Ismay had laid out became insignificant on the first look. However, NATO persisted and reinvented itself. In 1990 the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist as well and the CSCE extended its invitation to former Warsaw Pact nations in order to formally end hostilities. The new strategy moved security and stability into the foreground and NATOs entire capabilities were reduced. The North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) of 1991 formalized cooperation with former Warsaw Pact states. A newly built Rapid Reaction Force allowed for greater flexibility and out of area operations, which greatly expanded NATOs reach beyond the transatlantic arena (Kaplan 1999, 204). Bosnia proved as the first instance for NATO to apply its new conflict prevention and peace building measures in cooperation with official UN mandates. After the conflict had been ended, NATO retained its hold in Bosnia with its multinational Implementation Force (IFOR) to secure peace. Partnership for Peace (PFP) founded in 1994 included former Soviet states in trustbuilding activities, such as joint training and planning sessions. The 1996 Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) provided yet another means for flexible forces which could be assembled at NATOs discretion when seen fit (Kaplan 1999, 194). Moreover, a permanent Russia Council sought to stabilize relations between East and West. This step was necessary in order to enable the opening of NATO membership towards the Eastern neighbors. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic made up the first round of NATO expansion in 1999. As positive these undertakings seem, NATO faced significant limits in its role during the second major confrontation with former Yugoslavian territory. In the same year as the initial expansion, NATO intervened to protect Albanians in Kosovo from the Serb population. While the U.S. urged quick intervention, the Europeans showed reluctance and thus prevented any timely action.

Wahle 15 NATO: Mars &Venus Only 52 years after NATOs founding its most fundamental Article V was officially declared active. When the World Trade Center was attacked on September 11th, 2011 the European member states took immediate action to declare solidarity and support (A Short History of NATO n.d.). Since terrorism is not bound to a specific territory, any NATO member could fall victim to a similar attack at all times. Therefore, abstinence was not in question. Initially NATO states therefore faced a new common enemy. However, as will be shown later, this compassion and eagerness to act quickly vanished when differences in definitions and categorization of terrorism came to the surface. In 2002 the NATO-Russia relations restarted after the Kosovo war had put them on hold. The Prague Summit of the same year gave rise to NATO Response Force (NRF), which is a globally deployable force to fight and defend against terrorist attacks. In 2003 NATO further took charge with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. 2004 marks the year of the second round of NATO expansion and 2005 the first mission in Africa with the support of peace-building efforts in Darfur. While Ukraine and Georgia were denied, Albania and Croatia received membership in 2009 (A Short History of NATO n.d.). At the same time France rejoined the military organization. A new strategy was released with delay in 2010. This offers Missile defense cooperation with Russia as well as consideration for new rising threats, such as terrorism, energy security and cyber security. The preceding historic overview provides a small insight into the many structures and policies NATO took on while also increasing membership. In order to entangle these developments and reach the core of NATOs existence, the paper will now look into the different aspects which divorced the American and European camps while simultaneously binding them together seemingly infinitely.

Wahle 16 NATO: Mars &Venus

4. Conflicts of Interest (U.S. vs. Europe) Any perception that Europe has overcome nationalism in light of the integration within the EU is overrated. That said, it is probably unlikely that European nations would go to war with each other, since balance-of power politics among the different princedoms and empires within Europe, which characterized Europe all throughout the Middle Ages, the period of unification in the second half of the nineteenth century as well as the two world wars, may well have worn out the European thirst for war. Nonetheless, the absence of war does not automatically eliminate nationalism and striving to fulfill own interests. National interests can work to the advantage of NATO, such as the Eastern European countries desire to join NATO to bolster their own reputations and the European allowance to contribute less in return for more U.S. input. However, nationalism can fatally draw attention away from the transnational alliance just as a great focus on oneself may be bad for any relationship. Europes inward look can be justified by the magnificent project of integration (Kagan 2003, 66). But, such arguments do not necessarily account for a distancing from NATO. After all, as demonstrated before, the U.S. places a vital interest in the European integration and since integration also appears as the broader context of NATO, a European focus on domestic issues should be welcomed. Furthermore, the U.S. itself can be criticized for focusing too much on NATO and foreign intervention, while domestic factors such as healthcare are majorly neglected, especially as regarded from a European standpoint. There are two problems with this approach. First, it is questionable whether the U.S. is in a position to undertake large-scale NATO interventions when the domestic policies do not even draw close to a settlement. Secondly, the U.S. accepted its

Wahle 17 NATO: Mars &Venus unilateral role and thus showed interest in the other members and aims at carrying operations fast and efficiently, without always having to await a NATO decision, which may take a long time in the process of coming to a consensus. After all, the U.S. in the role of Mars is specialized in expansion and conquest. Gaullism was not the only effort to gain a greater focus on the building of the European Union. The gap between national versus transnational and transatlantic policies made it common today for NATO to be seen as Americas project and the EU to be seen as Europes (Asmus 2005, 94). Rather than becoming one entity in the transatlantic relationship, both sides chose to build themselves in the meantime. The French stayed especially skeptical and embodied a more widespread European discontent over the association with America. Atlanticism was often put aside in favor of working towards European independence and a lot of mistrust characterized the relations among the representatives. The French even doubted the proAntlanticist Secretary-General Dirk Stikker despite his Dutch heritage. But, the French had joined the alliance with the knowledge of its transatlanticist orientation and NATO was a transatlantic organization, so pro-Atlantic thinkers would hardly be out of place (Hoogenboezem 2009, 412). Once entered into such a relationship, it should be clear what to expect from each other. Yet, it seems that the French simply dismissed any transatlantic tendencies simply to reinforce their independent position. One of the most important prerequisites for an effective security alliance is the establishment of a community with political and economic ties. Building a we-feeling around common values advances the necessary trust. Even though the values between Americans and Europeans vary greatly, they resemble each other enough for the creation of NATO. Former President John F. Kennedys famous speech in Germany in the 1960s coined the most

Wahle 18 NATO: Mars &Venus memorable words for the transatlantic relationship. When his words I am a Berliner reached the large crowd, he sealed, even though only rhetorically, the long friendship between the U.S. and Europe, based on strong ties and commonalities. Not only did the U.S. evolve from Europe and based its state-building on a mixture of European models, but further the long history of U.S. efforts for rebuilding Europe and strengthening the EU reiterate this mutual dependency. Some of the most important shared values include democracy, free speech, human rights and at large the spread of the liberal world order since the fall of communism. Regardless of this long friendship, it cannot be denied that values are dynamic among NATO countries and thus repeatedly encountered differences. The approach to power became one of the most contested issues in the transatlantic relationship. To illustrate these views America is often seen as acting in a Hobbesian world of anarchy and Europe in a Kantian world of stable peace (Kagan 2003, 3). According to Thomas Hobbess theories presented in Leviathan (1651) the only plausible way to guarantee security is having an absolute sovereign to which everyone else submits. Immanual Kant, by contrast, belongs to the idealism from the late 18th century, which believes in the sense of duty toward each other. These two sides can be contemporarily understood through the theories of Realism and Liberalism. In keeping with Realists, the U.S. places little trust in international institutions, which can be concluded from the rejection of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Kyoto Protocol among other important international efforts for international cooperation. Besides a lack of trust, the U.S. as the physically stronger role in Mars is also concerned about losing its power status and being possibly constraint by these organizations. Hegemony and a global role remain the utmost concern to the U.S. In contrast, the European nations are unlikely to go to war with each other, and eagerly create more international rules, treatises and organizations. The theoretical idea of

Wahle 19 NATO: Mars &Venus the European Union emerged as a role model for all Liberal theories as it is one of the most recent examples of strong cooperation. After centuries of war and since the end of World War II the European states consciously began to distance themselves from Machtpolitik and in place advocate greater cooperation. However, these attitudes toward power from both the U.S. and European side have been observed only fairly recently and have undergone a significant shift. Since its founding, the U.S. has been rather isolationist as it focused on creating its nation through the Civil War and the Reconstruction period. In the meantime Europe has been involved in overseas missions and colonial ambitions across the world. Only the end of the nineteenth century gave rise to imperial America with interventions and explicit interests in Panama and Cuba. This shift in power, however, does not signify a complete rejection of power by Europe. National competition for prerogatives within the EU is still present. This can be explained by different perceptions of how power is defined. In lieu of power encompassing hegemony and more violent implementation of ideas, Europe found a new role of power. The new image includes the overcoming of power as dominance in lieu of power as a role model to set best practice governance examples (Kagan 2003, 65). Yet, the same could be argued for the U.S. likewise, since Americas top agenda seeks to spread a liberal world order to the entire world, and yet, the U.S. still follows Realist power schemes. There are further plenty of arguments against the shared history and values. The founding fathers of the U.S. were inspired by some of the institutions, but quickly sought to distinguish themselves and build something new apart from the old British or French systems. Today American and Europe value and pride themselves in their respective history and colonial power. Perceptions of each other offer another point of comparison. With the dominance over Latin

Wahle 20 NATO: Mars &Venus America, the U.S. developed its sense of responsibility to free the world. Victory in World War II in particular forced the U.S. into the role of a good-willed hegemon deserving obedience (Krotz and Sperling 2011, 306). Therewith, the U.S. often neglects to differentiate between interest and values, where the spread of American values seem to become the main interest. As a result the unipolar world enhances the importance of the Atlantic alliance. France, for instance, builds its foreign policy on its ancient image of glory and a specific historical experience of former hegemony, which is incompatible with Americans goals for the same. To France security may not necessarily refer to military terms, but it also entails security of French values as preserved through independence from the U.S. After all, no country should automatically project its values on another country, because there are also fundamental differences among liberal ideas. The U.S. and Europe may both support liberal and open ideas but still interpret these differently. Namely, the U.S. favors individual economic benefit as opposed to benefit for Europe as a whole (Krotz and Sperling 2011, 314). These differences in interpretations and perceptions of values cause the divergences in organization and burden-sharing within NATO as everyone sets different priorities.

5. Organizational Challenges In 1988 Colin L. Powell revealed a special insight into the workings of NATO, when immediately following a NATO heads of state meeting he publicly announced that where you have sixteen nations, all each sovereign, certainly there will be differences and there will be heated debate and discussion from time to time (Powell 1995, 373). Right around the same time, then president Ronal Reagan had told the media that the talks went well and there was no disagreement on how to proceed about the Soviet Union. But, in contrast to Reagans optimism,

Wahle 21 NATO: Mars &Venus disagreements were already seen during this first part of NATOs history despite the uniting factor of the Soviet Union as an enemy. Especially in the beginning stages of the transatlantic relationship differences had to be worked out. All initial member states followed the same objectives of containing communism. Nonetheless, it is impossible to reach an agreement on the details of strategy and scope of actions. For example, during the Cuba missile crisis high level NATO cooperation for Kennedy apparently meant informing the heads of government of two member states that something was wrong, and nothing more (Hoogenboezem 2009, 409). Not only, does this illustrate the lack of inclusion of all members at all times on equal levels, but also the predominance of sole American leadership if the U.S. saw it fit. These disagreements truly inflated with the fall of communism firstly, because the common purpose was lost that would drive the members in the same direction, and secondly NATO expanded widely in size and scope, which made the practice of consensus building increasingly difficult. In order not to interfere with each states sovereignty NATO continued with a pledged practice of decision by consensus. In contrast to the alleged importance of the consensus-building model in NATO, however the U.S. took on more leadership than anyone else, and communication, which would be essential for any consensus-model, largely failed. Although the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the official and most important meeting in NATO, there are many different formal and informal meetings taking place in many different locations, where not every member may be present. This makes it hard to consolidate all the points discussed into one comprehensive agenda and it is likely that certain points get omitted and not communicated between Washington and Brussels. Already in the 1960s former Secretary-General of NATO Dirk Stikker complained that governments would not always keep him abreast of their national policies (Hoogenboezem

Wahle 22 NATO: Mars &Venus 2009, 410). Being Secretary-General, he was supposed to bring all nations under his guidance within NATO, but the preoccupation with national egoism, makes sharing of policies extremely difficult. Namely, when Stikker wished to speak to De Gaulle, it took three months waiting and Adenauers intervention before an audience was granted (Hoogenboezem 2009, 415). This shows how personal connections often appear to carry more weight than institutionalized talks and it may at times be nearly impossible to even discover signs of an alliance. Moreover, once such relationships were established, they offered only temporary glue to the transatlantic relations, since most administrations only assume power for four years. Every shift in administration thus ushers in a new period of having to nourish relations among the states. Since elections take place at different times in every country, there is a great possibility that there is a change in administration in some NATO country in short intervals. Especially urgent and delicate matters of security, however, demand a fast and efficient response. With the increase in members, the number of opinions and goals steadily rise. Coming to a decision that is compatible with the greatest number of states slows down the process drastically. As a result, there have been many proposals to change the outdated NATO decisionmaking process. The idea of a more flexible system makes up the most viable option in the debate. Precisely because its member states have such a wide array of interests, fears, and capabilities, the alliance is more likely to take effective and timely action through coalitions of the willing (Kupchan 2010, 107). States could join their forces together whenever there is an issue of particular concern to those states. Temporary alliances within the alliance would thus be of smaller scale and with a shared vision mind as those states would agree on the issue at hand and could come to decisions in a timely manner. Usually bilateral agreements offer a strong alternative when formed between any major NATO member and any other country. In the next

Wahle 23 NATO: Mars &Venus step the countries working out a deal would then sell the diplomatic package to other members in order to get their support and utilize the alliance for implementation measures. One such example was the British-French Agreement about intervention in Libya. Yet, there are some concerns about such a loose system. Even though the differences in goals and ideas cannot be eliminated, offering the option of such alliances might invite even further divergences as there would be fewer incentives to find a common denominator and the states would in fact simply go for their own interests if the option can easily be griped. In addition, regardless of whether or not a state supports a cause, it will run under the banner of NATO. If a state completely objects a certain mission, it will still be associated with that action as a member of NATO. Once the other states carry through with an action, other states might have trouble identifying themselves with the alliance and all the other ideals. For instance, when the United States wants to use military force, it will try to get NATO support. If not, it will go alone. And if it gets a few NATO countries and a few non-NATO ones to come along, it will construct a coalition of the willing.' So how exactly is the new, improved NATO helping here? (Zakaria 1998). In any case the U.S. will follow its own objectives without being sensitive to NATO. If there are no clear terms, NATO will eventually become superfluous as anyone can do as they wish. Taking this argument even further then questions the relevance of Article V. Since an attack against one amounts to an attack against all, NATO should not even start operations without the approval of the majority of members to begin with. If many different alliances form, NATO itself would cease to be an alliance and the likelihood for NATO to actually perform as a coherent whole would almost become superfluous. When members commit to Article V they should automatically commit to the willingness for negotiations and preparedness to take a

Wahle 24 NATO: Mars &Venus certain direction. If there is a general lack of consensus, the issue might not belong into the realm of NATO responsibility, which after all had specifically been created to align transatlantic security. Besides decision-making governance the structure of NATO also faces challenges in the efficient coordination of the large number of resources. The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) found in 1996 best exemplifies the diminishing efficiency of NATO. The force includes nonNATO and non-EU states. On the one hand it is essential in a globalized world to look beyond the original alliance sphere and include other nations, which global threats affect to a similar extent. But, on the other hand when including nations outside of the alliance, NATO does not hold any influence on their approach on policy and implementation. The rules of NATO only exist in a limited fashion within such a combined force. The overlap also easily sparks more divisions as there are even more players and viewpoints involved. NATO finds itself at a high risk of losing oversight over resources allocated and missions started. Despite the blurring of lines and loss of awareness of what NATO entails, the organization undertook many attempts to consolidate its structure and simplify command. Taken the security structure by itself, NATO assumed a direction towards amalgamation. Since the fall of the Soviet Union large attention has been paid to communication and there are regular summits being held. Almost each of the summits produces a reform in command structures. Over time they created different subcommittees to deal with specific security demands. The most important ones are the Nuclear Planning Group and the Russia Pact. These committees collect all the assets of the member states. In addition, the civilian and military components of NATO work closely together in order to reach the best solutions for policies and methods for implementation. The specific institution of Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), for example, bridges

Wahle 25 NATO: Mars &Venus the command between American and European forces at least in theory. However, most SACEURS have been solely American citizens and thus the position rather opened another venue for exercising U.S. power in Europe. Since NATO is an American show, whatever some European secretary-general thought or did may not have mattered much [to defense secretaries like Robert McNamara] (Hoogenboezem 2009, 411). Furthermore, it is not clear if the militarycivilian divide is handled well since NATO is a military alliance in civilian control, of which each not only follow different objectives, but also employ different methodologies. All these different structures run the risk of converting NATO into a superstructure, in which the subcommittees easily fail to communicate and consolidate their work efficiently.

5.1. Unequal Burden Sharing The question of burden sharing is one of the most troublesome contentions that have accompanied NATO from the very beginning. American taxpayers cry out about tax dollars being spent on NATO defense on an ongoing basis, especially because the U.S. contributes the majority of military capabilities and sacrifices many American lives. Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned of these divergences in his 2011 June address (Gates 2011). Nevertheless, this argument might not necessarily be accurate for all situations. Firstly, there is a divide between the American citizens and the U.S. government and how much weight each one places on the importance on foreign policy and defense. Secondly, the way resources are being contributed has been changed over and over again and was influenced by events in the world stage. Namely, there was a shift in the 1960s to increase nuclear capabilities and decrease conventional forces. While the U.S. accuses European states of constantly cutting their defense budgets, military assets might in fact be less and less desired and needed. One provocative

Wahle 26 NATO: Mars &Venus argument even claims that the U.S. itself free rode in the first half of the 20th century, when Europe paid the price for competition through the two world wars (Walt 1998/ 1999).The following section will assess these dynamics of burden sharing and the changes in needs and demands. 1000000 800000 600000 400000 200000 0 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Figure 2: Defense expenditures of NATO countries in Million U.S. Dollars

NATO-Europe North America

Upon NATOs founding in 1949 all the member states more or less agreed on contributing equally and everyone would receive the equal return of security from the Soviets. Nonetheless, Germany increasingly complicated this process. The concern of how to implement the integration of Germany, retain control over it and let it rearm at the same time became known as the German question. As a result, there were differences in contribution by Germany and opinions towards Germany leading up to its membership in 1955. France expressed the greatest skepticism about German rearming for reasons of preserving their own power. On the other hand, the United States perceived a strong Germany being part of NATO as a useful asset. Former president Harry Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson emerged as the driving advocates for the U.S. to keep their position in Europe after World War II. If Germany was included, the other member states could grant Germany full membership and make it feel equal,

Wahle 27 NATO: Mars &Venus but still keep the possibility of putting controls over the rearming process. The biggest fear of an independent Germany was the risk of it possibly switching sides (Trachtenberg 1999, 109). Since the Cold War ultimately entailed a battle between capitalism and communism, it was the U.S.s main goal not to lose anyone to the other party. It was thus concluded that, if properly handled, Germany with its direct border to the Soviet Union could serve as a buffer zone against the Soviets spreading further into Western Europe. With the first round of NATO expansion in 1999 unequal burden sharing could be attributed to natural differences and not only the NATO-made restrains. As Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic had just been freed from Soviet control, they naturally had fewer resources at their disposal. Communism stalled the economy and rebuilding of institutions and infrastructure took up the assets that were still less. This was one reason that slowed down the expansion debate, which had been a topic since the moment the iron curtain fell. The advocates for expansion, such as Bill Clinton thought expansion to be essential for sustaining NATO. Paying the price was worth for allowing the U.S. to continue on the European project. Eastern Europe provided the space the U.S. was looking for to expand their liberal word order. Even though communism fell, such a deeply ingrained system in society and politics alike cannot vanish over time. Despite communisms defeat, eliminating the old system and bringing about reforms demands a long process. Whether or not this is part of NATOs original purpose, did not matter, because either way NATO expansion allowed the U.S. to put a foot into Eastern Europe. In addition, the eastern countries were very committed to belonging to the West. As a result, they showed eagerness to contribute proportionally more than perhaps other European nations, even if they had smaller budgets. For instance, former secretary of state Colin Powell noted that countries that had only just slipped out of the Soviet yoke came on board, including

Wahle 28 NATO: Mars &Venus Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria to support the U.S.s aim to drive Iraq out of Kuwait (Powell 1995, 490). This shows that they accepted the responsibility that comes along with NATO membership and they sought to immediately display their commitment and prove that their admittance had not been a mistake. Nonetheless, many skeptics used the argument of overstepping NATOs realm of responsibility. Many doubted if NATO would truly be willing to carry out Article V. Just like the debate during the Cold War whether the United States would risk New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles for Paris, Rome, or London; [the issue during the expansion asked] why would anyone believe that the United States would do so now for Warsaw, Budapest, or Prague (Ruggie 1996, 119). After all, Kennedys speech Ich bin ein Berliner reflected more Atlantic rhetoric than true feelings of allegiance. The reluctance of his administration to act more directly in the Berlin Crisis and against the Berlin Wall demonstrates that Kennedy was not prepared to go to war over Berlin (Hoogenboezem 2009, 409). With the threat of Soviet expansion gone, the East was less strategically important and irrelevant in regards to actually conducting security measures since it could not contribute as much to the defense budget. Further, the defense budget of those countries may not even have been substantial for the U.S. Even more troubling than the Eastern European countries were the Western NATO members, who were expected to contribute more than they actually did. After World War II almost everything had been lost and destroyed. Therefore, the similar excuse for less contribution after a major war as in Eastern Europe in the post-Cold War era could be applied. However, the small size of a European share carried on beyond the immediate World War II rebuilding period. Europe became dependent on the U.S. strength and nuclear capabilities to the extent that they never rebuilt its capabilities to the degree it would have been able to and would

Wahle 29 NATO: Mars &Venus be necessary for a fair share today. The historian Robert Kagan summarized the current division of labor in NATO as the U.S. making the dinner and the Europeans making the dishes (Kagan 2003, 23). Most of the military assets are provided by the United States, while Europe free rides and became comfortable while enjoying the American security guarantee. Even though Europe could potentially spend more on defense, the decision revolves not around ability, but more around the ideological divide on power as discussed previously (Kagan 2003, 53). While Europe was thus not only simply enabled to rebuild after the war, it in fact built an extensive social welfare state. This luxury is often attributed to the U.S.s great share of the burden, which relieved Europe of providing any large military spending. Whereas Europe is indeed free riding to some extent, there are also more tactical reasons and the lack of sufficient pressure from the U.S. NATO is often defined as an unwritten deal, in which the U.S. provides protection in return for having a substantial input in shaping the postwar order and diplomacy. Even though there also was no other choice, given Europes weakness and the U.S.s increasing hegemonic power, this forced situation was welcomed with open arms by both sides. After all, it was the U.S.s decision to retain a presence in Europe, to keep Europe under its protection and to facilitate European growth. For instance, the Marshall Plan provided generous financial assistance for rebuilding Europe. No country would voluntarily deny such support once offered and it was natural for Europe to accpet. This U.S. commitment manifested itself so deeply, that both U.S. and European efforts to stop it were weak. It can further be argued that investing in NATO and creating stability saves the U.S. money in the long run, since it eliminates the need for an arms race and prevents instability to resume, which would both take up a lot of resources.

Wahle 30 NATO: Mars &Venus American greater capabilities can also be traced back to the demands of the Cold War on military strategy. The U.S. was geographically far away from the Soviet Union and thus developed far-reaching, highly modernized and flexible weapons. In contrast, European NATO members solely maintained ground forces since the Soviet Union was an immediate neighbor and it was direct confrontation which could break out any time (Kagan 2003, 24). In addition the U.S. increasingly immersed itself in its new unilateralism and prepared for wars on a constant basis. Operations in Kuwait, Somalia, Panama and Iraq among others have necessitated and still necessitate concurrent technological advances. In contrast, Europe was worn out from the two World Wars and expressed little understanding for the need to fight several wars at the same time. In light of this pacifism, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) from 1997 specifically monitors the spending of EU member states, which are also part of the Euro zone and the common monetary policy. The pact authorizes punishments for countries that overstep the 3% mark in budget deficits (Leonard 2010, 143). Therefore, the laws of the EU set natural boundaries on the degree to which EU-NATO members may contribute. However, the recent financial crisis of 2008 has shown that the EU reached its limits to implement the SGP sanctions on countries such as Spain and Greece who have breached the pact since the beginning of the crisis and never returned to the obligated levels. The SGP may therefore solely be a pretext for certain European NATO states to avoid greater contributions, especially when the SGP possibly lost its credibility. Similarly, Germany has utilized the fact that it was not allowed to rearm to the same degree as other NATO members after World War II as an argument or excuse for not endowing a vaster defense budget.

Wahle 31 NATO: Mars &Venus While there are abundant talks about European defense cuts, the U.S. has also played with the thought of cuts in several instances. Immediately after World War II the U.S. shortly attempted to focus on domestic policies, since it is natural for a country to invest in its own society during calmer times. But, this lasted only until the start of the Korean War in 1950, which triggered the building up of more forces (Trachtenberg 1999, 96). The second notable instance includes former President George H.W. Bushs call for arms reductions during his speech in Germany in May 1989. His proposal concerns a less militarized Europe, the most heavily armed continent in the world. Even though he acknowledges that these steps have to be undertaken slowly in order not to invite a Soviet attack and that a strong European defense needs to be present for a constructive peace, Bush encouraged the gradual cut in military capabilities and troops (Busch 1989). This shows that the U.S. in fact enjoys and wants to preserve its unilateral and stronger role. To American eyes Europe is not a competitor, but a protectorate and therefore Bush never implemented the cuts in the U.S. side in light of protecting Europe and fighting more and more wars across the globe. The proposed cuts for U.S. ground forces never truly carried through. Since the fall of the Soviet Union following only a few months after his speech, the U.S. became even more internationally involved with campaigns in Somalia and Panama as well as most importantly in Kuwait. Around the same time as Bushs speech Powell correctly points out the challenge to accept that [the U.S.] had to retrench, yet to maintain the best damned Army in the world (Powell 1995, 403). Much like Europe after World War II, U.S. resources had been exhausted by the Cold War. But, whereas the U.S. had stepped into Europe to help with defense, the U.S. did not receive the same kind of support it wished to see from its European allies. Powell further also notes that he received complaints from some European NATO members who asked how they

Wahle 32 NATO: Mars &Venus could go to their parliaments asking for serious defense spending when the United States was ready to cut so deeply (Powell 1995, 455). This double standard of wanting a less militarized, but strong Europe, while keeping a hegemonic status causes trouble when the U.S. also demands an equal burden-share of Europe. Lastly, it is important to recognize that military capabilities do not make up the only shares to carry. Especially in countering global threats, the military might be less important besides the long-range weapons that are being developed. Within NATOs division of labor it is therefore not entirely clear that Europe only does the dishes, since there may well be capabilities beyond military action. Within security communities Deutsch distinguishes between tangible and intangible resources. The former includes military or financial burdens, drains on manpower and wealth, the burden of risk from political or military commitments, cost of social and economic readjustments, [and the latter includes] burdens upon attention-giving, information-processing, and decision-making capabilities (Deutsch, et al. 1957, 41). While it is correct that the U.S. shares a greater burden of military and monetary assets, it is harder to determine total contributions to NATOs efforts. It is difficult to place a value judgment on contributions, because different assets are not quantifiable. Europe contributes to the organizational structure of NATO just like the U.S. does. In that way the headquarters are situated in Brussels and the annual summits usually take place in Europe. Both of these examples require an input of time, funds and logistics. Moreover, the changing nature of threats might in the near future require less militarybased responses, but could demand a different set of skills. For instance Europe hosts a large information infrastructure and could easily expand on this base to share intelligence with the U.S. in countering cyber-attacks and terrorism. Concerning ethnic conflicts, NATO has proved

Wahle 33 NATO: Mars &Venus incapable of resolving the serious ethnic conflict among its members (Cyprus), while accommodating member states that have, at one time or another, been decidedly non-democratic in character (Greece and Portugal) (Ruggie 1996, 112). With ethnic conflicts and post-war reconstructions, Europes soft power policies are generally more apt at dealing with such issues. Especially regarding the former Yugoslav states, Europe is capable of securing peace and democratic reforms thanks to an already existing connection with these countries through the expansion of the EU. While Liberals will argue that institutions actually lower transactions costs and foster cooperation among its members which will allow for the sharing of resources, Realists would claim that the inequality in contributions in fact leads to great disparities that may make it difficult to cooperate, since the parties involved will increasingly focus on relative gains as compared to the other NATO member states. For liberals material inequalities pose less of a problem, since it is the absolute gains that matter. It is assumed that every member gains at some point and it is acceptable that the beneficiary rotates or receives gains in different ways. As Deutsch point out efforts to avoid placing heavy military burdens on weaker or smaller states or regions, or upon populations psychologically and socially unready or unwilling to bear them, were followed by the successful preservation of the wider political community (Deutsch, et al. 1957, 61). If NATO is considered as part of a larger project of political and economic integration, participating states may be more willing to carry a greater burden for the benefit of the whole community and in return for the achievement of other goals. In this sense, the United States was after a long period of negotiations willing to accept the first three Eastern European states into NATO. While the U.S. has been well aware not to expect grand contributions, American could meet the agenda of spreading liberalization.

Wahle 34 NATO: Mars &Venus

5.2. Expansion as a Means for Sustaining NATO

NATO member states, Membership Action Plan, Independent Partnership Action Plan,Partnership for Peace (PfP),Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), Contact countries (CC)
Figure 3: NATO and its Global involvement

Expansion has accompanied NATO since the beginning. The cases of Germany, the first three Eastern European countries of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic (hereafter referred to as the Visigrad Group) and lastly the newest round of expansion in 2009 to Albania as well as out-of-area operations and possible extension to Russia best illuminate what expansion means. Each one created large debates for NATO and contested the inclusion of others in the rather elitist relation. According to Article 13 of the treaty, membership can be extended to any European country (North Atlantic Treaty 1949). Following the Fall of Communism NATO discovered its new mission in Eastern Europe and especially in the Visigrad countries. The fight against communism was by no means over, because the defeat of the Soviet Union had to be locked in and the U.S. saw building democracy and spreading its liberal wings in its hands. Henry Kissinger who urged for expansion argued that if the Visigrads had not been accepted in NATO,

Wahle 35 NATO: Mars &Venus Germany would have experienced a large vacuum, because the Eastern neighbors would stay threatened by Russia and risk a possible return to the former state of mind (Kissinger 1994). The geographical immediacy thus made the European countries especially eager to include the Visigrad. In order not to aggravate Russia the terms prohibited the stationing of NATO troops in any of the new members. To the perspective of the Visigrad military security mattered less, but instead they viewed NATO as a door into the West and economic as well as political prosperity. This in turn would provide security understood as sustaining their newly independent state. Vaclav Havel, former president of the Czech Republic, became the biggest advocate for joining the alliance. However, concerns were raised across the alliance in fear of unequal burden-sharing that may arise with the lesser contributions of Eastern Europe. Interestingly European states especially pushed the Eastern countries towards NATO in spite of the EU in fear of an economic slow-down and an unwelcome flow of labor and competition (Kaplan 1999, 212). As a result of all these different interests in place, where neither the U.S. nor Europe even produced one clear opinion on expansion, it took almost a decade for the talks to be resolved and the Visigrads to be accepted. Next, Russia has also pressed for admission since the fall of the Iron Curtain. Expansion to the East put Russia into a threatened situation, and an inclusion could prevent a backlash of Russia as well. Advocates for Russias inclusion refer to the moral argument. Although Russia is developing towards democratic structures, it is at a true risk of not achieving democracy, unlike the Visigrad, who have to worry less about their democratic transition. Instead of utilizing NATO, the EU would have in fact proven as the better institution for the economic growth of the Visigrad (Zakaria 1998). Russia, on the contrary, would greatly benefit from NATO admission. However, there is no guarantee for trust in Russia, which is still a country with substantial

Wahle 36 NATO: Mars &Venus nuclear power and strong ties to states such as Belarus, the only dictatorship left in Europe. An inclusion of Russia would therefore turn the alliance away from collective defense toward protection against each other, and furthermore this would move China to the border of NATO, thus creating only another border conflict with a reviving power. Such out-of-area operations are often used as an argument for sustaining NATO. With the absence of a common threat, security would have to go beyond Europe in order to find quests of security. Goldgeier, for instance argues that there is no choice in such a globalized world, but to include non-NATO democracies regardless of their geographical location (Goldgeier 2010, 22). Since threats do not know any borders, an international response would be most sensitive to threats. Yet, Globalists dismiss the fact that simply increasing the numbers will make it unrealistic to achieve so many goals at the same time. NATO would soon become irrelevant as it would provide resources to missions across the globe without displaying national interest and towards remote areas, where there is not even a true security concern. In addition, the burdensharing issues as discussed in the previous section would climb even further. Because Europes long range capabilities are in even worse shape, the U.S. would have to once again provide the bulk of the resources. Besides geography, similar issues shape the debate around the scope of the alliance. In order to sustain itself, the number of missions increased after the end of the Cold War. As security offered less of a platform, NATO turned towards political and economic problems. The public and officials followed the common idea that NATO must go out of area or out of business (Brown 1999, 205). But, as the Eastern European states demonstrated the EU is more suitable for political stability, ethnic peace, economic revival and democratization. Even though NATO indirectly facilitates peace through stabilizing countries, it does so by paying the price of

Wahle 37 NATO: Mars &Venus losing focus and oversight in its missions and purpose. In fact, by pushing NATO to bring in new members, they have taken on the EUs burdens and obligations (Brown 1999, 217).

5.3. NATO and the Nuclear Age Nuclear power is a special topic within NATO policy since the unequal distribution of it automatically causes differences in burden-sharing as well as governance. Because nuclear power is important not only in terms of a countrys defense capabilities, but also to its status, nuclear weapons are often seen as the most compelling admission ticket to the high table seating the worlds major powers (Krotz and Sperling 2011, 320).The American nuclear arsenal served as the most efficient tool in containing the Soviet Union and displaying Marsian hard power. However, this protection was not a given at all times. The U.S. favored a policy of flexible response including conventional forces. In contrast, Europe preferred the rapid response nuclear weapons provide especially in light of rising flexible response, which reopened the haunting specter of a battlefield limited to Europe (Hoogenboezem 2009, 408). While the U.S. is geographically isolated and could launch long-range missiles, the European members immediately border Russia and are therewith at a high risk of sacrificing ground troops. Even though it is often claimed that the Soviet nuclear power has been exaggerated, it is indeed true that Soviet nuclear power is greater than American, which adds relevance to NATO in building a compatible counter response to the Soviet threat. However, significant problems arise with their inclusion in NATO structures. It may at times give too many privileges only to the countries that own them and join into the nuclear club. France, for instance, especially with its withdrawal placed magnificent emphasis on advertising their force de frappe (nuclear power). Frances force did little to impress the U.S. which was

Wahle 38 NATO: Mars &Venus certain of Frances dependence on U.S. nuclear weapons if it would ever come to the point of a nuclear response. To the U.S. or NATO at large French efforts were rather seen as an unwise use of resources. Instead the resources could be used for democratic peace-building efforts and military and conventional capabilities. Because of the unequal access to nuclear weapons and the competition with the Soviet Union, NATO did not succeed in bringing nuclear weapons under its jurisdiction. The Nuclear Planning Group stayed superficial to indicate European involvement to the outside. Yet, after all, those countries who actually own the nuclear weapons, not NATO, make the decisions over them. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) strictly organizes the behavior of the five internationally accepted nuclear powers. Due to these structural constraints a coherent nuclear policy is almost impossible. Unified governance thus becomes negligible when there is no central NATO control over NATO nuclear response (Hoogenboezem 2009, 407). Therefore, there will always be one country having the upper hand and preventing common actions and decisions when not even all the resources are shared and governed equally.

5.4. Separable, but not Separate: the European Failure for Independent Security The French German Army, the Western Union Defense Organization, the Berlin-Plus Agreement, the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and the most recent Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are only a few examples of the many attempts for a European security mechanism independent from the U.S. However, most either vanished very quickly or simply remained a part of NATO never being able to fully separate. In order to determine the reasons for this failure, Charles Tillys model of WUNC serves as a guideline. Even though Tilly utilizes these factors of Worthiness, Unity, Number and Commitment to

Wahle 39 NATO: Mars &Venus evaluate social movements, they prove essential for any movement also on the international scale. The greatest reason behind these failures is the European comfort under the American security umbrella and its unwillingness to cut back on the social investments. Having an independent institution has not yet been regarded worthy enough to replace greater welfare spending (Kagan 2003, 25). Thus, the lack of incentive to change hindered the long process required by institution building to ever take off. The status quo of NATOs division of labor is most worthy and provides Europe and the U.S. with a relationship of best possible benefits. Another argument claims, the largely unspoken justification for having a separate EU force was to cover situations, in which NATO (and, more particularly the United States) did not wish to be directly involved, but was nevertheless sympathetic (Leonard 2010, 260). Assuming that this is true in the European perception then their force would still be part of NATO and it would not be worth the effort to make it independent if the connection with NATO remains inevitable in either case. Especially since NATO rarely turns down opportunities for intervention, there is no benefit of having a separate institution solely to cover up missions that NATO does not want to publicly commit to. This would be unnecessary and redundant. Even though it is not quite the same as being independent, the Berlin-Plus Agreement already in place allows for Europe to use NATO assets at any time. Next, unity even within Europe and the EU itself is hard to achieve as the European governments are not completely amalgamated, but still hold on to their sovereignty. When the individual states disagree on issues, consolidating into a unit with a common goal is hard to implement in practice. The renunciation of the EU constitution by the Dutch and French governments in 2005 is the most drastic instance of the animosity mounted in the EU. Other

Wahle 40 NATO: Mars &Venus examples include, but are not limited to, the withdrawal of some members, such as Denmark, from the Schengen agreement to eliminate the borders among EU countries, as well as the abstinence of Germany to vote on Libya in the Security Council in 2010. Most significantly, this federalism leads to immense bureaucratic hurdles. Numbers should have been the easiest to allocate, since EU structures were already in place bringing together a relatively large number of countries. But, the numbers of those states supporting an independent European effort changed over time and with each attempt. Different European countries tried to seek greater autonomy during different points in time, which prevented any of the attempts to be collaborative and to bring together the majority of states. For example, the very first attempt of the French-German army in the 1950s and a tighter alliance in the 1960s foundered due to the strength of the alliance under the Soviet threat at that time (Hitchcock 2008, 66). Therefore, other European NATO members rejected the formation of French-German desires to isolate themselves. Once a certain number of states collaborate, it immediately raises the suspicion of other states. Moreover, as Europe tries to move away from power politics and towards pacifism, it does not recognize the need for security as urgently as the U.S. does, who has been involved in wars since the end of World War II. Because most European nations do not see a priority in fighting wars and extending their influence beyond the EU project, momentum stopped short of the amount necessary to carry through a new policy. Further, the lack of commitment is also the result of structural problems in the organization of the EU, where the six-month rotating presidency left it ill-equipped to lay out strategic priorities (Goldgeier 2010, 17). Although the Lisbon Treaty brought about some reforms, the EU encounters barriers in producing a popular head figure to lead clear actions. Catherine Ashton, the EUs High Representative of the Union

Wahle 41 NATO: Mars &Venus for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy most closely resembles the person that may be called a head actor in the EU. Despite her frequent appearance in international policy debates, she nonetheless plays a limited role. Instead, it is the respective heads of states that count and are looked towards in pressing security matters. Partially the sovereignty and the pluralistic nature of the EU cause the lack of a guiding figure such as the powerful president in the United States. The EU is less fond of attributing immense powers in the hands of a single executive. Even though this serves towards more equality among European states, at other times it might prevent the EU from reaching its full potential, such as an independent security institution. Furthermore, since a large number of heads of states are involved and policy often depends on personal connections, it is nearly impossible to have one comprehensive relation between the U.S. and Europe, since the new election in each states vary over time, so that there are rarely the same heads of states coming together to form policies. All in all, the unwritten deal manifested in NATO sees it as appropriate that Europe enjoys protection in return for Americas guiding diplomacy. By joining NATO these terms have thus been accepted by the members. This argument, however, reveals a policy paradox. On the one hand, the U.S. wants to strengthen the European pillar in order to strengthen Europe as a whole. On the other hand the U.S. also shows some fear of a Europe which may at one point turn into a competitor instead of protectorate. But for now, even if the European members would be independent they would not be able to gather as much strength as they do when joined with NATO. Even the force de frappe of France cannot act without the U.S.s nuclear power. In addition, a separate European institution would not guarantee a greater coherence. In fact it may simply be the same as NATO, except without the U.S. since the European states are themselves divided with their differing objectives and values. The EU still finds itself in the beginning stages

Wahle 42 NATO: Mars &Venus of eliminating major differences between states. Until the turn of the century there was not even a common military planning capability. The goal is it to minimize dependence within interdependence in order to accommodate the continuation of the federal system and at the same time guarantee assurance (Krotz and Sperling 2011, 313). Even though France rejoined the alliance fully in 2009, it still advocates for independence and the possibility of such can neither be excluded nor predicted with absolute certainty.

6. Endurance Explained through Realism In order to make sense of these apparent inequalities, research in this paper holds that Realism offers the best explanation for the survival of NATO. At the same time, however, it ought not to be denied that Liberals are right in stressing the importance of institutionalizing trust and building a positive hegemony. NATO most importantly survived after the end of the Cold War because it became more than just a security alliance, but it also provided mechanisms and venues to build political relations, conduct business, and regulate conflict (Ikenberry 1998-1999, 69). Exactly because countries found various purposes, especially liberal state building, it was able to survive as members acquired their own stake in the alliance. Most important are the increased returns and the lock-in effect (Ikenberry 1998-1999, 72). Over time little sense remains in eliminating an institution, because the cost of creating a new one is unbearable, learning affects are very high and time is sacrificed to build relations and commitments with other countries. Realists agree with this since overcoming prevailing mistrusts is a huge benefit and NATO is important to be sustained. Realist Mearsheimer claims that the Cold War actually turned out as a period of relative stability and peace granted by the bipolar order (Mearsheimer, Back to the Future: Instability in

Wahle 43 NATO: Mars &Venus Europe after the Cold War 1990). He distinguishes between two types of institutions. One is inner-directed and provides collective security among members and the other is outer-directed and focuses on deterrence against an external threat (Mearsheimer, A Realist Reply 1995, 83). The period after the Cold War, however, would experience a return to balance-of-power politics as it existed throughout most of Europes history with ethnic conflicts and strives for power. Before the U.S. and the Soviet Union balanced their power, but, with the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. achieved super power status and global hegemony and thus stirred the jealousy and fear of other countries. If this development proved true, this would mean that NATO instead of losing its purpose would have become more important than before in the Cold War era in order to control the powers set against each other and implement strategic retrains as an innerdirected collective security alliance. Not only is there still a possibility of Germany reviving nationalism, but Russia also remains a perhaps outdated but strong nuclear power and could at any time revert back into revenge. Henry Kissinger often stressed the importance of the U.S. to guarantee unity in Europe against all mistrusts (Kissinger 1994). International institutions generally counter an external threat, and besides the revival of Russia, there are other aspects which still require protection, such as terrorism and energy which demand the continuation of NATO. Institutions are most likely not products of a simple urge for international friendships, but rather a direct product of state interests. Decisions are thus based on interest and not affiliation, which explains the divergences of NATO opinions even in cases when cooperation would be more than beneficial. Even within the alliance there are still security competitions and there is no ultimate guarantee for trust. After the Cold War, the Strategic Concept of 1991 for instance reiterated the need for security in Europe.

Wahle 44 NATO: Mars &Venus The alliance was supposed to alleviate tensions by granting Europe the reassurance that the United States would neither dominate nor abandon them (Ikenberry 1998-1999, 77). Yet, NATOs relationship is painted with European fears of being prematurely abandoned by the U.S. and Europe as well as the U.S. remained suspicious of each others power all throughout. NATO was thus to keep in check Europes criticism of American hegemony and American attempts for strengthening the European pillar only so far as not to create a competitor. As realists claim, each country prevailed through pride in their own history and values since NATOs founding. Strict Realists claim that alliances generally do not help overcome such trust issues, because to keep your allies guessing, most of the time and on matters vital to them, about what you intent to do is bound to erode the foundations of confidence (Morgenthau 1957, 26). But they also acknowledge that fact that countries still keep the alliance vital to eliminate at least some of the mistrust. Another feature of NATO is, that the relationship is not seen as pacta sunt servanda (treatises are binding), but as rebus sic stanibus (by reason of changed conditions) (Raymond and Kegley 1990, 19). This attitude helped NATO after the demise of the Soviet Union to be flexible and newly adapt to the international system. However, this flexibility to exercise national interests and interpret the treaty according to those interests could also easily cause instability. Lastly, Constructivism as put forth by Alexander Wendt offers yet a different perspective to NATOs endurance. Instead of material capabilities, it focuses on social interactions (Wendt 1992). As could be observed in several instances the relations between administrations do impact countries relations. But, these relations are also influenced by the structure and the overall stand of the country and may thus not necessarily guarantee peace. If relationships are unfavorable, good relations between two states will be hard to maintain. Indeed the policies of such strong

Wahle 45 NATO: Mars &Venus Atlanticists such as President Clinton pushed NATO forward and kept it alive. But, at the same time anti-Atlanticists such as De Gaulle did not lead to the demise of NATO. Therefore, relations may be important to turn policies into a certain direction, but they are not a decisive factor to the survival of NATO.

7. Balkan Case Study: NATOs First Test The Balkans show the first instance when NATO, or more specifically the U.S. pushed for intervention and an active air campaign in order to counter fight the violent ethnic struggles, which escalated so far as to catch the attention of the international community and stir debates about the ethics of humanitarian intervention. The Kosovo-Albanians making up 80 percent of the population have not been, and are still up to this day, unwilling to integrate into the Yugoslavian state, now known as Serbia and Montenegro. The goal of Kosovo-Albanians is not to hold autonomy within Yugoslavia, but to reach complete state independence. Two main differences distinguish Albanians from Serbs. First, their ethnic background is fundamentally different. Whereas the Serbs belong to the Slavs, Albanians stem from the Illyrians, the original inhabitants of the Balkan Peninsula. As a result, the Albanians are perceived as a foreign body in the Slavic state of Yugoslavia. Second, while the Albanians are mostly Muslim, Serbs follow Orthodox Christianity. Due to alleged suppression of the Serbian minority, the autonomy of Kosovo was nullified and the country was scaled down to a Serb province in the 1980s (Jansen 2008). The Serbian government deposed the government in Kosovo and expelled all Albanians from all administrative organs. In addition, any Albanianspeaking media was suppressed. Serbs took on leadership in politics, administration and the

Wahle 46 NATO: Mars &Venus economy and Serbian evolved as the sole official language. All in all, Kosovo became a land occupied by Serbs and marked by violence, oppression and eviction. Albanians legitimize their claim to Kosovo through their big majority in populations as compared to the Serbs and their reinforced settlement of Kosovo in the 18th century, after most Serbs had left the Ottoman area. The Serbs in contrast view Kosovo as theirs since it is the medieval land of origin of the Serbian kingdom. Moreover, Kosovo is of strategic importance with its corridor to the South across Macedonia and Greece to the Aegean Sea as well as economic importance with mineral resources. Lastly, Serbs stress the protection of their minority rights. The defeat in the battle of the Amselfeld in 1389, which ultimately turned Kosovo into a Muslim country, remains a trauma to the Serbs even today (Jansen 2008). The majority of Serbs are convinced that Kosovo is part of Serbia. In order to demonstrate the divide within NATO on the Balkan conflict it is essential to lay out the different players and their position. Although the Serbs are generally viewed as the trouble-makers, Great Britain, Russia, France and Greece did not hide their sympathy for the Serbs (Koppe 1994, 12). Thanks to these reserves the Serbs allocated the necessary resources to fight in the first place. Russia with its pan-Slavic tendencies also sent troops surprisingly under NATO. However, their national interest was guided by the hope of using Serbian great power politics for their own purposes to access the Mediterranean (Koppe 1994, 5). This not only shows the preeminence of national interests, but also the fact that Russia may abuse partnerships with NATO in any other instances. However, the publicly announced stand of NATO members advocates not for Kosovos independence, but rather autonomy within an integrated Yugoslavia as well as a Bosnian Federation.

Wahle 47 NATO: Mars &Venus Many obvious reasons called for the immediate intervention of NATO in the conflict as firstly and urgently proposed by the U.S. The independence of Slovenia and Croatia in 1992 turned the formerly civil war into an inter-state war and thus demanding more international attention. Slobodan Milosevic was increasingly even opposed by his own Serbian population (Koppe 1994, 10). As it is widely known among the debate around intervention, all measures, including the UN Security Resolution, the envoy of blue helmets, the withdrawal of ambassadors and sanctions, did not affect Milosevics suppressing policies in any substantial way. Meanwhile, Serbs acquired more and more land even where there were no Serbs residing. The argument was to bridge the gap between the scattered presences of Serbs in Kosovo. Most importantly is the brutal ethnic cleansing exercised mainly by the Serbs and to some extent by the Croats against all UN Human Rights. No agreement seemed to be reached between Bosnians, Kosovo Albanians, Croats and Serbs, when even religious leaders found themselves in extremist positions. Despite these calls for intervention and the claims that airpower had been successfully exercised, the action of NATO states came too late and in fact encountered many hurdles. The international community should have seen the extreme Serbification in both Bosnia and Kosovo as critical, but the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) did not recognize the conflict on time and followed their rules of respecting state integrity. At the same time attention was focused on the East-West conflict and the Second Gulf War of 1990 with the Kuwait and Iraq conflict especially causing a delay in American reaction. The international principle of non-engagement prevented any valuable action. Even though the UN imposed a nofly zone in 1993 through NATO implementation, blue helmets remained absent to carry out the measures (Koppe 1994, 13). Further, the U.S. made it their spiel to put forward a lot of rhetoric against the atrocities, but was unwilling to commit any troops (Walt 1998/ 1999, 3). In line with

Wahle 48 NATO: Mars &Venus the labor division in NATO, the U.S. moved safely in the air, while the Europeans carried out most work on the ground and thus endangering their own troops. Ultimately the conflict exhibited a test for non-NATO European missions. The war was symbolic for the increasing lack of purpose of NATO after the fall of communism and this was the chance to proof the alliances adaptability to a reordered world. Uniquely in this case there was no dispute over national interests among NATO members, because to both sides the Balkan area did not attest to any national and strategic interests. Rather, the question the Balkan conflict raised was about proper process and strategy. The failure of NATO action is due to conceptual failures within each of the allied governments rather than to the structure of an alliance that was never designed to deal with ethnic conflicts (Kissinger 1994). There were certainly too many expectations placed on the role and ability of NATO to solve the conflict. No evidence shows that it was the air campaign of Operation Deliberate Force alone that brought about peace, but the diplomatic skills of Assistant Secretary of State Richard C. Holbrooke also made large contributions (Kaplan 1999, 206). Moreover, after the air campaign ended, efforts to return refugees and convict war criminals were extremely slow and the post-war Stabilization Force (SFOR) continued their presence for a long time. Another problem was the understanding of the deeply rooted ethnic conflict. Europe was often criticized because they failed to see the Serbs fault, but rather sought to take a neutral standpoint in viewing the ethnic groups as equal. As a result, Europe thought the historic conflict should be settled territorially, in which a Bosnian federal state as settled in the Dayton Acts would give each group its own jurisdiction (Hitchcock 2008, 68). Even though it is true that the Serbs settled the land first, nothing is static, so that shifts in power between different ethnic groups are normal and should not cause such a deep conflict. The U.S. itself was not even sure

Wahle 49 NATO: Mars &Venus which group to back up. Although they held the Serbs responsible for the bulk of the brutal acts, the U.S. also backed them many times because of their pro-Western ideals and lifestyle. After long interventions, the air strikes were seen as successful in driving Milosevic out. The entire conflict showed U.S. supremacy and the still existent need for U.S. involvement as Europe failed to act alone and was more important in the aftermath to keep the peace. It is therefore often argued that Europe is better suited to solving ethnic conflicts than carrying out hard power and military operations (Ruggie 1996, 117). All in all, there was no historical justification for the violence that took place, even though some of the secessionist movements from the former Soviet Bloc were provocative. There was no legitimacy in the tight Serbian control over the Kosovo Albanians and the random shooting and displacement. The fact that unrest and disagreements between the different ethnic groups in the Balkans still cover the news make it questionable in how far the European peacekeeping efforts were truly successful. Instead they point to a failure in the artificial federation of Bosnia and the limited understanding of the ethnic divides. Even though the belated American driven air campaign was successful to some extent, European reluctance to intervention but pacifist conviction slowed down any quick and valuable decision. NATO as a military alliance therefore may have to revise its capabilities if it seeks to focus on ethnic and religious conflicts as a sustainable means to resolve such conflicts as a coherent and effective whole in the future.

8. Prospects for NATO There are a number of initiatives that should be taken in order to sustain NATO and the vital transatlantic relationship in the future. First, costs need to be cut to keep the members in as well as better coordinate burden-sharing. After all both sides of the Atlantic seek substantial

Wahle 50 NATO: Mars &Venus returns from the alliance even though the returns may be different. Decreasing costs can be done by cutting some of the missions as well as delegating more non-security related responsibility to the EU. If the U.S. continues to provide the majority of assets, tax payers will eventually cease to carry the burden. U.S. withdrawal would mean NATOs demise. NATO already provides the structure and thus establishing new security alliances would just increase the cost. Moreover, despite its weaknesses, the structure has proven very steadfast and survived many crises and disputes. For instance, the NATO Response Force (NRF) of 2002 provides readily accessible corps for terrorism, which shows an ability to be flexible and adaptable to new threats. In addition, some NATO efforts are unknown to the public since the daily work of democratization is rarely discussed as disputes attract the media (Hitchcock 2008, 79). The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) functioned overall well in the Afghanistan crisis. In addition, the recent intervention in Libya showed great participation of European members and signs of an improved functioning of NATO in carrying out the air campaign (Daalder and Stavridis, NATO's Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run and Intervention 2012). Second, the alliance needs to clearly define its purpose and area of responsibility. This should be done in a way not to offset negative responses in Russia. For example, NATOs purpose could be reframed from collective defense to strategic reassurance (Brown 1999, 212). Within these lines NATO should stop expanding for the sake of having a clearly organized and functioning structure, unless a country is specifically threatened and would be accepted solely on the grounds of security and not just economic reasons. After all, the end of the Cold War did not reduce the salience of military power and Europe discovered that economic power does not translate into strategic power (Kagan 2003, 22). Not only Russia remains a security question, but the new strategic concept of 2010 also includes cyber and energy security as well as

Wahle 51 NATO: Mars &Venus terrorism. Expansionists like Kissinger, in contrast, suggest increasing the political role in light of lessened military threats and the rise of more ethnic and religious conflicts (Kissinger 1994). However, terrorism might well require a military response. The numbers of military staff necessary perhaps decreases in the near future, but this will only benefit NATO as it helps in cutting down costs. At the same time, it is still important to sustain a ready force in order to avoid such unpreparedness as in World War I or the failure of the League of Nations. Even though intercontinental missiles made it unnecessary to keep installations in Western Europe, they are still important not to have only protection in America, but also achieve European safety (Morgenthau 24). Generational change also needs to be considered. The new leaders did not grow up under the traditions and feelings of the Cold War and the culture of transatlanticisim, so that they may be unsure on how they will push for the importance of NATO (Walt 1998/ 1999, 6). The U.S. will certainly want to keep its role as Mars and retain military supremacy across generations, but it may be hard to create the same feelings of being pulled together by a common enemy. Fortunately, for the health of the alliance in 1999, [] the Clinton Administration believed the price for allied unity was worth paying (Kagan 2003, 49). Therefore, the future of NATO will to some degree depend on the sympathy of leaders to promote the transatlantic relationship. Since the end of the Cold War virtually transformed NATO overnight from a compulsory alliance into a voluntary one NATO will survive as long as countries see it worthwhile (Krotz and Sperling 2011, 318). If the reforms do not take place, Asia, already Americas biggest trading partner, will likely move into the foreground of security, and the EU gaining in strength may surpass the U.S., since U.S. growth has slowed down. Both players would be threats to the alliance instead of the

Wahle 52 NATO: Mars &Venus EU and NATO enforcing each other (Walt 1998/ 1999, 5). Since Europe shows less interest in Asia, this would deepen transatlantic divides even further. Yet, at the moment, as the graph based on data collected by the Pew Research Center demonstrates, there is still a lot of confidence and good will for NATO.

Opinion of NATO: Do you have a favorable or unfavorable view of NATO?

80%
60% 40% 20% 0% Percent responding Favorable (2011)

Figure 4: Public Opinion Survey on NATO

9. Conclusion With the end of World War Two, NATO did not simply continue to exist, but rotated its purpose from defending borders to providing security in the international realm. In the process, the marriage of the U.S. and Europe deepened and survived with every day differences. NATO is not a failure, but did in fact contain the Soviet Union, despite disunity that had been present since the beginning. Yet, NATO was set up as an ideal, which cannot ever be complied with due to national interests. Although it does not always prevent war, it is a platform for cooperation. Since all members devote a lot of resources there must be merit within it. There is often a divide between academia and reality, because NATO on the ground in Brussels today reflects world

Wahle 53 NATO: Mars &Venus events and is busier than ever in solving security policy issues against all predictions of its demise. Despite NATOs experiences with many inefficiencies and shortcomings due to its growth and divergences, the U.S. and Europe discovered their own objectives in NATO. While the U.S. up to now has provided the majority of military capabilities, Europe used this opportunity of being able to cut down their defense spending to focus on building an image as peacekeeper. The U.S. despite public discontent accepted this in return for a presence in Europe and legitimacy in missions abroad. However, if NATO seeks to retain its relevance it necessarily has to advocate for more political unity and equal burden sharing. After the Cold War it survived because it expanded and reinvented its purpose, so now NATO should follow the minimalist path in keeping its member list short and its aim for security focused. More research should address what specific steps NATO should take in its reorganization to ensure the current inefficiencies diminish and what incentives there are for countries to follow efforts of creating a clear and common purpose. After all, the U.S. might stay Mars and Europe Venus since these differences will most likely never be overcome, making it hence more worth accepting and working with the differences. There is room for these opposing security ideas to complement and compromise each other, where both sides effectively use their specific skills and resources in order for NATO to stay the main institution to address questions of transatlantic security.

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