Monarchy Democracy 21st C

Monarchy
& Democracy
in the
21
st
Century

2010 Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy
All rights reserved
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BCMD acknowledges the support Irom the Liaison OIfce oI Denmark Ior the
2009 Seminar on Emerging Democracies in the 21st Century and for the printing
oI this book.
A BHUTAN CENTRE FOR MEDIA AND DEMOCRACY PUBLICATION
P.O Box 1662, Thimphu Bhutan
www.bhutancmd.org.bt
Printed in Bhutan
ISBN No 978-99936-803-0-7
1 Monarchy and Democracy
Mark Mancall 1
2 The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy: Modern Dynasties,
Political Crises and the Perfect Prince
Mark R. Thompson 19

3. The Limits of Constitutional Monarchy in Scandinavia
Jrgen Elklitt and Birgitta Wistrand 40

4. Democracy and Monarchy in Thailand
Dr Suchit Bunbongkarn 57
5. The Future of Thai Monarchy
Kavi Chongkittavorn 65

6. Lessons from Japans Symbolic Monarchy
Kenneth J. Ruoff 75

7. The Story of the Demise of the Monarchy in Nepal
Sudhindra Sharma 84
8. Once Upon a Time: The Rise and Fall
of the Nepal Monarchy
Kunda M. Dixit 109

9. Media, Monarchy and the Management
o OFcial Memory. Juancarlisimo.
Hugh ODonnell 122
Contents
Monarchy & Democracy in the 21st Century
10. Self-Censorship: A Means to An End
Kinley Dorji 137
11. The Bhutanese Media and a Democratic
Constitutional Monarchy
Siok Sian Pek-Dorji 150

12. Bhutans Democratic Constutional Monarchy:
Revisiting Kingship and Democratic Transition Theories
Sonam Kinga 169

13. Bhutans Democratic Journey
Renata Dessallien 191
1
Monarchy and Democracy
Mark Mancall
1
The origins of the conference which gave rise to these papers derive from several
different directions. First, a one-day conference was held at Stanford University in
California in the spring of 2008, which took as its focus the supposed opposition
between monarchy and democracy. As was pointed out by some members
of the conference, this opposition made no sense either in contemporary
political theory or in practice. Indeed, many monarchies are democracies (for
example, Great Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, and even
Japan). While the conference passed almost as an unmarked moment in time, the
supposed opposition between monarchy and democracy often appears in armchair
commentary on political affairs or in ill-informed, semi-scholarly work. In light of
this there was, and remains, a pressing intellectual and practical need to explore
the relationship, rather than the opposition, between monarchy and democracy.
This was one of the objectives of the conference held Paro, Bhutan, on May 17-
20, 2009. We hope that the conference and the resulting papers will reignite a
discussion in political theory about monarchy, particularly as it may evolve in the
21
st
century.
Second, the Kingdom of Bhutan adopted a democratic Constitution in 2008.
This Constitution has been consistently described as, and in reality is, a gift from
the Monarch to his people, in particular a gift from His Majesty the fourth Druk
Gyalpo, the fourth King of the Wangchuck Dynasty, which has ruled in Bhutan
since December 190. 1he new Constitution, which was ratiFed on July 18, 2008,
was signed by all members of Parliament in the presence of His Majesty the King,
the Fth Druk Gyalpo, who had come to the throne on December 14, 2006, upon
the abdication o his ather. 1he Frst national elections in Bhutan were held on
March 24, 2008, under the new Constitution. From the very beginning, among
the many topics discussed among the intellectuals and bureaucrats in Bhutan,
2
particularly in the capital (to the extent that serious conversation about these
topics hae taken place at all,, hae been, Frst, the deFnition o the role o the
monarch in the new democratic monarchical system and, second, the degree to
which the new system is truly democratic. The Constitution has not been clearly
interpreted in both these areas, either institutionally by the Constitutional bodies
or conversationally by those participating in the discourse. Indeed it may be argued
that, within Bhutan, the discourse will persist in the future. The lack of conclusions
concerning these issues surrounding the Constitutional deFnition o the monarchy
and of the description of the democratic institutions it established sharpened the
feeling that such a conference would be useful.
We hoped that by bringing together a small group of scholars and journalists who
were, or who could be considered, specialists in the Feld, we might learn rom
them new ways of thinking about the issues that face us nationally. At the same
time we hoped that our experience combined with theirs would, as mentioned
above, reopen the discourse about monarchy in 21
st
century political theory.
The conference was structured in such a way as to encourage discourse itself.
The participants were asked not to write papers but only to prepare discussion
notes, and the conference was conducted throughout as a conversation among
the participants, gently (we hope) guided by a set of questions that we posed
to each other. Only after the end of the conference were the participants asked
to prepare papers in their own areas o expertise, but papers that renected, and
renected upon, the conersation that was the conerence itsel. 1hroughout, the
conference required very little guidance and moved ahead on its own momentum,
each moment of participation building on what had been said previously. It was an
exhilarating experience which still continues, months later, to raise issues of no little
importance. At the same time we must admit honestly that the conference came
to no conclusions that could be applied universally; rather, we seemed to conclude
that the issue was worth further and deeper discussion as the present century wears
on. From the point of view of the Bhutanese participants, all of whom shared
in these opinions, we still have a long road to travel before we achieve any clarity
but at least the Frst step seems to hae been taken. Indeed we hope that the near
future will see the development of a discourse in political theory within Bhutan
itsel, a community that through sel-renection and the exchange o ideas will
contribute further to the growth of democracy and to greater clarity concerning
the monarchical institution, which is so central to our very national existence.
3
The conference took place, and indeed was organised, around a set of intellectual,
theoretical, and historical issues which, in fact, were examined and re-examined by
the participants.
It seems that there are a series of concept confusions that appear across the
board in many areas of political theory, political thought, and even political
action. These concept confusions may arise from different sources: for example,
political theory` has primarily renected, or een issued rom, \estern cultural and
institutional considerations, and, we may argue, a certain confusion develops when
Western political theory confronts non-Western societies. Conversely confusion
may also appear in the thought and practice of non-Western political thinkers and
practitioners when they attempt to apply concepts and intellectual attitudes learned
in Western institutions to their own other-than-Western societies. For instance the
application of Western legal theory or Constitutional institutions to societies that
already have developed their own legal procedures and institutions for resolving
connict may result in considerable conusion i not a racturing o the society and,
no less obviously, of the mentalit of the theorists and practitioners themselves.
There would seem to be a confusion between the concept of democracy or
democratisation, particularly in contemporary American political thought and
action, and the concept of republicanism or, at least, a republican form of
government. (It may well be that this concept confusion is what led the Stanford
conference to pose an opposition between monarchy and democracy, a fallacy that
was pointed out by a member of Stanfords own political science department who
participated in the conference.) It must be pointed out that this concept confusion
leads to een greater complexiFcation conceptually when it is remembered that
many republican forms of government, such as Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union, were patently undemocratic or even anti-democratic; similarly some
undemocratic governments, such as the Spanish regime under Francisco Franco,
were titularly monarchical. The institution of republican forms of government
does not imply democratisation, nor does democratisation imply a republican
form of government.
Another area of concept confusion seems to arise with the use of terms such as
representative democracy in the context of elections to parliamentary institutions.
The simple holding of elections is no guarantee of democracy if we judge from
Soviet, Chinese, and other examples around the world. Nor does the holding of
elections that lead to populating parliamentary institutions with representatives
4
elected by voters participating in legal or Constitutional elections necessarily
guarantee democracy. This can be seen in the frequency with which certain powers
have insisted that elections be held in one or another country on the supposition that
elections themselves will lead to the process of democratisation. Indeed there is no
evidence to support such a conclusion when we analyse political reality. A further
conceptual confusion arises between the concept representative democracy and
something that might be called functional democracy. Democratic institutions
may run the gamut from congregations that include the entire community of
citizens (ancient Athens, for example) to those that use a variety of techniques
to arrive at popular consensus in traditional villages. This kind of confusion has
been recognised in recent years by some scholars who are looking at the potential
for the development of democratic ways of assessing opinion that do not rest
necessarily on institutions o representatie democracy`. Perhaps the Feld o
political theory needs to take greater account of the research produced in certain
areas of anthropology.
Many theorists, scholars, and policymakers, though not all by any means, share
what appears to be a allacious assumption that one size Fts all`, i.e., that political
theory qua political theory is applicable to all instances without regard to certain
variables that seem to be left out of their considerations.
One variable that does not appear to be taken into consideration in contemporary
discussions is that of the size of the state or polity that is the focus of attention
for the theorist or the researcher. Within a European context polities such as the
Dutch, the Belgian, or the Danish, to mention just a few examples, were considered
small and some scholarship about them paid attention to that idea. However,
in more modern times, the number of states that are not just small but are in
many ways tiny but which are still full and equal members of the international
community, at least legally has increased. In these states, where small or tiny
reers to either population or territory, size as a ariable is so signiFcant that it must
call into question a great deal of theory and research on political institutions based
on larger societies, to the extent that the theoretical formulations and research
results based on the largest societies are applied to small or tiny ones. To give but
one example: how do the institutions of representative democracy function in a
polity in which almost all the members of the politically active community know
each other and are actually or putatively related to each other across class and
geography? In fact what does representation mean in such a small but highly
integrated community?
5
Democratic theory also appears to have ignored the variable that may be
characterised as the stage of development, economic or political, of a given polity.
Some theorists of democracy appear to think that representative democratic
institutions can be introduced to, or imposed on, a society regardless of its stage
of development, much as certain tendencies in Communist theory thought that
the stage of capitalism could be skipped and a particular society could jump
immediately from feudalism to socialism. This argument frequently takes a
propagandistic form for immediate political purposes, but the question needs to
be raised on both theoretical and practical levels. Certainly this is easily observable
in foreign policy.
Political theory, and often political practice as proposed by certain governments
to others, seems to ignore the cultural and historical speciFcities o the dierent
states or polities to which advice is being offered. The problem becomes even more
acute when the elites of other-than-Western societies adopt Western concepts and
institutions without profoundly adapting them to their own polities. This situation
is exacerbated by the frequent tendency to rely on outsourcing decisions to
consultants who by virtue of coming from more advanced societies or political
systems are given an authority of opinion that overwhelms local considerations.
Indeed, it may not be too far-fetched to speak here of a kind of developmentalist
imperialism, supported by the education of many members of non-Western elites
in Western institutions.
In the republic of academic institutions, political theorists and, at certain levels,
political practitioners appear to hae ignored the particularities and speciFcities
that are so much the daily bread of historians and anthropologists; they have
come to believe that there is something called democracy that is (1) an object of
universal desire, and (2) a conceptual benchmark from which particular political
circumstances can move a society away or toward which they can move a society.
At a theoretical level, discussions of the political situation in Thailand in recent
times appear to have rested upon these assumptions about the universal desirability
of democracy and the measurement of progress toward or away from democracy
deFned as a benchmark.
On both the theoretical and practical levels positions taken on the issues
mentioned so far may be divided into two camps, roughly denominated right
and left (in the European, not the North American, sense), for shorthand
6
purposes. Take, for example, the question of the inclusiveness of democracy.
The right, it may be argued, privileges the political institutionalisation of some
form of representative or elective democracy. This theoretical position leaves open
questions such as the characteristics that voters or individuals eligible for election
must possess in order to participate in the roles assigned to them. 1he deFnition
of these characteristics may always be negotiable, but without the existence of a
set of characteristics, however they may be agreed upon, it is almost impossible to
conceptualise a representative elected democracy.
The left, on the other hand, appears to argue from very different assumptions
about the necessary prerequisites for a democracy. While the right may address
itsel to the characteristics deFning the oters and those eligible to be elected -
an approach very much in line with the individualism to which the right lays
claim the left tends to understand democracy in a much broader context,
so theoreticians of the left may raise questions concerning the very possibility
of political democracy in the absence of social and economic democracy. Another
issue that may concern the left is the possibility of democracy in a society in
which income differentials are so great that the possession of, or access to, money
is the overwhelming characteristic of eligibility for election or for participation
in decision-making. In this perspective, representative democracy may serve
narrow class or other-group interests or even function as an empty shell serving
non-democratic purposes.
To put the matter another way there is a theoretical distinction between procedural
democracy, which focuses primarily on representative institutions both nationally
and locally, and substantive democracy, which subsumes not only a genuine
public accountability of representative institutions but also the democratisation of
the economic, social, and other domains of collective human life.
These observations, while certainly not novel, provided the theoretical context for
the Paro conference. But the conference was also contextualised by modern history,
particularly since the so-called Reagan/Thatcher revolution. The particular
chronological framework for this historical context arises from the fact that it is
this period that saw the Frst steps being taken toward what eentually resulted in
the adoption o Bhutan`s Frst democratic` Constitution. Seeral characteristics o
the period need to be mentioned here. 1he Frst is the growth o the \ashington
consensus, which, broadly speaking, consisted of the application of neoliberal
economic theory and its domination not only of economic policymaking but
7
also o international relations in the Feld o aid and trade. A ery small country
such as Bhutan could not help but consider the future of its internal political
arrangements within the context of the Washington consensus, whether Bhutans
policymakers were completely aware of that fact or not. This is reinforced by two
other circumstances: Frst, Bhutan opened to the outside world in the early 1960`s
without the possession of an educated elite trained in the political and economic
thought and reality of the pre-Washington consensus world. The generation
of leaders who eventually brought Bhutan to the point at which democratic
institutions were introduced through the adoption of the Constitution largely
experienced an external environment dominated to a remarkably great extent by
the theories and practices of the Washington consensus. This, furthermore, was
reinforced by the fact that the leadership generation in question was largely trained
in Western institutions that were themselves both the source of and the vehicle
for the propagation of the Washington consensus. (It is interesting to note here
that the Frst major academic dissension rom the \ashington consensus may hae
taken place in French academic institutions at the beginning of the 1990s, but
France was not on the academic or the intellectual horizon of Bhutan.)
The basic assumptions of the Washington consensus that concern us here revolve
around the idea that a free market economy is a natural phenomenon, a force of
nature, and that it and democracy or democratisation are linked by some kind
of transcendent umbilical cord, each reinforcing, feeding, the other. The acceptance
of these assumptions in much of North American academia and in some British
political circles resulted in an inability to hear, much less to take seriously, other
perspecties. In a similar ein, it led to the unwarranted deFnition o other
perspectives, such as Scandinavian social democracy, Japanese or Singaporean
capitalism or, for that matter, Bhutans Gross National Happiness, as variants
of its own perspective rather than alternatives. This tendency was strengthened by
the triumphalism attendant upon the collapse of Communism in 1989 and after.
In the non-Francophone West, the dominance of the Washington consensus was
rooted in the marketing of its ideas through the education of students from the
developing world and by the power of the productive economic forces and the
military forces of the Anglophone West. The period from 1980 to the collapse of
the \estern, particularly Anglo-Saxon, Fnancial economy in 2008-2009 witnessed,
therefore, the aggressive marketing of democracy and democratisation
internationally, particularly its republican forms, by at least one Great Power, using
all means possible.
8
This, then, is the broad context within which the Paro conference took place, but
no less important is the fact that it is in this same period that political thought and
practice in Bhutan began to move in the direction of the adoption of a political
system based upon the immediate intellectual and institutional assumptions of
the Anglo-Saxon West or of its Indian derivative (remember that most Bhutanese
bureaucrats possessing political views in this area were educated abroad,
primarily in Anglo-Saxon or Indian academic institutions of one sort or another).
The Bhutanese Context
The issues discussed above, often unrecognised by the Bhutanese political players
themselves, also provided the context for developments in Bhutan over the last 35
years or so. O course, this is an arbitrary deFnition o a period, but the coronation
of the fourth King took place on June 2, 1974, and his reign witnessed profound
institutional, social and economic changes in the country. Indeed to say that it
witnessed these changes may be something of a misnomer, since the truth of the
matter is that he himself provided the vision and leadership for these changes. This
was possible in part, but only in part, due to the fact that during his reign Bhutan
came as close to being an absolute monarchy as possible (due to the development
of means of communications and control), it being understood that when all is
said and done no such thing as an absolute polity of any kind may ever have
existed. To no small extent, it must be carefully noted, the power of the Monarch
to inspire, direct, and guide the changes that Bhutan experienced in this era derived
very much from the extraordinary personality of the fourth King himself.
Several developments during this period provided the immediate contextual
environment for the Paro conference. First, from the fourth Druk Gyalpos ideas,
and under his leadership, Bhutan developed, however gradually, a Bhutanese idea
of development in all domains, an idea that has come to be known internationally
as well as domestically as Gross National Happiness. The discussion of Gross
National Happiness, and of its reception at home and abroad, will have to be the
subject o another essay but suFce it to say that, undamentally, it proides an
image, perhaps somewhat vague to be sure, of a polity in political, social, and
economic terms - that is an alternatie to, or at least a ery signiFcant ariant
o, the political economy deFned by the \ashington consensus. It is important
to recognise, however, that the idea and its acceptance, publically almost without
question, were, and continue to be, intimately associated with the mind and
personality of the fourth King within a polity that was widely considered to be an
absolute monarchy.
9
Under His Majesty the fourth Druk Gyalpos leadership Bhutan underwent a
transformation (I am consciously attempting to avoid teleological terms such
as development or modernisation which have become very much a part of
contemporary Bhutanese political discourse). This transformation included, most
profoundly, a transformation in the relationships of the means of production,
a process which began during the reigns of the earlier Kings of the Wangchuck
dynasty, and involved, for example, the abolition of certain pre-modern
relationships between labour and land, the introduction of money, etc.
The reign of the fourth King also saw a rapid increase in urbanisation in the
country and the appearance of new social classes clustered around the increasingly
signiFcant bureaucracy, which was the throne`s primary administratie instrument.
Indiiduals who were to become bureaucrats or members o the court beneFted
from the growth of domestic educational opportunities and opportunities to study
abroad as well as from the growth of international travel. Education and travel,
overwhelmingly to the Anglo-Saxon West as well as to India, were the primary
vehicles for the intrusion of, and eventually domination by, Western, particularly
Anglo-Saxon, intellectual innuences in the higher reaches o Bhutanese society.
These developments, and others too, reached a crescendo with the beginning of the
process o writing the Kingdom`s Frst Constitution, with the explicit purpose o
transforming a kingdom ruled by an absolute monarch into a polity over which a
Constitutional monarch reigned as head of state in a parliamentary democracy.
It needs to be clearly stated that there was no evident popular demand for such
a transformation, and that, moreover, very little cultural, social, educational, or
political preparation was made for the transformation. Even more to the point it is
diFcult i not impossible to Fnd eidence that suggests that the transormation o
the relationships of the means of production had reached a level where changes in
political structures were required. This transformation was accomplished through
the adoption o the Frst Bhutanese Constitution, which in terms o the ocus o
the Paro conference, radically transformed the political nature of the Bhutanese
monarchy and raised the question, in both practical and intellectual terms, of the
sources of legitimacy on which the thrones authority rested.
From the perspective of the foreign observer as well as of the internal
participant, the rapid and very remarkable political transformation which took
place in the middle o the Frst decade o the 21
st
century introduced into
10
Bhutanese history and into the nations political, social and economic practice,
a sharp discontinuity with which all concerned are still grappling in an effort to
understand its signiFcance and to Fnd mechanisms with which to naigate the
ship o state onto saer, Frmer, shores. It may be said without too much ear
of contradiction that throughout the 20
th
century the monarchy was the one
truly national institution in the kingdom. Bhutanese thinkers are still wrestling
with the implications of such a profound discontinuity, introduced by the order
of an absolute monarch to create a constitutional monarchy. This is why
the issue of the relationship between monarchy and democracy takes on such
importance within Bhutan against the background of the experience of other
transformations in different political, social, economic and cultural environments.
The Paro Conference
The objective of the Paro conference was to explore the theoretical bases and
concepts for the study of monarchy in the various societies represented at the
conference. The conversation was conducted in such a way as to encourage an
in-depth exchange of ideas and experiences. Among the questions raised at the
beginning were these: what are the trajectories of change that monarchy has
followed in democratizing societies? What kinds of monarchies were they before
they started on the trajectory of change, and how did their point of departure
innuence the point o arrial \hat external conditionalities innuenced their
point o arrial low were monarchical trajectories innuenced by external
social, economic, political and international forces? What are the problems they
have encountered along these trajectories? How have scholars and journalists
formulated these problems? What are the foundations upon which we can reignite
the discussion o monarchy in the Feld o political theory, i.e., to encourage the
reintroduction of the conceptual study of monarchy into the political discourse
and theory of the 21
st
century? What kinds or categories of monarchy are there at
the present time? Are there lessons from the past that make monarchies relevant
for the future?
Moving closer to the core of our issues we wanted to explore the varieties of
institutional and Constitutional structures that characterise contemporary
monarchies in democratising polities. How are contemporary monarchies in
such polities constituted? The Constitution of monarchies and of monarchical
legitimacy through the writing and creation of history, the use of ceremonial and
public festivals, special social arrangements, and the theoretical formulations used
11
to undergird the monarchical institution, the mechanisms for the construction
of monarchical charisma in the era prior to democratisation and in the era of
democratisation: these were some of the phenomenological questions raised in
the discussion. These lists can only hint at the range of questions raised by the
participants throughout the conference.
Given the nature and breadth of the conference it is impossible for the papers
included in this collection to renect the range o interests, the depth o the
discussion, and the excitement of the exchanges among the participants. We offer
these papers not as deFnitie statements on the topic o democracy and monarchy
but, rather, as spurs that we hope will lead to the return of monarchy to political
discourse.
In looking for participants in this conference we were struck by the relative paucity
of scholars whose main concern is monarchy. At the same time as the conference
progressed, and even more so after the conference, we became aware of scholars
whom we should hae inited but who somehow missed our surey o the Feld.
The existing literature on monarchy, particularly literature in the second half of the
20
th
century in English, is overwhelmingly a literature of nostalgia. This itself was
an interesting datum.
At the same time we were not unaware of the fact that those of us who were
addicted watchers of the television series Star Trek or continue to read science
Fction literature understand that in the uture there is little i any democracy
depicted in these tales of a world not yet born, and, no less interesting, there
is relatively little capitalism. We also became more aware of the fact that many
presidential democratic systems tend toward, or often display characteristics
of, monarchical systems. For example a semiological analysis of the way recent
American presidents have presented themselves to the public, particularly in press
conferences, suggests that a slogan the monarchy is dead; long live the King may
not be an inapt description of the contemporary state of presidential polities.
* * *
The papers in this volume are not intended to provide a coherent and integrated
discussion of the issues surrounding monarchy and democracy in the 21
st
century.
Rather they have two quite distinct but closely related purposes. First, the conference
12
and the papers that issued from it were and are intended to provide a perspective on
questions concerning the development of monarchical ideas and institutions in the
environment of experimentation with democratic institutions and ideas that seem to
characterize the late 20
th
and early 21
st
centuries. In this perspective the rediscovery
of the state in contemporary political discourse and research necessarily raises
the question of the varieties of states and Constitutional arrangements that are
or may be appropriate to state formation and change in the particular historical
conjuncture of the present and in the general, long-range process of change that
characterises the economic, social, political, and environmental domains of our
contemporary world. To frame the question as directly as possible, are the forms
of leadership and the institutions for the public expression of opinion and the
making of public decisions that seemed to be developing in many parts of the
world after the end of the Second World War and even earlier, adequate to our
contemporary condition? This volume, therefore, wants to not only encourage
urther discussion o the issues aboe but also to spark more renection on the role
of monarchy as a particular form of the contemporary state in future discussions.
1he second purpose o this olume ocuses on Bhutan itsel. Renection upon and
development of approaches to the creation of a democratic polity, for historical
reasons, centered on the maintenance o the monarchy. RedeFning the monarchy
in terms of the new political system appears not to have been integrated into the
broader political discourse concerning the state. As time passes it becomes evident
that the Bhutanese experience may itself contribute something to the development
of political thought in this area. Moreover as globalisation increasingly facilitates
the exchange o inormation and opinions, Bhutan may Fnd its own political
discourse enriched by the kinds of changes that took place at the Paro conference.
* * *
Mark R. 1hompson applies to his renection on monarchy the thought o the
philosopher Hegel. This is particularly striking because rarely are the reasoning
and insights of a Western philosopher applied to the analysis of a non-Western
monarchy such as Bhutan`s. 1he conclusion o this exercise, with signiFcant
examples drawn from different societies, is to distinguish between the Monarch
and the monarchy and to proide, by irtue o this distinction, a signiFcant
institutional emphasis that makes the indiidual Monarch the less signiFcant
variable. Beginning his contribution with an expression of the doubts, and often
13
the dismissiveness, of much of the contemporary discussion of monarchies,
1hompson ends by proiding us with a good basis or renecting on the potential
for a positive role for monarchy in the present and future. Of course, the broadly
accepted generalisation that progress moves from monarchy to republicanism may
be questioned from the Hegelian perspective that Mark Thompson provides. The
paper thus points in a potentially very productive direction for future theoretical
discourse on monarchy.
The paper by Jrgen Elklit and Birgitta Wistrand goes right to the heart of the
matter of monarchical political theory by revealing Scandinavian experience in this
area and raising the idea that monarchies may exercise soft power and not just
because it is constrained by democratic Constitutions but even, perhaps, because
of that. They suggest that the monarchy may have a stronger role than suspected
precisely because its role as manifest in the formal institutions of a monarchical
state may be left, perhaps even purposely, amorphous.
Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn discusses monarchy, the Thai monarchy in particular,
as an instrument to maintain peace, stability, and unity amidst political turmoil
and connicts` in 1hailand oer the last 30 years or so. le suggests that the 1hai
monarchy, for reasons of history and experience, can play a role that mediates
between demands for the growth of democracy and the forces or conditions
that may hinder or oppose such a growth; moreover he argues that, again for
historical reasons, the monarchy can contribute to , but not ensure that, democratic
development will be peaceful and sustainable. To some extent, this view redesigns
in democratic terms the traditional role of the Thai monarch, at least as it has
been constituted since the middle of the 19
th
century. Monarchy, thus understood
as playing a mediating role, serves, as it were, as a midwife in the birth of a new
democratic system if, of course, the other powers that are at play permit it to do so.
This argument resonates strongly with arguments in other papers in this volume. It
is suggestive of the role of the media discussed in Siok Sian Pek-Dorjis paper and
of the role of the monarchy discussed in Kenneth Ruoff s contribution, among
others. On another level, Dr. Suchits paper may lead in the direction of a different
analytical perspective: can we, or should we, consider the existence of monarchy
as an independent variable in understanding violence in democratic transitions?
Kavi Chongkittavorn points very clearly to the fact that consideration of the
monarchy must take into account the other political institutions and social classes
14
in the midst of which the monarchy performs its functions and against the
background of which the monarchy has to take into account and be accountable
for the welfare of the people and the nation as a whole. This essay appears at a
particularly sensitive moment in the history of the Thai polity, but its application
makes a point valid for monarchy in general, when it suggests that the King (by
extension not only the Thai king) has a role to continue to serve as the head of
state and symbol of unity.

Kenneth J. Ruoff brings our attention to at least two important facets of the
conversation. First, he makes it clear that the symbolic function of the monarchy
may well be no less important, indeed in some cases may be even more important,
than its political function. Second, he clearly sees the potential of monarchy as
an agent for positive political and social change in a society. It may be precisely
because the Monarch is above politics that he or she has the ability to serve as a
positive agent of change in the face of, or despite, the political interests that lodge
in the democratic institutions of the state.
Sudhindra Sharmas article, The Story of the Demise of Nepals Monarchy,
provides us with a very analytical overview of the history of the Nepalese
monarchy. In several ways it stands in contrast to the story told by Sonam
Kinga and is, therefore, very instructive. Several elements require noting: the
role of the monarchs personalities; the inability of either the monarchy or the
political leadership to develop a coherent position about democratisation and to
sketch, agree upon, and follow a single path from their present to the future; the
importance historically of violence in an extremely segmented society, leading
eventually to radical demands and to armed struggle for change (if not necessarily
or democratisation,, and, Fnally, the oerdetermination o the situation by a
particular event. More broadly, the Nepalese story includes three elements that
were absent in the transition that Bhutan has undergone: (1) The international
context proided a complex Feld in which arious domestic actors played and
were innuenced by external parties. In Nepal`s case the role o international players
was the relatively more obvious than in other situations. (2) Domestic politics took
place at a certain distance from the people themselves, doubtless due to the fact
that caste combined with class produced in Nepal a society so segmented that
those above do not think it necessary to take into consideration those below. (3)
Social and economic connict was both cause and eect in what was, again, an
apparently leaderless process of political change. Sharmas paper demonstrates,
15
perhaps, how diFcult it may be to single out one or een two primary actors in
such historical complexity. The contrast with Bhutans carefully guided process of
change could not be more marked and suggests the role that intelligent leadership
from above may play in 21st century democratisation processes.
Monarchical failure, the subject of Kunda Dixits contribution, provides much
material for speculation and theorising. It is obvious that the personality of the
Monarch and the Monarchs relatives is a political factor that must always be taken
into account. (Of course, the same may be said of non-monarchical polities as
well, and a certain surprise must be expressed at fact that the role of personality is
taken into theoretical account far less than history suggests it should be.) This is by
no means a consideration that has been unremarked, but its importance may be of
more than historical signiFcance, because the comparatie study and ealuation o
different systems may need to take incidental variables such as personality into
greater account than they do. The second observation that Dixit makes, and which
also seems to require more thought and renection, is the apparent ease and speed
with which the Nepalis have forgotten that the country was ever a monarchy.
To put it perhaps more abstractly than the author intended, memory and the
monarchy exist in a dialectical relationship characterised by some tension, and the
Monarch and other powers that exist in any given monarchical polity must pay
attention to the dynamics of this relationship if monarchy is going to be able to
provide future focus and stability.
Hugh ODonnell, discussing the experience of the Spanish monarchy, warns against
the emergence of what he calls celebrity monarchy, that is to say, monarchy as
entertainment (and, we may add, of both the highest and the lowest kind) and, at
the same time, suggests the potential signiFcance o monarchy as a repository o
history carried on into the present and future and a channel for emotion that may
contribute positively to the national stability in the midst of crisis.
Kinley Dorjis essay on self-censorship brings into the discussion of monarchy,
and even more important, into the discussion of democracy broadly conceived,
the issue of censorship not as a means of oppression to retain a system that would
otherwise falter but, perhaps less noticed and remarked upon, self-censorship as a
means for maintaining and strengthening a particular monarchical system. He also
points to the ways in which certain forms of verbal expression lodged deeply in a
particular culture may have political and institutional implications that go beyond
16
the observations of anthropologists. Restraint in expression as a positive political
phenomenon may be simply contrasted with the forced restraint of expression in
most democratic societies, which is considered a very negative value.
Siok Sian Pek-Dorjis contribution is instructive about the role of the media
in coherent change, in Bhutans case from a monarchy to democracy. What is
signiFcant here or uture renection is the dual role that the media may be called
upon to play in such a transition. On the one hand the media must exercise their
democratic responsibility to develop healthy critical and analytical attitudes, and,
on the other hand, the media must also exercise their historical and political
responsibility to sustain the determined steadiness of the transition. In Bhutan,
this is further complicated by the fact that to all intents and purposes the media
themselves have come into existence and developed alongside, and in conjunction
with, the new political system. While this complicates matters in the particular case,
more broadly it suggests that the media cannot be considered a separate system
over and against the political system but, quite the contrary, must be considered an
integral part of systemic change without becoming the automatic instrument of
the agents of change. If we consider the media themselves to be agents of change,
then perhaps the support of the media by the monarchy can be understood in
terms of cooperation toward a shared goal. If this is the case, it may be useful as
time goes on to renect on the media not just as potential critical opposition but
also as potential critical allies of the other agents of change, functioning more as a
gyroscope than as an instrument of ideology or an attack animal.
Sonam Kinga suggests the possibility, indeed perhaps the importance, of
questioning many theoretical propositions about the transition to democracy that
are essential to Western thought given the Bhutanese experience. This raises a
problem o no little importance: on the one hand, it is possible to aoid renectie
reformulation simply by assigning Bhutan the status of singularity. He himself
suggests this possibility in his conclusion. On the other hand, he also suggests
that it may be the accepted theories themselves that require reformulation in light
of Bhutans experience. It is not too extreme to suggest that political theory in
the modern and contemporary world has been primarily Western political theory;
international applicability may derive from forces other than the explanatory power
of Western thought. This leaves us with one of several very limited possibilities.
We may continue the present practice of exceptionalising experience that does not
Ft the model. Or we may try to reisit the question o uniersal theory by taking
17
into account experiences other than those from which Western theory has been
derived. We may abandon the attempt to arrive at a universal theory, at least at
the present time. Sonam Kingas paper provides theoretical challenges as well as
historical information.
The paper by Renata Dessallien provides an instructive contrast to the story told
in arguments made by Sudhindra Sharma. In fact, the story of Bhutans political
transition would seem to be almost precisely the opposite of Nepals. Dessallien
clearly identiFes isionary leadership proided by an historically conditioned and
well-placed leader (in contrast, perhaps, to a politician) as the crucially distinctive
variable. Almost inevitably, or at least in some way logically, the discussion must
lead to another question: what kind of democracy can be expected to develop
from the kind of leadership that Dessallien describes, absent any real popular
demand or any decisive eventual conjuncture, such as a rising against an oppressive
ruler. It is already very clear that uprising and social violence against tyranny and
repression are no guarantees of democratisation. What both Sonam Kinga and
Renata Dessallien seem to insist upon is a theoretical account of the appearance
and strategies of carefully guided leadership at the beginning of, and in the process
of, conscious political evolution of a polity.
It is a commonplace in western democratic theory to suggest the important role
of the bourgeois class in the demand for, and the process of, democratisation.
Neither the Bhutanese nor the Nepalese examples discussed in some of these
papers suggest that the bourgeois class played any role. The papers on Thailand,
as well as other commentary do not suggest that the Thai monarchys role in that
society rose from or even attended closely to the interests of the bourgeoisie. The
same seems to be true in Japan. If this is the case, then the experience of political
democratic change outside of the West may call into question the universality
of the claims made, both theoretically and politically, for the central role of the
bourgeoisie in the process of democratisation. And, if that is the case, this may
also have implications for the claims made for the social and political consequences
of one, as opposed to another, theory and politics of economic development.
* * *
The remarks provided above on each of the papers included in this volume are, it
goes without saying, very subjective. I can only hope that the authors will forgive me
18
if I have misrepresented their arguments or have neglected what they themselves
think is important in them. However, they all seem to point to an exciting and
important conclusion: the question of monarchy must move into the domain a of
political and social theory and of political science, transcending anecdote and the
kind of history writing that have characterised much of the discussion of monarchy
in the last century. This book will have achieved its purpose if it both focuses the
attention of scholars and theorists on Bhutan and, at the same time, serves as a
ehicle or Bhutan`s contribution to the broad Feld o political discourse.
Mark Mancall is Professor Emeritus of History at Stanford University,
California, USA.
19 19
The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy:
Modern Dynasties, Political Crises, and
the Perfect Prince
Mark R. Thompson
2
When thinking about monarchy in the early 21
st
century one might be struck
by how irrelevant or anachronistic it is often considered - the former when it
is constitutional and institutionalised, the latter when it is absolute and arbitrary.
Put dierently, either monarchy exercises ery little direct political innuence ,the
Scandanavian monarchies come to mind - see the contribution by Jorgen Ploen
Elklit in this volume) or it makes the wrong kind of difference (e.g., the autocratic
monarchies of the Middle East - see Michael Herbs book All in the Family: Absolutism
and Democratic Prospects in the Middle Eastern Monarchies). Based on the dynastic
principle monarchy might seem out of step with the meritocratic ideology that
supposedly dominates the modern age. Although monarchy is clearly compatible
with democracy if it is constitutionalised (e.g., the United Kingkom or Sweden),
a philosophical tension remains (most simply illustrated by the difference between
the words citizen and subject). So if monarchy is to be appropriately modern,
it must become irrelevant, not interfering with democratic legitimation by popular
rule. If it is more than that, it becomes a nuisance if not a positive danger to
legal-rational` orms o political organisation which the innuential German
sociologist Weber famously foresaw replacing traditional legitimacy in the process
of modernisation. On the other hand, both in the papers in this volume and
elsewhere, Bhutanese commentators and observers of Bhutan mostly argue that
without the strong leadership and continued guidance of the monarchy neither
modernisation nor democratisation would have taken the relatively peaceful path
they have there.
It is not easy to seek counsel on this issue from the realm of political theory as most
major enlightenment-innuenced thinkers in the \est either condemned monarchy
or ignored it altogether, an either or iew renected in the preious paragraph.
One of the few exceptions in this regard is Hegel who embraced constitutional
20
monarchy.
1
His defense of monarchy against the enlightenment onslaught (and its
seeming political expression in the French Revolution) was robust: in the Philosophy
of Right (1820/2001) he not only argued that a constitutional monarchy could
be considered a rational form of government, it was actually the most rational
form imaginable. He did not mean this just for Prussia (while making clear he
opposed the restoration of absolute monarchy which conservative thinkers of
his time proposed) but as a form of government generally. Hegels advocacy of
monarchy (as this principle was embodied in his philosophy of history) has been an
embarrassment to his often otherwise admiring commentators - Marx excepted, of
course, who was not stinting in his scorn of Hegel on this issue (Marx, 1970/1843-
44). Most interpreters found it best to ignore these residues of the past that clung
to Hegels shoes while he peered so presciently into the future.
But it is useful for our purposes here to take Hegel as a guide when looking into
the relevance of the monarchy in the modern age, which I will do in the next
section of this paper. He may well be a bit overenthusiastic at times (going so
far as to advocate a monarchs divine right to rule), but his views are a useful
counterpoint to the skepticism that dominates most contemporary considerations
of monarchy. In particular he argues that hereditary succession is a crucial aspect
of monarchy and that the role of the monarch should be strictly limited. I will
then brieny examine the dislocation that has oten occurred when the monarchy
is suddenly abolished. To understand how important something was it is helpful
to consider what happens when it is gone. The next part examines the dynamics
of monarchys underlining principlehereditary succession. Here my approach is
to ask how this precept has survived in politics in modern societies in the form
of political dynasties and what importance it has. This, in turn, will lead me back
to legel`s renections on why the hereditary aspect is crucial to monarchy. linally,
I will ask how monarchies have reacted in critical situations. Despite the large
variation between the various crises monarchies have faced in Asia and Africa, a
fundamental distinction emerges: situations in which the monarchs intervention
is seen as politically neutral and those in which the monarchy is perceived to have
acted in a partisan fashion. This will bring me back to Hegels key argument about
monarchy: that the prince must stay above the political fray and, in fact, who the
prince is should not actually matter at all (a very counterintuitive claim as the
credibility, and even survival of many modern monarchies seems to rest on the
personality and political skill of the current king).
1 Another important enlightenment thinker who had a positive view was Montesquieu, who, as will
be shown below, infuenced Hegel`s views on this subject.
21
Hegels Defense of Constitutional Monarchy
Hegels position on monarchy has been subject to much misunderstanding. Many
commentators have reacted with incredulity that monarchy can be rationally
justiFed and that such a justiFcation includes the arbitrary principle upon which it
is based - hereditary succession. Lli Diamond summarises the diFculties legel`s
interpreters have faced:
Is the institution of hereditary monarchy a merely given and natural
foundation to government that betrays the Cartesian-Kantian revolution
through a return to medieval forms grounded upon what lies beyond human
reason? Is Hegel betraying his own fundamental philosophical insights in
order to conform his argument to the historical reality given in his time?... In
the interest of defending Hegel, certain commentators have, against Hegels
own expressed intentions, radically historicized his claim to the rationality of
these institutions, without clarifying why constitutional monarchy appears
unacceptable in our own times. Should this contemporary shift away from
monarchy be understood as an historical refutation of the rationality Hegel
sees in this form of government? Or, conversely, are our contemporary
attitudes towards monarchy merely irrational prejudices from a Hegelian
perspective? (2004)
Hegels argument in favor of retaining a constitutional monarchy, formulated in the
wake of the French revolution, was reformist, not reactionary. He warned that the
excesses of the French revolution threatened the very freedoms that it had initiated.
But Hegel also distanced himself from conservative Prussian thinkers such as K.L.
von Haller who wanted to free the crown from constitutional constraints and make
it the sole source of law. (Hegel, in turn, was subject to harsh criticism by Prussian
reactionaries.) Hegel had close connections with several Prussian reformers
Stein, Hardenberg, and Altenstein. In fact it was Altenstein who was instrumental
in offering Hegel a professorship in Berlin because he found his reformist views
attractive (Beiser 2005). Hegel rejected an absolute monarchy freed from legislative
and executive restraints, envisioning instead a sovereign whose role was primarily
- but still quite signiFcantly - symbolic. legel neer abandoned the principle
of freedom he derived from the French Revolution, but saw in constitutional
monarchy the best way in which it could be upheld and preserved (Ritter 1965).
For Hegel, a political state is rational to the extent that it undergoes inner
differentiation in accordance with the nature of concept (Begriff) of the state itself
The Relevance of Hegelian Monarchy: Modern Dynasties, Political Crises, and the Perfect Prince"
22
(Diamond 2004). Monarchy represents the most rational form of the modern
state because it, more than any other form of government, realises the ideal of
freedom that underlies the concept, or idea, of the state (Beiser 2005). This claim
seems diFcult to accept in an age where many constitutional monarchies hae
disappeared; but this does not necessarily prove that monarchy is not adequately
rational, only that this rationality is no longer as readily apparent as it was in an
earlier age in which such state forms were more common (Yack).
A constitutional monarchy is a mixed form of government in the sense that
Montesquieu understood it as a guarantee of public freedom (1820/2001). It
is composed of the legislative, the executive, and the sovereign. The legislature
makes general laws and thus represents the principle of universality. The executive
applies and enorces laws to speciFc cases, making it particularistic in unction.
1he monarch is the third part, the soereign, who oFcially enacts these general
laws applied particularly and thus embodies both the legislative and executive
components as an individual (Beiser 2005). This leads Hegel to the metaphysical or
systematic claim that as sovereign only the monarch can represent the concept/
idea of the state. Marx denounced Hegel on this point for twisting the empirical
fact of the monarch representing national sovereignty into a metaphysical axiom
(Marx 1943-44/1970). Frederick Beiser offers a more positive interpretation of
Hegels position on the monarchy and the idea of the state:
While Hegel gives more weight to his systematic argument that any
prudential consideration about the best form of government, the fact
remains that his systematic argument is best understood in the light of
his claim that constitutional monarchy provides the best institutional
safeguards for freedom. Since the idea of the state is based on freedom,
and since constitutional monarchy realizes freedom more than any other
form of government, it follows that constitutional monarchy is the highest
realisation of the idea of the state. (2005)
Hegel argued that constitutional monarchy evolved through two historical steps
and was based on the hereditary principle. He believed human history to be a
series of stepping-stones that led to the gradual realisation o reedom. 1he Frst
historical stage of constitutional monarchy involved citizens transferring their
individual natural wills to the monarch to escape the hazards and uncertainties of
the divided sovereignty characteristic of the Middle Ages and the early Renaissance
23
period. As one person, the monarch is an indivisible power that better represents
sovereignty than a legislature that can be divided against itself (Diamond 2004).
But the monarch is not merely the highest oFcial o the state, bound to the people
by contract, who can hold him responsible for his actions. Hegel even adds to the
monarchys exalted status by suggesting it possesses a divine right to rule (Beiser
2005). Yet such transcendental speculation does not lead Hegel to claim that the
monarch has, or deserves, absolute power.
For after sovereignty had been gathered into the hands of an absolute monarch,
the next stage in Hegels account of the evolution of the state was the self-
differentiation of the political system. The granting of rights to the particular
spheres of civil society, on the one hand, and the division of powers between the
executive and legislative, on the other, led to an enormous increase in individual
freedom. This dual process of increasing personal security and granting civil rights
created a strong sense of obligation by the citizenry towards their enlightened
sovereign. This, in turn, helped stabilise human liberty through a longstanding
institution, something which the French Revolution with its radical republicanism
failed to accomplish.
2
Hegel had a holistic view of the state. In the state, each part exists for the whole
and the whole exists for the part. Thus, the individual is both means and ends for
the state. This is how Hegel is able to derive both individualist and collectivist
conclusions about the state: while the individuals rights must be upheld by the
state, the individual must devote himself to affairs of the state.
3
Hegel argued that
the Greeks and the Romans did not know the Christian principle of subjectivity,
the idea of the freedom of the individual. They propagated only collective, political
freedom involving the proper action of citizens acting according to laws they had
themselves created. Only the advent of Christianity led to a higher understanding
of the importance of individual freedom. (But Hegel also criticised those Christian
2 Hegel, like many other reIormist thinkers oI his day such as Humboldt, was also concerned about the
dangers oI unIettered democracy, with Socrates` martyrdom in Athens being the prime cautionary
example (Beiser 2005).
3 This individualist/collectivist dualism has led to a long running debate about whether Hegel was
a liberal or not. Beiser argues that 'Hegel`s partiality Ior liberalism was no less strong than his
sympathy Ior communitarianism. Although it is implausible to regard Hegel as a liberal, it is certainly
the case that he upheld some fundamental liberal valuesTrue to his respect for such rights, Hegel
strongly endorsed some classical liberal Ireedoms: Ireedom oI conscience, association, and press.
While he still aIfrmed the value oI a single Church in Prussia, he held that the state should tolerate
a diversity oI sectors, be they Quakers, Jews, or Catholics.
24
theologians who placed the highest good in other-worldly salvation, not in the
realization of human freedom in the world.)
The monarchy protects individual interest from clashing with the public good in
the ideal constitutional state or, as it were, Christian-inspired liberty with the Greek
idea of the polis. For the monarch symbolises the universal will of the sovereign
state against the particular wills of individuals operating within civil society. A well
functioning state must not allow particular wills to become ends in themselves.
State power must be predominant, precluding the potential chaos of civil society.
The monarch proclaims the decisions of the state, showing that their necessarily
arbitrary character has its logic in the universal claims of the state. As Diamond
writes, the majesty of the monarch lies in the free asserting of I will as an
expression o the unity o the state and the Fnal step in establishing law` ,2005,.
This linear historical process which Hegel describes may seem paradoxical because,
like Montesquieu, Hegel believed that the best constitution for a nation derived
rom its own speciFc cultural, historical, climatic, and geographical conditions.
He writes that every nation has a constitution appropriate to it and suitable to it
(Hegel 1830/2001).
4
Hegel argues that monarchy is particularly well equipped to
embody national character and constitutional continuity as it has often been linked
to a countrys history over generations. Hegels position also allows the conclusion
that because it well represents the nation and its culture, the monarchy is best
able to steer a nation through crisis (Diamond 2004). Beiser summarises Hegels
position this way:
Ultimately, the monarch plays essentially a formal role in the Hegelian state,
serving as the highest instance of formal decision. Yet this symbolic
role is o the greatest signiFcance or legel because it represents the
unity, sovereignty, and culture of the people. (2005)
But this culturalist perspective does not lead Hegel to depart from his claim about
the universal rationality of monarchy. Hegel presumes an inner unity of world
4 He adds: 'The constitution oI any nation depends in general on the character and development oI its
selI-consciousness.A nation`s constitution must embody its Ieeling Ior its rights and its position,
otherwise, there may be a constitution there in an external way, but it is meaningless and valueless.
As an example oI this danger, he points to Napoleon`s imposition oI a progressive constitution
on an unready Spanish nation which 'recoiled Irom it. Quoted and discussed in Avineri, 1985.
The obvious contemporary relevance oI Hegel`s argument (in Iraq or AIghanistan, Ior example) is
striking.
25
history in which there are countries/cultural regions lower down in the civilisation
hierarchy as opposed to those which have achieved a higher stage.
5
For Hegel, not
just Prussia alone has reached this point of historical development (Beiser 2005). It
had become widespread in Western Europe and was part of a necessary historical
transformation because it best guaranteed freedom - Hegels teleological endpoint
of the development of the state.
6
Monarchy must be based on hereditary succession, Hegel argues.
7
This means, of
course, that who succeeds as king is arbitrary, a kind of genetic lottery. The new
monarch may or may not be virtuous, enlightened or not. But given the legislative
and executive constraints on the monarchy, it does not really matter who the
monarch is. Diamond writes:
The natural immediacy of succession through primogeniture precludes
any justiFcatory argument that might ground the choice o this indiidual
as monarch, dictating that the monarch will come from this certain position
in this particular family. From the perspective of the understanding,
this seems to root irrationality in the very apex of the state[Hegel]
argues that in a fully evolved constitutional state, the particularity of the
monarch, which admittedly is wholly contingent, should play no role in
determining the general will, since the legislative and executive powers
together will propose laws and decisions which require nothing but the
formal approval of the monarch to enact them. The monarch in this
state acts only in concord with the other two powers, and the laws and
their application are brought into existence not through the monarchs
uninformed and arbitrary whim, but only after having passed through the
entire political process. (2004)
5 China, which Montesquieu had infuentially claimed was under the sway oI 'oriental despotism,
was considered particularly backward, even 'childlike. The extreme flial piety showed Ior their
rulers was thought by Hegel and many oI his contemporaries to be derived Irom ConIucianism and
was seen to typiIy the 'enslaved mind oI the Chinese (Lee 2010, Iorthcoming).
6 This, oI course, is part and parcel oI Hegel`s larger project oI combining Kantian universalism
with Herdian historicism. Through an elaborate philosophy oI history, Hegel aims to ground the
development oI philosophical rationality in its historical context.
7 Hegel did not consider the possibility oI electoral monarchy, such as exists today in Malaysia,
Ior example. Not only did he stress the advantages oI hereditary succession, he generally thought
elections to be the 'worst oI institutions (Levin and Williams 1987).
26
The hereditary succession places the monarch above an elite faction. The principle
of primogenitor insures for Hegel that who becomes king will be depoliticised, or,
in his words, that all fractious disputes are avoided (a highly dubious interpretation
of the history of monarchies!). Hegel concludes with the simple claim that the
principle of state must be such that the private character of its occupant [i.e., the
current constitutional King| shall be o no signiFcance` ,legel 1820,2001,. 1he
sole function of monarchy is to provide the state with agency, making the personal
traits of the monarch irrelevant (Diamond 2005). The personality of the monarch
is also insigniFcant due to the rationality o the constitution that underlies modern
monarchy. Monarchs must follow the advice of his ministers, and thus cannot be
held accountable for their actions. Hegel thus writes of the monarchy in a crucial
passage in the Philosophy of Right:
In a completely organised state, it is only a question of the culminating
point of formal decisionhe has only to say yes and dot the iIn
a well organised monarchy, the objective aspect belongs to the law alone,
and the monarchs part is merely to set to the law the subjective I will.
(1820/2001)
When Monarchy is Abolished
In his famous study of interwar democracies in Political Man the sociologist
Seymour Martin Lipset pointed to the absurd fact that those countries which
had retained constitutional monarchies had more stable democratic orders
than those which had become republics (1959). He argued that the deep-seated
social and political changes linked to industrialisation had made the institution
of the monarchy largely irrelevant. But preserving the monarchy did help retain
the loyalty of those groups that felt they were losers in modernisation: the old
aristocracy, traditionalists, clerics, and peasants. The continued existence of the
monarchy showed that the world they once knew was not entirely lost and that
the new world could gradually be adapted to. He cited the examples of Britain,
Scandanavia, the Lowland countries, Australia, New Zealand and Canada. On the
other hand, France, Germany, and Austria had been plagued by social instability
and political unrest since the abolition of the monarchy.
The experience of the Chinese (1911), Russian (1917), and German (1918-19)
Revolutions suggest that the abolition of the monarchy leads to a common
outcome: a massive legitimation crisis and a radical decline in human freedom.
27
What Peter Berger has termed the sacred canopy is torn away (1967). A
metaphysical vacuum emerges. After all, the monarchy had been the focal point
of cultural continuity involving a sacral system connecting heaven and earth.
In his famous study of Nazism, Eric Voegelin argued secularisation led to the
rise of political religions (1938/2000). With the transcendence of traditional
religion destroyed, revolutionaries, left and right, attempted to create heaven on
earth by deifying a concept such as class or race. The terror of the French
revolution, the rise of Maoism in China, Stalinism in Russia/the Soviet Union, and
Nazism in Germany make Voegelins argument seem plausible in these three post-
revolutionary, republican contexts.
This is not, of course, to suggest, that the abolition of monarchy is a monocausal
explanation for the rise of totalitarian political religions, nor are they necessarily
linked. Rather, the suggestion here is that the abrupt abolition of monarchy
creates a spiritual oid in which anaticism tends to nourish. 1he search or
meaning can lead to rapid radicalisation, particularly if other aggravating factors
(economic crises, lost wars, political turmoil, etc.) intervene. It is interesting to
note that ater the lrench and Chinese reolutions the monarchy was brieny
(but ultimately unsuccessfully, despite several attempts in France) restored. Even
one-time reolutionaries oten came to understand the metaphysical signiFcance
of monarchy, as Napoleons coronation as emperor demonstrates. In Germany
the presidency of Paul von Hindenburg, the famous World War I general and
ather Fgure, during the \eimar Republic is oten interpreted as an Ersatzmonarchie
("monarchical substitute"). Mao has been compared with traditional Chinese
emperors (Salisbury 1992). More generally the modern institution of the presidency
has been viewed as a substitute for the monarchy. The strong French presidency
under de Gaulle and more recently the revived Russian presidency under Putin
became political spearheads for resurgent states. In both the French and the
Russian cases, the rise of a powerful presidency seemed to put an end to a long
period of turbulence (in France a period of about 150 years!) that began with the
abolition of the monarchy.
All of this seems to provide support for Hegels position. Monarchy represents
political continuity; its abolition discontinuity. The political disruption that Hegel
had seen in the French revolution was repeated in the Chinese, Russian, and German
revolutions, for example. Jacobian excesses plagued all totalitarian democratic
revolutions proclaimed in the name of freedom but ultimately undermined it by
28
destroying the institutions that could protect it (Talmon 1952/1970). Constitutional
monarchies in Europe proved one of the most effective guarantees of individual
freedoms and an effectively functioning polity as Hegel would have expected and
Lipsets observation suggests. Thus constitutional monarchies do indeed seem to
help realise the idea of the state in terms of the preservation of human freedom
in Hegels terms.
The Continued Relevance of Dynasticism in the Modern World
In the Weberian tradition, dynastic rule is seen as the mark of traditional rule par
excellence. One rules not because one has, in some signiFcant way, proen onesel
capable but because one happens, by chance, to be born in the right family. In the
discussion of regime types, neo-Weberian scholars have developed the notion of
(neo-) sultanism - an extreme form of personalistic rule based on dynasticism
(Chehabi and Linz 1998). Drawing on Webers (historically misleading) analogy
between extremely arbitrary traditional rule and sultanism in the Ottoman
empire, the argument is that in modern times political rule can degenerate from
institutionalised government to arbitrary rule based largely on the will of one
person. Lacking a strong party or support in the military, this neo-Sultan turns
to his family and, in particular, his son or wife, to preserve his grip on power.
The Somozas in Nicaragua (Anastasio Somoza Garcia, Luis Somoza Debayle, and
Anastasio Somoza Debayle), Papa and Baby Doc (Francois and Jean-Claude
Duvalier) in Haiti, the Castros (Fidel and Raul), the Kims in North Korea (Kim
Il-sung, Kim Jong-il, and his supposedly annointed son-successor, Kim Jong-
un), the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran (Reza Shah Pahlavi and his son Mohammad), the
Ceausescu clan in Romania (Nicolae, his wife Elena and his son Nicu) in Romania,
and the conjugal dictatorship in the Philippines (Ferdinand E. Marcos with
his wife Imelda) are examples of this phenomenon.
8
Sultanistic rule is despotic
rule. Regime institutionalisation is undermined by the personality cult of the ruler
which does not serve an ideology but only family interests. Even the traditionalist-
style legitimacy some of these rulers seek (such as the Shahs in Iran) turns out to
be little more than a cover for personal rulership, neither constraining their rule in
any meaningful way nor raising their standing in the eyes of the public (who mostly
come to see them as usurpers).
8 These examples are mine. They are not all discussed in Chehabi and Linz. On the Marcoses`
'conjugal dictatorship, see Mijares (1986).
29
This view is close to Hegels criticism of absolute monarchy. Having gathered state
power in the monarchy, the next historical stage is missed because instead of
dividing power with the executive and legislative and granting rights to the people,
the ruler consolidates all power in his own person to be exercised entirely at his
own discretion. Neo-sultanism shows the dangers of absolute dynasticism.
Neo-sultanistic rule tends to arise in the midst of a crisis of sovereignty (Chehabi
and Linz 1998), roughly parallel to Hegels argument about divided sovereignty in
the Middle Ages. Kim Il-sung took power in a divided Korea; Nicolae Ceasusescu
came to predominance in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe, making a sharp
break with the Soviets with his condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968; Fidel Castro seized power as Cuba was still under the sway of U.S.
(neo-) imperialism. These leaders often quite successfully strengthened their
countries sovereignty and national pride, building their cults of personality
around nationalism. But lacking constitutional constraint, the behavior of these
dynasts became increasingly arbitrary. What begins to matter most in the state is
the character of the ruler. Among sultanistic rulers, the personality of the prince is
all important, which makes it, in the Hegelian framework, a degenerate state form.
More benign forms of hereditary rule also exist in the modern world. An under-
reported and analysed issue in U.S. politics is the role of dynasties in politics there.
While the Bush and Kennedy (and the would-be Clinton) presidential dynasties are
well known, these tend to be treated as uninteresting exceptions (Phillips 2004). In
fact, dynasticism is widespread in U.S. politics. Almost every U.S. state has powerful
local dynasties (one famous example is the dynasty established by Huey Long in
Louisana). The U.S. Senate has a long tradition of dynasties. It is not uncommon
for wives to follow their deceased husbands into senate positions, congressional
seats, or governorships (Kincaid 1978). One key to understanding dynasties in
the U.S. is the absence of strongly institutionalised political parties. Without
them, political families have the advantage both of a brand name and extensive
political networks which prove decisive in weak parties that rely largely upon
the entrepreneurial talent o candidates. But another aspect is the identiFcation
of dynasties with certain social-cultural traditions (the social liberalism of the
Kennedys, for example, which was strongly emphasised in eulogies for Ted
Kennedy in August 2009).
As is well known, dynasties are also widespread in Japanese politics (Curtis 2000 and
Itoh 2003). The most recent elections in Japan in August 2009 pitted two scions of
30
political dynasties against one another. The grandfathers of Yukio Hatoyama, who
led his opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) to victory, and of Taro Aso,
the defeated prime minister and leader of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP),
had fought over the founding of the LDP in 1955, switching off in that year as
prime ministers. In Japanese politics, sons often succeed their fathers as MPs in
the National Diet in order to keep the political faction that had backed the father
together. Even the reformist former prime minister Junichiro Koizumi broke with
his claimed opposition to dynasties, Felding his son as a candidate or his seat in
the Diet. He won despite massive LDP losses (Railing Against 2009). Without a
amilial Fgure around whom all can unite, actions tend to break up into competing
groups, giving other major factions a competitive advantage. This corresponds to
Hegels point that hereditary succession helps to avoid factionalism.
But the modern example of dynasticism that I think most clearly illustrates Hegels
argument about the importance of the hereditary principle is that of dynastic
female leaders in Asia (Thompson 2004). In eight Asian countries female leaders
have followed their fathers or husbands as national leaders or as heads of the
opposition (Bangladesh, Burma/Myanmar, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, Sri Lanka). But the most relevant cases of dynastic female
leadership for our purposes here are those in which female leaders represent the
national identity in succession to their state founding fathers (Aung San Suu Kyi
and her father Aung San, the Gandhi women and Nehru, Megawati and Sukarno).
This is close to Hegels point about hereditary monarchy symbolising national
culture. These independence leaders in Asia embodied the nation-state, a quality
which they passed on to their daughters. As the daughters (or wives) of nation
founders, female leaders acquired what can be termed inherited charisma. Weber
understood charisma as a form of authority that rests on leaders exceptional
(aueralltglich) qualities, extraordinary insights, heroic character, and profound
sanctity, giving them superhuman or even supernatural powers. Weber adds that
because ollowers and oFcials hope to maintain current power arrangements, they
will seek a mechanism that enables charismatic rule to be extended to the next
generation. 1hey may try to Fnd a successor through such means as an elaborate
search (e.g., the choice of the new Dalai Lama) or an institutional election (e.g., the
choice of a Pope) (Weber 1948/1922). But the claim that charisma is inheritable
is also common. Because they are viewed from a gendered perspective, it is not
expected that female leaders compete in terms of personal qualities with their
male predecessor. Although some female leaders are/were undoubtedly outgoing
31
and capable (Indira Gandhi and Aung San Suu Kyi come to mind), others are
noteworthy for their retiring, even shy public natures. In Indonesia Megawati
Sukarnoputris reticence is legendary she often refuses to say anything at all about
key issues (Ricarda Gerlach in Derichs and Thompson, forthcoming, argues that
for Megawati silence is golden). The personality of the princess in this case is
not crucial, rather it is her dynastic role that is central.
What matters is less their personal qualities, than the fathers or husbands they
represent, who in turn symbolise (one version of) national identity. When voting
for one of the Gandhi women (or men, including the martyred Rajiv), Indians pay
tribute to Nehrus vision of a secular India. A similar argument can be made about
popular support in Burma/Myanmar for Aung San Suu Kyi as a continuation of
the respect shown toward her father Aung Sans vision for a civilian run and a
multicultural Burma, opposing the current military and Burman-centric rule of
the generals. Interestingly in this regard, the divisiveness in recent Bangladesh
politics can largely contributed to the duelling ladies, Sheikh Hasina Wajed and
Khaleda Zia, who have alternated as prime minister since 1991 (excepting the brief
military coup of 2007 largely provoked by their feuding). These two women not
only represent men who were political rivals (Sheikh Hasina accuses Khaleda Zias
husband, Ziaur Rahman, of masterminding the assassination of her father, Sheikh
Mujibur Rahman, in order to seize power for himself) but also competing notions
of what kind of nation Bangladesh should be. For Sheik Hasina, upholding her
fathers legacy as the countrys founding father, it is a Bengali-based nationalism.
Khaleda Zia, on the other hand, follows her assassinated husbands call for the
Islamisation of Bangladesh as the basis of a stronger national identity (Ricarda
Gerlach, Female Leadership and Dueling Dynasties in Bangladesh in Derichs
and Thompson, forthcoming).
Except Indira Gandhi all recent dynastic female leaders in Asia have been the
widows, wives, or daughters of martyred male leaders who were assassinated,
executed, or imprisoned by non-democratic regimes or their political opponents.
After their assassination (Mujib and Zia of Bangladesh, Aung San of Burma,
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. o the Philippines, and,, execution ,ZulFkar Ali Bhutto
of Pakistan) or arrest (Sukarno of Indonesia, who died under house arrest and
Anwar Ibrahim of Malaysia, who has since been released and has now returned
to politics) became heroes, their jail cells or graves ritual pilgrimage sites. This
martyrdom of male politicians in these Asian countries became the chief moral
resource with which the opposition could mobilise support against a dictatorship,
32
leading in some cases to immediate opposition mobilisation (in the Philippines
after the Aquino assassination and in Malaysia after Anwar Ibrahims arrest) or to
later protests in which their legacy was invoked.
Despite the political advantages of martyrdom, the death or imprisonment of
an opposition leader posed grave dangers to his or her familys political interests.
Like sons succeeding their fathers as MPs in Japan, hereditary succession held
the adantage o preempting actional connict as legel suggested. lighly
personalistic parties/factions once held together by the martyred leaders charisma
and authority faced damaging internal splits during subsequent power struggles.
Moreover there were fears that other parties or factions might aspire to opposition
leadership, taking advantage of protests for their own ends. A successor was sought
from within the martyrs family to preserve unity and restore the groups strength.
A male heir was oten approached Frst. \hy, then, were emale kin chosen as
successors instead? In part leadership was thrust upon them because males were
unable, unwilling or unsuited to assume leadership of the family-based faction.
However women were chosen to lead simply for want of male relatives. For one
thing, they seemed less threatening to other would-be faction leaders, making it
easier for potential rivals to unite behind them. Also, it was thought that, despite
assuming the dynastic mantle, women would leave real control to male party leaders.
Arriving in London exile in 1984, Benazir Bhutto was chosen as the Pakistan Peoples
Party (PPP) leader by the party uncles because they assumed she would serve
primarily as a symbol.
9
In the Philippines, a divided opposition ultimately agreed
on Cory Aquino as its presidential candidate. Her chief rival, Salvador Laurel,
belieed that i they won oFce she would leae most political decision making to
him. In Malaysia, Wan Azizahs gender and political inexperience seemed to be the
key qualiFcations making her acceptable to a squabbling opposition alliance split
along religious and ethnic lines. Female relations of martyred male politicians were
best able to unite political factions because their leadership was seen as largely
symbolic.
Still we must ask why women were considered for leadership succession at all
given the highly patriarchal character of these societies. Several female leaders
faced openly paternalist/religious objections to their rule. For example key Muslim
politicians in both Indonesia and Pakistan protested strongly against Megawati and
9 The examples cited in this paragraph are drawn Irom Thompson (2004).
33
Benazir Bhutto becoming president or prime minister, respectively, claiming this to
be incompatible with Islam. Bhutto died at the hands of Islamist terrorists. Many
male rivals (and sometimes even the female leaders husbands!
10
) could not come
to terms with a woman running the country which, as the ideology of patriarchy
claimed, was a mans job.
One reason women could be chosen as leaders despite such paternalism is their
high social standing. Kinship trumped gender. In the case of Bangladesh, Najma
Chowdhury has suggested that the emergence of Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda
Zia in political leadership roles represents a paradox in a patriarchal culture that
is best explained by their kinship linkages to male authority (Chowdhury 1994).
The exceptional political situation created by martyrdom made it more tolerable
to break with traditional female roles. As Benazir Bhutto wrote about her anti-Zia
campaigns: There was no resistance to me ... as a woman, even in these where
the tribal women were Fercely guarded. 1he suering in the country, the suering
of my family, of all of us, had risen above the barrier of gender (Bhutto 1989).
But more important still, in the context of political crisis following the martyrdom
of an opposition politician, the gendered female role suddenly became a distinct
political advantage. In societies where women were traditionally seen as apolitical,
dynastic female leaders were perceived as standing above the political fray. They
were accidental politicians, reluctantly joining the political arena for a great cause,
not male machiavellis engaged in pursuing their own interests. Chosen because
of their blood or marriage ties to martyred leaders, they were less likely to be
thought of as representing a particular political faction or group. Often portraying
themselves as simple housewives to emphasize their reluctance to take up the
heavy duty of political responsibility, they were cast as (female) saints against
(male) sinners, as was the case between Corazon C. Aquino and Ferdinand E.
Marcos in the Philippines (Derichs and Thompson, forthcoming).
Monarchy in the Midst of Crisis: Nepal, Lesotho, and Thailand
Given Hegels historicist argument about monarchy embodying the state and
sanctifying national culture, it is not surprising that monarchal institutions appear
to help their countryies cope with political crises centered around national identity.
10 Wazed Miah, the husband oI Bangladesh prime minister Sheikh Hasina once said his wiIe is 'halI-
educated and simply not ft to govern. Taufq Kiemas has made similar remarks about his wiIe
Megawati. Here the wise words oI Indira Gandhi, whose husband 'exuded ... hostility aIter she
became politically active, are worth recalling: 'to hurt the male ego is the biggest sin in marriage
(Datta-Ray 2001).
34
1he example o Belgium comes to mind. \ould not the connict between the
Flemings and Walloons have long ago resulted in the break-up of that state had
not the monarchy provided the symbolic glue that somehow manages to keep this
political entity together?
11
As sketched above, Hegel believed the monarchy could
stabilise the constitutional system as long as it remained above the fray of political
connict. 1he perect prince embodies the state without interering in a partisan
fashion.
Clearly the abolition of the Nepalese monarchy is the consequence of a lost
political battle (see the chapters in this volume by Kunda Mani Dixit and Sudhindra
Sharma). In 2005 King Gyanendra assumed authoritarian powers in the name of
Fghting the Maoist-led insurgency ,the country`s oer two century-old monarchy
had been shaken by the assassination of King Birendra and eight other members
of the royal family in 2001 by Crown Prince Dipendra who then killed himself).
Maoist gains and anti-monarchy protests led to free elections and a government
coalition which abolished its chief enemy, the monarchy. In Nepal the inverse of
Hegels law seems to have been in force: a monarch who does not stay above the
fray can fall victim to it.
A similar narrative can be found in the little known experience of the Kingdom
of Lesotho. One observer writes:
Thanks to Lesothos founding father, King Moshoeshoe, the kingdom
can look back on almost 200 years of being a nation. Unlike most African
countries, the nation building process was achieved a long time ago as the
southern Basotho people rallied [to] the kings for protection from Boer
and Zulu aggressions from the surrounding lowlands. Moshoeshoe and
his successors maintained independence from white-ruled South Africa
through military power and diplomatic
wisdom, forming a protectorate under direct protection from London.
Until independence in 1965, the King - or the paramount chief as he was
called during British rule - was pretty much the uniting symbol of Lesotho.
11 Although it must also be said that the EU, with Brussels as its headquarters, provides a powerIul,
pragmatic reason Ior the Flemish to want to remain Belgian. Also, the country`s soccer team
provides a periodic sense oI national togetherness, despite its mediocre perIormance oI late. On the
other hand, Prince Philippe, the Irancophone heir to the throne is regular criticized in the Flemish
press as a bumbler.
35
With the 1966 constitution, that made the paramount chief a king, power
was given to elected politicians and Lesotho was made a constitutional
monarchyAfter independence camepolitical turbulence, with military
rule in the 1970s and 80s. In the mid-1980s, the military even installed
King Moshoeshoe II, King Letsies father, as the head of the executive
in a popular move. Popularity did not last long, however, and calls for
democracy led to another coup in 1990, deposing the King. (Hennig 2003)
In 1994 the so-called Kings Coup overthrew the democratically elected
government of Ntsu Mokhehle, bringing Moshoeshoe back to power. This
occurred after he had been dethroned twice in the past (1970 and 1990) because
he had ound himsel on the wrong side o a political connict in which he had
openly intervened. Subsequent political manoeuverings led to his reinstatement,
the last time by his son Letsie III. Only after Moshoeshoe died in a car crash
in 1995 did Letsie managed to return the monarchy more or less back to its
envisioned constitutional form. He did not intervene during a renewed outbreak
of political stability and outside intervention in 1998, even refusing widespread
demands to mediate (the unrest subsided, but there was renewed violence against
the government in 2008 and 2009). Having suffered nearly fatal damage through
politicisation, the monarchy appears to have morphed to an extremely apolitical
form. Lesothos monarchy appears to have returned to its Hegelian role as a
form of self-protection.
The most striking example of a monarchy in the midst of a political crisis at the
time of this writing is in Thailand (see the contributions of Kavi Chongkittavorn
and Suchit Bunbongkarn in this volume). The current Thai monarchy has long
presented itself (and is praised by its network supporters) as a politically
neutral institution that has only intervened as a last resort during national crises
(McCargo 2005 and 2007). King Bhumibol Adulyadejs interventions in 1973
and 1992 that put a halt to the shooting of largely peaceful protestors by the
military and paved the way for democratisation were seen as great successes in
this regard. More recent accounts, however, have painted a much darker picture
(most controversially, Paul Handleys unauthorised biography of 2006). Critics
like Handley argue that the Thai monarchs interventions have been much more
extensive than is commonly acknowledged in polite company in Thailand. Such
interventions, it has been suggested, have not just been against military bloodshed
but also on the side of military coups (in 1976 and most recently in 2006 which
36
overthrow the Thaksin government) (Hewison 2008). Defenders of the monarchy
dismiss such charges. They have increasingly resorted to charges of lse-majest
to silence critics.
12
Surveillance of malicious comments about the monarchy,
particularly on the internet, has risen sharply recently.
13
My aim here is not to judge
of the relative merits of these positions. It is only to point out that the perception
o the growing role o the monarchy ,or, more particularly, prominent Fgures in
Thailand claiming to act in its name and defense) undermines its Hegelian crisis
management capabilities.
Importantly in this regard, the issue of succession is one of the most widely
gossiped about (because it cannot be openly discussed) issues in Thai politics
today. It is well known that the Crown Prince is a controersial Fgure. 1his shows
the limits of the undoubted respect and admiration that the vast majority of Thais
show toward the current (ailing) King. His success as a monarch is very much
tied up with his own personality. The twilight problem of succession arises
because the personality of the monarchy seems to matter so much in Thailand.
Conclusion
Hegels defense of monarchy, found quirky by many a critic, sheds much light on
the nature of constitutional monarchy today. It represents institutional continuity,
symbolises national culture, and embodies the unity of the state, enabling it to help
guarantee human freedom, which for Hegel is the ultimate idea of a state. Lipsets
Fndings about the stability o constitutional monarchies in interwar Lurope - in
contrast to the instability of their revolutionary, republican counterparts - adds
empirical credence to Hegels philosophical claim. The French, Chinese, Russian,
and German Revolutions show how disastrous an abrupt shift away from monarchy
can be for preserving freedom.
12 It is interesting to consider lese-majeste in Hegelian terms. On the one hand, it serves to protect
the monarchy from criticism, given that in a constitutional system the monarch is only carrying
out the wishes oI his or her ministers. It also would seem to help keep the monarchy 'above the
Iray. But the reality in Thailand oI the increasingly widespread, and oIten indiscriminate use oI
this prohibition against the criticism oI the monarchy (including the jailing oI the Australian author
Ior several veiled reIerences to the monarchy in a novel oI very limited circulation) suggests that it
can be easily manipulated. What better way to shield a politically active monarchy than to prohibit
any criticism of it based on the premise that it is apolitical! For a thoughtful discussion see both
StreckIuss 2009 and Montesano 2009. The website 'LM watch actively tracks lse majest cases
(LM Watch).
13 Thai Netizen Network (TNN) oIIers a useIul summary (Cases related 2009).
37
The example of other modern dynasties supports the Hegelian argument about
how hereditary succession helps aoid actional inFghting and creates unity. Since
succession is genetically preordained and not open to political competition, the
new leader can better avoid partisanship. Dynastic female leaders, like the sons of
many Japanese MPs, were chosen as successors because family or marriage ties
maintained consensus among in their political faction. Dynastic ties (as well as
their perceived traditional gender roles) also seemed to elevate them above normal
dirty politics. In addition, their inherited charisma enabled them to symbolise
their father or husbands national project.
Monarchies are best able to stand above the fray, of course, when they are not
themselves actively involved in it. Where a monarch does intervene (unsuccessfully),
such as recently occurred in Nepal, he or she can be deposed. In Lesotho a legacy
of courtly intervention (and dethronement) has led the monarchy to take a
radically apolitical stance. In Thailand perceptions of growing royal intervention
have weakened the institution, with the timing being particularly problematic (but
surely not unrelated to) the fragility of the ageing king.
Hegel considers it not at all paradoxical to argue that the perfect prince must
not be perfect at all. Perfection is not a matter of the person who happens to be
monarch, but o the institution o the monarchy as a whole. I the latter is Frmly
established with its constitutional powers clearly delimited then it can perform
its function as the sacred embodiment of the state, symbol of the nation, and
uniFer in times o crisis no matter who happens to be King.
Mark R. Thompson is Professor of Political Science at Erlangen Nuremberg
University, Germany.
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40
The Limits of Constitutional Monarchy
in Scandinavia: The Road to Survival of
Monarchies?
Jrgen Elklit & Birgitta Wistrand
3
In the three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), where the
monarchies still thrive, all three Heads of State have reached or will soon reach
their seventies. But there are no signs of shifts on the thrones, which would have
been the case if it were in Bhutan where the King has to resign at the age of 65. In
the Nordic countries, however, it will continue to be business as usual, as there is
no age limit for monarchs and no discussion about that particular issue.
Presently Swedens Crown Princess, Victoria, is taking steps even if slowly
towards her future role as Head of State, but currently all focus is on her long-
awaited marriage next June to a work-out instructor, Daniel Westling, a man
of common background. In Norway, Haakon, King Haralds son, has already
married a woman from a common background which one only rarely sees in
Crown Princesses; and his colleague, Crown Prince Frederik of Denmark, married
a woman of foreign origin and also a commoner. These marriages all had to be
approved by the Head of State, i.e., the mother or the father. As so often is the
case, conditions for males are less restricted than for females. But the situation
changes once you are in power, a topic to which we shall return below.
The heirs and heiresses are all in their late thirties/early forties and authority
obviously lies with their parents, at least in regards to the Monarchs decision on
when to step down from the throne, i.e., to entrust the Crown Prince or princess
with the responsibility of carrying the torch forward if stepping down is being
seriously considered at all. Evidently the current Monarchs consider the position
worth the price or is it purely because of their sense of responsibility that they
apparently want to continue to endure their restricted and controlled lives?
Can one now foresee any obstacles for the heirs to the thrones, legally or politically,
when they eventually take on their duties in their respective bicycle monarchies
41
using Mark R. Thompsons term. Are citizens of the three Scandinavian countries
actually prepared to accept these increasingly ordinary and normal couples as
important symbols in and representatives for their countries?
We have found little or no discussion on the subject. In fact, the question of
the monarchys raison dtre is not really a salient topic in public discourse in
Scandinaia. Neither are the republicans an innuential group in any o the countries
and the criticism never seriously touches the present dynasties or their functions.
Instead, it dwells mostly on a theoretical level, with no substantial demands for
change.
Nor are the functions or status of monarchy a vital research topic in political
science - or in social science in general - maybe with one signiFcant exception:
The interrelations between media and monarchy have recently evoked some
interest, especially when it is understood that both institutions see themselves as
and are intertwined and interdependent.
The Stabilising Effects of Monarchies
If one wants to understand this peculiar state of affairs, one possibility is to start
by looking at what political science has to say about countries with a Monarch
as head of state. The Dutch-American political scientist Arend Lijphart reminds
us that it is surprising that so many democracies are or have been monarchies, as
it is a constitutional form that appears to be less democratic than a republican
government with an elected president (140).
Lijphart explains this state of affairs by the fact that they are constitutional
monarchies, i.e., the power of the Monarch is severely limited (by the constitution).
He then goes on to quote Rose and Kavanagh: Monarchs have remained in power
where the reigning family has been willing to withdraw from a politically active role.
Reciprocally, monarchies have fallen when the monarch has sought to continue to
assert political power (568). Nepal here becomes an interesting case to think of,
as the Royal House in Nepal never really appreciated the 1991-constitution and
the thinking behind it; the consequences were grave. It appears, however, that
the above formulation by Rose and Kavanagh could be further elaborated. It is
not only the withdrawal from a politically active role, which has allowed some
Monarchs to remain in power, but also their genuine (or perceived) acceptance and
support of democratic development, in some cases probably amounting to a sense
of having a very real responsibility for the country and its future development.
The Limits of Constitutional Monarchy in Scandinavia: The Road to Survival of Monarchies?
42
To this emphasis on the time perspective one can add differences in personal
competence and political understanding. Some Monarchs hae been diFcult to
work with and were complicated personalities while others have been just
the right person at the right place at the right point in time, which has therefore
contributed substantially to the position (and chances of survival) of the monarchy
in the country in question. This observation obviously has validity also outside
Scandinavian countries, and outside Europe.
In his study of inter-war democracies Lipset also argues that countries that have
retained constitutional monarchies have had a more stable democratic order and
development than those that became republics (78-79). Preserving the monarchies,
according to his view, helped those who were losers during the transition to a new
social structure and therefore felt alienated in the entire modernisation project.
These, often conservative, groups could then more gradually adapt to the new
situation, while countries with newly founded republics saw unrest and instability
and lack of legitimacy among the conservative orders. Where Lipset writes about
the inter-war period we are inclined to extend his argument to the very special
period of WWII and the German occupation of Norway and Denmark, where
the royal families in both cases provided an example of stability and the social
and national values of the times before the great upheaval of the occupation
(and WWII in general), thereby helping all those who were losers, i.e. opposed
to the German occupation. The symbolic importance of the two royal families
can probably not be over-estimated even though they themselves chose different
ways in their opposition to the German occupation. The Swedish royal family also
functioned as the national family in times of severe turbulence and concern.
It is easy to argue that today`s Fnancial crises and economic insecurity
is in no way comparable to times of major social upheavals or foreign
occupation during a war as comprehensive as WWII. But one can still ask
if the monarchical institution still provides an element of stability in todays
uncertain situation. The next question then is, are todays monarchies able and
qualiFed to take on this important role And what is then the actual situation
for the Nordic monarchies, constitutionally, and in political and social practice?
Constitutions and Political Practice
lirst, one should not misinterpret the speciFc ormulations in a written
constitution if political practice over time has changed the meaning of formal
43
formulations in some of the articles of the constitution. A good example of this
is the Danish Constitution, where the term The King does not in any way mean
the King (Queen) of the day, but refers to the government, which has in
reality and because they are the ones who can be held to account by Parliament
now assumed the powers which according to the words of the constitution
rest with the Monarch. This obviously can confuse those in particular (but not
only) foreigners reading the constitution verbally, but it does not create practical,
political problems in Denmark.
The same situation applies for Norway but the information on the Norwegian
royal households homepage clearly informs readers that when the Constitution
refers to the King, it nowadays means the government not the King. This is not
the case with the Danish royal homepage, where one really has to search for precise
information on the constitution and an authoritative interpretation thereof. It is
not available on the monarchy page, but on Her Majesty The Queens homepage
and then far down under the heading Tasks and Duties and after headings like
Language, Relations to Defence, and Politics. Nor is it anywhere explained
why the Queen is still seen to act as if she has real political-legal power, e.g., as she
still countersigns bills and appoints ministers, including the prime minister. So it
is not diFcult to understand that a substantial number o Danes still beliee that
their Queen has at least some formal power vis--vis the politicians, which is not
the case.
The presentations of the members of the Danish royal family are designed as
ordinary CVs. The Queens personal interests and accomplishments as an artist
are described at length.
The homepage on the royal family in Norway stresses the importance of history
and heredity, where the religious blessing of the Head of State is an interesting
special phenomenon. The presentation gives a general picture of a quite laidback
royal family, taking their responsibilities seriously, but not wishing to be high
proFled.
All three Nordic countries now have succession laws based on the principle of
cognatic (equal) primogeniture. In spite of this principle, it is worth mentioning
that there are still differences between the sexes. A Queens husband is not entitled
to kingship, and his title is Prince Consort, while a woman marrying a King
44
becomes a Queen, in her own capacity and with special duties. However, the
Danish Prince Consort, Henrik like other prince consorts has no special duties.
The Queens in Norway and Sweden lead their own households.
As mentioned earlier, discussions on the status of monarchies are rare, even though
the situation of preparation for the current Swedish constitution was one of 20
years o discussion. 1he ratiFcation o the constitution in 194 was preceded by
sharp and intense discussions and considerations. Much of this debate took place
inside the Social Democratic Party (which was then in power and had taken the
initiative to revise the constitution), as there was an urge among several groups in
the party to turn Sweden into a republic. Books and pamphlets were published,
and discussions and endless debates were conducted. The King, Gustaf VI Adolf,
was getting older and the heir, Carl Gustaf, was only a child when the revision
was initiated. Anyhow, at age 27, Carl X Gustaf succeeded his grandfather on the
throne in 1973 and a year later the new constitution was adopted by Parliament.
Probably due to the popularity of the royal family, the Social Democratic Party did
not dare to challenge the general public on the issue of abolishing the monarchy.
After 1974 discussions on the monarchy and its raison dtre have faded away. But
a ew signs o a republican naour were introduced in the constitution. Article 5
talks about the situation when it is possible to force the Head of State to resign:
"After six months of non-governing the government can report this fact to the
parliament and the King has to step down." The reasons for introducing this article
in the constitution are not known to us.
Two years later, in 1976, 500 million people viewed the wedding between King
Carl X Gusta and Queen Silia on 1V. In the context o potential connicts and
disagreements regarding the present and future role of the monarchy, this occasion
provided an excellent opportunity to re-establish the role of the monarchy in the
hearts and minds of the Swedish people. Not only did the ceremony (arranged as
a fairy-tale wedding/coronation with no costs spared) attract an almost incredible
TV audience, but the Swedes went to the streets in masses, showing their genuine
support for the newlyweds. The royal family had again displayed its social powers,
thereby regaining centre stage, although it had now no constitutional power
whatsoever.
The homepage of the Swedish dynasty consequently only presents the Kings
ceremonial and symbolic role. But the King has at the same time maintained the
45
position as the Frst representatie o the nation which certainly is a key actor in
our assessment of the role of the monarchies. One now sees that the King in all
situations apart from the opening of parliament in the Parliament House, where
the king has no right to speak, only to open the session - stands Frst, thereby
sending a strong symbolic signal to Swedish citizens on the countrys leadership.
As we have noticed earlier the situation in the three countries is quite similar in
rhetoric and practice, even if constitutions differ. The Heads of State want to see
and present themselves as the foremost representative of their countries. The
same approach is also implicit in their homepages where succession rules, heritage
and history is presented as something natural and valuable; this contributes to
making it diFcult to question the legitimacy o monarchies in a democratic
dispensation. 1he success in this particular Feld is eident as there has been
no serious discussion about the introduction of a republic in any of the three
countries (apart from the discussion in Sweden in the years before 1974).
Differences between Formal and Informal Structures and Patterns of
Behaviour
The brief descriptions of the development in the Scandinavian monarchies as well
as the observations by Lijphart, Lipset, and Rose and Kavanagh all point to the
importance of the time dimension as there has been a clear development over time
in how Monarchs (and other royalty) have perceived their roles and responded to
it. A hundred years ago the Monarchs in Denmark and Sweden saw themselves
as having a political role to play because they disagreed with this or that in the
political sphere, but they and in particular their successors gradually realised
that they had to make a very hard choice if they wanted to retain their position. In
real terms they had no other choice than to accept that the sovereign people had
now moved to a situation with chosen representatives to lead the affairs of state. If
they wanted their dynasties to continue, they therefore had to accept the symbolic,
unifying role as Head of State and only that. However the key question is still
what role the Monarchs of today want (or need?) to play and how they see the
future for their dynasties.
Only few opinion polls on attitudes towards the monarchies have been conducted
in Scandinavia. The picture is very clear as solid majorities in all three countries
(at least about two thirds) support the institution, even though the support in
all three countries has been slowly declining over recent years. But opinion
46
polls can only at best provide us with a partial answer to the question about
monarchies actual role and support. It is intriguing that there has not in any of
the Scandinavian countries been a serious, in-depth discussion about the future
position of monarchy and why the institution should be retained even when all
its important functions have been removed. One would expect that this kind of
public debate would be important to all who want to uphold the monarchy (either
because they are genuine monarchists or because they for one or another reason
are not sympathetic to the introduction of a republican form of government).
This kind of constructive debate is more necessary for monarchists now more
than ever as the position of the monarchies is probably weaker than ever because
o the ewer and ewer unctions which monarchies ulFl. Adding to the dangers is
the increasing medialisation which, in this context, refers to the interplay between
the media and the monarchical institutions.
John Plunkett argues in Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch, with considerable
strength, that the rise of modern mass media reinvented the position of the
monarchy in national life. When Queen Victoria was criticised for having retired
from her formal duties in 1870s, the economist Walter Bageholt concluded: "To
be invisible is to be forgotten [...] to be a symbol, and an effective symbol you
must vividly and often be seen." The situation is arguably the same today, as it
is obviously believed (and followed) by royal families who work professionally
on their images and on media strategies, engaging specialists to position them on
the public arena in order to make them popular and visible and therefore
irreplaceable. ligh proFled and positiely coered actiities seem to be the key to
success in all monarchies.
Today, as earlier, opinions on the obsolete royalty, incommensurable with the ideas
of a democratic and egalitarian political culture, are not infrequent, although not
spoken out loudly. Still stronger, however, is a trend of a growing attraction to
the royal institutions as argued by Jnsson & Lundell (2009). This appears to have
a certain validity also in the Scandinavian countries where the revival of royalty
is extremely noticeable in the media and, therefore, also by the public at large.
Television programmes, magazines, and periodicals are incessantly trying to meet
a rising demand from curious readers/royalists.
1he media coerage,books,Flms etc. around Princess Diana`s tragic death is only
one example, even though it probably is the best known and most obvious ever.
47
Media have played a determining role in shaping this new trend by not only giving
royal families a public platform where they function as the most prominent and
symbolically important personalities, but also at the same time acting as prime
time media stars. The christening of a little new prince in Denmark in July 2009
is another example where this ordinary and private event resulted in an enormous
media exposure even though the baby is only seventh in line for the throne.
Constant exposure in the media contributes to developing a feeling in the audience
(i.e., among the citizens) of presence and control. Even if the Head of State is
only seen as acting on behalf of the government, corporations, organisations, or
individuals he (she) takes on the role of an initiator, giving himself (herself) a
quality of taking charge and being in power. This image played in the media brings
forth an interest in these omnipotent, beautiful, and well-behaved personalities. A
typical royalist of today appears to be characterised by an affective and personal
relation to the monarchies, oten combined with aection or one speciFc royal
person. Todays media, therefore, try to make these well-known but obviously
distant personalities in the royal families more familiar and closer to the ordinary
citizens, thereby creating a Fctie proximity which encourages urther reading and
interest.
As we argued earlier, the traditional conservative groups (as nobility and upper
classes) were the royal proponents and supporters in the early twentieth century.
The actual situation is said to be different in that todays ordinary citizens have also
become strong supporters of the royalty. This is partly because of the opening
of the homes and parts of the private life to the media in Denmark, e.g., partly
by portraying the royal family of the 1940s and 1950s as a rather normal family
with three little girls, and partly because the royal families have now accepted
intermarriages between royalty and individuals of common background. On the
other hand, the entourage of the royal families is still very clearly almost exclusively
drawn from the upper classes so real interaction with ordinary citizens is still a rare
phenomenon.
The media focus is clearly aiming more at the private aspects of royal family life
which all citizens to some degree can understand and identify with than at
the political aspects and the game or power and innuence. 1his cannot aoid
but allocate so-called sot` power, i.e., arious orms o innuence and isibility,
to them. The media focus and interest on personal and intimate matters is not
48
exclusively aiming at the royal families as the same is the case for politicians also
giving the politicians new problems as well as new possibilities, depending on their
ability to interact constructively with the media.
The constitutional Monarch in a democracy can be (i.e., should be) the
unquestioned, impartial personiFcation o national unity. 1here are numerous
opportunities to work on the creation of this kind of unity and cohesiveness, such
as all kinds of ceremonies, inaugurations of institutions, buildings and monuments,
celebrations, tours of the country, etc. Simultaneously the King serves as a main
attraction, as part of the culture, giving him a distinct role as the natural centre at
such occasions. To choose the right events to attend and contribute to from the
hundreds suggested to the royal families every month is therefore a crucial and
strategic task.
At such occasions the Head of State may choose to deliver a speech which displays
his views/ feelings even more directly. The Swedish King recently inaugurated a
national reserve in the archipelago on the West coast of Sweden. This project has
been highly politicised; the King having a strong image as protector of nature
nevertheless accepted to inaugurate the reserve and in his speech he took a strong
political stand for the creation of the reserve. The media even hinted that he had been
instrumental in the process, giving him credence in some groups, criticism in others.
Informal or Soft Power
The right to formally appoint the prime minister is seen as a key issue by many, at
least theoretically and in complicated situations. But the political reality is that there
is no such right and this interpretation of the actual constitutional law has not for
many years been challenged in the three Scandinavian countries. In Denmark, e.g.,
the last serious confrontation over this topic was back in 1920 90 years ago
when the then King was taught a lesson by the majority of the politicians. And
since 1974 Sweden has transferred all functions related to the appointment of
prime ministers from the King to the Speaker of Parliament to completely avoid
any future problems in this area, i.e., of monarchical interference in the purely
political process o Fnding the next lead o Goernment.
The Monarch should, obviously, accept that he/she is Head of State, not Head
of Government. The temptation to forget that is, however, probably more often
seen with presidents because of the fact that they have also been elected and
49
therefore also have a popular mandate. This popular mandate confers a special
legitimacy on them which they may use to challenge the Head of the Government
of the day as we have mentioned earlier. But one should not forget that political
legitimacy does not only come from having been elected. It also to some degree
depends on personal charisma and other personality characteristics, which are also
instrumental for media penetration and acceptance.
The existence of dual channels of political legitimacy in many presidential systems
(i.e., where the president is elected separately from parliament) is a special problem,
which one does not see in monarchies. The other way to avoid this problem is
to have a president who is elected by members of parliament (functioning as an
electoral college). This is what one sees in a country like South Africa.
To this can be added that there is an important difference in the way preparation
or the oFce as lead o State takes place. 1he heir to a throne will, rom a young
age, be educated so that he/she might eventually (at an unknown point in time) be
ready to shoulder the responsibility of being the nations unifying element. This
is a tough challenge but it appears that even more could be done i.e. is the
preparation as we see it now good enough? And who is to decide if the person in
question has the necessary gifts for the job? Can his/her talents develop enough?
As far as we know there are no legal safety nets or resources to help out if a
situation should arise where it becomes obvious that the heir does not match a
speciFc set o requirements ,and expectations,. 1he requirements hae grown,
and gradually changed, to a considerable degree because of the increasing media
exposure and demands from the public who demand someone who can play a
distinctive, representative role both in the country and abroad.
It is also remarkable that the second-in-line to the throne is not given the same
kind of continuous educational and other training for that persons future role as
the Frst-in-line is. It would make a lot o sense to educate and prepare the second
in line to the throne in almost the same way, in order to avoid problems, should
something happens to the immediate heir to the throne.
Presidents, on the other hand, do not receie special training ,not oFcially, een
though unoFcially as almost all candidates running seriously or the presidency
are trained by specialists in communication, style, protocol etc.), but are selected by
their parties to stand for election if the party expects that they can win the ultimate
50
political prize to the party. One then has to hope that they based on their general
human and political qualities - can perorm in oFce.
The Monarch in a constitutional monarchy must act and be seen to act in a
way which is politically completely neutral. A formal expression of this is that the
Danish Monarch (and the heir to the throne, when he/she has turned 18) are not
included in the oters` roll ,and thus are also not eligible to ordinary political oFce,
een though they ulFl all ormal requirements or being registered as oters.
The Monarch must be non-partisan and be seen to be non-partisan. But how
far does this requirement go? Can the Monarch indicate publicly his political
preferences in relation to issues, which are important, but where some of the
political parties have positioned themselves differently, e.g., on a taxation issue?
Clearly not, because it would be clear that his position might subsequently innuence
how at least some voters perceive the issue and the reasonableness of the various
policy positions taken by the political parties.
The consequence is that the Monarch does not express at least party political
opinions which might have a bearing on the political development in the country.
But as we have suggested earlier, the Head of State has at least some channels
o innuence by engaging in actiities that support his or her ideas and interests.
Outside Scandinavia, Prince Charles interest in architecture in the UK is well-
known and controversial but supports our point. Another example is the
collaboration between the Swedish Social Democratic Party and the royal family
during World War II, when the royal family was heavily involved in obtaining a
loan to partly Fnance the deence o the country , i.e., getting people to oluntarily
contribute more than they did through the taxes).
A special event was arranged and activities were orchestrated with participation
from the royal family, prominent politicians, military personnel, and various cultural
personalities, thus giving the event credence as well as legitimacy and visibility.
The event was called The Big Propaganda and Citizen Party for the Defence
Loan. Not less than 60,000 people gathered at Skansen, where the King gave
a long speech that was broadcasted. The King and other members of the royal
family contributed to the loan from their own pockets. This kind of collaboration
between the King, the government, and media still takes place in Sweden as in the
other Nordic countries. The Norwegian royal family has been both instrumental
51
and successful in their contribution by winning the bid to host two Winter Olympic
Games in Norway during recent decades, which is a real political and public
achievement. In spite of industrious efforts Sweden has not been able to obtain
even one game, one partial reason probably being royal reluctance in promoting
Sweden in this particular respect. The initiatives and events might differ but all
those involved know that co-operation makes things easier and it provides the
royal family with an opportunity to express its position on issues from the political
arena, but obiously only as long as these positions do not run counter to oFcial
government policy positions.
This is also the case in relation to foreign policy issues. As Head of State the
Monarch must in his/her dealings with other states only express opinions that
are the oFcial opinions is-a-is the state,s, in question. 1he Swedish King was
heavily criticised some years ago when he expressed an opinion that could be
understood as running counter to oFcial Swedish oreign policy during a isit to
a country on the other side of the globe. The episode clearly weakened the Kings
position in Sweden, not only because of what he said, but also because the episode
demonstrated that he had diFculties in understanding - and remembering - what
he could and what he could not do.
It obviously presents a considerable challenge to embody the nation and act as the
Head of State and simultaneously have to accept that the democratic expression
and representation of the people should always only be through parliamentary and
governmental channels. One would think that a competent and intelligent person
should be able to learn to deal with this continuous challenge, but this hypothesis
is not always supported by evidence.
Democracy and monarchy only go well together if monarchy at all times
understands that its very special and certainly not unimportant role can only be
ulFlled i it at all times aoids to interere with the democratic and representatie
channel. But co-operation through informal channels and on non-controversial
issues are still an option if there is a willingness to reach for a positive outcome.
An important channel to exert some kind o innuence is the traditional royal
speeches at New Years Eve, which, in Denmark are heard and watched by most
Danes as they are both televised and broadcasted. The Head of State, i.e., the
Queen, can then present directly to the citizens what by many is perceived as her
views on various issues. The speeches obviously vary in depth, but it is interesting
52
that they are analysed by many and commented on by even more who want
to understand how the key national Fgure sees things at this particular point in
time. In the Queens latest speech, in 2008, she expressed clear support for Danish
troops on mission in Afghanistan, which of course is a very political issue, even
though popular support in Denmark is still clearly in favour thereof. What should
be understood, however, is that the Queen and her staff do not prepare the
speech completely on their own. Drafts are exchanged between the Castle and
the Prime Minister`s oFce so that both parties to this exchange can be certain
that no misunderstandings or misinterpretations o oFcial goernment positions
will occur when the speech is actually delivered. So the conclusion is that the
personal remarks and the moral hints obiously renect the Queen`s own eelings
and positions, while remarks and elements related to the political sphere renects
the governments positions on these issues nothing more and nothing less. It is
interesting that the 2008 remarks by the Queen on Afghanistan only resulted in
a few lifted eyebrows here and there, while in Sweden, the Kings support for the
same issue has been highly controversial and considered political as several parties
strongly oppose either sending soldiers abroad or at least the participation in the
Afghan mission.
Representatives of the royal houses are also very keen not to get involved with civil
society on issues which may be socially and politically divisive. When royalty agrees
to be patrons of civil society organisations, it is always at least in Scandinavia
- or good, humanitarian organisations Fghting or causes that are acceptable to
all such as the Red Cross while others (like Amnesty International) are seen as
being too political and they are, therefore, better avoided. The list of organisations
with royal patrons is long and impressive, but also mainly non-offensive as it is
dominated by humanitarian and cultural organisations that are fully acceptable to
most citizens. This is another way for the royal family to be and remain an
institution with innuence on many leels as it proides them with at least some
so-called soft power. We here refer to Joseph Nyes discussion of medias ability to
politically innuence people through conceptions, thought patterns, and mediated
ideals. Nye even argues that the media content is as important as how a countrys
domestic and foreign politics are being run (2004). We are convinced that this
concept and this understanding of medias ability to provide soft power is a useful
key to actually understanding how media interest in all aspects of royalty and
royal life contributes to the survival of monarchies at least in the short-run.
53
Media and Monarchy
A central point here is, however, that this forecast is based on medias positive
presentation of the monarchical institution as such and of the individual members
of the royal family (and especially those close to the throne). The decline in popular
support for the monarchies (seen in all three countries) is noteworthy, even if there
is still majority support for monarchy in all three countries. We are convinced
that this might change if the strong media interest (also in trivialities) wanes and/
or members of the royal houses would suddenly start to behave in a way that
challenges the accepted picture of them as modernising (up to a point) while still
behaving according to tradition and generally accepted norms.
But even the issue of which causes and organisations to accept as worthy of
royal support and patronage can be a thin line to walk. That has recently been
demonstrated in Denmark, where Crown Prince Frederik has been nominated for
Denmarks vacant position as member of the International Olympic Committee
,IOC,, to be Flled in October 2009. 1he Crown Prince is a keen and able sportsman
so that is not the issue. And he is using his position to argue in favour of Danes
being more concerned about their health and Ftness.
The issue is, instead, if it is a good idea to have the future King placed in a position
where he one day might have to vote on issues that are basically political in nature
as demonstrated by the discussions about the saliency of human rights issues in
relation to the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The government has accepted the
Crown Princes candidature but the discussion about it in the public demonstrates
how thin the line is. And that the Government was asked about its position on
the issue also shows that it is seen as something the young man cannot do on his
own, precisely because it is not a non-political, almost uncontroversial point . And
what about the future, when he one day inherits the throne and becomes King of
Denmark It is not diFcult to oresee problems and delicate situations arising but
the very fact that he will then have to step down from his IOC seat shows that it is
foreseen that there might be political and controversial issues to be dealt with. If
this is so, should he have the seat now?
Another almost unproblematic project royalty can and do engage in is the
promotion of the countrys business and cultural activities abroad, as that is
clearly advantageous to the entire country. Again, the point is that such activities
are beneFcial or the entire nation ,at least indirectly,, not only or particular
54
segments. But there are some vital political decisions in this area also. They
concern which countries to visit, who to take on as members of the entourage,
and who to meet oFcially once the royal amily has arried. In these matters the
royal family often holds more knowledge and connections than corporations and
organisations and they are therefore in a good position to take on a leading role.
Conclusion
It follows from the above that a constitutional monarch can have no role and
should have no role as an arbiter or arbitrator of political or other controversies
because that might easily put him in situations where he would have to speak
in support of positions taken by a political party, civil society organisation, or
an individual and that would be seen as taking sides. This has been clearly
understood by Scandinavian Monarchs, at least for now.
I politicians do not Fnd acceptable solutions to problems important to oters,
they can be held accountable during the next round of elections, and if they survive
politically they can claim that they have now obtained the legitimising support of
the people.
The Monarch cannot in the same way have his interference in political matters
approved or disapproved by the people (apart from them taking to the streets), so
his interference in the politics of the day will be seen by many (but not necessarily
all) as illegitimate. The politicians have their mandate to act and take decisions
from the electoral support of the voters, which is not the case of the monarch.
This is also the case when the people in a referendum support the monarchy as an
institution and/or chosen a particular individual as the next King (as was the case
in Norway in 1905).
The acceptance of the role for the King as a symbolic, nationally unifying element
also has another consequence, which is that the Monarch can continue as such (if
that pleases him or her) until he or she passes away, maybe as a very old person.
One can still be a symbol of the nation as an old, fragile person, even though there
obviously is also a limit to that.
One might even argue that one needs to be seen as active, strong, and healthy if
one wants positive attention from the media and broad support from the people.
Nobody would probably deny that the beautiful young daughters and wives in the
royal families are an important asset for todays monarchies. They are linked to
55
national pride, something for the nation to enjoy and be proud of. Furthermore
they can appear in national projects as marrying, giving birth, and being displayed.
These events are looked upon by media and by the public as symbols and
embodiment of the nation. Therefore, a royal child does not in this respect
belong only to his family, but also to the whole nation to the national we. The
royal glamour seems to fascinate the media and the general public (not least its
female part) as a never-ending story. It, therefore, appears to us that an important
maybe even the most important key to success that is monarchical survival in
the long run is to be accepted as being active, visible, and modern (to a point).
The requirement of the current Constitution of Bhutan that the King has to step
down at 65 actually sends the same kind of signal, namely that the Monarch must
be a person who is not beyond retirement age and who is in reality active and
able to be more than a mere symbol. This constitutional requirement is not found
in Scandinavian constitutions, but the role of the media and the provision of at
least a certain element of soft power might as we have argued change this
and also help us understand why it is that an institution as archaic as monarchy
survive in modern democracies. And one should not forget that Article 5 of the
Swedish constitution now says that after six months of his or her non-governing,
the government can force the Head of State to step down. This statement also
requests that the country has a vital Head of State even though that person has
been deprived of all formal tasks.
If the point is that there is a positive, active political role that the Monarch must be
able to shoulder, then one is moving away from constitutional monarchy, where
the King should not under any circumstances have a politically active role.
What we have argued is that the concept of soft power might be an important
key to understanding the actual perormance - and innuence - o monarchies
not only in Scandinavia, but probably elsewhere as well. Formal constitutional
power is not the only proider o some kind o innuence. 1he issue is well worth
pursuing because the meaning of the concept constitutional monarchy is still
that the monarch has his powers constrained by the constitution and that there are
the politicians who have been elected by the voters to be the representatives of the
sovereign people.
Jrgen Elklit is Professor of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark;
Birgitta Wistrand is attached to Gender Studies at Uppsala University,
Sweden.
56
References
Appleby, Joyce Oldham. Liberalism and Republicanism in the Historical Imagination.
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UP, 1992. Print.
Aris, Michael. The Raven Crown: the Origins of Buddhist Monarchy in Bhutan. London:
Serindia Publications, 1994. Print.
se, Cecilia. Makten Att Se: Om Kropp Och Kvinnlighet I Lagens Namn. Malm: Liber,
2000. Print.
Blain, Neil, and Hugh ODonnell. Media, Monarchy and Power. Bristol: Intellect,
2003. Print.
Duchhardt, Heinz, Richard A. Jackson, and D. J. Sturdy. European Monarchy: Its
Evolution and Practice from Roman Antiquity to Modern times. Stuttgart: F. Steiner,
1992. Print.
Hedengren, Sven-Olof, Elisabeth Tarras-Wahlberg, Cecilia Wilmhardt, and Clas
Gran Carlsson. Den Svenska Monarkin. Stockholm: Kungl. Hovstaternas
Informations- Ochavd., 1996. Print.
Jnsson, Mats, and Patrik Lundell. Media and Monarchy in Sweden. Gteborg:
Nordicom, 2009. Print.
Knopp, Guido. Majestt!: Die Letzten Groen Monarchien. Mnchen: Bertelsmann,
2006. Print.
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six
Countries. New Haven: Yale UP, 1999. Print.
Lipset, Seymour Martin. Political Man. London: Heinemann, 1969. Print.
Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York: Public
Affairs, 2004. Print.
Plunkett, John. Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003.
Print.
Rodell, Magnus. Att Gjuta En Nation: Statyinvigningar Och Nationsformering I Sverige
Vid 1800-talets Mitt. Stockholm: Natur Og Kultur, 2002. Print.
Rose, Richard, and Dennis Kavanagh. The Monarchy in Contemporary Political
Culture. Comparative Politics 8.4 (1976): 548-76. Print.
Stenius, Stefan. 0RQDUNLHQV 6WlOOQLQJ 2FK )UDPWLG 1nJUD 5HH[LRQHU. Eker: L.
Wallinder, 1982. Print.
Thompson, Mark R. Democratic Revolutions Asia and Eastern Europe. London:
Routledge, 2004. Print.
57 57
Democracy and Monarchy
in Thailand
Professor Emeritus Dr. Suchit Bunbongkarn
4
Introduction
Absolute monarchy, which had prevailed in Thailand for seven centuries, was
replaced by constitutional monarchy through a coup by middle ranking military
oFcers on June 24, 1932. Since then 1hailand has witnessed periodic political
instability, frequent changes of government, coups and counter-coups and
shifts back and forth between representative government and authoritarian rule.
Only the monarchy has remained stable as it continues to win respect from the
populace. Changes of government under the constitutional monarchy have mostly
been brought about through coups and mass uprisings rather than elections.
However, there has never been prolonged, nor large-scale political violence and,
as a consequence, the country has survived. This can be attributed to the unifying
role of the monarchy, which is the countrys most revered institution as well as
a symbol of the traditions and moral core of the nation. This paper attempts to
explain the role of the monarchy in helping to maintain peace, stability and unity
amidst political turmoil and connicts during the past three decades.
The King as Head of State
Under the present Constitution, like all the previous ones, the King is the Head of
State who is enthroned in a position of reverence and cannot be violated. No one
can expose the King to any sort of accusation.
As Head of State the Monarch performs several state functions. All legislative,
executive, and judicial functions are conducted under the Kings name. He signs
bills passed by the legislature, appoints the prime minister on the advice of the
legislature, and appoints cabinet ministers and high-ranking government and
military oFcers on the adice o the Prime Minister. 1he Monarch also appoints
the Buddhist Supreme Patriarch and high-ranking Buddhist monks, confers
58
honours on oFcials and other citizens and can grant pardon to those conicted
of crimes. The Monarch does not bear any decision-making responsibility in
performing these functions. The Prime Minister is responsible for most of the
symbolic functions the King performs.
In addition several ceremonial functions are performed by the Monarch.
For instance, he receives foreign ambassadors and other foreign government
representatives. As the patron of Buddhism he presides over important Buddhist
religious ceremonies. The King is also the patron of other religions that have
followers in the country.
Another important function as Head of State is that His Majesty is the honorary
supreme commander of the armed forces. During the period of absolute
monarchy, the King was the real leader of the military and was responsible for all
military affairs, including conducting warfare. Since 1932 the Monarchs power and
authority has been constitutionally limited. The King has ceased to command the
armed forces, but he is still given the position of honorary supreme commander.
1his position, although there is no real command authority, renects the traditional
bond between the Monarch and the armed forces.
Political Neutrality and the Constitutional Monarch
The Kings functions mentioned above are not different from those of the
Monarchs in Western constitutional monarchies. They are the functions of the
sovereigns who are required by their respective constitutions and tradition to
be either politically neutral or above politics. These functions are, by and large,
ceremonial in nature. Nonetheless the socio-political situation in Thailand is quite
different from those in the Western democracies and, as a result, the role played by
the Thai Monarch has not been limited to performing only ceremonial functions.
The exercise of his moral authority has sometimes been necessary to help assure
the stability and security of the nation.
In Western constitutional monarchies, the governments are relatively stable,
eFcient, and responsie to the needs o their people. 1here are a ew uprisings or
demonstrations, but the governments are able to handle them effectively and hence
the sovereigns are not under pressure to intervene. However, in Thailand, there
have been military coups, political violence, riots, uprisings and demonstrations,
which have often led to political instability. This creates a situation wherein the
59
Democracy and Monarchy in Thailand
Monarch must determine whether or not he should remain politically neutral.
Nevertheless the King, since ascending to the throne in 1946, has been mostly
effective in maintaining perceived political neutrality while, at the same time,
making it known that he was very concerned with any political instability that
might lead to violence and bloodshed.
The role of the King in political crises is not stipulated in the Constitution. When
the public expects the King to do something to bring the country out of a crisis,
what should the King do? In fact, when a crisis breaks out, it is the governments
responsibility to resolve it but the King may give advice if things get out of hand.
Being above politics does not mean that the King cannot be concerned with
political problems threatening the countrys stability. The King may exercise his
moral authority and give advice to the government and political adversaries as to
how to solve the nations problems, but he is always careful not to overstep his
duties as stipulated in the Constitution.
In April 2006 when the protests against Thaksins government became stronger
and the government mobilised its supporters to counter the protests, there were
calls by several groups for a royally-appointed Prime Minister, but the King did
not respond. It was understood that the Constitution did not give him power to
do so. In his address to newly appointed judges in April 2006, the King insisted
that political problems must be resolved through constitutional means. Even when
he intervened in 1973 and once again in 1992 to end bloodshed in Bangkok after
clashes broke out between soldiers and anti-government protesters, what he did
was not unconstitutional. He gave advice to the parties concerned as to how to end
the connicts peaceully. lis words carried weight due to the moral authority he had
acquired through his political neutrality, charisma and integrity.
Foreign media sometimes criticised the military coups, arguing that they are not
legitimate, including the one on September 19, 2006. These critics pointed out that
when the palace accepted the coups, it was going against the principle of political
neutrality and, in doing so, it gave the coups legitimacy. Let us look at the concept of
political legitimacy. Every political system must have legitimacy to ensure political
stability and to maintain its political integrity. The political legitimacy of a political
system is related to the political culture of the people in that system. According
to Lucian Pye, political culture is a set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that
60
gives order and meaning to a political process and that provide the underlying
assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system

(Pye 104-5).
\ith that deFnition, one can see the relationship between the political culture and
political legitimacy. If the peoples political beliefs or ideology are consistent with
the political processes and the scope of power and authority of the rulers, then the
political leaders and process would have political legitimacy.
Regarding the question of the legitimacy of a military coup, in the case of Thailand,
one has to look at the acceptance of the public. As long as there is not a large-
scale public protest, one can say that the military takeover is accepted and thus
legitimate. Since 1932, there have been a number of successful coups and they
were acceptable to the public if the coup leaders made sure that they would not
be in power for long. Therefore, whether a military coup can be legitimate or not
depends on the public acceptance, not the Kings. In fact, the King, being above
politics, cannot express his views on any coup. At any rate, there is now a sign of
growing discontent on the part of the public against a military coup, which would
make any coup in the uture ery diFcult to undertake and be deemed legitimate.
Political Polarisation and the Monarchy
At the moment we are witnessing an increase of political awareness among Thais
both in urban and rural areas. 1he connict between the pro-1haksin and the anti-
Thaksin movements that has divided Thai society is an indication of the increase
o political awareness. Some \estern press and scholars hae analysed the connict
in terms of class struggle between the old elites or the urban rich against the rural
poor. They have argued that old elites are against Thaksin because he had worked
against their class interests by helping the poor. They have further argued that the
poor have been Thaksins supporters because the former Prime Minister was the
only leader who really helped them to get out of poverty.
1o analyse the connict in terms o class struggle may not be correct. In 1hai
society the class system is not rigid as social mobility is rather nuid. One can moe
rom the lower stratum to an upper one without diFculties. 1hus 1hailand has
not witnessed any class connicts that led to inoled political iolence or a mass
uprising. In addition those who are in anti- and pro-Thaksin movements have
come from various social and economic strata. Although the urban middle class
people are in the anti-Thaksin group, there are also a number of rural people in
it. Regarding the pro-Thaksin movement, despite the fact that a large number of
61
supporters came from rural areas in the North and Northeast, the movement is able
to draw support from some urban middle class people too. The issue involved in
the connict is not class interests, but rather a political one centred around 1haksin.
Those who are anti-Thaksin believe that Thaksin is corrupt, anti-monarchy, and
likely to become an authoritarian ruler if he is able to come back. The objective of
the pro-Thaksin group is to bring the former prime minister back to power. The
attack on General Prem Tinasulanond, the President of Privy Council, and the
present political system, which the pro-Thaksin movements leaders have labelled
as a bureaucratic polity, may be ideologically inclined, but most of the rural
supporters joined the movement because they simply want Thaksin to come back
so as to respond favourably to their mouth and stomach concerns.
\here does the King stand in this connict 1he Monarch has been ery careul
not to do anything unconstitutional. At the peak of the crisis from October
to November 2008 when there was a violent suppression of the anti-Thaksin
protesters in front of the parliament and their occupation of Suvarnaphumi
airport (where there was no government suppression), some wanted the King to
intervene. The King did not indulge their wish, but let the constitutional processes
run its course.
The Thai Concept of the Monarchy
Despite the introduction of the constitutional monarchy system in 1932, Thais
continue to respect the King much as they did in the absolute monarchy period.
This demonstrates that the institution of monarchy is deeply-rooted in Thai
society, and the concept of kingship prevailing in that period was not greatly
affected by the 1932 revolution. Although the legal authority of the Monarch has
been substantially curtailed to that of a Head of State, the peoples reverence of
the monarchy as an indispensable traditional institution is still prevalent.
The system of absolute monarchy in Thailand can be traced back to the Sukhothai
period when King Sri-Intradhit established a kingdom at Sukhothai in 1238,
freeing itself from the control of the Khmer Empire. The patriarchal kingship
was founded in that year based on the original Thai concept of the father-child
relationship. It was believed that the Sukhothai people referred to their king as Pho-
khun or "revered father". As Prince Dhani put it, The Monarch was of course the
peoples leader in battle; but he was also in peace-time their father whose advice
was sought

,Prince Dhani 162, 1he monarchical rule was Frmly established
62
during the reign o King Ramkhamhaeng. 1he Indo-Buddhist innuence on the
conception of the kingship become more prevalent thereafter when the kings were
referred to as Dharmaraja or the righteous ruler. In fact King Ramkhamhaeng
himself had set a model of the righteous ruler abiding by the dictates of Buddhist
morality.
The concepts of kingship and the government authority during the Ayudhya
period were a mixture of Hinduism and Buddhism. The absolutism of the kingship
during this period was based on Hindu theory which considered the King as god,
or Devaraja. But this absolutism was constrained by Buddhism, which provided the
concept of Dharmaraja, or the righteous King. Therefore, as David Wyatt pointed
out, the Brahmanical concept of the Devaraja, the King as god, was modiFed to
make the King the embodiment of the law, while the reign of Buddhist moral
principle ensured that he should be measured against the law

(Samudavanija
8). The late Prince Dhani in his article on The Old Siamese Conception of the
Monarchy`, also renected on the nexus between linduism and Buddhism in the
Thai concept of kingship. He pointed out that the rule and duties of the King was
based on the Thammasat, or Dharmsatra, which describes its ideal of a Monarch as
a King of Righteousness, elected by the people. The ideal Monarch, as the prince
noted, abides steadfast in the ten kingly virtues (Prince Dhani 163).
The Ten Royal Virtues, or Tosapitrajadharma, were drawn from both Hindu
and Buddhist thought. King Asoka of ancient India who, in Somdej Phra
Buddhajinaamsa`s words, personiFed the Buddhist ideal o kingship, tried to
establish a Buddhist welfare state. He was known to be the one who observed
the 1en Royal Virtues, which included charity, good conduct, sacriFce, honesty,
gentleness, simplicity, freedom from anger, non-violent behavior, tolerance and
inoffensive nature (Buddhajinavamsa 92)
1he innuence o Buddhism on the 1hai concept o kingship not only can be seen
in the concept of Dharmaraja mentioned above, but in the belief that the King is
a Bodhisattva or incipient Buddha (Wales 31). According to Hinayana Buddhism,
since the accumulation of merit is rewarded by rebirth to a better life, the King
must be the one who had accumulated an abundance of merit in his former lives.
In other words, he must be the one who has barami. The word barami can be
translated loosely as "charisma". But, in fact, it means more than "charisma".
Barami often refers to personal character or a disposition of benevolence and
63
compassionate use of power. As William Klausner, a well known expert on Thai
culture and society stated, for barami one should also possess a certain gravitas
which connotes a weighted dignity and seriousness of purpose. Barami is earned by
a serious dedication to perorming beneFcial works and by doing so with dignity,
wisdom and vision (Klausner 6). Not every king in the Ayudhya period observed
the Ten Royal Virtues or used his barami to wisely maintain his political legitimacy.
Palace coups oten were carried out to oerthrow the King when his oFcers lost
faith in him.
Under the present system of constitutional monarchy, the theory of the Devaraja
is no longer accepted, but the people continue to respect the present King as their
revered father. This is because of the barami that he has accumulated throughout
more than sixty years of his reign. He is considered the Dharmaraja who has strictly
observed the ten royal virtues, and this is where his moral authority comes from.
His charisma, or barami, as a Dharmaraja, as William Klausner rightly notes, is
personal and not transferable (Klausner 3). The extent of ones barami depends
on the possession of the Ten Kingly Virtues and the rulers righteous behavior.
These attributes are personal and are not related to one having the title of Devaraja
or Dharmaraja.
The Kings Rural Development Projects
The Kings barami has been strengthened through his concern for his peoples
well-being. He has been working tirelessly for the welfare of the Thais, particularly
those in rural areas.
Political problems and crises have not distracted the King from his commitment to
promote the wellbeing of the Thai people. He saw the need for rural development
beore the introduction o the Frst economic and social deelopment plan in
1961. lis Frst rural deelopment program began in 1952, when he launched a
project to build the Huai Mong-Kol road in Hua Hin district, Prachuab Province.
Then he initiated rural development projects that have been spread out all over
the country. These included land allotments for farmers, rice and buffalo banks,
and agricultural cooperatives. The King established several experimental programs
on padi-growing, animal husbandry, the production of new rice seeds, and a dairy
industry. le played a signiFcant role in encouraging hill tribes in the North to stop
deforestation, and to substitute other crops for the opium poppy. Several irrigation
projects were suggested by him to help farmers in barren areas and to prevent
64
nooding. Recently, he introduced the philosophy o a suFciency economy in order
to sustain the countrys economic development.. Together with the prestige and
traditional continuity of the monarchy, the Kings contribution to the welfare and
wellbeing of the people has strengthened the bond between the Monarch and his
subjects, and reinforced his role of Head of State and Dharmaraja.
Conclusion
Thailands democracy has been very fragile and whenever the country was in crisis,
the people hoped the Monarch would intervene. But the King, although very
concerned with political fragility, always resolved crises through democratic and
constitutional means. In the past, the military often intervened when there were
political crises, but they failed to launch political reforms to consolidate Thailands
democracy. A military coup is now becoming less and less acceptable, and the
military knows very well that a military coup is not a solution to the countrys
political problems. Therefore, democratic development in Thailand will depend
on the people themselves. The monarchical institution, which has been a force
uniying the 1hai people, will play a major role in helping to reconcile connicts
through the process of democratic development that, as a result, will make such
development more peaceful and sustainable.
Suchit Bunbongkarn is Professor Emeritus of Political Science, at
Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand.
References
Buddhajinavamsa, Somdej Phra, and Wat Makutkasatri Yaram. Buddhist Philosophy
and Its Social and Educational Relevance in Modern Thailand. MS. Mahamakut
Buddhist University, Bangkok.
Klausner, William J. Thai Culture in Transition. Bangkok: Siam Society, 2002. Print.
Prince Dhani. The Old Siamese Conception of the Monarchy. The Siam Society
Fiftieth Anniversary Commemorative Publication II (1954): 162. Print.
Pye, Lucian W. Aspects of Political Development: an Analytic Study. Boston: Little
Brown, 1966. Print.
Samudavanija, Chai-Anan. Political History. Government and Politics of Thailand.
Ed. Xuto Somsak. Singapore: Oxford UP, 1987. Print.
Wales, H.G. Quaritch. Siamese State Ceremonies: Their History and Function. London: B.
Quaritch, 1931. Print.
65 65
The Future of Thai Monarchy
Kavi Chongkittavorn
5
Introduction
At Suvarnabhumi Airports Terminal C and D, international passengers can see a
huge golden-framed picture showing a gathering of 28 Kings, Queens and royal
members from around the world who came to Bangkok ("City of Angels") to
congratulate the worlds longest reigning King in June 2006. It was an exceptional
occasion to make all the royal families of the world sit together, according to
seniority, under one roof. The group photo is a testimony to the popularity and
aura of Thailands King Bhumibol Adulyadej who has been on the throne since
1946. In 1hai households, oFcial buildings, shopping malls, hotels and schools
today, it is common to see His Majestys face on posters, billboards and on the
walls. For centuries the Thai monarchy warded off foreign invaders and most
importantly survived repeated attempts by Western colonial powers to usurp
them. In Southeast Asia only the Thai monarchy survived colonialisation while
its neighbouring countries (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Malaysia)
succumbed when these powerful forces began their conquest in Malacca from 1511
onwards. This rare institution, particularly during the reign of King Bhumibol, has
been consolidating itself ever since. Only recently in Cambodia, the monarchy was
reintroduced after a reign of horror under the Khmer Rouge (1975-78) when the
royal institution was abolished.
The Thai monarchy is currently confronting new challenges emanating from rapid
transformation inside the country in the past three decades. Increased levels of
education and awareness, overall economic development, and new technologies
are all bringing demanding new voices into politics and the social scene. They are
coming from the younger people both in urban and rural areas. Their knowledge
and appreciation of traditional Thailand, in whatever form or structure, is marginal,
especially those that are framed under the ideas of constitutional monarchy. These
66
values and norms are becoming increasingly less attractive with the repeated
political turmoil in Thailand in recent times. In more ways than one they have
challenged established elite and traditional power-sharing arrangements that used
to be the foundation of the current Thai political system. Of late they have also
attacked the Thai bureaucratic polity, or amarnyathipatai, as being dictatorial and
elitist in nature.
In the past four years Thai society has become polarised between various contending
social groups, known locally as the yellow-shirt and red-shirt groups. While
these groups profess loyalty to the monarchy, they differ greatly in their political
preferences. The divide widened after the conviction of former prime minister
1haksin Shinawatra - who is considered the leader as well as the major Fnancial
supporter of the red-shirt group in October 2008 on corruption charges and
abuse of power. In late March and early April 2009 Thaksin openly challenged the
legitimacy of the Privy Council and its supervisory roles and indirectly criticised
the monarchy or meddling in day-to-day 1hai politics. During the Frst two weeks
of April 2009, Thaksin increased his attacks through the foreign media, accusing
the King of interfering in Thai politics and explicitly linked him to the September
2006 coup that ousted Thaksin from power (FT, 20/4/09). During the protest
in 2007 by the Peoples Alliance for Democracy (PAD) or the yellow-shirt group,
their leaders constantly urged the King to step in to end the political impasse. It
was customary for Thai opinion leaders to seek the Kings political intervention
in time of crisis. But this time it was to no avail. Previously, both politicians and
demonstrators had also used the royal institution for their own self-interests;
attempts were made from time to time to drag the King into the political quagmire.
At a time when large-scale bloodshed seemed possible in Bangkok over Songkran
1

(April 12-13, 2009), Thaksin immediately beseeched His Majesty to intervene
again to end the showdown. It was an unwarranted provocation from Thaksin who
wanted to implicate the King as the real king-maker of Thai politics. Fortunately
the latest riots ended without the kind of violence everyone anticipated, thanks to
Prime Minister Abhist Vejjajivas rejuvenated leadership and his stringent rule to
engage security forces and protesters. It was good that the King did not intervene
as everybody expected, despite repeated calls by Thaksin and his red-shirt group
during the riots. On April 21
st
, the King made his Frst appearance on 1V, and
through front page photos published in most Bangkok-based daily newspapers the
1 The Thai new year.
67
following day, showing him accepting an invitation of the governor of Confrerie du
Guillon ("Brotherhood of Guillon") to become a member of the Geneva-based
wine-drinking society. The message was succinct: the King was alive and well. He
was also drinking wine. Obviously the King is trying to do away with the much-
stated stereotype of him meddling with Thai politics. After all elected politicians
and Parliament have to settle their own political problems in democratic ways.
Never before in Thailand have debates on the role of the Thai Monarch and its
future been so intense and direct. Of course the Thai people are still discreet
whenever they talk about the royal family. But they do talk about them. During
coronation day on May 5, 2009, half a million Thais, wearing white T-shirts (not
yellow, red, or blue), showed up at the Royal Plaza to celebrate the anniversary
of the Kings 63-year-old reign. It was the largest gathering for such an occasion.
Whenever the King was admitted to Siriraj Hospital for health reasons thousands
of common folks lined up to offer their best wishes.
Can the Thai monarchy survive the current turmoil with a divided nation? This
paper attempts to answer this question by examining the relations between the
Thai monarchy and key institutions, including military, bureaucracy, media and
rural masses.
The King and his Reserve Powers in Thai Politics
King Bhumibhol became the monarch at a very young age. In his early years,
the King travelled widely throughout the country to get to know his people and
allowed them to get close to him and to know him. During his reign Thailand has
seen at least 18 Constitutions, 19 coups, 27 prime ministers and 56 governments.
So the King knows his constitutional role and duties well and that he must not
be involved in politics but that he must play a non-partisan role in the countrys
political process and development. But the public often thinks that the King is
behind all political manoeuvres. Obviously, these hearsays have further increased
the Kings political aura.
As a constitutional Monarch, according to former Prime Minister Anand
Panyarachun, the King possesses three discretionary powers: the right to be
consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. The King exercises these
prerogatives through private audiences he grants to the prime minister of the day.
\hat transpires during these meetings remains conFdential. loweer, ormer
Prime Minister Thaksin Shinwatra often divulged parts of his consultations with
68
the King. Six months before the September coup of 2006, Thaksin had an audience
with the King at Klai Kangwon Palace in Hua Hin. He came out saying the King
was not on the same page with the Privy Council, which at the time was criticising
Thaksin and his behaviour. Thaksin had broken a century-old taboo. Sometimes
the prime minister of the day would highlight one or two issues that the King
addressed and share it with the public so that they would be aware that the King
was concerned about certain issues. But there would not be any personal matter.
Under the Thai Constitution the King does have formal powers and responsibilities.
In exercising this function he is conscious of his non-political role. All legislations
vetted and approved by the National Assembly must be signed by the King.
Sometimes, the King delays his signatureconsidered a rubber stamp, which
could be interpreted in various ways. This discreet but powerful signal is strictly
advisory. Whenever the King speaks, either on his birthday or with the Cabinet
members or court judges, it is scrutinised and listened to with great attention. Of
course there is no guarantee that the Kings thinking is being heard and properly
understood.
Contrary to conventional belief, the King has not come out so often to intervene in
Thai politics. He has only intervened in a few cases. But when he did, it was always
important. Whenever Thai politics is caught in a quagmire, Thais automatically
think that the King will Fx it. Nobody knows exactly when this notion became
embedded in the Thai psyche, but the most famous scene occurred in May 1992
when the political protagonists General Suchinda Kraprayoon and Chamlong
Srimuang who were previously at each others throats, kneeled before the King.
The dramatic event was broadcast live on TV. Within a second, peace was restored.
That memorable image represented the high point of the Thai King and his barami,
or resered power, in ending instantaneously all political connicts. Deep down,
whenever politicians quarrel, or military leaders become restless, Thais bank on
the King and his magic power to heal all rifts. This strong sentiment derives from
the public belief that Thai political leaders often lack the kind of moral authority
to end a political crisis, as they are focused on their own vested interests and
constituencies. In this case the King has always been perceived as an impartial
person. It is a catch-22 situation. The King is needed when politicians are unable
to solve differences among themselves; but whatever measures were taken would
be viewed as intervention. The fact that the King is there to help out in times of
trouble enhanced his political maturity.
69
Thai Monarchy and the Military
Every year, 48 hours before the Kings birthday on 5 December, all the leaders
of the Thai armed forces dress in full military regalia to perform the trooping
of colours at the Royal Plaza to honour the King and pledge allegiance to him
and the throne. This colourful annual ritual symbolises the submission of the
military to the Kings sovereign authority and political will. The Thai military
culture has been built on the foundation of respect for the monarchy. In fact, it
has been deeply embedded in the Thai psyche. The most important duty of the
Thai military, besides defending the country from external threats, is to protect the
throne everything else is secondary. To outsiders it is hard to understand that all
Thai military actions must be carried out in the name of the King and must be
honourable and just as His Majesty is honourable and just. The King is the symbol
of national unity.
Since most of the coups occurred during his reign, criticisms are naturally aplenty
about His Majestys role in politics. In fact he does not have any executive power,
but he has high symbolic power over the military and society as a whole. The
military is clearly subordinated to the King. However, that does not prevent the
military from playing an active political role. The rise and fall of a government
could directly affect the morale of the armed forces and their budgets. In the past
when the top military leaders wanted to interere in any political connict, they
could do so easily by ordering their junior commanders to stage a coup. Quite
often, in responding to a political crisis in the past three years, pressure groups, as
well as the public at large, have requested the military to intervene. The military
has also realised that managing the country under a coup is a tough job, especially
to gain diplomatic acceptance. The 2006 coup tarnished the Thai military and
democratic development greatly because it showed that the military had not really
returned to the barracks. Indeed when Thailand changed from absolute monarchy
to constitutional monarchy in 1932, about 95 per cent of all prime ministers and
cabinet ministers were ormer general-rank military oFcers.
In the coming years the traditional role of the Thai military in protecting the
throne would become even more important due to the issue related to succession.
The Kings health has been the subject of intense speculation in the past four
years, which has caused great concern among Thai people. At present the relations
between the monarchy and the military are very solid. Army Chief General
Anupong Paochinda has built his career protecting the royal family as part of
70
the elite Royal Queens Guards. He has proved beyond any doubt, despite being
a classmate of fugitive Thaksin at a military cadet school, that he is a professional
soldier who has successfully resisted the calls to stage a coup since he assumed the
position in October 2007. The First Regions Army Chief, General Prayuth Chan
O-cha, who expects to succeed him next year, has also been a staunch supporter
of the monarchy.
Monarchy and the Rural Mass
In June 2006 during a week-long demonstration by the rural poor who had
gathered at Chatuchak Park, I met a group of rural farmers from Udon Thani,
who held a number of placards with the portrait of Thaksin in full military regalia.
I was surprised to see such a prolieration at the protest site. It was the Frst time
something like this had occurred. I wondered what had happened to all the smiling
faces that were a common sight whenever people waited to see the King and all
the kindness he has bestowed on his people for over six decades. Normally, during
such demonstrations, portraits of the King were the preferred choices. Since then
I sensed that there was a sea change in the perception of rural Thais who used to
be beneFciaries o the royal-sponsored projects that coered the whole gamut o
their life-cycle.
After Thaksin became the prime minister in early 2001, he initiated a series of
populist policies that directly beneFted the rural masses, especially in healthcare,
debt-relief, and education. With his business background and acumen he was able to
mobilise unding rom both oFcial and non-oFcial sources to back up his elaborate
populist schemes. As part of the so-called political marketing, he constantly
came up with new social schemes for the rural areas such as one tambon ("district")
one product, one village one free scholarship, one village one million baht fund,
among others. Some of these programmes used to be within the purview of the
monarchy. 1he King has been promoting his philosophy o economic suFciency
and sustainable development all along. He has done it without political overtones.
Throughout his reign, but not in recent years, the King often accompanied by
the Queen and his son and daughters traveled to remote villages to get to know
his subjects. Their Majesties entourage would comprise doctors, educators and
agricultural experts to provide advice and expertise to villagers directly. More than
3,000 royal-sponsored projects are currently in operation throughout the country.
These rural masses, especially those living in the North and Northeast regions,
are considered the countrys poorest. They feel that they have been left out of the
71
development process that has been concentrated in urban areas and major cities.
In the past, they saw the King as the only person who could deliver services and
ulFl their urgent needs. Suddenly 1haksin showed up and proided alternaties.
His populist policies woke them up especially as voters who could pick a prime
minister. Aided by former progressive students Thaksin has created networks
among villages in the provinces to support his political ambition. Some of them
have become elected members of Parliament and have been active in helping the
rural masses to organise them using experience they gained during the armed
struggle with the government. At the recent protest by the red-shirt groups, several
rural leaders spoke on stage and attacked the King, which had never happened
before within a Thai cultural setting. But somehow, Thaksin, the self-styled
champion of the poor, has quickly transformed these rural leaders and red-shirt
groups into republican aspirants.
Obviously the populist approach has been well received especially in times of
the global economic crisis. Every country has come up with its own economic
stimulus package to help domestic economies. Recent political outrage showed
that 1haksin`s supporters ear that without him, their direct beneFts and social
programs would be undermined. The government under Prime Minister Abhisit
Vejjajiva understands this concern very well and since January has adopted bigger
populist programmes, but with a better monitoring mechanism, for the rural poor
to widen social safety nets such as the 500-baht monthly allowance for senior
citizens, free education with free uniforms. In early May Abhisit injected an
additional 800 billion baht for the long-term stimulus package.
The Monarchy and Media
His Majesty has never given any interviews to members of the Thai media.
Journalists are used to reporting what he says verbatim during ceremonies such as
the opening of Parliament or to welcome new batches of senior judges. Each year
all media outlets faithfully report his speeches on his birthday and New Year Eve.
Through these speeches, the media interprets what is on His Majestys mind. The
palace-media relations are best described as distant but correct. However, the King
has granted several interviews to foreign correspondents and writers who were
interested in Thailand. The most famous interview was conducted in 1979 with
BBC Television, when he discussed the death of his elder brother, King Mahidol,
as well as his duty and responsibility as the King of Thailand.
The Thai media regularly prints news from press releases from the Royal
Household. Almost all photos related to royal activities are done by pooled media
72
teams, comprising state-run media organisations. In the printed media, royal-
related news often appears. Each day all TV channels will broadcast royal-related
news at 8.00 pm provided by the Royal Household, focusing on the activities of
members of the royal families. There are no independent royal correspondents as
in other constitutional monarchies.
The King, an avid newspaper reader and veteran ham radio operator, has stressed
the importance o ree now o inormation and reedom o expression. During
his birthday speech in December 2004 he spoke about the role of the media for the
Frst time. le said the media monitors what is going on in society as it acted as a
mirror for the government in power and the society as a whole. In the same message
he also talked about himself that as a King; he did not see himself as infallible, a
King who could do no wrong in the ordinary sense of the word. The King was
saying clearly that he was not above criticism. He added that he welcomed critical
comments based on facts and objectivity. For the Thai media the Kings comments
were signiFcant because the King supports the media doing their job as watchdogs.
They immediately associated his comment to earlier complaints on the media made
by former PM Thaksin, criticising the medias role. In a recent interview with Die
Spiegel (15-4-09), M.R. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, the Kings cousin and currently the
governor of Bangkok, talked about his perception of the King. He said that the
Thai monarchy has been successful: The King has never failed, so his success has
built up a myth around him that he could never do anything wrong. As such, the
belief that the King can do no wrong and is untouchable has become a template
for the media as well as the rest of the society.
So far no Thai journalist has been charged with lse majest, as they simply abstain
from reporting or writing about the monarchy. I have been often asked if I have
ever written about the Thai monarchy. The answer is in the negative. The only
time I did was on 21 January 2001 when I rewrote a short report from London.
The Nation on that day published news taken from an English daily, The Independent,
about Crown Prince Vajiralongkorns fondness for Thai minced pork and shrimp
balls made by a Thai restaurant in Stratford-on-Avon in Britain. To celebrate his
birthday, he had ordered the ood to be nown to his palace. 1hat ery morning the
Royal Household later made an inquiry asking why The Nation had published such
an article. I was on duty that day. My response at the time was to promote Thai
food in England.
It is interesting to note that since 2001 there has been an increase in court cases
related to lse majest. Most o them were Fled by oFcials and politicians. 1he
73
foreign media have paid much attention to the draconian set of laws for any person
who insults the King and his family. The King actually has never taken recourse
to legal actions to silence critics; nor is he, by royal convention, in a position to
answer or respond to these critics. He remains unperturbed and proceeds to give
royal pardon to those who are convicted. The latest case was that of an Australian
writer, Harry Nicolaide, who was jailed for three years in January 2009 for lse
majest against the Kings son in an unpublished book. He was given amnesty in
late March 2009. Another case that made headlines was the pardon of a drunken
Swiss tourist who tore off a portrait of the King in Chiang Mai two years ago.
However, the real test would soon come. Recently the Thai court passed a 10-year
jail term on Suvicha Thakor, a 34-year-old engineer, who used computer software
to doctor the image of Thai Queen Sirikit before putting the pictures on YouTube.
At present, his case has become the rallying point for a dozen international human
rights and freedom of expression groups. They have jointly called for amendments
to the draconian lse majest laws. A royal pardon is expected for Suvicha but nobody
knows when it will happen. The Abhisit-led government could have arrested more
online users who committed similar offences if it wanted to. All 37 Internet service
providers have recorded all the identities of Internet users, including the time they
logged in and out and the sites they clicked on for up to 90 days as mandated by the
Cyber Crime laws ,200,. Violators will be Fned up to 500,000 baht or US>14,000.
Two books on the life and role of the Thai King were written in the past decade.
William Stevenson wrote The Revolutionary King in 1999 after spending a year in
Thailand. He had access to private meetings and was able to interview the King
and his aides. Another book, The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailands Bhumibol
Adulyadej, by Paul Hanley (2005), has further prompted the curiosity of foreign and
Thai readers alike about the true nature of the Thai King. This book has caused
uneasiness among Thai authorities due to its unusual details and assumptions.
Both books were banned in 1hailand. Pirated copies are aailable in nea markets.

\ith the globalised world and ubiquity o the Internet, access to and now o
inormation is instant and borderless. It is diFcult or authorities to monitor all
websites and bloggers. At least 4,000 websites were shut down since January 2009
due to the anti-monarchy content. Such online censorship has already tarnished
Thailands media freedom, which used to be one of the best in Asia. This trend is
likely to increase as Thai authorities continue to react in knee-jerk fashion to any
website or content deemed innammatory to the 1hai monarchy.
74
Future of Thai Monarchy
Like any other human institution, the Thai Monarchy has to evolve with time.
Major royal-related institutes such as the Privy Council and Crown Property
Bureau are no exception. In general the Thai public respect the royal institutes with
positive views. Albeit this trend, it is imperative to improve the public perception
of the royal institutions by making them transparent and accessible by ordinary
people. As the Thai society becomes more open and democratic, the ever-
changing Thai psyche will become a major variable. Amendments to lse majest
laws including rule of procedures concerning royal-related activities should be
encouraged as they do not mean the erosion of loyalty or diminishing roles of the
monarchy. Rather, it renects royal pragmatism in catching up with modernity and
new perception of younger generations. Whoever succeeds King Bhumibol will
Fnd it diFcult to match the irtuous record set by him in the past 64-year reign.
His Majestys replacement will have an impact on the relevance of the monarchy,
democratisation and Thai lives. As long as the Thai monarchy continues to provide
social and political stability under the current democratic framework, its existence
is protected. In the Fnal analysis the King will continue to sere as the head o state,
the symbol of unity, and a revered icon in Thailand. His Majesty will represent the
continuity of history and the expression of the totality of Thai people.
Kavi Chongkittavorn is the senior editor of The Nation media group in
Bangkok, Thailand.
75 75
Lessons from Japans Symbolic
Monarchy
Kenneth J. Ruoff
6
Introduction and Background
The worlds youngest democracy, Bhutan, is also its newest constitutional monarchy.
Famous for the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH), Bhutan recently
transformed itself from an absolutist monarchy to a democratic constitutional
monarchy with the King as head of state. The Monarchs role in practice under the
new constitution will take shape in the coming years, with the King continuing to
intersect with politics but in a more ceremonial fashion than previously.
In May 2009, the Bhutan Centre for Media and Democracy hosted a small
group of scholars and journalists versed in issues of democracy and monarchy
at a conference in Paro, Bhutan. As the author of the book The Peoples Emperor:
Democracy and the Japanese Monarchy, 1945-1995 as well as of various essays about
Japans monarchy, I was one of the invitees. My role was to introduce suggestions
from Japans model that might prove useful to Bhutan, examples of which I shall
share below along with lessons in other areas that Bhutan offers Japan, the United
States, and other industrialised, advanced democracies. Japans symbolic monarchy
is more than six decades old, and Japans experience in this area suggests some
lessons for Bhutan.
First, however, some background on Bhutan is necessary. The Wangchuck Dynasty
was established in 190, and during the subsequent 100 years Bhutan has had Fe
Kings. 1he Frst our were hands-on rulers. Bhutan`s Kings hae been charged
with keeping their country (population 675,000) safe in a tricky part of the world.
Bhutan shares borders with the two elephants in the area, India and China.
Nonetheless, Bhutan has guarded not only its independence but also a strong sense
of national identity. Bhutan maintains close ties with India, but does not have
diplomatic relations with China.
76
When the fourth King, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, ascended the throne in 1972,
Bhutan suffered from high rates of poverty, illiteracy, and infant mortality. King
Jigme Singye Wangchuck committed himself to developing Bhutan to improve
the lives of his people, but on terms that seem prescient from todays perspective.
In order to provide a blueprint for his countrys development King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck, in the late 1970s, devised the concept of GNH. GNH has four pillars in
the present governments interpretation: equitable and sustainable socio-economic
development; preservation and promotion of cultural and spiritual heritage;
conservation of the environment; and good governance, which complements
the above principles. The King wanted Bhutan to develop, but not at the cost of
destroying its environment or by losing its cultural heritage.
In the succeeding decades Bhutan made considerable strides in areas such as literacy
(now at 55% and rising quickly) and poverty reduction, but under the leadership
of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck the country did not waver from the policy of
GNH. The fourth King was revered as a benevolent Monarch whose priority was
the welfare of his people.
Thus it came as a shock to most people in Bhutan when, in 2005, King Jigme
Singye Wangchuck voluntarily announced that he would be abdicating in favour of
his son as part of a process to transform Bhutan into a democracy. The King was
not under pressure to share power from, for example, a rising bourgeoisie, making
his decision to relinquish power all the more remarkable. However, many people
in Bhutan, far from being happy about this rare instance of a Monarch voluntarily
ceding his power in favour of democratic rule, were opposed to such a move by
their beloved King.
But King Jigme Singye Wangchuck insisted that what his country needed was
not simply an individual ruler but rather a system of rule. In rapid succession,
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck followed through on his promise to abdicate
(2006), Bhutans leaders authored the Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan
,promulgated 15 May 2008, that deFnes the Monarch as the lead o State and
the symbol of unity of the Kingdom and of the people of Bhutan, Bhutan held
its Frst general election to select 4 members o the National Assembly ,March
2008), and then Bhutan celebrated a grand coronation (November 2008) in order
to install ormally the Fth King, King Jigme Khesar Namgyal \angchuck ,b.
1980), on the throne.
77
Lessons from Japans Symbolic Monarchy
In a country that was not only accustomed to, but also in fact welcomed the Kings
playing the leading role in the political process, how are Bhutans newly elected
leaders to steer the countrys nascent democracy in a way that keeps the King above
politics? At the same time, how can King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck,
who maintains immense moral authority, continue to play an important societal
role in improving his country?
The Importance of Keeping the Monarch Outside Politics
The imperial will was central to Japans political system under the Meiji Constitution
of 1889. The postwar Constitution, in contrast, rendered it constitutionally
insupportable to invoke the imperial will to justify policies. Nonetheless Emperor
Showa ,lirohito, 1901-1989, was still a Fgure o awe or many Japanese in the
decades after the war, and many people were accustomed to the imperial will.
Fortunately most Japanese politicians came to understand that policies had to be
devised and instituted in the name of the people, and that it simply was no longer
acceptable to employ the Emperor in order to curry favour for policies.
While in Bhutan I watched footage of King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchucks
2008 coronation, and the displays of reverence that some of his countrymen
displayed toward him remind me of scenes from Emperor Showas tours to rural
areas immediately ater the war. Photographs and Flm ootage o these tours
show peasants prostrating themselves in deference to Emperor Showa. King
Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck is by all accounts humble and also mixes easily
with his countrymen, but it was clear from those scenes during the coronation
ceremony as well as from talking to Bhutans political leaders that the young King
enjoys tremendous authority.
Thus, there may come moments when it will be extremely tempting for Bhutans
elected leaders, frustrated with the messy process involved with making policy in
a democracy, to invoke the authority of the King in order to push through such
and such bill. They must resist this temptation at all costs if the new system of
constitutional monarchy is to mature. This means that not only must the elected
leaders avoid invoking the King in parliamentary debates, but those ministers who
are priy to the King`s opinions must maintain strict conFdence.
Consider the practice o brieFngs in Japan. Although this act is not well known
among Japanese at large, government ministers (especially the Prime Minister) and
78
other goernment oFcials regularly brie the emperor on political matters. Such
a custom is not out of line with the practices of other symbolic monarchies such
as Britain and Spain.
According to many accounts Japans present Emperor, Akihito (1933-), depending
on the subject o the brieFng, is anything but passie, asking questions and making
comments that undoubtedly gie the minister deliering the brieFng a sense o
the Emperors views on various issues. The same was true of Emperor Showa.
Japans national symbol is a human being, after all, and the Emperor has opinions
on various matters. No doubt the same is true of Bhutans young King.
Ministers and oFcials who brie Japan`s Lmperor understand, howeer, that they
are absolutely forbidden from making public the content of their conversations
with the Emperor during his lifetime (prime ministers who brief the Queen in
Britain observe the same rule). To make the emperors comments public would be
to involve him in politics, which is not acceptable.
Japanese politicians have made only a few mistakes in this area in the past six
decades, the most famous of which occurred in 1973 and resulted in swift and
severe consequences for the individual who leaked the Emperors remarks. After
Masuhara Keikichi, Chief of the Defence Agency, shared with reporters comments
that Lmperor Showa had made during a brieFng that indicated that the Lmperor
supported a defence build-up, Masuhara was forced to resign within days as a result
of a general uproar over his apparent use of the Emperor for political ends.
Along the same lines the political views of King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck
must be priatised` rom this point on, een i the elected oFcials and ciil
servants continue to brief the King on political matters. It may seem strange
to be recommending secrecy to a new democracy that is struggling to establish
transparency in governmental matters, but, ironically enough, in the case of the
King`s political iews, maintaining conFdentiality will help the democracy mature.
In most other areas, including in reference to issues such as the amount of public
money used to support the monarchy, transparency would be best in Bhutan, but
the case o brieFngs is an exception.
Prime Minister Lyonchhoen Jigmi Y. Thinley recognises the need for discretion.
During a meeting on 20 May, he stressed that in light of the Kings authority there
79
must not be the slightest interention` ,use, o the King by elected oFcials.
Prime Minister 1hinley went on to stress that the King was the Fnal guarantor o
democracy, and that it was the duty o elected oFcials not to behae in a manner
that might compromise the countrys young democracy.
National Unity and Identity
Buddhism is central to Bhutans national identity. Article 3.1 of the new constitution
reads: Buddhism is the spiritual heritage of Bhutan, which promotes the principles
and values of peace, non-violence, compassion and tolerance. In fact the new
constitution requires that the King be Buddhist (in this sense, Bhutans system is
similar to that o 1hailand,, een though he is also deFned as the protector o all
religions. Buddhist symbolism was central to the coronation even if the state itself
is now secular.
The extent to which Buddhism continues to be woven into the daily lives of
people in Bhutan is evidenced by the fact that many of the items constituting The
Dragons Gift: Sacred Art of Bhutan, an exhibition now touring internationally,
were borrowed from private homes where they continue to serve profoundly
religious purposes. There is little question that Buddhism will continue in part to
deFne the national identity, and this identity has in act been central to Bhutan`s
security.
But Bhutan is also changing fast now that it has opened itself to the world.
Approximately half of the people now own cell phones, and television, especially
programmes from India, is presently the rage. Although a majority of individuals
still make their living through agriculture, the country is rapidly urbanising. Certain
traditions no longer appeal to the young, much to the concern of some of their
elders.
The young Oxford-educated King thus faces the question of which aspects of
global culture to embrace (democracy being one important example), and which
to keep at bay. At the same time he is faced with the same question regarding
domestic traditions. Which traditions are worth preserving, and which should be
discarded?
Japans Monarchs have also faced these questions during the modern period, most
signiFcantly in the case o Lmperor Meiji ,1852-1912,, but later Monarchs aced
80
similar choices. For example it was Emperor Taisho (born to a concubine in 1879;
d. 1926) who established the system of monogamous marriage in the royal house,
something that his son, Emperor Showa, subsequently observed. The system of
ladies in waiting was ormally abolished shortly ater the Asia PaciFc \ar.
In the same way that Japans imperial family members lend their prestige to their
countrys traditional arts (e.g., waka), King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck has
an important role to play in supporting Bhutan`s magniFcent artistic traditions.
These traditions include hand-woven textiles that tourists snap up with delight not
to mention dazzling Buddhist art ranging from bronze statues to silk paintings.
Monarchies are often thought of as bastions of tradition, but they also are often
at the forefront of modernisation as well. One only has to think of Emperor Meiji
and his family being inoculated for smallpox during an epidemic in 1875, a time
when many people feared vaccinations.
In a country with a population of 675,000 it is literally possible for the young King,
during the course of his reign, to reach out individually to each and every one of his
countrymen, an advantageous situation that cannot be duplicated in Japan. During
a recent 25-day domestic tour that included visits to remote villages, King Jigme
Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck demonstrated his belief that certain superstitions are
in fact harmful and should be discarded.
Walking between two remote villages in March of this year, the King met Tashi
Wangmo, a woman ostracised in her community as a poison giver. In certain
rural villages, there are families who have been ostracised for generations because
they are seen as being cursed, and thus fellow villagers refuse to receive food or
drink from them. Someone from the Kings entourage who had scouted ahead
notiFed lis Majesty not to receie anything rom this woman.
Instead the King reached out to Tashi Wangmo by presenting her a rosary and
asking her to pour some ara (locally brewed alcohol) into his cup, which he then
drank. The King asked the woman to tell her fellow villagers that the King had
drunk from the so-called poison-giver, which proved to be a life-changing event
for her. By this simple act, the King had broken the curse that had plagued this
womans family for generations. It was the sort of benevolent act with tremendous
symbolic resonance from the young King to which people in Bhutan are quickly
becoming accustomed.
81
The 29 year-old King has not yet married. The case of Japan, especially in the post-
war period, inorms us that imperial marriages play a signiFcant role in renewing
the royal houses connection with the people. The 1959 marriage of the present
Emperor and Empress dramatically linked the monarchy to what at the time was
a burgeoning new middle class that held dear such post-war values as equality (the
present empress, Michiko, came from outside the former nobility) and liberty (the
marriage was interpreted as a love match).
Much about Bhutan young Kings reign, including the selection of a bride, is still
taking shape, but unless the constitution is amended his time on the throne will
end in 2045. The constitution requires the Monarch to abdicate upon reaching 65
years of age.
Lessons from Bhutan
It is no secret that Bhutan is not a major international player in terms of economic
or military might, but in the realm of ideas it has made a name for itself that
is disproportionate to its size as a result of the concept of GNH. GNH was a
guiding principle in the writing of the new constitution, which includes some
intriguing articles.
Consider, for example, the following two articles:
5.2. The Royal Government shall:
(a) Protect, conserve and improve the pristine environment and safeguard the
biodiversity of the country;
(b) Prevent pollution and ecological degradation;
(c) Secure ecologically balanced sustainable development while promoting
justiFable economic and social deelopment, and
(d) Ensure a safe and healthy environment.
5.3. The Government shall ensure that, in order to conserve the countrys natural
resources and to prevent degradation of the ecosystem, a minimum of sixty
percent of Bhutans total land shall be maintained under forest cover for all time.
82
Is there another country in the world that constitutionally requires that sixty percent
of the national territory be maintained as forest? Most of the developed countries
Frst innicted great enironmental damage beore eentually coming around to
protect what nature was left. Unfortunately, many of the countries developing
today are making the same mistake.
1he people o Bhutan are trying to aoid destroying the enironment in the Frst
place. Approximately one-third of the country is already under special protection
as part of the national park system. Of course, Bhutan is not a utopia. For example,
litter has recently become a problem in Paro, where the countrys one airport is
located and where, frankly, perhaps too many resorts have already been built.
Nonetheless, Bhutans long-standing, tenacious commitment to environmental
protection is undeniable and admirable.
Obviously Japan has also adopted many worthwhile environmental
policies. However, it is also true that huge amounts of concrete continues to be
poured throughout the archipelago in projects that sustained the alliance between
the construction industry and the recently dethroned Liberal Democratic Party,
but which are not only of dubious practical value but are also environmentally
destructive.
Although I think that the next lesson from Bhutan is particularly relevant to my
own country, the United States, where the wealth gap has grown to disgraceful
proportions, it also applies to Japan, which is also deeloping a signiFcant gap
between rich and poor. Although those individuals in Bhutan who practice
subsistence agriculture (even as urbanites roar past in their automobiles) may view
the matter differently, it is nonetheless the case that Bhutan does not have the sort
of sickening discrepancies between rich and poor that characterise so many other
countries, both developed and developing ones.
Bhutan would do well to keep the wealth gap as minimal as possible, and the King
should (and from what we know of him, likely will) employ his immense moral
authority in support of this goal. In any case, Article 9.7 mandates the government
of Bhutan to minimise gaps in wealth: The State shall endeavour to develop and
execute policies to minimise inequalities of income, concentration of wealth, and
promote equitable distribution of public facilities among individuals and people
living in different parts of the Kingdom.
83
1he wording o this article is simultaneously stronger and more speciFc than
Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan: All people shall have the right to maintain
the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living. In all spheres of life,
the State shall use its endeavours for the promotion and extension of social welfare
and security, and of public health.
Many Americans would probably denounce Article 9.7 of Bhutans Constitution
as socialistic. This is ironic because scholars who have looked carefully at the
United States often interpret the country as practicing socialism for the rich
through special tax breaks and other government programmes even while the poor
are required to live according to the market. Bhutan should avoid this aspect of
the American model.
Kenneth J. Ruoff is Professor of History at Portland State University,
Oregon, USA.
84 84
The Story of the Demise of Nepals
Monarchy
Sudhindra Sharma
7
On June 19, 2008, monarchy ended in Nepal when the elected constituent
assembly endorsed the country as a Federal Democratic Republic.
1
The main
political force calling for an end to monarchy in Nepal was the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoist), which had launched an insurgency in the Himalayan Kingdom
from 1996 onwards, among others, to oust what it regarded to be the feudal
monarchical institution. King Gyanendra had become increasingly isolated when
the parliamentarian parties, the Nepali Congress (NC) and United Marxist-
Leninist (UML), in particular, joined hands with the Maoists through a 12-point
Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 2005 in New Delhi, to bring
an end to the Kings absolute rule.
King Gyanendra Bikram Shah Dev eventually had to step down in April 2006
following 19 days of relentless mass demonstrations throughout the country. He
handed over the executive authority to the reinstated parliament, which expanded
to include the Maoist rebels. The Maoist members of the parliament along
with MPs from other political parties passed a resolution calling for an end to
the institution of monarchy and changed the status of the state from a Hindu
Monarchical Kingdom to a secular, democratic, and federal republic. Thus ended
the over two millennium-old monarchical institution of Nepal, and with it, the
Shah dynasty, which had helped form the modern Nepali state in 1769. Aside from
a ew Frecrackers lit by a handul o Maoist cadres and some republican-oriented
student activists of various political parties, there was no mass jubilation at the
ousting of the centuries-old institution, nor was sorrow openly expressed - at least
1 I am grateIul to Bhutan Centre Ior Media and Democracy Ior organising the ConIerence on
Monarchy and Democracy and Ior inviting me to share my ideas on the Nepali monarchy. I am
grateful to all the participants of the conference for sharing their ideas and commenting upon mine
in the conIerence held in Paro, Bhutan between May 18 and 20, 2009.
85
not on the streets. Neither exuberance nor anguish marked the termination of the
centuries-old institution of monarchy in Nepal.
This paper examines monarchy in Nepal. It begins with the circumstances leading
to the emergence of the state of Nepal in the late eighteenth century and the role
of Prithvi Narayan Shah, in this process. The paper then focuses on the milieu,
personalities and contributions of four Monarchs: Tribhuvan, Mahendra, Birendra
and Gyanendra. Political events leading to the ouster of the monarchy following
the royal massacre in June 2001 are then analysed along with a discussion of the
factors that made King Gyanendra increasingly unpopular. Lastly, the contribution
of monarchy to Nepal is assessed.
King Prithvi Narayan Shah and the Emergence of Modern Nepal
1he year 169 was decisie or the Gorkhali Lmpire in that the year signiFed
Gorkhas victory over the Malla dynasty ruled kingdoms of the valley. The
subjugation of the valley was an important turning point in the expansion of the
Gorkhali Empire in the central and eastern Himalayas. King Prithvi Narayan Shah,
who led the Gorkhalis in their conquest, was able to expand the dominion of the
House of Gorkha, a small principality in central Nepal, not only through military
conquest but also through marriage alliances and diplomacy (Blakie). Before the
nomenclature Nepal gained ascendancy from early nineteenth century onwards,
the land used to be known as the Gorkha ra bhar muluk underscoring the
territory as the dominion of the House of Gorkha.

While Prithvi Narayan Shah deposed the erstwhile rulers of the valley (either
through banishment or death sentence), he nevertheless sought the blessings of
Taleju Bhavani, the titular deity of the Malla Kings.
2
Likewise, while the new king
took over the land and property belonging to the Malla kings and their military
commanders, he recognised all the land that had been gifted by the previous
dynasty to ascetics, temples, and Brahmins. These gestures indicated a degree of
religio-cultural continuity: when Prithvi Narayan Shah deposed the Malla kings
of the valley, his intention was not to loot and plunder but to govern the new
possessions by integrating these into his ancestral possessions.
2 This deity was probably Tulaja Bhawani oI northern Karnataka. The goddess was brought into
the valley Irom the Kingdom oI Tirhut (present day Simraungad in northern Bara district) by Hari
Simha Dev aIter the kingdom was ransacked by a Muslim conqueror while returning Irom Bengal.
86
Dening the Pure Hindu Self vis--vis the Polluted Un-Hindu Others
Though Nepal, in the perceptions of its rulers, was a Hindu state, the monarchs
did not see themselves as dev-raja. The ideas articulated by the rulers of this
peripheral land, were those of cultural uniqueness and a claim to the continuation
of a civilisation that had been displaced at the centre of Indian-Hindu civilisation.
From the thirteenth century onwards, with the consolidation of Muslim rule over
much of north India, kingship in Nepal evolved along a different path from that
of India. As Max Weber notes, Muslim conquest of India not only deposed Hindu
kings, but also made redundant the services of the Brahmins as interpreters of
the shastras and as advisers in the administration and the judiciary (Weber). This is
because the various Islamic dynasties that ruled the Indo-Gangetic plains derived
their legitimacy from a different tradition. The Islamic clergy or ulema, versed in the
Koran, Hadith and the Shariat, played the role in Islamic sultanates that Brahmins
played in Hindu kingdoms.
The persistence in the symbiotic relationship between Brahmin priesthood and
Kshatriya kingship in Nepal and its severance in India led Hinduism to evolve
along different lines in Nepal (Sharma, Hindu State and Hindu Adhirajya). It
was thus that right up to the early part of the twentieth century, Brahmins played
a signiFcant role in statecrat. It was the King`s duty to uphold the chaturvarnashram
dharma - the four stages of life and four varnas.
3
By the seventeenth century the rulers of the petty kingdoms of the Himalaya saw
themselves in some sense as being Hindu,
4
meaning by this primarily that they were
not Muslims. Conversely, the Ganges basin was referred to not as Hindustan, but
pejoratiely as "Mughlan", the country ruled and deFled by the Mughals.
3 Even during the eighteenth and nineteenth century, when local society was coming under strong
infuence Irom Hinduism and Hindu social codes were beginning to aIIect societal Iormation, there
seems to have been not one, but three codes oI hierarchy centered on the Brahmin, the King and
the ascetic. The Brahmin, the King and the ascetic each claimed supreme rank in the ritual sphere.
The King, as the lord oI the land, claimed superiority over Brahmins and ascetics not only by
secularising their ritual status and incorporating them within the civil administration, but also by
deiIying the kingship (Burghart 1996).
4 Internal diIIerences among Hindus` (Vaishnavs, Shaivas, Shaktas, etc.) thus became less
important.
87
From Monarchical Shahs to Rana Shoguns
The campaign begun by the Shah King during the late eighteenth century was to
be consolidated by the regents of the incipient state during the early nineteenth
century. During the same period, once the young states interests collided with that
of the British East India Company and its ambitions were curtailed and territorial
boundaries Fxed, the rulers were to chart a largely isolationist policy or the next
century or so.
By the end of the eighteenth century, the relation of incorporated principalities to
the Gorkhali State was predominantly a tributary one. The state was maintained
by the appropriation of agricultural surpluses from the peasants. In contrast to
thriving trade during the Malla times with the takeover of the valley by Prithvi
Narayan in 1769, the contribution of trade to state coffers drastically diminished.
The new Gorkhali rulers, suspicious that traders, particularly foreign ones, were
informants of foreign powers, discouraged foreign traders from trading in the
kingdom. For instance, soon after taking over he expelled the gosain ("Indian
ascetic") merchants, while British attempts to establish trading relations and access
to Tibet were similarly rebuffed (Whelpton, John 2005).
1owards the end o the uniFcation campaign in the early nineteenth century, the
Kings power waned and state reign went effectively into the hands of military
families. During the same period, the young states interests collided with that of
the British East India Company regarding the ownership of the recently acquired
territory in the central Tarai, which resulted in the 1814-1816 war. The expansion
of the young Nepali state was halted by the defeat to the forces of the British East
India Company that reduced its size by one third. One of the conditions of the
treaty was to accept a permanent British representative (resident) in Kathmandu.
5
Competition for the control of the state led to bloody struggles between different
military families. From 1846 state machinery went effectively into the hands of
one family - the Ranas. The power of this family was consolidated through the
institution of hereditary prime ministership. During this period, the King was the
de jure Fgurehead, the de acto rulers being the hereditary Rana prime ministers.
5 The resident would press the King oI Nepal, as in the case oI princely states elsewhere in the
subcontinent, to appoint mukhiyars or dewans Iriendly to the British. This was also one oI the things
that Brian Hodgson the resident deputed by the East India Company to Nepal - did during the
1930s.
88
While the Shah Monarchs were referred to as Maharajadhiraj, the Rana prime
minister was referred to as Maharaja.
The person who ushered in the rule of Ranas as the de facto rulers in Nepal from
1846 to 1951 was Jang Bahadur. The man had humble beginnings, having come
from a military family that had assisted King Prithvi Narayan Shah in his campaigns.
The contacts he had with the Crown Prince helped him gain access to the court.
After consolidating his rule in the country by annihilating his rivals, he sought to
establish amicable relations with the British. This was important in that from 1816
onwards, with the establishment of the residency in the valley, the British were
closely monitoring events in Nepal. In 1850, Jang Bahadur visited England and
lrance. In doing so, he was one o the Frst princes o the subcontinent to break
the taboo on crossing the kala-pani (or the "black ocean"). After having gained a
Frst-hand experience o Britain`s military and industrial strength, he was coninced
that it would be prudent to ally with the British rather than go against them - a
policy that was to be followed by his clan and which was to yield it dividends for
another century.
6
The Ranas, as Nepals hereditary prime ministers and maharajas, were able to
maintain the countrys independence, so to speak, by being faithful allies of the
British. Unwavering support to the British - even in times of duress such as during
mutinies, wars, and independence movement - meant that the British, in turn,
reciprocated. This was also the main reason that their rule was to last as long as it
did.
King Tribhuvan, Nepals 1951 Revolution, and Monarchy as the Locus of
the State
Independent India, in particular the government at that time headed by the
Indian National Congress, was sympathetic towards the Nepali Congress. The
Congress was formed in the then-British India during the 1940's, and the leaders
had participated in Indias independence movement. Post-colonial Indias role in
Nepals transition of 1950-51 was to bring two rival institutions into the centre-
stage of Nepali politics: assertive monarchy and political parties.
6 He was, however, wary against beginning modern education on a large scale, introducing parliament
(which he had seen in England), or modern Iactories in the country. The pursuance oI this policy by
the Ranas Ior over a century was to make Nepal relatively backward in the region.
89
The Story of the Demise of Nepals Monarchy
The end to the century-old Rana Shogun came rather abruptly. In 1947, India
gained independence and the new democratic rulers of India, especially the Indian
National Congress that soon formed the government, were not as sympathetic
towards the Ranas, as had been the Imperial British. From within India there was a
campaign by the Nepali Congress against the regime. Various Congresses formed
in India, including the one started by C class Ranas, were amalgamated in 1950
and the new political party was simply called the Nepali Congress. The Nepali
Congress launched an armed revolt against the Ranas the same year. They formed
an alliance with King Tribhuvan in their attempt to topple the Ranas.
After King Tribhuvan was implicated in conspiracy against the Ranas, he sought
asylum at the Indian embassy in November 1950. Soon the rebel forces under the
leadership of the Nepali Congress began attacking Nepals bordering towns in the
Tarai. In the face of deteriorating military strength and desertion of government
troops to the rebel side, the Rana regime began to buckle under pressure. With
anti-Rana initiatives of the Nepali Congress receiving covert support from
Independent India, Rana rule oFcially came to an end in lebruary 1951.
In short, the withdrawal of the British from India and the insurrectionary activities
of the Nepali Congress were causes for the collapse of the Ranas. In addition,
the very legitimacy on which Rana rule was based rapidly eroded when King
1ribhuan - the King on whose behal the Ranas ruled - identiFed himsel with
those opposed to the Rana regime. In 1951, after being eclipsed for a century and
a half, monarchy, i.e. the Shah dynasty, was reinstated as the supreme authority in
Nepal.
The event of 1951 is a story of a legitimate, though powerless, King risking his
throne for the sake of his common people. Underlying the event is the story of
a King`s compassionate sacriFce and his siding with the people and their leaders
rather than with the nobility who belonged to his own class. It is this narrative
that helped boost the image of monarchy as a caring institution and this image
eventually helped it come to the centre-stage of Nepali politics. It was primarily
this narrative that bestowed legitimacy and sanctity to the institution of monarchy.
The reinstatement of Shah Kings as the centre of power in Nepal was accompanied
by speciFc symbols and gestures enacted by King 1ribhuan, which underscored
the Kings empathy and association with the common-folk: out went the Anglicised
90
dress worn by the Rana aristocracy, and in came the simple Nepali daura-surwal;
out went the courtly language (the hazuur culture), and in came the simple
Nepali language (the tapai culture); out went the gestures associated with courtly
culture such as swasti and in came the simple namaste form of greeting.
The enlightened rulers of princely states had probably undertaken this transition
during the 1930's when the independence movement led by the Indian National
Congress gained momentum: their transition and transformation probably became
the template for fashioning a democratic and pro-India-oriented monarchy in the
region.
The 1951 revolution had, in one stroke, changed the peasantry from subjects to
citizens. It helped transform those whom had been the subjects of feudal lords
of an autocratic regime into citizens of a democratic country. The 1951 event
brought abrupt change to a society that had been accustomed to tradition. The
seclusion of Nepal that the Rana rulers had painstakingly enforced ended, and
new political, social, and economic innuences began to enter the country. 1his
eventually led to new movements that were to have wide-ranging repercussions on
arious dimensions o lie. 1he 1951 reolution can thus be read as Frst attempts
at engagement with modernity (Khanal).
In the new narration of the monarchy, the contribution of the Ranas, especially
in ensuring Nepals independence and sovereignty, were generally glossed over. In
history textbooks, the Ranas have generally been portrayed as the ruling class that
deliberately kept Nepal backward.
7

Nepal in the 1950s and 1960s
1hough the Frst oices that contested conention were being articulated, the
forces of tradition in the 1950s were still quite strong. The traditional elements of
society, including much of the Rana family itself, were to later regroup and make
a comeback: they were to regroup around King Mahendra, who did not share his
fathers democratic convictions.

1hough Nepal in the 1950`s was rapidly opening up to modern innuences, politics
was far from stable. The decade of the 1950s has been characterised as a period
of experimentation with democracy where Cabinets were formed and dissolved,
Advisory Assemblies established and re-established, and parties created and
7 For a better discussion oI the images conjured up in history textbooks, see Onta 1996.
91
fragmented. The unstable nature of the polity, in the aftermath of the overthrow
of the Rana rule, was to help strengthen the hands of the monarchy since it was
more often than not, the King who would call upon the leaders of political parties
to form the government.
Things were changing on the international front during the 1950s. The Chinese
takeover of Tibet in 1949 created worries for both the United States and India.
The United States diplomatic relations with Nepal had begun from 1947 and after
1950, the Americans saw Nepal as a frontline state against communism and began
providing aid.
1hough the United States was the Frst to sign an agreement o cooperation, the
projects supported by India were the Frst to get underway. India`s assistance began
with the Frst isit to Kathmandu by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in June
1951, four months after the overthrow of Rana rule. Later in the same year, an
Indian military mission arrived in Kathmandu to modernise the Gauchar airport
and build a road from the Indian border to Kathmandu.
Nepal became a member of the United Nations in 1955 and the Colombo Plan in
1956; this assured it of durable foreign assistance. It was at around the same period
that Nepal`s Frst Fe-year plan was prepared.
With the removal of the Ranas from the centre-stage of Nepals statecraft, the
army saw the King as their chief and from 1952 began regarding the King as the
supreme commander-in-chief. This further bolstered the position of the monarchy
at the cost of the political parties. However, monarchy in Nepal did not make itself
assertive from 1951 onwards; its assertiveness was a gradual process and one that
spanned several years.
In February 1959 a parliamentary election under a constitution promulgated
by King Mahendra was held. Nepali Congress won a two third majority in the
Frst parliamentary election. 1he Nepali Congress goernment was subsequently
formed with BP Koirala as the Prime Minister. Despite the progress made by the
Koirala government, King Mahendra was not happy with it. Likewise, an assertive
monarchys ambition to maintain control over government was hindered by the
determined, popularly elected, and internationally recognised prime minister. As
a result, King Mahendra, using the emergency powers vested in him by the then-
92
constitution, arrested BP Koirala, dissolved the parliament, and assumed executive
authority of the country on the 15th of December 1960.
King Mahendra, Assertive Monarchy, and Modernisation
Some have tended to characterise Mahendras action in 1960 as a coup; however,
the event cannot be called a coup since the monarchy had been granted residual
powers by the 1959 Constitution and Mahendra had used these very provisions
when he took action against the B.P. Koirala government. Though his action was
constitutional, it was, however, not warranted; the situation within the country
was normal and did not call for the declaration of emergency. Though King
Mahendra was eventually able to sideline and marginalise his opponents, this
action by the King was a breach of trust with the political leaders and tarnished
the image of the monarchy. The symbolic capital and goodwill that the institution
had earned through King Tribhuvans gesture in 1950/51, was undermined by
the actions of King Mahendra in the event of 1960. (While Tribhuvans gesture
had highlighted monarchys alliance with people and with democracy, Mahendras
gesture underscored the Monarchs parting of ways with people, its leaders and
democracy.)
King Mahendra was able to do what he did because the traditional forces in society
were quite strong at the time. The army, whose upper echelons comprised of the
old Rana nobility, was behind him. For the new educated classes, there were few
employment opportunities aside from the bureaucracy and the threat of their
being expelled soon cowered many into accepting King Mahendras actions.
The Nepali Congress seriously challenged the Kings move, and an insurrection
soon got underway in parts of the Tarai through Indias tacit support. Soon the geo-
politics of the region changed dramatically with repercussions in the insurrection.
There had been long-standing disputes between India and China in the Himalayas,
which had been simmering for some time. In 1962 China launched a massive
attack in Indian territories in the Himalayas; as a consequence, Indias security of
the entire Himalayan region became vulnerable. The Indian government stopped
providing aid to the Nepali Congress; it had been doing so tacitly in the interest of
Indias security in the Himalayan region. This dramatic shift in geo-politics worked
in the Kings favour.
King Mahendra was able to shore up his legitimacy by various other means. He
soon promulgated a new civil code that ended the state patronage to the caste
system. He enacted a land reform - something that had been discussed in the
93
parliament but that the parliament had not passed. 1he land reorm Fxed the
upper ceiling of land a family could own and was generally perceived to favour the
lower classes. Besides these, he continued with the modernising thrust initiated by
the Koirala government. Moves such as these, to a certain extent, redeemed the
Monarch in the eyes of the common people.
Despite the monarchy monopolising state privileges, King Mahendra initiated
various other changes such as the abolishment of vassal states and vassal kings and
decentralisation of the administration. Though the popularly elected B.P. Koirala
government and the nominated governments that had preceded it had begun
many of these initiatives (such as planned economic development), the King gave
continuity to these. The bureaucracy manned by the newly educated elites, many of
whom had received their education in India, continued the modernisation thrust
even after the mantle was taken over by King Mahendra from B.P. Koirala (Dixit).
King Birendra: Transition from Absolute to Constitutional Monarchy
The Constitution promulgated in 1962 introduced a form of guided democracy,
known as the Panchayat system, which was a system of government with the King at
the apex of the political body. The Constitution banned political parties. It vested
sovereignty and powers of the state in the person of the King and underscored
the role of the King as the creator and custodian of the Constitution, while
simultaneously making him an active political agent. The Constitution of 1962
,with two major amendments Frst in 191 and another in 1980, was to last almost
three decades, until a popular peoples movement known as Jana-andolan forced
King Birendra, Mahendras elder son, to abrogate it.
It would not be wrong to characterise the period of assertive monarchy in Nepal
as a period that ushered in modernisation in the country. Modernisation of Nepal
under an active Monarch was possible because of a combination of both internal
and external factors. Internally, a new set of political leaders and bureaucrats at the
helms of the state aspired to modernise Nepal; externally, the international aid era
had begun.
King Birendra, unlike his father Mahendra, was more positively-disposed towards
democracy. Moreover, he had an acute political sense: knowing when to persist
and when to diffuse an impending crisis, and when to step down altogether. When
the agitation led by students, joined later by school and college teachers and other
94
professionals, gained momentum in 1979-80, King Birendra called for a plebiscite
asking the people to choose between a multi-party democracy or a reformed
Panchayat system. The latter won and the Panchayat system, with some modiFcations
(for example direct election to the national assembly in place of indirect elections),
continued for another decade and, as in earlier decades, the Monarch continued to
reign as well as to rule (Dixit).
Things came to a boil once again in 1989. The economic embargo, imposed by
India as well as the increased involvement of various professional groups to oppose
the Panchayat, were factors that helped build up the momentum of the movement.
The willingness of Nepali Congress and the Communist Parties of Nepal to join
hands in a united struggle was decisive in that the movement was able to create
enough pressure for King Birendra to open the door for a multi-party democracy,
an interim government, and a new constitution.
The 1990 Constitution envisioned a Westminster-type of democracy with
parliamentary democracy and constitutional monarchy. For a King who had been
an active political leader for two decades, Birendra took easily to his new role in
which he was expected to reign and not to rule.
8
Over the next decade or so, the
countrys governance was in the hands of the political parties. The role of the
Monarch centred on cultural and religious activities and that of the ceremonial head
of the state (Dixit). With the politically un-involved King, the image of monarchy
that had been nedging a ew years back, was now on the road to recoery. All that,
however, was to end on the fateful night of June 1, 2001.
Palace Massacre, King Gyanendra, Maoist Conict, and Assertive Monarchy
On the night of June 1, 2001, a gruesome massacre took place within the
Narayanhiti Palace premises that resulted in the death of King Birendra, Queen
Aishwarya and 11 other members of the royal family when (according to a report
by the government-formed commission) Crown Prince Dipendra pulled the
trigger on his family and ultimately on himself. The remaining younger brother
of late King Birendra, Prince Gyanendra, who was out of Kathmandu when the
incident occurred, was crowned the new King.
8 King Birendra`s upbringing, his education abroad, had probably made him more accommodative
towards democracy than his Iather, who had received a traditional Hindu education within the
palace premises. King Birendra received his schooling at St. Paul`s in Darjeeling and attended
Eton, Harvard, and Tokyo University. His exposure to 'Western education, in addition to his living
in societies other than his own, would have distilled a diIIerent set oI values, orientations, and
preIerences that had probably made him more accommodative towards democracy and popularly
elected leaders.
95
Since 1996 the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), referred to subsequently
as the Maoists, had launched a Peoples War aimed at ending the Westminster-
type democracy, including the monarchy, and instituting in their place, a Peoples
Republic. Multi-party democracy, reinstated from 1990 onwards, may not have
delivered on political stability and governance - but none of the political parties that
functioned under the 1990 Constitution espoused violence as a means of political
change. This was no longer the case with the rise of the Maoists, who believed in
and unhesitatingly deployed brute force to bring about political changes. This in
turn led to the introduction of a coercive element in Nepali politics, and eventually
was to cause upheavals in Nepali society and societal relationships.
Gyanendra was enthroned as the new monarch in June 2001. As Supreme
Commander-in-chief of the Royal Nepalese Army, he gave his acquiescence to the
deployment of the army to quell the Maoist insurgency. Unlike King Birendra, who
had restricted the elected government from using the RNA against the Maoists,
King Gyanendra showed no such hesitation and allowed government to undertake
operations against the Maoists. More extensive operations of the army done by
Frst declaring a state o emergency.
The 12 years of experiments with multi-party democracy ended in May 2002 when
Prime Minister S.B. Deuba, earing a ote o no conFdence rom his own Nepali
Congress party, dissoled the louse. 1his was not the Frst time that the prime
minister took pre-emptive action by dissolving the House when his own party
members challenged the government. This time, however, the actions of the prime
minister resulted in a constitutional crisis when after six months he was unable to
hold an election, citing security reasons for his inability to do so. He was summarily
sacked by the Head of State, King Gyanendra, for being unable to hold elections
as mandated by the Constitution. This action by the Monarch, unfortunately, not
only heralded a constitutional crisis (in that the 1990 Constitution did not have
any provision as to what should be done in such circumstances) but precipitated a
re-alignment of political actors: in particular, it led to the parliamentarian political
parties aligning themselves with the Maoists.
Deubas dismissal was followed by King Gyanendra nominating prime ministers
using Article 127 of the constitution. Each of the nominated prime ministers
tenure was short-lived. Although the King-nominated governments attempted to
build rapport - however fragile - between the various political actors including
the Maoists, they were largely unsuccessful in committing political parties for
96
fresh elections. As a consequence, on February 1
st
, 2005, the King declared a
state of emergency, took back executive powers, formed a cabinet under his own
chairmanship and promised to hold a general election within three years, after
which he would handover executive power to the elected parliament.
With the Kings dramatic actions on February 1st, 2005, the country witnessed a
major re-alignment of political forces with the seven party alliance and the Maoists
moving closer to one another. Whether it was on the question of constituent
assembly or the monarchy, the stance taken by the political parties had, in the
months following February 1
st
, increasingly gravitated towards the Maoist agenda,
whose bottom line was constituent assembly elections that would draft and then
ratify a new constitution. Nepali Congress, a political party that had professed
constitutional monarchy and multi-party democracy since its inception, decided to
remove any mention of constitutional monarchy from its statute during the party
convention in September 2005. UML was more equivocal in deciding whether to
adopt democratic republicanism through elections to a constituent assembly.
In November 2005, the leaders of the seven party alliance and the Maoists
reached an understanding whereby both political actors agreed to establish peace
by resoling the 10-year-old armed connict through a orward-looking political
outlet, stating that the long struggle between autocratic monarchy and democracy
in Nepal had reached a very grave and decisive turn in Nepali history.
9

The course of action proposed by the Monarch to overcome the constitutional
crisis was to hold local elections for municipality followed by election for the lower
house of parliament and then eventually to hand over executive authority to this
elected parliament. King Gyanendra seemed to be pursuing this line of action
seriously. The date for municipal elections was announced for 8 February 2006.
This was viewed as a prelude to the national election. But the Maoists, in spite
of commitments made in the memorandum of understanding, went on a blitz by
attacking the state security forces, candidates for municipal elections, and even
driers who deFed their calls or bandh, in order to deter people from participating
in the municipal elections. This paid off when the turnout to the municipal election
was 22 percent - lower than had been anticipated.
Added to the estrangement of the royal government was the precarious economic
condition the country was moing into as a result o heightened domestic connict.
9 The Kathmandu Post on 22 November 2005.
97
As the connict in Nepal grew in magnitude, the state had begun to siphon resources
rom the much needed deelopment actiities to the security arena. lrom Fscal
years 2000 to 2004, there was a decline in expenditure in the economic sector
while security spending increased dramatically. Foreign aid, an important source of
funding for the aid-dependant state, was not forthcoming when most of Nepals
bilateral and multilateral donors, objecting to the Kings action on February 1st,
2005, were unwilling to sign new agreements with the government. This trend,
coupled with increasing budgetary allocations to the Royal Palace when the overall
economy was deteriorating, had begun to make the monarchy unpopular among
the masses. These events exacerbated the people's mistrust of the King.
As the King increasingly began to become alienated from the people, the Maoists
rendered themselves closer to the common folk by transforming their public
persona. As early as late 2005, the Maoists were keen to shed their image as an
extremist group that espoused violence to achieve political goals, and had begun
projecting themselves as a moderate political party championing the cause of
republicanism.
In April 2006, mass street protests known as Peoples Movement II, organised
by the erstwhile parliamentarian parties and supported by the rebel Maoists, took
place. It forced King Gyanendra to step down and to hand over executive authority
to the reinstated parliament.
Longitudinal Public Opinion Poll on Orientation towards the Monarchy
Peoples orientation to the monarchy underwent dramatic changes between
2004 and 2008 the period when Nepal was going through tumultuous political
changes. Among others, the Peoples Movement II of April 2006 seems to have
led to a dramatic shift in public opinion. Data generated by a longitudinal opinion
survey, Nepal Contemporary Political Situation (or NCPS survey), conducted
in December 2004, showed that 81 percent supported monarchy in some form or
another.
10
1he Fgure dwindled to 53 percent by NCPS III, conducted in September
2006, a few months subsequent to the Peoples Movement II. The support for
monarchy further dwindled in 2007 to 45 percen,t after which it then stabilised. By
January 2008 when the question was last asked in the NCPS V, some 49 percent
10 NCPS longitudinal survey interviewed 3,000 individuals randomly selected Irom around 30
randomly selected districts spread across geographical and development regions. See Sharma, S
and Sen, P.K. 2008, 2007 & 2006.
98
favoured retaining the institution, 43 percent favoured abolishing it while another
10 percent were undecided.
Those who preferred to retain the institution wanted to do so because monarchy
was seen as part of tradition and because the forefather of the present king
formed Nepal. Those who preferred to abolish the institution wanted to do so
because monarchy was perceived as a feudal and exploitative institution and
because the monarchy didnt develop the country. What the survey data reveals
is that just a few months prior to its termination, a majority still preferred retaining
the institution.
11

To Retain or to Terminate: Debates on Monarchy in Nepal
Arguments against King Gyanendra came primarily from two camps: those who
wanted to retain the monarchical institution but were unhappy with what the King
was doing, and those who wanted to abrogate the institution itself. The writings
of two individuals - Kanak Mani Dixit and Baburam Bhattarai - exemplify these
two camps.
12

The writings of Kanak Mani Dixit, a journalist, exemplify a position that advocates
constitutional-ceremonial monarchy while simultaneously chiding King Gyanendra
for taking wrong political decisions. In various writings in Himal South Asia and
Himal Khabarpatrika between 2002 and 2006, Dixit argues that King Gyanendras
ambitious political decisions from October 2002 onwards, and particularly from
February 2005 onwards, have been very wrong. In strong words, Dixit writes how
the King`s decisions hae been unbeFtting o a constitutional and ceremonial
Monarch and how these could ultimately be a liability for the institution itself.
11 Ironically, the survey data also revealed that King Gyanendra was extremely unpopular: among all
the political leaders, he received the lowest score (2.8 on a scale oI 0 to 10). These fgures reveal that
the majority preIerred monarchy, but the type oI King they expected was someone like Birendra.
(This was in Iact mentioned by many respondents during the interview.) PreIerence Ior monarchy
but low ratings Ior King Gyanendra could also be interpreted as meaning either that they preIerred
not to have Gyanendra as King, preIerring instead to have someone else Irom the royal Iamily, or
that they preIerred to have Gyanendra as King but not as a political leader, i.e., preIerring to have a
politically un-involved Monarch.
12 This has parellels with Thailand. In the earlier part oI the twentieth century, when the idea oI the
Thai nation came into being, it was conceived oI as a trio involving 'nation-religion-monarch
(chat-satsana-phramahakasat) (Wyatt 2001). The idea could be traced even Iurther to the United
Kingdom and Russia. The phrase seems to have been adopted Irom the British, God, King
and country`. Likewise, the Russian apologist Ior autocratic rule, Uvarov, advocated autocracy,
orthodoxy and nationality in 1872 (Anderson 2006 and Shah 1992).
99
The position that disagrees in principle with the institution of monarchy and
calls or its abolition is exempliFed by Baburam Bhattarai, a politburo member o
Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists). Bhattarais writings on the Nepali monarchy
have been put forth in the book Monarchy vs. Democracy: The Epic Fight in Nepal
(2005). In the chapter on the relevance of monarchy in Nepal, the author attempts
to demystify some of the prevalent misconceptions about the Nepalese
monarchy. Bhattarai lists four points that are made in support of the monarchical
institution in Nepal: (1) It is the principle factor of stability in the country; (2) It
is the symbol of unity; (3) It needs to be preserved since Nepal is the only Hindu
kingdom in the world; (4) It has led to rapid economic development. He attempts
to debunk each of these points.
Baburam Bhattarais arguments against the monarchy are replete with stereotypes
and clichs. This is evident in his portrayal of various Monarchs. For instance,
Prithvi Narayan Shah is extolled for his supposed stand against colonialism;
Mahendra for his nationalism; and Birendra for his liberalism. Although the
author claims to demolish the arguments in support of monarchy, he does not
actually engage with the arguments at a theoretical or substantive level. Rather, he
simply exonerates some Monarchs and admonishes others. Contrary to his claims,
Bhattarai makes no substantive arguments against monarchy as an institution.
The Reasons for the Demise of Monarchy in Nepal
In broad terms, four reasons could be singled out for leading to the demise of
monarchy in Nepal: (1) the palace massacre; (2) the King aspiring to become a
constructive constitutional Monarch; (3) the Monarch being unable to become a
King of the Nepali people(s); and (4) the India equation. Each of these and how
they played a role in ending the monarchy in Nepal are summarised.
1. Palace Massacre
The palace massacre led to the erosion of the sanctity of the monarchical
institution. As a consequence of the massacre, the monarchical institution itself
became increasingly de-legitimised in the eyes of the public.
It became de-legitimised for two sets of people - those who believed in the
conspiracy theory and those who didnt - for quite different reasons. For those
who saw the incident as a conspiracy hatched by Gyanendra, which, one might
add, had a plot very similar to the story of the Lion King, the Walt Disney cartoon
blockbuster, the new King was an illegitimate monarch. For this set of people,
100
the monarchical institution became de-legitimised because the incumbent was an
impostor.
For those who did not see the incident as a conspiracy and who had no reason to
distrust the oFcial report, the monarchical institution was de-legitimised or an
entirely different reason. What Prince Dipendra - having access to sophisticated
weapons, taking to drugs, and killing his parents because they stood in the way
of marrying the lady of his choice - underscored is how little the institution
resonated with peoples expectations of virtue and tradition from the countrys
premier institution. After all, the royalty was massacred not by republicans or
reolutionaries, but by one o their own members - and or entirely selFsh reasons.
Besides exposing the vices of a decadent institution, the incident led people who
did not believe in the conspiracy theory to conclude that the institution was not
trustworthy: how could they trust an institution that was inept at handing its own
members? Thus, for quite different reasons for both sets of people, the sanctity of
the monarchical institution was severely undermined. The circumstance in which
Gyanendra became King was like an albatross hanging around its neck.
2. King Visualising His Role as a Constructive Constitutional Monarchy
King Gyanendra, soon after he was crowned the Monarch, began articulating his
views on what he thought the role of Monarch should be in Nepal. He expressed
his dissatisfaction over the role played by his late brother King Birendra; while he
saw his late brothers role as a passive constitutional Monarch, he saw his role
as a constructive constitutional Monarch. As one constitutional stalemate led
to another, he seized the opportunity to expand the scope and role of monarchy,
in line with his desire to become a constructive Monarch, when eventually he
became a full blown, active-assertive King. In the process, the type of monarchy
envisaged by the 1990 Constitution was thoroughly desecrated.
There were several landmarks in the transformation of the constitutional
monarchy, as envisaged by the 1990 Constitution, to the assumption of active-
assertie monarchy by King Gyanendra. 1he Frst o these was in October 2002
when he dismissed Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba for being unable to hold
national elections. At that time, the Nepali Congress headed by G.P. Koirala had
asked for reinstatement of the House of Representatives (which Deuba had
dissolved six months earlier with the intentions of holding the election). King
Gyanendra believed that the constitutional stalemate could only be overcome
101
through a new election to the House of Representatives and not by reinstating the
dissolved House. Without going into the legality of whether the Kings action and
his reliance on Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution at that historical juncture was
correct, what becomes apparent is his seizure of the constitutional stalemate, as an
opportunity to expand the role and scope of monarchy.
When King Gyanendra took political action in October 2002, basing his actions
on Article 127, he envisaged his role as a custodian of the Constitution. However,
from being a custodian, he soon became a central political player - something not
envisaged by the 1990 Constitution.
This came about in February 2005 when he dismissed the Sher Bahadur Deuba
government nominated by himself and assumed executive and state authority. By
assuming the responsibility and the authority of a chairman of the government,
he became simultaneously the head of the state and the head of the government.
With this, the transformation from a constitutional Monarch to active-assertive
Monarch was complete, notwithstanding his claims to trusteeship.
The political forces intent on ending monarchy in the country and defeating
Gyanendra politically, not surprisingly, portrayed him as a despot and as a tyrant.
His persona and circumstances in which he became king did not help much and
Gyanendra inadvertently played into this stereotype.

In redeFning the role o the institution as an actie political agent in circumstances
where its sanctity had been severely eroded not only decreased the popularity
of King Gyanendra further, his decisions ultimately took its toll in ending the
monarchical institution itself.
3. Unable to Become a King of the Nepali Peoples(s)
Establishment of formal democracy in 1990 created an environment wherein
cultural, ethnic, and religious identities could be expressed, and consequently
Nepal began witnessing the assertion of such identities.
When Nepal was being forged as a modern nation in the 1950s, three institutions
were involved in constructing the national identity - monarchy (with the recently
reinstated Shah Kings as Monarchs), Hinduism, and the Nepali language. Nepal
was seen as a single nation tied together by allegiance to monarchy, adherence
to Hinduism and bound together by a common lingua franca - Nepali. When the
102
modern nation was being fashioned during the 1950s, it was not that a plurality
of ethnic communities, language groups, and cultures was not recognised - the
country was seen to be plural; however, plurality was not conceived as an asset.
1his was to change signiFcantly in the 1990s, which witnessed an assertion o
cultural, linguistic and ethnicity-based identities. Identity-assertions were not
limited to Nepal: it was a global phenomenon. In fact, globalisation on the one
hand and assertion of cultural, linguistic and ethnic identities, on the other, were
to severely undermine nation-states in different fronts - economic, political, and
cultural.
From the 1990s onwards, Nepal was seen as a plural country. Not only was
plurality acknowledged - the mutual differences among the various ethnic groups,
languages, and religions - were highlighted. And not only was it acknowledged, it
was seen to be an asset. Indeed, the ethnic communities were now uplifted into the
status of nations. According to political discourse on the rise in Nepal during the
time, the country is not a nation but a multi-national state.
At a time when Nepal was seen to be a country of different peoples and nations,
King Gyanendra, through his gestures, including the dress he wore and the language
he spoke, embodied and epitomised only the Hindu-Parbatiya culture. That the
Shah dynasty is Hindu by religion and Parbatiya by ethnicity is a fact of history; at
a time of growing cultural, linguistic, and ethnic assertions, he could symbolically
have embodied the various peoples that make up Nepal. Through state rituals and
symbolisms, he could have been a King not just of the Hindus and the Parbatiyas,
but of the Buddhists, the Muslims, the Christians and the indigenous religions.
He could have aspired to be a King of Gurungs, Magars, Tamangs, Rais, Limbus,
Newars, Dalits, Sherpas, Tharus, Yadavs, and all the various communities living
in the Himalayas, the hills and the Tarai of Nepal. The politically-oriented King,
however, by projecting himself to be an icon of orthodox Hinduism, increasingly
became an anomaly in a milieu that acknowledged and celebrated pluralism. Not
only could the active Monarch not strike chords with identity-based movements,
but public gestures aimed at shoring his Hindu credentials alienated him further
from the masses and the intelligencia. Unable to become a king of the Nepali
people(s) estranged him further politically.
4. The India Equation
King Gyanendras inability to forge an understanding with Indian Congress
leadership along with the interests of the then coalition partners in India proved to
103
be fatal for monarchy in Nepal. Among the various political forces in India, Kings
of Nepal have been most comfortable with Bharatiya Janata Party, the Hindu
nationalist party of India. Relations between Nepali kings and the Indian Congress
leadership have been warm at times and chilly during others.
At the particular time when Gyanendra had taken over executive authority in Nepal
and was marginalising the parliamentarian parties while targeting the Maoists,
Indian government was made up of a coalition between the Indian Congress and
Leftist parties. The BJP, the party sympathetic to monarchy in Nepal, was in the
opposition. The Leftist parties in India were especially sympathetic towards the
Maoists. The nature of the coalition in India meant that they were more willing
to bring in the parliamentarian parties and the Maoists together than to work with
(what they considered to be) an undemocratic monarch.
Though the Indian government had played a crucial role in forging the 12-point
Memorandum of Understanding between the Maoists and the parliamentarian
parties, and in the process isolating a politically-orientated King, the oFcial Indian
line has been that they would accept whatever decisions were made by the Nepali
people including, as time revealed, the abolition of the monarchy itself.
During the heydays of colonialism, wherein racist discourses constituted the
dominant narratie and justiFed ciilised` British rule oer unciilised naties`,
enlightened native rulers, such as those of Baroda, Mysore, Cochin and Travancore,
contested the dominant narrative by undertaking progressive social reforms and
showing that Indians could govern themselves: this generated empathy and pride
among the Indian National Congress leadership. This also generated disdain in that
most of the Princely States did not allow political participation of the citizenry and
that civil liberties were less protected than in British India (Ramusack 216-221).
Gandhi, who led the Indian National Congress during the 1910s and 1920s,
wanted these constituencies to conform to his political and social programs.
He was generally sympathetic to the Princes and used intermediaries who were
personally loyal to him and who were likely to be non-confrontational with durbar
oFcials and popular leaders. 1he pattern o engagement that eoled between the
Indian National Congress and the Princely States in the early part of the twentieth
century was re-enacted in Nepal in the twenty-Frst when Karan Singh, whom the
Congress leadership could trust in person and who was also related to the King
104
of Nepal, was sent as an emissary to negotiate both with the King and heads of
political parties in Nepal.
That the Indian Congress was, in principle, not opposed to the monarchy in the
region is also attested by the fact that it had brought about the reinstatement of
the Shah Kings as Monarchs of Nepal in 1951 by helping bring an end to the
century-old Rana rule. It would not be incorrect to say that Indian Congress played
a role in fashioning a particular variant of monarchy in Nepal, one that was close
to the hearts of the Nepali people and one that underscored cooperation with the
peoples representatives.
But this was to change with King Mahendras actions in 1960 that led to a cooling
in the relationship between the Nepali Monarchs and Indian Congress. This
trend continued until 1989 when King Birendra continued to remain as the active
Monarch.

The decision by King Gyanendra to become a constructive constitutional
Monarch, which either intentionally or unintentionally led him to become an
active-assertive Monarch, constricted the choices for the Indian Congress to the
extent that led it, at least according to the oFcial ersion, to choose to accept
whatever decisions on the fate of the monarchy made by the Nepali people.
Conclusion: Assessment of the Contribution of Monarchy in Nepal
The contribution of monarchy in Nepal has been in building the state of Nepal,
in modernising the Nepali state and society, in delineating a distinctive version of
nationhood, and in fostering democracy. Each of these has been associated with
different reigns or rules.
It may have been Prithvi Narayan Shahs intention to expand the dominion of the
House of Gorkha, but the expansion process that he initiated and that continued
even after his demise, led to the formation of the present state of Nepal. The very
existence of Nepal owes its existence to the dream, dexterity, and dedication of
Prithvi Narayan. The hereditary Rana prime ministers who ruled from 1846 to
1950, as faithful allies of the British, ensured that Nepal became an independent,
sovereign state but the country had to pay dearly in that it was isolated from the rest
of the world. Nepals century-old political isolation ended with King Tribhuvans
bold act in 1950-51. The reinstatement of Shah Kings as the centre of power
105
in Nepal is enmeshed and interwoven with the tale of a King willing to risk his
throne for the sake of the common people. Tribhuvan began expanding Nepals
relationship with countries around the world, an initiative that was continued when
his son, Mahendra, ascended to the throne in 1955. The persona of Mahendra
generates two opposing narratives: one, of an ambitious Monarch who trampled
democracy; the other, a moderniser. The story of Mahendra is a tale of how an
otherwise traditionally-educated Prince undertook modernisation in order build
a modern nation-state. The tale of King Birendra is that of a democratising
Monarch. The jovial, happy-looking and pleasant Monarch facilitated the transition
from assertive to constitutional monarchy, in the process helping consolidate
parliamentary democracy in the country. The story of King Gyanendra is a tale of
a risk-taker who sought to rid the country o arious anictions ailing it, but lost in
the process: his failure resulted in the abrogation of the institution itself. The tale
of the last of the Monarchs, Gyanendra, is also the story of a King who gracefully
exited the palace and led the life of an ordinary citizen.
Post-Script
King Gyanendra may have sullied the institution, but he was not a party to its
abrogation: the decision to abolish the monarchy was a decision made by the Maoists,
UML, NC, MJF and other political parties. It was the elected constituent assembly
that on June 19, 2009, endorsed Nepal as a republic, something that the reinstated
and expanded House of Representatives had, a year earlier, declared. Neither
of these two bodies, however, stated why they were abolishing the centuries-old
institution; they did not furnish any explanation as to what the monarchy had done
wrong for which the representatives of the people were punishing it by terminating
its existence. Nor did these bodies provide an opportunity for the King to speak.
I there was any renection whatsoeer on the institution o the monarchy, it was
articulated by Gyanendra Shah (after he was no longer the Monarch) in his farewell
speech before leaving the Narayanhiti Palace premises.
World history is replete with instances of monarchies having generally ended
either through execution or exile. Nepal is unique in that the last of the Monarchs
continues to live in the country as an ordinary citizen.
That the end of monarchy will herald a new golden age in Nepal, as has been
propagated by communist parties, simply has not borne fruit. One and a half
years since the abolition of monarchy, the country continues to remain politically
106
unstable, the economy has not picked up, Maoists have not renounced violence,
public safety and security continue to deteriorate, agitations by various identity-
based movements harping on politics of differences continue unabated, armed-
separatist groups proliferate, and a new constitution that was supposed to be
formed by an elected constituent assembly has not been drafted, let alone been
ratiFed.
Sudhindra Sharma is the Executive Director at Interdisciplinary Analysts,
Kathmandu, Nepal.
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109 109
If one were to try to pinpoint the exact moment that Nepals monarchy began its
downfall, it would probably be 8:45 on Friday night on June 1, 2001.
It was a hot and sultry evening, thunderstorms were brewing on the valley rim
of Kathmandu. Filaments of pink lightning illuminated clouds towering over the
mountains, and there was the deep, dull boom of distant thunder.

As the editor and publisher of the Nepali Times, I used to take Friday easy because
that is the day the paper came out. That mornings edition of the paper had a story
on page one titled "Fight to the Finish". The political parties were continuing their
endless bickering in Kathmandu, while the Maoist insurgents were gaining ground
in the hinterland.
But few in Kathmandu were taking the Maoists seriously in those days, and no one
would have predicted that in six short years Nepal would become a republic. The
underground Maoists had been warning schools not to sing the national anthem
because o its gloriFcation o the monarchy and the reigning King. Our editorial
that morning was eerily titled God save the King.
Inside, on page 13 was a translated report about Crown Prince Dipendra titled A
Suitable Prince which delved into how he was now 31 and needed to get married.
Royal matters were not discussed so openly those days, and an article like that was
fairly rare in the Nepali media. It was the disagreement within the royal family
about the Crown Princes choice of wife that the story reported that was a factor
in the tragedy that was soon about to unfold. Here is an excerpt of that news item:
Once Upon a Time: the Rise and Fall of
the Nepal Monarchy
Kunda Dixit
8
110
A Suitable Prince
Preparations are underway to celebrate the 31st birthday of the heir to Nepals
throne, Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev. With this royal birthday
around the corner, peoples attention is focused on the Crown Prince. People are
asking why the Crown Prince is unmarried at this age, and whether his future
as the heir to throne is in danger. Crown Prince Dipendra is perhaps the Frst
member of the Nepali royalty to break tradition and not be married even at 31.
The Royal Palace is also concerned about the Crown Princes marriage. But many
do not know where the Crown Princes heart lies. People close to the Crown Prince
speak of two women he has an emotional relationship with. One is a childhood
sweetheart while his relationship with the other began when he was older. It
might be that the Crown Prince is Fnding it diFcult to choose between the two,`
jokes a palace employee, adding, but he does not support bigamy. Crown Prince
Dipendra is romantic by nature and he loves to joke and be open. His professors
say he is uninhibited and has the poetic talents of his grandfather, the late King
Mahendra, although his poems have not been published yet. Some people say
the Crown Prince is against parliamentary democracy, but in reality he supports
it wholeheartedly. He wants the Nepali people to have social discipline and
responsibility. The Crown Prince is also very studious, his favourite subject being
Nepal`s geography. le does not read a lot o Fction but deours non-Fction. le
also painstakingly reads all the major newspapers and engages in discussions about
how to boost the nations economy.
Crown Prince Dipendra turns 31 on 27 June. It is high time His Royal Highness
got married. The Nepali people wish to celebrate his marriage soon and in the
grandest manner. Everyone is worrying about when this will happen. (Nepali
Times, 1 June 2001, #45)
1he Frst phone call came at 9:30 pm rom a riend asking i I had heard that the
king had a heart attack and was in hospital. This was plausible since King Birendra
was a cardiac patient. Then came rumours that the royal palace had been attacked.
This is it, I remember thinking, the Maoists have attacked the palace. My
reporters instincts took over and I called people who lived in the neighbourhood
of the palace. They had heard gunshots.
An eye-witness said he had seen cars and army jeeps careening through the narrow
streets towards the military hospital on the outskirts of the city. Cell phones were
111
introduced in Nepal just two years earlier and they started going off all over town.
Hospital personnel started calling friends and relatives who, in turn, called others.
Like Chinese whispers a lot of the information got distorted as it spread. But the
broad outlines of the ghastly events began to take shape as the night wore on.
What emerged was so shocking and unbelievable that many rejected it as gossip
and went to sleep.
But the phones didnt stop ringing. King Birendra dead, Queen Aiswarya dead,
Princess Shruti wounded, Prince Nirajan dead, Crown Prince Dipendra in coma
the SMSs read. At 11 pm, three hours after the shooting, we had to decide whether
to put the news up on our website. But we hesitated, we hadnt cross-checked with
any other source. What if all the sources we heard from had all got it from the
same rumour?
The pre-monsoon clouds were closing in, and there was the sound of a helicopter
nying oerhead. It had taken o rom Kathmandu airport and was trying to gain
height oer the city beore nying o to the west oer the mountains. 1en minutes
later it returned, obviously the weather was too bad for it to continue. This was the
royal Super Puma helicopter trying to ny out to Pokhara to etch Prince Gyanendra,
the Kings brother.
At 1:30 AM we put up the Frst item o news up on our website relating what
we knew so far: that at least six members of the royal family were dead, there
were rumours the Crown Prince had shot everyone and then shot himself. It was
incredibly diFcult to get any inormation, but that much we could eriy and we
decided to put it up.
The nation woke up the next morning, stunned by the news. People gathered at
street corners reading the only two newspapers that had the news of the massacre.
Editors were so shocked by the news that their confusion could be seen in the
coverage, some papers played it safe and just ignored the story. The government
immediately clamped down on news in the state media, radio and TV were allowed
to broadcast only mourning music.
At the hospital eight members of the royal family were dead, King Birendras
brother Dhirendra was struggling for life and Dipendra was in a coma. The
Once Upon a Time: the Rise and Fall of the Nepal Monarchy
112
helicopter Fnally etched Gyanendra and it landed directly in the hospital premises.
Even though he was in a coma, and even though royal family members knew he
had killed his family, rules of royal succession meant that Dipendra had to be
declared king by the Privy Council. No country can make rules for something as
unimaginable as this, and there was no precedence on which to base decisions.
Not the First Time
Nepal until then had been known as a Himalayan kingdom of stupendous natural
beauty, gentle people, and as the birthplace of the Buddha. What wasnt so well
known in the outside world was the violent history of its royal families.
Nepal`s ruling Shah dynasty which uniFed and ormed Nepal ater military
conquests in 10, was ridden with intrigue and inFghting. 1he country was an
expansionist Himalayan power that stretched from the Teesta in the east to the
Sutlej in the west and half-way down to the Ganges to the south.
The belligerent Kingdom of Gorkha came into head-on collision with the East
India Company. The supply lines were overstretched, and the citizenry was
pauperised by taxation to fund the war effort. Palace intrigues and massacres of
the nobility ensured that the territorial gains could not be sustained. The treaty
signed at the end of the Anglo-Nepal Wars of 1814-16 allowed Nepal to retain her
independence but the Gorkha empire was cut down to its present size. The British
made sure that Kathmandu retained only a small strip of the plains to the south
because it was the agricultural surplus there that was the main source of revenue
for its military expansion.
In 1854 a little known general massacred more than 40 members of the nobility in
the palace and took over power, marking the beginning of 104 years of a dynasty
of Nepals hereditary and Anglophile Rana prime ministers. The British residency
in Kathmandu (part of the 1816 treaty) found it easy to divide and rule because
members of the two royal families were at each others throats. The Shah kings
were Fgureheads until they wrested power back in 1950 with the help o newly-
independent India.
Indias independence in 1947 brought a democratic wave, but it wasnt until
1960 that the Frst democratic elections were held. \ithin a year, King Mahendra
dissolved parliament and imprisoned Prime Minister B.P. Koirala, saying Nepal
113
isnt big enough for the both of us. He banned political parties and ruled with an
iron hand, instituting the Panchayat System, a sort of homegrown authoritarianism.
Mahendra married his three sons (Birendra, Gyanendra and Dhirendra) to three
sisters from the Rana clan. After his death in 1972, Birendra ascended to the
throne. He had been educated in Europe and was a soft-spoken liberal and started
well, trying to institute reforms in education and the civil service.
Under the absolute monarchy the press was severely curtailed. Criticism of the
government was punishable and there was zero tolerance of any negative coverage
of the King and royal family. Editors and reporters found out the hard way what
the limits were, and most journalists practiced self-censorship. Even innocent
mistakes, like a typo that turned the auspicious birthday of His Majesty to the
suspicious birthday of His Majesty brought down the wrath of the state. The
newspapers were Flled with goernment propaganda, radio was the mouthpiece
of the state, and television, when it arrived in 1985, soon became a station to
broadcast the home movies of the royal family.
The royal palace was the real source of control and power was exercised by the
Kings feared advisers who had more say than the government of the day. The rules
were laid out and everyone knew where the boundaries were. After Mahendra,
there was an expectation that things might change. However liberal Birendra may
have been he was too weak to change the system and the press secretary at the
palace was the defacto minister of information.
1he goernment media unctioned ery much as the Soiet papers did, conFned to
oFcial pronouncements and no criticism at all. 1here was no priate media. Some
o the underground political parties had their oFcial papers but these played a
cat-and-mouse game with the government. Usually the leftist papers were tolerated
more because they were critical of the democratic Nepali Congress.
In the 30 years of Panchayat the Nepali polity became like a pressure cooker.
There were no political parties and no free media to vent off steam. It all burst in
April 1989 when a people power uprising swept Kathmandu. Birendra vacillated
until the end and Fnally restored multiparty democracy and agreed to become a
constitutional Monarch.
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Hardliners in the royal palace never reconciled themselves to the loss of power
and innuence ater 1990 and it was well known in Kathmandu that they were
plotting to stage a comeback. Birendras brother Gyanendra was not a great fan of
democracy and was putting his brother under pressure to roll back on freedoms.
When the country turned from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional monarchy
after the 1990 Constitution, the media erupted with its new-found freedom. It
was as if the lid had been blown off and, as is usual during times of transition
like these, the media didnt know where the boundaries were. Criticism of the
government was suddenly allowed, and the papers competed with each other to
give sensational headlines and party papers ran each other down with defamatory
content. True, there was so much corruption, mismanagement and partisanship
in the governance process in Nepals new democracy that they deserved to be
written about. But the free-for-all medias coverage ended up making the people so
disillusioned that they started blaming the system, and not the politicians who had
given democracy a bad name. We are not mature enough for democracy, became
a favourite refrain.
In all this the monarchy was still a taboo subject. King Birendra, despite the dent on
his reputation during the 1989 uprising, was still treated with respect, and Queen
Aishwarya, who was the target of some of the most vitriolic street slogans during
the protests, was left largely alone. There was some occasional dark hints about
royal involvement in business deals, but no one really took the risk of spelling
it out. Part of the reason was that the lse majest laws were left intact in the 1990
Constitution, and the King and army were still powerful behind-the-scenes players.
With the media now distracted by negative coverage of politicians the monarchy
was left alone. This and the fact that King Birendra was comfortable in his role
as a constitutional monarch and played it by the book meant that the monarchy
started to regain its reputation. King Birendra, especially, gained new respect and
even affection from Nepalis. Unlike during the Panchayat years there would be
genuine and spontaneous show of support for him when he toured the country.
Sometimes hed just walk out of the palace with his Queen along the sidewalk to
go to the nearby home of his daughter, Shrutis. Many were reminded of Nordic
royalty who had no airs.
Things started to change with the antics of young royal family members. When
Prince Paras, the son of Gyanendra, allegedly ran over singer Prakash Gurung in
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2000, the media reported openly on the incident and the attempts of cover-up.
News of other drunken brawls in Kathmandus bars in which royals were involved
also started appearing in the papers, but the coverage was still circumspect and no
names were named.
Disillusioned with what they felt was the slow pace of change and impatient to gain
total power, Maoist rebels launched an armed struggle in 1996 to overthrow the
monarchy. The insurgency spread rapidly across Nepal, feeding on the inequality,
discrimination and social injustice in the country. Taking advantage of the political
instability the Maoists had, by 2000, spread their innuence across the country.
There was increasing disenchantment against the political parties because of their
corruption and mismanagement.
King Birendra took his constitutional role seriously and refused to intervene.
Because o this he had become a popular Fgure and genuinely liked and respected
by the people. Compared with his parents Crown Prince Dipendra was an
accessible Fgure who did not hae royal airs and mixed easily with commoners. le
had studied in a government school in Kathmandu and had many friends among
ordinary Nepalis. He was close to his cousin, Paras, Gyanendras son, who was
notorious or getting into drunken Fghts.
Nepalis were used to hearing about the excesses of their pampered royals, they
gossiped about their greed, wealth, and business interests. There was concern in
the public about Dipendra and there were strong rumours that his parents were
against his plans to marry Devyani Rana, the half-Indian daughter of a Nepali
politician.
Queen Aiswarya was said to be vehemently against the match because she had
a personal dislike for Devyanis Indian mother who was glamorous, suave, and
spoke good English. Birendra did not assert himself too much, but even he was
said to be concerned that the next Queen of Nepal should not be of half-Indian
descenteven hinting that his royal succession may be affected if he decided
to go ahead with the marriage. Dipendra was adamant. Although he had many
girlfriends, it seems he was smitten by Devyani. The girl, for her part, was probably
getting impatient with the waiting and was putting pressure on Dipendra to decide.
Much of this was not common knowledge and came to light only after the massacre.
In hindsight we now know that there was strong tension within the royal family
116
over the question of Dipendras marriage. And although the Crown Prince had a
good public image, what we didnt know was that he had problems with substance
abuse and had a gun fetisha lethal combination as it turned out.
Journalists speculated about his marriage plans but stopped short of reporting what
they knew: that Dipendras choice of bride was unacceptable to many members of
the family especially his mother. But one Kathmandu news magazine reported on
Dipendras interest and involvement in the Royal Nepal Armys procurement of
a new generation o assault rines. Dipendra`s aourite was said to be a German-
made leckler Koch G36 rine with laser sights, while others in the army aoured
the American Colt M-16.
So it was that on June 1, 2001, that Dipendra donned combat fatigues and black
gloves, slung a 9mm MP-5K, an M-16, and a French shotgun around his shoulders
and came downstairs. He advanced on his father, and Birendra seemed to think his
son wanted to show him his guns and started to walk towards him. But Dipendra
shot off a short burst into the ceiling and then at the direction of his father. The
King was hit, and eyewitnesses say he had a look of utter disbelief in his eyes as
he slowly slumped over to his side. As family members rushed to catch him as he
ell, Dipendra spun around and walked out o the room. Less than Fe minutes
ater the Frst shot was Fred, it was all oer and ten royals lay dead or dying, and
four others were injured. Most of the wounded were declared dead on arrival at
the hospital. Princess Sruti died one hour later, Dhirendra and Dipendra two days
later on 3 June.
The government was in disarray, no one knew who was giving the orders: the
prime minister, the palace, Dipendra who was in a coma, Gyanendra An oFcial
announcement Fnally came in the aternoon o 2 June saying King Birendra and
Queen Aiswarya were dead, it didnt say how they died. It proclaimed Dipendra
king, and Gyanendra regent. A senior palace oFcial told CNN that the royal family
was killed by the accidental discharge of an automatic weapon. An information
blackout and statements like these meant rumours ran rife and conspiracy theories
were everywhere. After Dipendras funeral, Gyanendra was named King and he
addressed the nation on television promising the people a thorough investigation.
Nepal had three kings in four days. Gyanendras enthronement happened as
protests raged throughout the capital.

117
1he probe team Fnally came out with its preliminary Fndings two weeks later,
saying Dipendra was responsible. But the people, lied to and denied information,
didnt believe the government when it told the truth. Most people were convinced
the unpopular Gyanendra was somehow responsible.
The medias role became one of a detective in a murder mystery. Gathering
evidence, piecing together the exact sequence of events, trying to crosscheck with
eye-witnesses. 1he task was made immeasurably diFcult because o the traditional
secretiveness of the royal family and the shock of the event. What the journalists
uncovered and the conclusions of the inquiry commission tallied on almost all
major points and the reason was that many of the eye-witnesses interviewed were
the same. But because most people did not beliee the oFcial inquiry, the media`s
conclusions also became suspect.
It got to a point where journalists who stuck to what they knew were immediately
labelled royalists or biased. The best test that the media was on the right track
was the fact that by sticking to journalistic professionalism the conclusion we
reached on the night o the massacre is still more or less alid Fe years later, ater
a lot more interviews and facts. Like the Kennedy assassination and the Princess
Diana accident, the conspiracy theories will never go away.
Some of these questions about the prelude and the events of that terrible night
will perhaps never be known because most of the protagonists are dead. But what
is true is that the massacre left an indelible mark on Nepali politics, eroding the
traditional respect for the monarchy. The murders were so shocking that Nepalis
never really came to terms with it, and the republican wave we see today is a
delayed reaction to that event.
King Gyanendra, soon after his enthronement, told his people he was not like his
brother and made it plain that he was not satisFed with his constitutional powers.
He staged a coup and took over the government on 1 February 2005, imprisoned
politicians and civil society activists and muzzled the media. Nepal was an absolute
monarchy again.
The King sent soldiers into the newsrooms. There were three of them in our
oFce, reading eerything beore the pages went to press. 1he Frst week, they took
out our editorial cartoon, hacked off a paragraph from our editorial, even took out
118
a letter to the editor and an op-ed column. This made censorship in the Panchayat
eel like a picnic. \e became quite riendly with one o the oFcers who was sent
to the Nepali Times because he spoke English. He seemed almost apologetic about
what he had to do and it was clear his heart was not in it.
lrom the next week we deFed the censors and pretended there were no controls.
Our papers and magazines came out with large white holes where material had
been censored. And when the army said we couldnt do that we replaced them
with gibberish and absurd editorials. We wrote allegorical opinion pieces about
democracy. FM stations were singled out for the strictest controls and our colleagues
in the district radio stations were bravest in standing up to the censors. They were
told not to broadcast news, only music. So they started singing the news, or theyd
take the news studio to the street and read the latest news to passers-by.
1he media was at the anguard o the Fght against an autocratic King, and ridiculed
him by defying his crackdown on the free press. It took only 14 months for a
peoples uprising to force him to restore parliament and bring back democracy.
That was made possible by an alliance between the Maoists and the seven
parliamentary parties in a pro-democracy movement brokered by India. By
February 2006, Nepals second people power uprising in 16 years forced King
Gyanendra to backtrack. What the Maoists could not achieve with a 10 year war
and 15,000 dead was done in 19 days of non-violent street protests. This was a
model for violent revolutions all over the world: that there is an alternative to
Fghting a ruinous war.
For two years after that Nepal was in a limbo between monarchy and republic,
the King was still in his palace but the word royal had been expunged from
the national airline, the national army and Nepals embassies abroad. Nepal was a
lingering royal republic. In those two years Nepal went from a Hindu kingdom
to secular republic, armed guerrillas faced elections, won and formed a government
in which they were prime minister and held the portolios or the Fnance, deence,
tourism and other critical ministries in a coalition with other parties.
The monarchy which with the royal army was responsible for the formation of
what is now Nepal were de-linked without bloodshed. The King wasnt beheaded,
his palace wasnt sacked. In fact King Gyanendra was allowed to perform all his
119
ceremonial duties for a full year after he had been sidelined, but when parliament
declared Nepal a republic, called a press conference and willingly vacated the
palace to become an ordinary citizen.
Lessons Learnt
The beginning of the end of Nepals monarchy was the royal massacre of June 1,
2001. It dented the respect and legitimacy o the kingship. 1he Fnal blow came
from King Gyanendra himself, a deeply unpopular king who had a visceral distrust
of politicians and the democratic process, and he tried to turn the clock back to
re-enact his fathers 1960 coup.
Nepal`s monarchy was also sacriFced or the peace process. 1he Maoists took up
arms to abolish the monarchy and, after they entered the peace process in 2006,
needed a revolutionary face to justify ten years of a wasteful war to their own cadre
as well as to the public.
Most Nepali people would have been neutral if asked to choose between a
monarchy and a republic. They disliked the King but that didnt mean there was an
overwhelming desire to abolish the monarchy. Nepalis knew the country would not
disintegrate without the monarchy, and there was residual respect for the tradition
of monarchy.
The People Power Uprising was predicated not on republicanism, but on the
removal of an absolute monarchy and a dictatorial King. There were very few
slogans for a republic when people marched on the streets in April 2006. The
Maoists, however, needed a revolutionary slogan, a trophy, something to justify the
struggle and sacriFce to their cadre. In negotiations ater April 2006 the Maoists
repeatedly threatened to go back to war if the monarchy was not abolished. In
essence they needed to prop up an enemy to bring down to prove that it was a
victorious revolution, even if it was a defanged King.
Even after the monarchy was abolished and the King dethroned in July 2008, the
Maoists kept citizen Gyanendra in their sights. They have needed to target him
even if he is no longer King just to take the attention away from their own non-
performance in government and to unite their fractious party against a common
class enemy.
120
This is not to say that Gyanendra is not capable of mischief and there are many
in Kathmandu who think he is plotting a comeback. They say he is a vindictive
man and would probably like nothing better than to exact revenge on those who
overthrew him. However, even if the monarchy is somehow restored, Gyanendra
probably knows that public opinion will not accept him, or his son, as King.
The moderate political parties realised that the monarchy probably needed to be
sacriFced to keep the peace process on track and appease the Maoists. Although
initially against abolishing the monarchy, party leaders relented because they
themselves had been targeted by the King after his 2002 creeping coup and the
Fnal coup de grace in 2005.
The joke in Kathmandu in 2005 was that the most pro-republican person in Nepal
was the king himself. He had no one to blame but himself, not just for his downfall,
but for the end of his dynasty. He lied to the international community, he misled
the parties multiple times even though they were essentially monarchists at heart,
and he listened to no one. In the end history will see an arrogant King who was
unable to understand the role of a modern Monarch in a developing country that
brought the end o Nepal`s monarchy. le was not satisFed with his constitutional
role, he hated the political leadership and the democratic process, and this brought
down the King and the kingship.
When an inquiry commission was formed to look into the excesses in the
crackdown on the 2006 pro-democracy movement King Gyanendra could have
saved the monarchy by making a public apology. But he didnt. He had another
chance at his departure press conference before vacating the palace for good in
2008 but he could never get himself to say sorry.
King Gyanendra must have known that he had a public relations problem and that
most Nepalis still blamed him for the murder of his popular brother. Yet he did
nothing to remedy this. It was only in his last press conference where he devoted
half the time denying his involvement in the massacre. But by then it was too late.
The restoration of the monarchy may not be possible now because Gyanendra
and his son, Paras, are so deeply unpopular. The only convincing argument for
restoration is if the country disintegrated into anarchy but both father and son
would be more of a divisive factor than a unifying one at a time when the nation
will need an institution to bind it together again.
121
Its too late also for the baby King proposal to make either Paras young son King
or make the only surviving person in Birendras bloodline (his grand-daughter) the
Queen. They will have a passive role in a ceremonial monarchy whereas, if Nepal
is really in a crisis, it may need a more active Monarch enforcing constitutional
provisions in the national interest.

Today, across Nepal, the most surprising thing is how quickly Nepalis have
forgotten that their country was ever a monarchy. It is as if they want to forget
about this tragic part of our history and want to move on.
Kunda M. Dixit is the publisher of Nepali Times, Kathmandu, Nepal.
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Introduction
News, British newspaper magnate Lord Northcliff is often (though almost
certainly spuriously) quoted as saying, is what someone somewhere wants to
suppress. All the rest, he added, is advertising. And indeed, this concept of
the uncovering of awkward and embarrassing truths for those in positions of
power, that is is a now long established element of the professional ideology of
journalism, and lies behind such notions as its existence as a Fourth Estate, or as
a public watchdog. Appealing though such an ideology may be, and excellent
though it undoubtedly is as the stuff of literary and cinematic drama, it has been
known for a long time
1
that the professional practice of journalism is often far
from this ideal. It is now widely recognised that news tends increasingly to
come pre-packaged to the journalist rather than being actively sought out by him/
her, coming down the wire in earlier days and now primarily distributed via the
internet. Western societies have largely learned to live with this kind of news,
though continuing anxieties regarding whose interests it ultimately serves surface
repeatedly in debates over spin, spin doctors, spin-meisters, and so on.
What is generally not viewed as acceptable, however (except perhaps in cases
where it is argued that national security is somehow at stake), is when journalists
deliberately cover-up information that could be viewed as being in the public
interest. In certain contexts, however, the curious phenomenon arises of the
disremembering of facts that are already in the public domain, which enjoy an
existence as elements of popular memory; but that are viewed by those in power
as somehow incompatible with the oFcial memory o the society in question.
Splits of this kind, where popular discourse on the one hand and political culture
1 It has been known at least since Daniel Boorstin published The Image in 1962 though he himselI
was to a large extent giving voice to something that was already well known in journalistic circles.
Media, Monarchy and the
Management o OFcial Memory
Hugh ODonnell
9
123
(with the collusion of journalists) on the other maintain quite different versions
of national history, occur most frequently when there is a transition of one kind
of political regime to another. Whether from dictatorship to democracy or the
other way round, the rationale most frequently advanced is the needs of national
reconstruction. The second case deserves particular attention since dictatorships
can and do demand the collaboration of the media enforcing it by violent
means if necessary. Alternatively, freedom of the press is widely viewed as
a cornerstone of democratic process, and under these circumstances the willing
collusion of journalists in strategies of forgetting cannot be straightforwardly
ascribed to intimidation and oppression.
This paper looks at a particularly interesting case of disremembering that
surrounding the person of the current Spanish monarch, King Juan Carlos. A
few words on the phenomenon of (European) monarchy in general, and on the
Spanish monarchy in particular, focusing in both cases on their relationship with
democracy, will help to set the scene.
Monarchy in the European case, at least, but no doubt more widely also is a
product of feudalism. Without necessarily wishing to subscribe either to the grand
Enlightenment teleology of nineteenth-century French thinker (and father of
sociology) August Comte, or those of his German near-contemporary Karl Marx,
it would not seem unreasonable to expect that monarchies would be now little
more than a historical memory in Europe. After all, capitalism and its concomitant
bourgeois rationality are now almost totally dominant in the economies of Europe
and the First World more generally. Even the remnants of the great feudal estates
have been absorbed into that economic system and bourgeois parliamentary
democracy is itself one of the expressions of that bourgeois rationality. Yet
this is clearly not the case. Not only have some of the old European monarchies
survived, but others which were overthrown were subsequently reinstated (even if
they have not all survived to the present day) and in addition two new ones have
also emerged, in both cases the Belgian and the Norwegian monarchies in
relation to the establishment of new nation-states.
Europes youngest monarchy the Norwegian royal house was in fact instated
just over a century ago, in 1905, following the countrys split with Sweden in
the same year. The decision to adopt a constitutional monarchy rather than a
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124
republic as the political form of the state was the result of a referendum rather
than executie Fat. 1his example, along with the continuing presence ,i not
uniformly rude health) of a number of European monarchies (seven in all) shows
us a number of things. Firstly, that parliamentary democracies have not universally
viewed monarchy as a foreign secretion that must be extruded at all cost, but have
on occasions willingly entered into a symbiotic relationship with it. Secondly, even
in the era o capitalist modernity, elites hae continued to Fnd monarchy to be
a valuable institution for the process of nation building. And thirdly and the
importance of this point can hardly be overstressed continuing popular support
for monarchies in Scandinavia and elsewhere, even if highly variable in both nature
and intensity over time, shows that despite (or perhaps to some extent because
of) the increasing commoditisation and bureaucratisation of daily life what the
German philosopher Jrgen Habermas calls "the colonisation of the Life World
by the System World" there remains more to popular culture and the experience
of everyday life than political and economic rationality. Whatever our own
personal opinions on monarchy might be (and I myself remain philosophically
republican), we cannot hope to understand the societies we live in if we cannot,
however imperfectly, attempt to grasp the enduring (complex, yes; variable, no
doubt, appeal o monarchies in twenty-Frst century democracies. Perhaps with
their lack of formal power and the intense media narratives focused on them as
families they have somehow come, despite the pageantry and paraphernalia of
state, to symbolise the continuing presence of the Life World in the very heart of
that System World.
The Spanish Case
In the twentieth century, Spain was without a monarchy or at least a reigning
monarch for forty-four years. This was the period between the abdication of
Alfonso XIII in 1931 and the ascension to the throne of Juan Carlos I in 1975
following the death of the dictator General Francisco Franco. After his victory in
the Spanish Civil War (1936-9), Franco did not formally reinstate the monarchy:
he neither recalled Alfonso XIII (who died in 1941), nor his son Juan, Count
of Barcelona (who died in 1993). Despite this, he carefully groomed Alfonsos
grandson, and Juan`s son, Juan Carlos, to be his successor, and oFcially named him
as such in 1969 (despite the fact that the legitimate heir to the throne, Juan, was
still alie, and handed oer ull power to him just beore his death. At his oFcial
instatement as monarch a ceremony of anointing rather than a coronation
Juan Carlos swore allegiance to the principles of the National Movement, the
125
political arm of Francos single-party state. He also named Francos last Prime
Minister, Arias Naarro, as his own Frst Prime Minister. 1hough Juan Carlos
would eventually dismiss Arias Navarro from his post in July 1976 as a result of
the latters ultra-conservative views, many at the time viewed both these moves as
a highly inauspicious start.
Francos death in 1975 was followed by Spains slow, and in some senses rather
fearful, transition to parliamentary democracy. Political parties were legalised, and
the last to be recognised, after considerable debate and much opposition from
both the Church and the military, was the Communist Party on Easter Sunday
1977. Independent trade unions were also legalised, and Francos old corporatist
trade unions abolished. 1he Frst multiparty elections based on uniersal surage
were held in July 1977 in an atmosphere of intense excitement and a 79% voter
turn-out. A referendum on the new Constitution followed a year later in December
1978, this time with a voter turn out of 67% and just over 88% of those voting
in favour. Juan Carlos introduced a parliamentary democracy with a constitutional
monarchy and renounced all rights to executive, legislative and judicial power with
a constitution that introduced wide-reaching reforms. In particular, it recognised
the right o regions` such as Catalunya and the Basque Country to a signiFcant
degree o political autonomy, and also recognised their languages as oFcial
languages of the Spanish state.
This programme for reform was largely led by a group of politicians who had risen
to the top of Francos political apparatus towards the end of his regime, but there
can be no doubt that it would not have been possible without the agreement of Juan
Carlos as the Head of State. Nonetheless, he remained a somewhat shadowy, and
to some at least a rather ambiguous Fgure at the time, and there were continuing
anxieties, particularly though not only on the Left, regarding the fact that he was the
dictator`s chosen heir. 1he relatiely low proFle the King maintained was to change
radically on the evening of 23 (and early morning of 24) February 1981, a date
now so deeply consecrated in Spanish collective memory that it is simply referred
to by the shorthand notation "23-F". While a new Prime Minister was being sworn
in, a group o Ciil Guards burst into the Chamber o Deputies Fring into the
ceiling and taking all the Members of Parliament hostage scenes captured live
on television and later relayed around the world. The captors called for a military
insurrection against the democratic process, a call answered in Valencia where the
army came out onto the streets in tanks. The situation was extraordinarily tense.
126
In the early hours of the morning of 24 February, Juan Carlos, having telephoned
the military commanders of all the Spanish regions to stress his opposition to
this attempted coup dtat, appeared on national television dressed in full military
uniorm in keeping with his oFcial role as lead o the Armed lorces and ordered
all necessary measures to be taken to maintain constitutional order. His brief
address just over a minute in length contained the following statement:
The Crown, symbol of the permanence and unity of the fatherland, cannot
tolerate in any way actions or attitudes of persons aiming to interrupt by
force the democratic process which the Constitution voted for by the Spanish
people duly laid down via a referendum.
Subsequent events were to show that the attempted coup had in all probability
relatively little chance of success, with none of the military units other than
Valencia responding to the call, though this was not at all apparent at the time. Even
so, Juan Carloss actions were and are clearly deserving of praise. He completely
ulFlled his role as laid down in the new constitution and deended and upheld the
constitutional order in the ace o attack. \hen the coup Fnally collapsed, he was
the hero of the hour.
That, however, is a very different matter from what was to happen next. In the
Spanish media Juan Carlos was instantly dubbed the saviour of democracy,
a description that was quickly expanded to the guarantor of democracy, the
pilot of change, the driving-force of change and other similar appellations. For
perhaps as much as two decades, it was well-nigh impossible to Fnd any critical
comments, however mild, of Juan Carlos in the mainstream Spanish media (the
Catalan-language newspaper Avui has always been a somewhat different case). I am
not in any sense suggesting a conspiracy of silence. There is no evidence (at least
none that I am aware of) that any kind of conscious decision was taken by media
outlets, either jointly or severally, to sanctify the king in any way. Nonetheless,
for an extended period the kings Francoist origins passed into the realm of the
unsayable, despite the fact that they were known to all.
This description of Juan Carlos as the saviour of democracy remains with us
today as we approach the end o the Frst decade o the second millennium. It is
ever-present, but reaches peaks of great intensity at what are seen for one reason or
another as key moments in time: anniversaries of Francos death, anniversaries of
127
the Constitution, anniversaries of "23-F" itself and so on. We can be quite certain
that 23 lebruary 2011 will proide a similar occasion or a large-scale enorescence
of such vocabulary. But these moments do not have to be overtly political in nature.
A particularly spectacular high-point was provided by the Barcelona Olympics in
1992, when viewers not only in Spain, but also throughout the world saw the
King hug and embrace winning Spanish athletes, who would then be kissed by
the princesses. This was also the moment of the consolidation of the discourse
of the citizen-King, a Monarch who saw his role in society not as a divinely
ordained function, but as a job, and who worked tirelessly for the good of the
citizenry at large. He was frequently put forward as the new model for Monarchy
as we approached the twenty-Frst century. 1he current Spanish Prime Minister,
Jos Lus Rodrguez Zapatero, even referred to him on one recent occasion as a
rather republican king.
2
Modernity, Postmodernity and the End of Myth?
Many commentators have proposed the failure of the attempted coup of 23
lebruary 1981 as the sign o Spain`s Fnal entry into modernity, though they are
generally laconic about what the features of that modernity might be, and many
alternative dates for the end (and indeed the beginning) of the transition have
been proposed over time. The process of modernisation had been in train for
some time, and it was its eventual incompatibility with the limitations of the
Franco regime despite a number of attempts on the latters part to adapt to the
changing environment that gradually engendered the widespread disillusionment
and outright opposition, even among elite circles, to the regime necessary for
the successul transition to democracy. Len so,"23-l" has now been deFnitiely
constructed, at least in the Spanish-speaking media, as a symbolic point of no
return, a point beyond which further military interventions were completely
out of the question. And one after which Spain became a mature, established
parliamentary constitutional democracy not one without its own problems and
internal tensions, since that is impossible but a mature and established one
nonetheless. Part of this new political stability has been the phenomenon known
in Spain as juancarlismo, or "Juancarlism", a term used to describe attachment to the
person of Juan Carlos this being associated intimately with his status as saviour
of democracy, pilot of change and so on rather than to the institution of
monarchy itself.
2 The Iact that the words 'real and 'royal are written and pronounced identically in Spanish has
allowed some media commentators to suggest punningly that Spain has a 'real rather than a
'Royal monarch (' real` y no Real` ).
128
1he major royal eents in Spain oer the last Fteen years or so hae not ocussed
primarily on Juan Carlos, but on his children, the new generation of Spanish
royals, to whom the phenomenon of juancarlismo does not, by deFnition, apply.
Their three weddings that of the infanta Elena in Seville in 1995, of the infanta
Cristina in Barcelona in 199 and Fnally o Crown Prince lelipe in Madrid in
2004 were large-scale media events attracting intense television and press
coverage, and opening up a space that many different constituencies were eager
to colonise. They were characterised by a concerted move to re-assert Spanish
monarchy as a valuable institution, over and above the person of the king himself.
Aboe all, in their teleision presentations, the Frst two worked to re-emphasise
the ancientness o the Spanish monarchy in two dierent ways: the Frst through
repeated assertions o the close association o the Monarchs with the Fe-hundred
year old Seville cathedral; the second emphasised the oneness of Spain, playing
on the fact that the princess was marrying a Basque, and that the wedding was
taking place in the capital of Catalunya with some of its elements in the Catalan
language. Cristina even arrived for the wedding in Barcelona in a Rolls Royce that
had previously belonged to Franco, thereby symbolically re-inscribing at least one
of the accoutrements of the Old Regime into the pomp and circumstance of the
New. Media treatment was deeply respectful and openly celebratory.
The treatment of Crown Prince Felipe has been rather different. His choice of
girlfriends in particular Norwegian model Eva Sannum in 2000 was the subject
of intense media and political debate, with questions being raised regarding what
kind o women were suitable to ulFl the role o queen.
3
No-one had seemed
to particularly mind when Elena married a young man with no professional
qualiFcations ,but then he was the son o a minor aristocrat,, or when Cristina
chose to marry a high-proFle handball player ,who represented Spain at both the
1992 and the 1996 Olympics). However the idea that the future queen of Spain
might be an underwear model whose photograph, it was claimed, was pinned
to the interior of lorry-drivers cabins seemed to be a step too far. She was
also widely criticised both or her lack o qualiFcations and or her lack o social
standing, suggesting an unappealing melange of both sexism and status snobbery
at work. Felipes friendship with Eva Sannum did not prosper, and four years later
he would marry Letizia Ortiz, a glamorous television journalist and newscaster.
3 By an ironic coincidence, the Norwegian Crown Prince Haakon raised similar hackles when he
announced his intention to marry single mother Mette-Marit Tjessem Hoyby in the same year,
though she Iared better than her compatriot Miss Sannum since the marriage oI Haakon and Mette-
Marit did indeed take place in 2001.
129
On the day of the wedding, contrary to all expectations, it rained torrentially
in Madrid. The bride could not arrive in an open coach, had to transfer to a
Rolls Royce, and arrived at the cathedral thirty minutes late as the prince waited
awkwardly at the altar. The noise of the rain pounding on the roof of the television
commentators box was at times so loud that it was impossible to hear what they
were saying. A freak meteorological occurrence, of course, but somehow readable
as a curious allegory of a changing and less propitious environment and of the
dwindling ability of media narratives central to the process of "Juancarlism"
and the rewriting of history embedded within it to reach their audience. While
the central elements of the myth of juancarlismo were courageous defence of the
constitution in the face of illegitimate use of power and a view of monarchy as
work in the service of the citizenry, none of these appellations seemed remotely
appropriate for someone considering marrying a lingerie model or actually
marrying a highly telegenic media star.
1his entire incident was merely a high-proFle sign o a urther change already
underway in Spain. While Juan Carlos had in some sense straddled the move
from a kind of pre-modernity to modernity or perhaps better from a political
apparatus that was holding back Spains gathering modernisation to one more
suited to its needs Felipe can be seen in some senses as negotiating the move
rom the modern to the post-modern. In a now Frmly established parliamentary
democracy, the defence of constitutional monarchy is no longer seen in Spain as
the matter of political urgency it once was, and can no longer provide the stuff
of political myth. Indeed, with the end of what French thinker Jean Lyotard in his
book The Postmodern Condition called the grand narratives systems of thought
providing totalising explanations of a wide range of social processes post-
modernity may no longer be able to sustain myth, only gossip at least in relation
to those disconnected from, or in the process of becoming disconnected from,
the real centres of power (other "grand narratives" sustained by those self-same
centres of power appear to be holding up much better).
The Management of Memory
OFcial memory - as indeed are opposing unoFcial or popular memories - is always
a construct, and a collective one at that. While it is, broadly speaking, acceptable to
speak of the rewriting of history, particularly when it can be shown that things
widely known to hae happened are not, or are no longer, part o the oFcial
narrative it is important to bear in mind that history is always (re)written. All
130
histories, including academic histories (albeit their greater methodological rigour),
are narratives. All histories (including potted histories such as this one) create a
subject position with a particular "Implied Reader" to use Umberto Ecos term
in mind, and invite the real reader to occupy that position thereby identifying
with the perspective embedded within it (the invitation is not always successful,
but its ushering gesture is always identiFable,. In other words, all histories produce
winners and losers, or at least those who are more favoured by the perspective
(who may indeed include, professionally, career-wise, or in some other capacity, the
authors themselves) and those who are less so.
The political career of Juan Carlos has shown a number of such rewritings; some
aimed at overcoming the limitations of juancarlismo, others having a broader political
remit. An example o the Frst concerns the person o the king`s ather, Don Juan,
Count of Barcelona. As a result of his claims to the throne being overlooked by
Franco, the Spanish monarchy effectively skipped a generation, thereby making a
mockery of the institutions own rules of succession; on his death in 1993 Juan was
widely referred to in the Spanish media as the King who never reigned. Despite
the fact that his father never acceded to the status of King, Juan Carlos decided
to bury him in the Panten de los Reyes ("Pantheon of the Kings") at El Escorial,
the oFcial burial place o Spanish monarchs - he had already had his grandather
Alfonso XIIIs remains transferred there in 1980 thus symbolically restoring the
continuity o the Spanish crown. OFcial support or this initiatie was extremely
strong, again highlighting the operational symbiosis of politicians, media and
monarchy (and also, in this case, the Church). The Government, meeting in an
extraordinary session on the day of Don Juans death, issued a decree allowing the
uneral in Ll Lscorial to take place with ull royal honours. 1he bishop oFciating
at his uneral spoke o the exemplary Fgure Juan de Borbn represented or
the history of Spain, while Pasqual Maragall, then mayor of Barcelona and later
(Socialist) Prime Minister of Catalunya (2003-6), stressed the fact that Don Juan
made the historical continuity of the institution of the Monarchy possible, as
well as contributing decisively to the restoration of democracy in Spain. Press
comment was also almost universally positive. Spains leading weekly magazine
Tiempo spoke of his leading role in the construction of modern Spain, while
another, Cambio 16, wrote: 1oday his Fgure eclipses that o his opponent oer
decades: General Franco... he was, in any case, the last victim of the Spanish Civil
War. And so, it was suggested, a great door had closed on history.
131
There are several examples of the second case, where the effects of the rewriting
are felt well beyond the monarchy itself. Though the myth to a very large extent a
media myth - o the King as the saiour,guarantor o democracy remains a Frmly
established ideological resource, it is not without its detractors who point out that
it has had the eect o eliding signiFcant elements o documented Spanish history
and of relegating to the unsayable their consequences for the present. Such
detractors argue (correctly) that the change from dictatorship to democracy was
not simply due to the actions of the King, or even of the politicians, but was
a lengthy process that began decades before Francos death involving resistance
organised by underground political parties and trade unions while the dictator
was still alive. Individuals and groups undertook this resistance, which at times
resulted in imprisonment and death, at great risk to both themselves and their
families. Spanish history was thus being rewritten, they claimed in ways discussed
at length by contributors to Joan Ramon Resinas edited volume Disremembering
the Dictatorship with the complicity of the media, with credit for the change to
democracy being removed from the actions of ordinary people and transferred to
the elites.
Further examples of the second relate more closely to the question of Juan Carloss
Francoist past, its reduction to silence, and its replacement by the much celebrated
myth of the guarantor of democracy. Opponents argue that this has worked
not only to efface the Francoist origins of Juan Carloss kinghood itself, but also
the likewise Francoist associations and even sympathies of many of the politicians
who went on to nourish in the new democratic enironment, declaring themseles
to have been lifelong democrats. Some of these self-same politicians are accused
of using the myth to push through policies that might otherwise not have been
guaranteed success.
Unease regarding the instrumentalising of the myth is most likely to be voiced in
leftist or nationalist political and intellectual circles in the so-called historical
nationalities, the term used in the Spanish Constitution to refer collectively to
Catalunya, the Basque Country, and Galicia, all regions with their own language
and their own long political and cultural history. Many Catalans in particular feel
that abuse of the myth has contributed, directly or indirectly, to a diminution in
the level of autonomy their country might have expected in the early nineteen-
eighties as a result of the process of democratisation, and some take the view
132
that the King himself is part of the process, at the very least by association
4
. This
argument recurs insistently in parts of the Catalan intelligentsia and the Catalan
media to this day, who claim that the need to stress the unity of the entire Spanish
state around the newly-mythiFed person o the King ollowing the eents o
"23-F" was the cause of the exclusion of Catalan nationalist politicians from
the preparation o the law that would deFne which powers were deoled to the
"Autonomous Communities", the so-called Organic Law on the Harmonisation
of the Autonomous Process, usually referred to in Spain by its acronym LOAPA
passed in June 1982. The lack of a Catalan voice, they claim, resulted in a dilution
of their powers of self-determination (an argument forcefully rebutted, needless
to say, by those responsible or the law,, their autonomy thereby being sacriFced to
the unity of the kingdom of Spain.
While these dissenting voices do have an audience in Catalunya they surface
with the same regularity as the high-proFle re-enactments o the saiour o
democracy myth they were for a long time more muted elsewhere in Spain
(though this is now changing). This has resulted, in addition to the split between
oFcial and popular memory ound more generally throughout Spain, in two
competing oFcial memories aligned along a range o axes, one o which pits
Spanish against Catalan nationalists. The result is a damaging schism that a more
courageous handling of the nationalities situation in 1982 would almost certainly
have averted. Journalistic reverence for the guarantor of democracy myth in the
early nineteen-eighties, and the resulting lack of investigation of some of its wider
political implications, have, with or without the express consent of the journalists,
as a result contributed to the defeat of a certain alternative understanding of
Catalunya and its relationship with Madrid. Was truth spoken unto power? What
seems clear is that not only did the provisions of the LOAPA fall some way short
of what would have been possible within the framework of the 1978 Constitution,
they were to some extent even in breach of it: a third of the text of the LOAPA
was later ruled unconstitutional by the Spanish Constitutional Court in 1991. But
if there was a lack of critical media engagement, this was almost certainly due less
to journalistic malevolence or negligence than to the reassuring power of myth.
4 In December 2008 the Catalan politician Joan Tarda, a member oI the republican party Esquerra
Republicana, caused considerable controversy when he ended a speech at an independence rally in
Barcelona with the cry, 'Long live the republic, death to the Bourbon ('Visca la republica, mori
el borbo). He later deIended his action by pointing out that this was a traditional battle cry oI
Catalan republicans dating back several centuries and was not to be read as a reIerence to the current
Monarch. Whatever the merits oI this argument, the anti-Bourbon sentiments are clear. Attempts to
have him indicted subsequently Iailed.
133
Conclusion
For those who feel that a republic is a more rational political form, there is much
about monarchy that is easy to criticise: the outlandish names the full name
of Don Juan, Count of Barcelona, was Juan Carlos Teresa Silvestre Alfonso de
Borbn y Battenberg, and the name o his son Juan Carlos is only marginally
shorter
5
; the at times bizarre pomp and circumstance; the outmoded ceremonial
livery; the quaint idiolects (in more than one European country the royal way of
speaking differs noticeably from that of the population at large); the inherent
sexism of some of the laws of succession; the brazen abuse of position for
commercial gain; the unedifying spectacle of the hangers-on; the lifestyles of
minor royals living it up at public expense with no obvious social return on such
an investment. Above all the vagaries of genealogical accident that can result in
quite inappropriate individuals (from a rational point of view, that is) occupying
important positions of symbolic and to some extent material power. Elections can,
of course, also produce hideously incompetent or even murderous incumbents
we do not have to look far for examples in either the twentieth or twenty-
Frst century - but we know that, assuming the constitutional order is respected,
their mandate must eventually come to an end. There is, with few exceptions,
no such procedural escape from an incompetent or embarrassing monarch: the
Bhutanese Constitution, adopted in 2008 following the move to a constitutional
democracy, is one of the few to contain such an escape clause and to include
provisions for the removal of a monarch who is clearly not up to the task.
And yet, now Frmly ensconced in the twenty-Frst century, monarchies remain
with us, variously ignored, opposed, satirised, tolerated, supported, celebrated
and even held in affection. They are here, on the one hand, because they remain
extremely useful, a highly valuable resource that can be exploited by other powerful
groups, in most cases with the implicit agreement of the monarch, for a range of
political projects, perhaps the most important being to provide a focus for national
imagining and, thereby, symbolising national unity. But monarchies are not just
the product of others manoeuvrings: they enjoy restricted, but nonetheless
signiFcant, agency that they can mobilise in mostly low-key, but on occasions in
5 A Russian joke tells oI a Spanish aristocrat returning late to his hotel in Paris one night to fnd the
door closed. He rings the bell, whereupon the porter asks, 'Who`s there? The aristocrat intones,
'Juan Rodriguez Caramba-de-Pepeto-y-Gonzalez. 'OK, come in, replies the porter, 'but would
the last person in please close the door. This would appear to be a variation on Nedeljkovich,
Brashick and Kuharich`s 'Pyramid oI the Capitalist System, in particular its 'We eat Ior you layer,
where, in terms oI resources consumed, each member oI the ruling classes appropriates many times
that oI a member oI the oppressed classes.
134
quite spectacular, ways. Lxamples o the Frst are the many charities and initiaties
they support, their ambassadorial functions, the heading-up of trade missions, and
so on. Examples of the second would include the role played by a number of
European monarchies during the Second World War, the actions of Juan Carlos on
the night of "23-F", or those of Jigme Singye Wangchuck of Bhutan in initiating
his countrys move to a parliamentary democracy. And then, confusingly (and
irrationally) for republicans, there is what appears to be the genuine affection that
at least part of the population holds for its Monarchs an affection rarely (if
eer, extended to Prime Ministers and Presidents, seen perhaps as the neeting
apparatchiks rather than the enduring embodiment of the nation an affection
nourished and supported by a range of specialist and non-specialist magazines.
And yet nothing stands still. Though affection for the British monarchs
6
can still
be detected despite the jeering and scoFng o the tabloids and the at times rather
more measured criticisms of the broadsheets, it is a pale shadow of the popularity
enjoyed by Victoria and her family in the nineteenth century, a popularity vividly
illustrated by John Plunkett in his book Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Even in
the Spanish case Juan Carlos no longer seems quite as untouchable as he once
was: a careless remark picked up during a meeting with President Hugo Chvez
of Venezuela to whom the King directed a petulant Why dont you shut up?
during a recent Ibero-American Summit in Chile was the subject of some (albeit
carefully worded) press disapproval in 2007 and was widely circulated on the
internet
7
. The King was not without his supporters as regards this incident a
number of right-wing commentators felt that the socialist Chvez badly needed
cutting down to size, and that Juan Carlos was exactly the right person to do
that. But even so, not everyone felt that this outburst was appropriate and there
was a fairly mild-mannered debate in some sections of the press regarding the
(constitutional) limits to legitimate interventions by the Monarch. All for the most
part very gentlemanly although Catalan politician Josep-Llus Carod-Rovira went
so ar as to describe him as a hooligan` - but deFnitely noel` in relation to what
had been the dominant tone up until then.
6 English social psychologist Michael Billig`s book Speaking of the Royal Family also refers to
expressions oI sympathy Ior what is sometimes seen as the 'diIfcult lot oI the royal Iamily.
7 Behind-the-scenes diplomacy and PR know-how soon resolved the spat. When President Chavez
met the king at the latter`s residence in Mallorca in July 2008, he jokingly asked his host 'Why don`t
we go to the beach? Juan Carlos later gave the president a tee-shirt with the words 'Why don`t you
shut up? an event given ample coverage, needless to say, by the media.
135
In addition, even mainstream Spanish-language newspapers such as El Pas now
carry articles on the conspiracy of silence surrounding Juan Carlos in various
ways. A greater understanding of the widespread social upheaval preceding the
Transition is also apparent. The highly popular television series Cuntame cmo pas
("Tell Me How it Happened"), launched in 2001 and now in its tenth season
8
, gave
Fctional orm to many o the strikes and demonstrations o the early seenties and
before. On 31 October 2007 the Spanish parliament passed a Law of Historical
Memory in relation to the victims of the Civil War.
9
This has led to an upsurge in
personal biographies from that period, including one-minute long mini-biographies
aired on prime time television news. History is again being rewritten.
And yet if royalty is to survive as a functioning institution, some kind of royal
memory with, of course, its own rewritings and omissions will be required,
along with journalists (and politicians) willing to reproduce and disseminate
it. Progress on this front is currently uneven: in the Spanish case, a working
replacement for juancarlismo has yet to emerge, either in the form of a viable
felipismo or of a commitment to monarchy more generally. As a result, the spectacle
of celebrity monarchy, lacking either memory or stable (if contested) meaning,
remains a real for some ghastly, for others entertaining possibility. Indeed, in
view of the heavily romanticised media discourse that surrounded the wedding of
Felipe and Letizia such was its scale that its detractors referred to it as Operation
Letizia for some, it is already here.
Hugh ODonnell is Professor of Language and Popular Culture at Glasgow
Caledonian University, Scotland.
8 Such has been the success oI this series that the Iormat has been adopted by both Portuguese (RTP)
and Italian (RAI) television to recount their own history oI the last quarter oI the twentieth century.
9 Although this law declared unjust all those sentences passed by the Francoist courts on political,
ideological or religious grounds, these sentences have not, however, been declared null and void.
136
References
Billig, Michael. Talking of the Royal Family. London: Routledge, 1992. Print.
Boorstin, Daniel. The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-events in America. London: Penguin,
1961. Print.
Eco, Umberto. The Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts. London:
Hutchinson, 1981. Print.
Habermas, Jrgen. The Theory of Communicative Action. London: Heinemann, 1984.
Print.
Lyotard, Jean-Franois, Geoff Bennington, Brian Massumi, and Fredric Jameson.
The Postmodern Condition: a Report on Knowledge. Manchester: Manchester UP,
1984. Print.
Plunkett, John. Queen Victoria: First Media Monarch. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003. Print.
Resina, Joan Ramon. Disremembering the Dictatorship: the Politics of Memory in the Spanish
Transition to Democracy. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2000. Print.
137 137
Introduction
1wenty-Fe years ago, I was a young man with a mission. Armed with a journalism
degree I believed I was on the threshold of a career to seek the truth and nothing
but the truth. It was not long before I realised how complex that mission was - and
how complex the concept of truth was.
A few years into a journalism career I began to grapple with the notion of
censorship. In my journalism classes any form of censorship was to be scorned
and resisted. Outside, in the real world, censorship was a protracted reality. It was
and is - practiced in more forms than we understand and acknowledge, from subtle
interactions to blatant violence. I realised, very quickly, that it was more than a
curb on journalism and media. It was a culture that was a critical element in human
behaviour and human relationships. In fact I eventually realised that society could
not function without a form of censorship. It is prevalent - in fact ingrained - in
all social and political systems.
This paper looks at one of the more subtle forms of censorship self-censorship.
I will discuss self-censorship in the media, self-censorship as a vital social norm,
and self-censorship as a value in the Bhutanese context. I look at self-censorship
as an important part of my own professional life and as a social skill that has been
developed to an art form. In the context of this book I look at self-censorship as
an element of the culture that has bound what we call the Bhutanese system, a
polity that places the Monarch at its centre. I contemplate the underlying question,
is this culture prevalent in the modern Bhutanese media?
In the end I conclude that sel-censorship is justiFed i it is, in its broadest sense,
applied as a skilful means to a noble end.
Self-Censorship: A Means to An End
Kinley Dorji
10
138
General Media
Throughout the 19th and 20
th
centuries writers, musicians, poets, journalists,
Flm-makers, painters, actors, and other artists sought the balance between sel
expression through the arts and what was seen as the boundaries of decency, of
politics, sexual conduct, violence, racial, and religious tolerance. Sometimes they
bowed to pressures and curbed their own creatiity, sometimes they deFed social
norms or runed oFcialdom. In the process they expanded the boundaries o
human thinking, speech, and behaviour and played an important role in shaping
human values.
In recent decades Flms and books and other media hae oten been mired in
controversy, usually on issues of religion and race, social and political sensitivities.
Democratic India has banned Flms like City of Joy and The Party, China banned
Memoirs of a Geisha, Brokeback Mountain, Kundun and Seven Years in Tibet; Monty
Pythons Life of Brian was banned in many liberal western countries, Thailand
banned The King and I. Among famous banned books are Ulysses, Canterbury Tales,
and The Arabian Nights. In recent years the fatwa imposed on Salman Rushdie by
Ayatollah Khomeini for his book, The Satanic Verses, and the angry debate and
threats that followed the publication of cartoons of Prophet Muhammad by
the Danish newspaper, Jyllands-Posten, are among the most graphic examples of
extreme censorship.
Generally, however, blatant and violent censorship of the media declined by the
end of the 20
th
century with the wave of democracy that swept across the globe
with about 180 countries adopting some form of democracy. The recognition
of media as the fourth estate became widespread and uncontested. In a notable
international initiative UNESCO promoted the concept of the Information Age
that strengthened the understanding of the information society and its role. Even
as the authority of the press, as housed in Londons Fleet Street, declined, the
media gained prominence in the United States. The Washington Posts revelation of
the \atergate scandal, glamorised by the Flm All the Presidents Men, raised the
proFle o the western media. By the turn o the century the Internet came as a
powerful medium with an almost irrepressible force that gave new meaning to
freedom of expression and provided unprecedented access to the masses.
Yet the pressure on all media is pervasive today. A range of censorship mechanisms
have been instituted by governments. Religious and ethnic groups intimidate
139
media. In industrialised countries corporations apply crippling Fnancial pressure
on media. Governments also spend substantive funds to control the electronic
and digital media, including the Internet, both to protect vulnerable groups like
children and to ward off political opposition.
But the most frequent form of censorship is manifested in self-censorship, the act
of restraint in the media by media professionals themselves. Self-censorship is a
response to pressures ranging from outright fear of retaliation from terrorists and
militants to the Fner aspects o human culture, sensitiities, and taste. In writing
a collection of short stories and memoirs, Within the Realm of Happiness, in 2006
I found myself going through extensive introspection on practically every word,
renecting on the audience, the purpose o the book, the possible reaction o the
community and the market, the real characters I might be portraying. Some of my
favourite stories were left unwritten.
Before Bhutan opened up to the process of modernisation, art was performed as
spiritual practice (traditional artists painted spiritual images to earn merit), literature
was largely Buddhist scriptures, and the most powerful media was gossip and rumour.
1he Frst newspaper was started by the goernment in 1986, the national radio station
in 192 by youth olunteers, and Flm picked up in the 1990s, but the oral tradition,
including rumour, remained the most dominant form of communication. While
there was no ban on any Bhutanese media society shied away from books that were
critical of the country and, particularly, the royal family. In 2010, with four radio
stations, six newspapers, and a number of entertainment magazines, the Bhutanese
media are more open and critical but news is characterised by self-censorship.
News Media
The discussion on censorship is more controversial and self-censorship more
criticised when it comes to the news media and journalism. Governments,
proprietors of media organisations, advertisers, and journalists themselves come
under Fre or innuencing or manipulating the media or political, commercial, and
personal reasons. Self-censorship with such motives is viewed as a betrayal of the
audience and thus a deprivation of peoples right to information.
Threats
Conventional critics would claim that censorship, in all forms, is normally
practiced in non-democratic countries on the assumption that only democratic
140
governments legally guarantee freedom of expression. It is also widely believed
that goernments, with arying degrees o justiFcation, almost always hae an
interest in controlling the ree now o inormation. And, while the need or
government regulations cannot be disputed, particularly at a time when media are
nearly completely commercialised, the control of media in the name of national
security and state interests is largely seen as an excuse to muzzle them. Although
violence in state censorship is something of the past journalists are still targeted for
their criticism of political leaders. In authoritarian countries those who report and
comment on politics are often in fear of sanctions by the authorities. Defamation,
anti-terror, and national security laws and oFcial secrets acts were repeatedly used
to silence journalists in Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Laos, Burma, and China.
Clashes between government and journalists occur every day in several African
countries.
The global media community is not proud of its performance in the Gulf Wars
of 1991 and 2001. Journalists actively sought censorship advice from military
authorities supposedly to prevent the inadvertent revelation of military secrets
and the war on terror after September 11, 2001, introduced the concept of the
embedded journalist. In the US organisations like Media Matters for America,
FAIR, Democracy Now!, and the ACLU have raised concerns about news
broadcasting stations (notably FOX News) censoring their own content to be less
controversial when reporting on the War on Terror. In fact the Iraq war, where
the western press exercised blatant self-censorship, increased the credibility of the
only alternative, the Qatar-owned television channel, Al Jazeera, which started an
English broadcast in 1996.
Meanwhile, even as the Internet broke down the walls erected by censors,
self-censorship has been globalised through the electronic media. Words like
Tiananmen, Tibet, and Taiwan have been blocked in the Chinese language. Search
companies including Google, Microsoft, and Yahoo, were reported to be censoring
more information than even Chinese laws demanded.
In 2009 71 journalists were killed, according to the New York based Committee to
Protect Journalists (CPJ), nearly half of them while covering political beats and
a quarter o them in armed connict. 1errorist and militant groups are responsible
for most violent attacks on journalists. Journalists and other media professionals
have been threatened, kidnapped, or executed by political and religious militant
141
groups and terrorists in all continents. Even governments have been intimidated
into self-censorship in an era of unprecedented suicide bombers in war-torn
Islamic countries. In more recent times, particularly, Islamic terrorists have placed
de facto controls on American media companies, something that would have been
unthinkable a decade ago. In a world that seems more dangerous and less proFtable
than it did in the past greed or fear is proving stronger than commitment to free
speech.
Corporate Power
In the west, today, large corporations are a more common source of censorship
than governments. Self-censorship is pervasive in pluralistic capitalist countries,
most often to conform to the pressures of the market. Media outlets kill numerous
stories because they undermine corporate interests. Adertisers use their Fnancial
clout to squelch negative reports. Powerful businesses use the threat of expensive
lawsuits to discourage legitimate investigations. Journalists and editors consciously
avoid topics that will anger a parent company or advertiser to protect their
livelihood. With commercial interests dominating, the proprietor and the advertiser
have more control over media than, say, the politician in industrialised societies.
In their seminal work, Manufacturing Consent, Chomsky and Herman argue that
corporate ownership of news media very strongly encourages systematic self-
censorship due to market forces. Even with supposedly liberal media bias and
self-censorship is evident in the selection and omission of news stories, and the
framing of acceptable discussion, in line with the interests of the corporation
owners.
A 2000 study in the US by the Pew Research Centre and the Columbia Journalism
Review notes that self-censorship is commonplace in the news media today. The
survey of 206 reporters and 81 news executives in the US 150 from local news
outlets and 137 from national news organizations found widespread concern over
commercial and competitive pressures. As a result of these pressures journalists
say that good stories all too frequently are not pursued. Apart from a handful of
countries where journalists can seek some form of legal protection most media
societies are at the mercy of proprietors.
In Bhutan the government, as the largest advertiser, is in a position to
pressure media organisations but corporate pressure, as seen around the
142
world, is already a reality. Even in the 1990s, when Kuensel was the only
newspaper, companies were known to withdraw advertisements if they were
unhappy with the coverage of their organisations. The tension between the
advertising departments and the newsrooms are the best proof of this trend.
Social Pressure
Besides market pressure journalists quote various forms of peer and social
pressures that force them to exercise self-censorship. According to the PEW
survey journalists and news executives said, perhaps surprisingly, that fear of
embarrassment or potential career damage is mentioned by about half of all
journalists as a factor for avoiding newsworthy stories. The PEW survey also
shows that about 20% of journalists steer clear of newsworthy stories because
they might aggravate community problems.
News media are often accused of self-censorship because they can face serious
backlash for controversial or hasty reporting. Sometimes they need to be politically
correct. Important and newsworthy stories can be avoided because they are too
boring or complicated. News media have been accused of not taking any risks.
A study by the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2009 found that journalists
perceptions of self-censorship are grounded partly in their professional norms,
partly in their own personal political attitudes, and partly in the distance between
their own political attitudes and the editorial stances of the news organizations that
they work for.
With its small population, all these pressures are heightened in Bhutan. The medias
tensions with politicians, senior bureaucrats, and business houses are emerging
although, in the context of a new democracy, it might be described as creative
tensions. The Bhutanese Constitution guarantees freedom of expression, freedom
of media, and right to information but the pressure on the media comes from
the sensitivities of the small society. As one editor described it: When you write
a critical report about someone on Friday you are likely to bump into him at the
vegetable market on Saturday, in the supermarket on Sunday, and probably at a
dinner on Monday.
Self-censorship under these circumstances questions the responsibility of
journalists who have taken on, by their profession, the mandate to report of facts
for the good of society. Otherwise it is a paradox. The owners of the media are a
143
handful of people, a tiny group that does not take responsibility for their impact
on society. A parliamentarian, president, prime minister, mayor, must be elected
but the media owners, who can wield more power than all the elected oFcials o
any country, are there for the sole reason that they have the money.
Journalists and Society
A graphic justiFcation o the need or sel-censorship in society would be to
imagine a world where everyone voiced his or her thoughts without considering
the implications, like people suffering from the neuropsychiatric disorder known
as Frontal Lobe Syndrome. As people shout involuntary obscenities, conversation
would be a crude exchange at best. Under normal circumstances people grow up
learning to edit their thoughts. As children we self-censor our conversations and
language with or in the presence of adults and, as adults, we do the same with
children. We censor ourselves for social, political, religious reasons. We censor
ourselves in respect of other peoples rights, freedoms, and sensibilities, so that we
do not insult their beliefs and emotions.
In Bhutan self-censorship, like all other social norms, has to be understood in the
context of the small society and a culture that is largely drawn from Buddhism.
Buddhist teachers explain that this is the teaching of self-regulation to discipline
the mind, through practices like the 16 virtues, thereby reducing anger. The
discipline of speech is based on respect for other persons and society at large. Not
harming others results in a good reaction from them, and that is good for society.
We avoid harsh speech to strive for delwa (bliss) of mind and body to ensure peace
and harmony in the community.
As philosophers like Ruth Benedict analysed, and Buddhist teachers also point out,
one basic dierence in the innuence on social behaiour is that western society is
a guilt-oriented society while eastern society is shame-oriented. Self-censorship
is, therefore, necessary to avoid shaming people. Public criticism of people in the
media is particularly painful and may aggravate rather than help solve a problem.
The sensitivity of a small society can be and often is - taken to extremes where
people do not express their views and decision makers do not make decisions
to avoid criticism. This sensitivity has a negative impact because the reluctance
to criticize can result in a lack of healthy discourse. In Bhutan this has led to a
more open and critical discussion on the Internet that is viewed with some relief
although the comments are too often personalised and usually made under the
cover of anonymity.
144
Journalists, in most societies, are more vocal than the average citizen. In their
attempts to portray extremities to make news stories more interesting they
inevitably stretch the boundaries of speech and offer new horizons in social
thinking. But, as members of society, they are conscious of the need to balance
the pursuit of the truth with the inevitable need for self-censorship. On one hand
they carry the responsibility of informing the people, sometimes risking their lives.
On the other they know that the world would not function without some form of
self-censorship. The answer is a right balance that, in Buddhism, includes the need
to question authority.

The Bhutanese Context
Accepting that the inviolability of free speech should not be challenged, particularly
for the success of democratic systems, this paper argues that the values which
held socio-political systems together over the centuries must also be respected
in the broader context of social health. It is not a contradiction with freedom of
expression. Media must play an important role in all political systems and freedom
must be interpreted as responsibility.
Bhutanese society recognizes that there is a wealth of experiences, both good and
bad, around the world. It has also recognized that, while respecting this diversity,
Bhutan has to be proud of its uniqueness and maintain its distinctive approach to
change and deelopment. 1o do this Bhutan must Frst understand this distinctie
identity that society has described as the Bhutanese system, meaning a polity that
places the Monarch at its centre.
1his Bhutanese system is changing rapidly, change that accelerated with the Frst
general election held in March 2008. The Monarch has stepped back from the
political arena and governance is characterized by party politics. How does society,
and members of society including the media, preserve the values of the Bhutanese
system, particularly against the potentially divisive forces that can come with
democracy, when society is diided into oFcial winners and losers and indiiduals,
families, and communities are pitted against each other?
Here lies the wisdom of Gross National Happiness which provides a perspective
on the evolving political structure and, therefore, guidelines for change. GNH is an
expression of the values that held Bhutanese society together over the centuries.
Bhutan is not changing because it needs new values but is enabling the polity to
145
eole and thus presere old alues that are symbolized by the state, personiFed by
the Monarch. The Monarch is the guardian of GNH and it is in the person of the
Monarch that the values of GNH are preserved through change.
Of Kings
Bhutanese society has functioned like an extended family largely because of its size.
Such a system has been held together by traditional values that are expressed by the
cultural code called driglam namzha, loosely interpreted as traditional etiquette. At
the heart of this system is the institution of monarchy. Driglam namzha prescribes
a code of behaviour including mental and physical obeisance to the King. The
emphasis on discipline and self-censorship stems from a culture that prescribes
a deep reverence for the Monarch, so much so that people lower their voices for
even a mention of the King.
In Bhutan the Monarch does not claim divine rights as did the European Kings of
the past or the link to heaven that the Chinese Emperors claimed. The Bhutanese
Monarch draws his power from the will of the people as symbolized by a unique
beginning when representaties o the people, the clergy, and oFcialdom gathered
to sign a Genja in 190, reposing absolute authority to goern in the Frst King,
Gongsar Ugyen Wangchuck.
The concept of kingship is drawn from the notion of a Buddhist King who is
created because the people place their will in him, reposing in him the mandate of
being a guardian over human society. He is the Dharma Raja, the protector and
supporter of the dharma, ruling by the laws of dharma that he himself follows.
In a culmination of these concepts the sacred enthronement ceremony of the
Druk Gyalpo takes place in the Punakha Dzong where he receives the sacred
empowerment in the presence of the relics of Zhabdrung Ngawang Namgyal.
The crowning of the Druk Gyalpo in the capital city is a civil ceremony performed
in the presence of Bhutanese and international dignitaries.
Modern Bhutanese society feels indebted to the monarchy for a century of
peace and prosperity during which Fe Monarchs achieed a Fne balance o
tradition and modernity. Drawing from this past Bhutanese society holds the view
that the Monarch is the foundation for Bhutans political stability and that the
credibility of this institution must be preserved for the survival of the country.
146
Media and Monarchy
The papers in this book look at monarchy in the 21st century. The experiences
and the impact of the institution of monarchy vary as much as the history and the
social systems of each country but they provide a rich portrayal of an important
aspect of governance of human society. There is surprisingly little written about
this vital institution, as Professor Jrgen Elklit of Denmark points out in his paper.
In the context of this book I look at the Bhutanese medias coverage of the
institution of monarchy, widely viewed by society as a sacrosanct institution. Here,
too, the media draws its codes of ethics, conduct, and practice from societys view
of the monarchy. Still in their infancy, we see that the tone of the Bhutanese
media renect the deeply ingrained alues in the Bhutanese psyche. 1hey renect the
cultural interpretation of the values imbedded in traditional Bhutanese etiquette.
Bhutanese societys relations with the Druk Gyalpo (Dragon King) could be
compared with the awe that the Spanish population held for King Juan Carlos,
or the love that the Thai people have for King Bhumibol, or the respect that
the Danish people have for their Queen, and the unquestioning acceptance that
Japanese had for the Emperors of the past. All the scholars who look at monarchy
in different countries share the resounding agreement that the Monarch must
remain above politics.
Thailand is an interesting example of societys view of the Monarch and the media
coverage. Both the Thai and international media have exercised self-censorship to
an extreme degree in their coverage of King Bhumibol Adulyadej and the Thai
royal family. It is also accepted that self censorship is imposed by the lse majest
law which states: anyone defaming, insulting or threatening the King, the Queen,
the presumptive heir or the regent is guilty of the crime of lse majest and can be
sentenced to three to 15 years in prison. The lse majest law in Thailand is known
to be the worlds harshest and, in 2009 alone, police were investigating 32 cases of
the crime.
According to the Thai royal palace, censorship is imposed to preserve national
security, maintain public order, preserve the rights of others, protect public morals,
and prevent insults to Buddhism. But, in all fairness, going by the popularity that
His Majesty King Bhumibol enjoys across Thai society, the Thai media carry a tone
of reverence that is more than what a law could impose. Thai journalists voice the
genuine reverence that a vast majority of the population have for King Bhumibol.
SigniFcantly, in 2005, King Bhumibol Adulyadej publicly stated that he was not
147
a supernatural being and that if he did do anything wrong, he wanted to hear
criticism so he could improve himself. This step was ostensibly taken to offset the
charges of lse majest in Thailand, most of which have been intentionally directed
at foreigners or Thai opponents of political, social, and commercial leaders.
Hugh ODonnel points out in this book that, in Spain, it was nearly impossible
to Fnd any critical comments, howeer mild, o Juan Carlos in the mainstream
Spanish media for two decades. It was not a conspiracy of silence but, he suggests,
the awe of the Monarch, Juan Carlos. The Japanese media maintained a stony
silence even as society agonized over the inability of the Imperial couple to
produce an heir to the Throne. In Nepal it was fear of reprisal that prevented the
press from reporting the antics of a Crown Prince who even ran over and killed a
popular singer.
Bhutanese journalists place the Monarch on an even higher pedestal and build the
mystical aura around the institution. In the perception of the people, at this time
o change this role o the Monarch, as the symbol o stability and uniFcation, is
more important than ever. It is the institution of monarchy that must carry Bhutan
through change.
Conclusion
The concept of self-censorship is complex. In a broader context society would not
function if the behaviour of its members, including their speech, were not self-
controlled. In politics it can also mean the manipulation of information in a system
where, as John Ralston Saul writes in Voltaires Bastards, intelligence refers more to
CIA than Einstein. Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, refers to this as the culture of
secrecy. Decision makers may tend to judge their worth by the device of secrecy,
that is, what they know and what they control.
The word censorship carries negative connotations with good reason, particularly
when it refers to the media. It implies the deprivation of a right that is now
indisputable in most societies freedom of expression. Self-censorship also
carries a negative connotation but to a smaller degree. In the media self-censorship
could mean that professionals succumb to political and commercial pressures from
governments, corporations, and media companies as well as threats from terrorists,
militants, and gangsters. Author Judy Blume laments on her web page: But its
not just the books under Fre now that worry me. It is the books that will neer be
148
written; the books that will never be read and all due to the fear of censorship. As
always, young readers will be the real losers.` 1his applies to Flms that will neer
be made, songs never sung, images that will never be painted.
Self-censorship in the news media, inevitable in a profession where the deluge
of information must be distilled in the service of the people, must be based on
a sense of responsibility. Sun Tzu said that secrecy is a narrow means and not an
end in itsel. and such means only work i there is a justiFable end and a moral
purpose guiding the way. 1his is not dierent rom the Buddhist justiFcation or
human behaiour that all action is justiFed i the intention is good. Applied to
self-censorship in journalism, it means that media professionals need to exercise
self-censorship for the greater good of society. It means good journalism.
The Bhutanese media have a clear purpose. Gross National Happiness not only
requires that people are informed but that society must preserve the good values
of the past as Bhutan transforms into a modern nation. In a world where the media
not only presents images of individuals and organisations but actually creates
them, the Bhutanese media must be mindful of their long term impact on society.
The Constitution of the kingdom of Bhutan does not include the lse majest law.
In fact it was not even considered during the drafting of the Constitution. Yet the
media are not even remotely critical of the King. On the contrary the Bhutanese
media makes a conscious effort to promote the aura of the Druk Gyalpo with a
tone of earnestness. In sharp contrast to the coverage of politicians, where the
media have shown a tendency to be confrontational, the coverage of the Kings
activities has been celebratory (with some of the writing even sounding like sloppy
school essays).
The premise of media coverage of the Monarch is that Bhutanese monarchy is
vital for the long-term peace and stability of the country. The King embodies the
legitimacy of state. Apart from being the upholder of the Constitution he is also
the guardian of the people, particularly the less fortunate. As the head of state
the Monarch personiFes the state and the credibility o the nation rests on his
credibility.
At a time of historic political change the Monarchy provides the political space and
the safety net for the process of democratisation which is a real life experiment
in Bhutan. As political change innuences socio-economic change he becomes the
149
symbol of unity for the small population. The transition of generations requires
that the King is a role model and an inspiration for Bhutanese youth.
1he Bhutanese media today renect the concerns o Bhutanese society that is
moving from a known era of stability into an unknown future. This means that
the media is also helping to deFne role o the King as a protector-Fgure that must
remain above politics. Strengthening the credibility of the King and the institution
of monarchy does not mean just singing praises of the King as a personality
the media must continuously make diFcult decisions and be constructie in the
coverage of the Throne to preserve the true sanctity of the institution. In this
context self-censorship must represent right thought, right opinion, right action,
for the greater and long term good of society.
After working as a journalist for 29 years, Kinley Dorji is now the Secretary
of the Ministry of Information & Communications in Thimphu, Bhutan.
150
The Bhutanese Media and a Democratic
Constitutional Monarchy
Siok Sian Pek-Dorji
11
The Year 2008
2008 was a bittersweet year for most Bhutanese. It was the year when Bhutan
became the worlds youngest democracy and enthroned the worlds youngest king.
More than 80 o its citizens oted on March 24th, 2008 in the country`s Frst
general election. The transition was all the more poignant for Bhutanese citizens
who had lived through 100 years of progressive development and stability, led by
a succession of far-sighted Kings. A century of stable progress was giving way to
change.
Bhutan`s Frst King Ugen \angchuck uniFed Bhutan under his rule in 190 and
made contact with the outside world; he had been an important mediator between
the British and the leadership in Tibet. The second King, Jigme Wangchuck,
strengthened Bhutans relations with British India and, during his reign, Bhutan
and India signed the 1949 treaty of friendship that guided Bhutans foreign policy
for many years. The rule of law was strengthened during the second Kings rule,
and a traditional educational system as well as a district administration system was
introduced. The third King of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji Wangchuck, abolished serfdom,
established the National Assembly, initiated Bhutans international foreign policy,
and ushered in a period of development - from road infrastructure to health care
and modern education.
The fourth King of Bhutan, His Majesty Jigme Singye Wangchuck, accelerated the
process of modernisation and took the nation from an era of basic infrastructure
development to the age of information. His Majesty goes down in history as the
King who decided that democracy would replace monarchy as the system of
governance for Bhutan: I have always made it clear that the people are more
151
important than the King. We cannot leave the future of the country in the hands
of one person who is chosen by birth and not by merit.
1
To see a King give up his authority and hand the throne over to his son, and to
see the dramatic political transformation introduced by the will of the King, was
to see an act of wisdom and compassion that few people have seen, or will see, in
contemporary history. 1he abdication o the King symbolised his conFdence and
trust in the new generation of Bhutanese. That is why Bhutanese today describe
democracy as a gift from the throne.
On August 18th, 2008, King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck signed Bhutans
Frst written Constitution. On the occasion he said that the power that the Bhutanese
people had reposed in him and his forefathers was now bestowed on the people
of Bhutan. It was a moving moment for Bhutanese citizens as they watched their
elected representatives sign the nations highest legislation, the Constitution of
Bhutan, live on TV. As the dramatic and historic year drew to a close, images of
the ourth King placing the Raen Crown on his son`s, the Fth King`s head, were
nashed around the world as the media told this unique story rom the heart o the
Himalayas.
Media Reect Reality
The media are not just providers of information but also shapers of reality. Media
are a renection o culture and society. In this paper I look at how the Bhutanese
media are deFning their roles and where they Ft into the changing political
landscape. After becoming a democracy, Bhutans media have changed their tone
of reporting on the new political system. What lessons can the media learn from
other countries as Bhutan embarks on creating a new system of governance that
strives to be a balance of tradition and modernity? How can media contribute to
the construction of a democratic constitutional monarchy?
Media and the Restructuring of Society
Bhutanese society is being restructured. A new generation of politicians is emerging,
so too is a generation of young journalists. The concept of contemporary civil
society is gradually taking root.
2
The recently established constitutional agencies
1 Quoted in 'The Legacy oI a King.
2 While Bhutan has had hundreds oI local selI-help groups and community organisations that
constitute civil society in the traditional sense, the emergence of modern civil society through more
The Bhutanese Media and a Democratic Constitutional Monarchy
152
the Election Commission and Anti-Corruption Commission are energetic
and sincere in their efforts to make a difference in the new political landscape.
All sections o society are now deFning their roles within the new system o
democratic constitutional monarchy. Amidst this major transformation of
Bhutanese society, the Bhutanese monarchy is also deFning its role in the new
democratic constitutional monarchy. It is the responsibility of the media in Bhutan
to renect this transormation.
The media today are the key to laying the foundations of a public space that is
essential in a democracy. The media help shape culture and peoples world view. As
Bhutans democratic culture takes shape and the political worldview becomes more
open, Bhutanese media need to deFne a role or themseles. low do the media
help restructure society? How do they build a public space and provide greater
transparency in the most important institutions? In the bid to ensure fair play and
objectivity, both the Election Commission and the media regulator, the Bhutan
Information, Communications and Media Authority (BICMA), drew up separate
and often overlapping guidelines and regulations (some say too many) for media in
the period leading up to the election campaign in March 2008.
The people of Bhutan have a new mandate, that of the voters. For many months,
the Election Commission schooled the people on the need to vote and how to
vote. This is a formal duty of every citizen. What is more complex, perhaps even
more important, is the informal role of the citizen in political life, and in the
development of their community and nation. This is the responsibility to maintain
igilance and pressure on the leaders that they ote into oFce and to ensure that
the politicians perform. People, therefore, can use media to provide feedback and
to keep watch on the performance of their elected leaders.
What then is the role of the media in an emerging democracy? Bhutan may now be
labelled a democratic constitutional monarchy but the culture underlying this new
democracy is yet to be developed. The media have a major role to play in creating
this culture and contributing to the peoples understanding of the new Bhutanese
political landscape. While the role of media in Bhutan is not necessarily different
from other democracies, they need to focus on the education of a populace that is
new to the concept of democracy.
Iormal non-governmental organisations is a recent development.
153
A New Political Landscape
The Constitution provides all the fundamental rights for the people of Bhutan. The
rights most relevant to the media are freedom of speech, opinion, and expression,
the right to information, and the freedom of the media.
There has been a monumental shift in the peoples perception of the media and
against the new political landscape. In the short span of three years Bhutans
media have taken on the role of being the fourth estate and have been given the
responsibility to strengthen the process of democracy. Bhutanese media have
adopted a critical (some would say an initially confrontational) approach to elected
leaders, much to the discomfort and dismay of new politicians, as this was a society
that has hitherto been unused to direct public confrontation. Media have begun to
openly question the authorities and the people in power.
New tensions have developed between media and the institutions they report on.
This is a natural development when media have to play the role of a watchdog to
hold public oFce accountable to the people. Media hae become our auditors,`
says a public oFcial at a discussion on the Bhutanese media.
3
The print media, in
particular, have become bolder and more openly critical.
Bhutan is a society that has rallied around the monarchy where the people`s Frst
responsibility is to be conscious of serving the King, the country and the people
(known as the concept of the tsawa sum). There has been visible change with the
introduction of democracy that has resulted in the emergence of winners and
losers in such a united society. Bhutanese today are learning to disagree and to
question even the authorities representing a real paradigm shift in public and social
behaviour.
4
Bhutanese contemporary society has been transformed from one in which
allegations of corruption and misappropriations of power, which were previously
shared through conversation, have now very quickly moved onto the print and
broadcast media, albeit with some degree of anonymity that is characteristic of
3 Stakeholders made their comments at a presentation oI fndings oI the Media Impact Study 2008
commissioned by the Royal Government oI Bhutan.
4 Both Media Impact Studies 2003 and 2008 show that people generally do not question government
decisions and media reports. This is due partly to a general acceptance that what the government
and media do are in people`s interest. These are largely the views oI a less literate section oI the
society.
154
a small society. A Media Impact Study commissioned by the Royal Government
of Bhutan in 2008 shows that people in general appreciate the medias newfound
courage and its watchdog role in Bhutan.

Bhutanese society has very quickly come to recognise that media are a powerful
and important institution in a democracy but many in the bureaucracy and even
among the elected leaders, for example, lack understanding of how media work.
Meanwhile the accuracy and professional maturity of the media professionals are
being questioned as a poorly trained media community takes on a major task.
The Media and Bhutanese Society
Bhutan has become a far more transparent and open society, partly due to the
medias growing openness in covering the opposing voices in parliament and
society at large. The live coverage on TV of sessions of the parliament, particularly
the National Assembly, have enabled Bhutanese everywhere to understand what
their elected members are doing and how the new democracy is taking shape
through the initial discussions in parliament.
Society is also witnessing situations o connict as the media`s oices become
increasingly critical along with the nation-building role that is characteristic of
media in many developing societies. But the perspective of media coverage needs
to expand. While the media hold institutions of democracy to account they also
indulge in increasing celebrity and trivia coverage. Media do not question the
dominance of global capitalism and the free enterprise market system, visible in
private sector development, including the media themselves.
5

Given Bhutans unique approach to change and development, the media need to
uphold traditional national values against the background of political, economic,
cultural, and social change. The philosophy of Gross National Happiness provides
the broad perspective for national development. In the GNH perspective democracy
is not a goal that can be reached one day but a path to good governance which
means a source of good values. The new political system is, therefore, regarded as
5 Media in Bhutan rarely challenge the dominance oI capitalism. Media should introduce this
discourse and use the same critical lens to view anything that is new in Bhutan`s social, economic,
and political landscape. This is important in view oI Bhutan`s larger goals oI Gross National
Happiness. Bhutanese media need to raise the level oI consciousness and understanding oI
economics and the market Iorces in a developing society that aspires to equity and happiness Ior its
citizens.
155
the means to good goernance, one o the our pillars o GNl identiFed by the
government. The other three are conservation of the environment, sustainable
socio-economic development, and promotion of culture.
The Bhutanese media have been and must continue to be sensitive in their
coerage o the institution o monarchy. 1he institution ulFls all the positie
qualities that Hegel propounds (see Mark Thompsons paper) where kingship
represents institutional continuity, national culture, and embodies the unity of the
state. Bhutans kingship goes a step further as the guardian of GNH.
Media and Monarchy
Tales of dharma Kings abound in oral history and the scriptures found in the
Indo-Tibetan region. Although Bhutanese kingship is not derived from divine
authority, many Bhutanese believe the King is synonymous with enlightened
beings, or Bodhisattavas, whose sole purpose is to serve the people after having
attained wisdom and compassion.
6

The Bhutanese believe that the fourth King of Bhutan is a reincarnation of a
reered Buddhist saint. le is not just the national ather Fgure but also the spiritual
guardian of the nations religious heritage. The medias portrayal of monarchy
supports the symbol of a wise and compassionate King in the service of his
people. The royal family is often depicted in the media as supporting spiritual
institutions and the well-being of the poor and needy.
It is perhaps no exaggeration to say that many peoples psyches mirror another
time and era, when the Bhutanese system was characterised by a Fdelity between
the Monarch and his subjects. The people offered the Monarch their reverence
and loyalty and the Monarch was responsible for the well-being of the people and
provided for all their basic needs. The fact that it was the throne that introduced
democracy adds to this aura of an enlightened leadership; it was only the Monarch
who could have even enforced such a policy.
So it is not surprising that Bhutanese medias approach towards coverage of the
Monarchy verges on being extremely reverential, to the point of being highly
6 In the context oI Buddhist teaching, a King`s purpose in liIe is to enlighten himselI and set an
example Ior citizens, and then to enlighten his people through education so that they may attain
wisdom and compassion.
156
sel-regulated. 1his is a renection o the psyche o Bhutanese society which is
respectul o the royal amily. lence, reporting on the Monarchy renects the deep
reverence and respect that society has nurtured.
The Bhutanese media mirrors the changing society the media appear to have
intuitively adjusted their coverage of the roles of the two Kings, the fourth King
of Bhutan and His Majesty the King, which changed almost overnight.
The Bhutanese media (at the time, the newspaper Kuensel and BBS) often portrayed
the fourth Druk Gyalpo as an executive King - discussing development plans and
priorities and minute details of the national budget (a western journalist described
him as a master consultant). The King was businesslike and yet mingled with
the people. le was most relaxed with people ater oFcial meetings, sering them
food and drinks in the lunch he traditionally hosted after each district meeting. The
fourth Druk Gyalpo was frequently photographed with the people, most often
with children and youth, because he spent long hours with students. Since the early
1990s, when the power of the media was recognised, the Kings speeches were
broadcast live and reproduced regularly.
7

Shortly beore Bhutan launched a military operation in 2003 to nush out Indian
militants illegally camped on Bhutanese soil, the fourth King visited the South and
addressed the people, the armed forces, and the country. TV viewers watched,
riveted, clinging onto every word of their King. In a series of meetings the King
and the government had repeatedly asked the militants to leave Bhutan. Just before
the military operation, the weekly Kuensel reported on the growing tension and
the possibility of military operations. The operation itself was covered cautiously
by the Bhutanese media but became a more sensational story once it hit the
Indian press. The King was depicted as a Bodhisattva
8
by the Bhutanese media and
as a war hero by the Indian press. What was most remarkable was the fourth
Kings command that there be no national celebrations even after a successful
military operation. Thus, an occasion that many leaders would have used to build
7 The Kuensel newspaper was a newspaper oI record as it was the only media where the King`s
speeches were documented, oIten verbatim. With the rapid transitions to democracy, there is to this
day a practise oI reproducing the King`s speeches to the nation, or to the National Assembly as a
supplement.
8 Bodhisattva a Sanskrit term to describe persons with the mind oI enlightenment` who, recognising
the suIIerings oI the world, decide to work Ior the enlightenment oI all beings.
157
national pride or patriotism went by quietly, without major fanfare, and the troops
and volunteers returned home without celebrations. The media reported on the
outcome but without the usual hype and emotion that would usually surround such
stories. For the people of Bhutan their King was truly a wise and compassionate
leader who was orced into a situation o connict.
As BBS began live radio and television coverage of the fourth Kings addresses to
his people during the last years of his reign, his words often moved the people to
tears. Both the Kings of Bhutan are shy of the media, in particular of TV. They
have never granted an interview to a TV programme, at least not in Bhutan. And,
unlike Thailand, the media do not provide daily news on the monarchy unless there
is a major event.
The media coverage of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck heightened the aura of the
Monarch. When His Majesty was able to reach out live to the nation, the people
watched and listened. The images of the King laughing and playing games with the
people during the National Day celebrations were viewed with awe.
The transition of Monarchs was also broadcast live on December 17th, 2007,
during the celebrations that signalled the start of the centenary celebrations of the
monarchy in Bhutan and the countdown to the general election in March, 2008.
BBS 1V proided lie coerage as the ourth King, or the Frst time in the history
of Kings, arrived early to receive the chief guest. People who saw the fourth Druk
Gyalpo walk down the path, avoiding the red carpet in reverence to his son, were
overcome with emotion. On the arrival of His Majesty the King the two Kings
lowered their scarves to each other in traditional greeting. It was a historic moment
of transition that strengthened the Bhutanese monarchy and continuity of the
institution in the minds of the people.
King Jigme Khesar Namgyal Wangchuck carries the same aura but, by contrast,
the media depict the young Monarch in more relaxed and social situations. The
King has introduced a new closeness with the people and is often seen with his
arms comfortably around the old and the young, often hugging and kissing little
children. The live coverage of the coronation celebrations in 2008 captured this
intimacy and, at the same time, conveyed the new informal role of the monarchy
in the new democratic system. His Majestys charisma has also extended beyond
the borders. 1he King`s acebook site has more than 5,000 ans, a signiFcant
proportion o them rom 1hailand, where lis Majesty made an oFcial isit in
2007 to celebrate 60 years of the King of Thailands reign.
158
The new Kings natural oratorical skill and his moving addresses have created
powerful TV imagery. One of the most moving moments was His Majestys
address to the Bhutanese people during the national day of 2008.
Throughout my reign I will never rule you as a King. I will protect you
as a parent, care for you as a brother and serve you as a son. I shall give
you everything and keep nothing; I shall live such a life as a good human
being that you may Fnd it worthy to sere as an example or your children,
I hae no personal goals other than to ulFl your hopes and aspirations.
I shall always serve you, day and night, in the spirit of kindness, justice
and equality.
The 2008 televised programmes on the coronation and centenary celebrations was
a large-scale media event that attracted 146 foreign journalists, more than the 127
journalists who came to coer the Frst general elections.
9
The live coverage, held
over the four days of celebrations, replaced the normal TV programming and
helped reaFrm the centrality o the monarchy to Bhutan`s new democracy.
It was in October 2007 that His Majesty shared his vision and mandate for Bhutan.
His Majestys address to the graduates that year was broadcast live on TV. His
Majestys mandate Peace, Security, and Prosperity for Bhutan, achieving the goals
of Gross National Happiness, and building a vibrant democracy rang out clearly
in a speech that inspired many of the younger generation.
Apart rom more sombre moments at other oFcial unctions and in parliament
the images of the new King are best recorded in remote parts of the country
where he appears to be completely at home.
His Majesty spent several weeks travelling the country in 2008, and again in 2009
when he visited Eastern Bhutan. In a candid moment in Kurtoe district His Majesty
requested a woman whose family was associated with the local belief in poison-
givers to serve him a drink.
10
This one moment, made public by the media, helped
9 Figures Irom BICMA
10 The report stated that despite the advice oI a local guide, His Majesty took two cups oI ara (local
brew) oIIered by a 49 year old woman who was greeting the royal entourage. His Majesty gave her
a hug and told her to tell the world that she had served the King oI Bhutan and that the belieI in
poison-givers was baseless. Other members oI the entourage then Iollowed His Majesty`s example
and drank ara Irom the woman who has been ostracised Irom society Ior almost 20 years Ior having
159
to eradicate the stigma associated with such families in the East and was a powerful
reminder of how monarchy can be a positive force to break down negative views
and beliefs.
The media continue to provide coverage of His Majestys treks in the wilderness,
showing him going into homes and engaging with people of all ages. His Majestys
coronation coverage showed him truly a King of the people at ease with his people.
The three days of live coverage showed His Majestys fondness for socialising and
his stamina in meeting every single person who lined the roads and footpaths to
greet their Monarch. His Majesty showed a particular regard for the elderly and had
a kind word for every person who came to offer him the ceremonial white scarf.
His Majesty has also reinforced his role as the provider of care and welfare. There
are two royal oFces, one in Bumthang and the other in Mongar, headed by lis
Majestys sisters, whose responsibilities are to study the needs of the people in the
areas. This is an attempt to take welfare to the people; in keeping with the privacy
accorded to the royal family the media has done little reporting on the progress of
these oFces.
Monarchy and National Identity
The monarchy in Bhutan, described as the symbol of national unity, plays a strong
role in deFning the Bhutanese identity. \hereer the Monarch traels, the media
coverage emphasises his place among the people and his concern for their well-
being (kidu).
The bureaucracy, the executive, judiciary, and legislature and indeed all other
institutions are being critically watched and questioned, but when it comes to the
monarchy the Bhutanese media, by and large, remain loyal subjects. Most Bhutanese
today are royalists at heart. The population does not see a contradiction between
loyalty to the monarchy and being a citizen in a constitutional democracy. The
manner in which the Bhutanese media portray both the monarchy and democracy
is understood to be critical for the success of Bhutanese democracy. Here there
is much that Bhutan can learn from its neighbours, notably Thailand and Nepal.
The media must be objective and not just jump into a confrontational role. In an
emerging democracy media also have the vital responsibility of educating people
inherited the power to poison people (Kuensel).
160
about democratic governance and about their own roles as citizens. They need to
be conscious of the central role of the King and the credibility of the institution
of the monarchy. As in many other countries recent events covered by TV in
Bhutan have reinforced the role of Bhutans monarchy as the symbol of national
identity. Bhutans strong traditional culture will probably not permit the media to
intrude into the personal daily life of the Monarch in the immediate future. The
world has learnt how this has destroyed not just the mystery of monarchy but also
reduces it to mere celebrity status elsewhere.
11

At the same time Bhutans media have been discreet about the monarchy and the
royal family to the point of not providing adequate information. Many people,
for example, do not recognise younger members of the royal family including His
Majestys own siblings. News on the royal family is almost negligible.
Old Culture in a New Society
When discussing the role and trends in the Bhutanese media we need to understand
the culture of Bhutanese society and the sentiments of the people the educated
elite as well as the people in rural areas.
1here is an ingrained reerence or the Kings and spiritual Fgures, and, thereore,
there is extreme sensitivity about their printed pictures. People, especially in rural
areas, do not throw away a newspaper that had a picture of the King or a senior
monk or deity printed in its pages. They would be upset if they found such pages
desecrated. The practice is to burn these papers and pictures.
Media in 2008 released numerous supplements, publications, and programmes
on the royal family, in particular tracing the contributions of the Kings to the
development of Bhutan, to mark the centenary of monarchy. Many people across
Bhutan suggested that media minimise the use of such pictures, particularly in the
advertisements and supplements, as it hurt their sentiments to see others using the
paper to wrap books and other things. Younger Bhutanese, however, felt that the
media tended to become repetitious by using the same pictures of the royal family
over and over (MIS 2008).
Coverage of His Majestys tour of Eastern Bhutan after an earthquake in
September, 2009, show many touching moments of a King with his people in
11 See Hugh O`Donnell`s paper, "Media, Monarchy, and the Management oI OIfcial Memory".
161
the aftermath of a natural calamity that damaged many homes and facilities. A
newspaper editorial noted the important role of the King in Bhutan: People may
question the transition to democracy gifted by the fourth Druk Gyalpo but no
Bhutanese will question the monarchy. Unwavering trust and respect will always
reside in the monarchy.
12
The open displays of affection for the King are genuine. This tone of love and
respect for His Majesty, while a common sentiment in Bhutan, is so strong when
expressed in the media that it could appear to lack credibility to people who are not
Bhutanese.
13
A Royal OFce o Media was established in 2008 as the oFcial liaison
oFce or media on royal amily matters.
The values of Gross National Happiness are a legacy of the Bhutanese system.
Bhutans media have to keep GNH alive at a time when Bhutanese are being
bombarded by global images - Bollywood and Hollywood and all the commercials
in between. A signiFcant challenge today arises rom the act that entertainment
is beginning to outweigh the information and education. The Media Impact Study
2008 shows that people today tend to go to media for entertainment compared
with 2003 when they sought media for news and information.
The media today, particularly the use of the internet and mobile phones, are
breaking down the hierarchy o inormation now where inormation tended to
now rom the central goernment, or example, to the periphery. 1he internet
is providing a tidal wave of raw information and users of the internet have yet
to learn how to process and assess the reliability of such information. Internet
forums have also become the most vibrant forums on issues concerning Bhutan.
And, as they become more popular, a blog established by the opposition leader is
one of the better known in Bhutans emerging blogo-sphere.
12 "The People`s King" an Editorial in Bhutan Times, November 1st, 2009, written as Bhutan
celebrated the frst anniversary oI the coronation oI the King. The editorial states: 'Journalism in
essence is about objectivity. It is about being stern about a story sans sentimentality. Bhutan defes
all set notions because we are diIIerent. A journalist is sent to get a story about the King and she
comes back all teary-eyed. That is because nowhere in the world will a journalist see images oI a
King cooking meals Ior school children or making his bed in a kitchen.
13 There is a widely diIIering tone that newspapers use in reporting on the newly elected political
leaders and the bureaucracy, and the Monarchy on the other. One is critical and verging on the
sensational, while the monarchy is reported in a tone oI respect and even awe. A visiting media
observer remarked that it seems diIfcult to understand how the two widely diIIering approaches
can be Iound in the same newspaper.
162
There is an absence of a forum of credible and alternative voices - people tend
to shy away from sharing opinions on blogs. On the other hand, many news
stories are emerging to be more opinions than objective news, at a time when the
audience has yet to learn to differentiate between opinion and news. The challenge
today is that, in a generally traditional society where knowledge used to lie with
seniors or the educated elite, it is hard for the community to accept strong and
unsubstantiated opinion pieces from relatively young and inexperienced writers
in the media, particularly when they replace news, which is meant to be objective,
fair, and balanced.
14
Bhutanese TV is limited to one national channel compared with the aerial invasion
of more than 190 global channels bringing in the worlds commercialism and
entertainment to the remotest homes in Bhutan. Children, who had learnt values
from their parents and families, are now tuning in to global values on TV without
haing had time to acquire the Flters that other cultures hae deeloped oer the
Fe decades since 1V was introduced to the world.
Society is yet to understand the difference between news, opinion, advertising, and
entertainment.
The traditional respect for the written word is still strong among those who have
not gone to school. People have not learnt to question the reliability of news and
information, and believe that anything in print must be right. The reporters are
all educated so who am I to question what they write? is a familiar comment from
people in farming communities outside the main towns.
The Media Impact Study 2008 also shows that people generally accept stories
about the government to be true since there is no reason for the government to
misinform the people. A political party worker in the valley of Phobjikha says:
This is our government, why should our government lie to us? (MIS 2008).
There is a growing recognition of the need to scale up media literacy for all levels of
society, including elected leaders and all sections o oFcialdom. Media literacy is a
14 This is a problem with young and new media. To overcome this initial challenge, Bhutanese media
must work harder to establish their credibility through objective news reporting and gain their
audience`s trust beIore launching into opinion articles posturing as news. Similarly, the Bhutanese
audience needs to learn the diIIerence between news and opinions and how to judge the reliability
oI news.
163
vital need in a small and rapidly changing society faced with a deluge of information
and media. There is an acute lack of Bhutanese content and programming that
could give Bhutanese society a real sense of the new political developments and
understanding of what citizens can do to be a part of this new democracy. At
this juncture, Bhutanese media must do more to encourage questions and debate
to ensure that peoples views are heard. Media must also provide more public
space for discussion about the democratic constitutional monarchy that everyone
is collectively responsible for shaping.
Monarchy Supports Media
The advent of democracy has spurred the growth of media. In the months
preceding the general elections, millions of Ngultrum were poured into the
development of media messages, campaigns, and campaign speeches on TV,
radio, and newspapers. At one stage, driven by a misguided sense of equity, the
authorities ensured equal amounts of funding for all media regardless of their
reach or content. The understanding of advertising and media content has grown
in the past year and government policy is becoming more professional. Newspapers
are becoming more competitive with more newspapers emerging in a free market
situation hoping to capture a niche readership.
It is noteworthy that Bhutans monarchy has been a prime mover in supporting
the independence of media in Bhutan. In 1992 the fourth King of Bhutan issued
a decree that gave the national broadcaster (then the BBS radio) and the only
newspaper, the weekly Kuensel, editorial independence, although they were funded
by the government.
BBS has since become a public service broadcaster that introduced TV in 1999.
Kuensel is now 51% government owned, with 49% sold to private shareholders,
and has an independent editorial policy free of government control. Government
policy supports the free and professional growth of the media and the government
provides incentives to support media growth.
The media today have grown to six newspapers (the latest, a weekly newspaper
launched in December, 2009,, a woman`s magazine, Fe radio stations ,that
includes three FM stations and one university radio station), and one TV network
(with potentially 190 international channels). All this developed within a span of
three years spurred by the advent of democracy. More applicants are waiting to
start media services for a population of 679,000 with a 59% literacy rate.
164
In 2009 the third sitting of the parliament of the new democratic constitutional
monarchy began with the parliament deciding that BBS TV should no longer
provide live broadcast of the discussion of bills although all other sessions were
permitted to be telecast lie. A reason gien is that the 1V cameras innuence
their conduct and the MPs end up pandering to TV rather than focusing on the
debates.
15
By the end of the parliament session three weeks later, His Majesty, in
his closing address to parliament, stated that he would support the professional
development of media in Bhutan:
Media - newspapers, television, radio and the Internet - must play a very
important role. I appreciate that while some of the media agencies are
young and lack adequate resources they have strived to perform their
duties with complete commitment. Hereafter, media will be vital in
keeping people well informed and in encouraging debate and participation
key to a vibrant democracy (Kuensel 31st July, 2009).
On February 21st, 2010, His Majesty signed a royal decree that launched a Bhutan
Media Foundation to support the growth of a strong, responsible media. His
Majestys decree stated:
In our small nation media can be even more effective in encouraging
debate and participation, vital to building a vibrant democracy...As it is
my sacred duty to ensure the success of our young democracy, I have
decided, through the exercise of my Royal Prerogative of Kidu,
16
to
strengthen media agencies so that they may carry out their duties, without
fear or favour, in the interest of democracy (Royal Kasho granted on the
21st of February, 2010).
The Bhutan Media Foundation, endowed with an initial grant of Nu. 15 million from
His Majesty, will provide fellowships and grants to support media development.
15 Some people believe that it was the ruling party`s way oI not showing up` the un-preparedness
oI their members in parliament. Others saw it as a breach oI the Ireedom oI inIormation, although
many recognise that Parliament sittings in many countries are not carried 'live except Ior specifc
sessions.
16 Kidu is a term that is loosely translated as 'welIare, and is generally used as a term to describe
support.
165
To Build a Democratic Culture
Media are young and at a critical juncture where they must discuss and understand
the critical role they play in Bhutans political future. Today there is an urgent
need for media, and Bhutanese society, to be involved in discussions on the
responsibilities of the media and the need to build a democratic culture.
The Bhutanese peoples vision of Bhutan continues to place the institution
of monarchy at the centre of the system. It symbolises peace and stability for
the nation, and the Monarch has the unique role of being the guardian of the
Constitution and guardian of Gross National Happiness. As head of state the
Monarch personiFes the deep Buddhist alues o wisdom and compassion and
the high ideal that must become the strength of Bhutanese politics. The prime
minister described the Monarch as the moral force of the Bhutanese system.
The Bhutanese media have the responsibility to help build a democratic culture
at a time when the country is making the complex transition from an absolute
monarchy to a democratic constitutional monarchy. In this new political landscape
the media have the responsibility to provide a new way of seeing Bhutan as an
imagined community (Anderson), and to create a new shared consciousness.
In a fundamentally hierarchical society media have to continue to explore ways to
be more democratic without losing the tradition of respect that characterise the
society. The Media Impact Study 2008, for example, raises this point when focus
group discussions show that viewers may like the new broadcast programmes
that offer opportunities to question key institutions and persons, but remark that
journalists seem to lack respect or senior oFcials and elders in their interiews
and their tone of voice.
Bhutanese media are experiencing a contradiction in terms of the inherent
traditional respect for elders in society, and the questioning of persons in position
o innuence that is required in a democracy. One can argue that there should be
respect or the democratic oFces, or example, but the persons in oFce will need
to earn the respect of the people in this new democratic environment. In the case
of the monarchy it is without doubt that people continue to uphold tremendous
respect for both the institution and the King in person.
Reporters are pushing hard to report on the new political landscape but they are
not doing enough to enable Bhutanese to understand this new transitioning society.
166
While our media continue to expand they are not able to keep pace with covering
the numerous rapid developments taking place in governance, and in society.
Bhutans politics have become far more complex than before. The introduction of
democracy has brought about a whole new way of thinking that is being played
out in the parliament, in the halls of government, among the business community
and on the farms. Journalists today need to understand everything from the role
of the King to the concept of the state and the government, from the concerns of
the villager to the concerns of youth who make up 54% of the population. They
need to dig deeper into the foundations of a democratic constitutional monarchy.
Media have to ask more probing questions about the way society is and the way
it is changing. Bhutanese today need greater transparency in every aspect of life
- we need to understand the new economy, the new society, the new politics and
the changing culture. How will all this make a difference to our lives and move us
closer to the goal of Gross National Happiness? Media must play the dual role of
pointing out what is working well and being a public watchdog at the same time.
And this is a challenge in a young democracy.
Bhutan is currently in the midst of building a democratic culture and nothing
before this has prepared us for the roles we all play as citizens, as leaders, and as
media.
As Bhutan makes the transition the aerage Bhutanese Fnd themseles making the
shift, by royal command, from being the subjects of their King to being citizens in
a democracy. This is part of the process of creating a democratic culture.
1he media need to deFne their own role in this process and nurture and expand
the discourse involving other sections of society. Like the higher ideals that have
historically driven journalism, media must be motivated by a sense of wanting to
make a positive change.
Bhutanese people call the socio-political system the Bhutanese system to
emphasise this uniqueness and the media needs to continue to report on the
institution of monarchy with sensitivity. The media should go beyond rhetorical
political coverage and avoid the sensationalism or trivialisation seen in some
countries where the royal family make celebrity news or are icons and souvenirs
167
for tourists. The media do not just report on the institution but also strengthen
the credibility and create the image of the institution of monarchy. Media should,
therefore, be constantly conscious and enhance the awareness of the people of
the importance of the royal institution, and a democratic constitutional monarchy.
For a small country that believes its strength lies in the uniqueness of its national
identity, the media must play an important role in creating a shared national
consciousness that must be translated into shared national values as the foundation
on which Bhutans democratic constitutional monarchy will grow.
Siok Sian Pek-Dorji is the Lxecutive Director of the Bhutan Centre for
Media and Democracy.
References
Diamond, Larry Jay. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins UP, 1999. Print.
Diamond, Larry Jay. The Spirit of Democracy: the Struggle to Build Free Societies
throughout the World. New York: Times /Henry Holt and, 2008. Print.
Kovach, Bill, and Tom Rosenstiel. The Elements of Journalism: What Newspeople
Should Know and the Public Should Expect. New York: Crown, 2001. Print.
Mats, Lkstrom. Research on Media and Democracy, Renections on Changes and
Challenges. Nordicom Journal. Print.
"Media and Public Culture", Proceedings of the Second International Seminar on
Bhutan Studies. Publication. Centre for Bhutan Studies, 2007. Print.
Pek-Dorji, Siok Sian. The Legacy of a King: the Fourth Druk Gyalpo Jigme
Singye Wangchuck. Thimphu: Dept. of Tourism, 2007. Print.
Royal Government of Bhutan. Ministry of Information and Communications.
Deparment of Information and Media. Media Impact Study 2008.
Thimphu, 2008. Print.
Royal Government of Bhutan. Ministry of Information and Communications.
Mediadom, Media Impact Study 2003. By S. S. Pek. Thimphu, 2003.
Print.
168
Saul, John Ralston. Voltaires Bastards: the Dictatorship of Reason in the West. New
York: Free, 1992. Print.
Wangchuk, Dorji. Royal Gesture Dispels Stigma. Kuensel [Thimphu] 21 Apr.
2009. Print.
Zakaria, Fareed. The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. New
York: W.W. Norton &, 2003. Print.
169 169
Bhutans Democratic Constitutional
Monarchy: Revisiting Kingship and
Democratic Transition Theories
Sonam Kinga
12
Introduction
On 9
th
December 2006 King Jigme Singye Wangchuck, the fourth King of
Bhutan, abdicated to make way for the enthronement of the Crown Prince and
the introduction of parliamentary democracy. He had announced a year earlier that
he would abdicate before 2008.
1
Against everyones expectation that the abdication
might happen in 2007, he did so a year earlier at the height of his power, fame,
and success, after ruling for 34 years. He was only 51 years old, although the
constitution, which was drafted under his command (issued in 2001), requires a
King to abdicate only at the age of 65.
His abdication was not triggered by any crisis. It was neither a consequence of
military coup, internal uprising, international pressure, nor usurpation by his
successor. It was oluntary. In public perception he has made a huge sacriFce
to empower the people by introducing parliamentary democracy. It was not
uncommon among the people and media to draw a parallel between him and
King Drime Kunden, a legendary Buddhist King who made sacriFce and charity a
lifelong concern. He gave up his Kingdom and even his family. The notion of the
King sacriFcing his power to empower the people imbued Bhutan`s democratic
transition with a strong moral dimension. By giving away the Kings right to rule,
the monarchys moral right to reign has been reinforced. The institution of
monarchy has been strengthened.
When I say that the introduction of democracy has strengthened the institution of
monarchy, I do not suggest that the King has retained powers of governance and
1 He made this public announcement in Tashi Yangtse Dzongkhag in eastern Bhutan during his
address on Bhutan`s national day, which is celebrated on 17 December every year. The national day
marks the Iounding oI the monarchy in 1907.
170
the right to interfere in everyday politics. He had already stepped aside to be the
head of state in historic political reforms in 1998 by handing over executive power
to a cabinet elected by a legislature, two-third of whose members were directly
elected by the people. By this, he has suggested the idea of state and government
as separate entities. His abdication and introduction of democracy reinforced that
idea of separation. The Constitution tries to draw this distinction by calling the
state gyal kham
2
and government as zhung. However, many people do not think
along the lines of this conceptual distinction. In their understanding, the king has
given away his powers to the people. Exercising that power by voting to elect a
government was felt to be a responsibility, not so much a right. It was not unusual
to hear around election time thus, His Majesty has given his powers to us. Now
it is our responsibility (gen khur) to decide on which button we should press our
thumbs.
The subsequent discourse on democracy came to centre on the idea of it as a
gift from the King. This is a very powerful discourse in the context of Bhutanese
society that identiFes the King as the source o justice and welare. In popular
parlance, he is referred to as drinchen gi pham ("benevolent parent") or kidu gi pham
,"parent o welare",. \e Fnd the echo o such a notion een in the King`s own
public pronouncement. In his coronation speech on 1 November 2008 the new
,and Fth, King said, 1hroughout my reign I will neer rule you as a King. I will
protect you as a parent, care for you as a brother and serve you as a son. This is
suggestive of a national community conceived in the image of a larger family with
the King at the centre.
The strengthening of monarchy through the introduction of democracy creates
an interesting paradox that posits a challenge to academic discourse which sees
the possibility of democratisation only in the context of monarchy receding as
constitutional sovereign. Foremost among these proponents is Benedict Anderson
who declared; For in fundamental ways, serious monarchy lies transverse to all
modern conceptions of political life (1983: 19). Anderson did not advance the
idea that monarchy and democracy were conceptually binary opposites. What he
did imply, however, was that they were tenable only with the Monarch as ceremonial
sovereign head. According to him, monarchy is antique and sacral, and draws its
2 Gyal kham is translated as "state in the Constitution". Literally, it means "the realm oI the King".
I fnd the translation problematic since the realm oI the King includes everything (even the
government) and thereIore does not distinguish between state and government.
171
Bhutans Democratic Constitutional Monarchy: Revisiting Kingship and Democratic Transition
Theories
legitimacy from divinity and not from populations (ibid). To survive in the twenty-
Frst century, monarchies must make the necessary transition to democracy.
In a paper presented at Ryukoku University, Japan,
3
he suggests that monarchies are
relics of the past. The fact that they have survived thus far is strange. He believes
that those strange monarchies that survived did so because they managed to be on
the winning side of the world wars or remained neutral, adapted to nationalism in
time, accommodated the principles of democratisation and aligned with new social
groups especially the middle class people. For monarchies to survive, he argues
that they must make the necessary transition to constitutional monarchy just as
they did in Europe between 1809 and 1875.
I contend that his arguments are focussed on monarchies that pre-date the
twentieth century and draw legitimacy from divine rights. To argue that monarchy
is antique and can survive only by making the transition to constitutional monarchy
is to argue against any idea of monarchies forming in a modern age dissociated
from divinity and becoming a relevant political organisation. Bhutans monarchy
problematises this argument precisely because it came into being by discarding an
ecclesiocratic institution of succession that depended on multiple reincarnations
to rule as sovereigns (Kinga 2009: 158-173).
4
It does so because it was formed in
the twentieth century and drew legitimacy from a contract (see below) signed in
190 between the ounding Monarch and oFcials who represented` the people
of different regions of the country. Moreover, it has been the source and agency
of modern socio-economic development and political reforms for nearly half a
century. Whereas European monarchies gave way to nationalism and the formation
of modern nation-states in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and accepted
being mere ceremonial heads, the Bhutanese monarchy became central to the
conception and formation of the modern Bhutanese state, and not marginal to it.
1he 1wo-Body 1heory of the King
We must look at King Jigme Singye Wangchucks abdication not in isolation but
in conjunction with the constitutional provision that a King must step down at
3 "UseIul or Useless Relics: Today`s Strange Monarchies" (2006).
4 Bhutan as a national polity was Iounded in the 17th century by Zhabdrung Rinpoche. It was his
reincarnations who were enthroned as successive sovereigns oI the country. Although he had
body, speech and mind reincarnations, it was the mind reincarnations that were Iavoured to rule
as sovereigns. On the other hand, there were occasions when the reincarnations oI Zhabdrung
Rinpoche`s son, Gyalse Jampel Dorji were also enthroned. Similarly, the reincarnations oI his halI
brother known as Gyalse Tenzin Rabgye also served as sovereigns oI Bhutan at diIIerent times.
172
the age of 65. The suggestion is that a King would still be healthy and able when
he retires. This contrasts with an image of a King who retires or dies in old age
from ill health or sickness. What the Kings abdication and constitutional provision
suggest is the distinction between a mortal, corporeal body of the King and non-
material, continuing body-politic of the King. I draw this from Kantorowiczs two-
body theory o the King. Beore I elaborate on this theory, I wish to renect on
Frazers (1972) theory of kingship. He posits that a King or his surrogate must be
sacriFced or remoed beore his physical degeneration endangers the health o
the kingdom and cosmos since their well-being is identiFed with the King`s bodily
perfection. The King is also said to embody all the sins and evils of his subject
and, therefore, he carries them away in the traditional ritual of scape-goating. The
Hocartian theory (1969) sees kingship as a form of ritual rather than a political
organisation. The kingdom is thought of as a realm of prosperity realised by
obsering traditional rules to perorm repetitie sacriFcial rituals. Kingship is
regenerated as rituals remoe pollution and deFlement.
In the last one hundred years of its existence the Bhutanese monarchy did not
create any ritual that has to do speciFcally with it or which was its exclusie
preserve. There are Buddhist rituals, such as sipa chidoe or jana chidoe, in which
sacriFcial eFgies o the King and Je Khenpo, the supreme Buddhist leader, are
made and disposed. They are intended to remove misfortunes and obstacles in life.
These rituals require many resources and only wealthy patrons can sponsor them.
A patron can hae his or her eFgy made or scape-goating`. State-sponsored
rituals also hae eFgies o a man and woman representing the people in the
country. 1hereore, these rituals are neither speciFc to kingship nor are they
performed at regular intervals. The Bhutanese kingship is not founded on any
such ritual. In contrast to Frazers argument that the King embodies all the sins
and evils of his subjects, the Bhutanese King is seen as the fruition or realisation
of the collective merit of all the people (saynam chithuen le drup pa). Similarly, the
Hocartian conception of kingship as a form of ritual contrasts with the Bhutanese
perception of kingship as a political organisation, holder of the diarchic spiritual
and temporal polity (choe sid lugnyi kyi tenpa zin mi). For both Frazer and Hocart,
kingship is associated with necessary rituals.
The abdication of King Jigme Singye Wangchuck and the constitutional provision
suggest that kingship need not be associated with old age and sickness. Whereas
Kings retire, kingship can continue. Thus, his abdication and the constitutional
173
Theories
retirement age for future Kings imply strengthening of the institution of monarchy.
Before the corporeal body gives way to old age, sickness, and death, kingship can
be continued by a younger, healthier heir. The Kings "body-natural" recedes to
give way to a continuing "body-politic". But rather than think of body-politic as
a divine continuum that Kantorozowicz draws in relation to medieval European
kingship, I think of it as the continuing institution of monarchy in the context of
Bhutan. This is not to undermine the importance and agency of individual Kings,
whose role and innuence cannot be isolated rom the institution o monarchy.
Each reinforces the other. Through his act of abdication, King Jigme Singye
Wangchuck has strengthened the institution of monarchy. In other words, by
relinquishing the Kings legal right to rule, he has reinforced the monarchys moral
right to reign. Democracy has been deFned in relation to kingship and ounded on
the body-politic of the King, not in place of it.
It is within this framework of the Kings body-politic or the monarchy as the site
of democracy that the subsequent parliamentary elections took place in Bhutan.
Bhutans democratic transition thus contests Andersons thesis that monarchy
must give way to democracy, and that the nation-state is the site of democracy.
Democratic Transition Theories
How do we then explain Bhutans democratic transition? Can mainstream
democratic transition theories that focus on institutions, elites, and formal
procedures explain it My contention is that they cannot suFciently explain
Bhutans democratic transition process. In order to show why this is so, I wish to
Frst discuss, albeit brieny, prealent democratic transition theories.
The two mainstream democratic transition theories are the structuralist and elite
bargain theories. Drawing from the early modernisation theory, the structuralists
argued that societies underwent progressive stages of development or
modernisation towards democracy ,Lipset 1959, Moore 1966,. 1hey hae to ulFl
many pre-conditions before they can become a democracy. Since the publication
of Seymour Martin Lipsets The Social Requisites of Democracy, political scientists
and scholars have built on the thesis of economic pre-conditions necessary for a
country to democratise. Lipset theorised that the rise in income among citizens as
well as the rise in GDP makes society move on the democratic path. Democracy
is post-development. Unless constitutional reforms and economic liberalisation
are well in place, democracy cannot be established. Although this thesis has been
contested ever since Rustow published his article "Transition to Democracy" (1970),
174
the idea has not been totally abandoned. Huntington (1984) went on to discuss
economic, social, external and cultural preconditions of democratisation. Zakaria
(2003: 69) argued that only "a country that attempts a transition to democracy
when it has a per capita GDP o between >3,000 and >6,000 will be successul".
The primary argument of the structuralists is that economic development creates
an alternative centre of power that is able to challenge state power. That is the
basis of democratic transition. In discussing this argument, Chadda summarises
her position as follows.
In their view, the development of a capitalist economy creates a rival
focus of power to the state. This is an essential precondition for the
development of individual freedom. Capitalism also creates a condition
in which these individuals are able to band together to attain political or
economic goalsDemocracy emerges as the best method of achieving
this goal. (2000: 5)
Not only was the structuralist theory very Euro-centric, its position began to lose
ground as poor countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe, which did not
meet the pre-conditions, began to democratise. Thus, a new group of scholars
following Rustow sought an alternative explanation to democratisation that came
to be known as the elite settlement or elite bargain theory (Linz 1997, Diamond
1990). Rather than socio-economic and cultural preconditions, these scholars
emphasised elite bargains and negotiations as causes of democratisation. Whereas
the structuralists see the struggle between established authorities and emergent
centres of powers generated by way of capitalism as the cause of democratisation,
the elite theorists see bargain or negotiation among existing centres of powers
as the cause of democratisation. The elite theorists contend that the elite in any
society are never homogenous. There are different groups of elites. Instead of
grabbing all power for themselves, these elites enter a process of negotiation to
make compromises on differences and bargain to share power. They agree on open
rules of competition for sharing power so that there is no forcible seizure of power
(Chadda 2000:6). Burton and Higley (1987) built on the elite settlement theory and
concluded that 1) elite settlements are relatively autonomous elite choices and thus
cannot be predicted or explained in terms of social, economic and cultural forces;
2, the consensually uniFed elite structure created by a settlement constitutes the
primary basis for subsequent political stability; which 3) is a necessary condition
for the emergence and sustained practice of representative democratic politics
(1987: 304).
175
Theories
Neither the structuralist nor the elite settlement theories can fully explain Bhutans
democratic transition. The structuralists arguments do not hold for Bhutan as
they did not for the poor countries in Latin America and Eastern Europe that
democratised during the third wave
5
. When Bhutan embarked on the path of
democratic transition, it did not ulFl those pre-conditions that the structuralists
identify. Firstly, Bhutan is still a least developed country. Its economy is largely
rural with 68% of the people engaged in subsistence farming. Although hydro-
electricity generation and tourism constitute the major economic activities in terms
of their contribution to GDP, Bhutan is far from being an industrial society. The
per capita income in 2006 was US >1,321, which is ar below the benchmark that
the structuralists they set. Nearly 30% of the people live below the poverty line.
Most of the poor live in rural areas.
Second, democracy was introduced in a social setting characterised by cultural
diversity. With over eighteen different ethno-linguistic groups constituting the
small Bhutanese population of only 634,000 people, there is neither the cultural
homogeneity nor the sort of linguistic uniformity that is deemed indispensable for
transparency in democratic dialogue and communications (Abizadeh 2002).
Third, the introduction of democracy was not a consequence of any elite bargain
or settlement process. Most of the traditional elites were part of the state. They
consisted of ministers and senior bureaucrats. But there were no other elite groups
in society with signiFcant powers or resources to challenge the state. 1he present
government consists of the prime minister and ten ministers. The prime minister
and four ministers were ministers in the previous government. Two former
ministers formed the opposition party although both of them resigned after losing
the elections. Two of the six new ministers of the present government were senior
bureaucrats. One was a major in the army. The Speaker of the National Assembly
was also a senior bureaucrat and a diplomat. Thus, many political actors in the
new political system were part of the previous government. The leadership largely
consists of former ministers and senior bureaucrats. It has been said that they are
like old wine in a new bottle. But there are also new political entrants. Thus there
has been no abrupt and total change in leadership. This provides enough space for
continuity and change. Hence, the democratic process in Bhutan was not triggered
by negotiations and compromises among different groups of existing elites to iron
out their differences.
5 Huntington dates the beginning oI "third wave" oI democratisation to 1974 (Huntington 1991).
176
Larry Diamond is a leading elite bargain theorist. In his latest work, The Spirit of
Democracy (2008), he moves beyond discussion on the role of elites to look at various
factors that trigger democratic transition. I wish to summarise his arguments to
show how they cannot explain Bhutans democratic transition.
The Internal Factors
1. Loss of Legitimacy
One of the most important internal factors that trigger the democratisation
process is the regimes loss of domestic legitimacy. The loss occurs when the
regime fails to deliver economic development or political performances: A crucial
reason is that authoritarian regimes lose domestic legitimacy when they ulFl their
self-proclaimed missions and become redundant - or when they completely fail
to do so and clearly cannot deliver. (Diamond 2008: 91) In his review of recent
theory and research on democratisation process, Shin (1994) makes the same
point. The most prominent domestic factor is the steady decline in the legitimacy
of authoritarian ruleUnable to meet new demands for political freedom and
participation, these regimes could no longer justify their existence. (Shin 1994:
152) The perception that the regime has lost legitimacy need not be that of the
people of a particular country. It could be shared by powerful states and global
public opinion.
2. Authoritarian Development
Just as the failure of authoritarian regimes to deliver, Diamond argues that the
successes of these regimes also trigger democratic transitions. This is to say that as
long as the regime is authoritarian, democratisation is inevitable irrespective of
the regimes success or failure. Successes in delivering economic development, and
therefore, raising income, education levels, access to information and particularly
the growth of a middle class push democratisation forward. It is the middle-class
intellectuals who become the agency for democratisation. But how?
3. Free Values
Economic development "alters a countrys social and economic structure, widely
dispersing power and resourcesit profoundly shifts attitudes and values in
democratic direction" (Diamond 2008: 98). Structurally, the middle class enlarges.
1hey become more independent Fnancially and intellectually rom traditional
patrons and sources of authority. Income disparities lessen which reduces social
distance, and political polarisation, between classes. The threat of excessive
177
Theories
taxation to an otherwise wealthy few is diminished. As more people earn greater
income and become politically more aware through education and access to
information, they become more inclined to participate in the political process.
Their democratic values change. These values include self-expression, tolerance,
suspicion of authority, and valuing of freedom. As a result they come to demand
institutions that protect their rights and freedom.
4. The Rise of Civil Society
The growth of middle class also translates to the formation of organisations and
associations or the acquisition of membership to them. These organisations grow
in numbers, resources, and sophistication enabling them to check and challenge
the state. This alters the balance of power from state to society. For civil society
to effect democratic transition, they must be able to mobilise themselves in order
to unite different political parties and disparate social classes into a movement.
Again Shin states: The strengthening of civil society is the second domestic factor
that has helped to remoe authoritarians rom oFce.1hey directly challenged
authoritarian regimes by pursuing interests that connicted with those o the regime
and eroded the capacity of authoritarian rulers to dominate and control their
societies (1994).
The External Factors
1. Peaceful Pressure
By external factors, Diamond refers to peaceful external pressure on an authoritarian
regime applied by way of diplomacy, economic assistance and sanctions. These
pressures overlap or converge. The effectiveness of diplomatic persuasions to
democratise depends on the regimes willingness to initiate political reforms in
exchange for economic aids. Aid is made conditional to political reforms. Where it
does not work, economic sanctions are imposed. Diamond is cognizant that these
factors have their limits and do not necessarily generate success all the time.
2. Democracy Assistance
Another external actor he identiFes is assistance or democracy. 1his includes
assistance to strengthen democratic institutions, civil society, monitoring of
elections, reforming governance, etc. Elections are the most important entry point
for democratic assistance.
178
[E]lections became the natural focal point for democracy assistance,
rom technical and Fnancial aid to the oFcial administration where new
democracies were emerging, to Fnancial support and training or ciil
society groups to educate and mobilise voters and monitor the vote; and
to international election observation teams to help scrutinize the conduct
of elections and detect and deter fraud. No form of international aid has
had a more dramatic and immediate effect, nor wider and more legitimate
participation. (Diamond 2008: 122-123)
Diamond maintains that democracy assistance has not been limited to elections
alone, but has been expanded to support elected parliament, local governments,
judiciary, etc. But the main form of democracy assistance was largely during and
after elections.
Making similar arguments, Shin again states that "democratic pressures from
other countries and assistance from international organisations have weakened
the physical basis of authoritarian rule by cutting off economic and military aid.
The pressures have weakened its moral basis by encouraging people to realise that
democratisation is the necessary ticket for membership in the club of advanced
nations" (1994).
3. Democratisation by Force
1his is the last resort or democratisation that external actors apply to a deFant
regime. The consequence is not always a democratised polity since a government
formed through external force and coercion faces challenge of legitimacy both by
the people at home and the international community.
The Regional Factors
Finally, Diamond attributes membership to regional organisations as a means
to democratic transition. Citing the European Union, and the Organisation of
American State and the Organisation of African Unity, he argues how the condition
o membership to these organisations innuences democratic reorms in candidate
countries. An important criterion for admission as members in such organisations
is for the candidate country to initiate democratic reforms, institute democratic
practices, respect fundamental rights of its people, and human rights. As part of
accession to these bodies, the countries have to prove that they are democratic.
179
Theories
The Bhutanese Exception
To support his arguments, Diamond draws most of his examples from Europe,
Latin America and Africa. When they are tested against the recent democratic
transition in Bhutan, they do not hold up.
The democratic transition in Bhutan was not triggered by any crisis of legitimacy.
Rather than suffer any decline in legitimacy, the Bhutanese monarchy has been very
successful in delivering socio-economic development as well as initiating political
reforms especially in the last three-and-a-half decades. Political reforms that
expanded decentralisation and popular participation in decision-making process
particularly in village societies have been the hallmark of the fourth Kings reign.
This period has been characterised by high increases in literacy rates, enhanced
access to basic social services, modernisation of transport and communications,
development of trade and industry, promotion of public education and mass
media, and improvement in living conditions.
Second, in contrast to Diamonds argument that the middle class push forward
the democratisation process, Bhutans small middle class largely consisting of civil
servants, corporate employees, and the business community have not been the
agency of dissent and democratisation.
Third, there has not been a growth of civil society to pose a challenge to state
power. This does not suggest the absence of civil society organisations. In contrast
to western notions of civil society as organisations and associations that stand in
opposition to the state, traditional civil society organisations in Bhutan existed
as voluntary organisations to support community life and activities (Dorji and
Choden 2005).
Fourth, the Bhutanese government was never under any international pressure
to democratise its political system. As I indicated above, Bhutan has already been
undergoing a steady process of decentralisation and democratisation for over
three decades. Only when the King issued his command to begin the drafting of
the constitution did some international agencies offer help in drafting it. That was,
however, politely regretted. As a least developed country, Bhutans development
partners provide important sources of investment capital and resources. The
domestic revenues are only enough to meet recurrent expenditures. Development
partners hae, howeer, neer used the leerage o their Fnancial aid to orce
180
any socio-economic and political change within Bhutan. Instead, all of them
hae constantly lauded the eFciency o the Bhutanese state to utilise aid and
comparatively achieve far better results.
Fifth, there were offers of democracy assistance after the elections. Before and
during the elections, the King commanded that all expenses for elections must
be met from internal resources. This was an important command to ensure that
the democratisation process, particularly the elections, remained free of external
pressure.
6
Finally, Bhutan is a founding member of a regional organisation called the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The SAARC charter does
not require its members to be democracies. Its primary objective is to promote
regional social, economic, and technical co-operations. Although it does mention
adherence to the UN charter, SAARC has never demanded that its members
democratise their political systems.
For these reasons, it is problematic to locate Bhutans democratic transition in
prevailing democratic theories. This is not to argue for a Bhutanese variant of
Asian-style democracy. Those who have considered the possibility of such a
democracy ,Zakaria 1994 and Neher 1994 or examples, renected the iews
of South East Asian leaders like Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahathir
Mohammed of Malaysia. This view centres on the Confucian communitarian
values such as respect for authority and placing priority of society over individuals.
Because Asian society and culture is different from that of the west, they argued
that western ideas of individual rights and democracy are not conducive for Asia.
These views have been contested. Hood (1998: 854) thinks that these regimes
are actually those which have failed to complete the transition to democracy. Lee
(2002) argues that if there is an alternative Asian model of democratisation, it
is the demonstrations and political protests that brought about democratisation
in countries such as the Philippines in 1986, South Korea in 1987, Indonesia in
1998, Mongolia between 1989-1990, Nepal in 1990, and Thailand between 1991-
1992. Lee draws a few common characteristics of these protests. First, they were
sparked off by students. Second, the middle class became the backbone of the
6 The only exception has been the assistance provided by the Government oI India in procuring
Electronic Voting Machines. The fnancial assistance provided by India has been used to purchase
the machines produced by an Indian company.
181
Theories
movement. Third, a pro-democracy organisation orchestrated the demonstrations
and protests. And fourth, these demonstrations never stopped until their demands
were met (2002: 833-835).
Conucianism is an attribute o Southeast Asian countries, which has a signiFcant
population of Chinese ethnicity or descent. But this is not true of Bhutan. In
the early 1990s, there were instances of demonstrations in southern parts of
the country. But they were largely attributed to immigrants from Nepal, who
had illegally settled in the country.
7
A nation-wide census in 1988 identiFed the
illegal immigrants and required them to leave. The states attempt to enforce its
citizenship and immigration laws were, however, contested as moves to enforce
certain cultural ideas and practices. The complexity surrounding this issue is not
the concern of this paper. However, to establish any causal link between these
sporadic demonstrations and the Kings democratisation efforts is problematic.
Foremost among them is the risk of being ahistorical. This would isolate the
events of 1990s from all the other political reforms in the previous decades.
Obviously, this is not tenable. In contrast to Lees arguments, these demonstrations
were neither launched by students nor supported by the middle class or any pro-
democracy organisation.
It would be, however, incorrect to think that political reforms in Bhutan which
culminated in the introduction of democracy took place in isolation of regional and
global events and processes. I suggest that developments within Bhutan took place
at a time of profound changes in the world. When King Jigme Dorji Wangchuck,
the third King began a process of political and socio-economic development and
modernisation of the country in 1953 and 1960-61, many Afro-Asian nations were
undergoing a period of decolonisation from imperial rule. The rulers in these
nations were confronted with the task of fashioning a state and the only immediate
model available to them was the European nation-state: "After all, that was the only
kind o Luropean state which the Frst generation post-colonial Asian and Arican
leaders had really known, Frst-hand, during the colonial period",Nandy 2006: 283,.
Bhutan was never a colony of any European power and I do not suggest that the
modernisation of the Kingdom took after a European model. Developments in
the region were more visible. For example, India and Pakistan won independence
in 1947. The Republic of China was proclaimed in 1949. The Rana regime came
to an end in Nepal in 1951. And in 1959, Tibet was occupied by China. There is
7 See Thinley, J.Y. 1993.
182
no doubt that the Bhutanese leadership was aware of these changes. But no causal
link can be established between these changes and the Kings initiative for socio-
economic and political reforms.
When King Jigme Singye Wangchuck ascended the throne in 1972, Bhutan had
just become a member of the United Nations. His formal enthronement in
1974 also coincided with what Huntington calls the beginning of third wave of
democratisation. One of his major political reforms was the establishment of local
development committees known as Dzongkhag Yargay Tshogdu between 1976 and
1981. He took this further down to village communities with the establishment of
Gewog Yargay Tshogchung in 1991. In India, a constitutional amendment in 1993
gave rise to the creation and growth of local governments or panchayats. In Nepal,
local governments were also established in 1994 after the Jan Andolan movement
gave birth to a written constitution and constitutional monarch. But I do not imply
any causal link between developments in different countries. My suggestion is that
the process of democratising local communities by establishing local governments
was characteristic of South Asia in early 1990s.
In short, Bhutan`s journey through the last Fe decades took alongside
developments both in the region and the world. Although there is no evidence
of these developments affecting Bhutan, there is no doubt that the King was fully
aware of events unfolding all around. The transition to democracy preceded by
three decades of decentralisation and political reforms took place within such a
regional and global context.
Trigger of Bhutans Transition
Thus far, I have shown how conventional democratic transition theories do not
explain Bhutans recent transition to parliamentary democracy. In my opinion the
real trigger for Bhutans transition was a critical decision of leadership. I argue
that this was a mark of "innovative leadership", as Juan J. Linz (1987) calls it. To
deny leadership the agency of transition is to argue that democratic transition
is dependent only on certain institutional or structural factors. It completely
discounts the personality of leaders and decisions they take. Bernecker (1998),
for example, demonstrates how the leadership of King Juan Carlos was crucial
to introducing democracy in post-Franco Spain. Juan Linz has made a case for
leadership as agency of change:
183
Theories
No sociological, structural, or even political model is adequate to explain
such a process without reference to particular political actors making
decisions day by day, facing unexpected and disturbing crises which could
have derailed the process, even if there had been a clearly conceived and
premeditated political plan. In such a context, the question of leadership
is central. (Quoted in Bernecker 1998: 65)
Linz refers to the leadership factor in crucial moments and crises. The decision of
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck to abdicate and introduce democracy was, however,
made in a time of peace. It needs to be mentioned here that the founding of
monarchy in 1907 was also done in a time of peace. Critical political decisions in
times of peace do not constrain or restrict decision-makers from the exigencies of
crises. Decisions are more visionary.
King Jigme Singye Wangchuck had said that Bhutans political system must change
with the times. The principal argument he made then was that Bhutan needs a
dynamic political system to adapt to a changing society that aspires for new means
and institutions of expressions. In Bhutans case, however, the needs of a changing
society were foreseen by the King. According to him the inherent weakness of
monarchy was its dependence on one person. The intentions of Kings may be
good, he said, but they could change. The need, therefore, is for institutions and
a political system that rests on the wisdom of all people rather than one person.
8

That political system was to be parliamentary democracy established under a
written constitution. In his view, democracy was a viable political institution that
could ulFl the aspirations o Bhutanese people. I democracy had not worked
elsewhere, it was not due to its inherent weakness but due to abuses of democracy
by those in power. What we can glean from these arguments is the positioning
of monarchy as an institution of stability and continuity amidst uncertainties and
vicissitudes of politics and politicians in a democratic polity.
Abdication then was in a way what Giuseppe di Palma calls "forward legitimation"
in contrast to a process of backward legitimation that would resort to reviving
ancient rituals or invoking divine rights. I have argued that Bhutanese monarchy is
not seeped in rituals and divinity. This is not to imply any lack of historical basis
of monarchys legitimacy that compels invention of new ones. The historical basis
of legitimacy exists (see below).
8 Kuensel, 1-7 December 2001.
184
The fact that democracy was introduced in a time of peace calls for an explanation
for the absence of violence, which underlies most democratisation process. In
the Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Barrington Moore Jr. (1966) argues
that the path to modernisation is underpinned by iolence. le identiFes iolent
revolutions either led by the bourgeois, traditional landed elite, or peasants
which in turn lead to different kinds of regimes (Wiener 301). Violence has also
characterised the democratic transition of many South Asian countries. But Bhutan
has pre-empted any violence in timing its democratic transition. The stability of
the state and absence of the breakdown of law and order did not create any room
for military intervention. The military is very loyal to the monarchy. The King
is the commander-in-chief of the armed forces that consist of the army, police,
and the royal body guards. The only role for the military during this time was to
provide security to polling stations around the country. The Maoist elements from
Nepal made threats of violence on Election Day. However, no violence disrupted
the elections.
Since the King introduced democracy in a time of peace, the question of how
the people, who had not demanded it, came to accept and interpret it, posits an
interesting area of enquiry. According to the Constitution, the King is above the
law and he is not answerable for his actions in a court of law. It is logical that
someone who grants the Constitution has to be outside the realm of law. The
question that we need to pose is from where does the power and legitimacy to
grant the Constitution as a gift and, hence, democracy arise? If not divinity, what
is the other source of power?
Every year, on 17 December, the national day celebrations throughout the country
relie the memory o that day in 190 when the monastic community, state oFcials,
and representatives of the people signed a contract with the founding Monarch,
King Ugyen Wangchuck. The document, which is well-known as the genja, bears
the seals of forty eight signatories including the First King Ugyen Wangchuck. A
genja commits both parties to uphold the undertaking or responsibilities enshrined
in it. The undertaking of King Ugyen Wangchuck was to lay a secure future for
the Bhutanese people and country. On their part, the other signatories were to
serve him and his heirs as hereditary Monarchs with loyalty and dedication. The
signing of the genja signalled the establishment of hereditary monarchy. It is this
document that has endowed the monarchy with the legitimacy of its reign. At the
opening o the Frst parliament on 8 May 2008, what King Jigme Khesar Namgyal
185
Theories
Wangchuck said echoes this notion of legitimacy: The highest achievement of
one hundred years of monarchy has been the constant nurturing of Democracy.
1his has culminated today with the Frst sitting o Parliament and the start o
democracy, whereby my father, the fourth Druk Gyalpo, and I, hereby return to
our People the power that had been vested in our kings by our forefathers one hundred years
ago (emphasis mine). There is no doubt that legitimacy is derived from this genja.
Although the genja provides the historical basis of monarchical legitimacy, the
Kings of Bhutan did not seclude themselves in its comfort. They also did not
concern themselves with the invention of rituals and ceremonies to fabricate
a more backward legitimated kingship. Instead, each King became the agent
of social, economic, and political reforms, in contrast to former rulers whose
primary concern was the support of monastic community to legitimise their rules.
Monarchy has never been a conservative institution retarding social change. In fact
it became the force of change in a traditional society.
Another important factor legitimising the Kings authority to grant the Constitution
as a git arises rom popular participation in drating and Fnalising the Constitution.
The draft prepared by the drafting committee was circulated to every household
in the kingdom. Then the King and the Crown Prince held public consultations
with the people of all districts on every article of the draft Constitution. These
provided both the moral and legal grounds for legitimacy.
The Democratic Constitutional Monarchy
The democratisation of the Bhutanese state has created what the constitution
reers to as democratic constitutional monarchy`. I wish to renect brieny on what
such a monarchy could mean or twenty-Frst century Bhutan. lirst, monarchy
represents the continuity of the Bhutanese state. The Constitution states that
the King is the "head of State and the symbol of unity of the Kingdom and of
the people of Bhutan". Since the job of the head of state as opposed to head
of government cannot be open to political competition, it ensures continuity of
the state. Moreover, no politician can ever claim to represent the totality of the
Kingdom or the whole of its people. The King is the only person and monarchy
the institution that represents the entire people. Although Bhutans population is
small, its ethno-linguistic composition is heterogeneous. Besides, new social groups
are emerging. The King is the symbol of unity of these heterogeneous social and
ethno-linguistic groups. His job is non-partisan, unlike that of an elected leader.
186
How could this function of being the symbol of unity be actualised by a
constitutional Monarch in everyday life of the nation? It encompasses a paradox
which lies in the necessity for political distanciation and social engagement. By
political distanciation, I mean the necessity to be above and beyond politics.
Neutrality in politics ensures that the symbol of unity is upheld. While upholding
political neutrality is o great signiFcance, the King has to mediate crises o
constitutionality since he is the guardian of the Constitution. Political engagement,
on the other hand, is partisan. It divides rather than unites. Yet political distanciation
and neutrality should not result in the monarchy being aloof and removed from
the society in which it is located. It has to be politically neutral to function as a
unifying force. By political neutrality, I strictly think of a non-partisan role in the
kingdoms political life. A non-partisan political agency for the monarchy, however,
is an argument for the need for the King to act when the interests of the kingdom
and the people are at stake.
Similarly the monarchy needs to be socially engaged. The engagement of Bhutans
royal amily with philanthropic and oluntary works is noteworthy. Renecting
on such activities of the British royal family, Vernon Bogdanor writes: The
philanthropic and charitable work undertaken by the royal family may lack
mystery, butserves the country by propping up civil society, that commonwealth
of citizenship outside the state, and also pinpoints social needs otherwise ignored
by government and offers a voice to minorities and other deprived groups which
are little represented politically (1995: 308). The foundations and institutions that
the Queen Mothers of Bhutan have established
9
hae been playing signiFcant
social roles by targeting the poor, youth, women and children. Rather than create
an aura of mystery by distanciation, their philanthropic and voluntary activities
have made them reachable, relevant and sensitive to the needs of more vulnerable
sections of Bhutanese society.
One of the most important prerogatives of the King enshrined in the Constitution
is to grant welfare or kidu. This includes citizenship, land, and other kidu. In order
9 Ashi Dorji Wangmo Wangchuck Iounded the Tarayana Foundation in 2003 'as a potential solution
to the problems oI the disadvantaged that she witnessed frst hand during her tours to the remote
corners oI the nation. Ashi Tshering Pem Wangchuck is the president oI Bhutan Youth Development
Fund, which was launched by her in 1999. It Iocuses on disadvantaged youth advocating disability
rights, substance abuse prevention and treatment, education, and other important youth issues. Ashi
Sangye Choden Wangchuck Iounded RENEW (Respect, Educate, Nurture and Empower Women)
in 2004. It is a non-governmental organisation dedicated to empowerment oI women and girls in
Bhutan, especially the disadvantaged, with a special Iocus on victims oI domestic violence and
sexual assault.
187
Theories
to realise this welare unction, the OFce o Gyalpoi Zimpon
10
has been revamped
and extended in dierent parts o the country. A signiFcant command o the
King to this oFce was that welare must reach those people in need. 1he people
who need welfare the most would not be able to travel to the capital to seek it.
Therefore, they must be sought out and given kidu. Democratic politics has begun
to usher in new notions of contestation for resource allocation and entitlements.
The institution of kidu system will ensure that imbalances in resource allocation
that will necessarily arise is offset and the needs of vulnerable sections of society
are addressed.
Among different kinds of kidu that the King has granted so ar, the most signiFcant
has been land and relief-support for victims of natural disasters particularly those
of the earthquake that hit eastern Bhutan in September, October, and December
2009. Land kidu has been especially relevant in the context of implicit threats
of taking over the excess land of rural people. As the modern state deployed
different technologies of land surveys over different periods of time, rural people
were found to own lands in excess of what was recorded in their land record
registers. The state required people to pay for the excess lands or surrender them
to the government. The debate on this issue has dominated the last few sessions of
the previous National Assembly. In fear of losing land, some people paid money
to the government to retain ownership of these excess lands. In a historic land
reform initiative that the King launched after his coronation, the people were
permitted to own all the excess lands. He also commanded that the money paid
earlier by some people should now be returned.
I cite these as examples of how the symbolic authority of the King as the source
of welfare and re-distributor of resource has been successfully deployed. But I
do not suggest that these are the only prerogatives of the King. The Constitution
deFnes other important prerogaties.
Conclusion
I began this paper by arguing against the universalist idea of monarchy being
ancient, sacral and, hence, irrelevant as a means of organising modern political
life. I made this argument primarily by suggesting that such an idea assumes all
monarchies to be formed in pre-modern age and draws legitimacy from divinity.
10 Gyalpoi Zimpon means the Chamberlain oI the King. However, the chamberlain or zimpon is no
longer confned to his traditional roles.
188
They, therefore, obstruct progress and social change. In order to survive, they must
make the necessary transition to being a constitutional monarchy of a modern
nation-state. On the contrary I have shown that Bhutans monarchy was not only
founded in the twentieth century drawing legitimacy from a signed contract, but
has been the agency of socio-economic development and political reforms. The
introduction of parliamentary democracy has, therefore, not been a mere survival
strategy or the monarchy but o reaFrming its position as a progressie institution
of social and political change. In other words, monarchy in Bhutan is not founded
on any ritual or ceremony. It is not a cosmetic relic of a sacral past but a relevant
and contemporary national institution.
I argued that the democratic transition in Bhutan has not been triggered by
conventional causes that scholars of democratic transition theories identify.
Scholars and students of political science particularly devoted to regime change
and transition are interested in models and theories to explain such change and
transition. I have illustrated how the Bhutanese case does not hold up to the logic
of these models and theories. Instead, I have located the agency of democratic
transition in Bhutans monarchy and its innovative leadership, which does not
concern these theories. From these, I conclude that either the Bhutanese case is
an exception to these theories or that the theories are insuFcient and in need o
further elaboration.
Sonam Kinga is a member of the National Council of Bhutan.
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191 191
Bhutans Democratic Journey
Renata Dessallien*
13
Introduction
Democracys lustre has dimmed in recent years, both in the south and the north.
1he nurry o democratisation in the last part o the 20
th
century evoked prospects
for a democratic golden age. But too often elected governments deviated from
the basic precepts of democratic rule, sometimes straying so far that democracy
became unrecognisable. Recent books such as Wars, Guns, and Votes describe some
of the brazen tactics employed in the name of democracy (Collier 2009).

Although democratic transition was supposed to usher in an era of good
governance and peoples emancipation, in many societies it delivered something
very different:

What many (or most) citizens actually experienced was a mix of distressed
governance: abusive police forces, domineering local oligarchies,
incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and inaccessible
judiciaries, and venal, ruling elites contemptuous of the rule of law and
accountable to no one but themselves. As a result, people especially in the
bottom strata of society, which in many new democracies comprised the
majority were citizens only in name. There were few meaningful channels
of participation and voice open to them. There were elections, but they
were contests between corrupt, clientelistic parties that served popular
interests only in name. There were parliaments and local governments,
but they did not represent or respond to broad constituencies. There
was a constitution, but not constitutionalism a commitment to the
principles and restraints in that hallowed charter. There was democracy
* The views expressed herein are the author`s own and do not necessarily refect the views oI the
United Nations or any United Nations oIfcial.
192
in a formal sense, but people were still not politically freethere is good
reason to question whether such a shallow rendition of democracy can
legitimately be termed anything more than a competitive authoritarian
regime. (Diamond, 2008)

Democracy is clearly a complex, vulnerable and fragile system, susceptible to
deformation. While undoubtedly the least worst form of governance, democracy
is also the least easy. 1o work well it must be calibrated to speciFc country contexts.
It must be steered by decision-makers who must place national interests above
individual and group pursuits. And it must be carefully scrutinised by a society that
actively engages with the system to keep it true to purpose. Otherwise, democracy
tends to veer off course and malfunction. It becomes a front for other forms of
governance; it becomes a Trojan horse.

Bhutan started its democratic journey with several important advantages that
most other developing country democracies lacked: peace and stability, good
governance, great leadership, and a carefully crafted constitution. The fourth King
had groomed the country carefully for the transition, starting several decades
before the historic 2008 elections with the early decentralisation decisions of
1981 and 1991
1
and other measures. This gave the country time to prepare itself,
to study the experiences of other nations, to design a system tailored to its own
context, and to make the transition on its own terms.
Yet despite these favourable conditions and careful preparations, the transition to
a ull-nedged democracy represents a signiFcant adjustment or Bhutanese society.
The introduction of political parties in 2007 was a major change and has not come
without stress and strain. Anxieties over how the new systems function are running
high. While much of this can be attributed to growing pains, the Bhutanese must
be careful because democratic growing pains have a habit of becoming chronic
pains. Decisions taken now, during democracys formative stages, will determine
the path dependency of the system for decades to come.

Bhutan is therefore at an important conjuncture in its history. It has a unique
opportunity to steer clear of the most costly mistakes made by other young
1 In 1981, important administrative Iunctions were decentralised Irom the central level to the
district or dzongkhag level, and in 1991 Iunctions were Iurther decentralised to the block or
gewog level.
193
democracies that could save years of struggle, frustration and lost progress. It
can establish, right from the start, a well-functioning, high-quality democracy that
reaps good harvests for the Bhutanese people, maintaining the countrys peaceful
and stable development path. Indeed, as a small nation in a sensitive geopolitical
zone, Bhutan may not have the same space to repeat the mistakes of others.
Bhutan`s Frst political goernments thus hae a two-old responsibility - to goern
well during their tenure for citizens current wellbeing and to establish healthy and
constructive political conventions and standards that will shape the nations future
political process.
This paper draws on previous work by the author to understand the causal
actors behind the most common, costly mistakes o nedgling democracies
in the developing world. Areas such as the incentives structures and behaviour
o traditional power structures and predatory elite, disproportionate innuence
o externally drien deelopment paradigms, design naws in the democratic
architecture, and the impact of high levels of corruption on democratic polities
and politics have emerged as areas of particular concern. This paper applies some
o the Fndings o this research to the case o Bhutan. It stresses the importance
of a strong national vision and development strategy, grounded in country
speciFcity and conducie to democratic alues and processes. It emphasises the
importance of democratic framework conditions, both from the perspective of the
Constitution and constitutionality, as well as from the perspective of democratic
culture. It highlights the need to overcome public scepticism toward democracy,
to establish healthy inter-party relations, and to encourage citizens and civil society
to proactively engage with the democratic process. The paper concludes with that
ital ingredient o good goernance - leadership - and renects on the role o
the King in encouraging Bhutans democratic process to settle into an enduring
positive trajectory.

The Importance of Democratic Ends
In a country that quietly took the wide-spread notion of economic growth as the
principle object of human progress and turned it on its head,
2
any discussion of
democracy must be preceded by clearing the air with respect to means and ends.
2 In 1979, His Majesty the Iourth King was asked by journalists about Bhutan`s development and he
told them that Gross National Happiness was more important than Gross National Product. This
simple turn of phrase has had a profound impact not only on Bhutan and its development paradigm,
but on many other countries around the world.
194
As Lyonchhen Jigmi Thinley has repeatedly emphasised, it is when we confuse
means with ends that we end up pursuing the wrong goal.

Should we think of democracy as a means, an end, or both? To answer this
question, it may be helpful to break down democratic governance into component
parts. What is known as procedural democracy the casting of votes by citizens
to elect leadership, the practice of public consultation, debate and deliberation, the
function of representation, etc. may be considered means toward certain desired
governance outcomes or ends. In its procedural aspects, therefore, democracy may
be viewed as a set of means to attain higher level aims. This aspect of democracy,
especially elections, currently receives most of our attention.

But is that all there is to democracy? What is it about democracy that inspires
millions o people around the world to Fght so passionately or democratic rule,
to the point that many are willing to place themselves at great personal risk for its
achievement? Why does democracy evoke such aspirational yearnings? What causes
people to place such faith in democracy? Certainly it is not democracys procedural
elements alone. Above and beyond its systems and processes, democracy seems
to correspond to some intrinsic values that resonate deeply in the human spirit.
It seems, at least conceptually, to ulFll some undamental human needs - the
need for freedom from subjugation, the need to participate in decisions that effect
oneself, ones family and community, the need to be treated fairly and equally by
the state. Viewed from this perspective, democracy may also be considered an
end in itself.

And there are some who contend that democracy, at least some parts of it, is at
the same time both a means and an ends. Peoples participation, for example, is
concurrently a means and an end in itself, argues Amartya Sen (Sen 1999).

We know quite a lot about democratic procedures or means, and indeed
spend inordinate time and energy on some of them. We also know a lot about
democratic ends philosophers have thought deeply about human freedoms
and the equality of man for centuries. But somehow the practice of democracy
too often brushes aside the latter or accords it secondary status. How can systems
of democratic practice be adjusted to take greater heed of the intrinsic ends that
they are supposed to achieve? How can democratic ends be repositioned to their
rightful place at the top of our hierarchy of preoccupations? How can they, rather
than means, become the primary object of our democratic endeavour?

195
Few countries are better placed to do this than Bhutan. Just as Bhutan trailblazed
a new set o measures o human progress that place ends` Frst,
3
so it can break
new ground for democratic governance, endowing it with deeper meaning. This
could contribute immensely to a much-needed general shift in global perspective,
creating incentives for better democratic performance.

Such a democratic framework would require us to revisit our current crude
taxonomy of countries that legitimises any government established through multi-
party elections with the label democratic regime, no matter if the winning party
or coalition is fundamentally authoritarian or even predatory in nature, operating
above the law, using coercive and criminal tactics, etc. Does a democracy without
the rule of law merit the name? When people are afraid to report crimes to the
police for fear of their elected MPs retribution, is that democracy? Clearly we
need a new classiFcation, indeed a new ocabulary, that allows us to go beyond the
surface of multi-party elections to describe the real forms of governance at work
beneath the democratic faade. Only by putting the intrinsic values of democracy
at the apex of our conceptual construct, can we hope to realise the deeper purpose
of democracy to which we aspire.

Bhutan owes it to itself and to the world to develop a deeper approach to democracy
one that inspires a new, normative democratic discourse. The seeds of such an
approach are embedded in the concept of Gross National Happiness (GNH), and
in its index variables of social and institutional trust, freedoms, community vitality,
human security, etc. 1hey need to be urther reFned, monitored and analysed,
particularly with respect to policy implications, so that democracy develops depth
and meaning for the average Bhutanese. Democracys real product is trust trust
in ones neighbours, in public institutions, and in public representatives (Barber
2008).

This dimension of the GNH Index is of paramount importance as it will
renect the general health o the country`s democracy. 1o ascertain this and to
create positive incentives for preserving and enhancing trust, public opinion
polls on peoples trust in various branches of government and political parties
could be considered, as well as their general trust in their neighbours, community
organisations, and civil society groups.
3 Gross National Happiness (GNH) Index, http://www.grossnationalhappiness.com/gnhIndex/
intruductionGNH.aspx
196
In concluding this section, it may be important to remember that many promoters
and practitioners of democracy do not have time for normative enquiry and
conceptual niceties. Some believe that democracys higher purpose is mere
rhetoric; democracys real merits lie in its ability to contain the coercive powers of
the state and release pent up societal steam, enabling multiple, competing claims
to work themselves out through a legitimized process. They are less bothered that
democratic processes are driven by the narrow strategic calculus of competing
political parties, rather than by principles of the public good. This paper argues
that while democracy certainly possesses pragmatic merits, it is ultimately not
sustainable unless it also delivers on peoples aspirations for better living conditions
and social justice, and for this to occur it must be guided by normative principles.
It is therefore in the interest of both the demos and the democratic system itself, to
focus more on values and principles, on the moral underpinnings of governance,
and on what democracies actually deliver to people at large on democratic ends.

linally, een those who Frmly beliee in democratic ends hae a hard time aligning
their words with their deeds. Western nations are strong in espousing the importance
o democratic reedoms and other ends`, but Fnd themseles pouring the lion`s
share of their democracy building support to developing countries into means.
4

All the more reason for a country like Bhutan to focus on what exactly it wants its
democracy to achieve.

National Specicity, Vision, and Strategy
Democratic transition and consolidation cannot be understood in isolation from
a country`s deFning characteristics and its ision o human progress. Bhutan`s
basic characteristics include: its physical size and geopolitical location; its value
systems including spiritual, cultural, and environmental heritages; the evolving
system of governance, including the centrality of the monarchy and the emergence
of political governance within a traditionally administrative, patriarchal state; the
structure of the economy and employment; the population including its size, age
pyramid, educational levels, degrees of civic awareness, ethnic composition and
dynamics, the nedgling ciil society sector, etc.

4 A recent study oI EU support Ior democratic governance in developing countries Iound that while
people across all regions expected democratic systems to produce societal changes in the Iorm oI
social cohesion, equality, social stability/security, ability oI governments to deliver, 'the EU applies
a narrow understanding oI democracy, Iailing to link procedural democracy to delivery aspects oI
democracy (Bradley 2009).
197
From these characteristics, Bhutan developed its own vision of development that
gradually began orbiting around the concept of GNH. It emphasises balance
between individual and collective wellbeing, between man and nature, between the
temporal and the spiritual, and between rights and responsibilities. In this vision,
for example, forest cover is valued not only for its economic utility, but also for
natures own intrinsic value.

It was within this context that Bhutans democratic framework conditions were
conceied, and subsequently crowned by the national Constitution Frst drated
in 2004, and signed in July 2008. The Constitution evokes the basic elements of
Bhutans national character and aspirations, and outlines its democratic system.
The articles on spiritual heritage, culture, environment, human rights and
responsibilities, and principles of state policy are both aspirational and normative,
conveying the desired character of the country. They have direct bearing on the
framework conditions for good governance.

Vital elements of this national vision are at odds with dominant global currents
and therefore vulnerable. As global forces entered the country, particularly since
the 1980s, tensions emerged that impacted the countrys development strategy and,
hence, its governance. Today, there is a growing tension between GNH and the
countrys susceptibility to (and in some quarters, preference for) individualistic and
consumerist lifestyles advertised by free-market economies. There are those who
wish to resist the pressures to conform to the global market-based ethos so as to
preserve the countrys values and lifestyle, and there are those who want the country
to embrace the global models of development. As the latter view is buttressed by
international mass media and dominant global thinking, its proponents have an
advantage. This tension is evident in Bhutans WTO accession process. While the
forces behind GNH in Bhutan are strong and gaining international recognition,
5

no national development strategy in the world offers a good model for balancing
GNH values with the forces that drive 21
st
century modernity.

How the GNH vision unfolds in Bhutan and what direction the countrys
deelopment path takes will hae proound innuence on the character o the
countrys democracy. A more GNH-focused development trajectory, with its
5 The GNH ConIerences since 2001 illustrate a growing resonance across countries, North and
South. For example, President Sarkozy`s recent Commission on the Measurement oI Economic
PerIormance makes direct reIerence to Bhutan`s work on GNH, and its proposed index is very
similar to Bhutan`s.
198
emphasis on socio-economic equity and concern for all sentient beings, would
deFnitely enhance the quality and depth o democracy. A more neo-liberal, ree-
market development path would undoubtedly lead to the pursuit of a Western-
centric form of democracy. This would leave Bhutan wide open to the deceptions
and struggles witnessed by other countries that abandoned their roots to tread this
path. It would almost certainly destroy certain natural, indigenous traits within
Bhutanese society that could otherwise reinforce meaningful democratisation.

A GNH anchored development strategy would not only promote smoother,
deeper democratisation by cultivating a conducive environment for civil liberties
and political equality, but it would also innuence the choice o certain democratic
procedures. For example, it would help inform whether political parties should
be active during local elections and whether this would enhance or undermine
community vitality (a variable of the GNH Index). It would also, for example,
inform the choice of electoral systems. Bhutan selected the single constituency,
Frst-past-the-post ,lP1P, electoral system because o its simplicity and the direct
representational link it establishes between the elected and his or her electoral
constituency. But FPTP also happens to be the most politically divisive electoral
system. Already political party rifts have emerged in Bhutan. This should be
of concern because these social cleavages tend to grow and fester in young
democracies. And they concurrently detract from the goal of GNH and the
consolidation of democracy.

Clearly, one of the best strategies for deepening democracy in Bhutan is to further
anchor GNH, enabling it to become the states social contract and inspiring and
guiding the overall development and political processes. In this way, its attributes
can infuse the character of Bhutans democratic governance. Some work toward
this end has been done at the conceptual and policy levels, mainly through the
work of the Centre for Bhutan Studies and the establishment of the GNH
Commission, but much more is required. The GNH Survey of 2007 ascertained
peoples perceptions of their happiness and informed the GNH Index. The GNH
Commission is now charged with analysing state policies, plans and programmes
or their GNl implications. But this is an extremely diFcult task since there is no
clear methodology for determining what policies are or are not GNH-enhancing. It
is compounded by the fact that virtually all international development conceptual
rameworks are singularly unhelpul and, in act, innuence the decision making
process away from GNH. They lead toward excessive individualism, consumerism,
199
and materialism, which drien by the relentless pursuit o proFt maximisation,
often at virtually any cost and most are socially and environmentally unsustainable.
The fact that despite the interesting spatial considerations of the countrys GNH
strategy, its central preoccupation is economic growth, illustrates just how hard
it is for analysts to break away from global conventional wisdom. The GNH
strategy is in fact a growth strategy. Its analysis and conclusions may all be perfectly
valid from an economic growth perspective, and it may outline a sound, GNH-
enhancing growth path. But then it should be labeled as such; it should not be
accorded the overarching title of GNH strategy. Such mislabeling is misleading
and dangerous for GNH. It underscores how much more work the Commission
needs to do in order to develop a real GNH strategy. Building state capacity for
GNH strategy and policy analysis is fundamental.

But enhancing national capacity for GNH policy and programme analysis is
not enough. The social contract is a two-way street. GNH policy-making work
needs to be complemented by public understanding of, and engagement with, the
GNH concept. Today, most Bhutanese have only a vague notion of GNH, and
misunderstandings abound. Some people feel that GNH is a nice idea, but relegate
it to the intellectuals. Some people think it is pie in the sky. Some fear it may
become a means of state control and a threat to individual freedoms. A recent
opinion piece in the Kuensel warned that GNH could become an instrument for
state authoritarianism ("Dissecting GNH" 2009). These voices need to be heard and
discussed. Bhutans current transition from administrative to political governance
will take time and frictions between the two modus operandi will inevitably emerge in
which GNH may become entangled. The more the Bhutanese public engages with
the concept, making it their own, the less likely it is to be misused or to smack of
paternalism. A bottom-up GNH track is therefore vitally important at this time.
Fortunately, the Ministry of Education has begun a process to weave GNH into
the school curriculum, which will help to raise general awareness. This needs to
be complemented by a proliferation of public GNH discussions and exchanges
among different groups, particularly among youth.

At a moment in history when the limits of the invisible hand have become so
painfully apparent and the crisis in global leadership so pervasive, it would be a
great pity if Bhutan were to dilute its identity and erode its inherent strengths by
going with the global now. As Dasho Karma Ura aptly put it, the inisible hand
is invisible because it does not exist (Ura 2009). GNH can help Bhutan remind
200
itself of its inherent values and beliefs, the dilution of which have led so many
other countries astray. It can help maintain Bhutans distinct identity and qualities
that are essential for its continued strength as a nation, and which are inherently
more sound and sustainable than today`s nawed dominant discourse. It can help
Bhutan deepen its democratic experience.

Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law
In addition to a strong national vision and strategic abilities to chart the countrys
development pathway on its own terms, conducive democratic framework
conditions also require robust legislative and institutional provisions of governance.
While many of the institutions that underpin Bhutans democracy are already in
place and have been for some time, the new political process has only recently
been introduced and the whole system therefore merits careful monitoring. While
there are many dimensions to this, I wish to highlight two areas of competing
logic and possible tension. First, there is the balancing act between the need to
test and adjust the new systems, and the need to infuse the Constitution and its
supporting structures with trumping powers. Second, there is the need to keep a
close eye on possible gaps between the provisions of the law, the spirit of the law,
and the application of the law. Behind both these areas lies the paramount issue
of the rule of law.

Democracy without the rule of law is toothless. Had more attention been placed
on building the institutions and conventions for upholding the rule of law in
developing countries, alongside efforts to develop democratic procedures such as
elections, the quality of these democracies would certainly have been better. The
rule o law must take Frm root in order or a democracy to merit its name.

At the heart of establishing the rule of law lies the process of developing the
Constitutions trumping powers. In Bhutan, the Constitution is young and as
the nation tests its provisions, it is inevitable that areas will emerge where some
modiFcation may be desirable. \hile the undamental design o the Constitution
should not be touched, some elements may need Fne-tuning. loweer, amending
the Constitution at this early phase of its existence could undermine its ability to
consolidate trumping powers. Furthermore, differentiating between the genuine
need or Fne-tuning and the impulses o political orces may not always be easy.
The challenge of knowing when and how much to amend the Constitution
will confront the country in the not-too-distant future and clear principles and
201
parameters will need to be set for this, with political and public consultation and
endorsement forming an important element to ensure broad support. Consideration
of Indias basic structure doctrine may be helpful in this regard (Noorani 2001).
For the time being, however, it would be unwise to touch the Constitution, both
in order to enable its gravitas to settle and because constitutional change under an
overwhelmingly majoritarian National Assembly is potentially dangerous.

When a constitution lacks trumping powers, those in power can easily circumvent
the rule of law, and serious gaps can form between the law, its spirit, and its
application. In some instances disrespect for the law is so rampant that all pretence is
dispensed with, and impunity is naunted. In other instances, a aade o the rule o
law is deemed necessary for public consumption, but the law is routinely breached
surreptitiously. The rule of law can only be established through institutions. In
countries that began their democratic adventure with weak public institutions,
building their capacities has been a focus of international assistance for many
decades. But experience shows that such endeavours can take an exceedingly long
time to reap meaningful results, and beyond a certain critical point where political
orces begin to see their innuence and beneFts curtailed, progress is irtually
impossible. Countries that managed to develop reasonably strong institutions
before the introduction of democracy, like Bhutan, are clearly at an advantage.
But they are not risk-free. When political forces are driven by mal-intent, they can
always Fnd ways o to circument een the most robust institutional ramework.

To be on the safe side, Bhutan should anticipate that at some point its political
forces may try to alter the countrys legal or institutional framework with ignoble
purpose. A common method employed in other countries is to gradually politicise
the organs of the state the civil service, the judiciary, the police, the armed
forces, etc. Excessive politicisation leads to progressive de-professionalisation
and de-capacitation of institutions, making it easier to divert them from their
fundamental purpose of public service. The main conduit for this is through the
politicisation of appointments, promotions, and transfers. Bhutan would do well
to ensure that it is well guarded against this risk. Appointments to key positions,
such as constitutional bodies and independent institutions, should be carefully
monitored for their political neutrality, their professional calibre, and their integrity.
The appointment commissions prescribed in the Constitution were designed to
do this; however, similarly designed commissions in other countries have not been
able to hold up under political pressures. Bhutan should heed their experiences.
202
Civil society watchdog groups could assist by keeping a close eye on these critical
processes and advocating for the substance and spirit of the Constitution to be
upheld as long as these groups themselves are politically neutral and professionally
qualiFed. Lnsuring the law speciFes minimum proessional qualiFcations and other
prerequisites for vitally important positions, such as judges, is advisable.

Strengthening Democratic Culture
Democracy works best when it is supported by a democratic culture. This is a broad
subject and can be interpreted in different ways. I wish to highlight three important
elements for Bhutan the interface between citizens and their government, the
role of civil society, and the relationship between political parties.

Interface between Citizens and Their Government
Time and again we see the spectacle of elected leaders invoking the people
when, in fact, the people are the furthest thing from their mind. Apart from
oting, what are the means and ways through which people can innuence their
governments that are supposed to be of them, by them, and for them? The
practice of public consultation, public deliberation, public polling, public hearings,
etc., are present in most democracies in one form or another. But it is possible to
have all these in place and still have almost no responsiveness by the elected to the
electorate. low can these and other opportunities or citizens to innuence their
government develop depth and meaning in Bhutan?

One of the biggest constraints to building democratic culture in Bhutan is the
dearth of people who truly believe that democracy is the best system of governance
for them. Peoples scepticism and apprehensions are understandable, given the
exceptional quality of governance under Bhutans recent Monarchs to which they
became accustomed. But they will need to embrace the new system wholeheartedly
in order for it to function well. A major effort is thus needed to help the Bhutanese
public appreciate the merits of democracy and to shape it to their aspirations
and the best people to do this are the politicians. Rhetoric alone, however, will
not suFce. Politicians will hae to back up their words with hard eidence o
the merits of the new system. This will require not only delivering on electoral
promises, but also ensuring that the democratic process is collegial, peaceful,
inclusive, responsive, effective, transparent, and accountable. Practising intra-party
democracy (e.g. regular and transparent elections at all tiers of the party apparatus)
would also help convince the public that politicians practice what they preach. If
203
successful democracy depends on peoples belief in it, then elected leaders should
feel a vested interest in building peoples faith in the system. If they act accordingly
with sincerity, peoples scepticism in democracy can be transformed from an
obstacle into an active agent for deepening democracy.

In the quest for healthy interface between the electors and the elected, Bhutan
has an advantage that many other young democracies lack its size. Despite the
countrys rugged terrain, its small population makes direct democracy a feasible
proposition. While some quarters may wish to delay this practice in Bhutan until
the general public becomes more politically aware, this may be a mistake. What
better way to help expand the publics political awareness than by starting the
practice of organised consultations with them, including referenda when necessary,
at this early phase 1his may also be the best way o building public conFdence in
democracy.

Importance of Civil Society
Civil society organisations (CSOs) have a vital role to play in building peoples
understanding of democracy, facilitating the exchange of ideas to enrich the public
decision-making process, and keeping government in check. In Bhutan, a wealth
of local and indigenous civil society groups exists to manage collective concerns
water sharing, community infrastructure, social assistance, etc. At the national level,
CSOs are emerging very gradually around social, developmental or environmental
concerns. Apart from the media, the Centre for Bhutan Studies, and the Bhutan
Centre for Media and Democracy, there are no CSOs that engage directly on issues
of democratic governance. This is partly because the topic is so new; perhaps
partly because the CSO Authority is still being set up and people may not be clear
about registration issues; and partly because the law stipulates that CSOs should
remain politically neutral and there may be some confusion between this and the
expression of personal opinions on the political process.

For Bhutans democratic culture to develop, it would be important to encourage the
development of CSOs that question and challenge decisions and directions taken
by the government, as well as to monitor the overall workings of the democratic
process. Media has a vital role to play here, as do think tanks and democracy
watchdog organisations. This web of institutions is what John Keane refers to in
his concept of monitoring democracy (Keane 2009). How to promote this type
of CSO in a young democracy, while ensuring that it is not captured by political
204
parties, will be a challenge. Keeping the ownership of CSOs out of the hands of
political orces and their aFliates is important ,as stipulated in the CSO Act,, but
this alone will not suFce to keep them politically neutral.

The independent media constitutes a special category of CSO. In some countries,
where the main opposition party is unable or unwilling to play its role, the media
actually ends up performing an opposition function holding government to
account. The independent media in Bhutan has started to do this. But to enhance
its effectiveness it needs both greater access to public information and high
reporting standards. 1he Frst could be addressed through a Right 1o Inormation
Act, similar Indias, where it has proven to be catalytic. The second could start
with a media-generated code of conduct for reporting. Government should resist
the urge to regulate the reporting standards of the media as this will be perceived
as infringement on their freedom. Instead, media should be encouraged to self-
regulate. Finally, one of the greatest modern threats to independent and quality
media reporting is from the commercial pursuits and considerations of media
owners. Unless and until the media of Bhutan can work out innovative funding
mechanisms that allow it independence not only from government but also from
big business and the business bottom-line, it will lose its ability to serve the pubic
interest. This would have a very negative impact on the process of democratic
consolidation. Several thoughtful papers on this topic have been discussed at
GNH Conferences (Dorji 2007). Given Bhutans context, government assistance
in setting up such funding is required. As it is this same media that often lashes out
at public Fgures and decisions, a goernment`s willingness to help establish unding
mechanisms for independent public media is a good indicator of its commitment
to that vital but messy democratic ingredient freedom of speech.

The Relationship between Political Parties

Another deFning ingredient o democratic culture is the quality o relationships
between political parties. Design eatures o the democratic system innuence
these relationships and the FPTP electoral system tends to produce two major
political parties with high degrees of competitiveness. In some developing
countries, this electoral system has degenerated into a winner takes all, zero-
sum game that has made it almost impossible to develop any meaningful form of
political dialogue between the opposing parties. In worst case scenarios, this has
dragged the political process down into the realms of hatred and violence. This
205
phenomenon is exacerbated in situations of landslide electoral victories, such as in
Bhutan. Developing a democratic culture of constructive inter-party dialogue and
deliberation under these circumstances is exceedingly diFcult. Bhutan may wish
to consider other electoral systems that could produce less connictual political
party relations. An interesting proposal to this effect the Majority Judgement
system was made at the Asian Conference on Deepening Democracy, held in
Paro in 2009 (Balinski 2009). In the meantime, if Bhutans majority and opposition
parties do not consciously guard themselves against the risk of confrontational
politics, their relationship will almost inevitably slide into acrimonious and
connictual territory. 1his will not inspire people`s conFdence in democracy. Gien
the majority partys massive advantage in the National Assembly, it is behoven on
it to be generous toward, and accommodating of, the opposition. Each big-hearted
effort to constructively engage with the opposition will be another step toward
consolidating a democratic culture.

An instrument the government may wish to explore in this context is the use of
political party codes of conduct. Such a code exists for election periods and there
is a general code of conduct within the National Assembly Act.
6
However, it may
be necessary to add greater speciFcity to the latter to ensure digniFed treatment
of the opposition party. For example, the Speaker may be required to entertain
motions of a certain gravitas submitted to him by the opposition for plenary
discussion, or the PMs question periods may be required to grant preference to the
oppositions queries, or a certain proportion of the chairs of National Assembly
sub-committees may be reserved for opposition members, etc.
Codes of conduct, monitored by the appropriate oversight bodies and by civil
society organisations, can help encourage constructive political party behaviour.
But such codes cannot fundamentally change the nature of inter-party relations.
Only statesman-like leadership from within the main parties can do that. Regular
consultations between the leaders of the majority and opposition parties, initiated
by either side but particularly by the former, on issues of national importance, are
a good gauge of constructive engagement.

Only when relations between the main political parties are collegial and constructive
can the full dividends of democratic deliberation emerge. Democratic practice
hinges on the ability of political parties to aggregate the diverse views and opinions
6 Article 124 oI the National Assembly Act also accords preIerential treatment to the opposition.
206
of the electorate into coherent agendas. This requires both intra- and inter-party
negotiations, deliberations, and give-and-take. In this way, the diversity of political
views becomes an asset, as the deliberative process enriches and broadens the
perspective of people, parties, and the government and informs public decisions.
Without democratic deliberation, there can be no meaningful democracy. And
without constructive inter-party dialogue, there is no real democratic deliberation
where it matters most.

Leadership the Heart of the Matter
His Majesty the fourth King once said that shortly after acceding the throne,
he realised the decisions he made for the good of the nation would usually not
be good for himself personally, while decisions that might be good for himself
personally would usually not be good for the nation. He had to make a choice. The
record of his words and deeds during his 34-year reign makes it abundantly clear
what choice he consistently made. He placed the greater good above his personal
consideration. His only compulsion was his conscience. That is what we expect
from public leaders. That is true public service. That is the calibre of leadership
that most Bhutanese want and expect from democracy and that will determine
their aith and conFdence in the system.

Democratic literature is thin on leadership because democracy is supposed to have
looked after this preoccupation through the electoral process. What literature there
is on the subject tends to focus either on the qualities of good public leaders or on
the checks and balances required to keep public leaders on the straight and narrow.
Almost no literature exists on how to get great leaders, endowed with the ethos of
public serice, elected in the Frst place. 1his is curious, since it is so obious that
no matter how perfect the democratic system may appear on paper, no matter how
robust the legal and institutional framework, it can all be undermined, overtly or
covertly, by ill-intentioned leaders. It is also curious because the types of leaders
that the democratic system tends to produce around the world are those with
charismatic qualities capable of pushing societys populist buttons to trigger knee-
jerk electoral responses very different from the leadership qualities required
to help democracy produce good governance, and enable people to realise their
collective and individual freedoms, capabilities, and equalities.

Bhutan has a big head start over other countries when it comes to leadership. The
country has been blessed with great rulers under the Wangchuck dynasty, and His
207
Majesty the Fth King clearly continues this legacy. 1he new political goernment
inherited some of that legacy, as virtually all its members were groomed under
the fourth King. Because of this, there is an expectation that they deliver on more
than the day-to-day running of government. In line with the far-sighted leadership
of the monarchy, they must also anticipate the future. They must review their
current decisions and actions not only with respect to their immediate impact, but
also in light of the conventions, practices, and standards of political governance
they will establish for the country, and in whose tracks future governments will
follow. And they must pave the way for the next generation of leaders. While a
few young leaders have emerged or seem to be emerging, they need assistance.
It is behoven on the current leadership to groom the countrys future leaders in
the same enlightened spirit that they themselves were. This is an important task
for Members of Parliament, leaders of other constitutional bodies, government
institutions, and political parties. Civil society groups can also help incubate future
leaders.

What about the King? What is his role in protecting the quality of Bhutans leadership
and ensuring the emergence o the next generation o Fne leaders, particularly
those who will pass through the electoral process? Apart from continuing to lead
by example, his most powerful instrument, the King is constitutionally endowed
with important functions as Head of State and is required to grant royal assent for
various aspects of governance that have direct bearing on the countrys leadership.
For example, he must endorse appointments like that of the Chief Justice and the
Drangpons. For some posts, he makes the selection from the recommendations of
pre-deFned selection commissions or the Prime Minister. But the mere act o his
involvement imbibes the process with his moral authority. This is a great safeguard
for the country.

In addition, the King may award titles, decorations, and other recognitions through
which he can choose to draw public attention to the desired calibre and quality
of public leadership. He may direct some of these recognitions to outstanding
contributions by youth and to inspire young people for public service. In his
speaking engagements, the King may also highlight the qualities of great leadership,
and encourage the next generation to lead with the same selness and dedicated
spirit that guides him.

In addition to promoting the emergence of great future leaders, the King also
innuences current public leaders. le is, or example, endowed by law with the
208
discretion to address or send messages to Parliament when he deems Ft, reer
questions of law to the Supreme Court, return bills to Parliament, and he may
command a National Referendum. Naturally, with the recent introduction of
political party democracy and the need for the new system to take root, the King
is reticent to intervene unless absolutely necessary.
The King may also need to compensate for the lack of familiarisation of the
people with their new system of governance. As mentioned earlier, despite the
check and balances within the system, it is the people who are the Fnal guarantors
of democracy. When they are unable to provide the required oversight and
innuence, the system can quickly mutate into deious impersonations o the real
thing. So, until the Bhutanese general public develops strong, organised groups
and outspoken eminent persons whose views hold sway over government, some
o their responsibilities ineitably all on the shoulders o the King, as the Fnal
protector of the state and guardian of the people. Given this situation, the
King may also wish to consider extending his activities to help develop peoples
understanding of their roles and functions in the new system, and their capacities
to perform them well.

Clearly, the King has vital contributions in shaping the countrys current and
future leadership and the quality of democracy. He is leading by example. He is
introducing and shaping the new role of the monarchy under a constitutional
democracy. He is working to infuse the new system with the ethos of public
service that characterised past governments in Bhutan. And while it will remain
his most fundamental responsibility to represent his peoples collective aspirations
and needs, he is having to assume some of his peoples democratic responsibilities,
until they develop these capacities themselves. All these are in addition to the other
vital functions of the monarchy.

The role of the King in Bhutans young democracy will perhaps never be as
important as it is today. lis legacy is noble, his innuence immense, and his reach
extensive as he must support parts of the democratic system that have yet to
Fnd their eet. Precisely because o this innuence, and because the system needs
to avoid over reliance on the Monarch to develop its own strength, the King is
treading very carefully. Those who advise the King must do so with equal care and,
like their King, must remain totally and utterly above the political fray.

209
Concluding Thoughts
Bhutan has crossed a major threshold on its democratic journey. Before it lies a
long road with many forks and hairpin turns that will require great presence of
mind and navigational skill for the ride to be smooth. The need for stability and
continuity must be balanced with the need for greater freedoms and inevitable
change. The logic of democracy must be balanced with the logic of GNH.
The introduction of political governance must be balanced with the legacy of
hierarchical, administrative governance.

Many other young democracies faced similar challenges in the past, and while each
situation is unique, broad trends can be drawn from their experience. Bad decisions
early in the transition phase often led to devastating and long-term impacts. The
democratic system proved itself to be highly vulnerable to non-democratic power
structures and predatory elite, as well as to global forces that were not always
helpful. Democracy was thus frequently drained of its soul and paraded like the
Emperors New Clothes, as in the well-known fairy tale. The building blocks
for consolidating and deepening democracy inevitably require the ruling class to
submit to the curtailment of its power and authority. As this relies on leadership
of a calibre that most democracies are not wont to produce, young, struggling
democracies often got caught in a catch-22 situation. Many have lingered in
democratic limbo for decades during which time people have been forced to
swallow a sorry substitute for meaningful democracy, while their leaders played the
system for personal gain.

Bhutan has a precious opportunity to avoid this dismal experience. The countrys
legacy of great leadership and good governance gives it a distinct advantage. But this
window of opportunity is time-bound; it will not exist in a few years time, at least
not to the same degree. By then the pattern of political behaviours and conventions
of the new system will have been largely set into a path of dependency that will
characterise the countrys future governments. Using the current opportunity well
is, therefore, the single most important task of the current government and people
of Bhutan.

Many of Bhutans inherent characteristics and its legacy of good governance
could help guide and shape the countrys democracy positively. As the quality of
democracy is inextricably linked to the quality of a countrys values and vision,
an obvious starting place is GNH. The GNH concept is inherently democracy-
210
friendly it could help Bhutan deepen its democratic experience right from the
start. But while GNl is gathering some steam internationally, it Fnds itsel at risk at
home. The economic-centric forces that have blinded the international community
to other essential elements of human wellbeing have entered Bhutan and are hard
at work. The economic bias of the countrys mislabled "GNH strategy" is but one
renection o this. I Bhutan is to leerage its strengths to deepen its democracy
right from the start, it needs to enable GNH to shape the countrys new system of
goernance by Frmly anchoring it both in goernment decision-making as well as
in the minds and hearts of the general public.

The overriding lesson to be learned from other young democracies is that
democratic ends must be valued on the same footing, if not higher, than
democratic means. The sign of a good democracy is much more than a good
election it is what happens in between elections. Four main areas emerge from
this observation. First, strong democratic framework conditions are required for
democracy to deliver on peoples expectations. The rule of law, constitutionalism
and the trumping powers of the Constitution are key to this, both in their aspect as
rules and as morality. Second, keeping the appointments and promotions to high
state oFces ree rom political bias, while maintaining the highest standards o
professionalism and integrity, is vital. In this way, the process of state building can
resist misguided orces that sometimes inFltrate the democratic process and try
to drive it in unhealthy directions. Third, developing the attributes of a conducive
democratic culture is a priority. This includes maintaining constructive and collegial
inter-party relations, raising citizens` awareness o and conFdence in democracy,
engaging citizens and civil society with democratic processes, and strengthening
the ability of the media to play its vital democratic oversight functions.

Finally, although the literature on democracy has neglected the fundamental issue
o leadership, nothing is more important. \hile Bhutan currently has a signiFcant
leadership advantage over other countries, care must be taken to maintain the
standard and groom the countrys next generation of public leaders. In addition to
his many other vital functions, the King has an important role to play in inspiring
and encouraging both Bhutans present and future leaders, political and non-
political, to maintain the high standards of public service to which the people have
become accustomed.

Renata Dessallien is the UNDP Resident Co-ordinator in China. She held
the same functions in Bhutan from 2002-200S.
211
References
Balinski, Michel. The Majority Judgement: A New Mechanism for Electing and
Ranking. Proc. of Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia, Paro.
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Barber, Benjamin. Benjamin R. Barber: A Credit DeFcit or a Democratic
DeFcit` %UHDNLQJ1HZVDQG2SLQLRQRQ7KH+XIQJWRQ3RVW. 27 Oct. 2008.
Web. 31 Jan. 2010.
Bradley, Andrew, Amor Boubakri, Sridhar K. Khatri, and Rizal Sukma. Democracy
in Development: Global Consultations on the EUs Role in Democracy Building.
Publication. Stockholm: IDEA, 2009. Print.
Collier, Paul. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York:
Harper, 2009. Print.
Diamond, Larry Jay. The Spirit of Democracy: the Struggle to Build Free Societies
throughout the World. New York: Times /Henry Holt and, 2008. Print.
Dissecting GNH. Kuensel [Thimphu] 20 Oct. 2009, Editorial sec. Print.
Dorji, Kinley, and Siok Sian Pek. The Bhutanese Media: In the Service of the
Public. Proc. of Second International Conference on Gross National
Happiness, Antigonish. Print.
Keane, John. The Life and Death of Democracy. New York: W.W. Norton &, 2009.
Print.
Noorani, A. G. Behind the Basic Structure Doctrine. Frontline Apr.-May
2001. Print.
Sen, Amartya. Democracy as a Universal Value. Journal of Democracy 10.3 (1999):
10. Print.
Ura, Karma. Conference on Deepening Democracy in Asia. Paro. 12 Oct. 2009.
Speech.

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