Kenya Studies Review

Kenya Studies Review

ISSN: 2150-5764 (online)

Volume 1, Number 1, December 2009

Kenya Studies Review, Volume 1, Number 1 Contents 1. Foreword by Ambassador Peter Ogego 1 2. From the Editor-in-Chief 2 3. Editorial Board 5 4. From KESSA President 7 5. Constitution-Making in Contemporary Kenya: Lessons from the Twentieth Century by Robert Maxon 11 6. Post-Moi era Discourse Patterns in Kenyan Universities: A Nation crying for Organic Intellectuals by Mwangi Chege 31 7. Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development by Maurice N. Amutabi 55 8. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional politics in Kenya by Raymond Muhula 85 9. Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery by Kefa M. Otiso 107 10. Quality of Education and its Role in National Development: A Case study of Kenyas Educational Reforms by Peter Otiato Ojiambo 133 11. Book Reviews 151

Kenya Studies Review Kenya Studies Review (KSR) Kenya Studies Review (ISSN 2150-5764) is a bi-annual publication of Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA). It is an interdisciplinary journal whose major focus is on issues which are central to the development of Kenya. Its principal objective is to provide a forum for the exchange of ideas among scholars from a variety of intellectual persuasions and various disciplines, working on Kenya. The journal also encourages other contributors working on East Africa or those undertaking comparative analysis of Kenya and other African countries to contribute. Kenya Studies Review welcomes contributions which cut across disciplinary boundaries. Articles with a narrow focus and incomprehensible to people outside their discipline are unlikely to be accepted. It welcomes articles and other academic communications from scholars in Kenya and elsewhere regarding issues touching on Kenya directly and indirectly. The Review exists in the first instance to promote the extension of research and knowledge on Kenya. Relevant work from elsewhere will however also be considered. Contributions must be in English only. Editors: Maurice N. Amutabi Kefa O. Otiso Francis Koti Charles G. Manyara Central Washington University Bowling Green State University University of North Alabama Radford University

KSR Editorial Advisory Board Names Lisa Aubrey Patrick Dikirr Eunice Kamaara Karanja Rosemarie Khayiya-Ombwori Faith Maina George Mamboleo Christine Mathenge Benard Manyibe Martin Shanguhyia Frederick M. Nafukho Shadrack W. Nasong'o Mary Nyangweso Wangila Faith Wambura Ngunjiri John Mulaa Oscar Mwangi Peter Tirop Simatei Affiliations Arizona State University Binghamton University Moi University, Kenya Kenyatta University State University of New York Alabama A & M University Austin Peay State University Langston University College of William and Mary Texas A & M University Rhodes College, Memphis East Carolina University Eastern University The World Bank National University of Lesotho Moi University

Nicole Tami Auma Okwany Osaak Olumwullah Ruth Otunga Jerono Phylis Rotich Fred Walumbwa

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Institute of Social Studies, The Hague Miami University OH Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology North Carolina A & T State University Arizona State University

Editorial correspondence and manuscripts should be sent to: Dr. Maurice N. Amutabi, Kenya Studies Review Department of History, Central Washington University, 400 University Way, Ellensburg WA 98926 United States E-mail: amutabim@cwu.edu or Amutabi@yahoo.com

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Kenya Studies Review

Table of Contents
1. Foreword by Ambassador Peter Ogego...1 2. From the Editor-in-Chief.....3 3. From the Editors..5 4. From KESSA President...7 5. Constitution-Making in Contemporary Kenya: Lessons from the Twentieth Century by Robert Maxon....11 6. Post-Moi era Discourse Patterns in Kenyan Universities: A Nation crying for Organic Intellectuals by Mwangi Chege.31 7. Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development by Maurice N. Amutabi...55 8. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional politics in Kenya by Raymond Muhula85 9. Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery by Kefa M. Otiso.107 10. Quality of Education and its Role in National Development: A Case study of Kenyas Educational Reforms by Peter Otiato Ojiambo...133 11. Book Reviews Maurice Amutabi review of Rethinking Africas Globalization...151 Hannington Ochwada review of The NGO Factor in Africa155 Mary Nyangweso-Wangila review of Because of Honor.157

Kenya Studies Review

Kenya Studies Review From the Editor-in-Chief Maurice N. Amutabi, Ph.D Central Washington University Today marks the publication date of the inaugural issue of the Kenya Studies Review, an academic journal published by Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA) and hosted at Central Washington University. My immediate thanks go out to my fellow editors Drs. Kefa Otiso, Francis Koti and Charles Manyara as well as historian Robert Maxon. The four have been invaluable for helping in guiding the journal from initial planning to the first steps it is taking now. Our aim is that the journal will be the pre-eminent repository of knowledge on studies on Kenya and East Africa. The Kenya Studies Review is a bi-annual professional journal that publishes quality academic work research articles, book reviews and review essays - and seeks to disseminate the latest knowledge related to Kenya in order to help policy makers in development as well as stimulating scholarly engagements in theory and practice on Kenya. The journal seeks quantitative and/or qualitative research findings; conceptual or theoretical discussions; or program practices. Relevant topic areas (centered on development from any disciplinary approach but not limited to Kenya are welcome. The journal will operate on the traditional subscription-based model. It is very important to note that all submissions, upon approval by our peer review process, will be indexed in the regular indexing standards of the full-text repository of the United States National Library of Congress. We hope that many other growing indexers such as Google Scholar will also display our articles, making them more widely read and accessible than any other system. Our goal is to have a rapid peer review process, and we will make every effort to make an initial decision within 6 weeks of submission. Our inaugural issue offers five essays on development in Kenya. We are enormously grateful to Robert Maxon, Mwangi Chege, Peter Otiato, Kefa Otiso and Maurice Amutabi for writing excellent essays for this inaugural issue. I also want to thank all the book reviewers Hannington Ochwada, Mary Nyangweso and Eliza Johannes. Like we have done for this inaugural issue, our peer review process matches knowledgeable reviewers with submitted manuscripts to produce high quality articles of interest and social humanities, social and science and scientific merit. The process is confidential so that criticisms and revisions are made in the fairest manner possible. The final decision on publication will be made by the editors. We will look for submissions of interesting and important arts and humanities as well as social science and scientific information that hopefully will have application to development in Kenya. This focus does not deny the relevance of other relevant fields. Whether there are obvious development implications or not, high quality research of all types on Kenya as well as theoretical aspects will be fostered and presented with pride in the journal. One of the main goals of our endeavor is to cultivate cross disciplinary dialogues to enhance our understanding of development in Kenya from all disciplinary perspectives. Prior to today's inauguration Kenya Studies Review, there has been no single, dedicated place to discuss critical issues affecting Kenya. We have the opportunity to improve the quality of life of so many people in Kenya, especially those in disadvantaged situations such as women, children, disabled, nomadic pastoralists and indigenous people, like the Ogiek. The talent and determination of our readers is a resource with unlimited potential and we have this as a motive to produce and foster new ideas for the benefit of the Kenyan and international community.

The mission of KSR is to help shape the culture of medicine by demonstrating whether and how patient participation is necessary to achieving better health. KSR will publish research articles, editorials, narratives, case reports, reviews and updates on related research in other media. I look forward to a most interesting future for Kenya Studies Review. Our editorial board includes leading researchers and scholars on Kenya and East Africa. There is every reason to expect that we will set new standards for the study of Kenya and in the process improve research and scholarly discourse on Kenya. I thank our editorial board and our contributors and members of KESSA for their interest and hard work in supporting this admirable cause.

Kenya Studies Review From the Editors Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi (Central Washington University) Kefa O. Otiso (Bowling Green State University) Francis Koti (University of North Alabama) Charles Gichana Manyara (Radford University) KESSA is really delighted to introduce the inaugural issue of the Kenya Studies Review, a peerreviewed, subscription and limited openaccess online journal. KSR functions as an open forum where scholars and students on Kenya have opportunity to interrogate various issues affecting the country and its neighbors. The idea for KSR was born in the spring of 2006 when KESSA held its first meeting on the sideline of during the African Studies Association (ASA) meeting in San Francisco in 2006, and picked up in intensity at the next ASA meeting in New York. Members, led by Prof. Robert Maxon demanded for a journal that would articulate and present research on Kenya. Members were concerned about the obstacles faced by scholars working on Kenya. Articles on topics on Kenya were often rejected by African journals that found them too focused on Kenya, different from their usual fare on Africa-wide topics, making it hard for new and worthwhile work on Kenya to see publication. And scholars working on Kenya were often at institutions that could not afford increasingly costly journal subscriptions on journals on Kenya. As a result, it was harder than ever for them to stay abreast of the latest research in the area. We are pleased that our first issue reflects the disciplinary and topical breadth that we had hoped KSR would embrace. It features contributions from scholars in history, geography, education and rhetoric (English). Launching KSR required herculean work on the part of the editor-in-chief Maurice Amutabi, who had to work throughout December 2009 holidays. It also required the full cooperation of the editors and contributors as well as reviewers of the blind peerreview process. We are enormously grateful to the editorial advisory board members who solicited contributions, recommended readers, wrote pieces, and reviewed submissions for the journal. We are also indebted to the scores of scholars around the world who graciously agreed to participate in the peerreview process for us. Most of all, perhaps, we are grateful to all of the authors in this inaugural issue for having worked within such a short notice to produce world class articles. The first issue of KSR is a collection of five essays which serve as the springboard from which the journal will grow. In the current and future editions, KSR hopes to bring together the best available research on Kenya. The Journal will provide a forum for those at the cutting edge of research on Kenya.

Kenya Studies Review From KESSA President: Kenya in the Global Knowledge Economy By Kefa M. Otiso1 It is my pleasure to welcome you to this inaugural issue of the Kenya Studies Review (KSR), the flagship journal of the Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA). The journal is a critical piece in the development of KESSA into a fully fledged academic association since it will play a key role in meeting KESSA's core objective of advancing scholarly, scientific, and research work on the Republic of Kenya. Additionally, the journal will, hopefully, help KESSA to play a central role in Kenya's future development as the country jockeys for a more favorable position in the current global knowledge economy. In this economy, Kenya must do a better job of linking "scientific inquiry to commerce" if it hopes to prosper. 2 Once hailed as a placeless or globally equalizing economy that renders geography mute; it is now clear that geography is far from irrelevant since the production and consumption of knowledge as well as its benefits do favor specific places over others. In fact, this new economy, while very much active in creating and modifying existing geographies of economic activity, appears to be solidifying existing patterns of global economic inequality.3 This begs the question of how Kenya is doing in this economy and its future prospects in this century. There are many ways of measuring any country's wellbeing in the emerging information economy including its intellectual production (e.g, as measured by number of patents, basic and advanced research paper publications, number of journals and books produced) and the global rank of its tertiary institutions and research institutes. In terms of Kenya's intellectual production, as measured by the number of patents filed, the picture is mixed. On the downside, with 65 patents filed between January 1977 and December 2008, Kenya ranks 69th out of 193 countries in the world in patent production. On the positive side, this small number of patents ranks Kenya 3rd in Africa (out of 53 countries) in patent production behind South Africa and Egypt.4 Nigeria rounds up the top 4 African countries in terms of patent production. Yet while, the number of patents Kenya filed generally rose between 1977 and 2005, peaking at 16, they have declined ever since though still higher than their 1977 level. Moreover, while Kenya ranks high in patent production in Africa, it is sobering to note that South Africa's 3,456 patents in the 1977-2008 period, not only rank the country 26th in the World but are also over 50-times more KESSA President & Associate Professor of Geography at BowlingGreen State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403 USA.
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Caryle Murphy (Fall 2009). Science and Islam, Carnegie Reporter, vol. 5/no.3: 11-17.

Carmody, P. (2009). A New Socio-Economy in Africa? Thintegration and the Mobile Phone Revolution. IIIS Discussion Paper No. 279. Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS), Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland; Kefa M. Otiso and William G. Moseley (2009). " Examining Claims for Information and Communication Technology-Led Development in Africa." African Geographical Review, 28, 99116, 2009. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (March 26, 2009). " Patents By Country, State, and Year - All Patent Types (December 2008)", Parts A1, Granted: 01/01/1977 - 12/31/2008, online http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/cst_all.htm
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than Kenya's output. South Africa's strength in patent production is one more reason it is the only African country on the IMD's World Competitiveness Yearbook 2009.5 According to the African e-Journal Project6, there are 1,500 periodicals that are produced in Africa. Of these, 509 are produced in South Africa, 218 in Nigeria, 130 in Kenya, 39 in Ghana, and 29 in Egypt (Egypt's number is probably this low because this database mostly includes English journals). As these data show, Kenya once again ranks third, with notable change that Nigeria now ranks second in this category. While, this is a respectable position for Kenya, it is noteworthy that most of the periodicals produced in the country are in the sciences. Besides, the scarcity of humanities and social science journals, few of the country's periodicals last long, and the existing journals are far from adequate for the country's academic and research needs; hence the need for a journal such as the Kenya Studies Review. South Africa's lead in patents and journal production is also mirrored in the high rank of its tertiary institutions, with one of its universities ranked in the top 500 globally, and another five in the top 1,000 globally. No other African country, including Kenya, has a tertiary institution in top 1,000.7 But within Africa, Kenya's tertiary institutions are relatively wellranked. Thanks to Strathmore University, which comes in at position 16 in Africa well ahead of the University of Nairobi which is ranked 29th in the continent, Kenya is once comes in third after South Africa and Egypt. But overall, the poor global standing of African universities globally suggests that unless Kenya and other African countries are careful, they will be marginal players in the global knowledge economy. Fortunately, Kenya need not be permanently consigned to the margins of the new economy. Indeed, according to a recent study by Research Life, Kenya is one of the developing countries that have recorded significant growth in the output of its scientists.8 Kenya's growing scientific research output is due to many factors including its being home to major international research institutions such as ICIPE (International Center for Insect Physiology and Ecology) and KEMRI (Kenya Medical Research Institute), both of which are most likely responsible for some of Kenya's patents. Moreover, the country has benefited from hosting the world headquarters of some UN agencies such as UNEP and, as a former British colony, Kenya is "fortunate" to have English (the leading global language of science) as one of its official languages. While the country spends a pittance on research, with proper management and funding, the country's research institutes and tertiary institutions can increase their intellectual production and help the
5

IMD (2009). The World Competitiveness Yearbook 2009, www.imd.ch/wcy09.

A collaborative effort of Michigan State University, the Association of African Universities, and the African Studies Association that seeks to make journals published in Africa and about Africa more available to scholars worldwide -- http://africa.msu.edu/AEJP/index.php. According to this database, another 179 periodicals on Africa are produced in the USA, 129 in the UK, 60 in France, 34 in the Netherlands, 33 in Germany, 27 in Belgium, 13 in Canada, 11 in Sweden, 10 in Switzerland, 10 in Portugal, 9 in Spain, 7 in India, 6 in Japan, 5 in Australia, 4 in China, 4 in Brazil and 2 in Russia. CCHS-CSIC (2009). Ranking Web of World Universities, July 2009, http://www.webometrics.info/Distribution_by_Country.asp 8 Shira Tabachnikoff (2009). Research output in developing countries reveals 194 percent increase in 5 years, http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/2009-07/e-roi070209.php
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Kenya Studies Review country reap greater rewards from its knowledge production. This possibility can most certainly benefit from greater cooperation between scholars in Kenya and the Diaspora and the Kenya Studies Review is one timely avenue for such cooperation.

Kenya Studies Review Constitution-Making in Contemporary Kenya: Lessons from the Twentieth Century By Robert Maxon* Abstract The drafting and implementation of a new constitution ranks high on the public agenda in contemporary Kenya. The party leaders who formed the government of national unity in early 2008 agreed to produce a new constitution that would meet the aspirations and needs of Kenyas varied peoples and regions and facilitate national development in an equitable manner. Nevertheless, the completion of a new constitution is likely to prove a daunting task if past experience of constitution-making is any guide. This article offers significant perspectives as to potential difficulties in the process of developing a new constitution through a study of twentieth century examples. Four problems are examined which helped to stall or derail the process of constitution-making: the failure of Kenyas political elite to reach consensus, the inability of outside experts to move the process to a successful conclusion, the lack of majority support for majimbo or utaguzi schemes, and the failure to thoroughly incorporate democratic principles. These issues remain relevant at the end of the first decade of the new century and will likely prove difficult to surmount in the quest to bring a new constitutional dispensation to Kenya. Key words: Constitution; Federalism (Majimbo); KANU; KADU; Tom Mboya *Robert Maxon is a professor of history at West Virginia University, where he teaches African history. Citation Format Maxon, Robert (2009). Constitution-Making in Contemporary Kenya: Lessons from the Twentieth Century. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 11-30.

Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction The challenge of drafting and implementing a new constitution ranks high on the agenda of current government leaders in Kenya. The need for a new constitution has been recognized for the past two decades, but various issues and roadblocks have held back the process of constitution-making. The efforts that culminated in the 2005 referendum seemingly left Kenya at a dead end. However, the election campaign of 2007 and its bloody aftermath highlighted the need for a new constitution. The party leaders who formed the coalition government of national unity in early 2008 gave a commitment to produce a new constitution. As a result, a committee of experts was charged to draft a new constitution. Some progress has been made in this new constitution-making initiative as a draft constitution was published for public debate in November 2009. Nevertheless, it is far too early to be optimistic that the outcome will be a new and efficient governing document that will meet the nations current and future needs.1 The difficulties and tensions that beset the current government a year and a half after its formation suggest that the current initiative faces formidable obstacles. Yet the fact that the process has gotten underway gives grounds for some hope. This hope may be disappointed, however, if those charged with constitution-making continue to ignore or fail to understand the lessons of the past. This article seeks, therefore, to look to the past as a means of provide some valuable perspectives as to why efforts to craft a new constitution in the twenty-first century have yet to bear fruit. The lessons of the 1950s and 1960s offer important perspectives which should not be ignored. The two decades witnessed the inauguration of the Lyttleton (1954) and Lennox-Boyd (1957) constitutions as well as the constitution implemented as a result of the 1960 Lancaster House Conference (Lancaster House I). In 1963, the self government constitution was inaugurated on Madaraka Day (June 1) while December 12 witnessed the coming into force of the independence constitution. In examining these colonial era constitutions, the article will highlight problems of constitution-making that have continued to stall the process. Four issues, in particular, will be addressed. These include the failure of Kenyas political elite to reach consensus on constitutional goals and the means to attain them, including the inability to compromise. A second focus will be the role of outside experts in the constitution-making. Despite hopes to the contrary, foreign constitutional experts provided negligible impact on these twentieth century constitutions. Thirdly, majimbo and utaguzi, while not lacking in support among Kenyas political elite, have never enjoyed the support of an overwhelming majority of the population. Insistence on such principles as crucial to constitution-making seemingly flies in the face of democratic norms. Finally, a key element in the lack of success of past efforts to provide Kenya with a workable constitution that would stand the test of time was the failure to implement key elements of democratic governance. Lack of Consensus The ability to reach consensus on a constitutional model has historically never been easy or quick to achieve. Nevertheless, agreement among political leaders as to constitutional forms and goals has always been of critical significance in constitution-making efforts in the twentieth

Committee of Experts on Constitutional Review, Harmonised Draft Constitution of Kenya, 17 November 2009.

Kenya Studies Review century or earlier. For Kenya, the experience of the twentieth century indicates a lack of consensus as to the goal of constitution-making and the specifics of constitutions. Looking at the 1950s, to start, the model set forth by the British government in 1951 for future constitutional development clearly laid down the achievement of consensus as a key ingredient in the process. Secretary of State (SofS) for the Colonies James Griffiths made this clear in announcing British policy and plans in May of that year. He proclaimed that decisions as to Kenyas future constitutions would rest on firm foundations if they were based on agreement among the leaders of Kenyas racial groups (Africans, Arabs, Asians, and Europeans). He thus proposed the establishment of a body where all Kenyas people would be represented; it would consult and make constitutional recommendations to the colonial state and ultimately to the British government. An independent chairman from outside the colony would be appointed, and the SofS was prepared to obtain the services of a constitutional expert to advise on technical questions, if the delegates desired. The consultative body, Griffiths hoped, would be able to reach agreement that could be reflected in a new constitution that could be brought into force either in 1956 or an earlier date, if there was general agreement to do so.2 While agreement by all Kenyas racially defined political groups was thus the goal set out at the start of the 1950s, it proved impossible to achieve. The declaration of the State of Emergency in October of 1952 and the subsequent outbreak of the Mau Mau rebellion caused the Kenya and British governments to drop the idea of a multi-racial conference or any kind of interracial negotiation. For example, then SofS Oliver Lyttleton told African Legislative Council (LegCo) members in October 1952 that it would not do any good to call together a constitutional body which meets to disagree.3 In March of 1953, following notable reverses for the security forces of the colonial state, Lyttleton agreed with governor Sir Evelyn Baring that while no constitutional changes should be undertaken without the concurrence of representatives of all Kenyas racial groups, it did not seem practicable during the emergency to hold talks of the nature contemplated in the Griffiths agreement.4 The British and Kenya governments revised this assessment during the following year as the problems facing them as a result of the on-going insurgency called for constitutional reform. Nevertheless, the history of the 1954 Lyttleton and 1957 Lennox-Boyd constitutions was marked by an absence of consensus among Kenyas racially defined political elite. This lack of consensus and the likelihood that Kenyas political leaders would not be able to agree caused Baring and the SofS for whom the constitutions were named to work out in advance what they wished to see implemented. There was no real attempt to promote negotiations among the leaders of political groups in Nairobi. Negotiations involving Kenyas political elite therefore proved to be a matter of the SofS imposing the plans on them. In both instances, the Colonial Office (CO) and Baring concluded, in advance, that the assent of some racial leaders was more significant than others. In both 1954 and 1957, the European political leaders as well as those representing the Asian population had to be brought on board. African agreement was not

Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., 488 (31 May 1951): 408-09.

Verbatim Report of Meeting of SofS with African Representative Members on 30October 1952, British National Archives (BNA): CO 822/460. 4 Baring to SofS, secret and personal, 24 February 1953 and Lyttleton to Baring, secret and personal, 5 March 1953, BNA: CO 822/598.
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deemed critical. Thus in neither 1954 nor 1957 was the assent of African LegCo members obtained, but the colonial rulers went ahead to impose the constitutions. In both instances, this strategy of non-negotiated, imposed constitutions proved unsuccessful. African opposition and refusal to accept the Lyttleton and Lennox-Boyd constitutions doomed both to a much shorter life than their planners had hoped. With the breakdown of the Lennox-Boyd constitution and the multi-racial philosophy upon which it was based in 1959, a different path for constitutional change was set. The SofSs acceptance of the need for a London constitutional conference where all Kenyas political elite would meet to address the colonys constitutional future seemed to promise a return to the Griffiths policy set out at the start of the decade. With the start of the first Lancaster House constitutional conference in London in early 1960, hopes of a negotiated constitutional agreement quickly evaporated. There was, unlike in 1954 and 1957, some negotiation between the largely racially defined political groups represented at the conference. However, this inter-racial bargaining produced no bargain.5 Failure to achieve a comprehensive agreement for a new constitution caused SofS Iain Macleod to impose a new constitution. In a major departure from the 1950s, however, the SofS now viewed African agreement to his plan as most significant. The all European United Party delegation refused to accept the new plan which provided for an African majority in a reconstituted LegCo, but Macleod did not let this European opposition stand in his way.6 Although some of the European delegates (those representing the New Kenya Party) accepted Macleods imposition, the lack of agreement among the political elite over Kenyas constitutional future continued to characterize the post-Lancaster House political arena. The new constitution was implemented in April of 1961, but by that time, demands for constitutional change had become overwhelming. Yet the implementation demonstrated divisions among the political elite. That divided elite, now predominantly African, found organizational focus in two political parties, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) and the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU). Moreover, events from April to September moved the elite far apart in terms of a desired constitutional framework for a now soon to be independent Kenya. These divisions, which initially emerged in the attitudes of the leaders to the two parties to the formation of a government under the terms of the Lancaster House constitution, manifested themselves in bitter disputes in and outside the LegCo following KADUs decision to form a government in April. The division became clear with regard to constitutional issues at the close of the Nairobi talks (September-October 1961) held under the chairmanship of the governor. The aim of the talks was to achieve agreement on the constitutional means of moving to self government and independence, among other things, but the talks broke down in October when KADU leaders interjected their new constitutional vision of regionalism or majimbo at the talks. KADU leaders insisted that specific principles associated with their new regionalist ideal must guide future constitution-making. This principle was rejected by KANU leaders, thus setting the stage for a long and controversial struggle over the future shape of the independence constitution at the second Lancaster House conference in early 1962. There, for the first time, there was extensive negotiation involving the leaders of Kenyas political elite and the British government, led by now SofS Reginald Maudling. Nevertheless, the interchange of views that took place in plenary sessions and the various committees set up at Record of Meeting Between the SofS and United Party on 15 February 1960, BNA: CO 822/2359 and Macleod to Macmillan, 16 February 1960, BNA: PREM 11/3031.
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Kenya Studies Review the behest of the CO to facilitate agreement on a constitution produced no agreement whatsoever. This was largely the result of the stance of the KADU delegation. Its leader, Ronald Ngala, adamantly refused any agreement unless KADUs basic principle was accepted: that Kenya should have a federal or majimbo constitution. KADUs intransigence irritated and frustrated the KANU leadership and Maudling, but Ngala and company refused to budge. Moreover, KADU kept secret its detailed plan for a majimbo constitution, not revealing the whole of the partys constitutional model until more than three weeks of the conference had passed. In the end, Maudling and his advisors squeezed out of Jomo Kenyatta and his KANU colleagues acceptance of a two house parliament and the creation of other governing authorities for future regions. Building on that acceptance, Maudling produced a constitutional framework that both delegations reluctantly accepted. For KANU, the acceptance of the framework reflected, according to party vice president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, a desire to move quickly to self government and independence. When the party won power through the ballot box, it would be free to change the constitution to the unitary form it desired.7 For KADU, acceptance of the framework owed much to the formula for constitutional amendments included in the framework by the British.8 Even then, more of the KADU delegation refused to sign the framework agreement than did the KANU delegates. A key element accepted at Lancaster House II was that a constitution based on the framework would be worked out by a coalition government with equal numbers of KANU and KADU ministers. Given the lack agreement at Lancaster House this was a daunting prospect. KADU and KANU ministers remained divided over the details of the constitution, and it took a year (April 1962 to April 1963) to finalize the constitutional document that came into effect on 1 June 1963 (but was never completely implemented). Here, as in earlier episodes of constitutionmaking, the intervention of the British CO was critical. Maudling soon recognized that disagreement between the parties and among political leaders was likely to make the achievement of a constitution by consensus very difficult, if not impossible. Thus when he visited Kenya in July of 1962 to try to speed up the process of constitution-making, he forced the leaders of both parties to agree on a way to overcome disagreements as to specifics of the constitution. This was that if the two parties could not agree, the SofS would impose a decision which KANU and KADU leaders would accept as final.9 That decision provided the basis for finalizing the most controversial aspects of the self government constitution. Maudlings successor, Duncan Sandys, gave final decisions on twenty-five constitutional matters in dispute when he visited Nairobi in March of 1963.10 The fact that many significant aspects of the constitution were decided by the SofS pointed to future problems in the achievement of a consensus as to what should constitute the independence constitution. Potential problems became real as soon as KANU took control of the

Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1967), 229. Extract from Minutes of the SofSs Sixth Meeting with Ministers of the Kenya Government, 9 July 1962, BNA: CO 822/2239.
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These were formally announced on 8 March. Included in the SofSs decisions was his edict that each region should have control of its own civil service. East African Standard (EAS), 9 March 1963 and Daily Nation (DN), 9 March 1963. Decisions of SofS on Points Referred to Him for Settlement, BNA: CO 822/3216.
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government apparatus created by the new constitution following victory in the 1963 House of Representatives and Senate elections. KANU ministers quickly set a goal of changing the constitution in significant ways so as to eliminate majimbo. They were not successful in their initial attempts to change the constitution since KADU leaders were strongly opposed and the British government reluctant to make wholesale changes. This left the KANU governments demands for changes in the self government constitution to be considered at the third Lancaster House constitutional conference that opened in London in September 1963. The Kenya government was represented at Lancaster House III by a strong ministerial delegation led by Prime Minister Kenyatta while the opposition delegation, much smaller in numbers, was led by Ngala and Masinde Muliro, KADUs vice president. The conference opened on 25 September, and when it came time to consider the significant changes in the self government constitution demanded by the Kenyatta government, SofS Sandys and his advisers decided not to hold further plenary or committee sessions after the seventh plenary session on 30 September.11 Instead, Sandys and Governor Malcolm MacDonald met separately with the government and opposition delegations to try to negotiate agreement regarding the constitutional changes demanded by the Kenya government. In all, the KANU ministers called for more than twenty changes. Most controversial were the demands for a change to a single civil service commission for both regions and central government (rather than the eight called for in the self government constitution), complete central government control over the police, that executive authority of the regions be vested in civil secretaries (the post created in the constitution to replace provincial commissioners), and that in terms of the executive Kenya should become a monarchy at independence (KADU favored a republic).12 In a separate paper, the Kenya government put forward its proposal for changing the requirements for constitutional amendments. These would now require 65% in both houses of parliament with the amendment being submitted to a national referendum if the bill did not receive the 65% in both houses.13 The KADU delegation strongly opposed the latter change as well as the proposed amendments relating to the police, civil service commissions, and executive authority. Despite the efforts of Sandys and MacDonald, no agreement proved possible as the conference moved well into October. Both KADU and KANU delegations threatened to abandon the talks and return to Kenya. In the end, the threat of the latter proved most influential in forcing the British to come down on the side of the Kenya government. The result was another imposed constitution which left KADU leaders most dissatisfied. The independence constitution provided for a single public service commission and gave the central government control over the police. In terms of amendments, the SofS now decided that while basic rights of the individual, the judiciary, tribal authorities, districts, the senate, and the structure of regions should remain with
11

Record of Seventh Meeting Held on 30 September 1963 at 10:30 am, BNA: CO 822/3138. K.I.C. (63) 2, Amendments to be Made to the Present Constitution. Memorandum by the Government of Kenya, 25 September 1963, BNA: CAB 133/215. K.I.C. (63) 3, Future Amendments of the Independence Constitution. Memorandum by the Government of Kenya, 25 September 1963, BNA: CAB 133/215.
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Kenya Studies Review the 75%/90% majorities for amendment, all other amendments would require 75% in both houses. Significantly, this applied to the powers of regional assemblies. The independence constitution also provided for the option of a national referendum which required approval by 65% of the votes cast.14 This final constitution of the colonial era thus had in common with earlier constitutions that it was imposed by the colonial power. After long discussions, KADU dropped its refusal to accept the new constitution. This was not because of agreement with many of the changes that resulted from the conference. Rather, it was a product of a now divided party leadership and the fact that some of the amendments opposed by the KADU delegation were not implemented by Britain (e.g. executive authority in the regions was vested in the regional assemblys finance and establishment committee rather than in the civil secretary). Most important was the promise made by Kenyatta to quickly implement the constitution; the latter had been a major demand made by KADU prior to and during the conference. The prime minister promised to transfer all departments and services that were constitutionally mandated regional services to the regions (with the exception of education) by 1 December 1963. The necessary funds would also be transferred from the center.15 On 19 October; Kenyatta told the SofS that he accepted the amendments on behalf of his government. He and his colleagues would make no further amendments, he pledged, except in so far as these were shown to be absolutely necessary in light of subsequent experience.16 The failure to agree that marked Lancaster House III thus constituted a continuation of what had characterized constitutional talks since 1951. Kenyas political elite not only failed to agree. More often than not, they refused to even enter meaningful negotiations, bargain, or compromise. In this instance, the failure of the Kenya government to compromise, even from a position of strength, set a most unhappy precedent for independent Kenya.

Failure of Expert Assistance The lack of success in constitutional negotiations during the pre-independence years also owed much to the failure of non-Kenyan experts to move the process to any kind of agreement. Two examples illustrate this point as constitutional advisers appointed by the CO were not very helpful to the process of consensus building at the first Lancaster House conference in 1960 and the second conference of 1962. Prior to Lancaster House I, the CO tapped Professor W. J. M. Mackenzie, a political scientist from Manchester University, as constitutional adviser. Besides offering advice to the CO, Professor Mackenzie paid two visits two Kenya during the second half of 1959 and met with leaders of all the racially defined political groups. His visits and advice certainly helped the CO prepare for the conference. His suggestions, for example, set the agenda for the conference. 17 However; his interaction with the Kenya political leaders did nothing to bring them to agreement as to Kenyas constitutional future.

Great Britain, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmd 2156 (London: HMSO, 1963), 19-22. 16 Kenyatta to Sandys, 19 October 1963, BNA: CO 822/3139. This, like the other letter of 19 October, proved to be a worthless promise.
17

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At the conference itself, Mackenzie circulated papers setting out possible plans for the franchise and legislature under a new constitutional arrangement, but these failed to draw support from the two most important groups at the conference: the African Elected Member (AEM) delegation and the New Kenya Party (NKP) led by Michael Blundell.18 The NKP delegates and the AEM leaders did later meet and attempt to strike agreement of these matters, but Professor Mackenzie played no part in bringing them together or in the talks themselves. These eventually produced no agreement In the end, Macleod imposed a settlement at the conference that was accepted by the AEMs and the NKP after a good bit of arm twisting and clever dealing by the SofS. Mackenzie played only a small part in the new constitution as Macleod and his CO advisers drafted and pushed through the plan that provided a breakthrough to a LegCo that promised to have an African majority. Nevertheless, Professor Mackenzie can be credited with one success at the first Lancaster House conference. That was in his efforts to make sure that federalism, or majimbo, was not a part of discussions. He recognized that the United Party had made devolution of power to local government bodies a part of its constitutional plan following its formation in August 1959. This was largely an initiative associated with former members of the Progressive Local Government Party (PLGP), successor to the Federal Independence Party (FIP), who formed a backbone of the United Party. Mackenzie urged party leaders and the officials at the CO to avoid discussion of an utaguzi system for Kenya as it was likely to raise emotions on all sides and provoke strong opposition from African and Asian delegates.19 While the United Party leaders actually had little enthusiasm for utaguzi by the time the conference started, Mackenzies main success was in convincing the leadership of the NKP, particularly Blundell and Wilfred Havelock, that the issue should not be raised. This was significant because some NKP leaders had toyed with such ideas in late 1958 and early 1959. Havelock devised at least three schemes for devolution during that period. The last, completed in January of 1959, was actually submitted to the CO.20 By the end of 1959, however, Mackenzies negative attitude convinced Blundell and Havelock that they should not support any form of federalism or devolution.21 Professor Mackenzies opposition to federalism for Kenyas future meant that the CO did not consider him when seeking a constitutional adviser for the second Lancaster House

SofS to Officer Administering Government, Kenya, telegram, 2 February 1960, BNA: CO 822/2354. EAS, 3 February 1960. 19 Secret Memo, enclosure in Mackenzie to J. F. Buist (East African Department of the CO), 29 September 1959, BNA: CO 822/1474. Wilfred Havelock, Adjustment to the Constitution, 12 January 1959, BNA: CO 822/1861 and Papers of Sir Wilfred Havelock (Havelock Papers), KNA: MSS 12/11. Mackenzie told Blundell, for example, that devolution or provincial autonomy for the white highlands would never work as Europeans hoped. There were far more Africans resident there than Europeans. Blundell to Havelock, 25 September 1959, Papers of Sir Michael Blundell (Blundell Papers), Box 5/4, Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford (RH), Mss. Afr. s 746. Havelock to Mackenzie, secret, 27 October 1959, Havelock Papers, KNA: MSS 12/12.
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Kenya Studies Review conference. Instead the SofS turned to a former colonial civil servant then serving as legal officer for the Commonwealth Relations Office, Sir Ralph Hone. Hone, a former attorney general of Uganda, had considerable experience with constitutions, notably the federal system established in Malaya. He spent parts of December 1961 and January 1962 in Kenya, and attended Lancaster House II as CO adviser. Hone proved less successful than Mackenzie in bringing the main parties to any form of agreement either before or after the start of the conference. From his arrival in Nairobi, his lack of sympathy for KADUs majimbo ideal was apparent. After an initial submission on 11 December, KADU leaders had nothing to do with Hone thereafter.22 KADU hired their own constitutional adviser, Dr. Edward Zellweger, and worked secretly with him to develop the constitutional plan they presented at Lancaster House II. Hone worked more closely with KANU, particularly those allied to Tom Mboya, as the party put in shape its constitutional model. Hone thus had some influence on the KANU plan, but not KADUs. He also sent reports to the CO in January setting out what he thought might be the positions of KADU and KANU at the conference.23 The hope in London was that these could be used by the CO as a means of finding some common ground between the constitutional plans of the two parties that might lead to agreement. This never materialized, but Hones main contribution to the preparations for the conference was in his advice to the CO regarding KANUs likely stance in London. Hones discussions with Mboya convinced him that the party was deeply divided between moderates and radicals. He reported to London that the moderate elements under Tom Mboyas leadership supported by the Europeans in the party were gravely worried over the activities of the radicals led by Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Paul Ngei, and others on the left of the party who were, Hone concluded, almost certainly getting considerable financial and other support from Communist sources. What was particularly dangerous about this left wing faction in KANU was that they would likely not abide by the partys official position on land; after independence free land would be found for the landless and poor.24 This analysis led Hone to recommend to the CO that British strategy at the conference should be to provoke a split in KANU and encourage Mboya, James Gichuru, and the moderates in KANU to join forces with the moderate elements in KADU.25 This recommendation was adopted by SofS Maudling prior to the start of the conference as one of the British aims. It helps to explain why KADUs constitutional plan received some sympathy from the CO, which was, it must be emphasized, totally lacking in support for KADUs majimbo plan for Kenyas future constitution. That no split in KANU nor union of moderates occurred in London was largely the result of KADUs stubborn and uncooperative tactics at the conference. Hones contributions at Lancaster House II, slanted to the KANU

K.A.D.U. Initial Submission to Sir Ralph Hone, 11 December 1961, Blundell Papers, Box 19/4, RH, Mss. Afr. s 746. 25 Hone, Conference Prospects, nd, enclosure in Griffith-Jones to Monson, secret and personal, 15 January 1962, BNA: CO 822/2238.
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position, did nothing to promote consensus or agreement. For example, a compromise plan drafted by Hone dealing with the subject of regional powers in March was a non-starter.26 As the constitutional adviser did little to promote agreement, it was left to SofS Maudling to impose a settlement. Rather than a constitution, Maudling prescribed a framework on which a new constitution could be based. He forced both KANU and KADU leaders to agree by offering both parties something that they had advocated. Reflecting the thinking of Prime Minister Macmillan and himself, Maudling made the requirements for amending the constitution very difficult to achieve, as noted earlier in this article. A coalition government, with equal numbers of ministers from KANU and KADU, was given the task of finalizing the constitution. As noted earlier, this proved difficult as the parties remained deeply split over the specifics of a federal constitution for Kenya. Such was the lack of success with a CO appointed constitutional adviser, moreover, that the appointment of such an adviser for the third Lancaster House conference was not seriously considered. Popular Support for Majimbo? The difficulties encountered in framing a constitution based on the Lancaster House II framework highlighted an essential factor in modern Kenya history: the lack of broad-based, majority support for majimbo or utaguzi. Such constitutional plans did not lack for advocates during the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s, just as in the present day. However, the often impassioned advocacy for systems providing for provincial autonomy or devolution of power and responsibility from the central government to local government bodies never had the support of anything close to a majority of Kenyas population. For the 1940s and 1950s schemes, moreover, the European settler advocates were never able to convince a substantial portion of the colonys European population that these were in their best interests. During the 1946 to 1948 period, for example, the European Electors Union considered constitutional plans that would have provided self government for the white highlands while leaving the rest Kenya under colonial control. Such provincial autonomy plans were meant to give Europeans the greatest possible measure of control over their own affairs. A key to supporting such a political system was to make sure that the land in the white highlands stayed in European control.27 The Electors Unions Kenya Plan, published in 1949 advocated, on the other hand, the greatest degree of local government autonomy in non-native areas of the colony under European leadership. Development and control of local government was seen as key to this which was to provide the means for the greatest possible executive control by the European community.28 These ideals failed to win support from the majority of settlers, and the leadership of the colonial state and the CO were far from being in favor of provincial autonomy or devolution. The CO and colonial state had a far different model in mind as the 1950s opened: multi-racialism
26

Record of Third Meeting of Sub-Committee on Governing Authorities Held at 10 am on12 March 1962, BNA: CO 822/2382. EAS, 13 March 1962. 27 Electors Union, Notes on Prospective Self Government for Kenya Colony, 1946, Electors Union Papers, Box 32/2, RH, Mss. Afr. s 596 and ELECTORS UNION, Final Report of the Constitutional advance Sub-Committee, Confidential, 1948, Blundell Papers, Box 22/1, RH, Mss. Afr. s 746.
28

Electors Union, Kenya Plan (Nairobi: East African Standard, 1949), 13.

Kenya Studies Review under a unitary system of government. Majimbo ideals remained the property of a small minority among the European population. Influential voices of political leaders such as Earnest Vasey, Blundell, and Havelock were ranged against it.29 Nevertheless, the 1950s brought further calls for provincial autonomy from a minority of Europeans. This was a product of continuing European fears for the future brought about by the Mau Mau rebellion and a strong opposition from the majimbo advocates to the ideals on which the policy of multi-racialism was based: inter-racial sharing of political power in the future. The leaders of the White Highlands Party were the advocates of federalism. Farmers in the Londiani and Fort Ternan areas of western Kenya, such as B. P. Roberts and A. T. Culwick, continued their advocacy following the partys merger with the Kenya Empire Party in February of 1954 to form the FIP. The leader of the Kenya Empire Party (later chairman of the FIP), Nairobi construction firm owner L. E. Vigar, was not an enthusiast for provincial autonomy, and this proved a source of weakness for the party. However, Roberts used Vigars weekly magazine, then called Comment, to promote federal ideas and to appeal to Europeans. As a party wedded to segregation and white supremacy, the FIP made no attempt to gain support from African or Asian inhabitants of Kenya. Right from the first, the partys federalist message was heavily laden with anti-Asian rhetoric. At the time of its formation, the party leaders had not worked out a plan for provincial autonomy in any kind of detail. They maintained, nevertheless, that provincial autonomy would appeal to the African population in particular. Africans, Culwick and Roberts maintained, did not want to be governed by Europeans or to utilize western political forms. The African population would be happy if they were organized into provinces on a tribal basis with African customary law combined with government by their own councils assisted and controlled by European officials appointed by the British government. The European, on the other hand, was immediately capable of governing his own area.30 Culwick, Roberts and friends eventually did work out a provincial autonomy scheme in more detail. In both 1954 and 1955, the FIP produced a federal framework for Kenyas future as part of party policy. The 1954 plan called for separate governments for Africans and Europeans. The former was essential, it was asserted, as African political systems demanded political forms which are not satisfactory to Europeans.31 The following year, the FIP published a more detailed scheme in the form of a pamphlet emphasizing separate development and justified by crude racist statements.32

No one was more outspoken in opposition to provincial autonomy and those who advocated it than M. F. Hill, Editor of the Kenya Weekly News (KWN). 30 KWN, 26 March 1954. L. E. Vigar, What is Truth? Comment, 1 April 1954; L. E. Vigar, Whither Kenya? Comment, 27 May 1954. L. E. Vigar, The Federal Independence Party, Kenya Comment, 21 November 1958. Plan for Constitutional Development of Kenya, copy in BNA: CO 822/1200. Extract from Kenya Special Branch Headquarters Fortnightly Intelligence Summary, No. 19/54 for the Period 8 to 21 September 1954, BNA: CO 822/844. Comment, 2 September 1954. Right at the start of the pamphlet the party stated its first principle. This was: We will never accept the principle of the Asian having any part in the governance of either the African or
21
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29

The FIP leadership claimed, however, that its stance did enjoy considerable backing among Europeans living in Kenya. Pressured by its opponents to prove this claim, the party sought to use the 1956 European election as a means to demonstrate the FIP appeal. Party leader Roberts stood against the leader of the European elected members in the LegCo, Blundell, and Vigar opposed Blundell ally Norman Harris for the Nairobi South seat. Party policy set out in 1955 was amplified by an expanded plan for provincial autonomy in the form of a new pamphlet. The white electorate was told Your Future Depends... On the General Election of 1956. The partys federalism was designed to support certain core principles: that the white highlands were to be irrefutably for European settlement, the halting of Asian immigration to Kenya, racially segregated schools, and total opposition to racial intermarriage.33 In the election European voters failed to support the FIP position. The party won no seats in LegCo and but 21% of votes cast.34 Clearly there was little support for provincial autonomy among Kenyans. To make things worse for the FIP, the party split soon after the election. Roberts and his allies sought the expulsion of Vigar, and the latter withdrew together with his supporters to form the Reform Party. This new party called for continued white supremacy but made no reference to majimbo in its program.35 Beset by these difficulties, FIP leaders decided on a change of course during 1957. Their failure in the election convinced Roberts, Culwick and their colleagues that they must make a direct approach to the CO since it seemed that everything done by the Kenya Government was devised on some desk in Whitehall and then sent to Kenya for implementation. Thus Major F. W. Day, a coffee farmer and rancher, visited the CO in April to plead the FIP case. He met with W. A. C. Mathieson of the East African Department. Mathieson suggested to Day that what he and the FIP really wanted was not a self governing province in the white highlands but a European county in the highlands with a county council with full powers over education and other social services and such matters as agricultural practices and extension services with a government at the center controlled by civil service officials.36 The second reason for the FIP change was the result of the first African elections which had seen eight African members join the LegCo in March and adopt a united nationalist stance. the European. FIP, Policy and Constitutional Principles (Nairobi: W. Boyd & Co., 1955), 2. Extract from Kenya Special Branch Monthly Intelligence Summary No 8/55, BNA: CO 822/844. FIP, Your Future Depends... On the General Election of 1956, copy in BNA: CO 822/1860. Extract from Kenya Special Branch Headquarters Intelligence Summary No. 4/56 for April and May 1956, BNA: CO 822/844. KWN, 5 October 1956; The Election Results, New Comment, 5 October 1956. Baring to Lennox-Boyd, secret and personal, 8 October 1956, BNA: CO 822/1201. Extract from Kenya Special Branch Headquarters Monthly Intelligence Summary No 10 for the period 1 to 30 October 1956 and No 11 for the Period 1 to 30 November 1956, BNA: CO 822/844.
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Mathieson to Baring, confidential, 26 April 1957, BNA: CO 822/1860.

Kenya Studies Review Day worked with Roberts, Culwick and western Kenya farmer A. E. C. Prescott to put a new plan before the Kenya public; the emphasis was now utaguzi. It was ready by late June and struck a very anti-African tone from start to finish. The FIP thinkers claimed that most Africans were still very primitive while the FIP plan would insure that civilized modes of life shall spread.37 As far as the constitutional future was concerned, this should now rest on the development of local government so as to decentralize administration as much as possible. However, only the European dominated local government bodies were then viewed as capable of running their areas efficiently. FIP leaders believed that Africans would be incapable of doing the same in the African areas of the colony. Thus the colonial administrative system would continue.38 FIP leaders moved further to develop their devolution plan in 1958. The party identified the extension of powers for county councils in European settled areas and African District Councils in the African land units as the basis for its revised policy.39 The change in policy was accompanied by a change in name. A party conference at Nakuru in May authorized a change from FIP to the PGLP.40 A month later, the new party published its constitutional blueprint in the form of a pamphlet titled Kenya Constitution. It had much in common with the 1957 plan and called for the rapid development of local government and Local Financial Control in all areas to the fullest extent possible with sound administration.41 Despite the change of name and policy emphasis, neither the CO nor the majority of Kenyans supported the PLGP plan. British policy for future constitutional change had been set out in the Lennox-Boyd constitution. Any alteration in the constitution had to command reasonable support among all races. The PLGPs utaguzi plan did not. It would be very costly as many services provided by government would be duplicated.42 There was never any possibility that the new plan would be considered for Kenyas future as SofS Lennox-Boyd told Major Day.43 Nevertheless, the changing Kenya political scene that marked 1959 meant that utaguzi ideals would continue to be voiced by the PLGP enthusiasts. The April announcement that a constitutional conference would be held to plot Kenyas constitutional future helped produce a realignment among European politicians. Thus the NKP emerged as a multi-racial party under European leadership. The PLGP leaders opposed the party and its goal of power sharing among the racial groups, and they made common cause with Group Captain L. R. Briggs and his allies in forming the United Party (UP) in August of 1959. While Briggs became party leader, the PLGP stalwart Roberts was deputy leader and Culwick chairman. These PLGP enthusiasts played an influential role as the UP quickly put before the Kenya public its constitutional plan. An August pamphlet was marked by strong opposition to
37

A. T. Culwick, F. W. Day, A. E. C. Prescott and B. P. Roberts, The Kenya Constitution,25 June 1957, enclosure in Baring to Lennox-Boyd, confidential, 5 July 1957, BNA: CO 822/1860. B. P. Roberts, A Right Wing Viewpoint, New Comment, 7 June 1957 and Michael Levien, The F.I.P. Takes Stock, New Comment, 5 July 1957.
38 41

The Kenya Constitution. PLGP, Kenya Constitution (Nakuru: Nakuru Press, Ltd., 1958), 1. Note of Meeting of Major Day with the SofS, 11 September 1958, BNA: CO 822/1860.
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racial integration and a call for Kenya to be divided into local government units based on racial and tribal division.44 Local government devolution was to provide each racial or tribal group full scope to develop along lines fitted to their own ideas. The central government was to rest in British hands, but there would be no legislative branch as the UP called for the abolition of the LegCo.45 By the time the first Lancaster House conference began in January 1960, the UP had lost most of its enthusiasm for devolution. Party leaders failed to raise the issue at the conference and, as noted earlier, Professor Mackenzie worked to keep the issue from being considered. The UP leaders rather sought to gain support from Kenyas European population by pointing to what they claimed was a sell out by Britain. The change in policy that opened the white highlands to farmers of other races was an issue that Briggs and others emphasized. The UP now championed the mixed farmer who wished to sell his farm and depart from the colony. This drew considerable support from the European farming community after the conclusion of Lancaster House I as most felt, in the words of an intelligence assessment, that their future in Kenya was bleak and the sooner they leave the better....46 Majimbo/utaguzi schemes had little appeal in these circumstances. Despite a lack of support from the European settler population and the negative attitude of the CO, federal schemes were far from dead. The second half of 1961 witnessed a new approach to majimbo, this time from KADU. Just as with the European-inspired schemes of the 1950s, the KADU plan was defensive in nature and based upon concerns over ownership of land. KADU leaders recognized the partys minority status in Kenya as the 1961 election had demonstrated. The party had nevertheless taken the lead in forming a government following that election in the hope that this would provide the opportunity for KADU to lead Kenya to independence. When it became clear that the British government would not agree to this, KADU leaders turned strongly to embrace the concept of regionalism. This meant a constitution that provided for regional assemblies with power over land as well as responsibility for various government functions (education, health care). The party also made the creation of a democratic and non-authoritarian system for Kenya a key characteristic of its constitutional model. Such a model, it was assumed, would provide opportunities for leadership roles and patronage opportunities for party leaders. It was the second of these aims that clearly distinguished the KADU plan from those propounded by the FIP and its successors in the 1950s. KADU called for an independent republic with a two house parliament and executive which aimed at power sharing (e.g. the cabinet had to include a minister from each region). In particular, KADUs plan called for a head of state who was to be elected annually by the council of ministers. Such a leader could only serve two consecutive terms.47
45

Ibid., 9-11. Culwick later claimed that he personally drafted the UP scheme. A. T.Culwick, Britannia Waives the Rules (Capetown: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1963), 66. The UPs desire to do away with the LegCo drew criticism at the time, and long after the party disappeared this aspect of its plan remains fairly well known. 46 Extract from Kenya Intelligence Committee Appreciation No 10/60, BNA: CO 822/2107. See also Rift Valley Provincial Intelligence Summary for June 1960, BNA: CO 822/2059. 47 K.C.C. (62) 16, Memorandum by the KADU Parliamentary Group: Further Constitutional Proposals, confidential, 20 February 1962, BNA: CO 822/2242 and KNA: GO/1/1/12.

Kenya Studies Review KADU tried to achieve acceptance of its regionalism or majimbo scheme at Lancaster House II. The party gained some success due to its unity and stubborn tactics. Led brilliantly by Ronald Ngala, the KADU delegation refused to even discuss detailed constitutional issues unless the KANU and British delegations accepted the partys demand for regional assemblies with powers and responsibilities. Eventually the party convinced the British, though not KANU, that six regional assemblies should be created as a basic part of the new constitution as well as a bicameral legislature. Nevertheless, SofS Reginald Maudling insisted that Kenya must have a strong central government, based on the British model of an executive branch, rather than that advocated by KADU. The outcome of Lancaster House II thus represented only a partial victory for KADU. Moreover, KADU gained less that what leaders had hoped for in the self government constitution that was finalized in the end by SofS Sandys when KADU and KANU ministers could not agree on all constitutional issues.48 Party leaders still had to confront their minority status for the coming universal suffrage elections. The development of a constitution for self government did not change the reality that a majority of Kenyans in 1962-63 did not support majimbo. This fact was graphically demonstrated by the 1963 House of Representatives election. By the time the electoral campaign got under way, KADUs chances of winning a majority in the lower house were slim. The party put forward 59 candidates for the 117 seats; KANU nominated 91 candidates for House of Representatives constituencies. This meant that since KADU could not likely gain a majority and form a cabinet, the party adopted a defensive strategy. A key to this was winning sufficient seats in the lower house and in the Senate to be able to block major changes in the self government constitution. For the upper house, KADU put forward 24 candidates to KANUs 28.49 Right from the first KADU made defense of majimbo a central plan in its electoral platform. The party manifesto reminded voters that KADU had struggled hard to achieve a regional constitution while suggesting that KANU leaders wished to change the constitution if they won power.50 KANU, on the other hand, made no mention of the constitution or majimbo in its manifesto.51 KANUs silence on the issue changed, however, as the campaign began to pick up steam. Party general secretary Mboya issued several statements claiming that the constitution was not permanent and would be changed following a KANU victory in the elections. Mboya refused to admit that his party had agreed to the self government constitution

Kenya Special Branch, The General Election-1963, secret, 6 May 1963, BNA: CO 822/3166. Another huge advantage was in the external funding KANU received. According to a Special Branch estimate, this amounted to more than 150,000 from foreign sources. KADU obtained little or nothing from such sources. Kenya Special Branch, An Appreciation of the Kenya General Election and the Newly Formed Government, secret, 11 June 1963, BNA: CO 822/3061.
50

49

KADU, Uhuru na Majimbo Sasa! (Nairobi: 1963), 1. EAS, 25 April 1963. KANU, What a KANU Government Offers You (Nairobi: 1963). EAS, 19 April 1963.
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and insinuated that electoral success would give KANU the right to make amendments that would remove regionalism.52 The outcome of the House of Representatives poll gave Mboya and KANU reason to claim a mandate for constitutional change and that the majority of voters were anti-majimbo. Kenyatta as leader of KANU thus formed Kenyas self governing cabinet. In the end, KANU held 72 seats in the lower house to KADUs 32; the African Peoples Party (APP) held 8.53 In the Senate vote, KADUs defensive strategy paid off as the party and its APP ally won 17 seats and KANU 21.54 Almost as soon as the new government took office on Madaraka Day (1 June 1963), Mboya, Kenyatta, and other party leaders launched Kenyas first change the constitution campaign. For example, Mboya traveled to London in June to impress upon SofS Sandys the need to amend the constitution and to press for a date for independence to be set. He was successful with the latter initiative, but not the former. Odinga, as Minister of Home Affairs, undertook two initiatives in June and July aimed at significantly reducing the powers and responsibilities of the regional assemblies set up under the self government constitution. Neither was successful, but these and other attempts to change the constitution prior to the third Lancaster House constitutional conference, which KADU leaders strongly opposed, pointed to difficulties in obtaining agreement on the independence constitution. As noted earlier in the article, no consensus was possible at Lancaster House III. Faced with threats by Kenyatta and his ministers to abandon the talks, return to Nairobi, and declare Kenya independent, Sandys gave in and made several changes in the self government constitution. This, in retrospect, was clearly the first step in the dismantling of majimbo. The British decision to accede to some of the KANU demands represented the COs view that KANU represented an overwhelming majority of Kenyas voters. Britains decolonization plans had always emphasized the need for a regime friendly to British interests and able to provide stability and safety for British economic interests in Kenya. It was clear by October that the Kenyatta government was committed to doing just that. It was soon clear also that the new government would stand with the west in the cold war, another important goal of British decolonization policy so far as Kenya was concerned.55 Failure to Entrench Democracy A final characteristic of the constitutions that marked the 1950s and early 1960s was the failure to implement a democratic system. Until the 1963 elections, there was nothing like a representative system of government. Elections were held on a communal basis prior to 1961 when the first common roll election was carried out, though there was a far less than universal
52

For example, EAS, 15 May 1963.

An Appraisal of the Kenya General Election and ...., BNA: CO 822/3061. The APP was a party, led by Paul Ngei, that broke away from KANU. Ngei formed an electoral alliance with KADU. Ibid. Three Senate seats, all in the Northeastern Region, were not filled as the Somali resident there boycotted the 1963 elections. 55 Kenyatta had already made his famous forget and forgive speech to European settlers. EAS, 13 August 1963; DN, 13 August 1963.
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Kenya Studies Review suffrage associated with the poll. Neither did the constitutional framework provide for responsible government as, until 1961, the majority of ministerial positions in the executive were held by civil servants. Thus both the legislative and executive branches in the late colonial constitutional order could not meet many of the basic criteria associated with democracy. For the executive branch, a key characteristic after 1954 was an increase in the number of non-official ministers. Following the implementation of the Lyttleton Constitution there were eight. The holders of portfolios were racially determined so as to fulfill the aim of Britain in establishing a multi-racial executive. The makeup of the council of ministers did little to reflect the colonys population. The great majority of the population was African, but only a single African served as a minister between 1954 and 1961. The 1954 constitution provided for five European settlers as ministers, on the other hand. The pre-1963 constitutions presented another non-democratic feature in addition to the number of portfolios for each racial group. The two most important and critical portfolios, finance and agriculture, were always held by European settlers. Only in 1962 was a non-European placed in charge of finance while the tradition of a European farmer serving as minister in charge of agriculture continued until the 1969 election. After 1962, moreover, another non-democratic factor entered into the executive as far as the ministry of finance was concerned. The portfolio was treated as the exclusive preserve of a single ethnic community: the Kikuyu. During the Kenyatta era, as during the Kibaki presidency, only Kikuyu (and Meru in the case of Kibakis first government) were favored with this significant post. Daniel arap Moi departed from the practice during his long presidency, but most of the men who served in the post were Kikuyu. Also significant with regard to the executive was the lack of accountability to the legislature that marked the period prior to 1963. Under the Lyttleton, Lennox-Boyd, and Lancaster House I constitutions, the governor had the power to nominate unofficial members of the LegCo. This meant in practice that the council of ministers could never lose a significant vote in the legislature and, even more important, a vote of no confidence in the executive could never succeed as such nominated members (as well as the ex-officio members) had to vote as the government desired. Independent Kenya has continued to experience a lack of accountability by the executive, though for different reasons than noted above. For the legislative branch, on the other hand, the non-democratic character of the electoral system stands out during the late colonial period as after independence. Until 1963, for example, some racial groups (Asians, Arabs, and Europeans) enjoyed universal suffrage, but Africans did not. Only with the Lennox-Boyd constitution was parity between the European elected members and members of other racial groups altered. Even then there was established parity in numbers of African and European elected members. The Lancaster House I constitution provided reserved seats for Asians and Europeans, but the latter had ten and the former eight in spite of the fact that the Asian population in Kenya was twice as large as that of the European. Even more significant, the electoral system of colonial Kenya was characterized by rural bias and gerrymandering right from the time of the first elections in 1920. European elections from that date to 1956 were characterized by the over representation of the rural areas and the under-representation of Nairobi. The urban area, particularly after World War II, held more than half the European population, but the majority of European members of LegCo were elected from rural constituencies with less than 2,000 voters.56 This over representation of rural areas did not change after independence, and it remains a hugely undemocratic feature of the Kenya constitutional order crying out for change today.
27

An even more critical negation of representative democracy may be noted in the late colonial period in the form of ethnic gerrymandering. This was a factor insisted upon by the colonial state for the first African elections in 1957. The constituencies were arranged and voting qualifications set so as to make sure that at least one Kamba and Kalenjin candidate be elected to LegCo while at the same time making it difficult (e.g. passing a loyalty test) for any Kikuyu candidate to be elected.57 This was because the latter were seen by the governor to have caused the state of emergency and Mau Mau rebellion while the former ethnic groups provided the bulk of the local security forces that fought the rebels. The election produced just such an outcome as no Kikuyu was elected and Kamba and Kalenjin members took seats. When additional seats for African elected members were created in 1958, ethnic considerations continued to hold sway. In an interesting about face, Governor Baring and the CO now desired a Kikuyu to be in LegCo (elected by loyalists in Central Province of course). Buist at the CO recognized that the recommendation represented an attempt to reintroduce the Kikuyu to a political position more in accord with their numbers and education, and in particular give their tribe a chance a securing a further elected member, presumably a moderate, as a reward for behaving so far.58 Constituencies were structured so as to insure the return of a second Kalenjin and Kamba member as well as a Maasai. On the other hand, the colonial state made certain to structure the constituencies for the 1958 election so that no Luo or Luyia would be elected.59 This was because Luo members Odinga, Mboya, and Lawrence Oguda together with the Luyia Muliro had distinguished themselves by what the colonialists viewed as radical nationalist demands for constitutional change and a campaign of non-participation in the executive. Here again, ethnic electoral engineering was successful from the perspective of the colonial state. Unfortunately the ethnic based electoral system, often at odds with concepts of majority rule and democratic governance, has continued to characterize Kenya down to the present. It was embedded in the system of constituencies created for the self government election in 1963 and really never changed. For example, five constituencies were created in the Northeastern Region where the population numbered just over 290,000. The Gusii, with a population of 519,000 received six seats and Embu district with 293,000 inhabitants had two constituencies. Nairobi had only seven seats. Perhaps the classic example came from Western Region where constituencies were created for the Saboat and Maragoli (Logoli). The latter constituency had more than four times the population of what became Mount Elgon constituency.60 A fair and balanced system of representation, which took account of the will of the majority while protecting minority rights with the impact of ethnicity kept to a minimum, had
57

Governors Deputy to SofS, telegram, 20 December 1957, BNA: CO 822/1425. EAS, 27 March 1958. Odinga, Not Yet, 153-54.

59

Population figures were taken from the 1962 census. For complete detail see Great Britain, Kenya: Report of the Constituencies Delimitation Commission, Cmnd. 1921 (London: HMSO, 1963). The commissioners provided a rather brief justification for the ethnic emphasis rather than population. They wrote: In certain cases strong tribal affinities or a close community of interest have induced us to delimit constituencies well below what might be considered the mean figure for a constituency, having regard to the total population of the country. Ibid., 3.

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Kenya Studies Review thus yet to be achieved at independence. It remains a huge challenge facing constitution makers at the end of the first decade of the 21st Century. The composition and selection of an upper house in a bicameral legislature provides one example. The independence constitutions provision of a senator for each district entrenched ethnicity and flew in the face of majority rule.61 The history of constitution-making at the end of the colonial era suggests, moreover, that solutions to contentious constitutional issues will not be easy to find. Heeding the lessons of the past is one important way to start. Consensus is crucial, but this must be based on a sincere appreciation of Kenyas problems and needs and a willingness to compromise in order to achieve a viable constitution. A particularly critical problem that requires such appreciation and compromise is the place of majimbo or utaguzi in a new constitutional order. This is especially when it comes to the shaping of regions, counties and their boundaries. The advice of outside experts can certainly play a positive role as well, but such experts are not likely to provide the critical support to move constitution-making to a successful conclusion. Popular will and agency must find its voice and exercise influence as never before if success is to be attained in this critical endeavor. Bibliography Primary Sources Bodleian Library of Commonwealth and African Studies at Rhodes House, Oxford Electors Union Papers,, Box 32/2, RH, Mss. Afr. s 596. Papers of Sir Michael Blundell (Blundell Papers), Boxes 5/4, 19/4, 22/1, Mss. Afr. s 746. British National Archives, London. Cabinet Papers: CAB 128/35; CAB 133/215. Colonial Office Records: CO 822/460, 598, 844, 1201, 1425, 1427, 1474, 1532, 1860, 1861, 2059, 2107, 2238, 2239, 2242, 2354, 2359, 2382, 2390, 2754, 3061, 3138, 3139, 3141, 3166, 3216. Prime Ministers Correspondence: PREM 11/3031. Federal Independence Party. Policy and Constitutional Principles. Nairobi: W. Boyd & Co., 1955. Great Britain, Kenya: Report of the Constituencies Delimitation Commission, Cmnd. 1921. London: HMSO, 1963. Great Britain, Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference, Cmnd 1700. London: HMSO, 1962. Great Britain, Kenya Independence Conference 1963, Cmd 2156. London: HMSO, 1963. Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), 5th Ser., 488 (31 May 1951). Kenya African Democratic Union, Uhuru na Majimbo Sasa! Nairobi: 1963. Kenya African National Union, What a KANU Government Offers You. Nairobi: 1963. Kenya National Archives, Nairobi. Papers of Sir Wilfred Havelock (Havelock Papers), Kenya National Archives: MSS 12/11. For example, the Somali were to have three senators, the same number as the Luo and more than the Gusii, Embu, or Meru. KADUs proposal at Lancaster House II called for seven members of the upper house from each of the six regions the party projected. The members were to be elected by the regional assemblies sitting as electoral colleges.
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Maudling, Reginald. Memoirs. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1978. Progressive Local Government Party, Kenya Constitution. Nakuru: Nakuru Press, Ltd., 1958. Secondary Sources Comment. 2 September 1954. Culwick, A. T. Britannia Waives the Rules (Capetown: Nasionale Boekhandel, 1963. Daily Nation. 9 March 1963, 13 August 1963. Duder, C. J. D. An Army of Ones Own: The Politics of the Kenya Defence Force, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 25 (1991): 207-25. East African Standard. 27 March 1958, 3 February 1960, 4 April 1960, 13 March 1962, 9 March 1963, 19 April 1963, 25 April 1963, 15 May 1963, 13 August 1963. The Election Results, New Comment. 5 October 1956. Kenya Comment. 28 February 1958, 16 May 1958. Kenyans Eyes From the Diaspora Group, Kenya: The Future of the Constitution, Pambazuka News. 11 June 2009. Kenya Weekly News. 26 March 1954, 5 October 1956, 13 December 1957, 9 May 1958. Levien, Michael. The F.I.P. Takes Stock, New Comment. 5 July 1957. Odinga, Oginga. Not Yet Uhuru. Nairobi: Heinemann, 1967. Roberts, B. P. A Right Wing Viewpoint, New Comment. 7 June 1957 Rothchild, Donald. Racial Bargaining in Independent Kenya. New York: Oxford University Press, 1973. Rothchild, Donald. Changing Racial Stratification and Bargaining Styles: The Kenya Experience, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 7 (1973): 419-31. Vigar, L. E. The Federal Independence Party, Kenya Comment. 21 November 1958. Vigar, L. E. What is Truth? Comment. 1 April 1954. Vigar, L. E. Whither Kenya? Comment. 27 May 1954.

Kenya Studies Review Post-Moi era Discourse Patterns in Kenyan Universities: A Nation crying for Organic Intellectuals By Alex Mwangi Chege*

Abstract The Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi regimes in Kenya are known for their ruthless suppression of discourse, including in higher education. Examples are galore of university lecturers and students that were harassed, arrested, detained without trial, or allegedly executed under suspicious circumstances for their political activism. But the same period, between the 1960s and mid 1990s, witnessed vibrant discourse in the country as radical scholars, politicians, and students refused to be intimidated by the state machinery. Unfortunately, serious discourse has diminished particularly in universities during the Mwai Kibaki regime, since 2003, despite the many misgivings that have characterized Kenyan politics during this periodreturn of mega corruption, abuse of human rights, economic inequalities, and escalating ethnic polarization. The countrys intelligentsia has retreated, leaving the task of nurturing the nascent democracy to politicians, the media, the civil society, the clergy, and ordinary citizens. Adopting an analytical approach, this article seeks to: account for the apathy that characterizes discourse among Kenyan intellectuals; demonstrate the need for the intelligentsia to reclaim the role of organic intellectuals; and propose means by which the intelligentsia can execute the role of re-shaping national ethos. Key words: Organic intellectuals, Discourse, NARC, Ivory-tower, Critical Pedagogy, Ethnicity, Social change. *Alex Mwangi Chege (Ph.D) teaches composition at Bowling Green State University, Ohio.

Citation Format Chege, Alex Mwangi (2009). Post-Moi era Discourse Patterns in Kenyan Universities: A Nation crying for Organic Intellectuals. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 31-53.

Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction Many scholars have analyzed how postcolonial regimes in Kenya reproduced the colonial state and its apparatuses to silence opposition. Klopp and Orina,1 and Amutabi2 have adopted a historical approach to demonstrate how the Jomo Kenyatta and Daniel Moi administrations resorted to repression and rhetoric of sycophancy to curtail dissent. Similarly, Chege3 has used a historical approach to demonstrate how the political class in Kenya, both colonial and postcolonial, has used education, especially higher education, to perpetuate their hegemonies. He recommends universities adopt progressive pedagogies in order to challenge the status quo and thereby reclaim their role as vanguards of change. This article builds on that work. Prompted by the 2008 violence that was experienced in many parts of the country following the disputed presidential elections of the previous year and the escalating ethnic polarization, this article seeks to account for why contemporary Kenyan scholars are not taking advantage of the current democratic space to spearhead discourse of change; how the intelligentsia can reclaim the role of organic intellectuals, which Gramsci defines as the thinking and organising element of a particular fundamental social class4 in a muddled political environment. Amutabi5 has analyzed the various types of intellectuals and how they are manifested in the Kenyan body politic. But, this article focuses on organic intellectuals on the grounds that with radical intellectuals, politicians, and prominent and seasoned members of the civil society co-opted by the political class, the nation is in dire need of a new crop of intellectuals to redirect national discourse by countering the ethnic fetish that now dominates national psych, including institutions of higher education. Background Discourse patterns in Kenya have always been characterized by government crackdown on self expression and intellectual freedom. Although scholars have pointed out that the Kenyatta administration was relatively tolerant compared to most African leaders of his time, and Moi who succeeded him as Kenyas second president (Munene6 ; Throup and Hornsby7 ), the works

Jacqueline Klopp and Janai Orina, University Crisis, Student Activism, and the Contemporary Struggle for Democracy in Kenya, African Studies Review 45, no 1 (2002). Maurice Amutabi, Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and Democratization Process, African Studies Review 45, no 2 (2002). Mwangi Chege, The Politics of Education in Kenyan Universities: A Call for a Paradigm Shift. African Studies Review (forthcoming). Gramsci Antonio, Selections From prison Notebooks, eds. H. Quintin and G. Nowell (New York: International Publishers, 1971), 3. Maurice N. Amutabi, Intellectuals and the Democratisation Process in Kenya, Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, eds. G. Murunga and S. W. Nasongo (London: Zed Books, 2007).
6 5 4 3 2

Macharia Munene, African Intellectuals in Hostile Media Environment. Paper

Kenya Studies Review of the scholars named above illustrate how the administration was out to quash any perceived political threat. Scholars such as Ngugi wa Thiongo, Maina wa Kinyatti and Abdilatif Abdalla joined political prisoners such as Oginga Odinga, Martin Shikuku, Jean Marie Seroney, and Koigi wa Mwere in detention for criticizing the administration. By the time of Kenyattas death in 1978, there were many politicians and intellectuals languishing in detention. Suppression of discourse became even more pronounced during the Moi era. This was his strategy to consolidate power given the circumstances that surrounded his ascension to the presidencythe fact that he belonged to a little known ethnic group, his humble economic background, modest education, hostility from Kenyattas inner circle and power brokers, and the attempted coup of 1982 (Throup and Hornsby 8and Widner9). Detention without trial and harassment by the state machinery were to become the hallmark of the administration. Scholars, such as Ngugi wa Thiongo, Alamin Mazrui, Edward Oyugi, Maina Wa Kinyatti, Mukaru Nganga, Willy Mutunga, and Katama Mkangi were detained without trial and later forced to flee into exile. Other scholars perceived as radical, such as Micere Mugo and E.S Atieno Odhiambo fled into exile as well. The same fateexpulsion and for some detention, faced student activists. The long list of victims, as documented by Klopp and Orina10 and also Shaila Wambui in a Daily Nation article on November 28, 1992,11 includes Mwandawiro Mghanga, Tirop arap Kitur, Peter Ogego, Adungosi, and Gacheche wa Miano among others. Thus, discourse patterns in the universities during the two regimes present an intriguing paradoxexistence of vibrant discourse in the face of systemic stranglehold on intellectual freedom. Radical scholars and student activists exercised intellectual freedom fully aware of the risks such an undertaking entailed. These were scholars who assumed the role of organic intellectuals in the struggle against dictatorship, corruption, and mediocrity in government. The intelligentsia identified with national issues and used their position to influence policy and shape national ethos.12 During this period, which Amutabi refers to as the golden age of the University of Nairobi, the late 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, discourse in the university was dynamic. The university was, as he puts it, academically vibrant and tumultuous, a hub of political activism.13 This view is tandem with Mazruis; he describes post-colonial African Presented at the Conference on Media and the Construction of African Identities, Nairobi, Kenya, August 3-6, 2004. 7 David Throup and Charles Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta & Moi States & the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election (Nairobi: E.A.E.P, 1998), 15.
8

Throup and Hornsby, Multi-Party Politics.

Jennifer Widner, The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee" to "Nyayo!" (Berkeley: University of California, 1992).
10

Klopp and Orina, University Crisis.

Sheila Wambui, The Purge of Critical Academics Continues, Daily Nation, November 28, 1992, 15. 12 Maurice Amutabi, Crisis and Student Protest, 164.
13

11

Maurice Amutabi, Crisis and Student Protest, 165.

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universities as having been at one time the vanguard of intellectualism; defining intellectualism as an engagement in the realm of ideas, rational discourse and independent inquiry. This was a time when, as he puts it, campuses vibrated with debates about fundamental issues of the daynationalism, socialism, democracy and the party system, and the role of intellectuals in what was widely designated as the African revolution.14 Furthermore, this enthusiasm was not a preserve of Dons. Not only did students fill university halls to listen to lectures from teachers and other notable figures, they were also on their part fully engaged in public discourse. Vibrancy characterized student politics. In those days, as Amutabi observes, student politics were ideologically driven: student action was more likely to be accompanied by demands for democratic reform. 15 Klopp and Orina provide a detailed analysis of student activism in Kenya during this period.16 Indeed, a significant number of intellectuals were at the core of the second liberation movement, a movement that brought together the civil society, a section of the clergy, opposition politicians, and radical scholars in the clamor for democracy. Vigorous discourse among the intelligentsia thrived pitting KANU apologists, the partys think-tank hired to propagate KANU propaganda and legitimize the one party rule, such as Eric Masinde Aseka, William Ochieng, Henry Mwanzi, and Chris Wanjala against organic intellectuals. Etende Embeywa, then a lecturer at Kenyatta University, in a Kenya Times article on November 27, 1992 defends these pro-establishment scholars as some of brilliant sons of this landwho are committed to educating Kenyans on the prospects and problems of policy alternatives in this era of multipartyism, referring to them as perceptive scholars while castigating his anti-establishment colleagues as cogs in the wheel of imperialism and political blackmail, 17 a propagandist label meant to discredit organic intellectuals and the opposition in general. On the other hand, progressive intellectuals countered this propaganda and exposed these scholars for who they werescholars for hire. As Odegi-Awuondo, in a Daily Nation article on November 24, 1992 points out, the agenda of pro-establishment scholars was to discredit the opposition as they glorify Kanu, a job best left to charlatans and quacks. He accuses KANU of hiring the ugliest calibre of academic opportunists to spread cheap propaganda to hoodwink the electorate and concludes his argument by asserting that: The role of scholars is not to use their pens and privileged positions to spread and instill fear and despondency in the peopleInstead, the role of the intelligentsia at this particular point in Kenyas political history is to educate the masses--the toiling peasants and workers, the teeming wretched of the earth, students, the famished and harassed underprivileged who have suffered 30 years of Kanus

Ali Mazrui , Pan-Africanism and the Intellectuals: Rise, Decline and Revival, 59 Amutabi, Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and Democratization Process, 161.
16

14

Klopp and Orina, University Crisis. Etende Embeywa, Varsity Dons Have Done us Proud, Kenya Times, November, 27

17

1992, 7

Kenya Studies Review tyranny--on how best to exercise their democratic rights so as to get them peacefully out of the present quagmire into a better future. Prof Mwanzi and Dr. Asekas propaganda pieces poison the mind 18 Like Odegi-Awuondo, Mwiria, in a Daily Nation article on September 26, 2005, castigates this KANU academic political machine and masterminds of the Youth for KANU 92, the partys most influential and well financed campaign apparatus in the 1992 first multiparty elections for openly [defending] a system that a majority of Kenyans were uncomfortable with. Others either shut up in the face of the obvious excesses of the Moi regime, or were used to entrench dictatorship and corruption. As he puts it, In the Kanu days, it was difficult to differentiate between the highly-educated and their semi-literate counterparts; all plundered the economy and sang songs of praise very shamelessly and determinedly!19 These excerpts help illustrate the dynamic nature of discourse in the university during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, illuminating the clash between hegemonic and counter hegemonic discourses represented by pettybourgeois intellectuals20 or intellectual homeguards21 on one hand and organic intellectuals on the other. The analysis demonstrates existence of vibrant discourse despite a harsh political environment. It reveals engagement of scholars and students in public discourse. It demonstrates scholars playing the role of organic intellectuals by aligning themselves with progressive forces and ordinary citizens to challenge the status quo. It shows scholars and students subverting the ivory tower status of the university. However, discourse patterns in the country appear to have changed significantly during the last decade, after KANU was defeated in the 2002 elections by NARC.22 The NARC victory was a culmination of decades of agitation and political action aimed at ending KANU dictatorship, especially under Moi. To majority of Kenyans, as demonstrated by election results and the euphoria that characterized the campaign period and the announcement of NARC victory, the victory was a dream come true. It was supposed to represent a watershed in the countrys political landscapethe death of the old order and the birth of a new order founded on democracy, good governance, justice, and equal opportunities for all. It is, therefore, not
18

C. Odegi-Awuondo, Varsity Dons Critique a Sham, Daily Nation, November, 24

1992, 7 Kilemi Mwiria, A Little Education for MPs Essential, Daily Nation, September, 26 2005, http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed September 26, 2005).
20 19

Ngugi Wa Thiongo, Detained: a writers prison diary, (London: Heinemann, 1981),

xxi. Daniel Moi, Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles, (Nairobi: Macmillan, 1986), 131. 22 NARC was a coalition of opposition parties formed in 2002 with the aim of defeating KANU in that years presidential elections. The strength of a united opposition led to the first defeat of the hitherto invisible party.
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surprising that a Gallup poll in early 2003 ranked Kenyans the most optimistic people on earth.23 Unfortunately, this optimism was short-lived due to constant bickering within the government, re-invention of mega corruption, perpetuation of human rights abuse, growing social inequalities, the constitutional review stalemate,24 and ethnic cronyism. The nation came to the brink of collapse after the disputed results of the 2007 presidential elections and the ensuing post-election violence in early 2008. In spite of these developments, the intelligentsia appears to have taken a back seat in public discourse. Furthermore, this silence prevails within the backdrop of unprecedented opening of democratic space credited to the Kibaki regime. This leaves one to wonder why academicians have remained aloof in the post-Moi era when the country is plagued with myriad problems, some threatening the very survival of the nation. The intelligentsia, and the university, is a crucial stakeholder in nurturing the budding democracy in the country and, therefore, should reclaim its role as catalysts of change. The Ivory Tower Mentality As noted earlier, the irony of the last decade is that although the Kibaki administration has been perpetuating the old order (bad governance that has produced endemic corruption, abuse of human rights, and heightened ethnic polarization), the intelligentsia has adopted an indifferent attitude. This is happening despite the unprecedented opening up of democratic space not just in the wider society, but also in the university. As a matter of fact, the Kenyan university has undergone several reforms such as the President relinquishing the role of Chancellor, a position his predecessors held. Furthermore, university councils and administrations now have relative autonomy in the management of these institutions, including hiring Vice-Chancellors and other high level administrative staff. It would appear that prevailing conditions are conducive for intellectual freedom to flourish than ever before. What is clear though is that these reforms have not produced concomitant dynamic discourses among the intelligentsia. Of course the university community is not and has never been a monolithic group. Not all scholars and students during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes were activists, neither are all scholars and students in Kenya today cocooned in the culture of silence. It is true there are academicians who continue to contribute to public debate, especially through publication of politically probing articles in local dailies, such as Emanuel Kisiangani of Kenyatta University. Students have also come out to protest unpopular government policies such as demonstrations following the assassination of Oscar Kingara and John Paul Oulu, two officials of Oscar Foundation. The assassinations were interpreted as a case

Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, Briefing: Using Opinion Polls to Evaluate Kenyan Politics, March 2004-January 2005, African Affairs, 104, no 415 (2005), 325. Kenyans have been clamoring for a new constitutional order for a long time. The current Constitution was adapted during the transition period from colonial state to independence, in 1963, and was actually written by the British Government, the departing colonial power. The Kenyatta and Moi governments amended this constitution at will to suit their interests. Toward the end of his era, Moi succumbed to both internal and external pressure and started the process of re-writing a new constitution. NARC promised a new constitution within its first 100 days in power, but the internal squabbles within the party derailed the process. The pursuit of a new constitution remains a mirage, about a decade after KANU was voted out.
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Kenya Studies Review of extrajudicial killings that the Kenyan government has been accused of perpetrating25 especially because shortly before both were assassinated, the government had claimed the foundation had links with the Mungiki, a militia group based mainly in Nairobi and the Central Province. But, certainly, the level and quality of discourse in higher education today pales in comparison with what was witnessed between the 1960s and early 1990s. In fact, latest student protests have become orgies of violence attracting outrage even from progressive forces, such as the Mars Group.26 The following section examines the causes of this ivory tower syndrome. The NARC Illusion The NARC revolution may have been the worst phenomenon in the liberation movement in Kenyan history. Liberation movements in the country, starting with the struggle for independence and later struggle against Kenyatta and Moi dictatorships, usually assumed a nationalistic outlook. Reformists whether politicians, civil society, or intellectuals, coalesced around the agenda of change in a spirit that appear to have transcended ethnic chauvinism. However, that kind of nationalism appears to have died with NARC. Soon after NARC assumed power, cracks between the two main coalition partners, the National Alliance Party of Kenya (NAK) of Mwai Kibaki, now president, and LDP of Raila Odinga, became imminent following claims by LDP that NAK had reneged on a pre-election memorandum of understanding (MOU) guaranteeing equal sharing of power. Perpetual bickering and squabbling characterized the NARC government leading to the ultimate fallout in 2005 between Raila Odinga and his lieutenants on one side and Kibaki and his supporters on the other. The disintegration of NARC had far-reaching ramifications in the countrys political landscape. First, hitherto reformers, the most prominent opposition politicians and members of the civil society who had come together to form the NARC party, abandoned the platform of change and became heavily involved in political turf wars that epitomize post-Moi politics in the country. Those who remained in NARC (and later the Party of National Unity (PNU) that propelled Kibaki to his second term in power after the controversial 2007 elections) became preoccupied with consolidating power. This category includes Kiraitu Muriungi, Paul Muite (before falling out with Kibaki), Martha Karua, and Kivutha Kibwana. Gibson Kamau Kuria, a renowned human rights lawyer and ardent critic of the Moi administration, though not in government, became an ardent apologist of the regime. Some of these politicians have even been linked to multiple corrupt deals such as the Anglo Leasing scandal.27 On the other side of the political divide, in LDP, which evolved into the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) in the In his report, Professor Paul Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions Mission to Kenya concludes the Kenyan government has been involved in systemic extrajudicial killings. The Standard, April, 28 2009 http://www.standardmedia.co.ke.downloads/alston_pressfinal.doc (accessed April, 28 2009). Led by Mwalimu Mati, Mars Group is one of the most politically active and dynamic non-profit organization in Kenya today when it comes to checking on the political class. Shadrack Wanjala Nasongo and Godwin R. Murunga, Prospects for Democracy in Kenya, in Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, eds. Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasongo (London: Zed Books, 2007), 10.
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build up to the 2007 elections, yesteryear reformists such as Raila Odinga, James Orengo, and Anyang Nyongo have been consumed by how to wrestle power from their now political nemesesinitially in the NARC government and now in the coalition government.28 They are equally consumed in partisan politics just like their coalition counterparts in government. With perennial reform advocates sucked in these turf wars, the agenda of change in the country appears rudderless and this development has impacted discourse patterns in the university as well since intellectuals have also taken sides in this political duel. The death of NARC also exacerbated ethnic tensions and polarization in the country. It is worth noting that tribalism has always been a significant factor in the Kenyan socio-political fabric. The colonizers planted the seed of tribal suspicion through the policy of divide-and-rule and postcolonial regimes perfected the strategy for the same reasonperpetuation of their hegemonies. Like his predecessors, the Kibaki administration has been heavily accused of perpetuating tribalism by appointing people to strategic positions in government from his Kikuyu ethnic group and their cousins from the Mount Kenya region (the Meru and the Embu), and surrounding himself with ministers and a cabal of business people from the regionan exclusive club dubbed the Mount Kenya Mafia. His appointment of Nick Wanjohi as Vice-Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, a political scientist to head an exclusively science-oriented institution, was widely viewed in this light. No wonder his appointment triggered opposition and disquiet in the university. Reverting to the old order of governing, through ethnic henchmen was utter betrayal of the spirit of NARC, which was a multi-ethnic coalition. This development and Kibakis decision to renege the MOU with LDP gave credence to the belief by other communities that the Kikuyu, the most populous, widely spread, most educated, and economically endowed ethnic community are determined to entrench themselves in power at the expense of other ethnic groups.29 Politicians exploited this tribal fetish during the constitutional referendum of 2005 and the elections of 2007 resulting in the 2008 postelection violence. The tension that characterized the NARC administration leading to the fallout between Kibaki and Odinga is being replayed in the coalition government to the extent that political action to mitigate the myriad socio-political and economic challenges facing the country such as food insecurity, unemployment, the Mungiki menace, environmental crisis caused by wanton destruction of forests, resettling of people displaced during the post-election violence, how to deal with perpetrators of that violence, and the constitution review process, is being obscured and impeded by tribal suspicion, acrimony, and vendetta. The nationalist spirit that united political activists during the Kenyatta and Moi regimes has given way to apathy, disillusionment, and tribal-based political shenanigans. This reality gives credence to Daniel Branch and Nic Cheesemans argument that what may appear to have been ideological alliances against repressive regimes were in fact alliances of the elite, alliances driven by political expediency.30
28

To end the post-election violence of early 2008, Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary General, negotiated an arrangement whereby both parties (Kibaki and Odinga) agreed to share power in a coalition government.
29

Joel Barkan, Will the Kenyan Settlement Hold? Current History 107, no 708 (2008),

150. Daniel Branch and Nic Cheeseman, Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya, African Affairs 108 no. 430 (2008): 1-26.
30

Kenya Studies Review One only needs to look at how the NARC coalition was crafted to see this reality. It is undeniable that there are those who joined the coalition out of genuine need to dislodge KANU and usher in a reform-oriented government. However, most of the leaders of the party, including the top decision making organ, the Summit, constituted former KANU loyalists who left the disintegrating party because Moi had sidestepped them by anointing Uhuru Kenyatta, a son of his predecessor, his successor. Others abandoned the party because it had become an unpopular brand. Thus, joining NARC for them was simply a bandwagon effect, rather than ideological persuasion. In other words, although NARC took the shape of a mass movement, at the core it was an elite alliance driven by politics of exclusion and opportunism. The fragmentation of these elites due to mistrust and suspicion exposes the nature of these politicians and the misgivings of the reform agenda in the country. Furthermore, this was not the first case of elite fragmentation. FORD (Forum for the Restoration of Democracy), the party formed by leading opposition politicians during the clamor for restoration of multiparty politics in 1991 disintegrated in the same way, out of power struggle and conflicting egos of Kenneth Matiba and Jaramogi Oginga Odinga.31The most unfortunate consequence of this latest elite fragmentation is that it has produced unparalleled ethnic acrimony in the country as party leaders (who behave like ethnic chieftains) incite their ethnic groups against others and use them as bargaining chips for power. The university has also become a victim of this re-invented tribal animosity. As noted earlier, tribalism is not a new phenomenon in Kenyan universities. It is true Kenyatta and Moi appointed senior administrators in the university from their ethnic groups to ensure loyalty that was crucial in curtailing radicalism among lecturers and students. For instance, the appointment of Josephat Karanja, a career diplomat with limited teaching experience as Vice-Chancellor of the University of Nairobi by Kenyatta in 1971 bypassing many experienced and seasoned scholars drew resistance from faculty and students who attributed his appointment to his ethnic background rather than qualification.32 The Moi administration perfected the art of hiring his tribesmen to head universities and even where Vice-Chancellors were from different ethnic groups, he appointed people from his community or loyalists in strategic positions to ensure the government had a firm control on what was going on in these institutions. But even with this political interference, activism in these institutions apparently remained less tribalized. The same cannot be said about discourse patterns in Kenyan universities today. The level of political activism seems to have degenerated, reproducing the political and ethnically charged tensions evident in the wider society. According to Ali Mazrui, in a Daily Nation article on February, 28 2008, while ethnicity has always been a factor in the Kenyan university system, What we now fear on our campus is greater ethnic consciousness of each other rather than greater sensitivity to intellectual nuances; that The post-election violence has begun to trigger academic ethnic cleansing resulting in members of the university community desiring to transfer to ethically friendly campusesusually areas inhabited by their ethnic group. As he puts it, instead of universities being arenas of universal values and intellectual fraternity, they seem Matibas faction of the FORD party acquired the name Ford-Asili while Odingas became Ford-Kenya. Amutabi, Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and Democratization Process, 163.
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to be deteriora[ting] into beehives of [ethnicity].33 Mwiria, the Assistant Minister for Higher Education and one of the few individuals whose reform credentials appear uncompromised by the trappings of power, echoes the same sentiments. He abhors ethnicity in public universities, manifested through staff recruitment and promotions, procurement contracts and student politics. He argues that practicing the vice affects the quality of education, undermines the role of education in national development, and negates the universities moral authority to challenge the political establishment. 34 Subjecting these institutions to local politics promotes pettiness and parochialism at a time when they should be embracing globalization and celebrating diversity; a time when the university should be at the forefront in finding solutions to the daunting challenges facing the nation, including how to bring about national cohesion, how to restore good governance, and how to realize Vision 2030. 35 Student politics have not been spared this ethnic mischief. As Benjamin Muindi reports in a Daily Nation article on May 22, 2009, student government elections held earlier this year in the University of Nairobi mirrored ethnic tensions and partisan politics that undercut ODM and PNU power struggles, alleging that the two parties were even backing their preferred candidates.36 That university politics would stoop this low led the Editorial of the Daily Nation on May 22, 2009 to express doubts whether current student leadership in universities could match the credentials of previous leaders, such as James Orengo, Richard Onyonka, P. L. O. Lumumba, and David Murathe. As the Editorial points out, The then student leaders were known for highlighting the ills affecting the country and championing the rights of their colleagues. It laments this development by claiming that: Ethnic rivalry, money and propaganda dominated the campaigns, instead of issues, which have traditionally defined university politics. Clearly, this was the lowest point in university politics and a damning indictment of the calibre of youths and professionals coming out of our learning institutions. Obviously, the student elections were a perfect mirror of what assails the national body politics, Ali Mazrui, Are the Universities Being Tribalised? Daily Nation, February, 28 2008, http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed July 23, 2009). Kilemi Mwiria, We Must Stem the Slide of our Universities into Tribal Enclaves, The Standard, March, 20 2009 http://www.eastandard.net/print.php?id=1144010007&cid=490 (accessed March, 20 2009).
35 34 33

Vision 2030 is the Kenyan Governments development blueprint which aims to transform Kenya into a newly industrialising, middle-income country providing a high quality life to all its citizens by the year 2030. Kenya Vision 2030: The Popular Version, www.planning.go.ke (accessed July, 20 2009). Benjamin Muindi, Ethnic Political Bug Hits Varsity Polls, Daily Nation, May 22, 2009 http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960, (accessed June 16, 2009).
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Kenya Studies Review where the country has been torn apart by primitive ethnic chauvinism, corrupted electoral process and outright thievery. In the past, student politics provided a platform for ideological contest. Student leaders propagated high-brow socioeconomic and political theories aimed at creating an egalitarian societySo when university politics degenerate to ethnic hatred, vote-buying and violence, then the ear of ideology and political thinking has gone to the winds. As we vilify the students for resorting to the jungle law, we must not forget that they are a creation of a perverted political system and a faulty education system.37 As the discussion reveals, the abortion of the NARC dream has had a significant impact on discourse patterns in the wider Kenyan society and the university. In particular, the co-option of reformers into the mainstream of politics as usual has robbed the reform agenda a crucial stakeholder. Furthermore, ethnicization of discourse as a result of elite fragmentation has crept into the university hindering meaningful intellectual dialog and interrogation of issues of national importance. Lack of Motivation Another major factor that has affected discourse patterns in Kenyan universities is lack of motivation among lecturers, with poor remuneration being the most significant contributing factor. Lecturers are among the most poorly paid professionals in the country. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that in earlier decades, when universities were vibrant, lecturers earned decent salaries. Soon after independence the salary of a university professor was higher than that of a judge, Member of Parliament, or even a Permanent Secretary, 38 but now a Member of Parliament earns more than ten times what a professor earns. This harsh economic reality has forced educators to moonlight to supplement their meager incomes, a development that has impacted negatively the quality of education and scholarship in these institutions. 39 It is sad that intellectuals are forced to concentrate on bread and butter issues rather than pursuit of knowledge and teaching. Lack of facilities is another demoralizing factor lecturers have to contend with. As scholars such as Amutabi40 and Sifuna41 have pointed out, the rapid expansion of university Varsity Ideology Sinking, Daily Nation, May, 22 2009, Editorial section. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960, (accessed June 16, 2009). Kenyan University Lecturers strike for improved working conditions, Voice of America News, June 18, 2007, http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/.../2007-06-18voa36.cfm (accessed August 20, 2009). Chacha Nyaigotti-Chacha, Reforming Higher Education in Kenya: Challenges, Lessons and Opportunities (Paper Presented at the State University of New York Workshop with the Parliamentary Committee on Education, Science and Technology, Naivasha, Kenya, August 2004), 6. 40 Maurice Amutabi, Political Interference in the Running of Education in Post Independent Kenya: A Critical Retrospection, International Journal of Educational Development 23 (2003): 127-144.
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education in Kenya has been motivated by political considerations rather than sound planning. Forcing universities to admit large numbers of students without corresponding expansion of facilities has resulted in a logistical conundrum whereas the unrealistic teacher-student ratio continues to pose a teaching and assessment nightmare to teachers. Most importantly, teaching large classes has taken away meaningful interaction between teachers and students that is necessary for dialogic education to take place. According to Freire, dialogic education thrives in a democratic classroom environment where students are empowered to participate in the teaching and learning process. This kind of education is the antithesis of banking education where the teacher exercises authoritarian power and the student is reduced to an object. 42 Unlike in earlier decades when smaller classes allowed for tutorial sessions where issues raised in regular lectures were revisited and discussed in a more interactive environment, interactivity in the current classroom set-up is impossible. Teachers have to rely on lectures to cope with the large class sizes and pressure to moonlight. Another factor that appears to have affected teacher-student interaction is the adoption of the 8-4-4 system of education to replace the 7-4-2-3 system in1985. To this day, most Kenyans resent the new system. Adopted during the height of Moi dictatorship, no national debate was entertained on its merits and demerits. More than a decade later, and after collating views from the public, The Koech Commission of 1999 took a bold move and recommend the country revert to the old system. As was characteristic of the administration (basing decisions on politics rather than professional advice or the will of the people), the president went around the country trashing the Commissions recommendations. Backing these recommendations, Okwach Abagi and others, in a paper published by the Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, a renowned nonprofit research and policy analysis organization, hail the report for coming up with 558 recommendations to salvage education from its present worrying state. In their view, those recommendations were both pertinent and timely since they had the potential of resuscitating the education sector by making it more focused, manageable, relevant and costeffective considering the critical challenges facing the education system.43 Public opinion on the system has mostly been negative, including many university lecturers who still consider high school students joining the university academically unprepared and immature, and therefore, incapable of engaging in meaningful academic discourse. 44 Even when the students graduate, Daniel N. Sifuna, Crisis in the Public Universities in Kenya, in Educational Dilemmas: Debate and Diversity, eds. Keith Watson, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil (London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1997). Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New Revised 20th Anniversary ed. (New York: Continuum, 1993), 53. Okwach Abagi and others, Implementing the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (The Koech Report): Realities, Challenges and Prospects. Practical Strategies for Transforming the Report Recommendations into Reality, Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, Kenya, 2000. http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resource guides/education&id=28638&type=document (accessed July 29, 2009). Mwangi Chege, Old Wine and New Wineskins: De-colonizing Kenyas University System, (La Vergne, TN: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, 2008), 69.
44 43 42 41

Kenya Studies Review many Kenyans are skeptical about their preparedness and qualification to handle professions they are trained for. That educators would lack faith in their students, compounded with the sheer numbers in their classes, is an impediment to dialog in the learning process that is requisite for critical discourses to thrive. The motivation issue not only affects teachers, but students too. The unplanned university expansion has meant students have to endure deplorable conditions in classes and dormitories. Their living conditions are dire following the governments decision to withdraw financial support for their upkeep. Consequently, most students are more concerned with how to survive as opposed to their studies, a reality aggravated by the ever growing economic disparities in the country. For these students, as the Editorial of the Daily Nation on February 11, 2008 put it, juggling academic pursuit and basic survival is a murky endeavor that leaves them with little or no desire to engage in activism.45 Thus, lack of incentives, either from the university system (where meritocracy in promotions and other avenues of professional development is nonexistent) or the government, has pushed the university community away from finding solutions to problems facing society, which according to Nafukho ought to be the focus of higher education,46 to matters of basic survival. Unfortunately, this is happening at a time when the country is in dire need of scientific and technological innovators to meet the economic challenges of the 21st Century and organic intellectuals to guide the country out of the socio-political quagmire it is in currently. Brain Drain Kenya is one of the many Third World countries faced with the acute problem of brain drain. According to the Kenyan government, there are about 1.8 million Kenyans living and working abroad.47 A significant number in this group includes the most talented, skilled, and learned individuals. Lamenting this reality, Raila Odinga, the countrys Prime Minister, is quoted in a Daily Nation article on July 27, 2009 calling upon Kenyan trained professionals to serve in the country before relocating abroad to avert manpower crisis. 48 There are several categories of the Diaspora scholars, such as those who decide to work abroad in search of greener pastures and the older scholars who were forced into exile by the Kenyatta and Moi regimes, for example, Ali Public Universities Crisis could Get Worse, Daily Nation February 11, 2008, Editorial section, http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed June 16, 2009). Nafukho, Fredrick M, The Role of Universities in Promoting Cooperation Between Social and Pure Scientists for Human Development in Kenya, Journal of Third World Studies xvi, no. 1 (1999), 87. Government of Kenya, The Kenyan Diaspora, Brand Kenya, http://www.brandkenya.go.ke/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53:the-kenyandiaspora&catid=54:visiting-kenya&Itemid=85 (accessed July 26, 2009). Brain Drain Hurting Kenya, Daily Nation, July 27, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/630706/-/view/printversion/-/13cc57g/-/index.html (accessed July 27, 2009).
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48 47 46 45

Mazrui, Ngugi wa Thiongo, Micere Mugo, Maina wa Kinyatti, and Rok Ajulu. The absence of the latter is crucial since the void they left has apparently never been filled. Furthermore, most of these scholars seem to have abandoned their political activism after settling abroad. Lingering Big Brother Syndrome Although the country has witnessed an unprecedented opening of democratic space, the same cannot be said about university administrations. In spite the relative level of autonomy universities currently enjoy, administrations in these institutions have demonstrated that old habits die hard; the Big Brother legacy of the Kenyatta and particularly Moi eras continues to haunt them. As a result, lecturers still find it hard to criticize the political class and university administrations out of fear of retribution.49 What makes political correctness even worse in the recent past is the fact that most of the intimidation comes from within the university. Unlike in earlier days when the political establishment orchestrated suppression of discourse in higher education to curtail political dissent, current infringement on intellectual freedom and witchhunting is mostly engineered by university administrations to ensure ethnic cronyism, corruption, and manipulation of governance organs goes on unabated.50 Unfortunately, as Otieno points out, this has led to gagging of university teachers on what they can teach (by rewarding cronies with promotions and frustrating independent-minded academicians) and interference in student politics to ensure pro-administration or ethically correct students assume leadership positions in the student government. Thus, the culture of playing it safe and authoritarianism still remains an impediment to vibrant discourse and political activism in Kenyan universities. The Way forward: From Ivory Tower to Organic Intellectuals That higher education plays a crucial role in the socio-political and economic development of any nation is a truism most people would accent to. As this discussion has revealed, there was a time the Kenyan university played a significant role not only in producing skilled manpower, but also in shaping national ethos. Radical scholars and students became catalysts of change by collaborating with like-minded reformists in the struggle against totalitarian and corrupt regimes. This is a role current academicians must reclaim if the university is to regain its relevance. The myriad socio-political problems plaguing Kenya todayreturn of mega corruption, abuse of human rights, escalated ethnic polarization, economic inequalities, and a dysfunctional political system warrants a rejuvenation of the reform agenda. The civil society appear to be regrouping, although it is reeling from a credibility crisis since most of those stepping in the shoes of those who decamped to join the political class are lightweights yet to establish their ethos. The media is also picking up momentum and the masses generally remain enthusiastic about change. This is where intellectuals need to step inas organic intellectuals to sustain the reform agenda. They should abandon the ivory tower attitude, the aloofness they have demonstrated, and spearhead discourse of change. It is high time the university reclaimed the sphere of influence it once

49

Mwangi Chege, Old Wine, 55-57.

Wycliffe Otieno, Politics, Ethnicity, and the Mission of the University: The Kenyan Example, International Higher Education4 (2008), http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/Number52/p24_Otieno.htm (accessed July 29, 2009).

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Kenya Studies Review enjoyed in order to re-direct national discourse from tribal acrimony and vendetta to a unified call in the pursuit of what is good for the country. The call for universities to take a leading role in the reform agenda is not without precedent. Universities universally have had the history of catalyzing social movements. Through their sheer numbers, ability to mobilize, intelligence, creativity, inquisitiveness, social standing, social skills, energy, boldness, and progressive world view, there is something about the university community that makes it a force to reckon with when it comes to social movements. Recent democratic protests in Iran after the alleged manipulation of the 2009 presidential vote by the ruling clergy in favor of the hardliner candidate and the Tiananmen Square student protests in China pushing for democracy two decades ago attest to the enormous potential universities have to influence political action in a country. University students in USA are also credited in creating an enabling environment for the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American president of the United States. Furthermore, there was a time Kenyan intellectuals were influential on the national stage. It is a question of reclaiming this role. In heeding this call, a reconfiguration of the role of the university, a pedagogical paradigm shift, and intellectuals in Kenya networking with Kenyan Diaspora scholars is imperative. Reconfiguring the Role of the University As Makau Mutua51 and Shadrack Nasongo52 point out, there is a general consensus on the indispensable role the civil society plays in the democratization process and socio-political movements in any given society. Elucidating this role, Nasongo describes the three-stage evolution of social movements as follows: It begins with what he refers to as the incubation period which, as he points out, is usually led by men and women of words. The role of this class, made up of the intelligentsia and the ideologues is to utilize their gift of the gab and the power of the written word to publicise existing social dysfunctions and to philosophise how the dysfunctions can be fixed. In other words, the function of this class is to create consciousness among the citizens on the evils facing society; to sensitize the masses on the problems facing them and to inspire them into action. The second stage is the action phase, which as he puts it, is led by fanatics whose function is to Take the ideology and words of the ideologues and translate them into comprehensible terms for the masses under stress. The third stage, the institutionalisation phase is when the social movement becomes bureaucratised on account of its growth in age and size, as it attracts different elements in society (or the social movement has attracted mass following that calls for structured leadership to steer the movement). 53 The above analysis of social movements underscores the need and urgency for the Kenyan intelligentsia to reclaim its influence on the socio-political scene, the role of exposing the many problems facing the country today and to offer a modus operandi for tackling them; a Makau Mutua, Lessons from Kenya, Chronicle of Higher Education 54, no. 36 (2008), http://0-search.ebscohost.com (accessed July 15, 2009). Shadrack Wanjala Nasongo, Negotiating New Rules of the Game: Social Movements, Civil Society and the Kenyan Transition, in Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, eds. Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasongo (London: Zed Books, 2007).
53 52 51

Nasongo, Negotiating New Rules, 21.

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framework rooted in reality and nationalism rather than myopic ethnic-based approaches. The intellectuals must realize the role of a university transcends producing skilled manpower or disseminating knowledge for the sake of it. Universities have a duty to produce responsible citizens, conscious individuals empowered to discern social contradictions and motivated to desire to create a better society. A university education should strive to create an informed citizenry by inculcating critical thinking skills among students. The concept of critical thinking has become common place in the academe, but often limited to academic abstraction. Schafersman defines critical thinking as thinking correctly for oneself that successfully leads to the most reliable answers to questions and solutions to problems, a process he argues involves applying principles of scientific thinking.54 To the contrary, an education process premised on critical thinking should challenge students to connect educational content with the broader social context in which the learning process is situated. Freire expounds on this view of critical thinking through what he terms conscientizacao, the capacity to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, and to take action against the oppressive elements of society.55 In other words, there is need to situate the education process in the larger socio-political context. That the nation is at crossroads warrants all responsible citizens to engage in seeking solutions on how to heal the country and move the democratization agenda forward. As the postelection violence of 2008 revealed, entrusting politicians with the destiny of the nation is catastrophic. That is why it is important the intelligentsia reclaim the role of organic intellectuals and together with like-minded members in the civil society and other stakeholders spearhead the discourse of change informed by the reality that socio-political change in modern times will not be achieved through the barrel of the gun, arrows, or machetes, but through discourse. There is nothing wrong with scholars fighting for decent salaries. In fact UASU, the University Academic Staff Union, should continue the fight for just salaries and reasonable working conditions. There is no justification for academicians to continue living in poverty whereas politicians and higher echelons in the civil service and government corporations continue to allocate themselves huge salaries. Ironically, the governments rationale for paying the political class and topnotch civil servants exorbitant salaries is to promote efficiency and professionalism, to deter them from corruption. Why cant the same principle be applied when it comes to academicians? Dont scholars deserve decent remuneration to allow them concentrate on their core callingteaching and research? However, it is also important for the intelligentsia to not lose sight of the big picturetheir role in the creation of a democratic and stable society. They must be engaged in public discourse to demand good governance and accountability from the political class; they must join other stakeholders and responsible citizens in questioning the culture of corruption, disregard of the rule of law, abuse of human rights, and politically motivated but unsound educational policies. If they have no faith in the education system, they should be in the forefront demanding and outlining necessary reform. After all they are the experts and critical stakeholders on educational matters. This change in approach must be informed by the acknowledgement that the ivory tower attitude they appear to have adopted is elitist and serves neither them nor the society. After all, their own fate is tied to the fate of the Steven Schafersman, An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and the Scientific Method, 1994, www.freeinquiry.com/intro-to-sci.html (accessed June 28, 2008).
55 54

Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 17.

Kenya Studies Review wider society, which means realization of a prosperous democratic and just society would translate into reform in the education sector, equitable remuneration, and better working conditions for them. In other words, they should take the lead in championing systemic change rather than the narrow-minded fixation on regime change that continues to fuel ethnic based politics and discourse in the country.

Adopting Progressive Pedagogies As this author has argued elsewhere, Kenyan educators must re-examine their pedagogies as a prerequisite for empowering students to be critical and reflective thinkers.56 Banking education, which is the predominant pedagogy in the country, is incapable of equipping students to discern social contradictions and to challenge the status quo. According to Freire, The capability of banking education to minimize or annul the students creative power and to stimulate their credulity serves the interests of the oppressors, who care neither to have the world revealed nor to see it transformed.57 Granted, it is high time educators adopted pedagogies that empower them (educators) and students to envision and pursue the agenda of social transformation. Instead of the system that mainly promotes regurgitation of ideas, educators must adopt problemposing education grounded on emergence of consciousness and critical intervention in reality as opposed to submersion of consciousness that underpins banking education.58 In other words, lecturers must adopt pedagogies that restore vibrant discourse in the university, pedagogies that allow them to exercise intellectual freedom on matters that not only pertain to their institutions and education in general, but also national issues. After all, according to Giroux, the exercise of intellectual freedom by teachers and students to challenge social injustices is a major goal of university education.59 Thus, lecturers must embrace the role of organic intellectuals at a time when progressive forces are shrinking. However, adopting progressive or critical pedagogies demands educators confront what Bourdieu and Passeron refer to as habitus; The product of internalization of the principles of a cultural arbitrary capable of perpetuating itself after PA [Pedagogic Action, or literacy] has ceased and thereby of perpetuating in practices the principles of the internalized arbitrary.60 As this discussion has revealed, both educators and students are engrossed in a culture of political intimidation and tribal fetish. Educators must come to terms with the reality that maintaining the culture of silence perpetuates the status quo and, therefore, serves the interests of the political class. Hence, the call for educators to adopt critical pedagogies stems from the need for
56

Chege, The Politics. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 54. Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 62.

57

58

Henry Giroux, Academic Freedom Under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy, College Literature 33 no. 4 (2006), 2. Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture. (London: Sage Publications, 1990), 31.
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educators to embrace their civic duty just like any other responsible citizen, which is to be vigilant and concerned about the welfare of the nation. Most importantly, it should be a shift guided by the realization of the need for them to reclaim the role of organic intellectuals that is critical in spearheading the much needed leadership in the pursuit of changing the course the country is taking. This conceptual transformation should compel teachers to strive to challenge students to also be agents of change by nudging them to come out of their comfort zones to interrogate how their lived experiences can be transformed;61 it is a call to critical thinking designed to raise consciousness among students to ensure they are cognizant of the world they live in, how the learning process reinforces their experiences, and how they could apply the knowledge they have acquired to transform their world. It is a process driven by acknowledging the double-edge nature of literacyits hegemonic and counter-hegemonic potential. As Spring succinctly puts it: In one dimension, the distribution of knowledge (or schooling) is used to control others. In the second dimension, knowledge gives the individual the ability to gain freedom from the control of others.62 Thus, educators and students must come to terms with the fact that there is no way an empowering education can be divorced from real issues that affect society. Any attempt to divorce literacy from lived experiences serves the interests of the political class since it produces politically unconscious individuals. This realization must motivate educators to create classroom dynamics that allow vibrant discourse to thrive; the kind of discourse that is capable of challenging the ethnically poisoned rhetoric of the ruling elite that has come to define national body politic. A common critique of critical pedagogies is that they are populist.63 However, this position overlooks the reality that the pedagogy combines a sound educational theory and praxis. The pedagogy not only exposes the hegemonic nature of literacy, it offers tools of empowerment by advocating critical discourse built on dialog. It is substantive since it calls for students (and educators) to act as self-reflective subjects with an ability to think critically.64 This is not an impossible goal or mere solipsism considering the near universal consensus that a major goal of education is to inculcate critical thinking among students. The emphasis on empowerment of learners to challenge the status quo that underpins critical pedagogies makes these pedagogies handy in the Kenyan situation today.

Min Zhan Lu and Bruce Horner, The Problematic of Experience: Redefining Critical Work in Ethnography and Pedagogy, College English 60 no. 3 (1998): 257-77. Joel Spring, Conflict of Interests: the Politics of American Education, (New York: McGraw Hill, 2005), 56. Thomas Popkewitz, A political Sociology of Educational Reform: Power/Knowledge in Teaching, Teacher Education, and Research, (New York: Teachers College Press, 1991), 230. Michelle Inderbitzin and Debbie Storrs, Mediating the Conflict Between Transformative Pedagogy and Bureaucratic Practice, College Teaching 56 no. 1 (2008), 48.
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Kenya Studies Review Networking with Kenyan Diaspora For Kenyan academicians to play the role of organic intellectuals, it is also important they network with their counterparts in the Diaspora. First, as noted earlier, a good number of Kenyan intellectuals in Diaspora were forced to flee the country as their political activism made them enemies of the establishment. Granted, these are scholars whose credibility in the discourse of change is unquestionable and at a time when the nation is engulfed in a heavy cloud of ethnic suspicion and mistrust, they have the potential of bridging the ethnic divide. Secondly, as stated earlier, many of the Diaspora scholars are extremely talented; why cant the nation (and Kenyan educators) tap from their expertise? It is unfortunate many Kenyans see Diaspora contribution only in terms of remittances and not their intellectual and professional potential. On the other hand, some scholars have argued the term brain drain fails to take into account the Diaspora are actually developing themselves professionally since their host countries provide advanced facilities and incentives for research. They argue brain gain best captures this reality. This argument is valid, but it is one sided. Of course to the Diaspora it is brain gain since they are undoubtedly developing professionally and scholarly. However, if their expertise is not utilized by the motherland, then it remains brain drain. It would, therefore, be more accurate to describe this scenario as brain drain, but economic gain (to the mother country). However, there has been a glimmer of hope when it comes to Diaspora involvement in national affairs as the following examples illustrate: Some scholars in Diaspora have remained engaged in Kenyan public discourse by publishing well thought out, well analyzed, and poignant articles in Kenyan newspapers. Contributions by Professor Makau Mutua and Professor Ali Mazrui come to mind. There is also extensive scholarship on the socio-political situation in Kenya by scholars in Diaspora. The Kenya Scholars and Studies Associations annual conferences provide a forum where scholars can flesh out ideas germane to the nation. The decision to publish presentations made in these conferences in anthologies and journals allows for dissemination and sharing of these ideas to a broader Kenyan audience making the forum not just another elitist platform, but one with the potential of offering constructive and transformative ideas. That scholars from Kenyan universities and non-Kenyans interested in studying Kenya participate in this forum helps enrich the discussions. Hopefully, current initiatives in Kenya to make the Internet more accessible and faster will allow for more collaboration between Diaspora scholars and their counterparts in the country in a way that will transcend academic pursuits, to include socio-political activism. That the government would invite Professor Calestous Juma of Harvard Universitys School of Government and Professor Sam Makinda from Murdoch University, Australia, to make presentations in a conference of the countrys ambassadors meant to strategize on how to use the diplomatic missions to advance the countrys competitiveness, as reported in a Daily Nation article on July 27, 2009, 65marks a break from the past where expatriates were often preferred at the expense of Kenyan professionals. Tapping from the expansive expertise from Diaspora scholars opens doors for scholars to contribute to Don: Africas Envoys Can Help Countries Grow Faster, Daily Nation, July 27, 2009, http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/630984/-/view/printversion/-/ckvrws/-/index.html (accessed July 28, 2009).
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national development (not just economic, but also socio-political development) to the benefit of the country and fulfillment of these scholars. Appointment of Ali Mazrui, a patriarch scholar in Diaspora as Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology for eight years, is another encouraging gesture. However, it would have helped if the government would cast its net wide and also develop a systemic policy of utilizing local talent. But for this to happen, the onus is on Kenyans at home and abroad to put pressure on the political class to end the culture of tribalism, cronyism, nepotism, bribery, and all other manifestations of corruption that obstruct meritocracy.

Conclusion In conclusion, it is evident the current situation in Kenyas socio-political structure is unique. During the KANU days, there existed a clear distinction between apologists of the oppressive status quo and reform advocates. But, when previous champions of reform become the perpetrators of the same old order they risked their life fighting, then the reform agenda is in a crisis. That the public has generally remained politically charged provides opportunity for sustaining the momentum in the reform agenda, but it also opens a window of vulnerability with politicians misdirecting that energy for selfish gain as was witnessed in the post-election violence of 2008 when gullible youth and peasants were manipulated to perpetrate ethnic cleansing at the behest of the political class. This is where organic intellectuals come into partner with like-minded stakeholders to direct this energy into insistence on institutional reforms and accountability from the political class that will guarantee democratic gains made so far are sustained; to galvanize the country in demanding nothing less than a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. The function of this class, the organic intellectuals, would be to inspire citizens to once again coalesce around issues of national interest rather than succumbing to the ethnic fetish that has been a tool of choice by both colonial and postcolonial establishments to advance their self-enriching interests grounded on corruption, oppression, and exploitation of the masses.

Kenya Studies Review References Abagi, Okwach, W. Owino, et al. Implementing the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Education System of Kenya (The Koech Report): Realities, Challenges and Prospects. Practical Strategies for Transforming the Report Recommendations into Reality. Institute of Policy Analysis and Research, Kenya, (2000). http://www.eldis.org/go/topics/resourceguides/education&id=28638&type=document (accessed July 29, 2009). Alston, Paul. Press Statement by Prof. Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions Mission to Kenya 16-25, February 2009. The Standard, April 28. http://www.estandard.net (accessed April 28, 2009). Amutabi, Maurice N. Intellectuals and the Democratisation Process in Kenya. In Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, edited by Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasongo, 197-226. London: Zed Books, 2007. ___. Political Interference in the Running of Education in Post Independent Kenya: A Critical Retrospection. International Journal of Educational Development 23 (2003): 127-144. ___. Crisis and Student Protest in Universities in Kenya: Examining the Role of Students in National Leadership and Democratization Process. African Studies Review 45, no. 2 (2002): 157-177. Barkan, Joel D. Will the Kenyan Settlement Hold? Current History 107, no 708 (2008): 147153. Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Education, Society, and Culture. London: Sage Publications, 1990. Brain Drain Hurting Kenya. Daily Nation, July 27, 2009. http://www.nation.co.ke/news//1056/630706/-/view/printversion/-/13cc57g/-/index.html (accessed July 27, 2009). Branch, Daniel and Nic Cheeseman. Democratization, Sequencing, and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. African Affairs 108, no. 430 (2008): 1-26. ___. Briefing: Using Opinion Polls to Evaluate Kenyan Politics, March 2004-January 2005. African Affairs 104, no 415 (2005): 325-336. Chege, Mwangi. The Politics of Education in Kenyan Universities: A Call for a Paradigm Shift. African Studies Review (forthcoming). ___.Old Wine and New Wineskins: De-colonizing Kenyas University System. La Vergne, TN: VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, 2008. Don: Africas Envoys Can Help Countries Grow Faster. Daily Nation, July 27, 2009. http://www.nation.co.ke/news/-/1056/630984/-/view/printversion/-/ckvrws/-/index.html (accessed July 28, 2009) Embeywa, Etende. Varsity Dons Have Done us Proud. Kenya Times, November 27, 1992, 7 Freire, Paulo. Pedagogy of the Oppressed, New Revised 20th Anniversary ed. New York: Continuum, 1993. Giroux, Henry. Academic Freedom Under Fire: The Case for Critical Pedagogy. College Literature 33, no. 4 (2006): 1-42. Government of Kenya. The Kenyan Diaspora. Brand Kenya. http://www.brandkenya.go.ke (accessed July 26, 2009). Gramsci, Antonio. Selections From prison Notebooks. Edited by Hoare Quintin and Geoffrey Smith. New York: International Publishers, 1971. Inderbitzin, Michelle and Debbie Storrs. Mediating the Conflict Between Transformative Pedagogy and Bureaucratic Practice. College Teaching 56, no. 1 (2008): 47-52. Kenyan University Lecturers Strike for Improved Working Conditions. Voice of America
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News, June 18, 2007. http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/.../2007-06-18-voa36.cfm (accessed August 20, 2009). Klopp, Jacqueline, and Janai Orina. University Crisis, Student Activism, and the Contemporary Struggle for Democracy in Kenya. African Studies Review 45, no. 1 (2002): 43-76. KU Riots Utter Madness. Daily Nation, March 30, 2009. http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Editorial/-/440804/554806/-/q33vlfz/-/index.html (accessed March 30, 2009). Lu, Min Zhan and Bruce Horner. The Problematic of Experience: Redefining Critical Work in Ethnography and Pedagogy. College English 60 no. 30 (1998): 257-277. Mazrui, Ali. Are the Universities Being Tribalised? Daily Nation, February 10, 2008. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed Retrieved 23, 2003). ___. Pan-Africanism and the Intellectuals: Rise, Decline and Revival. In African Intellectuals: Rethinking Politics, Language, Gender and Development, edited by Thandika Mkandawire, 5677. New York: Zed Books, 2005. Moi, Daniel. Kenya African Nationalism: Nyayo Philosophy and Principles. Nairobi: Macmillan, 1986. Muindi, Benjamin. Ethnic Political Bug Hits Varsity Polls. Daily Nation, May 22, 2009. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed June 16, 2009). Munene, Macharia. African Intellectuals in Hostile Media Environment. Paper presented at the Conference on Media and the Construction of African Identities, Nairobi, Kenya, August 3-6, 2004. Mutua, Makau. Lessons from Kenya. Chronicle of Higher Education 54, no. 36 (2008). http://0-search.ebscohost.com (accessed July 15, 2009). Mwiria, Kilemi. We Must Stem the Slide of our Universities into Tribal Enclaves. The Standard, March 20, 2009. http://www.eastandard.net/print.php?id=1144010007&cid=490 (accessed June 16, 2009) ___. A Little Education for MPs Essential. Daily Nation, September 26, 2005. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed September 25, 2005) Nafukho, Fredrick M. The Role of Universities in Promoting Cooperation Between Social and Pure Scientists for Human Development in Kenya. Journal of Third World Studies xvi, no. 1 (1999): 87-100. Nasongo, Shadrack W. Negotiating New Rules of the Game: Social Movements, Civil Society and the Kenyan Transition. In Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, edited by Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasongo, 19-57. London: Zed Books, 2007. Nasongo, Shadrack and Godwin R. Murunga. Prospects for Democracy in Kenya. In Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, edited by Godwin R. Murunga and Shadrack W. Nasongo, 3-16. London: Zed Books, 2007. Nyaigotti-Chacha, Chacha. Reforming Higher Education in Kenya: Challenges, Lessons and Opportunities. Paper Presented at the State University of New York Workshop with the Parliamentary Committee on Education, Science and Technology, Naivasha, Kenya, August 2004. Odegi-Awuondo, C. Varsity Dons Critique a Sham. Daily Nation, November 24, 1992: 7. Otieno, Wycliffe. Politics, Ethnicity, and the Mission of the University: The Kenyan Example.

Kenya Studies Review International Higher Education 52 (2008). http://www.bc.edu/bc_org/avp/soe/cihe/newsletter/Number52/p24_Otieno.htm (accessed July 29, 2009). Popkewitz, Thomas. A political Sociology of Educational Reform: Power/Knowledge in Teaching, Teacher Education, and Research. New York: Teachers College Press, 1991. Public Universities Crisis could Get Worse. Daily Nation, February 11, 2008, Editorial section. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed June 16, 2009). Schafersman, Steven D. An Introduction to Science: Scientific Thinking and the Scientific Method. (1994). www.freeinquiry.com/intro-to-sci.html (accessed June 28, 2008). Sifuna, Daniel N. Crisis in the Public Universities in Kenya. In Educational Dilemmas: Debate and Diversity, edited by Keith Watson, Celia Modgil, and Sohan Modgil, 219-229. London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 1997. Spring, Joel. Conflict of Interests: The Politics of American Education. New York: McGraw Hill, 2005. Thiongo, Ngugi. Detained: A writers prison diary. London: Heinemann, 1981. Throup, David, and Hornsby Charles. Multi-Party Politics in Kenya: the Kenyatta & Moi States & the Triumph of the System in the 1992 Election. Nairobi: E.A.E.P., 1998. Varsity Ideology Sinking. Daily Nation, May, 22 20009, Editorial section. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=25&newsid=57960 (accessed June 16, 2009). Wambui, Sheila. The Purge of Critical Academics Continues. Daily Nation, November 28, 1992: 15. Widner, Jennifer A. The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee" to "Nyayo!" Berkeley: University of California, 1992.

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Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development

By Maurice N. Amutabi* Abstract This article uses a historical trajectory to examine the impact of presidential politics in development in Kenya, using Kenyatta, Mo and Kibaki regimes for illustration. My argument is that corruption and inefficiency of the three regimes has made Kenya very vulnerable, now regarded as one of the fragile states on the African continent. Kenyatta inherited colonial structures that were designed to serve British imperial and financial interests, and these structures have remained intact and have brought certain material advantages to privileged few, especially his family. A recurring problem for the three regimes has been the unresolved land issue and factiousness of the state. I suggest that the expansion of representational technologies and capacities have allowed people access to freedom, as well as important information and can make superior judgments. These new mentalities and self imaging have been generated, largely outside spaces of political control such as the internet which address the challenges of this new historical period. Proliferations of FM radio stations and gutter press have also added to this free flow of information. As a consequence, new critical discourses abound on Kenyas past and present. New academic approaches such as postmodernism, multiculturalism and post colonialism have also helped to raise new questions which this essay grapples with. Key words: Ethnicity; political parties; Kenyatta; Moi; Kibaki; ODM *Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi (Ph.D) teaches at Central Washington University.

Citation Format Amutabi, Maurice (2009). Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 55-84.

Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction Presidential historians in Kenya have not done a good job in assessing the effects of presidential policies from 1963 to the present. Jomo Kenyatta ruled Kenya between 1963 and 1978 and a lot of information is just starting to emerge about his rule.1 His successor Daniel Moi ruled from 1978 to 2002 and his political closet is still unraveling but has not been thoroughly examined by historians. Despite the secrecy that surrounds presidents in Kenya, there is a lot that is in the public sphere. Kenyatta believed in delegation and created a strong cabinet and forceful provincial administration. He rarely appeared in public, largely as a result of his old age, having become president in old age (about 80 years). Moi was a hands-on leader and more energetic and transformed KANU into a formidable political machine through which he channeled his development agenda. It is also evident that the last years of Kenyatta and Moi regimes were notably unproductive, and replete with succession intrigues and disputes. When Mwai Kibaki took office in 2002, he was equally old, in his 70s and tended to emulate Kenyatta, staying away from e public glare. Like Kenyatta, he was frail due to old age and having suffered a serious accident during the campaign period, in 2002. Like Kenyatta, Kibaki seems to believe in delegation although he is indistinguishable about everything else. Kibakis last years in office are not likely to be different. Thus, the three presidents that Kenya has had this far are similar: Kenyatta was old and suffered ill health which made him insecure. Moi lacked charisma and did not have a solid intellectual base which made him nervous and easily irritable; while Kibaki has been a political recluse of sorts, largely as a result of his approach to politics. Kenyatta and Moi were convinced of the dangers of constitutionalism and tried to impose total control over the information available to Kenyans through VOK and KBC through single party rule. Alternate political voices were mercilessly suppressed. The harshest measures were directed against the university community and trade unions. My objective in this article is that in order to prepare better ground for Kenyas future development, we need to unpack and expose past mistakes in order to learn from them. Kenyatta tended to privilege members of his Kikuyu ethnic group in appointments to strategic ministries as well as civil service positions. Moi did the same and so has Kibaki. What is interesting is that the three presidents rewarded party loyalties as well, Kenyatta and Moi through KANU and Kibaki through DP and its subsequent metamorphoses as NARC, PNU, etc. To understand presidential politics in Kenya, one has to examine the nature of party and ethnic politics. 2 It is through understanding of the place of ethnicity and party politics in Kenya that we can understand the history of presidential politics in the country. Ethnic groups have For more on Jomo Kenyatta, see Guy Arnold, Kenyatta and the politics of Kenya (London: Dent, 1974); Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London: Allen & Unwin, 1979); and George Delf (1961), Jomo Kenyatta: Towards Truth about The Light of Kenya (New York: Doubleday, 1961). 2 The concept political ethnicity is similar to what Lonsdale has called, political tribalism. For an elaboration on the notion of political tribalism, see John Lonsdale, Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism, in Kaarsholm, Preben and Jan Hultin (eds.), Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Occasional paper No. 11, International Development Studies, Roskilde University, 1994.
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Kenya Studies Review become vital building blocks for Kenyas democracy, as seen in the scholarship on ethnicity in Kenya.3 In a country whose politics are ethnically determined, pronounced disparities in population sizes have posed numerous challenges. To enhance their political premium nationally, politicians have used populations of their ethnic groups as a bargaining chip. They have created alliances based on their ethnic numbers and support. The more numerous an ethnic group is, the better recognition its leaders get in the re-configuration of alliances and attention from the political schemers. During the dominance of KANU, ethnic groups were recognized as significant in determining the sharing of power even though the ethnic group from which the president comes has been the main beneficiary of the national spoils, occupying the centre circle around the presidency.4 To them belongs the actual power. But the big ethnic groups were still regarded very highly in the sharing of the national cake. Kenya has had elections in 1964, 1966, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1983, 1988, 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007. Between 1964 and 1988, the elections were held under KANU. In these elections, ethnic competition was not as pronounced as later became the case in liberalized politics under a multiparty political dispensation, from 1992. After 1992, it became clear that ethnicity mattered in national politics and Kenyans for the first time started to vote on what was clearly ethnic basis. Leaders with small parties even without a chance of ascending to the presidency performed better among their own ethnic groups during elections. The best example is that of George Anyonas Kenya Social Congress (KSC), which always performed relatively well in Kisii districts but palled into dimness outside Anyonas Kisii ethnic turf. Even Ford Kenya has consistently performed well among the Abaluyia areas especially Bungoma District since Michael Wamalwa, a Luyia was its leader. An assessment of party and ethnic politics in Kenya offers a vantage point from which to examine where Kenya has come from and where it is going. For many decades, access to the national cake in Kenya has been through ethnic balancing, even if not well balanced, but the intention has been visible.5 Using these multiparty elections - 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007, I See Korwa Adar, Ethnicity and Ethnic Kings: The Enduring Dual Constraint in Kenyas Multiethnic Democratic Electoral Experiment, The Journal of Third World Spectrum. Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998, 71-96; Shadrack Nasongo, Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa: Beyond the Inter-Ethnic Hatred Thesis, in Okoth, P. G. and B. A. Ogot, eds. 2000. Conflict in Contemporary Africa. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, 2000, 44-55; O. Oanda, Economic Reform, Political Liberalization and Economic Ethnic Conflict in Kenya, Africa Development, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, 1999, 83-107; B.A. Ogot (ed) Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research, 1997; S. Orvis, Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism in Kenyas Virtual Democracy, African Issues. Vol. XXIX, Nos. 1&2, 2001, 8-13; Walter O. Oyugi, Ethnic Politics in Kenya, in Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA, 1998, 287-309; Walter Ouma Oyugi, Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in Kenya, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, 1997, 41-69. 4 Godwin R. Murunga,Ethnicity, Community Relations and Civil Society in Contemporary Kenya: Trends and Field Experiences, in Ufahamu, Vol. 29, Nos. 2/3, 2003, 2936. R. Ajulu, Politicised Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A Historical Perspective, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2002, 251-268; E.S. Atieno-Odhiambo,
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demonstrate how tensions have been precipitated by ethnic elites under various pretences. I show that these elites have used ethnic groups to acquire power and manipulate the masses. They have used political parties as vehicles of achieving their ambitions. The article demonstrates that greed, poor leadership, deceit, corruption, grandstanding and separatist threats, manifested through ethnic nationalism and sectionalism are responsible for the tensions in contemporary Kenya. The country has not fully recovered from the effects of the Kenyatta era, where the president was supposed to be the patron of the nation. To understand the origins of recent tensions and developments such as the apprehension over the referendum in 2005 and the bungled presidential elections of 2007, one must look back in history. I seek to examine the reasons for shifting political alliances and why there is political fragmentation in Kenya based on ethnic cleavages. I argue that the hatred, fear and suspicion among ethnic groups were clearly visible in the results of 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 elections. Tensions came into the open in the referendum carried out on the Kenya Constitution Draft in 2005 (Wako Draft) and in the 2007 elections more than before. My argument in this article is that political parties in Kenya have never been driven by ideology, right from independence to the present. They represent individual greed masquerading as ethnic interests; and elitist and personal ambition masked as popular wills of members of ethnic groups. Thus, parties and ethnic groups provide sites, spaces, and frameworks under which to assess the constituent parts that influence politics in Kenya, and only through them can we provide diagnosis and treatment to the present political malady. Powerful and Imperial Presidency: The Reward System Jomo Kenyattas rule lasted between 1963 and 1978 has been accused of so many omissions and commissions. Four factors worked to the advantage of Kenyatta when he became president. First, he was an old man and in many African patriarchal structures, this gave him a huge advantage, earning him respect from fellow politicians many of whom were much younger. Second, Kenyatta hailed from one of Kenyas largest ethnic groups, the Kikuyu and who happened to be politically savvy, having participated in the Mau Mau war of liberation. Third, Kenyatta had travelled widely, lived in Europe for almost twenty years and was also reasonably educated. Fourth, Kenyatta perfected the reward system and divide and rule policies which had been used by the colonial system. He rewarded those who supported him and was often accused of engaging in some form of Kikiyunisation or negative ethnicity, in the process.6 Apologists for Kenyatta have argued that Kenyatta did not create ethnicity, pointing out that pioneer political parties were formed largely around ethnic considerations. The Kenya African National Union (KANU) was predominantly for the Kikuyu and Luo, whereas the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU) was regarded as a party for the so-called small ethnic groups. But this is not entirely true because even KANU had members from minority ethnic groups. Another variable besides political parties was the role of ethnic chiefs. Jaramogi Oginga Odinga was seen to represent Luo interests, and Pius Masinde Muliro represented Abaluyia ones. Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2002, 223-249; J.M Klopp, Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2002, 269-294; K. Omolo, Political Ethnicity in the Democratization Process in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, 2002, 209-221. 6 Godwin R. Murunga, The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, in Identity, Culture and Politics: An Afro-Asiatic Dialogue, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2004.

Kenya Studies Review The Embu and Mbere interests were purportedly represented by Jeremiah Nyagah, and those of the Meru by Jackson Harvester Angaine, and the Maasai by John Kochellah while Paul Ngei was the Akamba chief. But at the center of these two agencies parties and ethnic groups was the presidency. In their article, Prospects for Democracy in Kenya Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasongo suggest that many of the political problems in Kenya can be placed right at the doorstep of imperial presidency. They write, the prospects for democracy in Kenya are contingent, to a large extent, upon restructuring the institutions of governance and concomitantly devolving power from the presidency, a process that all governments in Kenya, including the Kibaki one, have been reluctant to shepherd.7 Many writers have grappled with the problems created by a very powerful presidential structure in Kenya, which does not have significant checks and balances. The occupants of the position of the president have exploited this office to enrich themselves and their cronies. Since independence in 1963, Jomo Kenyatta started consolidating power around the presidency. As the first president, he ensured that members of the Kikuyu ethnic group and loyal members of his party dominated politics and economic realms, for good political reasons. By tasting power, they would support him by all means, because Kenyatta loved power.8 Kenyatta reasoned that by controlling economic matters, his cronies would ensure success of the state, as stakeholders. The first three years of independence were spent on political and economic recruitment, creating a ruling class. Kenyatta ensured that he recruited able and loyal lieutenants into this ruling aristocracy. He gave them land and money and power and ensured that they were loyal while isolating legitimate heroes, those who fought in the war of liberation (Mau Mau). 9 The youthful lieutenants became very loyal and were willing to do anything for Kenyatta because they owed him everything. Many of Kenyattas lieutenants had homes in posh areas of Nairobi, and land in the former white highlands in the Rift Valley. They formed an impenetrable aristocracy. Some of these lieutenants whom Kenyatta placed in positions of influence were in their 20s, for example Kenneth Matiba who was made a permanent secretary at the age of 29. Kenyatta also used KANU to recruit young lieutenants to do his bidding. He made 30 year old Tom Mboya party secretary general and minister in his government. He also recruited Mwai Kibaki into the party as executive officer in his 20s and when he proved reliable quickly moved him to the cabinet.

Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasongo, Prospects for Democracy in Kenya. In Godwin Murunga and Shadrack Nasongo (eds), Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007), 3. John Lonsdale, Ornamental Constitutionalism in Africa: Kenyatta and the Two Queens. The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, Volume 34, Issue 1 March 2006, 87 103. See David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britains Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson: London, 2005).
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These young lieutenants owed allegiance to Kenyatta through either ethnic or party connections. The next stage in Kenyattas drive to consolidation of power was to unmake his perceived threats and enemies in order to entrench himself. He did this by removing other legitimate leaders, particularly those who had large, legitimate and loyal constituencies, such as Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Ronald Ngala, Pius Masinde Muliro and John Kochellah. Kenyatta wanted to make his own leaders, who would be loyal to him. His first target for destruction was his populist vice president Jaramogi Oginga Odinga. The first political disagreement between Jomo Kenyatta (a Kikuyu) and Oginga Odinga (a Luo) in 1966 was quickly seen as a Kikuyu Luo conflict. In 1966, Jomo Kenyatta isolated Oginga Odinga as Kenyas Vice President and the Luos have never forgiven the Kikuyu community for that fallout. Ironically, it is Odinga who had held KANU together when Kenyatta was in detention. Odinga even declined to form a government without Kenyatta when the British invited him to do so. The dismissal of Odinga was very Machiavellian in the way it was executed, because Kenyatta basically baited Odinga into resigning from government. He made it very hard for Odinga to function effectively as his principal assistant for Kenyatta was a very cunning politician. Although he rewarded his followers and supporters, he was also very sensitive to those who appeared popular and tried to become independent of him. This is a lesson which for politicians like Tom Mboya, Ronald Ngala and J.M Kariuki came too late, for Kenyatta was very retributive.10 He always warned his adversaries and those who changed and reformed, like Paul Ngei, they lived to see many years ahead, but for those who did not heed his warnings such as Fred Kubai, Kungu Karumba and J.M Kariuki they always ended on the wrong side.11 Karumba and J.M Kariuki were killed. NonKikuyu politicians opposed to his policies felt the brunt of his power as well, such as Ronald Ngala, Bruce Mackenzie, Pio Gama Pinto, Argwings Kodhek, and Tom Mboya, who were all killed or died in suspicious circumstances. Other critics such as Martin Shikuku, Jean Marie Seroney, Oginga Odinga, George Anyona, among others, suffered detention or long jail terms on trumped up charges.12 Kenyatta liked to isolate and frustrate his opponents. This was a pattern that reached its apogee in the many politically related killings from 1968 when opposition against his regime became sharp. That is why the deaths of Ronald Ngala and Tom Mboya came in quick succession, almost in Machiavellian fashion, to silence his critics, and it almost worked. Indeed, this is one of the reasons that the name Kenyatta still raises goose bumps on skins of a many octogenarian politicians in Kenya that lived in that era. The name still exerts a chilling effect on many politicians. The Moi era was not much different. When Daniel Moi took over in 1978, some Kalenjin also became wealthy largely due to his patronage. During the regime of Daniel Moi that lasted from 1978 to 2002, there was a significant reduction of Kikuyu influence in government, especially senior positions of the civil service. Moi reversed the order in favor of Kalenjins. From 1979, Moi started to develop the Kalenjin alliance more earnestly.13 For instance, whereas in 1978 there were 35 Kikuyu District
10

See David Goldsworthy, Tom Mboya: The Man Kenya Wanted to forget (London: Heinemann; New York: Africana Books, 1982). Joseph Karimi and Philip Ochieng The Kenyatta Succession (Nairobi: Transafrica Press 1980).
12 11

Karimi and Ochieg, The Kenyatta Succession.

Kenya Studies Review Commissioners (DCs) out of 41, 5 Kikuyu Provincial Commissioners (PCs) out of the 8, and 13 Permanent Secretaries out of 19 available; in 1991, there were 17 Kalenjin PSs out of 28 in the nation, 45 Kalenjin DCs out of 66 available positions and 4 out of 8 PCs.14 It is clear that the Kalenjin and their allied pastoralist ethnic groups such as the Maasai, Samburu and Turkana replaced the Kikuyu almost to a man when Moi took over as Commander-in-Chief and President of Kenya. Many scholars have written about this, assessing the so-called Nyayo Era providing the personnel breakdown.15 Lucy Mulli writes, Through a process of cronyism, Moi [was] able to retain power by using his ethnic group as a support base. In exchange for their support, the Kalenjin have been rewarded with resources from the public sector. These include senior positions in parastatal organizations and the administration, as well as actual monetary benefits in the form of government loans. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the accession to power by Moi saw the simultaneous entry of Kalenjins into top positions, and the corresponding exit of Kikuyus. 16 During the Kenyatta and Moi regimes respectively, the Kikuyu and Kalenjin possessed disproportionately large representation in all leading sectors of the economy such agriculture, health, and education, among others. The tension between President Daniel Moi and the elite members of the Kikuyu ethnic group was not just confined to the corporate world and civil service positions. The contestation took many forms and and spread to all sectors, including
13

Contrary to popular belief, the Kalenjin appeared as an ethnic group in official records in the 1989 census, although in 1955, Daniel Moi, Henry Cheboiwo and Taitta Towett had created the Kalenjin Political Alliance. This means that the Kalenjin alliance is not as recent as the Moi era. True, in 1979 Population census the Kalenjins appear as Nandi, Kipsigis, Keiyo, Marakwet, Pokot, Tugen, and Sabaot. Maurice Amutabi, Ethnicity and Kenyas Civil Service: A Retrospection, Mimeo, Department of Development Studies, Moi University, Kenya, 1999, 8. The Kalenjin replaced the Kikuyu as chief executives in heading the leading agricultural parastatals such as the Agricultural Finance Corporation (AFC), the Agricultural Development Corporation (ADC), the National Cereals Board of Kenya (NCBP), the Kenya Tea Development Authority (KTDA), the Coffee Board of Kenya (CBK), and the Kenya Seed Company (KSC), among others. During Kenyattas term as president, the Kikuyu not only headed but also held senior positions in all the key government corporations such as the Central Bank of Kenya, Kenya Commercial Bank, Kenya Power and Lighting Company, Kenya Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, Kenya Industrial Estates, Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC), Kenya Ports Authority (KPA), among others. Lucy Mulli, Understanding election clashes in Kenya, 1992 and 1997. Africa Watch Institute for Security Studies. http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/ASR/8No4/AfricaWatch.html (Accessed July 12, 2009).
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16 15 14

education. Some scholars felt that Moi targetted schools found in Kikuyu regions for poaching of good teachers. Many good teachers often ended up in schools in the Rift Valley such as Sacho, Baringo, Kabarak, Kapsabet girls and boys, and Tambach high school, which became academic giants. Of course this argument has been countered by the fact that accorfing to the Teachers Service Commission Act, teachers of public schools agree to work anywhere in Kenya. The defenders of Moi argue that teachers are not marked for any particular region when they graduate from university and it is wrong to suggest that by distributing teachers to various parts of the country, Moi undermined certain regions. There are also those who have argued that Mois policies did not just affect only schools from Central Kenya, pointing out that former giants in Kaelnjin regions such St. Patricks Boys High School (Item), Kapkenda Girls, Moi Girls, Eldoret all declined during Mois period for various reasons. However, the area in which Moi was seen to target the Kikuyu occiured in run up to the 1992 multiparty elections, during which Mois regime was blamed for using ethnic clashes from 1991 to target members of the Kikuyu ethnic group, and others such as the Luyia, Luo and Kisii.17 President Moi was against multiparty politics and was quick to interpret the violence that accompanied political competition as the results of multiparty politics, which he had warned against. Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA)18 warriors targeted non-pastoralists (mainly the Kikuyu) that had settled in the Rift Valley. Over 3,000 people were killed in the ethnic skirmishes. Thousands were displaced, and since they were outside the areas in which they had registered to vote, their votes were rendered useless. The ethnic cleansing was seen as a pre-emptive move by KANU operatives to disfranchise the Kikuyu and other ethnic groups in the vast Rift Valley province. KANU used money looted from the Treasury to buy support of ethnic leaders and even blamed the ethnic clashes on the victims. The Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) was used

In 1991-3, Kenya witnessed state-sponsored violence directed against ethnic Kikuyu, Luyia, Luo and Kisii farmers who had migrated to the Rift Valley (former President Daniel Mois home province) and were likely to vote for parties opposed to his KANU Party (which is associated in the main with Mois own Kalenjin ethnic group and its allies) during the first multiparty elections held in 1992. The perpetrators of the violence - window-dressed as Kalenjin or Maasai warriors - attacked wearing red uniform T-shirts and trousers (uniform of KANU youth wingers). With faces concealed, they conducted Ku Klux Klan-style night rallies and vowed to cleanse the Rift Valley of the baleful madoadoa (non-Pastoralists). Use of guns, bows and arrows, and nighttime firebombing of homesteads, Christian churches, and Kikuyu, Luo, Luyia and Kisii businesses were standard procedures. Firebombs by the phantom militia were planted in those newspaper and human rights offices in Nairobi that dared to publicize the ethnic cleansing in the Rift Valley. Some 3,000 people - mainly Kikuyu - perished in these ethnic attacks, while about three hundred thousand others became, and remain, internal refugees (internally displaced persons). For more details see Divide and Rule: State-Sponsored Ethnic Violence in Kenya (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993). Kalenjin, Maasai, Turkana and Samburu (KAMATUSA) formed an alliance known as KAMATUSA to mount anti-Kikuyu crusade in the Rift Valley. KAMATUSA was supposed to be a counter movement against the pro-Kikuyu ethnic alliance known as GEMA that brought together Gikuyu, Embu and Meru ethnic groups and which dominated political activities back in the 1970s and 1980s.
18

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Kenya Studies Review successfully to spread propaganda against the Kikuyu. This caused disaffection for the Kikuyu by other ethnic groups. Ethnic tensions in the run-up to the 1992 multiparty elections Towards the end of 1992, the country was polarized ethnically and the Kikuyu were at the receiving end, viewed very suspiciously by other groups despite being victims of the KAMATUSA attacks. The government clamped down on pretests and marches. The crack paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) was everywhere, monitoring people on the streets and at public meetings. Arresting of people opposed to the government, often on false charges became common and courts were increasingly incorporated in this scheme. Members of the Kikuyu ethnic group composed majority of those arrested and tried. The government also targeted civil society groups, many of which were headed by the Kikuyu, such as the Greenbelt Movement led by Wangari Maathai, which were placed under a government control structure (the NGO Coordination council),19 created for that purpose under an act of parliament that had been quickly rushed through the single-party National Assembly in 1991. Some rich Kikuyu that were isolated from power could not restrain themselves from working towards removing KANU from power. Thus, although Martin Shikuku (Luyia), Masinde Muliro (Luyia), Oginga Odinga (Luo), Ahmed Baharmariz (Swahili) and George Nthenge (Kamba) were the opposition lynchpins in Kenya, it was Kenneth Matiba (Kikuyu) and Charles Rubia (Kikuyu) who were often vilified for their campaign for multiparty democracy beginning May 1990. When Matiba and Rubia were detained, the Kikuyu saw a sinister anti-Kikuyu scheme in the move by the KANU regime. Following this, many prominent Kikuyu politicians kept a low profile as nonKikuyu politicians pushed the country towards multiparty politics. By the end of 1991, KANU and Moi were in terrible panic due to the massive support that the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD) enjoyed, and which they did everything to scuttle.

Table 1: Percentage Population of Ethnic Groups in Kenya (1999)

Ethnic group Kikuyu Abaluyia Luo Kalenjin Kamba Kisii Meru Others (35) Non-African % Population 22 14 13 12 11 6 6 15 1

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS). 1999. See Maurice Amutabi, The NGO Factor in Africa: The Case of Arrested Development in Kenya, New York and London: Routledge, 2006.
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The FORD movement remained united for a while, before ethnic considerations emerged, particularly on how the pie would be shared in the face of what was seen as imminent defeat of a weakened KANU. The Kikuyu elite were thought to be scheming revenge against the Kalenjin, and strongly felt that only a Kikuyu could ensure that the Kalenjin paid fully for their atrocities. Also, the Kikuyu elite could not envision a Luo presidency under Oginga Odinga (who was then the acting chairman of FORD and the front-runner for a FORD presidential ticket), neither could they stand a Luyia presidency (under Pius Masinde Muliro or Martin Shikuku). The Luos could not budge. In 1991, the Luo elite was determined this time to see one of their own ascend to the presidency, having allowed Kenyatta the chance to become president in 1963 as Oginga had turned down the offer from the British to form a provisional government as deputy leader of KANU in 1962, at a time when Kenyatta was still languishing in colonial jail. 20 The Luo were not prepared to hand over power to the Kikuyu a second time. Following ethnic suspicions that were building up around the torchbearer for the FORD presidential ticket in the 1992 elections, the movement broke up due to three factors. First, the sudden death of Pius Masinde Muliro on arrival at the Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (Nairobi) from London meant that the neutral, moderating and unifying voice in the opposition movement was gone. Many saw KANUs hand in this death. 21 Second, it has emerged recently that KANU stage-managed the arrival of Matiba in Kenya, sending crowds to receive him and raise his ego, and they succeeded as Matibas image was so puffed up after wards, making him refuse to back down for Odinga. Third, the FORD leadership was complacent following the euphoric support the movement was receiving nationwide. Suddenly Oginga Odinga was waving to crowds through city streets in an open roof vehicle the way President Moi did. Fourth, the Kikuyu dominated media played a role in dividing the opposition. The media had created a hero of some sort out Matibas medical predicament arising out of detention. Thus, the media had created and sustained Matiba beyond his real political value and worth, mainly out of ethnic considerations. The gutter press illuminated and valorized Matiba to the point that he quickly became the opposition front-runner, eclipsing Oginga Odinga. Finally, the constitution gave the President the power to call elections and there was no way Moi would call elections when KANU was weak but rather at the weakest point of the opposition FORDS. This he confessed when he said that the day of elections was his secret weapon which he indeed used very successfully. By holding onto the election date, the KANU government worked on the principle of attrition successfully as many terrible things started to happen to the opposition. In August 1992 FORD which was at the center of the emergent political process and agent of change, split into two factions, FORD-Asili (led by Kenneth Matiba) and FORD-Kenya (led by Oginga Odinga). Ethnic Fragmentation and loss of opposition in 1992 Before the 1992 elections, FORD, broke up into two factions (Ford Kenya and Ford Asili) and experienced further splinters afterwards. The Kenya National Congress (KNC) broke off from FORD-Asili. Many observers of Kenyas political scene believe that it was the Kikuyu factor See Oginga Odinga, Not Yet Uhuru. Muliros family stunned the public when it declared that there was need for postmortem. His South African-born widow Mercy Muliro did not help matters when she insisted that the matter of Muliros death should not be politicized.
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Kenya Studies Review that destroyed the opposition unity in 1992 allowing KANU to win the elections. It was as a result of Kenneth Matiba forming his own party (FORD-Asili, a splinter from FORD), that the invincibility of FORD was shattered. The Kikuyu voted overwhelmingly for Matibas FORDAsili and for Mwai Kibakis Democratic Party (DP) thereby dividing the opposition vote. Therefore, some analysts believe that what sealed the fate of the opposition for the 1992 elections was the formation of the Democratic Party of Kenya (DP) in December 1991 by Mwai Kibaki. DP was created in order to serve Kikuyu business class interests just in case the Kikuyu scheme did not succeed through Matibas FORD-Asili. Many non-Kikuyu leaders felt betrayed with the late arrival on the political scene of Mwai Kibakis DP, embracing people from the coast, the Meru, the Embu and Kisii areas who had felt that their stakes were not very clear in FORD. They therefore gravitated very fast towards DP. It was clear that Mwai Kibaki had founded DP to forestall what the Kikuyu elite (mainly from Kiambu and Muranga) feared to be wrong crowds, of radical politicians who did not have immense wealth, and who were therefore unlikely to preside over vengeful looting after the departure of KANU and the Kalenjin plunderers. To them, government was useless and meaningless if it was not accompanied by pillaging. Radical politicians and mavericks such as Martin Shikuku, and George Nthenge surrounded Matiba and this scared the golf playing Kikuyu group. This conservative wing did not see how Matiba would deliver the pie under all those Mr. Cleans. The other fact that made Ford Asili unattractive was its attraction of ordinary loafers (manambas or makangas) and petty traders, and the many Johnnie-come-lately. Being a conservative Kikuyu politician and having experienced his ascendance in politics under the patronage of rich Kikuyu from Kiambu, Mwai Kibaki appealed greatly to this part of Kikuyu elite and they predictably trooped to his party. The DP was associated with big business and pioneer Kikuyu elite within the Kiambu, Muranga, Nyeri, Nyandarua and Kirinyaga districts. DP was also associated with the remnants of the Kiambu Mafia from the Kenyatta years (1963 -78). The DP also appealed to those elements not represented in FORD-Asili and Ford Kenya, such as the Taita, the Meru, the Embu, the Kisii, and the Miji Kenda. The formation of the DP created a political re-alignment within the Kikuyu ethnic group, which prior to this was often divided between the Kiambu and Muranga on one hand and those from Nyeri, Kirinyaga and Nyandarua on the other. The formation of DP and its centrality in sections of the Kikuyu constituency clearly underlined the lack of cohesion among the Kikuyu while at the same time unmistakably delineating the ethnic dimension of Kenyan politics. In many ways therefore, the DP leaders represented the interests of Kikuyu bourgeoisie and leaving those of the hoi poloi (peasantry) to Kenneth Matibas FORD-Asili.22 This was clearly frustrating even to the international community. The 1992 general elections, both presidential and parliamentary were similarly frustrating for the majority of the electorate who had overwhelmingly voted for the opposition. A joke was made that a dog would have won against a KANU candidate in any Kikuyu-dominated constituencies. Indeed some of the candidates that won in Kikuyu-dominated constituencies (especially on Ford Asili ticket) came from dubious backgrounds. The There has been this myth that the Kikuyu (mainly coffee farmers and subsistence peasants) often vote as a block in national elections, meaning that the elites (industrialists, businesspersons and bourgeoisie) and ordinary ones (hoi poloi such as peasants, lumpens and proletariat) often unite. This was clearly not the case in 1992 and in subsequent elections, in 1997 and 2002.
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parliamentary elections were more frustrating because the opposition MPs could not change much in a KANU-dominated parliament. Bribery-induced post-election defections depleted opposition ranks even further.

Table 2: 1992 Presidential Elections

Candidate
Daniel Moi Ken Matiba Mwai Kibaki Oginga Odinga

Percentage Vote
36.3% 26.0% 19.5% 17.5%

Source: Daily Nation and East African Standard Newspapers (Nairobi), January 1-3, 1993. In 1992 general elections Moi was elected to a fourth term as president of Kenya with 36.3% of the vote ahead of Kenneth Matiba (26.0%), Mwai Kibaki (19.5%) and Oginga Odinga (17.5%). The three opposition candidates had a combined 63%, which clearly meant that they enjoyed popular mandate. The two Kikuyu candidates (Matiba and Kibaki) had a joint percentage vote of 45.5% which was a clear 9.2 % ahead of Daniel Mois 36.3%. It was the alliances that they created that made the two Kikuyu politicians to garner a substantial number of votes across their ethnic divide. Matiba gained many votes from Western Province due to the influence of Martin Shikuku (the Secretary General of Ford-Asili). Mwai Kibaki received many votes from the Embu, Meru and Akamba constituencies due to the role of his lieutenants in Eastern Province such as Norman Nyaga, David Mwiraria, Kiraitu Murungi and Agnes Ndetei (deputy DP chair person). KANU garnered 100 seats, FORD-Asili and FORD-Kenya gained 31 seats each and DP got 23 seats of the 188 seats in Parliament.23 The Kikuyu allegiance was split between Ford Asili and DP. Many ordinary Kikuyu voted for Ford Asili whereas many Kikuyu elites voted for DP. Ford Asili dominated in Muranga (Kenneth Matibas home district) and parts of Kiambu and the regions of Kikuyu diaspora in Nairobi and Rift Valley, whereas DP dominated in Nyeri (Mwai Kibakis home district) and Kirinyaga. The divisions of lighter and darker Kikuyu were also clearly at play here, with the lighter Kikuyu (from Muranga and Kiambu) voting for Ford Asili and darker ones (from Kirinyaga and Nyandarua) voting for DP. Overall Ford Asili was regarded as the party of the ordinary individuals. Many ordinary Kikuyu mistrusted Mwai Kibaki whom they nicknamed General Kagwoya (General Coward) but easily identified with the courage of Kenneth Matiba. Many admired Matibas slogan, Moi Must Go which seemed to resonate well among peasants. They thought that it was the courage of Matiba that would get them back their land in the Rift Valley where many had been ejected under the ethnic clashes and not the gentlemanly mien of Kibaki.

See Daily Nation (Nairobi), January 1-3, 1993 and East African Standard (Nairobi), January 1-3, 1993).

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Kenya Studies Review

Table 3: Party Parliamentary Seats at 1992 General Elections Party KANU FORD-Asili FORDKenya DP Others 1993. Parliamentary seats 100 31 31 23 03 % of (188) 53.2% 16.5% 16.5% 12.2% 01.6% Total

Source: Daily Nation and the East African Standard. (December 30 31, 1992 and 1-3 January

The performance of the opposition in the first multiparty parliament, which convened in March 1993, was disastrous largely due to Matibas arrogance and betrayal within the opposition ranks. The country witnessed many defections from the opposition ranks to KANU with embarrassing frequency. There were many defections of MPs from the opposition to KANU. FORD-Asili, which emerged as a Kikuyu outfit, was the major casualty of the defections. As the first leader of opposition in Parliament Kenneth Matiba was quite uninspiring and was to blame for the poor showing by the opposition. He took to empty sloganeering such as Moi Must Go and to grossly unappealing behavior such as technical appearances in Parliament. Matiba quickly became a public spectacle, a caricature of sorts and a shell of his previous dynamism and charisma. Matiba was a sick man whom the government had wronged by detaining and really needed serious medical attention. Matibas bad health affected FORD- Asili. FORD-Asili started to disintegrate because of many reasons. First, there were differences between Matiba and Martin Shikuku, his Secretary General. Matiba and Shikuku were ideologically poles apart and could not just work together, a billionaire and a self-appointed peoples watchman. Second the party suffered due to Matibas ill-health and his incoherence in public appearances. The party was very weak structurally as it seemed to function and operate solely on Matibas personal fortune. In terms of vision, the party could not provide the muchneeded opposition leadership. Third, FORD-Asili MPs were an embarrassing lot. Many were previously public vehicle touts (manambas) and other lowly positions with dubious credentials, such as former councilor Stephen Ndichu, self-proclaimed prophetess and faith healer Mary Wanjiru, semi-literate Dickson Kihika Kimani, and former lorry driver David Manyara. Majority had glided into parliament on the threshold of the multiparty euphoria. As the 1997 elections approached, the opposition was embroiled in wrangling. In June 1994 opposition groupswith the exception of FORD-Asiliformed a coalition, the United National Democratic Alliance (UNDA). From the onset, ethnic disagreements and irreconcilable differences plagued UNDA. Opposition to Kenneth Matiba within FORD-Asili led to the formation of a rival party executive in FORD-Asili led by Salim Ndamwe. In October 1997 Matibas faction of FORD-Asili registered as an independent party, Forum for the Restoration of Democracy for the people (FORD-People). Ford People, unlike Ford Asili remained a Kikuyu affair. Only Matibas Kikuyu bosom friends and minor politicians such as Kimani wa Nyoike and Philip Gachoka trooped to Ford-People. Martin Shikuku had succeeded in ditching Kenneth
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Matiba from the shell that FORD-Asili had remained. Following his boycotting of the 1997 elections, and which decision banished him to political oblivion, Matiba abandoned FORDPeople and promptly formed Saba Saba Asili Party that has remained unregistered but dominated by the Kikuyu. Thus, towards the 1997 elections, Ford Kenya was preoccupied with turf wars between Michael Wamalwa Kijana and Raila Odinga, DP was mute as a result of Matibas dominance, and Ford Asili was in disarray, an empty shell left to the whims of Martin Shikuku. It was in this confused state that the opposition parties moved towards the 1997 General elections. The 1997 General Elections and Ethnic Voting Towards the 1997 general elections Kenneth Matiba declared that he would not offer himself for election. It was therefore not surprising when Paul Muite, a Kikuyu politician together with a few of his friends created a new political party in 1995 known as SAFINA. The creation of SAFINA in May 1995 explained many things. First it was an indication that some Kikuyu were still uneasy about the existing political parties, especially DP of Mwai Kibaki. There was also the thinking that Muites party was supposed to take over the vacuum left by Ford Asili in Kiambu, Muites home district. Second, since his resignation from Ford Kenya as vice-chairman, Muite still harbored presidential ambitions and he needed a vehicle to do so. Third, some Kikuyu elite believed that Kibakis DP could not cater for their interests the way Ford Asili under Matiba would have done. Thus the creation of SAFINA was what some observers saw as a Kikuyu safety net, although its founders, mainly youthful opposition activists claimed that the party intended to campaign for the introduction of proportional representation and improved human rights and fight against corruption. In 1997, Moi and the KANU hard-liners devised a rigging strategy similar to the one they used in 1992, to take care of the Kikuyu. The first scheme was to perpetuate the Kikuyu division using mavericks like Joseph Kamotho, Kuria Kanyingi, among others. Second, KANU deployed zoning where non-Kikuyu areas were declared KANU zones, locking out opposition and Kikuyu politicians. The third mechanism was to create more constituencies in areas dominated by KANU. There was an addition of 24 constituencies (parliamentary seats) resulting in 210 parliamentary constituencies.24 For instance, Nairobi which had the highest population growth and an area dominated by the Kikuyu and where KANU had won only one of eight parliamentary seats in 1992, received no additional constituency. Fourth, areas that were predominantly sympathetic to the opposition in 1992 were denied new ID cards and voting cards (required for voting), especially Kikuyu constituencies. These actions affected their presidential vote. Others had their voter registers messed up and names removed. Fifth, during the election time, ballot papers from Kikuyu and other opposition areas were intentionally sent to wrong constituencies hence aborting voting in the process. Kikuyu politicians falsely believed that they had the required numbers and support to make one of their own win the 1997 presidential elections. Mwai Kibaki and his handlers in the Many constituencies were created in KANU strongholds and where it was expected to win. In Nandi, the not very large Mosop was divided into two, creating Mosop and Emngwen constituencies; in Kakamega, Butere was divided into two constituencies, Butere and Khwisero; and Mumias into Mumias and Matungu. Opposition strongholds such as Muranga received Mathioya hived from Kiharu to create a constituency for Joseph Kamotho.
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Kenya Studies Review DP thought that they had a realistic chance with Matiba out of the running. They therefore refused to join a unified front against Moi and KANU. What Kibaki and the rest of the opposition failed to see and acknowledge was that Moi and his allies were a legitimate voice of roughly one-third of Kenyas voters. Unable to unite behind a single presidential candidate due to the arrogance of Kibaki, Raila and Wamalwa, the opposition stood no chance against the welloiled KANU campaign machine. Whereas in 1992 the opposition was divided among three major parties and several minor ones, by late 1997 it had divided into at least six significant factions. For the Kikuyu, there was one dominant party, the DP in 1997 unlike 1992 when two major Kikuyu parties (Ford Asili and DP) fought it out. Mwai Kibaki falsely believed that the Kikuyu alone would propel his DP party into victory. In the 1997 presidential election Moi gained 40.64% of the popular vote, Mwai Kibaki 31.49%, Raila Odinga 11.06%, Michael Wamalwa 8.40%, and Charity Kaluki Ngilu 7.81%. The absence of Matiba on the ballot did not make matters better for Kibaki as he had mistakenly imagined. The reality dawned that Matiba had performed better due to the alliances that he had created with non-Kikuyu leaders. Although there were some doubts among some sections of the Kikuyu with regard to Mwai Kibakis courage and sincerity, they overwhelmingly voted for him. Due to the nature of Kenyas politics that are dominated by ethnicity, the Kikuyu voted almost to a man for Mwai Kibakis DP. However, many Kikuyu constituencies rejected the choice of people that the DP presented and instead elected people from different parties (Social Democratic Party- SDP, Ford People, SAFINA and National Democratic Party - NDP) although giving Kibaki the presidential vote. KANU won 107 out of 210 available parliamentary seats, while DP gained 39 seats, NDP 21 seats, FORD-K 17 seats, and SDP won 15 seats. Table 6: The Results of 1997 Presidential Elections Name of Candidate Daniel Moi Mwai Kibaki Raila Odinga Michael Wamalwa Charity Ngilu Percentage vote 40.64% 31.49% 11.06% 8.40% 7.81%

Source: The Daily Nation and the East African Standard Newspapers [January 1-3, 2008). The ethnic nature of Kenyan politics became apparent in 1997 elections. The Kikuyu had voted overwhelmingly for Kibaki. The Luos voted almost to a man for Raila Odinga, a fellow Luo; the Abaluyia voted overwhelmingly for a fellow Omuluyia Michael Kijana Wamalwa; the Kamba voted for fellow Kamba Charity Kaluki Ngilu.25 Even small party candidates such as George Anyona and Katam Mkangi, received more votes among members of their own ethnic groups compared to the rest of the candidates. An idea of creating ethnic alliances as an important beacon in politics in Kenya was born after the 1997 elections. It was clear that personality factors also played a role in the elections besides the ethnic factor. Without Matiba, Ford Asili had suddenly become an insignificant party. However, KANU remained predomantly a Kalenjin party, DP was Kikuyu, NDP was Luo, Ford Kenya was Luyia and SDP was Kamba.
25

Daily Nation and East African Standard January 1-3, 1998.

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Therefore, smarting from defeat in 1997 elections, three opposition leaders Mwai Kibaki, Michael Kijana Wamalwa and Charity Kaluki Ngilu (the Big Three as they became known between 1997 and 2001) worked out some sort of an alliance, a working relationship. They held frequent breakfast meetings at strategic hotels in full media glare, to keep the idea of unity going, but nobody took them seriously, not even KANU. This became the impetus that would see inter-ethnic bridge-building develop later to become NARC. The opposition had realized that this was the only way they could defeat KANU at elections. The populous Kikuyu had realized that they could not go it alone. It was a biter reality but one that would be put in use in the 2002 general elections.

Table 7: Party Performance in 1997 General Elections

Name of Party KANU DP NDP FORDK SDP Safina Small parties Seats seats) 107 39 21 17 15 05 06 (210 % of Total 51% 18.6% 10% 8.1% 7.1% 2.4% 2.8%

Source: The Daily Nation and the East African Standard Newspapers (January 1-3, 1998).

The 2002 Grand Coalition and Opposition Victory and Fallout In 2002, Emilio Mwai Kibaki was elected Kenyas third president. Many factors contributed to Kibakis election. First, it was the amalgamation of hatred against the dictatorship of former President Daniel Moi by many politicians in Kenya. the second factor was the political alliance of the big three of Kibaki, Wamalwa and Ngilu. Michael Wamalwas clarion call for the Grand March to State House in 1997 had initially sounded empty and hollow but became a reality in 2002. This was because on the road to the 2002 general elections, the opposition was more prepared and attuned to KANUs underhand strategies. The Big Three alliance of Kibaki, Wamalwa and Ngilu coalesced to form NAK just months before the 2002 general elections. The NAK revolved around Kibakis DP, Wamalwas Ford Kenya and Ngilus National Party of Kenya (NPK). The NAK was seen as the most formidable alliance to be forged from Kenyas opposition and this became even so obvious when Wamalwa and Ngilu abandoned their own presidential ambitions and decided to support Mwai Kibaki for the presidency under one party. The grand coalition that would end KANUs forty-year iron grip on power had been born!

Kenya Studies Review The alliance was built around elite consensus rather than democratic principles, a factor that would come back to haunt the alliance later. Voices of dissent were stifled, especially those against a Kikuyu presidential candidate for NAK. But the Rainbow Alliance created by KANU rebels such as Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, George Saitoti, William Ole Ntimama, Joseph Kamotho, Moody Awuori, among others and who had abandoned KANU because it was bent on nominating Uhuru Kenyatta for presidency and which later became the Liberal Democratic Party, was even thinner on democratic credentials. Except for Raila, who had been victimized by the state for dissent, virtually the entire LDP senior cast consisted of survivors from KANU. These were individuals who had made careers out of repressing reformers in Kenya. But that seemed not to matter at that time. Both groups found a common agenda at the eleventh hour, to defy Moi and help in removing his party from power. NARCs unity caused nightmares for KANU whose torchbearer for the 2002 elections was a greenhorn whose only political credential was being a scion to Kenyas first President, Jomo Kenyatta. The selection of Uhuru Kenyatta by KANU was Mois plan which was made through emotion more than political reality and was doomed to fail. The merger between NAK and the Rainbow Alliance that created the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) was born when Raila Odinga asked the mammoth crowd at Uhuru Park, Kibaki Tosha? (Is Kibaki capable to be president?). The crowd answered in the affirmative, effectively endorsing Kibaki as the only opposition candidate. Simon Nyachae of Ford People who was waiting in the wings to create an alliance with the Rainbow Alliance (they had actually agreed tentatively on some form of alliance but the Raila-led group found Nyachaes party rather a one man show and not serious) left immediately. NARC courted Kikuyu votes through Kibaki, Luyia votes through Wamalwa and Awuori, Luo votes through Raila Odinga, Kamba votes through Ngilu and Kalonzo, Maasai votes through Saitoti and Ntimama, and the list could go on and on. Thus, from the very beginning, the political marriage of NARC was based on ethnic alliances through recruitment of ethnic political leaders. NARC perfected a game that Daniel Moi and Jomo Kenyatta before him, had started. Therefore, in the 2002 General Elections Daniel Mois inaptitude as a politician was for the first time exposed for lacking in his actions was his so-called political shrewdness and astuteness. It occurred to observers that maybe he had been given more credit as a strategist than he really deserved. Perhaps he had just dealt with nave and somewhat incompetent politicians in the past. His major undoing was to build so much on the incompatibility of Luos and Kikuyu. His main logic and on whose strength his 2002 election strategy seemed to rest were faulty and based on defective logic and facts. To begin with, Mois ethnic arithmetic had never envisaged a Luo (Raila) supporting a Kikuyu (Mwai Kibaki) based on two historic fallouts. First, the fallout between Jaramogi Oginga Odinga (Railas father) a Luo with President Jomo Kenyatta a Kikuyu in 1966; and second when Kenneth Matiba, a Kikuyu denied Jaramogi Oginga Odinga the presidency by dividing FORD into two factions, Ford Kenya and Ford Asili. These two events, Moi believed, had created a permanent wedge between the Luo and the Kikuyu. Moi had learnt many political lessons but had probably forgotten the Machiavellian maxim, which states that there are permanent enemies in politics and the Bismarckian principle, which states that only fools fail to change with situations. Moi thought that all the Kikuyu would troop to Mwai Kibakis DP leaving the rest with no choice but to support Mois candidate. He also though that since there appeared to be so much mistrust in the past between the Kikuyu and the rest of Kenyans, there was no way other ethnic groups would support a Kikuyu candidate. Daniel Moi played the ethnic card to the very end. In order to scuttle the Western Kenya vote in 2002, Moi
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named Musalia Mudavadi Vice President. When Mudavadi took the second biggest flag in Kenya to his home district Vihiga in Western Province, he became the first Vice President in Kenya to be stoned by constituents. With the formation of the grand alliance of NARC, Moi saw his schemes and strategies melt and resorted to his age-old resolve and recalcitrance, hoping that something would probably go wrong in the NARC alliance. Nothing of the sort happened. Moi was wrong on all of his premises. With the Abaluyia, Luo, Kamba, Maasai and about 60% of the Kikuyu votes behind Kibaki, Mois game plan of the small ethnic groups ganging up against the big ethnic groups was futile, predestined to fail.

Table 8: results of 2002 Presidential Elections

Candidat e Kibaki Kenyatta Nyachae Orengo Ngethe Political Party NARC KANU FORDP SDP CCU Votes 3,646,27 7 1,853,89 0 345,152 24,524 10,061 % of Total 62.20% 31.32% 5.89% 0.42% 0.17%

Source: Daily Nation and East African Standard Newspapers (December 30, 2002 and January 1 - 3, 2003). The results of the elections clearly indicated that the Democratic Party (DP) was the party of choice for the Kikuyu together with their distant cousins the Meru, Embu, and Mbeere. The Abaluyia were solidly behind FORD-Kenya, since Michael Wamalwa Kijana, a Luyia, was its leader. The Kalenjin as expected unquestioningly adhered to the direction of Daniel Moi despite the fact that there was apparent error and miscalculation in his choice. The Abagusii (Kisii) were in FORD-People, almost to a man, since Simeon Nyachae, a Kisii was its presidential candidate. Similarly, the results confirmed that the Luo could only hear a voice of their own, this time they obeyed the bidding of Raila Odinga as his father had done for over three decades, and voted as Raila told them. The Kamba were behind Kalonzo Musyoka and Charity Ngilu. The results confirmed that ethnicity was so entrenched and that it cannot be wished away by the self-same politicians, the major beneficiaries of ethnicity. NARC was a unique experiment at coalition building. The question was whether this alliance would last long. It did not.

Kenya Studies Review Table 9: Results of 2002 Parliamentary Elections Party NARC KANU FORD-P SISI KWA SISI Safina FORD-A Shirikisho Seats 125 64 14 2 2 2 1 % of Total 59.5% 30.4% 06.6% 01% 01% 01% 0.5%

Source: Daily Nation and East African Standard Newspapers (December 30, 2002 and January 1 - 3, 2003).

The Kibaki Presidency and Ethnic Question Mwai Kibaki started his presidency in 2002 on a rather shaky ground. Mwai Kibaki started by disregarding other members of the coalition. He had agreed to a pre-election pact with other parties in the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) but ignored it after elections. The unfilled memorandum of understanding (MoU) remained a contentious aspect in the alliance and preoccupied the first term of the Kibaki presidency. The refusal to honor the MoU literally spelt the end of the coalition. As Kenya quickly moved towards 2007 general elections, new alliances emerged to replace the dishonest National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) that was created just before the 2002 elections. NARC was all but dead by 2005. Politicians from all ends of the ethnic spectrum started to forge possible winning coalitions from their ethnic bulwarks, in which members of the Kikuyu ethnic group are increasingly getting isolated. What isolated Kibakis regime was the fact that almost half of cabinet slots in the first NARC government went to Gikuyu, Embu and Meru Association (GEMA) areas Mwai Kibaki, John Michuki, Chris Murungaru, Martha Karua, Amos Kimunya, Kiraitu Murungi, David Mwiraria, etc. Kenyans were also not surprised to see the strong re-emergence of the Kiambu connection in the Kibaki government in the reconstituted so-called government of National Unity that embraced the GEMA grouping even more enthusiastically; especially after non-GEMA members of parliament (MPs) rejected some cabinet positions, especially those who were made assistant ministers. Kibaki did not do well on the ethnic question. In 2006, there were 19 permanent secretaries from GEMA-related ethnic groups out of 34 in the country. In 2002, there had been 14 permanent secretaries from the Kalenjin, and related ethnic groups out of 26. In 2006, members of the GEMA group headed 23 of the 34 public corporations (parastatals). 26 From the events of the NARC coalition and how President Mwai Kibaki mishandled his colleagues in the alliance, there was a sense in which the Kikuyu were held in deep suspicion by other ethnic groups, and this was tested in the 2007 elections. The defeat of the Kibaki government (Banana Team) during the 2005 referendum on the watered down Draft Constitution by the Orange Team Maurice Amutabi, The Kikuyu Factor in Politics in Kenya. Paper presented at the African Studies Annual Meeting (ASA), New York, 2007.
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was significant in determining events for 2007 elections. Economic scandals did not help Kibakis course either. Leaders from other ethnic groups in Kenya, even Kibakis allies like the Meru and Embu (after Mwiraria and Murungi were sacked) felt that they were ejected from the government as sacrificial lambs following Anglo-Leasing Scandal). When Kibaki took over, members of the Kalenjin and allied groups headed 24 of the then 33 public corporations. In 2006 there were 47 District Commissioners from the GEMArelated ethnic groups out of 82 positions in Kenya. In 2002, there were 37 DCs from the Kalenjin and related groups, out of 74 positions at the time. In 2007, there were two Kikuyu ViceChancellors of public universities, for the first time. Before 2002, only the Kalenjin ethnic group had two vice-chancellors. In the military, the armed forces chief was from GEMA, the first since independence, with the army, navy and air force strongly controlled by GEMA-related officers. In 2009, Matthew Iteere, from GEMA replaced Major General Hussein Ali as commissioner of police and the officer ranks of the force were dominated by members of GEMA who also headed the rest of the police units and formations, from the CID to the GSU. The Judiciary especially the High Court and Court of Appeal are dominated by members of the GEMA groups, right from the Chief Justice. The list of Kenyas diplomatic representation abroad since 2003 read like a GEMA directory. In short, things have changed very quickly, with almost GEMA replacing the Kalenjin directly. There were several Kikuyu PSs who were above the Civil Service retirement age. In July 2006, the five PSs that were still serving in the Civil Service contrary to the retirement age were all from GEMA. They included the Head of Civil Service, Francis Muthaura, Karega Mutahi (Education), Patrick Nyoike (Energy), Gerishon Ikiara (Transport) and Stanley Murage, who was President Kibaki's strategic policy adviser, based at State House.27 Younger and more talented Kenyans could not serve their country in these important positions because some old PSs were being recycled again and again simply because they belonged to the Presidents ethnic group. Mois regime respected the retirement age even if his ethnic group were over-represented in those positions. Within the first anniversary of NARC in power in 2004, it was clear that a Mount Kenya Mafia had taken over. On NARCs third anniversary in power, the Kiambu mafia joined in the fray under the guise of government of national unity on invitation by NAK to cushion the Presidency from would be enemies from within. This occurred following the loss of the government in the referendum on the drat constitution of 2005. The poor performance by the NARC government under President Mwai Kibaki made it difficult to forge an alliance with any of the opposition leaders, who could not trust Kibaki. The bad blood that had developed between NAK and LDP leaders within NARC had shown that coalitions and alliances were very shaky and tenuous in a state where politics are played along ethnic lines. It was embarrassingly obvious that the NARC government had been pursuing a constricted ethnic agenda instead of larger national interests. By 2006, the NARC record at national unity and at pursuit of democratic principles was dismal. Like Kenyatta and Moi regimes, Kibabi regime confirmed that Kenyas political elite is largely self-centered, narcissistic and unrefined hodgepodge of ethnic barons with no national vision for the country. Since ascending to power, the NARC government was engulfed in factional warfare that was structured around ethnic calculations. The preelection reformist promise never materialized due to the ethnic polarizations that President Kibakis had failed to stem. Daily Nation, Nairobi, Kenya. July 10, 2006. http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=64&newsid=76934
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Kenya Studies Review By 2007, observers of the political scene believed that that Kibaki had failed to offer bold and visionary leadership. Instead, he surrounded himself with plotters, sycophants, incompetents, buffoons and nincompoops, drawn mostly from the Kikuyu and kindred ethnic groups such as the Meru and Embu and the Makerere grandfathers some of whom he had appointed to universities as chancellors and leading corporations as CEOs. Unfortunately for Kenya, many of these courtiers did not have what it takes to deliver development, as they were entrenched in ethnic cocoons and old classmate tales and were lacking in insightfulness in dealing with people from outside their own ethnic group and class. There was not trust in the coalition, and a new constitution was not possible under the circumstances. The ruling coalition of NAK and LDP did not agree on how to divide the power of executive between the position of prime minister and president. This was guided by ethnic insinuation, innuendo and selfishness. Kenyans knew that Moi and KANU were opposed to a new democratic constitution due to selfishness and lack of democratic will. But little did they know that once in power, NARC and Kibaki would turn out to be an exact reproduction of KANU. After all, NAK was a vehement advocate for a new constitution; so was Raila Odinga, even within KANU. It quickly became apparent that the fervent appeal for a new constitution was a strategy on the part of NAK and the Rainbow Alliance to simply get rid of KANU from power, not to change the political landscape in Kenya. The Makerere grandfathers constituted a significant lot of NARCs gatekeepers at State House. They deployed divide and rule strategy and used state rewards to win supporters just like Moi had done for many years. It was clear that the regime was interested in survival and it did not come as a complete surprise when Kibakis regime started to warm up to KANU and those in its former regime. These were individuals whom Kibaki had accused in his inaugural speech of causing bloodshed, carnage, chaos, and mayhem and looted the country. It was clear that Kibaki was interested in containing the rebellion of Raila Odinga and LDP. Thus, the greatest mistake of NARC was its insistence on engaging KANU era personalities as well as appointing people from the Mt Kenya region to key positions at the expense of merit. The Kibaki regime had moved very fast into the Moi mode - of wheeling and dealing- as well as divide and rule and self destruction. By 2007 it was becoming difficulty for Kibaki to forge an alliance with leaders from other ethnic groups. End of high road for Kibaki: Repression and Corruption On March 3, 2006 Kenyans awoke to the shocking news of an attack by Government agents on the Standard Group, in which the Kenya Television Network (KTN) was put off air, the Standard Newspapers printing plant located at Industrial Area in Nairobi was disabled and tens of thousands of newspapers burnt.28 In the commando-like operation, masked policemen descended on the Standard Groups premises at the I&M Bank Tower in downtown Nairobi and switched off the KTN channel, before proceeding to the Groups printing plant on Likoni Road, in Industrial Area where the masked police squad, from the dreaded Kanga crack squadron, beat up guards and staff and carried away vital broadcast equipment and computers from the KTN

Standard Under Attack, Standard Newspapers, Nairobi, Kenya. March 3, 2006. http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=37310 (Accessed 9/7/2006).
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newsroom. The police also stole a delivery van, which was later found abandoned in a police yard three months later on July 9, 2006.29 The Government took responsibility for the attack, with Security Minister, John Michuki (a Kikuyu), declaring: If you rattle a snake, you must be prepared to be bitten by it. Michuki said police were simply doing their job. Police spokesman Jaspher Ombati, in a widely publicized statement on the raid, claimed that the media house was raided following information that it intended to commit an act that posed a major threat to national security. This was reminiscent of the days of dictatorial KANU regime when print media was often raided and newspaper copies confiscated and destroyed. The raid on Standard Group was directed by the Director of CID, a Kikuyu. The then Police Commissioner (a non-Kikuyu) Major General Hussein Ali was left out of the plans for the raid. Many professionals condemned this police action but copiously missing were the voices of so-called democratic forces and the media. During the raid, foreigners of dubious credibility known in Kenya as Artur brothers - Artur Margaryan and Artur Sargsyan - participated, using racist language on the newspaper employees. From this incident, among others, it emerged that free press only mattered in Kenya when a Kikuyu was not in power as president. But the problem is not just with freedom of the press but also high-level corruption. The plethora of corruption, financial and political scandals that have bedeviled Kenya in the recent past under President Mwai Kibaki and his National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) and Party of National Unity (PNU) is appalling. Scandals of gigantic magnitude such as that involving the fictitious Anglo-Leasing Company concerning questionable dealings in which the government of Kenya lost billions of dollars is compared to the Goldenburg scandal in which the previous regime of President Daniel Moi and KANU lost billions of dollars that benefited few people in the system and their foreign accomplices. Other scandals under NARC include the corrupt manner in which tenders for the security system upgrading and passport upgrading machines were awarded and in which billions were swindled; the cowboy contractors that have received payments for incomplete or shoddy road and building projects; the Uchumi supermarkets debacle; and the Artur brothers scandal, which have left a bitter taste in the mouths of Kenyans. Corruption in Kenya is blamed on a group of elite and other minor functionaries surrounding the president, and the predominantly Kikuyu regime. Composed of what has been described as the Mount Kenya mafia, from the GEMA group of ethnic groups, this elite group has been hell-bent on resisting the liberalizing effects of a nascent democratic pluralism in Kenya that brought it to power under an alliance of many parties that produced NARC. The anti-corruption Tsar in the NARC regime John Githongo ran into exile fearing for his life, after several of his attempts to bring the many corruption scandals to a halt were frustrated by Kibaki confidants and insiders. The social cohesiveness, and the sharing of the national wealth through ethnic quotas, which was instituted by KANU under Moi has been replaced by an out rightly regional agenda. Just like the dictatorial Moi regime, the NARC government recruited a cabal of intellectuals as advisors and think tanks as well as creating a propaganda office known as Government Spokesman. Moi was a dictator and his regime corrupt, but Kibaki has turned out to be more dictatorial and his regime more corrupt. He has filled important positions in his government with his cronies. The regime has been busy since 2003 removing Standard Under Attack, Standard Newspapers, Nairobi, Kenya. March 3, 2006. http://eastandard.net/archives/sunday/index.php?&date (Accessed 9/7/2006)
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Kenya Studies Review critics from critical ministries and promoting Kikuyu dominance by replacing non-Kikuyu with members from the Kikuyu ethnic group. Even Universities have not been spared. For example Ratemo Michieka, a Kisii and the Vice-Chancellor of Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology (JKUAT) was replaced by Nick Wanjohi, a Kikuyu who was not even qualified to be VC as he was not a full professor but associate by the time of his appointment to the position by President Kibaki. Nick Wanjohi is a political scientist, a discipline that is not even offered at JKUAT. Kibakis regime has also been refused aid on allegations of corruption by such bodies as the IMF and the World Bank and leading Western nations. The response to allegations of corruption by Britain and United States has been the nave chest pounding that Kenya can do without foreign aid. This was the popular response from NARC ministers and functionaries, and which Prime Minister Raila Odinga has taken up under the PNU and ODM coalition. Two of the Ministers in the NARC government Chris Murungaru and David Mwiraria were banned from visiting the United States and Britain due to the undesirable business associates, a diplomatic way of saying that they are corrupt. In 2005, in a move that must have terribly embarrassed the NARC government of President Mwai Kibaki, the United States and United Kingdom blacklisted former Transport minister Chris Murungaru on whom they imposed a travel ban, and notified all airlines through written notices not to grant him airtickets to the two countries. In 2006, President Kibakis former private secretary and personal assistant Alfred Getonga and businessman Jimmy Wanjigi were also banned from visiting the United States. The US also imposed a travel ban on Baringo Central MP Gideon Moi (former dictator Mois son) to the United States. 30 To be sure, officials in Mois regime never reached that level of international notoriety and revulsion. The NARC administration experienced the same hostility that the KANU government faced at the height of its dictatorship from the early 1990s to 2002 when it was bundled out of power. Moi, unlike Kibaki, often fought his critics, even diplomats. For example, responding to the German ambassador's 1994 recommendation to close the "moral deficit" with more accountable governance in Kenya, President Moi said, Moral standards in Africa and Kenya particularly were much higher than in Europe ... where moral decadence had set in ... [due to] ... perversion and other unnatural acts.... Any degree of immorality that had crept into Africa was due to the decadent influence of the West.31 Left unsaid, but clear to many Kenyans, was the implication that Kenyas corruption was not homegrown, that foreign forces fanned it. Of course that is not true, as corruption in Kenya is by and large a vice borne by the government bureaucrats and politicians. Opinion polls have always revealed that government departments such as the Office of the President and Police lead in corruption. Addressing his KANU parliamentary group caucus on September 30, 1996, Moi was reported as saying that, should he depart from the political scene, this country will be just like Rwanda. 32 His prophecy came close to becoming true after the 2007 elections when over 1,300 people were killed and Prominent Kenyans banned from travelling abroad, Daily Nation (Nairobi), Kenya. June 21, 2006. ttp://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?premiumid=0&category_id=2&ne wsid=75599
31 30

President Moi Criticizes Diplomat, Daily Nation (Nairobi), March 7, 1994. The People Newspaper (Nairobi), October 4-10, 1996.
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thousands displaced in post election violence. Kenya has not recovered from the tensions of the post election violence of 2007 and 2008 and the country has remained in a permanent election mode with all kinds of alliance-creations despite the fact that the 2012 elections are many years away. The 2007 Post election violence Because the tensions of the post election violence are still in the air, and given the many contradictory figures from the polls, I would like to avoid discussing the results of the 2007 elections. Kenyans cannot gain anything from revisiting the disputed results, wether it was Mwai Kibaki or Riala Odinga who won. Revisiting the issue only seems to raise bad blood and negative energy. What is clear is that in the parliamentary race, Raila Odingas ODM won twice as many seats as Mwai Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU). Over two thirds of Kibakis cabinet, including his Vice President Moody Awori, was vanquished at the polls, many at the hands of ODM candidates.

Table 10: Results of 2007 Parliamentary Elections

Party ODM PNU ODM-Kenya KANU Safina NARC-Kenya Ford-People NARC Others Total seats Seats 99 43 16 14 5 4 3 3 23 210 % of Total 47.14% 20.56% 13.3% 6.66% 2.40% 1.90% 1.42% 1.42% 19.16% 100%

Source: Daily Nation and East African Standard Newspapers (December 30, 2007 and January 1 - 3, 2008).

Kenya Studies Review

Source: The Standard Newspaper, Nairobi, Kenya. http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/cartoon/ (Accessed December 12, 2009) Going by the parliamentary election results, Raila Odingas ODM should also have won the presidential election, because that is the logic of the pattern of elections of the past elections, but this is a debate I do not want to engage in. What I would like to state is that the 2007 election results reflected an ethnic dimension as well as personality traits. The three main presidential candidates (Raila Odinga, Mwai Kibaki and Kalonzo Musyoka) and their allies influenced the way their ethnic groups voted. Kibaki received more votes among the Kikuyu, Raila Odinga among the Luo and Musyoka among the Kamba. It was clear that ODM had formed the most formidable and broader alliance. The results also revealed the massive rejection of KANU and the legacy of former president Daniel Moi, especially when his three sons lost in all the constituencies in which they ran. Just like the pre-election polls had indicated, Kibaki lost a lot of support from areas that previously supported him in the 2002 elections. However, the 2007 elections did not veer off the pattern of previous elections. Like the multiparty elections of 1992, 1997, 2002, the 2007 results revealed the presence of political ethnicity, where Kenyans overwhelmingly voted for individuals and political parties along the dictates of their own ethnic groups. It seems like other ethnic groups in Kenya isolated the Mount Kenya or GEMA groups, due what was seen as Kikuyu dominance and suspicion. This became apparent in the post election violence following the 2007 elections in which the ethnic

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clashes that followed seemed to target the Kikuyu. The revival of GEMA and rise of Kikuyu-led atavistic movements such as mungiki did not help matters.33 Although the intervention of Kofi Annan saved Kenya, by coercing Kibaki and Raila Odinga into a coalition government, tensions have remained and the cabinet has remained divided. Corruption has remained endemic with a lot of sleaze reported in all ministries. Politicians and public officials are still grabbing public land. The Mau forest controversy has raised new corruption questions, where former KANU operatives have received payouts as compensation for returning the land they had acquired illegally. The change of official cars from Mercedes Benz limousines to Volkswagen passats has also been controversial with claims of kickbacks. The most recent corruption has emerged in the Ministry of Education in which Ministry officials embezzled funds meant for the implementation of universal primary education. By 2009, over 20 prominent Kenyans were banned from travelling to the United States and the United Kingdom, including Attorney General Amos Wako due to corruption and blocking constitutionals reforms.

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For more information on mungiki movement, see Grace Nyatugah Wamue, Revisiting Our Indigenous Shrines Through Mungiki, African Affairs, 100:453-467 (2001). See also Peter Mwangi Kagwanja, Facing Mount Kenya or Facing Mecca? The Mungiki, ethnic violence and the politics of the Moi succession in Kenya, 19872002. African Affairs, 102:25-49 (2003).

Kenya Studies Review Conclusion Given the ethnic arithmetic in 1992, 1997, 2002 and 2007 elections the script is written clearly, that no politician can afford to ignore the ethnic factor card in Kenyas politics. In political transition to democracy, elites have been busy manipulating ethnic groups to ascend to power. Even after the tumultuous 2007 elections, the manipulation of ethnicity seems to be set to continue with politicians eyes set on 2012 elections. Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki have all cunningly adopted the colonial framework of perpetuating their own egocentric interests. Many Kikuyu intellectuals who were known critics of the Moi regime, with constant calls for better government in Kenya have kept quiet since 2002 after Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, became president. Despite the fact that the Kibaki regime has presided over some of the worst scandals in Kenyan since independence, the Kikuyu intellectuals gave the NARC government a clean bill of health, and are doing the same for PNU. In pre-2007 some GEMA elite went a step further by commissioning dubious opinion polls which showed that the NARC government was still popular. The ODM and PNU alliance is obviously not working for there are many tensions on a new constitution. There are fears that a new constitution will not be in place before the next elections. The high-profile demand for transparency and accountability has disappeared. The critical articles directed against the Moi regime have ceased under the Kibaki regime. Although NARC was a triumph of the multi-party advocates, the fruits of its success have quickly translated into a Kikuyu victory for the simple reason that the then opposition selected Kibaki, a Kikuyu as their torchbearer. Today, there is need for the rule of law as Kenya increasingly slides into anarchy with Ethiopian rebels operating inside Kenya and Nairobi and other urban areas having fallen into the hands of gangs where cabinet ministers with bodyguards have been carjacked.34 Kenyans do not enjoy a free press any more. The 1992 general elections were held against a backdrop of what the opposition perceived to be a weakened KANU, but it was obviously mistaken. Months before the elections, many Kenyans assumed that the FORD movement that had converted itself into a political party was going to win. For the KANU government, save for a miracle, it was just a matter of time before it was edged out. Even KANU itself seems to have resigned itself to that fate. It was a foregone case that FORD was going to win, and what was still in doubt was only the margin of the victory.

References Adar, K. G. 1998. Ethnicity and Ethnic Kings: The Enduring Dual Constraint in Kenyas Multiethnic Democratic Electoral Experiment, The Journal of Third World Spectrum. Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 71-96. Ajulu, R. 2002. Politicised Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A Historical Perspective, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp.251-268.
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Hon. Kamanda was hijacked at gun point in 2004. On June 29, 2006, Trade Minister Mukhisa Kituyi was carjacked, his car snatched, his bodyguard disarmed, before they were abandoned in Ngara from where they walked to Pangani Police station in Nairobi. The car was later found abandoned in Majengo. In 2009 many prominent Kenyans have been robbed at gun point. On July 27, 2009, a senior police officer was carjacked and robbed at gun point in Nairobi. Kinuthia Murugu, the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Youth and Sports died on July 9, 2009 at Nairobi Hospital after he was shot by carjackers in Nairobi.
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Akintoye, S. A. 1976. Emergent African States: Topics in Twentieth Century African History. London: Longman. Alwy, A. and Schech, S. (2004) Ethnic Inequalities in Education in Kenya. International Education Journal, 5 (2), 266-274. http://iej.cjb.net Amutabi, M.N. 1999. Ethnicity and Kenyas Civil Service: A Retrospection, Mimeo, Department of Development Studies, Moi University, Kenya. Amutabi, M. N. 1996. Federalism as a Solution to Tribalism in B. A. Ogot, ed. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa, Kisumu: Maseno University Press, pp.176 - 86. Amutabi, M. N. 1995. Challenging the Orthodoxies: The role of Ethnicity and Regional Nationalism in Leadership and Democracy in Africa, Conference Paper, UNESCO Conference, Kericho, May 28-31. Amutabi, M. N. 1997. Ethnicity and Politics in Kenya: The Naked Truth. Mimeo. Department of Development Studies. Moi University, Kenya, March. Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. 2002. Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethnicity and Democracy in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 223-249. Bauni, E; Gichuhi, W. & Wasao, S. 2000. Ethnicity, modernity, and fertility in Kenya. Working paper No. 11. Nairobi, Kenya: African Population & Health Research Center.Chazan, N. et al. 1992. Politics and Society in Contemporary Africa. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner. Bravman, B. 1998. Making ethnic ways: communities and their transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800-1950.Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann. Dayton, S. 1995. De-Mystifying Tribalism: Identity, Politics and Conflict in Modern Africa, CODESRA Bulletin No. 1. Dibie, R. A. 2001. The Politics and Policies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Lanham, MD.: University Press of America. Gikandi, S. 2000. Reading the Referent: Postcolonialism and the Writing of Modernity, in S. Nasta, ed. Reading the New Literatures in a Postcolonial Era. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer. Gilroy, P. 1993. The Black Atlantic: Modernity and Double Consciousness. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Glassman, J. 2004. Slower than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial Thought in Colonial Africa, in American Historical Review, Vol. 109, No. 3. Gyekye, K. 1997. Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience, New York: Oxford University Press. Handler, R. 1988. Nationalism and the Politics of Culture in Quebec: Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. Horowitz, D. L. 1993. The Challenge of Ethnic Conflict: Democratic Societies, Journal of Democracy Vol.4, No.4, October. Hutchinson, J., and Smith, A. eds. 1996. Ethnicity. London: Oxford University Press. Ibrahim, J., and Preira, 1993. On Dividing and Uniting: Ethnicity, Racism and Nationalism in Africa, CODESRIA, Dakar. Kanyinga, K. 2000. Redistribution From Above: The Politics of Land Rights and Squatting in Coastal Kenya, Research Report No. 115. Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute. Kanyinga, K. 2004. Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Kenya, The Kenya Country Study Prepared for the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, March 2004 Kieh, G. K, Jr., and Mukenge, I. R. eds. 2002. Zones of Conflict in Africa. Westport, CT: Praeger.

Kenya Studies Review Khapoya, V. 1995. The African Experience. New Jersey: Prentice Hall. Klopp, J. M. 2002. Can Moral Ethnicity Trump Political Tribalism? The Struggle for Land and Nation in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 269-294. Lazarus, N. 1994. National Consciousness and the Specificity of (Post)Colonial Intellectualism, in F. Barker, et al. eds. Colonial Discourse/Postcolonial Theory. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Leys, C. 1975. Underdevelopment in Kenya, the Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism, 19641971. London: Heinemann Educational Books. Lonsdale, J. 1994. Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism, iIn Kaarsholm, Preben and Jan Hultin (eds.), Inventions and Boundaries: Historical and Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Ethnicity and Nationalism, Occasional paper No. 11, International Development Studies, Roskilde University. Mafeje, A. 1971. "The Ideology of Tribalism "Journal of Modern Africa Studies, 1971. pp. 136140. Mamdani, M. et al, 1988. Social Movements, Social Transformation and the Struggle for Democracy in Africa. CODESRIA Working Paper. Mamdani, M. 1998. Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism. Kampala: Fountain Publishers. Mamdani, M. 2001. When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism and the Genocide in Rwanda, Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press. Mazrui, A. 2001. If African politics are ethnic-prone, can African constitution be ethnic-proof? Nairobi: Constitution of Kenya Review Commission. Mazrui, A. A. 1972. Cultural Engineering and Nation-Building in East Africa. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Mazrui, Al Amin, 1998. Kayas revisited: a post-election balance sheet. Nairobi, Kenya: Kenya Human Rights Commission. Murunga, G. R. 2003. Ethnicity, Community Relations and Civil Society in Contemporary Kenya: Trends and Field Experiences, in Ufahamu, Vol. 29, Nos. 2/3. Murunga, G. 2004. The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, in Identity, Culture and Politics: An Afro-Asiatic Dialogue, Vol. 5, No. 1. Nasongo, S. W. 2000. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Political Conflicts in Africa: Beyond the Inter-Ethnic Hatred Thesis, in Okoth, P. G. and B. A. Ogot, eds. 2000. Conflict in Contemporary Africa. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation, pp. 44-55. Nyangira, Nicholas, 1987. Ethnicity, Class and Politics in Kenya, in Shatzberg, M. G. ed. The Political Economy of Kenya. New York: Praeger, pp. 15-31. Nyongo, P.A. 1993. The Challenge of National Leadership and Democratic Change in Kenya. Nairobi., Shrikon Publishers. Nyongo, P.A. (ed). 1987. Popular Struggles for Democracy in Africa. London: Zed Books. Nyongo, P.A. 1988, Political Instability and the Prospects for Democracy in Africa, Africa Development, 13. Nyongo, P.A. 1989. State and Society in Kenya: The Disintegration of Nationalist Coalitions and the rise of Presidential Authoritarianism 1963-1978, African Affairs, Vol.88. Nzomo, M. 1993. The Gender Dimensions of Democratisation in Kenya: Some International Linkages, Alternatives, Vol.18, pp. 61-73. Nzomo, M. 1995. The Political Economy of the African Crisis: Gender Impacts and Responses, International Journal, 51.
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Ochieng, W. R. 1984. The Third Word. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. Oanda, O. 1999. Economic Reform, Political Liberalization and Economic Ethnic Conflict in Kenya, Africa Development, Vol. 24, No. 1-2, pp. 83-107. Ogot, B. A. ed. 1997. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research. Ogot, B. A. and W. R. Ochieng, eds. 1995. Decolonisation and Independence in Kenya, 19401993. Nairobi: East African Education Publishers; Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. Okalany, D.H. 1997. The Culture of Eating in Uganda, 1962-1986, in B.A Ogot ed. Ethnicity, Nationalism and Democracy in Africa. Maseno: Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research.pp.188-198. Oloka-Onyango, J. 2004. Towards a Pan-East African Citizenship and Identity: Conceptual, Political and Legal Dimensions, Concept paper for the Kituo cha Katiba project Citizenship and Identity Struggles in East Africa; November 27, 2004. Omolo, K. 2002. Political Ethnicity in the Democratisation Process in Kenya, African Studies, Vol. 61, No. 2, pp. 209-221. Orvis, S. 2001. Moral Ethnicity and Political Tribalism in Kenyas Virtual Democracy, African Issues. Vol. XXIX, Nos. 1&2, pp. 8-13. Oyugi, W. O. 1998. Ethnic Politics in Kenya, in Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Conflicts in Africa. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 287-309. Oyugi, W. 1997. Ethnicity in the Electoral Process: The 1992 General Elections in Kenya, African Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 41-69. Pratt, M. L. 1992. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturalism. London: Routledge. Ranger, T. O. (1999). Voices from the Rocks: Nature, Culture and History in the Matopo Hills of Zimbabwe. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Ranger, T. O. 1989. Missionaries, Migrants and the Manyika: The Invention of Ethnicity in Zimbabwe in L. Vai, ed. The Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa. London. Rupesinghe, K. ed. 1992. Internal Conflict and Governance. London: Macmillan. Spencer, J. 1989. Writing Within: Anthropology, Nationalism and Culture in Sri Lanka, Current Anthropology 31, No. 3: 283-300. Wamwere, K. 2003. Negative ethnicity: from bias to genocide. New York: Seven Stories Press.Wanyama, F.2000. Democratisation in Africa: Advances and Setbacks. In Godfrey Okoth (ed), Africa at the Beginning of the 21st Century. Nairobi: Nairobi University Press.pp.109-134. Wanjala, C. 1980. For Home and Freedom. Nairobi: Kenya Literature Bureau. Were, E. M. and M.N. Amutabi. 2000. Nationalism and Democracy for People-Centred Development in Africa. Eldoret, Kenya: Moi University Press. Zeleza, P. T. 2003. Re-thinking Globalisation in Africa. Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press. Zeleza, P.T. 1997. Manufacturing African Studies and the Crises. Dakar, Senegal: CODESRIA Book Series.

Kenya Studies Review

Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional politics in Kenya By Raymond Muhula* Abstract This essay examines the nature of horizontal inequalities in Kenya since independence and their implication for political stability in the country. It argues that horizontal inequalities remain the single most important determinant of political contests in Kenya, fuelling much of the sometimes violent contests during elections. Moreover, it suggests that the overwhelming focus on ethnicity per se, undermines citizen agency, confounds political interests, and at best down plays the historical antecedents that have undermined the Kenyan state. The essay argues that the socio- economic and political inequalities in Kenya are rooted in both the historical as well as structural characteristics of the Kenyan state. Four major factors account for these inequalities: (i) ethno-regional political patronage (ii) dominance of the Kenyan state (iii) colonial legacy (iv) historical grievances and inter-ethnic rivalries. Keywords: Horizontal inequalities, ethnicity, Kenya *Raymond Muhula is with the Development Economics Data Group (DECDG) at the World Bank. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Howard University, and a Masters in Public Administration from the University of Texas, at Tyler.

Citation Format Muhula, Raymond (2009). Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional politics in Kenya. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 85-105. Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction The ethnic and regional violence in Kenya after the controversial 2007 Presidential elections demonstrated the fluidity of ethno-regional cohesion, exposed the depth of historical grievances, and further polarized the country along ethno-regional lines. At the core of these grievances is the belief that political power provides the ethnic group of the President with exclusive advantages. Not coincidentally, deep schisms resulting from inequality in access to political and socio-economic resources remain. Historically, the region that controls political power in Kenya also controls the direction and magnitude of economic and political resources of the state. The resulting intra-regional variations in access to political and socio-economic power have in turn sustained deep seated grievances, sometime causing the kind of conflict witnessed in early 2008. These socio-economic and political differentiations based on socio-cultural identities such as ethnicity, religion or race, are known as horizontal inequalities (Stewart 2000, 2002). The role of ethnicity in Kenyas politics has received enormous attention (e.g. Haugeraud 1995, Ndegwa 1997, Nasongo 2000, Osamba 2001, Atieno-Odhiambo 2002, Omolo 2002, Lynch 2006, Yieke 2007). More recently, the resulting variations in political and socio-economic benefits (horizontal inequalities) associated with access to power have been discussed (e.g. Widner 1992, Atieno-Odhiambo 2002, Murunga 2004, Githongo 2005, Mueller 2008, Branch and Cheeseman 2008). Moreover, the potential for ethnic conflict resulting from unequal distribution of national resources has always concerned keen students of Kenyan politics (e.g. Rothchild 1969, Nellis 1974, Gertzel 1974). According to data from the highly regarded Afrobarometer Survey there is a high perception of unfair treatment among ethnic communities. Except for Central province where only 7 percent viewed their treatment as unfair, other provinces reported above average rates. For example: North Eastern (62 percent, Coast (48 percent), Nyanza (39 percent), Rift Valley (38 percent), and Western (21 percent). Central province is the home of President Mwai Kibaki, and boasts disproportionate representation in the government and quasi government agencies. Regional disparities in the availability of social services, such as water, follow the above pattern. Central province enjoys better access than the rest of the country. In Central province, 12 percent of households have access to piped water compared to 8 percent in Coast, 5 percent in Rift Valley, and 1 percent in Nyanza provinces ( Githongo 2006: 20). The other provinces have far lower levels of access. Predictably, the rationale for post election violence has been couched in instrumental (ethnic chauvinism) and not in ideological terms (demand for respect of the vote). This essay examines the nature of horizontal inequalities in Kenya since independence and their implication for political stability in the country. It argues that horizontal inequalities remain the single most important determinant of political contests in Kenya, fuelling much of the sometimes violent contests during elections. Moreover, it suggests that the overwhelming focus on ethnicity per se, undermines citizen agency, confounds political interests, and at best down plays the historical antecedents that have undermined the Kenyan state. The essay treats ethnicity as an important factor in Kenyas politics, but insists that it is the actions of the governing elite that elevate ethnic differences to conflict inducing status. By promoting exclusive economic benefits to sections of the country that promise the most political support, successive ruling elites have created grievances that are channeled as ethnic sentiments in every election. At worst, this situation has made it difficult for citizens to expect fair treatment if one of their own is not in power. More importantly, they have undermined efforts to alleviate poverty, created wastage in

Kenya Studies Review public expenditure, and resulted in cross regional, gender, and generational variations in wellbeing. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows: the next section lays out the conceptual framework guiding this discussion. The following section provides the political context of the discussion on socio-economic and horizontal inequalities. The next section describes the nature of horizontal inequalities including political and socio-economic dimensions. The subsequent section discusses recent efforts by the Government of Kenya to redress these inequalities, while the last section concludes by offering some lessons and initial thoughts on policy recommendations. Horizontal Inequalities: A conceptual overview By horizontal inequalities we mean the socio-economic and political differentiations based on socio-cultural identities such as ethnicity, religion or race (Stewart 2000, 2002). As opposed to the more familiar vertical inequalities that measure individual variations in income, horizontal inequalities seek to understand how group affiliations determine socio-political and economic benefits from the state. Horizontal inequality is different from vertical inequality in the sense that the latter measures individual inequality, while the former is concerned mainly with deprivations at group level. Thus instead of using individual income as a unit of analysis, as would be the case in vertical inequality, horizontal inequality is concerned with those aspects of disproportionate allocation of social, economic and political resources that confer advantages to one group at the expense of others. The emphasis on vertical inequality at the expense of horizontal inequality militates against an appreciation of the latter as a potential cause of conflict. Traditional measures of inequality, such as income distribution, do not capture the magnitude of group inequalities (Stewart 2000, Crammer 2003). Recent theorizing has demonstrated the inadequacy of using vertical inequality to explain the onset of violent conflict (Crammer 2003). According to Crammer, economic inequality is hugely important, but it must be viewed as a subset of the socio-political, cultural, and historical dimensions (p.406). Instead attention is being focused on inter-group inequalities based on race, ethnicity or religion (Stewart and Langer 2007; Stewart 2006, 2002, 2000, 1998; Langer 2005; Stewart, Brown and Mancini 2005; Sriskandarajah 2005). Stewart et al. note that groups gain salience because of the tightness of their boundaries. And, because members understand the advantages of memberships, they are always willing to defend these advantages, even through violence. Brown, Stewart and Langer (2007) note that addressing horizontal inequalities is important for the following reasons: First, individual conditions may be difficult to improve without improving group conditions. Where group inequalities are widespread, it does not matter what is done to improve the conditions of the individual. The salience of group exclusion would endure, thereby increasing the likelihood of violent conflict. More importantly, by focusing on social relations that undermine inequality such as ethnicity, religion, or race, it is possible to understand the aspects of history or political choice that create categorical group differences within society. Thus according to Crammer, economic inequality exists by virtue of the social and political forces that give rise to it, just as material forces shape the social and political (2003:406). Economic inequality is embedded in a social and historical milieu that determines the choices that the political class makes in relation to outside groups. Cultural factors are important for group mobilization. They combine with existing geographic and economic conditions in society to provide the potential for construction of a group identity as a source of political mobilization (Stewart 2000: 247). As was evident in Kenya
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after the 2007 general elections, this potential may then be exploited by political actors in and out of government to make cultural identity salient enough as a resource for political mobilization. But the differences have to be viewed in relative and sometimes in absolute terms as conferring various advantages to the favored group. Otherwise they may not rise to a sufficient level for group mobilization. For horizontal inequalities to rise to the level where they induce conflict, elite political leaders have to be involved in the process of grievance formation and group mobilization ( Langer 2005:27). In practice, ordinary citizens are concerned with the bread and butter issues- socio economic wellbeing, while the elite are interested in power. As such, where the political elite are well taken care of in the distribution of political power, the risk of violent conflict is severely reduced given that the elite do not have the motivation to mobilize the citizens for violent conflict. This may explain why some countries with obvious significant inter ethnic inequalities, such as Kenya, remained relatively stable over a long period of time. But, notes Langer (2005), there is still a danger of mobilization by new and upcoming ethnic elite if the current elite fail to address the demands of the masses. The new elite might be more confrontational and adopt a more violent approach to addressing the existing horizontal inequalities. It is understandable that once co-opted by the ruling elite from the group in power, elites from the disadvantaged group, now satisfied, have no reason to mobilize the masses for protest. However, Stewart (2000) offers additional insights into this paradox. The presence of strong state intervention to prevent protest in these countries makes it possible for highly unequal societies to escape violent conflict (p. 253). Also, in situations where economic and political power is shared among groups, the likelihood of conflict is reduced. But, where the group that controls economic power also controls political power, the chance of violent conflict is increased. The importance of ethno-regional basis of political power is also demonstrated by the pattern of political conflict in recent years. The two regions that have been associated with political power i.e. Central and Rift Valley provinces are also the ones that have been deeply involved in the major political ethnic conflict in recent times. After the 2007 elections for example, more violence was witnessed in Rift Valley province than in any other part of Kenya. It was not a coincidence that it was mostly directed against the people of Central province ancestry, now perceived to benefit from political power (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, Yieke 2008). Stewart (2000), however, notes that intra group vertical inequality may reduce the chances of violent conflict, even in horizontally unequal societies, considering the difficulty of unifying the entire group around an inequality agenda. There is also the rare case of elite from a vertically unequal society identifying more with elite from other societies, than with low income members of their own group thereby neutralizing its potential for protest (p.253). But, it is not automatic that horizontal inequality will cause conflict. The size of the group determines their ability to organize and protest- smaller groups are unlikely to cause violent conflict even when they experience high levels of horizontal inequality. In order to reduce the likelihood of conflict, greater attention must be paid to policies that reduce horizontal inequality- policies that address and aim to provide political, economic and socially inclusion. The 2007 Kenyan election, the post election violence, and subsequent efforts to re-engineer the contours of the state provide important lessons on the nature of horizontal inequalities and their impact on governance and public administration in unequal societies. It is to this that we now turn.

Kenya Studies Review Background and Context Kenya has enjoyed decades of peace unlike most of her neighbors. Ethno-regional schisms have, nevertheless, always lurked on the surface. Long periods of economic well-being and perceptions of equality, it is suggested, accounted for the absence of internal conflict (Klugman et al. 1999). But recent events in the aftermath of the disputed 2007 Presidential elections suggested the existence of deep seated inter-ethnic and regional animosities. Contemporary and historical factors were at the root of the vicious reaction to the election results. Among these factors are the political bargains at the founding of the Kenyan state, the post independence coalitions crafted to sustain ethnic hegemony and the insularity of post independence governing elites. These historical factors have been sustained by the patron- client nature of Kenyan politics, and the resultant exclusion of non-power holding ethnic communities. Elections are thus important vehicles for the control and transfer of state resources to favored regions. Election time ethnoregional conflicts in 1992, 1997 and 2007 all have one thing in common: The determination to control the spoils of office. The 2007 election was different from any other election in recent times. It was the first time a clearly discernible difference existed in the political agenda of opposing contenders. At an ideological level, it was a contest between a conservative ruling elite and a more liberal and activist opposition. More importantly, it was also an emotional reaction to perceived state sanctioned horizontal inequality. Opposition campaign agenda revolved around this theme. The overarching opposition response to this phenomenon was devolution: the spread of state power to regional units which would oversee tax collection and determine expenditure depending on local need. But, like previous electoral contests the 2007 election was organized around disgruntled and suspicious ethno- regional coalitions. The post election violence was historic in the sense that, until then, no violent articulation of citizen grievances of that magnitude had occurred in the country. But these were different times: it would be the first time in independent Kenya that an incumbent regime would come close to losing power, itself an important indication of the countrys democratic maturity. In this sense it was different from previous electoral contests given the high stakes involved. Previous Kenyan Presidents had been replaced as a result of natural and constitutional causes. The first President Jomo Kenyatta died while in office, while his successor Daniel arap Moi was constitutionally barred from a third term at the end of his second term in 2002. Mwai Kibaki, Kenyas third president is serving his last term. Ethno-regional interests have therefore never been threatened. The prevalence of violence in the Rift Valley and sub-urban Nairobi and its target on Central province communities, demonstrated existing grievances against Central provincial political elite. One thing was common in both parts of the country: high levels of poverty, the cause of which was perceived to be horizontal inequality, the one based on land pressure caused by migrant Central province communities in the Rift Valley, and the other economic pressure represented by wealthy Central province land lords in slum communities of Nairobi such as Kangemi, Kawangware, Kibera, and Mathare. In both cases, political horizontal inequalities were key determining factors. Nevertheless, the perceived lack of response to citizen demands for fair distribution of national resources, and the impunity of the ruling regime even when its legitimacy was under assault may have also contributed to the post election crisis in 2007. After the 2005 referendum, the governing elite around President Kibaki became more insular than at any other time in the five year period his first term ( Murunga and Nasongo, 2006, Whitaker and Giersch 2009). Political appointments in both the Cabinet and the Civil Service bureaucracy now favored
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Central province after the sacking of proponents of the draft constitution who were mostly nonKikuyu ministers. These included Raila Odinga, Kalonzo Musyoka, and William Ruto who would later initiate presidential bids of their own. Appointments to executive positions in state corporations and parastatal agencies followed a similar trend. At the same time, the governments image was blemished by what became known as the Anglo Leasing Scam, a series of corruption allegations by the Secretary for Governance and Ethics, John Githongo (Githongo 2005). This led to the resignation of three Kibaki loyalists from the Cabinet namely: David Mwiraria (Finance), Kiraitu Murungi (Justice) and Christopher Murungaru (National Security). These events set the state for the 2007 elections, making the inequitable distribution of state resources, corruption and nepotism core themes of the impending elections. Poverty was also an important catalyst for the post election violence. Even though the country registered an impressive 7 percent growth rate during the previous five years, growing poverty and high cost of living persisted, especially in slum areas of major cities. The failure of the state to respond to citizen demand for socio-economic improvements especially in poor urban areas may have heightened popular disaffection. The most affected socio- economic segments in the poor urban areas believed that a new political dispensation was the panacea for their economic woes. Additionally, the political rhetoric of unequal distribution of economic resources hardened existing inter-ethnic suspicions against landlords in poverty ridden urban areas. These historical grievances found expression in the post election violence. The discourse on inequality has been a subject of much political and academic debate in Kenya since independence (Rothchild 1969, Nellis 1973, Kariuki 2004). The political elite have responded in various ways. In the immediate years after independence regime representatives responded by (i) blaming the colonial regime (ii) insisting that individual recruitment was based on merit, and by (iii) assuring less endowed areas that resources would be distributed equitably ( Rothchild 1969: 704). Scholars are, however, unanimous on the pervasiveness of inequality and the manipulation of political power for access and control of state resources (Widner 1992, Cohen 1995, Weinreb 2001). Successive presidential regimes have attempted redistribution programs to improve socio-economic equity. Similar efforts targeting political horizontal inequalities remain elusive. Among the most innovative programs addressing socio-economic inequalities are the District Focus for Rural Development (DFRD), the Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF), the Constituencies Development Fund (CDF), the Free Primary Education (FPE) and the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA) of 2008. Even though intended for socio-economic parity, most of these programs have not succeeded in reducing inequality. Part of the reason for this lack of impact is that they have been used to benefit new regional power holders (e.g. DFRD), or have been undermined by existing differences at initiation (e.g. CDF). They have also been affected by technical weaknesses, poor prioritization, and elite capture (e.g. LATF; CDF). It is too early to determine the impact of the NARA in addressing the political horizontal inequalities. Nevertheless, it remains an important initial attempt. Nature and Scope of horizontal inequalities in Kenya: An overview The extent of horizontal inequalities in Kenya reflects the nature of the Kenyan state, the intersection of politics and ethnicity, and the divided loyalties of major institutional actors. These factors significantly influence allocation of resources as well as the exercise of sovereign powers. Unlike neighboring Tanzania, Kenyas nation building program was undermined by an inward looking strategy that promoted sectional interests in language, education and material culture while maintaining fidelity to the colonial state system. The result was a regional strategy of

Kenya Studies Review divide and rule, which emphasized local vernacular more than the national language and adherence to regional identity over national outlook. Specifically the education system was designed to impose notions of parochial identity with indigenous languages occupying prominent roles in the curriculum (Miguel 2004:327-362). Thus, the failure to build a unitary nation out of the disparate ethnic communities, and the retention of colonial era geographical divisions has continued to undermine national unity. These have jointly led to major socio-economic and political cleavages, affected economic growth, and caused substantial political and socioeconomic horizontal inequalities. We look at some examples below: a. Political Horizontal Inequalities Group based differences in access to political power and the significant benefits that are attached to group membership are pervasive in Kenya. The Ethno-regional group (ethnic community) is the most politically salient unit in Kenyan politics. The interaction of geographical, administrative and political boundaries only heightens the salience of these ethno-regional groups. Nevertheless, there is an increasing assertiveness of alternative social groupings that were very active in the 2007 elections. Among these are religious groups notably the Muslims (Cheeseman 2008: 168). However, another key emerging and increasingly salient demographic group is the Youth. Like many developing countries, Kenya is currently experiencing a youth bulge. About 60 percent of Kenyas population comprises the youth in the 18-35 age bracket. Apart from being the most politically active demographic they are also one of the most politically excluded groups in the country, and also the most economically affected. According to Government of Kenya (GoK), youth accounts for about 45 percent of the unemployed (GoK 2003:8). While the economic implications of this bulge have been documented, its political significance remains largely understudied (Kagwanja 2006, Muhula 2007, Mwangola 2007). The recent wave of violence and the prominent participation of the youth in the disturbances is a clear indication of this segments growing importance. Its continued exclusion not only means that a major portion of the countrys human capital is not productively engaged, but it also raises important implications for political stability in Kenya. These two constituencies, the ethnic groups and the youth must be factored into any discussion on growth, poverty reduction and political stability in Kenya. (i) Political Inequalities: ethno-regional groups Post independence political bargaining and coalition formation has largely assumed regional dimensions. Similarly, access to political power has, by and large, determined the distribution of socio-economic and political benefits. Several studies have underlined the existence, and indeed the potential dangers inherent in these regional variations. Rothchild (1969) and Nellis (1974) have shown regional differences in Cabinet and Public Service appointments in the immediate post independence years, and that these differences were artificially determined by the power holding political elite. Similar studies by Barkan and Chege (1989), SID (2004) and Kanyinga (2006), also pointed to the persistence of political inequalities and to their long-term implications for economic growth and political stability. Apart from variations in regional composition of Cabinet and Public Service appointments, perceptions of political inequality exist in several regions. The Afrobarometers third round survey on Attitudes to Democracy and Markets in Kenya conducted in 2005 found regional variations in perceptions of political power. About 38 percent of Kenyans noted that
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their ethnic community had less or much less political power compared to other communities. The magnitude of this perception is only remarkable when viewed across regions: Central (7%), Nairobi (28%), Eastern (34%), Western (36%), Nyanza (38%), Rift Valley (42 %), Coast (72%), and North-Eastern (83 %). It is important to note that post election violence was predominantly in Western, Nyanza, Rift-Valley, and Coast provinces, and they were also the areas with significant opposition victories in the 2007 elections. While these data emerged from a period of heightened political activity, coalition formation and inter-party rivalry they nevertheless, present evidence that these perceptions exist nationally. Historically, political patronage has also reflected regional access to political power. The Kenyan constitution confers vast powers to the President. These include powers to allocate ministerial positions, and make appointments to constitutionally protected offices. Successive regimes therefore entrenched their rule, assigned strategic administrative positions, and directed political resources to supportive provinces. The level of regime insularity rises with increased challenge to the regime by non- governing regional elite. Conversely, challenge to the ruling elite negatively affects the representation of non- governing provinces in the national bureaucracy. It also results in total withdrawal of state support for programs in such provinces. Thus between 1963 and 1978, and 2003 to 2007 Central province was disproportionately represented in Cabinet, Military, Diplomacy, and Public Service. Not accidentally, Jomo Kenyatta, Kenyas president was from the province. A similar pattern was evident between 1979 and 2002, with Rift Valley province, the home of President Daniel arap Moi, disproportionately represented. But these periods also coincided with the deliberate exclusion of specific provinces whose political elite were considered disloyal to the ruling elite. This can be seen in the reduction in the proportion of PS appointment from Nyanza and Eastern provinces between 1969 and 1972 (see table 1).

Table 1. Central province disproportionately represented in Cabinet and Civil Service appointments (%), 1969- 1972. Province President Assistant Permanent Provincial & Cabinet Ministers Secretaries Commissioners 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972 1969 1972 33 33 16 17 27 45 57 50 Central 5 10 13 20 11 10 29 25 Rift Valley 10 10 16 23 5 10 0 0 Western 10 10 9 9 26 20 0 0 Nyanza 10 10 9 3 21 0 0 0 Eastern Figures do not include Nairobi, Coast and North Eastern (Adapted from Nellis (1974), p. 14-15). This reduction coincided with antagonism between the Nyanza ( Luo) and Central province (Kikuyu) elite leading to the formation of opposition party Kenya Peoples Union, and the alleged involvement of military officers from Eastern province (Kamba) elite in the army mutiny of 1971. A similar pattern occurred between 1985 and 2002, with Rift Valley securing more representation, while Nyanza and Central provinces witnessing substantial reduction in representation. For instance, by 1994 Central province proportion in the Cabinet had dropped from 20 percent in 1985 to 4 percent, while the Nyanza proportion dropped from 16 percent in

Kenya Studies Review 1985 to 4 percent in 1994. Meanwhile, Rift Valley representation increased from 12 percent in 1985 to 17 percent in 1994. Again, inter-regional political considerations explain these differences. The considerable reduction in Nyanza and Central provinces proportion (table 2) coincided with the consolidation of political power around the Rift Valley elite, as well as greater agitation for political reforms led by Nyanza and Central province elites. Table 2: Rift Valley province disproportionately represented in Cabinet and Civil Service appointments (%), 1985-2001 Province President Cabinet and Ambassadors Permanent Secretaries

1985 1994 1985 20 4 10 Central 12 17 13 Rift Valley 8 17 10 Western 16 4 17 Nyanza 8 17 8 Eastern Figures do not include Nairobi, Coast and North (2006), p. 274-275).

2001 1985 2001 12 28 9 21 20 35 12 12 13 15 8 9 3 12 4 Eastern provinces (Adapted from Kanyinga

More recently, inter-coalition differences within the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition led to the capture of the presidency by Central province elite. The process of exclusion that started with the purging of Rift Valley elites after the end of the Moi regime extended to representatives from Nyanza and Eastern provinces after the 2005 referendum in which political elite from these regions campaigned against the draft constitution. The beneficiaries of this fallout became the Central province elite. Nationally, a perception of Central province hegemony inevitably escalated, and was manifestly demonstrated during the post referendum debates, the 2007 election and the events thereafter. The three cases demonstrate how access to political power by the presidents home determines the fortunes of that province, and the resultant exclusion of other provinces. (ii) Political Inequalities: Youth, Politics and Inequality The youth (age-group 18-35) comprises about 60 percent of the national population (Afrobarometer, 2005). It is the fastest growing demographic group, with potential significant effect on economic growth, poverty reduction and political stability. The youth is therefore an important political constituency in its own right. Estimates indicate that in the 2007 elections age was an important factor. About 1.6 million new voters registered to vote for the first time, most of these under the age of 35. The youth, mostly in urban areas became the third most sought after electoral constituency (ICG 2008: 8). Unlike ethno-regional groups that are amenable to political consideration, the fluid nature of this category undermines its salience as a significant political constituency. This is however changing in Kenya considering the role of the youth in the 2007 general elections, as well as in more recent elections. Opinion surveys carried out before the general elections point to a politically active as well as a highly volatile demographic. According to Afrobarometer (2005) survey the youth are actively engaged in political affairs. About 63 percent indicate that they are very interested in public affairs, while 71 percent
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indicated that they discuss political matters frequently. Three factors account for the political salience of this group: It is highly mobile i.e. youth can easily move across all group as well as geographical boundaries. Also, it is mostly educated and networked. Youth literacy rate in Kenya is about 80 percent, while the youth comprise about 45 percent of the unemployed (GoK 2003:8). This makes it the most disaffected, and therefore the most vulnerable to political mobilization. Youth engagement in politics has rarely assumed organized forms in terms of agenda setting for political debate. Traditionally, the youth have been used as party agents, not necessarily in substantive roles, but as party foot soldiers (Youth Agenda 2008). Their role has largely been restricted to providing security and in some cases forceful mobilization of support for both parliamentarians and presidential candidates. Unemployment and resultant poverty makes election time a highly rewarding time for the youth. But, it also makes it the most risky time for them given the volatility of electoral politics in Kenya. The post election violence in 2007 demonstrates how violently engaged youth were in the conflict. According to Youth Agenda, a local NGO, while the youth were responsible for the planning of only about 7 percent of the violence, they were responsible for the execution of about 55 percent of election related violence ( ICG 2008:25). Similar trends are evident in the funding for violence. About 60 percent of funding for violence was sourced from non- youth sponsors, while youth sponsorship of violent activity accounted for only 7 percent (ICG 2008: 23). These figures demonstrate, even if circumstantially, the existence of a supply chain, in which youth are merely conduits. Nevertheless, the concerns of the youth such as employment, security, and political representation remain only marginally considered. In the 2007 elections as in previous ones, in spite a high number of young people registering as candidates for parliamentary nominations (e.g. Cecily Mbarire, Kabando wa Kabando,Miguna Miguna among others) , there was no organized articulation of a unified youth agenda. Major political candidates rarely articulated a youth action plan in their speeches, and only occasionally referred to plans to fund youth selfhelp programs, such as capital to operate bicycle transportation businesses. Nevertheless, there was a highly visible participation of the youth in the elections. An emerging phenomenon in Kenyan politics is the rise of youth militias. Some of these militias have been known to work for individual politicians. In 2002 elections for instance, the Mungiki militia openly identified itself with the KANU presidential candidate, while in the 2007 elections, this group was identified with the PNU presidential candidate, and were active in the post election violence. The ideology of these militias is couched in pure instrumentalist termsyouth have been excluded, and have to claim the political space through violence if necessary. The rise of the Mungiki in Nairobi, Nakuru and parts of Central province, as well as the emergence of the Land Defense Force in Western province and parts of Rift Valley could be attributed to the socio-economic and political exclusion of the youth. High unemployment, poverty, little confidence in state interest in addressing their concern, and a manipulative and predatory political environment collectively heightens perception of inequality among the youth. To be sure, youth mobilization for political participation follows the ethno- regional patterns characteristic of national politics. Thus youth in one region are more likely to vote for the regions preferred candidate, and not necessarily the one with the best policy for youth. This undermines the articulation of a decisive youth platform as well as a collective attempt at organized claim making. The resultant horizontal inequalities against this highly impressionable

Kenya Studies Review group pose major implications for security and vulnerability of the country. Both could undermine long term economic growth and political stability. b. Socio-economic horizontal inequalities Regional imbalance in the distribution of political appointments inevitably contributes to the ethno-regional inequalities. This is exacerbated by the synchronous relationship between administrative and political boundaries. The distribution of public goods such as education facilities, health, water and physical infrastructure also follows patterns of access to political power. Senior government officials including ministers and permanent secretaries influence public expenditure decisions. Thus the pattern of socio-economic inequalities reflects the patterns of regional representation in public service appointments. Under Kenyatta, Central province experienced better access to public services compared to other provinces. Similarly, under Moi, Rift Valley province received disproportionate share of government investment in public service delivery. In 1969 about 64 percent of primary school age children were enrolled, compared to 31 percent for Nyanza and 29 percent in Rift Valley. Central Kenya was the only province above the national average of about 39 percent (Alwiya and Schech 2004:271). While enrolment itself is a household level decision that does not necessarily follow political patronage, provision of education inputs such as teachers is amenable to political influence. Citing Ministry of Education data, Alwiya and Schech (2004) note that Central Kenya also had the highest percentage of professionally qualified teachers compared to any other province, other than Nairobi during the Kenyatta regime (p.271). By the end of Kenyatta regime and beginning of Moi regime in 1979, about 90 percent of Central province teachers were qualified compared to about 68 percent for Nyanza and 70 percent for Rift Valley. Regional variations in pupil-teacher ratio during the 1990s demonstrate the existence of influential political considerations in the provision of teachers. For example high enrolment in Central and Nyanza (100 percent and 80 percent respectively) was not marched with the same proportion of teachers. Consequently, the two provinces had a higher pupil-teacher ratio (34 percent and 31 percent respectively), while Rift Valley with 94 percent enrolment rate, had a pupil teacher ratio of about 28 percent (Alwiya and Schech 2004) .This pattern was evident in access to health care and housing during the various regimes. Central province was more favored than other provinces during the Kenyatta regime. In 1970, the province accounted for about 15 percent of government expenditure on housing while Nyanza province accounted for only 1 percent even though the difference in population was negligible (ILO 1972:301). Similarly, the province had only 766 people per hospital bed (only worse than Nairobi, with 152). Whereas politically excluded areas like Nyanza, Western and North Eastern provinces had an average of over 1,000 peoples per bed.i The Moi era brought similar advantages for Rift Valley province, again at the expense of politically non-salient ethnic communities. By the end of Mois term in 2002, Rift valley province had about 6,000 people per health facility-the least of any province. Nyanza had about 9,000 while Western had 11,000 people per health facility, only better than sparsely populated North-Eastern province which had about 14,000 people per health facility ( SID 2004 :21). Similar variations are demonstrated in under- five mortality rates across the country. Kalenjin children in rural areas were less likely to die under the age of five compared to children of other ethnic communities during the Moi presidency (Brockerhoff and Hewitt 1998:22). Similar trends were evident for the Kikuyu during the Kenyatta regime, where under-five mortality rates declined by 69 percent during the 1970s

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(p.23). The effect of these inequalities has been evident in later years, and continues to widen inequalities even further. From the foregoing, it is clear that the socio- economic and political inequalities in Kenya are rooted in both the historical as well as structural characteristics of the Kenyan state. Four major factors account for these inequalities: (i) ethno-regional political patronage (ii) dominance of the Kenyan state (iii) colonial legacy (iv) historical grievances and inter-ethnic rivalries. It is to these that we now turn. i. Ethno-regional political patronage and horizontal Inequality Ethno-regional political patronage remains a pernicious aspect of Kenyan politics. It determines access to both political and economic resources. The resulting horizontal inequalities are further exacerbated by the alignment of electoral with administrative regions. Electoral constituencies sometimes combine three to four administrative divisions headed by a civil servant. Since most constituencies (politico-electoral) and provinces (administrative) are dominated by one ethnic community, policy decisions made on the basis of political considerations account for much of the existing horizontal inequalities. Central province received much of the political and economic benefit under Kenyatta, while Rift valley was the main beneficiary under Moi. In all three post independence regimes these inequalities have been reflected in appointments to the Cabinet, Judiciary, Diplomatic Corps, State Corporations, and in the nature of public service delivery. National poverty estimates indicate that Central and Rift Valley provinces with poverty indices of 31 percent and 44 percent respectively are the wealthiest provinces in the country. Both regions have produced a President at least once. The poverty indices in Nyanza and Western provinces are 61 percent and 65 percent respectively. These regions have never produced a President and are the poorest (GoK 2006). The ruling elites use political power to direct resources to areas that enjoy their patronage. These group based advantages in economic and socio- political realms have provided the advantages that make horizontal inequality a persistent feature of socio-economic and political structure in Kenya. The result has been unequal access to education (Amutabi 2003), health (Grab and Priebe 2009, Nyanjom 2006), water and sanitation services and a disproportionately better quality of life in provinces associated with political power ( Alwy and Schech 2004). For instance, Grab and Priebe (2009) note the paradox around low malnutrition rates and high mortality rates of children in Nyanza province. Accordingly, they state that an interaction of cultural, geographic and political factors can reverse the positive relationship between a good nutritional status and the survival chances of children (p. 3). Ethno-political patronage is also the main determinant of horizontal inequalities in land distribution in the country. The political origin of landlessness as a manifestation of horizontal inequalities is the Million Acres Scheme. This land redistribution program immediately after independence opened up Rift Valley, the traditional home of the Kalenjin, to external purchasers from Central province who enjoyed massive economic advantages during the Kenyatta era. It brought about 35, 000 non- Rift Valley families, mostly from Central province into the Rift Valley. While it helped the departing colonial and the newly independent Kenya government settle immediate short term instability, the magnitude of inequalities that would result from it were not immediately apparent (Leo 1981: 202-222). The land buying companies that were formed by the Central province elite during the Kenyatta era helped negotiate better prices for their members, and therefore led to their disproportionate migration into the Rift Valley (Oyugi 2000, Atieno-Odhiambo 2002). More importantly, because of political advantages accruing from

Kenya Studies Review the Kenyatta presidency, members of the Kikuyu community had more access to the loans than any other community. This disparity in the distribution of state resource would continue henceforth. For instance, by 1966 about 64 percent of all industrial and 44 percent of commercial loans given by the state owned Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation (ICDC) went to Kikuyu clients (Rothchild 1969: 693). As a result, there ensued an expansion of kikuyu reserves to include Nakuru, Laikipia, Nyandarua, Eastern Nandi, Eastern Kericho and Southern Uashin Gishu (Leo 1984). Land pressure in the greater Rift Valley precipitated much of the animosity to the Central province immigrants and other migrant communities in this region. This would be exacerbated by an imminent loss of political power. Thus in recent years political conflicts among elite have degenerated into local conflicts over land. It is not a coincidence that these conflicts have routinely coincided with general elections, as witnessed with the targeting of Central province Diaspora communities in the Rift Valley after the 2007 elections. Similarly, in both 1992 and 1997 ethnic conflict occurred in the Rift Valley, Nairobi and Coast provinces. The findings and recommendations of a government appointed commission of inquiry (Kiliiku Commission and Akiwumi Commission) to investigate the violence were never considered. ii. Imbalanced State- Society relations contribute to horizontal inequality The nature of the Kenyan state that favors a strong executive with vast powers promotes the exercise of state powers for ethno-regional and political interests. With vast controls over parliament and the judiciary, executive officials have used state resources to reward supportive constituencies while excluding others. The state is the main provider of social services in Kenya even though private sector participation in the provision of education, health, water and sanitation has expanded in recent years. As such, executive influence in the provision of public goods results in unequal distribution of these resources. Such influence also affects recruitment into the national bureaucracy- the Civil Service. At independence, the majority of public service delivery was undertaken by Local Authorities. The provision of primary education and health, for instance, was until 1970 a function of Local Authorities. The subsequent abolition of the Graduated Personal Tax in the 1970s dried the much needed source of revenue and increased Local Authority dependence on the central government. Similarly, the politically motivated establishment of numerous Municipal and Urban councils through divisions of these hitherto large entities reduced their efficiency while increasing the power of Central government to control Local Authorities through the appointment of personnel. The transfer of important public services to line ministries ensured that important service delivery decisions would be made through the highly politicized and partisan civil service command that stretched from the president to the sub-location level. Structurally, the civil service is underpinned by a technocratic tradition. However, ethno-regional influence, executive interference and client-patron relations undermine service delivery, and promote horizontal inequalities. The performance of the Kenyan parliament has been mixed. Important oversight organs like the Public Investment Committee (PIC) and the Parliamentary Accounts Committee (PAC) exist but, with no real enforcement mechanisms, their recommendations are routinely ignored. Annual reports of the Controller and Auditor-General routinely cite politically motivated and in most cases economically unviable projects, while recommendations of oversight committees of parliament such as the PAC are rarely implemented. More importantly, disclosure laws remain weakened both by stringent libel laws and the Official Secrets Act, a colonial era law that undermines citizen access to executive action. This makes it not only difficult for citizens to
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determine the degree of political influence in the allocation of state resources, but also provides no incentive for transparency and accountability. Horizontal inequalities are thus concealed, and inevitably thrive unchecked since the oversight function of parliament is hampered by tradition of a strong executive. Moreover, the constitutional requirement that the Cabinet is drawn from among legislators further undermines parliaments oversight role. First, it weakens parliament since a section of the membership can no longer oppose government agenda because of collective responsibility requirements. But more importantly it introduces opportunities for executive incursion into the independence of the legislature, coercion of legislators and opportunities for patronage (Widner 1992, Murunga 2004). Even though the Kenyan legislature has increasingly become more assertive in recent years ( Barkan et al. 2004), it still remains subordinate to the executive in many aspects. For example a recent study on the strength of legislatures worldwide ranked the Kenyan parliament at 126 out of 158 (Fish and Kroneig 2008). This has major implications for governance, but the most obvious is that political actors cannot depend on parliament to mitigate executive excesses. Historically legislative initiatives to reduce horizontal inequalities have received hostile reception from government aligned members of parliament. Instead, parliament has consistently participated in facilitating executive clamping of its independence and effectiveness. The fact that parliament does not control its own calendar and can be prorogued and dissolved at the presidents will undermines its independence. More importantly, parliament has no control over the budget, and members of parliament only encounter the budget on the day it is presented by the Minister for Finance. Recent efforts to create a budget office and to allow parliament to control its calendar have met stiff resistance from the government. Consequently, presidential powers to appoint top Civil Service and military officials remain, as do powers to order the provision of any kind of development project to a favored constituency. Kenyan Presidents have no doubt used this power to enrich their communities, resulting in both economic and political horizontal inequalities. While in recent years private sector involvement in the provision of social services such as water, education and health services has increased, the government still remains the main provider of these services. And, even though the network of public service delivery systems follows the provincial administration system, there are still variations in access. In most cases, such variations reflect patterns of political patronage and relative access to political power over the years. Inequality has arisen because political considerations determine access to government resources. State bureaucrats in the districts are important executive agents that ensure compliance with state policy. As representatives of the president, they have traditionally invoked the Presidents executive authority to reward loyal constituencies and to build a political base. Moreover, since development projects in all regions are overseen by Permanent Secretaries with very little parliamentary oversight, certain areas have been favored in allocation of state resources. Thus deserving areas may be starved of resources, while areas with powerful political patrons get access to government programs. The result has been regional variations in access to social services. But, as shown below systemic horizontal inequalities are also rooted in historical legacies. iii. Colonial legacy and post independence bargains fuel present inequalities British colonial settlement in some parts of Kenya had two distinct outcomes. First it resulted in disproportionate infrastructural development in areas that were inhabited by the settlers. These areas tended to have better access to education, roads, water and sanitation, as well as potential

Kenya Studies Review for commerce. Additionally, colonial settlement in these areas led to the emergence of a class society based on access to land. In the process, three main classes emerged: the European settler farmers, the middle class African farmers and the landless Africans. These two outcomes continue to shape not only horizontal inequalities in land ownership, but also other socioeconomic and political inequalities in the country. In this sense much of the imbalances in the years immediately after independence and subsequent years are attributable to inherited conditions. Both colonial settlement and government policy on land have sustained initial horizontal inequalities sometimes with grave consequences. Additionally, these actions have also created an imbalance in land ownership-thus making landlessness a politically salient issue that can be used to rally constituents for violent action. It is no wonder that Rift Valley has always been the scene of violent clashed during election time. The need for fertile and temperate conditions for livestock and dairy farming precipitated the expropriation of land in Central Kenya and the Rift Valley provinces by settler farmers. In 1902 the colonial government set aside 3.1 million acres for this purpose (Kariuki 2004). Because of its restriction on subdivision of land, a landless class emerged alongside successful African farmers in the Native Reserves and the European farmers in the White Highlands. Post independence African elite not only replaced the European settler farming class, but also kept intact existing inequalities in land distribution and ownership. Remedial measures such as the Million Acres Scheme that was initiated by the government to remedy landlessness only worsened the situation. Through this scheme the government settled thousands of families, mostly from Central province, in the Rift Valley. Subsequent population growth and infrastructural development during the Moi presidency created land pressure. More importantly, because of their newly acquired political power following the consolidation of Moi rule, native Rift Valley communities were more educated, lived longer and became more assertive over land rights. Areas that were traditionally occupied by British settlers were more developed than the rest of the country. Thus, at independence, Central province had better access to education, health services, and transportation infrastructure. It therefore followed that Central province produced the bulk of the national bureaucracy at independence. Subsequent horizontal inequalities were based on these initial advantages not only in access to services but also in the representation in the public and private sector. These regional imbalances became critical in shaping subsequent inequalities, and have not been addressed by post independence governments. Not only did they shape access to education, they also determined access to loan facilities, and ultimately to the differences in per capita earnings in the respective administrative regions. These imbalances persist to date, and are the basis of subsequent inequalities in both political and socio-economic realms. More importantly, they created a legacy of ethno-regional rivalries and grievances that continue to influence politics in Kenya. iv. Historical grievances, Inequality and Exclusion in Kenya Political rivalry and ethno-regional animosity is the result of perceived historical grievances. These rivalries, to a large extent, are also responsible for existing horizontal inequalities. Accusations of betrayal by the political elite across communities underpin greater inter-ethnic distrust in addition to hardening the positions of the political elite. Thus political opposition to an incumbent is based on diverse ethno-regional and political interests with the immediate objective of supplanting the ancien political elite. The fallout between President Jomo Kenyatta and VicePresident Oginga Odinga in1966, the assassination of prominent Luo politician Tom Mboya (in
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1969) and the banning of Odingas KPU and his detention (in 1969) consigned Nyanza province into a conflict with the Kenyatta regime ( Atieno- Odhiambo 2004). Similar ideological disagreements during the Moi and Kibaki regimes likewise led to the blacklisting of Nyanza province both in access to capital development and also in terms of appointments to public positions. The Kenyatta-Odinga hostility has continued to inform the political mistrust between the Nyanza provinces (Luo) and the Central province (Kikuyu). To be sure, Central province was neglected under the Moi regime after military officers from Central and Nyanza provinces were implicated in the failed coup of 1982. Subsequent Luo- Kikuyu political agitation against the Moi regime during that decade hardened the Rift Valley province (Kalenjin) distaste for these two provinces. The exclusion of the Rift Valley elite from senior government positions after Mois retirement is mostly attributable to these grievances. The underlying cause of these disagreements was traditional rivalries over historical grievances. Ethnic articulation of political grievances is however not a recent phenomenon in Kenyan politics. The war for land rights against British colonialists by communities in Central province notably the Kikuyu remains, to date, the most vicious expression of ethnic grievances against a ruling elite in Kenya. But the first ethno-political conflict after independence occurred in what was then called the Northern Frontier District (NFD), and present day North Eastern province. The dominant Somali community in Northern Kenyan preferred to be part of Somalia, and not Kenya, and so when the colonial government opted to have the new Kenyan state deal with this issue, the Somali community initiated an irredentist war against the Kenyan state. Successive regimes have responded to historical grievances arising from this conflict only casually. They have co-opted members of the Somali community into the Civil Service, military and the political bureaucracy without confronting the key grievances of the community. Because of this conflict or even despite it, the Northern districts remains among the most impoverished and the least represented in Kenyas state bureaucracy. With a poverty index of 65 percent, it is one of the poorest provinces in the country, and records the worst in all measures of socioeconomic wellbeing. The failure to address the political grievances of this community continues to haunt successive governments in various ways, and may be a fissure for the next major violent conflict. Conclusion In conclusion, a few issues emerge from our understanding of socio-economic and horizontal inequalities in general, and with particular reference to post- election violence in Kenya. At the institutional level the post election violence demonstrated the importance of oversight even where institutions of governance such as credible electoral commissions exist. Before the elections the electoral commission was generally considered independent, but it succumbed to external pressure, and in the process lost its credibility as an arbiter of the electoral process. Second, state capture by political elite may not only exacerbate existing horizontal inequality, but also heightens the perception of a politically motivated horizontal inequality. The perceived arrogance of the ruling political elite in defense of a flawed election may have fuelled perceptions of ethnic superiority and subsequent violence against the Kikuyu in all parts of the country. Third, where there is a lack of clear state response to citizen demand for redress of historical grievances, including horizontal inequality, the mere fact of peaceful coexistence must not be construed for tolerance. Finally, perceptions of horizontal inequality are organic, and where rampant may affect confidence in other important state institutions such as the judiciary. Citizens then resort to extra judicial means for resolving political conflict. Governance

Kenya Studies Review institutions must be driven by a non- partisan, non-political ethos that embodies the national identity of the country and not parochial interests. Institutions such as the judiciary, electoral commission, as well as other quasi- statutory bodies such as political parties must be delinked from ethno-regional influence. Such institutions must not only be strengthened to survive political pressure, but also be required under the law to display a national character. Political parties must endeavor to cultivate a national character not only in recruitment but also during campaigns. The state must move in to deliberately encourage and manage the political reform agenda with a view to reconstituting afresh the national governance arena, as well as the redefining the nature of the Kenyan state. An important starting point must be a recognition that ethnicity remains the most pernicious challenge to the reduction of horizontal inequalities in Kenya. Because ethnic communities are enduring, specific governance measures to reduce regional allegiance must be anchored in a governance framework driven by diversity. Initial steps may include bold measures to facilitate not only the equitable distribution of public service opportunities, but also efforts to redress perceived regional inequalities in the provision of these opportunities. Such measures might include affirmative action programs to target specific regions, quota systems to improve group representation in public sector employment as well as specific measures to improve diversity in the Civil Service. Consequently, there should be a deliberate national program of inclusiveness not only in political rhetoric but also in the practice of governance. Appointments to public positions as well as allocation of resources to regions should be based on objective criteria that take into account the diversity and the needs of specific regions. A first step would be an acknowledgement of ethno-regional sensitivities and the need for ethnic balancing in public appointments. The recent publishing of The National Ethnic and Race Relations Commission Bill, 2008 is a step in the right direction. The political impasse at the end of the general elections in Kenya was only a public demonstration of private ethnic anxiety over access to power. At the core of this conflict were the anticipated advantages that political power confers on the ethnic community. An ethnic community with access to power tends to benefit more, hence the intense competition for the presidency. Long term resolution of these competing ethno-political interest demands a clear appreciation of the magnitude of historical grievances and their residual effect on contemporary political conflict. It is envisaged that the recently creation of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in 2009, will provide a framework for addressing some of these historical grievances. More importantly, reforms that would devolve power from the presidency to other levels such as parliament are necessary. The recent creation of the office of the PrimeMinister is an important first step. Similar bold measures are necessary, for instance, to improve parliamentary effectiveness in functioning as an oversight institution. Other important measures such as the strengthening of the Local Authorities through aggressive professionalization and expansion of their mandate would not only bring public service closer to the citizens, but also create alternative points of accountability separate from the executive. The provinces in which violence was most evident also happen to be the ones with the most grievances. Historical animosities of inequalities in land distribution and access to land was foremost in Rift Valley. In Nyanza and Western provinces, political grievances over access to power and the historical neglect of these areas fuelled much of the animosity that found expression in the post election violence. The National Accord and Reconciliation Act is an important step in reducing executive power, it must however be expanded to include parliamentary involvement in executive exercise
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of power. Parliament must be recognized as a co-equal arm of the government with the executive- and must be consulted. Strengthening oversight power and committee system will help check the President and Prime-Minister in addition to strengthening parliament to ensure equity. Legislative amendments might be necessary to allow parliamentary committees to summon executives of statutory bodies and other government departments. This might be useful in examining employment practices as well as resource allocation countrywide. Such oversight roles should also be expanded to include vetting of presidential nominees for key public service appointments in the judiciary, electoral commission, diplomacy, and the military and to other quasi- state institutions. While the introduction of both CDF and other funds is an important step, it is important to refocus it to reducing socio-economic horizontal inequalities, improving its management capacity, and making it truly citizen driven. The fact that some areas in the country experience initial inequality suggests the need for individual attention to these regions. The CDF and other funds could be further strengthened through a preferential formula that would ensure transfer of more funds for targeted public service programs such as water, health and education. For example, in the wake of the recent conflict the government established many police stations across the Rift Valley province- a similar big bang approach could be applied in the provision public service utilities and health services to region that have traditionally lagged behind in access to these resources. Finally, youth remains the most critical political constituency in the country today. Whether by sheer number or the level of political involvement, they can only be ignored with grave ramifications for national stability and economic growth. The youth are easily excitable, and remain the most impoverished demographic in the country. For this reason, they are more likely to be extreme in their response to perceive state inattention to their grievances. Consequently, as the government moves to institute strategies to address inequalities in the country, there is need to particularly focus on measures to include the youth not only in government policy documents but also in actual resource allocation and representation in visible public positions. This might include the expansion of the innovative Youth Fund as well as other opportunities from both the private and public sector. References Afrobarometer Survey Round III. 2005. Available on the web: www. Afrobarometer.org. Alwy, A and Susanne Schech. 2004. Education and Inequalities in Kenya,International Education Journal, 5, 2: 266-274. Amutabi, M.2003. Political Interference in the running of education in post-independence Kenya: a critical retrospection, International Journal of Educational Development, 23:.127-144 Bangura, Y (ed.) 2006. Ethnic Inequalities and Public Sector Governance. New York: UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD). Barkan, J., Zhou, Y. and Ladipo A. 2004. Emerging Legislatures: Institutions of Horizontal Accountability, In Levy and Kpundeh. 2004: 211-256. Branch, D. and Cheeseman, N. 2008. Democratization, Sequencing and State Failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya, African Affairs, 108, 430:=1-26. Brockerhoff, M. and Hewitt, P. 1998. Ethnicity and Child Mortality in Sub- Saharan African. New York: Population Council. Cheesman, N. 2008. The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction, Journal of East African Studies, 2, 2: 166-184.

Kenya Studies Review Brown, G., Frances S. and Langer, A. 2007. The Implications of Horizontal Inequality for Aid. UNUWIDER, Research Paper, 51, Available on the Web: http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2007/en_GB/rp200751/. Accessed August 5, 2009. Crammer, C. 2003. Does Inequality cause conflict? Journal of International Development, 15, 2003, pp. 397-412. Fish, S. and Matthew Kroenig, 2008. Kenya's Real Problem (It's Not Ethnic),Washington Post Online, Wednesday, January 9, 2008. Available on the web: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/08/AR2008010803541.html. Gertzel, C. 1974. The politics of independent Kenya. London: Heinman Books Ltd. Githongo, J. 2005. Cover letter accompanying report of my findings on graft in the Kenya Government. Personal letter. Available on the web: http://secure.wikileaks.org/leak/Githongo_report.pdf Githogo, J. 2006. Inequality, Ethnicity and the Fight Against Corruption in Africa: A Kenyan Perspective, Economic Affairs, 26, 4: 19-23. Available on the web: http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118587852/PDFSTART. Accessed August 5, 2009. GoK. 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth Creation and Employment, Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development. GoK 2006. Kenya: Facts and Figures, Nairobi: Central Bureau of Statistics. Available on the web: http://www.knbs.go.ke/downloads/pdf/Kenyafacts2006.pdf Grab, J. and Jan Priebe. 2009. Low Malnutrition but High Mortality: Explaining the Paradox of the Lake Victoria Region, Unpublished conference paper. Available on the web: https://editorialexpress.com/cgi bin/conference/download.cgi?db_name=ESAM09&paper_id=59 International Crisis Group (ICG), 2008. Kenya In Crisis, Africa Report, no.137. Brussels: ICG. Available on the web: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?action=login&ref_id=5316 Haugeraud, A. 1995. The Culture of Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press. ILO. 1972. Employment Income and Inequality: A Strategy for Increasing Productive Employment in Kenya. Geneva: ILO. Kanyinga, K.2004. Governance, Inequality and Public Sector in Kenya. In Society for International Development (SID), 2006: 345-397. Kanyinga, K. 2006. Ethnicity, Inequality and Public Sector Governance in Kenya. In Bangura, 2006: 261-281. Kariuki, S. 2004. Can Negotiated Land Reforms Deliver? A case of Kenyas South Africas, and Zimbabwes Land Reform Policy Debates. ASC Working Papers No. 59. Available online: http://www.ascleiden.nl/Pdf/workingpaper59.pdf. Accessed on April 25, 2008. Klugman, J. 1999. Conflict and Growth in Africa: Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda Paris: OECD. Langer, A. Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Group Mobilization in Cote dIvoire.Oxford Development Studies, 33, 1, 25-45. Leo, C. 1981. Who Benefited from the Million-Acre Scheme? Toward a Class Analysis of Kenyas Transition to Independence. Canadian Journal of African Studies, 15, 2: 201-222. Leo, C. 1984. Land and Class in Kenya. Toronto: Toronto University Press Levy, B. and Kpundeh, S.J. 2004. Building State Capacity In Africa. Washington DC: World Bank. Lynch, G. Negotiating Ethnicity: Identity politics in contemporary Kenya, Review of African Political Economy 33, 107: 49-65.
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Miguel, E. 2004. Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania, World Politics 56, 327:362. Muhula, R. 2007. Youth and Politics in Kenya: Promise or Peril? Africa Insight, 37, 3: 362375. Murunga, G. 2004. The State, Its Reform and the Question of Legitimacy in Kenya, Identity, Culture and Politics, 5 (1&2), pp. 179-206. Murunga, G. and Nasongo, S. 2006. Bent on Self- Destruction: The Kibaki Regime in Kenya, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 24, 1, pp. 1-28. Murunga, G. and Nasongo, S. 2007. Kenya: The Struggle for Democracy, London: Zed Books. Mwangi, K. 2006. Power to Uhuru: Youth Identity and Generational Politics in Kenyas 2002 elections, African Affairs, 418: 51-75 Mwangola, M. 2007. Leaders of Tomorrow? The Youth and Democratization in Kenya, in Murunga and Nasongo, 2007:129-163. Nasong'o, S. 2000. Resource Allocation and the Crisis of Ethnic Conflict in Africa: Beyond the Inter-ethnic Hatred Thesis. Okoth and Ogot, 2000: Ndegwa, S. Citizenship and ethnicity: An examination of two transition moments in Kenyan politics, American Political Science Review 91, 3:599-616. Nellis, J. 1974. The Ethnic Composition of Leading Kenyan Government Positions. Research Report No. 24, Uppsala: The Scandinavian Institute for African Studies. Nyanjom, O. 2006. Inequality in Kenya's Health Sector," In Society for international development, 2006: 97- 156. Odhiambo- Atieno, E.S. 2002. Hegemonic Enterprises and Instrumentalities of Survival: Ethinicity and Democracy in Kenya, African Studies, 61 (2), 223-249. Okoth, P.G. and Ogot B.A. (eds.) 2000. Conflict in Contemporary Africa. Nairobi: Jomo Kenyatta Foundation. Omolo, K.A. 2002. "Political Ethnicity and the Democratization Process in Kenya," African Studies, 61, 2, pp.202-22. Osamba, J. 2001. Violence and Dynamics of Transition: State, Ethnicity, and Governance in Kenya, Africa Development, XXVI, 1&2, Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 37-54. Otieno, J. 2007. Raila is the Youths Favourite Candidate Daily Nation, October 8, 2007. Available on the web: http://allafrica.com/stories/200710080016.html. Accessed August 4, 2009. Oyugi, W.2000. Politicized Ethnic Conflict in Kenya: A Periodic Phenomenon. Addis Ababa (Processed). Rothchild, D. 1969. Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya, Journal of Modern African Studies, 7, 4: 689-711. Sriskandarajah., D. 2005. Development, Inequality and Ethnic Accommodation: Clues from Malaysia, Mauritius and Trinidad and Tobago. Oxford Development Studies, 33, 1, pp. 63-79. Society for International Development (SID).2004. Pulling Apart: Facts and Figures on Inequality in Kenya. Nairobi: SID. Society for International Development (SID). 2007. Readings On Inequality in Kenya, vol.1, Society for international development. Nairobi: SID. Stewart, F. 2000. Crisis Prevention: Tackling Horizontal Inequalities, Oxford Development Studies, 28, 3:245-262. Stewart, F. 2002. Horizontal Inequalities: A neglected dimension of development, QEH Working Paper Series, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security

Kenya Studies Review and Ethnicity (CRISE) Oxford: CRISE. Available on the web: http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/pubs/workingpaper1.pdf Whitaker, B.E. and Jason Giersch. 2009. Voting on a constitution: Implications for democracy in Kenya, Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27, 1, 1-20. Widener, J.A. 1992. The Rise of a Party- State in Kenya: From harambee to nyayo. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yieke, F. 2007. The Discursive Construction of Ethnicity: The Case of the 2007 General Election, Dakar: CODESRIA. Available on the web: http://www.codesria.org/Links/conferences/general_assembly12/papers/felicia_yieke.pdf. Accessed August 4, 2009.

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Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery By Kefa M. Otiso*

Abstract Kenya is a target of global terrorism because of a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and sociocultural factors. The direct causes of terrorist attacks in Kenya are (1) its close ties with Israel and western countries, especially the US, (2) its vibrant coastal beach tourism industry that threatens local Islamic culture and, (3) the perception that the countrys predominantly Christian population is an obstacle to the Islamization of Eastern Africa. Factors that facilitate terrorist attacks in Kenya include the countrys (1) coastal geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighboring African countries, (2) porous borders due to poor policing, (3) politically unstable neighboring countries like Somalia and Sudan, (4) a relatively open and multicultural society, (5) relatively good transport and communications infrastructure and advanced regional economy, (6) relatively large Muslim population and, (7) the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the coastal population relative to the rest of the country. Terrorism in Kenya has (1) cost the country the loss of workers and family members, (2) led to a flare-up of tension between Christians and Muslims, (3) undermined the countrys economy especially tourism and, (4) led to the erosion of citizens rights and the countrys sovereignty. Besides tightening security, Kenya is coping with the terrorist threat by developing anti-terrorism legislation and by spearheading efforts to resolve the Somali and Sudan political crises. The paper concludes that as long as the factors that cause and facilitate terrorism remain unchanged, Kenya will probably continue to deal with terrorist attacks. Keywords: Terrorism, Kenya, September 11, Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, US Embassy bombings *Kefa M. Otiso (Ph.D) teaches geography at Bowling Green State University.

Citation Format Otiso, Kefa (2009). Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 107-132.

Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction Kenya is one of only two Sub-Saharan African countries (the other being Tanzania) to be directly targeted by the current wave of global terrorism i.e., the global use of violence to achieve certain objectives. In 1998, Kenya, along with Tanzania, suffered terrorist attacks that collectively killed over 250 people and injured nearly 5,000 others, mostly Kenyans (Muendo 2003). Then in 2002, another terrorist attack in Kenya killed 13 people and injured 80 (Daily Nation, November 29, 2002). This unfavorable distinction is due to a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and sociocultural factors. The purpose of this paper is to (1) explore how global terrorism has manifested itself in Kenya, (2) outline the reasons why the country is a terrorist target, (3) examine the effects of terrorism on the country, (4) evaluate the steps that are being taken to control this phenomenon and, (5) attempt to outline the future of the countrys terrorism challenge. But first is a short definition of terrorism, followed by an outline of the types and waves of terrorism, as well as the characteristics and causes of terrorism. Definition, Types, Waves, Characteristics and Causes of Terrorism Terrorism is a notoriously difficult concept to define because of its many forms, objectives, ambiguity, contextual fluidity, and the multiplicity of perpetrators. In a generic sense, terrorism, unlike random acts of violence, is the premeditated use of violence to achieve certain objectives. Essentially, terrorism is intimidation through violence (Mathewson and Steinberg, 2003:59). Terrorism can also be defined from a legal, moral and behavioral standpoint (Ruby 2002: 11-12). Legally, terrorism is a violation of established laws. Although this approach is popular with governments, it is scarcely universal given the wide variety of laws and governments around the world. From a moral standpoint, terrorist acts are morally unjustifiable. But since morally unjustifiable acts can vary from individual to individual, it is not surprising that terrorists and their victims have a different view of terrorist attacks. The behavioral approach is more unifying since it defines terrorism purely by the behaviors involved, regardless of the laws or morality of those doing the [definition] (ibid.). Because the approach permits a reliable operational definition of terrorism regardless of who measures it (ibid.), it is preferred by many societies although some behaviorally defined terrorism acts may be morally and legally justified. This conundrum is most evident in the use of terrorism by states and in liberation struggles (Sorel 2003:367). There are four major types of terrorism movements around the world: left-wing (leftist), right-wing (rightist), ethno-nationalist or separatist and, religious or sacred (Cronin 2002:39). Each of these terrorism types has a different style and mode of behavior that can provide insight into the likeliest manifestations of its violence and the most typical patterns of its development (ibid.). Currently, religious or sacred terrorism, e.g., that perpetrated by Al Qaeda, dominates the global stage although all four types of terrorism are capable of unspeakable brutality. Besides being currently dominant, religious terrorism can be especially dangerous because (1) its all-encompassing struggle of good versus evil can easily engulf all of humanity especially when it is essentialized into binaries such as The Faithful or True Followers versus Infidels or Apostates in Islam (Cronin 2002:39), (2) its perpetrators can unleash unpredictable terror at the command of deities unknown to non-adherents and without regard to any earthly concerns such as peoples feelings (ibid), (3) its perpetrators can act in complete disregard of existing social or secular values or laws and may in fact be interested in

Kenya Studies Review replacing such values (ibid) e.g., Al Qaedas Islamic extremists attempts to impose Sharia (Islamic) law in multi-religious or secular societies around the world (Sieff 2003: no pp), (4) its perpetrators may be motivated by grandiose apocalyptic visions and disconnect from or work to overthrow existing social order (Cronin 2002:39), (5) this form of terrorism can garner broad global appeal and support that can complicate measures to control it, not to mention that such measures may degenerate into full scale conflict, especially when viewed with apocalyptic eyes e.g., some Islamic clerics view US attempts to go after Osama bin Laden as a Christian crusade that calls for Jihad (ibid) and, (6) unlike ethno-nationalist or separatist terrorist movements, the objective of this type of terrorism is often not material gain. The four types of terrorism mentioned above have occurred in four mutually nonexclusive historic waves (Rapoport 2001). The first wave occurred during the breakup of world empires in the 17 through 19th centuries. The second wave was associated with decolonization in the mid-1900s, while the third wave pertains to Soviet inspired leftist antiWesternism in the 1950-1989 period. The fourth and current religious wave is primarily driven by the desire to overthrow western neocolonial and capitalist economic systems that are seen as corrupting influences on Islamic religion and societies and, to a smaller extent, by jealousy at the advancement of western capitalist countries relative to the socioeconomic stagnation of Islamic countries. A number of discernible modern terrorism characteristics/trends are critical to an understanding of this phenomenon. These include (1) the proliferation of the number of terrorist actors (Mathewson and Steinberg, 2003:59-60), (2) a declining trend in the overall number of terror attacks (Cronin 2002:42-44), (3) an increase in the lethality of attacks as terrorists resort to more deadly weapons as well as the unconventional use of everyday conveniences such as passenger planes, (4) the growing victimization of Americans by terror attacks, (5) the growing incidence of religiously motivated terrorism and, (6) the globalization of terrorism (ibid). The globalization of terrorism as well as a notable dispersal in the geography of terrorist acts (Cronin 2002:44) is most worrisome because a terrorist organization from one part of the world can launch attacks in another part of the globe thereby complicating the process of identifying terrorism perpetrators. In essence, whereas terrorism in the pre-1970s period had a local origin and target, global terrorism has dispersed attackers and victims at various geographic scales. The global reach of terrorism is made possible by the explosion of modern global transport, communications, and media (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004:43, Cronin 2002:37). Global terrorism is also made possible by the rise of terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda that are capable of operating at the global scale much like global transnational or multinational corporations with far-flung production and distribution facilities serving global consumers. And just as global corporations form synergies that enable them to operate at a global scale so do global terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda. The causes of terrorism are as varied as the motivations of the many types of terrorists that exist. Nevertheless, the key motivations of terrorism include ethnic conflict, political exclusion and the resultant insurrections, illicit drugs, environmental degradation (Silberfein, 2003:67-70), religious differences and socioeconomic exclusion or marginalization. Once started, insurrections and associated acts of terrorism can be sustained by (1) basing operations in relatively secure locales that are inaccessible to the state, (2) taking advantage of locally available resources such as minerals (e.g., in Sierra Leone) and illicit drugs (e.g., opium in Afghanistan), (3) creating a network that facilitates exchange of local resources for weapons and other basic amenities, and (4) availability of easily traversed borders and accessible ports that
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facilitate contact with the outside world (ibid.70). In the Middle East where much of the current wave of religious terrorism originates, most people are trapped in poverty and underdevelopment despite the regions oil wealth. Frustrations with the slow pace of social reforms in the region, coupled with poor governance and lack of social services, facilitates the proliferation of terrorist groups that purport to offer solutions to the poor living conditions (Cronin 2002:38). Because this broader enabling environment of bad governance, nonexistent social services, and poverty punctuates much of the developing world (ibid), anti-western terrorists have many sympathizers around the world. Moreover, Globalization, in forms including Westernization, secularization, democratization, consumerism, and the growth of market capitalism, represents an onslaught to less privileged people in conservative cultures repelled by the fundamental changes that these forces are bringing or angered by the distortions and uneven distributions of benefits that result. This is especially true of the Arab World (Cronin 2002:45-46). Because of the complex nature of the causes of terrorism, easy solutions to this challenge are nonexistent and any solution that is developed is bound to be controversial, just as disagreements exist in the very definition of terrorism. For instance, if terrorism is partly caused by unequal access to the benefits of the global economy (Cronin 2002:45-46), then solutions to terrorism would include spreading the benefits of globalization more evenly. Yet western economic powers appear unwilling to make the global economic system more inclusive (ibid). Thus, while there is an urgent requirement for solutions that deal both with the religious fanatics who are the terrorists and the far more politically motivated states, entities, and people who would support them because they feel powerless and left behind in a globalizing world (ibid:38), such solutions are rare because they require substantial sociopolitical and economic changes that current terrorist source regions are unwilling to carry out. As a result, terrorism is likely to continue occupying center stage in global affairs for a while to come. Nevertheless, if the conditions that give terrorism so much power are well managed, its impact can be minimized even though it is unlikely to be completely eliminated (ibid). Global Terrorism in Kenya Although Kenya has experienced all four major types of terrorism i.e., leftist, rightist, ethnonationalist, and religious (Cronin 2002:39) - the most devastating attacks have come from ethnonationalistic and religious terrorism. The manifestation of these dominant forms of terrorism in Kenya has a definite historical sequence. Ethnonationalistic terrorism was mostly experienced in Kenya towards the end of the countrys colonial rule in the 1950s when freedom movements such as Mau Mau used terror to hasten the countrys independence (Edgerton 1989). The terrorist events that took place in Kenya at that time perfectly exemplify the maxim: one mans terrorist is another mans freedom fighter (Sorel 2003:367). While the British sought to suppress the Mau Mau terrorists, natives oppressed by colonialism saw this ragtag army as freedom fighters and supported it, eventually culminating in the countrys freedom from British colonial rule. The success of this bloody ethnonationalistic movement lines up with Cronins (2002:40) characterization of such organizations as often being (1) astoundingly violent, (2) durable, (3) able to utilize traditional

Kenya Studies Review paramilitary structures and, (4) having strong support among the organizations founders coethnics. The current incidence of religious/sacred terrorism in Kenya is most bothersome because its perpetrators have no qualms about sacrificing civilians in the process of achieving their objectives. To this end, Al-Qaeda religious terrorist groups have subjected Kenya to devastating terrorist attacks in the last six years including (1) the August 7, 1998 bombing of the US Embassy in Nairobi which killed over 200 people (Maina, 2004) and injured thousands (Muendo 2003) and, (2) the November 28, 2002 suicide bombing of the Israeli-owned Paradise Tourist Hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, which killed 15 people and injured 80 others (Daily Nation, Friday, November 29, 2002). Simultaneously, there was an abortive attempt to blow up an Israeli passenger jet on take-off from Mombasa International Airport. But why is Kenya a target? Why Kenya is a Target of Global Terrorism Kenya is a good target of global terrorism because of a combination of geographic, regional, historical, political, economic and sociocultural factors. Some of these factors are direct justifications of attacks while others facilitate the attacks. Direct motivations of terrorism in Kenya include (1) the countrys close ties with Israel and western countries, especially the US, (2) its vibrant coastal beach tourism industry that is at odds with the locally dominant Islamic religion and culture and, (3) the perception that the countrys predominantly Christian population is an obstacle to the Islamization of Eastern Africa. Factors facilitating terrorist attacks in Kenya include the countrys (1) coastal geographic situation and strategic location relative to Europe, Asia, and neighboring African countries, (2) porous borders, (3) unstable neighboring countries, especially Somalia and Sudan, (4) relatively open and multicultural society, (5) relatively good transport and communications infrastructure, (6) relatively advanced regional economy, (7) relatively large Muslim population and, (8) the political and socioeconomic deprivation of the coastal population relative to the rest of the country. The following is a review of the specific contribution of these factors to Kenyas terrorist threat. Analysis of Direct Justifications of Terrorism in Kenya Historical Ties to the West, Israel and the Middle East Kenyas coastal region has centuries old trading relations with states in Southwest Asia and the West (Somerville 2002). Ties with the West began with the coming of the Portuguese in the late 1400s (Were and Wilson 1968) and were strengthened in the colonial and postcolonial period. Since independence the country has aligned itself with U.S., European, Israeli and other western capitalist interests. This geopolitical stance led to beneficial economic and technological aid flows that have advanced many aspects of the countrys development. The close relationship between Kenya and the West, together with an abundance of tourist attractions and the countrys pleasant tropical climate and alluring beaches, have made the country a major magnet for western tourists. Kenya also has a substantial presence of western interests, investments, installations, diplomatic corps, and the headquarters of international agencies such as the UN (Soke, 2003: no pp). Many western countries and corporations run their Sub-Saharan African operations from Nairobi because the countrys relatively well-developed infrastructure, financial system, and strong economy facilitate such endeavors. Moreover, the country has close military relationships
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with a host of western countries e.g., US, Britain, Germany, Italy, France and Israel (Somerville 2002, Harman 2002). Many of these western nations run de facto military bases in Kenya (Maina,2004). This the comparatively large Western presence in [Kenya] (Kelley 2003b: no pp) is the main attraction and target of anti-western terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Another geopolitical factor that contributes to terrorism in Kenya is its close ties to Israel (Maina, 2004, Harman 2002), a country that Muslims around the world dislike for its persecution of Palestinians. This relationship is a major irritation to foreign and native Muslims who have repeatedly but unsuccessfully been calling for the severance of the relationship (Ali 2003). One indication of the strength of this relationship is Kenyas June 1976 decision to offer Israel crucial logistical support in its raid on Entebbe Airport in order to free Israeli hostages held there by Palestinian hijackers allied to then Ugandan dictator Idi Amin (Kyemba 1977:56, 172; Harman 2002). This assistance was later avenged in the 1980 bombing of the Israeli owned Norfolk Hotel in Nairobi, killing 15 and wounding more than 80mostly [Kenyans] (Harman 2002: no pp). Another indication is Israels prompt dispatch of a strong contingent of an Israeli Defense Force rescue team to Nairobi during the 1998 terrorist attacks. The Israel team was the first to arrive from abroad. Given that one of Al Qaedas major grievances against the US is its support of Israel at the expense of Palestinians, it is not surprising that Kenyas long pro-Israel stance is viewed by Al Qaeda as evidence of Kenyas support of US policy in the Middle East. Whether right or wrong, this makes Kenya a bona fide Al-Qaeda target (Soke 2003). The local tourism industry Kenyas vibrant tourism industry has also contributed to the countrys vulnerability to terrorist attacks. Tourism, as it is practiced in the countrys coastal beaches, is at odds with the local Islamic culture and customs. For instance, Islam teaches that women should cover every part of the body except the eyes when in public and also forbids the consumption of alcohol. Yet in Kenyas coastal beach areas, women tourists walk around barely dressed and alcohol is freely served in the many bars that cater to tourists and non-Muslim Kenyans. Moreover, tourism has also contributed to the high incidence of prostitution and drug use in coastal Kenya. In addition, the tourism industry has not really benefited local people, especially Muslims, because of three reasons. First, many of the areas tourist facilities are owned by the government and upcountry or foreign investors [with slight] trickle-down effect (Eastman, 1995:176). Second, the facilities are oriented to Western tourists whereas most locals practice an Arabized Muslim lifestyle that is largely incompatible with the norms of Western style tourism (ibid). Lastly, many local Muslims, being schooled in Madrasas or Islamic schools and not in the countrys western-style educational system, lack the skills (e.g., English training) that could enable them to work in the countrys western-tourist dominated industry (Eastman, 1995:177). This disjunction between tourism and the dominant local culture have created low-key anti-tourism sentiment in the coastal regions of Kenya. Although some local Muslims have for years abhorred the role of tourism in degrading their culture and morals, the government has not ameliorated or shown enough sensitivity to this issue because its hands are tied given the many economic benefits of tourism (e.g., jobs and foreign exchange) to the local economy and country at large (Maclean 2003: no pp). Nevertheless, the anti-tourism sentiment among some of Kenyas coastal Muslim residents has made it easier for groups like Al-Qaeda to infiltrate the area in the guise of providing solutions to poverty and local Islamic cultural erosion. Moreover, in targeting Kenyas tourism facilities, Al Qaeda hopes to increase its chances of intimidating prospective tourists.

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Kenya in the larger Islam-Christianity contest for regional spiritual supremacy A less well-documented, but widely acknowledged reason (albeit anecdotally) for Kenyas terrorist attacks, is its prominent role in the larger Christianity - Islam contest for spiritual supremacy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Whereas most countries in the horn of Africa have large Muslim populations, Kenya stands out with its predominantly Christian population and relatively large economy (Potter 2003). This presents a major stumbling block to Muslims who desire to play a larger role in the regions affairs by, for instance, offering Sharia (Islamic) law as solution to the regions socioeconomic challenges (IPS 2004). With this in mind, the terrorist attacks, besides mainly targeting US and Israeli interests in Kenya, were designed to strengthen the hand of Muslims in the countrys national affairs, thereby aiding the cause of Islam in the country and region (Mbogo 2003). Review of Factors that Facilitate Terrorism in Kenya Kenyas geographic and strategic location Kenya occupies a geographically, regionally, and internationally strategic position (Figure 1) that has enabled the country to become a regional hub of international air, road, maritime, and communications traffic from Europe, Asia, and the rest of Africa. These links make it easy for would be foreign and local terrorists to travel to, from, and within the country, to communicate easily, and to launch terrorist attacks against Kenya (Soke 2003, Cronin 2002).

Porous national borders with many unstable neighbors Kenya shares long, remote, sparsely populated, and poorly protected borders with Tanzania, Uganda, Sudan, Somalia and Ethiopia (Figure 2). All of these neighboring countries, except Tanzania, have varying degrees of political instability that undermine their ability to provide for their peoples basic needs especially safety or protect their territorial integrity. Consequently,
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Kenya is home to refugees from surrounding countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia and Sudan. Many of them crisscross the countrys international borders at will. Moreover, Kenyas own limited financial and human resources undermine its ability to better police her borders hence the countrys inability to stop weapons smuggling and would be terrorists entry into the country (Figure 2, Soke 2003, Somerville 2002). But of all surrounding countries, Somalia is perhaps the most worrisome neighbor from a security standpoint. Besides sharing a 700-kilometer boundary that is hardly marked, this border area that largely consists of North Eastern Province has been a zone of conflict since the colonial period (Weiss 2004). As a result the government maintains a significant military presence in the area in order to deal with sporadic armed conflict and banditry (ibid). Moreover, since the early 1990s Somalia has been embroiled in a civil war that caused the collapse of the Somali state in 1995 resulting in the countrys control by warring clan factions. The clans conflicting interests have led to untold suffering and bloodshed, a litany of broken peace treaties, and have transformed the country into a haven of numerous extremist Islamic groups such as Al-Ittihad alIslami (Soke 2003) and Al-Qaeda (Somerville 2002). Al-Ittihad al-Islami and Al-Qaeda have both managed to infiltrate cross-border refugee traffic and some Somali refugee camps in Kenyas North Eastern Province and have made their way into Somali dominated neighborhoods in Nairobi and Mombasa (Soke 2003: no pp). From these convenient hideouts, these terror groups have been able to map their targets and mount terror attacks. Somalia is also a source of danger to Kenya because the [w]eapons used in [the Mombasa] attacks were smuggled into Kenya by sea from Somalia Some of the same components were used in the bombs that destroyed the hotel in Kikambala [Mombasa] and the U.S. embassy in Nairobi [in 1998] (Kelley 2003a: no pp). In sum, Somalia has become an Al-Qaeda (1) source of weaponry, (2) base of operation and attack, and (3) a convenient hideout for its attackers.

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Sudan is an equally troublesome neighbor because its Islamic government has in the past supported radical groups such as the National Islamic Front and Al-Qaeda. Actually, in the early 1990s, Osama bin Laden himself lived and managed a string of businesses in the Sudan before moving to Afghanistan and setting up Al Qaeda (Shahar 1998). Kenyas open multicultural society and lax security The long relations between Kenya and other parts of the world have also unwittingly endangered the country by creating a very diverse culture in cities such as Nairobi and Mombasa. Specifically: [t]he country's open, and friendly posture coupled with lax security and immigration laws make it easier for a would be terrorist to [enter and] blend easily. Indeed the chief mastermind of August 1998 bombing, one Odeh, was able to enter the country, acquire citizenship and Kenyan passport, marry from the local community, and go on to establish a fish business that is believed he used as a cover whilst planning the embassy bombing (Soke 2003: no pp). Moreover, poor security and high levels of corruption have compromised Kenyas security. In fact:

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In the previous Moi regime, corruption and inefficiency heavily undermined the ability of the government to provide security to its people. This was due to the fact that crucial services related to security such as the police, immigration and border security (customs) were commercialized to the extent that they became goldmines for the civil servants who worked in those departments. It became very easy to slip into the country and do whatever one wanted provided you had the money to pay bribes to relevant persons (Soke 2003: no pp). The local Muslim population Islam spread to the coast of East Africa shortly after its founding because Omani Arabs were already trading with the East African coast (Were and Wilson 1968). Since then, Islam has spread throughout East and Central Africa. In Kenya, Muslims now constitute between 6 and 10% of the countrys 31 million people (Potter 2003, Mulama 2003), a much smaller proportion than that of surrounding countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, and Tanzania. Most Kenyan Muslims live in the Coast and Northeastern Provinces and in major upcountry urban areas such as Nairobi while most Christians live in the central and western parts of the country. However, because of the dominance of Christianity in Kenya, the relatively small proportion of Christians who live in the Coast Province, outnumber Muslims. Because Kenyan Muslims are generally less fundamentalist (Potter 2003) compared to their brethren elsewhere Muslim-Christian relations in the country have been generally cordial. Although the Kenyan Muslim population is relatively small, it is large enough to have unwittingly facilitated terrorist attacks by Muslim extremist groups such as Al-Qaeda. This is because the local Muslim population made it possible for terrorists to slip into the country unnoticed, blend in, plan, fundraise or set up cover businesses, and carry out their attacks (Soke 2003, Kelley 2003a). It also makes it easy for terrorists to slip out after the attacks. For instance, the accomplices of the Mombasa Hotel suicide bombers vanished into the local Muslim population before fleeing to Somalia two days later (Kelley 2003a). Moreover, the perpetrators knew that investigations into their crime would be complicated by the presence of a relatively large local Muslim population because any arrest and interrogation of local Muslim suspects could be easily interpreted as Muslim persecution by the countrys Christian dominated government (Potter 2003, Chemchemi ya Ukweli 2000?). Economic and political disenfranchisement of local coastal population Kenyas coastal population has been marginalized politically and socio-economically since the colonial days creating an enabling environment of nonexistent social services and poverty (Cronin 2002:38) that facilitates terrorism (but does not necessarily cause it) by creating sympathy for terrorist causes in the local population. The spatially unequal development process initiated by the colonial government has been accentuated by independent governments with most of the investment resources being concentrated in the Central and Rift Valley provinces that have the bulk of the countrys socioeconomic and political elite (Eastman, 1995; Foeken, Hoorweg and Obudho, 2000:7). As a result, the coastal region of Kenya remains comparatively underdeveloped relative to the Rift Valley and Central Province core area. Besides unfavorable colonial and postcolonial government policies, the coast region of Kenya lags behind other provinces in development because (1) it is an ecologically low potential region with few fresh water sources, (2) it has since the colonial era lacked sufficient agricultural extension services, (3) it has a shortage of agricultural labor owing to its sparse population

Kenya Studies Review (Meilink 2000), (4) of insecurity especially in areas outside of the main towns of Mombasa, Malindi and Lamu and, (5) the high incidence of landlessness especially among locals (Kanyinga 1998). The regions landlessness is partly attributable to hyperinflation of land costs due to the growth of beach tourism in the area. Meilink (2000:24) has aptly described the current socioeconomic situation of the Coast region: Reviewingbasic household welfare indicators such as child nutrition, child mortality, educational participation, and access to safe water, leads to the conclusion that Coast Province indeed finds itself in a disadvantaged position vis-vis the other provinces. It has the highest percentage of stunted children, a high child mortality rate and the lowest educational enrolment rates, while in terms of supply of safe water, households at the Coast are also worse off.

The Effects of Global Terrorism in Kenya The two terrorist attacks on Kenya in 1998 and 2002 have had many negative economic, social, political and geopolitical effects on the country. These effects include the decline of the countrys tourism industry and the attendant loss of jobs and foreign exchange, growing tension between Muslims and Christians, radicalization of the countrys Muslims, rising anti-western sentiments in the Muslim and general population, the passage of unpopular anti-terrorist measures that threaten Kenyans human, civil and political rights besides eroding the countrys sovereignty, and rising tension between Kenya and the West. These effects are discussed below. Economic effects Though widespread, the economic effects of Kenyas terrorist attacks are most noticeable in the tourism sector. The sector that represents 15% of foreign exchange earnings and 12% of GDP, constitutes an eighth of the economy (Soke 2003: no pp) and employs some 500,000 people (Maclean 2003: no pp) suffered a major slump after the terrorist attacks due to lower tourist flows from key European markets and the attendant trip cancellations and drop in hotel bookings. Thus while the country received over 1 million tourists in 1997, the attacks scared away many tourists causing a 25% decline in the number of tourists in 1998 (Kenya 2002:186). In the 1999-2000 period the number of tourist arrivals rose slowly before further declines occurred following the September 2001 attacks in the US and the second terrorist attack in Kenya in 2002 (ibid). The drop in the number of tourists to Kenya inevitably resulted in the decline of hotel bookings and occupancy (Table 1). In mid-2003, [h]otel occupancy, normally [at] about 40 to 45 per cent at [that] time of the year slumped to an average of about 20 to 30 per cent in the shoreline tourist hotels (Maclean 2003: no pp) resulting in a substantial drop in tourism sector earnings and jobs. In mid-2003, the government estimated that Kenya [was] losing $14 million (about Sh1 billion) a week in tourism earnings and tax revenues due to the [untimely] US and British warnings of a looming terrorist attack [in Kenya] (Kelley 2003b, Figure 3). Moreover, slump in the tourism sector increased the size of the governments budget deficit and a worsened the countrys balance of trade since tourism is a major source of foreign currency. To cushion herself against these massive losses, the country sought $400 million (Sh30 billion) worth of "emergency" assistance from the US in [that year] (Kelley 2003b).
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Table 1: Hotel bed-nights by zone, 1997-2001 (000) Zone 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001* Coastal-Beach 3,074.4 1,505.3 1,625.2 2,065.2 1,872.5 71.5 109.1 73.9 85.8 137.9 -Other Coast Hinterland 59.0 43.9 48.7 76.3 56.5 Nairobi-high Class 801.5 655.6 685.5 836.1 681.3 311.8 178.0 173.2 167.2 138.2 -Other Central 218.1 92.9 77.5 145.7 83.1 Masailand 215.0 85.2 84.3 141.5 138.3 Nyanza Basin 88.2 110.8 110.1 87.3 107.1 Western 64.3 27.3 69.2 72.4 98.8 Northern 6.5 4.9 3.4 10.3 41.2 TOTAL-OCCUPIED 4,910.3 2,813.0 2,951.0 3,687.8 3,354.9 TOTAL AVAILABLE 9,516.6 7,975.7 8,711.4 9,382.3 8,327.8 *Provisional; Table source: Kenya, Republic of (2002), Economic Survey 2002, Prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Nairobi: Government Printer, pp. 191

Beyond tourism, the attacks cost the country unknown sums of money in security costs and lost economic production. These costs came at a time when the country could least afford them having gone through economic contraction for much of the 1990s. The economic contraction was precipitated by economic and political mismanagement under the Moi administration, World Bank-IMF Structural Adjustment Programs, and a serious shortage of credit occasioned by foreign donors withholding of funds due to dissatisfaction with the countrys political and economic management.

Kenya Studies Review Figure 3: Effect of Travel Advisories on Kenyas Tourism Industry

Source: Editorial Cartoon, Sunday Standard, December 21, 2003

Sociopolitical effects The terror attacks have also produced profound sociopolitical effects in Kenya including (1) the loss and disruption of lives, (2) growing tension between Muslims and Christians, (3) birth of a nascent Anti-Arab/Muslim rightwing movement, (4) radicalization of the countrys Muslims, (5) harassment of Kenyans by the security forces, (6) further erosion of the countrys sovereignty and, (7) rising anti-western sentiments. These effects are briefly examined below. Loss and disruption of lives Collectively, the 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks in Kenya killed 228 people and injured 4,080 others, mostly Kenyans. Many of these victims were in the prime of their life and were, therefore, the breadwinners of untold numbers of people (Muendo 2003). In short, the country lost many workers, husbands, wives, and friends besides being saddled with the cost of taking care of the injured, maimed and orphaned. The following excerpts summarizes the human cost of the terrorist attacks: Pendo Mashas expression tightens and her eyes fill with tears at the mention of her dead mother, a dancer torn apart in a suicide bombing as she welcomed Israeli tourists to Kenya. Barefoot amid the palm trees of this coastal village, the eight-year-old child stiffens at the thought of the strangers who came and blew themselves up nine months ago, also killing at least 13 other people including her mother Kafedha.
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Like most others in this huddle of huts, Pendo does not know why the bombing happened and has not heard of Osama bin Laden, whose Al Qaeda group claimed responsibility for the attack on the nearby Paradise Hotel. What she does know is that her life of hardship became even tougher without the 600 shillings ($8) a week Kafedha earned performing the traditional welcoming dance of her Giriama community for tourists (Maclean 2003: no pp). Bread winners were killed and others lost their ability to provide for their families and this is what we want the Kenyan and US governments to realize, we need support to gather our messed lives (Muendo 2003: no pp)

Growing tension between Muslims and Christians Kenya has enjoyed relative Muslim-Christian religious harmony for much of its history because the countrys secular constitution guarantees freedom of religion and accords equal protection to adherents of the countrys diverse religions (Mulama 2004). Nevertheless, the Christian majority dominates most aspects of the countrys social, political and, to a lesser extent, economic life. But after the 1998 terrorist attacks by purported Islamic extremists, relations between the two groups began to sour (Kelley 1999, Potter 2003) with many Christians blaming local Muslims for abetting the attacks (Mwaura 2004). For Muslims, these accusations add insult to injury because many of them believe that they are disadvantaged in their access to jobs and other socioeconomic opportunities (ibid). Whether rightly or wrongly, Muslim perception that they are under siege is beginning to radicalize them resulting in their increasing demand for a federal system of government that could make it easier for them to introduce Sharia (Islamic) law in their regions as they have done in Northern Nigeria (Mulama 2004). Actually, Islamic law is already in use in limited cases in predominantly Muslim areas of Kenya such as Northeastern Province (Weiss 2004: 67). This radicalization was also evident in the countrys recent constitutional review process. Because the exercise was conducted after the terrorist attacks that inevitably complicated life for Kenyan Muslims, they, like other social groups, sought to have beneficial articles, e.g., extension of Kadhis (Islamic) courts to the national level, included in the new draft constitution (Mulama 2004, National Constitutional Conference 2004). But because of the relatively tense relations between Muslims and Christians since the 1998 terror attacks, the latter opposed such provisions arguing that they make: Islam the only faith explicitly mentioned in the draft, and that the provision for Muslim courts gives Islam precedence over other religions [when] [n]o faith should be seen to be superior (to) the other (ibid: 2004: no pp). When Christian objections to the Kadhis courts were overruled largely because these courts have existed since the colonial era, one Christian leader argued: This has created (a) way for the country to be ruled by Islam. What is it that will

Kenya Studies Review prevent (the) northern, north-eastern and coastal provinces from taking advantage of Muslim law to hurt their Christian brothers? If the government yields to this, it is selling this country into chaos and I'm not ashamed to say they will take blame for the bloodshed Kenya risk[s] going the way of Nigeria and Sudan (ibid: 2004: no pp). This religious rivalry, if unchecked, could spiral downwards into civil war and anarchy as has happened in Sudan following the imposition of Sharia law by General Mohamad Numeiry in the 1980s (Mulama 2003). Muslims have also increased demands for parity in their access to national socioeconomic resources and for a federal or majimbo system of government that could guarantee the coast region greater autonomy (Kagwanja and Mutunga 2001). The demand for the creation of a national university at the coast region is also high on the Muslim agenda because [t]he expansive Coast Province has neither a full-fledged university nor a constituent college of any of the countrys six State universities (East African Standard, Wednesday, March 3, 2004). Birth of a nascent Anti-Arab/Muslim rightwing movement The terrorist attacks have also created room for racist and xenophobic anti-Arab and anti-Islam views or islamophobia to begin to be more openly expressed and tolerated in Kenya (Mwaura 2004). Xenophobic rhetoric, which first surfaced in the mid-1900s at the height of the countrys freedom struggle, is also informed by many indigenous Kenyans resentment of the prominent role that foreigners and non-indigenous Kenyans, especially Asians, play in the countrys economy. While much of this native Kenyan xenophobia has traditionally been mostly directed at Asian Kenyans, who acted as minority middlemen in colonial economy in the first-half on the 20th century (Gwyn 1977:114), there has been long running but muted anti-Arab sentiment among local black Kenyans especially in the coast region where most Arab Kenyan businesses are located1. Besides, tarnishing the local image of Islam (Mwaura 2004), the terrorist attacks rekindled the muted anti-Arab/anti-Muslim sentiment and also elevated it in the public consciousness as the following excerpt demonstrates:
A Kenyan man stands outside the office of a Middle East airline company, gesticulating wildly and complaining loudly about "Arabs" ruining his country as three building guards gather around him. "We deserve to have our countries back -- Morocco, Somalia. Who are these Arabs anyway?" the man asks, jabbing his finger in the direction of two men in long, white robes standing in the airline company's doorway. The men ignore him, but others in the building lobby stare curiously. It's not as unusual outburst in Kenya these says [days]. (Potter 2003: no pp).

The War on Terrorism: A threat to citizens rights and Kenyas sovereignty? As in other countries such as the US, the war on terrorism has become a major threat to human, civil and political rights in Kenya as the security forces have acquired unprecedented powers and tools to combat terrorism. Since the attacks, Kenyas security forces have been
1

Even among Kenyan Muslims, there is a distinct racial separation between the fairer skinned Arabs and their indigenous black brethren.
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accused of using heavy-handed interrogation tactics on terrorist detainees and body searches are becoming more common especially on routes to airports (Maclean 2003). Although there have been some protests against the new security measures, they have not been sustained enough to produce change. Most Kenyans appear tacitly supportive of the measures unaware that they could be victimized by them. Many have subconsciously mortgaged liberty for security. But perhaps the most worrying new tool in the countrys anti-terrorism war is the draft Suppression of Terrorism Bill that was published on April 30th, 2003. Besides defining terrorism and terrorist organizations, the bill, among other things, (1) seeks to criminalize unlawful weapons training, the leading of terrorist organizations, possession of articles of terrorism, being a member of or supporting a terrorist organization (Kenya 2003), (2) confers extra powers on police and spells out cooperative procedures to enable Kenya to work with other countries to combat terrorism, (3) provides punishment, and or life imprisonment for anyone convicted of terrorism and, (4) allows for the seizure of property acquired through terrorism (Wabala and Wandera, 2003: no pp). However, the bill is unpopular because (1) it is widely believed to have been foisted on Kenya by the U.S. and British governments (Potter 2003: no pp) thereby undermining homegrown responses to terrorism (Thuku, Agutu, Mugonyi and KNA, 2003; Otieno, 2003), (2) it appears to target certain groups of Kenyans, especially Muslims (Otieno, 2003) and is perceived to be divisive because it pits Christian supporters against its Muslim opponents (ibid.), (3) it is seen as being draconian and oppressive (Thuku, Agutu, Mugonyi and KNA, 2003) because it contains no remedy for those wrongly accused of terrorism unlike the USA Patriot Act (ibid.), (4) it is seen as being unbeneficial to Kenyans even though they will bear its brunt not so much to protect them but to satisfy American and British concerns over their own security (Otieno, 2003), (5) it eases the extradition of terrorist suspects to other countries without the normal safeguards (Thuku, Agutu, Mugonyi and KNA, 2003), (6) it perpetuates neocolonialism and violates the countrys sovereignty by facilitating the operation of foreign security forces viz. American and European- in Kenya (ibid.) even though some of these foreign forces have been accused of being disrespectful of their Kenyan counterparts (Walunywa 2003: no pp), (7) it is undemocratic having been drafted with no due input from most Kenyans (ibid.), (8) it terrorizes Kenyans (Figure 4) and violates their civil and human rights by, for example,

Kenya Studies Review Figure 4: Kenyas Anti-Terrorism Legislation

Source: Editorial Cartoon, East African Standard, July 17, 2003 allowing for the arrest and holding of terrorist suspects without allowing them to contact lawyers and relatives (Thuku, Agutu, Mugonyi and KNA, 2003). Additionally, the bill has also caused angst among some Kenyans because they view it as being racist (Walunywa 2003) because of its likely violation of the rights of non-whites while protecting those of whites. In response the government denies most of these criticisms, especially charges that the bill was brought about by external pressure and that the bill is unfriendly to Kenyans, arguing instead that the bill will be amended to [suit] the Kenyan situation [and that] the views of Kenya Muslims will be catered to before [its] enactment (Akolo 2003). Such government assurances are unconvincing to many Kenyans (Figure 4). Most Kenyans also see many of the anti-terrorism measures taken by the government of Kenya as a breach of the countrys sovereignty (Thuku, Agutu, Mugonyi and KNA, 2003). In 2003, for instance, the US and Britain pressed Kenya to implement intrusive security measures before the two countries could lift their economically debilitating travel advisories against Kenya. These measures include (1) passage of an anti-Terrorism Bill (Walunywa 2003), (2) cancellation of all airport staff passes and re-issuing them after carefully screening all staff members, (3) introduction of a new electronic pass system, (4) improving airport fences and enforcing security patrol inside and outside the fences, (5) increasing Kenyas passenger screening equipment at the two international airports, (6) increasing staff manning the immigration arrival desks and, (7) deploying mobile security units at its international airports even below aircraft flight paths (Wabala and Wandera 2003). As with the anti-terrorism legislation, the Kenya government is not keen to be seen as acting at the behest of foreign countries, especially the US and the UK.

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Geopolitical effects Tension between Kenya and Western countries Terrorism in Kenya has also produced geopolitical effects such as tension between the governments of Kenya and Western countries, especially the U.S. and U.K. The tension stems from differences in the perception of the countrys terrorism risk (Figure 5), the issuance of economically harmful travel advisories on Kenya by western countries such as the U.S. and the U.K. (Figure 3, Lugaga 2003: no pp), and Kenyas inability to sustain the high cost of the war on terrorism without adequate international support. This has put Kenya in a tough position because even though Kenyais affluent enough by African standards to have western investments and interests[it] is without enough money to buy worldwide security (Jenkins 2002: no pp). As a Kenyan journalist aptly put it: Since the 1998 terrorist bombing and subsequent events and the travel advisory, there's a feeling that Kenya is being hit from both sides - by the terrorists because we are a friend of the US, and by the US because we're being hit by terrorists (Gaitho: 2003: no pp).

Figure 5: US, UK and Local Perception of Kenyas Terrorist Threat

Source: Editorial Cartoon, Daily Nation, June 24, 2003 Growing anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment The geopolitical tension between Kenya and her western counterparts is also manifested in the growing anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment because Western governments have been pushing Kenya to implement unpopular anti-terrorism measures. Such negative rhetoric is especially coming from local Muslims who see themselves as the target of the anti-terrorism war

Kenya Studies Review and have wasted no time coming up with their own three axes of evil namely, President Bush and Prime Ministers Blair and Sharon (Potter 2003: no pp). Another reason for rising anti-western and anti-Israeli views is the unsettling sense of insecurity among the many Kenyans that realize that the substantial presence of westerners and their investments is the main reason Kenya is a terrorist target. Indeed one captured terrorist agent recently confirmed this (Maina, 2004), leading many Kenyans to the conclusion that if westerners and Israelis left, the country would be safer (ibid). This thinking is evident in the following excerpt: Lamu West MP Fahim Twaha wants the Kenya Government to close down Israeli, Russian, British and American Embassies in Kenya, claiming they are a security risk. He said the closure should be done immediately to save the country's tourism sector and threats of attacks from terrorist... We do not need them. Let them close down and leave us alone until when the world will be at peace," said the MP through a press release. (Ali 2003: no pp). Other Kenyans have taken a different approach to the issue and have questioned the wisdom of keeping large numbers of non-tax paying Americans in Kenya when they take so much more looking after (Walshaw, 2003: no pp). These negative sentiments are partly informed by Americas dreadful conduct after the 1998 US Embassy bombings in Nairobi, especially its apparent disregard for Kenyan lives and casualties during the rescue efforts although far more Kenyans than Americans were killed or injured in the bomb blast (Maina, 2004). Moreover, Americas refusal to include Kenyan victims in the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001 made many Kenyans unhappy (Muendo 2003) because the fund benefited Americans who either got injured or lost loved ones in the Nairobi Embassy bombing. Although the US had its reasons for doing so, this action made many Kenyans feel sorely betrayed by a superpower which they once thought was a good friend (Gacheru, 2003: no pp). The substantial Israeli presence in Kenya is also becoming increasingly unpopular and problematic for the country from a security standpoint. This despite the fact that most Kenyans and their government, being influenced by a Christian worldview, are sympathetic to Israeli interests. Ironically, except for local Muslim opposition to Israeli presence in Kenya, it is Israels own security measures at its Nairobi embassy, especially the frisking of citizens near the embassy that has become a major source of Kenyan discontent with the Israeli embassy and calls for its relocation to a more convenient site (East African Standard, Tuesday, June 29, 2004). As one Kenyan recently posed in a letter in one of the local dailies: Why must we keep this embassy open? (Kamau 2003: no pp). In sum, it is noteworthy that overt anti-western and antiIsraeli views were rare in Kenya prior to the terrorist attacks. Steps to Control Terrorism in Kenya Currently, Kenya is relying on a combination of legislative, security, social and diplomatic measures to deal with the countrys terrorist threat. These measures include (1) anti-terrorist legislation, (2) beefed up security patrols by the military and police, (3) social outreach and, (4) peace talks to resolve the Somalia and Sudan crises. These measures are explored below.

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Legislative action On April 30th, 2003, Kenya published a draft Suppression of Terrorism bill to guide its future response to terrorism. Since this bill is yet to be enacted into law (Kelley and Munaita 2004), the country is using various pieces of existing laws e.g., Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act, the Police Act and other elements of Kenyas criminal code to deal with its terrorism threat. The countrys broad executive powers are also being extensively used for this purpose. The recent passage of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act is especially likely to help to seal a major loophole corruption of the police, immigration and customs agencies -- in the countrys vulnerability to terrorism. Police and military action The country has also stepped up security measures (Maclean 2003) and its forces have even carried out daring missions that have managed to snatch some terrorist suspects from Somalia (Soke 2003). Border patrols especially along the troublesome Kenya-Somalia border (Daily Nation on the Web, Wednesday, June 25, 2003) and joint Kenya-U.S. navy patrols of Kenyas Indian Ocean territorial waters (Wabala and Wandera, 2003: no pp) have been enhanced in order to stop the infiltration of terrorists from Somalia and to curb illegal immigration and the smuggling of narcotics and [other] contraband goods [like weapons] along the coast (ibid: no pp). Moreover, the U.S. has also been conducting additional security patrols of Kenyas territorial waters along the Kenya-Somali coast, although these are proving to be unpopular with local residents who fear that the U.S. is slowly building a base in Kenya (Mango 2003: no pp). Such fears may be unwarranted as Nairobi and Washington have a longstanding agreement that allows US forces to make periodic use of air and sea bases in Kenya (Daily Nation on the Web, Monday, July 7, 2003: no pp). On the police side, the government has taken a number of measures aimed at strengthening the forces ability to combat terrorism. These measures include, (1) the creation of an Anti-terrorism Police Unit (Kelley 2003b), (2) the opening of a National CounterTerrorism Center to [provide] an institutional framework to combat the [terrorist] threats (Kelley and Munaita 2004: no pp), (3) the replacement of personnel at the top echelons of the force e.g., the appointment of an Army Brigadier to head the force and, (4) the infusion of $641 million over the next five years in a bid to make the unit more effective in combating crime (ibid). Moreover, internationally renowned anti-terrorism police units such as the Scotland Yard are aiding and training their local counterparts to better combat the threat (Wabala and Wandera 2003). Additional security support for Kenya has also come from the US in the form of: counter-terrorism efforts including technical collaboration in detection and disarming of bombs, protection of government leaders and hostage negotiations [and,] $30 million worth of US counter-terrorism aid as part of a $100 million US initiative involving five East African countries (Kelley and Munaita 2004: no pp). Airport security has also been enhanced by the US provision of: computer systems for Kenyan airports that allow each travellers identity to be quickly checked against an updated terrorist watch-listA US government team is also working with Kenyan authorities to develop means of blocking clandestine terrorist financing (Kelley and Munaita 2004: no pp).

Kenya Studies Review

Sociopolitical solutions The use of force in reducing Kenyas terrorism risk is complemented by sociopolitical efforts aimed at reaching out to local communities to help identify terrorists and to promote continued co-existence of Muslims and Christians in Kenya. To this end, the government has also tried to reach out to social groups (e.g., Muslims) that are apprehensive of the new anti-terrorism measures e.g., the antiterrorism bill (Otieno 2003: no pp). Specifically, the government has reassured Muslims of its commitment to unbiased application of the law without regard to religion, and has promised to revise the draft anti-terrorism bill to remove religious stereotypes contained in the original draft (Kelley and Munaita 2004: no pp). Muslim views have been also included in the recently completed draft review of the Constitution of Kenya (National Constitutional Conference 2004). International aid donors such as the US are also boosting the war on terrorism with increased development assistance to the Muslim dominated Coastal and Northeastern regions of Kenya. Assistance in the form of the rehabilitation of clinics, construction of classrooms, bridge repairs, provision of potable water and donations of medical services, are helping to improve the quality of life in these regions (CNN, February 7, 2002). Many of these services are provided through civil action by the US military, which also gives the troops a chance to engage in dialogue with local Muslim people. As expected, there have been bumps in the delivery of such development assistance e.g., the recent Muslim rejection of a US offer to fund Islamic schools out of fear that the offer was insincere and intended to influence the schools curriculum (The EastAfrican, February 24, 2004). There are also attempts to promote inter-religious dialogue in Kenya. Although the country has seldom seen religious violence, there have been a few worrisome incidents in Wajir, Nakuru, Nyeri, Mombasa and Nairobi in recent decades. According to Chemchemi ya Ukweli (lit. Oasis of Truth): Some examples of this tension include the 1984 Wagalla massacre, which resulted in 1,600 Muslims killed after a referendum showed the populations preference to be part of Somalia. Religious animosity peaked after the August 1998 bomb-blast in the American Embassy in Nairobi. The Kenyan Muslim community was blamed and victimized. Five Muslim NGOs were de-registered. [That] same year, the Oromo Liberation Front army crossed into Kenya and killed 300 Muslims in Baggala, Northeastern Province. [In 1998] there was also a conflict in Nakuru, when an evangelists remarks about Prophet Mohammed where reciprocated with the burning of a church and the public stripping of a Catholic nun by Muslim youth in Wajir. In 1999, policemen entered a mosque in Kwale and killed 6 Muslims. The Muslim community perceived it as an anti-Muslim act by a predominantly Christian police force (Chemchemi ya Ukweli 2000? 7-8). To counter this alarming trend, organizations such as Chemchemi ya Ukweli have begun to offer Kenyans of various religious persuasions basic courses on peaceful conflict resolution. Some religious leaders and organizations are also taking the lead in promoting inter-religious dialogue in the country (Nyamai 2004).

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Diplomatic solutions The main diplomatic thrust of Kenyas anti-terrorism effort is the search for peace in Somalia and Sudan. This initiative is driven by the recognition that political instability in Somalia and Sudan is a major contributor to Kenyas terrorist threat. Thus, Kenya has for a long time hosted both countries peace talks. Most recently, the Sudan peace talks were held in Naivasha while the Somali talks were initially held in Eldoret and later Nairobi. Both peace talks have made good progress lately. Sudans peace process received a major boost recently when the warring parties signed a a document compiling six previously negotiated protocols into one framework agreement, at the start of the final phase of their peace talks at State House, Nairobi, in June 2004 (The EastAfrican, June 07 - 13, 2004: cover page). Similarly, a promising breakthrough has been achieved in the Somali peace talks (Njeru 2004). If both peace talks result in binding treaties, they could stabilize these two countries politically helping to transform them into good neighbors whose security will greatly enhance that of Kenya. Conclusion and the future of Kenyas terrorism challenge Kenya was thrust into the center of global terrorism in 1998 when the US embassy in Nairobi was bombed. Four years later, a bomb destroyed an Israeli hotel in Mombasa and a shoulderlaunched missile was fired on an airliner full of Israeli tourists. Although, in both Al Qaeda terrorist incidents, the primary targets were Americans and Israelis, Kenyans paid the heaviest price in terms of lives lost and number of injuries, not to mention the socioeconomic disruptions occasioned by these events. Because the factors that have contributed to terrorism in Kenya are unlikely to change in the short-term, the country will continue to be on the terrorist radar screen for a while. Thus, it is imperative for the country to maintain a high level of terrorism preparedness by enacting antiterrorist legislation and reducing corruption especially in its security forces. Simultaneously, conditions such as iniquitous socioeconomic development within the country should be addressed in order to reduce some local Muslims sympathy and support for would be terrorists. Kenya should also continue to support the Somali and Sudan peace talks because their success could greatly reduce the countrys vulnerability to terrorism. If these countries were to become politically stable, this would deprive Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations of easy weapons sources and convenient safe havens, thereby making it harder for them to operate in Kenyas neighborhood. Attention should also be paid to the negative effects of the war on terrorism on Kenyas civil, human, and political rights. This is important because the war on terrorism will not be won without the cooperation of citizens. Thus, the anti-terror war should not be used as a pretext to wantonly violate the basic rights of Kenyans. In short, the war on terrorism should not be allowed to degenerate into a war on citizens rights, lest success on the former be found to be hollow in the end. Unfortunately, the religious-inspired terrorism that Kenya is dealing with right now is driven by spiritual/religious motivations with no material solutions. As a consequence, the best way for Kenya to reduce its vulnerability to this type of terrorism is by reducing immediate contributing factors while whittling down its local and regional support base. Equally important is the need to reevaluate the countrys global geopolitical stance, especially the security and socioeconomic cost of its support of Western and Israeli interests. While a geopolitical realignment may not change the countrys position in the larger Christianity-Islamic contest for

Kenya Studies Review regional spiritual supremacy, it could put Kenya below the radar screen of religious inspired terrorist groups. References Akolo, J. (2003). Terror Bill to be domesticated, says Minister, East African Standard, Wednesday, July 16, 2003, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Wednesday, July 16, 2003. Ali, A. (June 23, 2003). MP [Member of Parliament] calls for closure of embassies, East African Standard, Monday, June 23, 2003: no pp, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed June 23 2003. Bergesen, A. J. and Lizardo, O. (2004) International Terrorism and the World-System. Sociological Theory. 22: 1 (March 2004): pp. 38-52. Chemchemi ya Ukweli (2000?). Chemchemi Ya Ukweli, the Active Non-Violent Movement in Kenya Phase II, Online at http://www.chemchemi.org/docs/cyuproposal.pdf, accessed June 8, 2004. CNN (February 7, 2002). U.S., Kenya troops conduct exercises in East Africa, Online at http://www.cnn.com/, Accessed June 9, 2004. Cronin, A. K. (2002). Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism. International Security, 27:3 (December 01, 2002). pp. 30-58. Daily Nation on the web (Friday, November 29, 2002). Two suspects arrested after terror bomb on hotel kills 13, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed July 3, 2004. Daily Nation on the web (June 24, 2003). Editorial Cartoon, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed June 24, 2004 Daily Nation on the Web (Wednesday, June 25, 2003). Security patrols intensified at the Coast, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed June 25, 2003. Daily Nation on the Web (Monday, July 7, 2003). US seeking to set up military bases in Africa, Daily Nation on the Web, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed Monday, July 7, 2003. East African Standard online (Wednesday, March 3, 2004). Reward us with varsity, say Coast leaders, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Monday, August 4, 2003. East African Standard online (Tuesday, June 29, 2004). Plans to relocate [Israeli] embassy [in Nairobi], onliine at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Saturday, July 03, 2004. EastAfrican, The (February 24, 2004). Kenya's Muslims reject US aid, The EastAfrican online, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed February, 24 2004. EastAfrican, The (June 7-13, 2004). Sudan Peace Process Cover Page Picture Caption, The EastAfrican online, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed June 7, 2004. Eastman, C. M. (1995). Tourism in Kenya and the Marginalization of Swahili, Annals of Tourism Research, 22: 1, pp. 172-185. Edgerton, R. B. (1989). MAU MAU: An African Crucible. New York: Ballantine Books. Foeken, D., Hoorweg, J. and Obudho, R.A. (2000). The Kenya Coast: A regional Perspective. In Jan Hoorweg, Dick Foeken, and R. Obudho (eds.), Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, Resources and Development in the East African Littoral, Hamburg: LIT. pp 3-10. Gacheru, M. W. (July 8, 2003). Parallel sentiments to Keeping Americans in Kenya costly; how many pay tax? Letter to the Editor, Daily Nation on the Web, Tuesday, July 8, 2003).

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Gaitho, M (December 15, 2003), US-Kenya ties 'better than before', Daily Nation, Monday, December 15, 2003, online at http://www.nationmedia.com/, accessed July 3, 2004. Gwyn, D. (1977). Idi Amin: Death-Light of Africa, Little, Brown and Company, Boston and Toronto. Harman, D. (2002). In Kenya, a history of attacks, The Christian Science Monitor, From the December 02, 2002 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/1202/p01s04-woaf.html, accessed June 9, 2004. IPS (April 15, 2004). Countries of the Horn Urged to Apply Sharia, Online at http://www.vitrade.com/sudan_risk/terrorism/980417_neighbors_urged_apply_sharia.htm, Accessed June 9, 2004. Jenkins, C. (2002). Kenyas press asks Why us?, BBC NEWS, Friday, 29 November, 2002, online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/2527967.stm, accessed July 7, 2004. Kagwanja, P. and Mutunga, W. (May 20, 2001). Is Majimbo Federalism? Constitutional Debate in a Tribal Shark-Tank, Daily Nation, May 20, 2001, online at http://www.hartfordhwp.com/archives/36/136.html , accessed June 9, 2004. Kamau, J. (July 11, 2003). Why must we keep this embassy open? Letter to the editor, Daily Nation on the Web, Friday, July 11, 2003, available online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed Friday, July 11, 2003. Kanyinga, K. (1998), Struggles of Access to Land: The Squatter Question in Coastal Kenya, Copenhagen: Centre for Development Research, CDR Working Paper 98(7), http://www.cdr. dk/working_papers/wp-98-7.htm, accessed on 10 October 2001. Kelley, K. J. 1999. Religious Tensions Growing in East Africa,The EastAfrican on the Web, September 22 - September 28, 1999, Accessed May 25, 2004. Kelley, K. J. (2003a). How Al Qaeda Carried Out Paradise Hotel Bombing, The EastAfrican on the Web, Monday, November 10, 2003. Kelley, K. J. (2003b). Kenya seeks Sh30b from US. Daily Nation on the Web, Thursday, June 26, 2003 Kelley, K. J. and Munaita, P. (2004). US: Al Qaeda Threat Greatest in East Africa, The EastAfrican on the Web, Monday, April 12, 2004, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, Accessed April 12, 2004. Kenya, Republic of (2002), Economic Survey 2002, Prepared by the Central Bureau of Statistics, Ministry of Finance and Planning, Nairobi: Government Printer. Kenya, Republic of, 2003. The Terrorism Suppression Bill (draft), in Kenya Gazette Supplement No. 38 (Bills No. 15), 2003. Nairobi: Government Printers. Kyemba, H. (1977). A State of Blood: The Inside Story of Idi Amin. New York: Ace Books. Lugaga, X. (2003). Angry Raila, Ngilu attack US embassy closure, East African Standard, Monday, June 23, 2003 available online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Monday, June 23, 2003. Maclean, W. (2003). Bombers Push Kenyas Coast Deeper into Poverty, The Financial Standard, August 26 - 1 September, 2003, Available online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed August 26, 2003. Maina, C. (2004). How the Kenya government invites terrorist attacks, expression today, ________, online at http://www.kenyanews.com/exp24/psto_15.html, accessed July 7, 2004. Mango, C. (2003). Patrols by US Marines anger Lamu residents, East African Standard online edition, Wednesday, July 9, 2003, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Wednesday, July 9, 2003.

Kenya Studies Review Mathewson. K. and Steinberg, M. (2003).Drug Production, Commerce, and Terrorism. In Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks (ed), The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism, Routledge: New York and London. Mbogo, S. (2003). Kenyans Deeply Divided Over Islamic Law Proposals, CNS, April 22, 2003, Online at http://www.vitrade.com/, Accessed June 9, 2004. Meilink, H. (2000). The Kenya Coast in National Perspective. In Jan Hoorweg, Dick Foeken, and R. Obudho (eds.), Kenya Coast Handbook: Culture, Resources and Development in the East African Littoral, Hamburg: LIT. pp 11-28. Muendo, L. (2003). US embassy bombing anniversary set for today, East African Standard, August 7, 2003, Online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Wednesday, July 07, 2004. Mulama, J. (2003). Christians fear Shariah will Undermine Tolerance. InterPress Service News Agency, June 18, 2003, Online at Mulama, J. (2004). Constitutional Endorsement of Muslim Courts Provokes Anger. Online at http://www.axisoflogic.com/artman/publish/printer_5623.shtml, accessed June 8, 2004. Mwaura, P. (2004). Islamophobia on the rise everywhere, Daily Nation of the web, Friday, January 23, 2004, online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed July 7, 2004. National Constitutional Conference (April 2004). The Draft Constitution of Kenya 2004, , Bomas of Kenya, Nairobi. Njeru, M. (2004). Breakthrough in Somali peace talks, Daily Nation on the Web, Friday, January 30, 2004, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed June 8, 2004. Nyamai, C. (2004). Kenya Inter-Religious Peace Week, Unification News for March 2004, Online at http://www.tparents.org/UNews/Unws0403/kenya.htm, accessed June 9, 2004. Otieno, S. (2003). No hidden agenda on terror Bill, says Govt, East African Standard online edition, Monday, August 4, 2003, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed Monday, August 4, 2003. Porter, B. (August 07, 2003). Terrorism Splits Kenya Christians and Muslims. Online http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20030806-062435-7097r.htm, accessed October 24, 2003. Rapoport, D. (2001). The Fourth Wave: September 11 in the History of Terrorism, Current History, December 2001, pp. 419-424. Ruby, C. L. (2002). The Definition of Terrorism. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2002, pp. 9-14. Sieff, M. (2003). The Inevitable Aftermath? Radicalism's New Foothold in the Middle East, In the National Interest, June 4, 2003, Online at http://www.inthenationalinterest.com/, Accessed June 9, 2004. Shahar, Y. (August 22, 1998). Osama bin Ladin: Marketing Terrorism, ICT, http://www.ict.org.il/articles/bin-ladin7.htm, Accessed April 27, 2004. Silberfein, M. (2003). Insurrections. In Susan L. Cutter, Douglas B. Richardson, and Thomas J. Wilbanks (ed), The Geographical Dimensions of Terrorism, Routledge: New York and London. Soke, H. A. (2003). Somalia Flights Banned as Kenyan Government Steps Up Terrorism War, African Conflict Journal, Monday, June 23, 2003, Online at http://www.africanconflict.org/newacj, accessed June 9, 2004. Somerville, K. (November 28, 2002). Questions over Kenyan security. Online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2522681.stm, accessed February 20, 2004. Sorel, J. (2003). Some Questions About the Definition of Terrorism and the Fight Against its Financing, EJIL (2003), Vol. 14 No. 2, 365-378.
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Sunday Standard, The. (December 21, 2003). Editorial Cartoon, The Sunday Standard, December 21, 2003, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed December 21, 2003. Thuku, W., Agutu, M., Mugonyi, D. and Kenya News Agency (2003). Pressure mounts on antiterror Bill, Daily Nation on the Web, Friday, July 4, 2003, Online at http://www.nationaudio.com/, accessed July 4, 2003. Wabala, D. and Wandera, N. (2003). Scotland Yard joins Kenya war on terror, East African Standard, Thursday, June 27, 2003, online at http://www.eastandard.net/, accessed June 27 2003. Walshaw, T. (July 8, 2003). Keeping Americans in Kenya costly; how many pay tax? Letter to the Editor, Daily Nation on the Web, Tuesday, July 8, 2003. Walunywa, Joseph (2003). Racial origins of the Terrorism Bill, East African Standard, Friday, July 11 2003. Weiss, T. (2004). Chapter Five: Northeastern Province, in Guns in the Borderlands, Reducing the Demand for Small Arms, Monograph No 95, January 2004, Online at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Monographs/No95/Chap5.pdf, accessed June 9, 2004. Were, G. S. and Wilson, D. A. (1968). East Africa through a Thousand Years. New York: Africana Publishing Co.

Kenya Studies Review Quality of Education and its Role in National Development: A Case study of Kenyas Educational Reforms By Peter C. Otiato Ojiambo* Abstract Education is a vital tool in the developmental process of any given nation. In this article, a critical examination is made of various educational reforms that have been undertaken in Kenya in both colonial and post-colonial period and their correlation to national development. Specifically, the article examines historical development of Kenyan education and its challenges in meeting its national developmental goals. In order for education to foster development this article recommends: the need to separate educational policies from national politics, clear stipulation of educational policies and their role in national development and a sound implementation of educational reforms. Key words: Educational policy; Education planning; Educational history; Educational administration; Comparative education; Education financing *Peter C. Otiato Ojiambo holds a Ph.D from Ohio University, Athens and is based at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA.

Citation Format Ojiambo, Peter Otiato (2009). Quality of Education and its Role in National Development: A Case study of Kenyas Educational Reforms. Kenya Studies Review: 1, 1, 133-149.

Copyright 2009 Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA)

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Introduction There has been a widespread belief among educational economists that educational development would lead to accelerated economic growth, more wealth and income distribution, greater equality of opportunity, availability of skilled human power, a decline in population growth, long life, better health outcomes, low crime rates, national unity and political stability. This belief has made many individuals and nations to invest immensely in education. But why has education become such a big business? In many of his works on this subject, Schultz has noted that population quality and knowledge constitute the principal determinants of the future welfare of mankind.1 Expounding on this further, Harbison argues that the wealth of nations depend on their capacity to develop their human resources and not so much on their physical resources. He argues that a country which is unable to develop skills and knowledge of its people and to utilize them effectively in the national economy will be unable to develop anything else.2 According to Pscharopolos, education is considered the route to economic prosperity, the key to scientific and technological advancement, the means to combat unemployment, the foundation of social equality, equal wealth distribution, and the spearhead of political socialization and cultural diversity.3 Education is also seen as defining and guiding cultural, economic and political dynamics and generational developmental imperative of societies (Ayodo and Gravenir, 1999; Nafukho, 1998; Okech and Abagi, 1997; Amutabi, 2003). Similar studies indicate that countries with high literacy rates among men and women have lower levels of fertility, lower infant and maternal mortality and longer life expectancy. As evidenced by various studies, the socioeconomic benefits accruing to formal education are now unambiguous, and when educational opportunities are opened to women such benefits are even greater. It is against this backdrop that education reform and development have been long standing objectives of the Government of Kenya (GoK) since gaining its independence in 1963. Although the causal relationship between schooling and development in Kenya is less extensive compared to more industrialized nations, there is sufficient evidence to conclude that provision of quality education leads to both economic and social development. It is in this regard, that the Kenyan Government has continued to invest heavily in formal education. In the last two decades, for instance, public spending in education in Kenya as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has increased from 5.1% in 1980/1981 to 15% in 2008/2009. Compared to other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa with similar GDP per capita, Kenya spends considerable more funds on education in relation to its total Government expenditure and Gross National Product (GNP). The recognition of the noble role of education in society has led for several years to the historic struggle over the control of education, that is, formal education in Kenya. This struggle has led to numerous conflicting interests among various actors in education in both colonial and post-colonial period. Todays struggle in Kenyan education is no longer about seeking to regain control of the school, both privately and publicly; instead, it concerns the quality of education as provided in the school, family, and society. Todays educational struggle in Kenya
1 2

Thomas Schultz, Investing in People (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

Fredrick Harbison, Human Resources as the Wealth of Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 3.
3

George Psacharopolous, Education and Development: A Review (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1988).

Kenya Studies Review is the need for pedagogy, more specifically, an African pedagogy that is responsive to the African condition today. This calls for what Bennaars refers to as the need for genuine education.4 It is a pedagogy according to Gore that requires well defined instruction and vision in educational theorizing. It is a pedagogy that is expected to be liberating, empowering and responsive to societal needs.5 This requires offering reflective education that attends mindfully to the social and political context of educating, as well as to its technical and practical aspects. Amidst these contestations one question emerges: what is the possible good that is expected to come out of the Kenyan education? No society anywhere in the world educates its people without having good reasons for doing so. Obviously, no society or government will spend so much time, energy and money on an enterprise such as education, if it does not serve any purpose. Despite enormous investment in education, the Kenyan education enterprise since independence has been marked by various changes and severe predicaments, and so has been its impact on national development. The initial post-colonial euphoric confidence in education has to a considerable extent been replaced by a mood of disillusionment. The education system has been accused of being egocentric and materialistic at the expense of collective effort and responsibility, for adopting irrelevant and rigid curricula, for embracing antiquated teaching and learning techniques, for dampening initiative and curiosity, for producing docile and dependentminded graduates, and for widening the gap between the rich and the poor. It is in the light of these tensions that this article critically examines various educational reforms and interventions that have been undertaken in Kenya in both colonial and post-colonial period and their role in national development. Historical Development of Kenyas Education System, its Vision in Fostering National Development and Challenges Historical Development of Kenyas Education System in the Colonial Period The aftermath of the First World War saw a number of government measures with regard to African education. During this period, the colonial government ended its hitherto spectator status and initiated a system of grants-in-aid immediately after establishing the Department of Education in 1911 to help in the development of education provided by Christian missions. It also appointed East Africa Protectorate Education Commission in 1919 to review education provided in the colony for all races. According to Achola and Pillai, it was mandated to look into unsatisfactory status of education for all races in the protectorate. The commission made a vague recommendation to the effect that while the provision of education would remain a major responsibility of the missionaries, the government should increase its role in the provision of education.6 During this period, the Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1912-1925 also visited the
4

Gerard Bennaars, Schools in Need of Education: Towards an African Pedagogy. (Nairobi: Lectern Publications, 1998). Jennifer Gore, The Struggle for Pedagogies (New York: Routledge, 1992). Paul Achola and Vijayan Pillai, Challenges of Primary Education in Developing Countries: Insights from Kenya (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000).
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colony. The reports of these two commissions formed the backbone on which Kenyan education was cemented during this phase. Among the major aims of the report was to make the individual efficient, promote and advance agriculture, develop native industries, improve health, train people in the management of their affairs and the inculcate citizenship and service (Bogonko, 1992; Sifuna, 1990, 1992). Equally important during this period was the passing of the education ordinances in 1924 and in 1931. Some of the key commissions that were undertaken to review education during this period included: a Ten Year Plan, Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1924, the Beecher report of 1949, and the Binns Commission of 1952. A Ten Year Plan sought to provide 50% of school age children with an education lasting six years and to offer within ten years a full primary course for undergraduate teachers to ensure that there was adequate supply of trained teachers. In addition, a satisfactory number of pupils of both sexes was expected to receive education up to the certificate level (Bogonko, 1992; Sifuna 1990). The plan however, was not implemented for the whole cost was to be borne by local government authorities that had inadequate finances. Phelps-Stokes Commission of 1924 advocated for both quantitative and qualitative improvement of African education. One objective of this qualitative improvement was to give Africans academic type of education similar to that available to European and Asian children. It recommended a practically oriented education for Africans. This was reinforced further by the permanent Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical Africa that was set up by the British colonial Africa office. Its purpose was to develop rural areas. It advocated for continuity in policy and fuller cooperation between governments and missions (Otiende, Wamahiu and Karugu, 1992). Although the Commission was expected to create avenues that could make Africans have more access to education and national development, this was note the case. Education during this period remained racial. Europeans and Asians had an education that laid more emphasis on academics and aimed at preparing them for white-collar jobs while Africans on the other hand received an education that geared them towards manual labor. Although the commission made some important contributions in teacher education it failed to meet Africans personal goals and paid little attention to affective domains of education. Most Africans did not want the type of education it was propagating and thus rejected it. They yearned for an academic education that was not racial and one that could promote development. Because of its inadequacies many Africans opted to set up their own independent schools (Bogonko, 19992; Sifuna 1990). The Beecher Committee of 1949 was mandated to examine the scope, content, methods, administration and financing of African education.7 The report reinforced the argument of Phelps- Stokes and the Ten Year Developmental plan on the provision of practical education to Africans. Its recommendations formed the basis of the government policy on African education until the last year of colonial rule. The Africans were strongly opposed to the Beecher Report. They felt it did not meet their utilitarian, cultural and personal needs. The general African view to the report according to Bogonko (1992) was that it was to lead to Europeanization rather than Africanization of education and it sought to maintain the status quo of perpetually keeping Africans in low cadre positions. In addition, the Africans did not find its recommendations on:

Joseph Otiende et al, Education and Development in Kenya: A Historical Perspective (Nairobi: Oxford University Press, 1992).

Kenya Studies Review control of secular education, provision of universal primary and higher education, African teachers responsibilities, and learning facilities adequate (Sifuna, 1990; Bogonko, 1992). In 1952, Binns Commission of education was set up. It was sponsored by the secretary of state for the colonies and the Nuffield Foundation. It examined educational policy and practice in British Tropical African territories. It was mesmerized by the high level of wastage within the education sector. The commission was a landmark in Kenyas education because it expressed concern regarding the internal efficiency of African education and its ability to address their needs (Sifuna, 1992). It made far-reaching recommendations that influenced the development of teacher-education both in the colonial and post-colonial period. Like previous commissions it met fierce criticism from Africans because of its advocacy for racial education, inability to address social and cultural goals and its emphasis on keeping Africans on native reserves. The state of emergency of 1952 rendered the implementation process of both the Beecher and Binns reports difficult. In addition to several commissions that were undertaken during this period, the colonial government also passed three major education ordinances in 1921, 1931, and 1934 and set up several educational committees, councils and boards aimed at improving the quality of African education (Bogonko, 1992). In the mid 1950s, the colonial office realized it needed a new policy of education. This led to the drawing up of a developmental plan. The plan advocated for speeding up of output of high-level African workforce by expanding secondary and higher education. Within five years the pace of education was enormously increased for there was anticipation of African rule that required training of more manpower. Sifuna (1992) and Bogonko (1992) observe that the colonial education policies, even after the 1950s, continued to favor European population in terms of finance, curricula and structure and the African education was always the residuary legatee of the wealth of the state. Moreover, only a small number of African children went to school and the rate of attrition was very high compared to European and Asians. The openings for post-primary education for the Africans were also limited and those Africans who qualified were restricted by the many examinations they had to undertake (Bogonko, 1992). An examination of educational reforms undertaken during this period depicts colonial government efforts of using education to foster development that was racial. Historical Development of Kenyas Education System in the Post- Colonial Period In the post-colonial period, Kenyas struggle for political independence served as a major impetus for her educational development. During the struggle for independence, the nationalists educational aim was to provide an education that would serve immediate needs of the country. In 1961, when independence was imminent in most African countries, a conference on the development of education in Africa was held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and Tananarive in Madagascar in 1962. In these two conferences, representatives from all over Africa set educational priorities that aimed at promoting economic and social development. It was upon this framework that Kenya like other African governments formulated its educational programs (Sifuna, 1990, 1992). The expansion and reform of the education system during this period was also motivated by political pressures. Sifuna writes that almost every politician and election manifesto leading to the independence elections had called for more educational opportunities of all types, cheaper or free education, universal primary education, Africanisation of syllabuses and teaching staff

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and an atmosphere in which the African personality and culture could flourish.8 The education system was expected to fulfill two main objectives: technical and social. The technical objective was to provide future human resource with necessary skills and knowledge, and the social purpose was to inculcate values that could enrich peoples lives and maintain cohesive sensibilities. In line with this thinking most African countries devoted their early educational policies to training personnel that could man their burgeoning economic and administrative units. Based on this historical advance, Kenya embarked on various educational legal policies that could advance its development. The first undertaking by the government was the drafting of Sessional Paper Number 10 in 1965. This served as an important document for examining immediate needs and goals of post-independence Kenya. The paper saw education much more of an economic than a social service, a key means of alleviating shortage of skilled domestic workforce and of creating equal economic opportunities for all citizens (Republic of Kenya, 1965b). During this period the government established five major inquiries to look into the development of Kenyan education: The Kenya Education Commission-Ominde Commission(Republic of Kenya, 1964, Republic of Kenya, 1965a, Republic of Kenya, 1965b), The National Committee on Educational Objectives and Policy- Gacathi Report ( Republic of Kenya1978), The Presidential Working Party on the Second University-Mackay Report (Republic of Kenya, 1981a), The Presidential Working Party on Education and Man-power Kamunge Report ( Republic of Kenya, 1988) and Commission of Inquiry into the Education system of Kenya- Koech Commission (Republic of Kenya, 1999). The Ominde Commission outlined what education was and had to be during and after independence. It was the blueprint that laid the foundation of post-independence education. It was mandated to survey existing educational resources and to advise the government on the formation and implementation of the required national policies for education (Republic of Kenya, 1964; Republic of Kenya, 1965a). The commission was strongly influenced by the then existing international opinion, economic and political forces and available publications that underscored the importance of education in accelerating national development (Sifuna, Fatuma and Ibrahim, 2006). The organization of education during this period was closely linked to the management of human resources and the labor market. This link led to the growth of enrollments, especially in secondary schools, a growth that continued to be experienced in the 1980s. Although formal education was expanding during this period, it was not directly accompanied by the economic growth. Thus, most school dropouts were soon left out with neither jobs nor training. By 1970, majority of secondary school drop outs began to experience unemployment crisis. Due to increase in demand for higher education and the need for highly qualified manpower, the government made more acts in the 1980s geared towards the improvement of education to enable it spearhead development. A critical examination of various educational acts that were undertaken during this period illustrate the governments commitment to improving education and the emphasis it placed on its ability to develop the nation. It is important to note that despite its noble objectives the Ominde Commission recommendations were not implemented in full, a blunder that has had significant effects on education. Amutabi writes that if the first Ominde Commission Report would have
8

Daniel, Sifuna, Development of Education in Africa: The Kenyan Experience (Nairobi: Initiatives Publishers, 1990).

Kenya Studies Review been implemented in full Kenya would not have been wandering and experimenting with dubious systems like 8-4-4 today.9 The Gacathi Report reiterated objectives of the Ominde Commission and sought to enhance the use of the Kenyan educational goals to shape its national character and development. It recommended vocational, technical and practical education (Republic of Kenya, 1964a; Republic of Kenya 1965b). In 1975, the government realized that education was not doing much to achieve its stated objectives. Education curriculum was viewed as being too academic, narrow and examination centered (Republic of Kenya, 1979b; Republic of Kenya 1980). Rate of unemployment grew as school leavers went to urban centers to seek for white-collar jobs. This led to the formation of the third development plan of 1974/78 to address some of these challenges (Republic of Kenya, 1979b). Education system during this period was required among other things, to provide high level skills needed for economic, industrial, vocational and technical training that was essential for employment and development.10 In the 1980s the government changed its policy on education. This was because of the difficulties which were being faced by graduates of its education system at both primary and secondary levels. Most graduates who were matriculating from these levels could not be absorbed into the shrinking labor market. This made the government to reconsider changing its education system and to set up a Presidential Working Party in 1981 (Republic of Kenya, 1981a). The report sought to investigate ways in which education could make graduates from these levels self-sufficient, productive in agriculture, industries and commerce. Education system was expected to ensure that students acquired technical, scientific and practical knowledge vital for self and salaried employment, lifelong skills and nation building. The commission was also mandated to investigate the feasibility of establishing a second university that was development centered. It advocated for a practical curriculum that would offer a wide range of employment opportunities and equitable distribution of educational resources. It gave rise to the current education system, the 8-4-4 (Republic of Kenya, 1988). An in-depth examination of the rationale for introducing the 8-4-4 system gives a hidden agenda. Available evidence seems to suggest that the change of the system was more political than an educational need. Amutabi notes that the system was introduced partly as result of the Mackay Report and also as a political self-actualization by the government. inherent in the system was a hidden motive of an apparent settling of some imbalance and political scores. 11 The concept of the 8-4-4 system of education was therefore from the beginning politically driven and there was no major crisis to warrant the change of the system. This is clearly evidenced in the numerous challenges that the system has faced right from its inception such as lack of: involvement of relevant stakeholders, infrastructure such as classrooms, workshops, curriculum,
9

Maurice Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, International Journal of Educational Development 23(2003): 141. George Eshiwani, Education in Kenya since Independence (Nairobi: East African Publishers, 1993). Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 137.
139

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and trained personnel, funds and relevant literature and pedagogy (Sifuna, 1990, 1992, Amutabi, 2003). It was from these shortfalls that the Government of Kenya and other stakeholders realized that there was need to review and re-evaluate the system. The GoK, appointed the Commission of Inquiry into the Education system of Kenya (Koech Commission) in 1999. The commission was expected make recommendations on ways that could be used to provide quality education (Republic of Kenya, 1999). Based on the collected views the commission evolved the concept of Totally Integrated Quality Education and Training (TIQUET) to reflect the vision of Kenyan education. TIQET, as a concept embraced the values and substance that was to characterize the education system. It was to be total because it was expected to be inclusive, accommodative and life-long. It was to be integrated in its view of the purpose of learning. It focused on quality of delivery and outcome of the education and training process. The report reiterated that, the proposed education system was to become a ticket to a better life, and future for the individual, community and the nation. As a departure from the 8-4-4 system of education, TIQET according to Sifuna had some basic innovations, namely: the expansion of access to basic education; elimination of disparities in education based on geographical, social and gender factors; introduction of manageable curriculum content; introduction of modular learning approach and credit accumulation in postsecondary education; increased access to education through expanded alternative and continuing education; flexibility in university admission; introduction of early childhood, special and technical education and; continuous assessment.12 The purpose of this was make education demand-driven and to tie it to the labor market. The changes were also expected to promote equity, quality, efficiency and effectiveness in the education system. Contrary to past beliefs, the proposed education encompassed important societal ideals and values that the content of education was expected to offer rather than the mere belief on the numerical value (Sifuna, 1990). Specifically, the report called for legal educational reforms, for instance: reviewing of the education act, political will and commitment by making public policy pronouncements on the required changes, enhancing of efficiency and effectiveness in educational administration and management, ensuring there is prudent governance and management of resources, building and strengthening genuine partnership and collaboration among educational stakeholders. In addition, the report also called for cutting-edge reforms like: totally integrated quality education training, abolition of the 8-4-4 and replacement with a system not very distinct from the pre-8-44 system of 7-4-2-3, and universities maintenance of 1:10 ratio of graduate/undergraduate student; (Republic of Kenya, 1999, Amutabi, 2003). Despite its candid professional research, assessments and honesty on the challenges that were facing Kenyan education system, Koech Report was never implemented by the government. It was perceived as being expensive and complex. A critical analysis of the report indicate that the Ministry of Education and Human Resource Development (MoE & HRD) argument appeared far fetched. A cursory assessment of the report indicate that even with increasing expenditures towards teachers remuneration and development, the report still promised significant financial savings. It is my thesis that the recommendations made by the
12

Daniel Sifuna, Implementing the Koech Report: Realities, Challenges and Prospects (Nairobi: Lectern Publications, 2000).

Kenya Studies Review report were not only pertinent but timely, they provided the way forward and were aimed at resuscitating the education sector by making it more focused, manageable, relevant and costeffective. As Amutabis notes these were avant-garde recommendations that would have moved Kenya to higher levels of efficiency in education but which unfortunately were scuttled.13 It is important to note that the key reason why the findings of Koech report were rejected were more political than the logistical and budgetary claims. In the first place the commission was appointed majorly because there was a lot of popular uprisings and professional uproar over the shortfalls of the 8-4-4 system and not because there was a genuine commitment from the government to address the educational challenges that were being experienced. The reports recommendations on abolition of the 8-4-4 system and the School Milk Programme (Republic of Kenya, 1999; Amutabi, 2003) were executive orders that were valuable to President Moi with regard to his legacy and he was not ready to abolish them.14 It was ironical that after the rejection of the Koech Report, the MoEST went ahead and introduced some few cosmetic changes to the system. Going by the rejection of the Koech Report perhaps because it did not agree with the political motives of the government, it is increasingly being suspected that may be the Mackay Report of 1981 was just used a ploy to legitimize the system. Just like the Mackay Commission of 1981 and Kamunge Report of 1988 and other minor reports like Sagini Report (Republic of Kenya, 1995a); Archbishop Kirima report (Republic of Kenya, 1995b); the Mungai Report (Republic of Kenya, 1995c), any educational reforms acceptable to the system were expected to favor the position of the government.15 Free Primary Education and its Role in National Development Since attaining its independence in 1963, the concept of offering Universal Free Primary Education (UPE) has been central to Kenyas efforts to advance national development. In their struggle for independence, African politicians everywhere in the region promised free and universal primary education once the political goal was attained. These aspirations were reinforced by the recommendations of UNESCO Addis Ababa Conference of 1961 which set 1980 as the year when all African states should achieve UPE. All the Kenya African National Union (KANU) manifestoes issued between 1963 and 1979 committed the country to attaining the goal of a seven-year free and UPE since they believed that Kenyas ability to develop faster depended on the quality and quantity of the literacy of its population (Republic of Kenya, 1979a; 1965b, Bogonko, 1992; Amutabi, 2003). It is with this mindset that the Kenya education Commission Report of 1964/65 supported the objective of offering free UPE to every Kenyan child. The Report expected this to be achieved by 1971, facilities and finances permitting (Republic of Kenya, 1964; Republic of Kenya, 1965a; Republic of Kenya, 1965b). These
13

Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 141. Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 141. Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 142-143.
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sentiments were equally underscored and reflected in all the Five-Year Development Plans between 1966-1983, educational reviews and commissions. In all these efforts UPE has been seen as a fundamental factor for human capital development. Within this broad policy framework the expansion of learning institutions has been one of the greatest achievements in the education sector. Kenya has achieved an impressive increase in adult literacy (Sifuna, 2001). The achievements in literacy have reflected the countrys impressive progress in expanding access to education during the last four decades largely by establishing a comprehensive network of schools throughout the country. The substantial expansion of education has resulted in increased participation by groups that previously had little or no access to schooling such as girls. The Free Primary Education Declarations of the 1970s In the 1963 elections, when the Kenya African National Union (KANU) became the ruling party, it published a manifesto that committed the party to offering a minimum of seven years of free primary education. In the 1969 election manifesto the party again re-echoed its commitment to the same and pledged to extend its educational programmes to sparsely populated areas and those which were neglected during the colonial rule so that every Kenyan could participate fully in nation building. In 1971, a presidential decree abolished tuition fees for the districts with unfavorable geographical location. A second presidential decree on 12 December 1973 tried to bring the country closer to achieving FPE. The directive provided free education for children in standards I-IV. It gave a uniform fee structure for those in standards V-VII. Other subsequent directives that followed went further and abolished school fees in primary education. The aim of providing FPE during this period was to offer more school opportunities, especially to the poor communities since school fees was inhibitive to their access to education. Whereas this was an aspect already considered by the government at both party and state level, the implementation machinery was not ready for the mission. The announcement was met with great panic and whirlpools in the education circles, manifested by massive recruitment of teachers on almost an ad hoc basis. This decree instantly raised enrolments in primary schools from 1.8 million in 1973 to 2.8 million in January 1974. 16 Just like the appointment of previous educational commissions and reviews the presidential decree providing FPE in the early classes was one of the most dramatic political pronouncements of the Kenyatta era since it took planners and the public by surprise. The financial implications as well as the various methods for its introduction were not subjected to close scrutiny by the public or relevant stakeholders. 17 The decree forced in January 1974, the Ministry of Education to start rethinking of ways of how to cope with the staggering rise of pupil enrolment. Enrolment in standard one rose by a million above the estimated figure of about 400,000. The total enrolment figure for standards 1 to 6 increased from 1.8 million in 1973 to nearly 2.8 million in January 1974 (Sifuna, 1990; Bogonko, 1992; Amutabi, 2003).

16

Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 131. Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection.

17

Kenya Studies Review Since the decree was unexpected and was not in conformity with the projected estimates of the Ministry of education, it caused numerous problems to the primary school system in January 1974. By the time of abolishing school fees no counter measures were announced on how to replace the lost revenue. Most primary schools did not have a clear directive from the Ministry on how to recover the lost revenue and most school management committees gave themselves the prerogative of raising school revenue under the guise of a building levy that ostensibly was aimed at putting up new facilities (Sifuna, 1980; Amutabi, 2003). The building levy varied from one district to another and in most cases, it turned out to be higher than the school fees charged prior to the decree. This frustrated many parents who had little alternative but to withdraw their children from the school. Initially, in most districts, except Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL), enrolments almost doubled showing a radical change during the 1973-74 year. After that the situation reverted to what it had been in the previous years. It is estimated that around one to two million school age children dropped out of school after the decree due to building levy (Sifuna, 1990; Amutabi, 2003). As a result of high enrolments, there was a lot of overcrowding in classes and many schools were unable to cope with the high enrolments. The supply of teaching and learning materials was minimal. Because of large enrolments, a country-wide building programme was required to cope with extra classes. In some schools as many as five extra streams were created. It was common to find classes being conducted in the open, under trees or in church buildings to supplement the available space. Many schools introduced double sessions, for morning and afternoon to cope with the upsurge. Many others introduced several streams to scrape through the upsurge. Those schools that opted for multiple streams did not have enough teachers and this saw one teacher hop from one classroom to the next. Teachers were overloaded and therefore fatigued and as a result learning suffered. 18 Further, the teacher/pupil ratio was very high with some schools recording ratios of 1:150. Bogonko notes that immediately after the post-1973 decree standard 1 enrolment increased by 153% from 379,370 in 1973 to 958,980 the following year. Some schools permitted between 25 and 40 pupils per class. In terms of pupil/school ratio, standard 1 pupil to a school was 54.7:1 in 1973 and 124.4:1 in 1974.19 The political decree affected greatly the quality of education that was being offered. Pupils in lower primary require greater teacher attention in their learning process yet this was overlooked. The adhoc introduction of the decree also did not allow learners to sustain their interest in schooling because of the many challenges they were experiencing. For instance, slow learners felt ignored and a number of them dropped out of school. Whereas explanations for these drops have mainly been interpreted in economic terms the teacher/pupil ratio was also a significant indicator (Amutabi, 2003). With the increased enrolments, a countrywide construction program had to be launched to build extra classes. This disrupted many essential education activities as much emphasis was placed on construction instead of the teaching and learning. The Kenya School Equipment Scheme (KSES) which was formed in 1969 and had become one of the most efficient
18

Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 131. Sorobea Bogonko, A History of Modern Education in Kenya, 1895-1992(Nairobi: Evans Brothers, 1992), 116.
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departments in the ministry prior to the directive could not cope with the increased demands and steadily begun to decline and eventually collapsed with the introduction of the school milk programme by another political decree in 1978 (Amutabi, 2003; Sifuna, 1990). With increased enrolments and schools, it became difficult to dispatch the necessary materials and equipment to most schools. The situation was worsened with the varied topography in the country and long distances. It was thus not suprising that many schools went without basic learning materials greater part of 1974 (Sifuna, 1990). In terms of the teaching force the decree had a lot of effects too. At the time of the decree, the country was already experiencing a cute shortage of properly trained teachers. In 1973, the teaching force stood at 56,000 teachers, out of whom 12,600 untrained. In 1974, an additional 25,000 teachers were needed for the new classes. By 1975, the number of unqualified teachers stood at 40,000, out of a teaching force of 90,000 teachers.20 To meet the need for more additional teachers the Presidential decree of 1973 recommended more recruitment of teachers, a process that led to enormous increase of untrained teachers. Many unemployed school leavers, some of them who had not done well at form II and IV levels were recruited in large numbers as teachers. A Form II or Form IV school-leaving certificate with professional training teaching was adequate to guarantee a person employment at the primary level. As a result of this, the country recorded an estimated 38.5% increase in teachers from 56,543 in 1973 to 78,340 in 1974 (Bogonko, 1992; Sifuna, 1992; Amutabi, 2003). This increase was by all measures was very high and the Ministry of Education was under great pressure to meet challenges emanating from it especially, financial, supervisory and quality teaching. Amutabi observes that the high number of untrained teachers may have accounted for the weak performance in the Certificate of Primary Education (CPE) exams between 19771982 by many schools compared to the previous years as these were the first group of free education beneficiaries from 1974.21 The presidential decree was counter-productive in many ways. Education became insurmountable to many parents more than it was prior to the decree. After the abolition of school fees, the institution of building fees, the cost of schooling quadrupled and many primary schools imposed supplementary fees for such items as building funds, activity costs, uniforms, feeding schemes among others22 This increased drop-out rates a situation that was exacerbated further by the presidential decree in 1979 where there was a big annual increase of 23.5% in enrolment because of a 1978 presidential directive by for an additional free education for standard VVII that was intended to declare the entire primary education free in Kenya. This time however, there was no significant increase in the number of schools. There was, however, an increased number of Teachers Training Colleges enrolments to meet the need (Sifuna, 1992; Amutabi, 2003). These decrees caused enormous enrolments, increased teacher recruitment and building of new schools, compared to previous years. Increased numbers of teachers meant increased government expenditure on salaries more than physical development. The two presidential
20

Sifuna, Development of Education in Africa: The Kenyan Experience, 174. Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection. Sifuna, Development of Education in Africa: The Kenyan Experience, 280.

21

22

Kenya Studies Review directives were never supported by adequate professional advice or infrastructural framework and they caught many teachers and education planners by surprise, a factor that had a great impact on its implementation and quality of education. (Amutabi, 2003). With such teaching atmosphere, high drop out rates in primary education became a norm and the newly created building fund, which was meant to act as an emergency became legalized fee in most schools. Despite creating the mess, the government apart from helping in the recruitment of mediocre teachers played a dismal role in the implementation process. If anything, it was satisfied that school committees had successfully implemented the programme with minimal cost from the government. The Free Primary Education Intervention of 2003 During the 2002 general elections, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) made the provision of free primary education (FPE) part of its election manifesto again. Following its victory, on January 6, 2003 the Minister for Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) re-launched FPE to fulfill its election promise. Fees and levies for tuition were abolished as the government and development partners pledged to meet the cost of basic educational materials as well as salaries for non-academic faculty and co-curricular activities (Sifuna, 2005). Unlike the 1960s and 1970s decrees, the FPE under NARC government did not require parents and communities to build new schools, but they were expected to refurbish and utilize existing facilities within their environment. In situations, where school heads and committees felt there was need to do so they were required to obtain approval from the MoEST. This request had to be sent to the District Education Board by the Area Education Officer, after a consensus among parents through the Provincial Director of Education, a fairly lengthy and tedious process.23 Before the NARC pronouncement the number of primary schools in the country had increased steadily from 14,864 in 1990 to 18,901 in 2001/2 representing a 27.2% increase. Enrolments had also gone up from 5,392,319 to 6,314,726, being a 17.1% rise over the same period. The percentage of girls enrolment had also increased in the same period to 49.3%, implying that gender parity in enrolment in primary schools at the national level had effectively been achieved. The primary school Net Enrolment Ratios (NERs), however, showed a very worrying scenario in North Eastern Province where boys constituted 16.5% and girls 9.8%, with an average of 13.4% for the province. Following the NARC government decree, it was estimated that the NER rose from around 6,314,726 to 7,614,326 by the end of the year, representing a 22.3% increase nationally. It was also estimated that another 3 million children were not enrolled in school.24 Despite the various logistical problems that seem to be hampering a successful implementation of the FPE, the policy to some extent sounds commendable as it has meant cushioning children from poor socio-economic backgrounds, especially girls from failing to participate in primary education or dropping out of school due to lack of fees and other levies. Overall, the policy intervention could prove determinative in the efforts to achieve UPE and EFA (Sifuna, 2005).
23

Ministry of Education , Science and Technology, Free Primary Education: Every Child in School, Nairobi (2003). Ministry of Education , Science and Technology, Free Primary Education: Every Child in School.
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Although free primary education under NARC government seems to have increased pupil enrolments, it has at the same time created considerable problems as the preliminary surveys show. The program seems to have exacerbated the problem of teaching and learning facilities, there is a lot of congestion in classrooms, learning facilities are minimal, and many school management committees feel they are restricted in improving the state of learning due to the governments ban on school levies and the conditions laid down to request for concessions are cumbersome and slow.25 As a result of FPE, the situation of the teaching force in most districts in Kenya is not promising. Teachers complain of increased pupil teacher ratios, many primary schools are understaffed. Many school management committees are of the opinion that as a result on the ban of levies, they are unable to recruit extra teachers through the PTAs. In addition, these problems are contributing significantly to high school drop out rates and have seriously affected the inflow of pupils in primary education, for instance, districts that had registered over 20% increase in enrolment in 2003, hardly recorded more than 5% of standard one enrolment in 2004 ( Sifuna, 2005). Most of these logistical problems bedevilling the implementation of FPE are well known to the educational administrators in the country. But due to the culture of fear and silence inculcated by the former regimes, coupled up by an inept administration at the MoEST headquarters, the official rhetoric is that FPE is working smoothly when in reality it not. This has casted doubts on quality of education that is being provided by FPE and its role in national development. Apart from the logistical problems and other challenges being experienced in the implementation of FPE, the central question remains: is the programme sustainable by the Kenyan government? In the 2003/04 financial year, the government increased its education budget by 17.4% to Kshs.79.4 billion, with over Kshs. 7.6 billion specifically allocated to the FPE programme (Sifuna, 2005). A retrospection look at the funding of the FPE since its retroduction in 2003 show that the bulk of its funding is from the donor community. Although the FPE program is a noble undertaking its future still remains illusionary. It is difficult to comprehend how it will be sustained on a weak economy like Kenyas and donor aid that is temporary. The implementation of FPE, like previous similar education interventions, seems to have been a matter of political expediency rather than a well thought out educational undertaking. The NARC government, just like its predecessors, did not carry out a situation analysis prior to the implementation of the program. The consequence has been poor quality education and a host of challenges. The incompetent administration at the MoEST, which attempts to deal with some of these challenges, only serves to aggravate the situation. With these problems, the attainment of FPE will continue to be illusionary. From the outset the emphasis on educational expansion that took place during the postindependence period was complimented by an increasing priority accorded to programmes of quality improvement in education and have been closely linked to Kenyas evolutionary, reformative and developmental processes. In the first two decades of independence, according to Eshiwani, curriculum reforms played a pivotal role in directing the expected quality of development in Kenya. Major innovations were introduced in the curriculum namely: the new mathematics, agricultural, industrial and science education Project for Africa (SEPA), the SPP
25

Daniel Sifuna, The Pastoralist Communities and Free Primary Education in Kenya: A Preliminary Survey (Nairobi: Lectern Ltd, 2005).

Kenya Studies Review Nufflied-based science programmes, the New Primary approach among others. These curriculum efforts unfortunately did not bring about desired quality in the education system. They failed to respond to the problems of low quality curriculum materials, irrelevant content and inappropriate instructional approaches and contributed decimally development.26 Close examination of educational reviews that have been undertaken in Kenya in the post-colonial period also indicate that they have operated under the framework of the countrys national goals. The goals of Kenyan education enunciate an answer to the question earlier posed on the purpose or function of Kenyan education today. By any standards Kenyan educational goals and objectives as formulated in numerous reports and commissions are of high quality. If this is so, how comes they have not brought much development to Kenya over the years as earlier envisaged? Apparently, the quality of educational goals and objectives is not reflected in educational practice. There is-I contend- a chasm between theory and practice. A cursory glance at schooling in Kenya today shows that educational practice suffers chronically from what Dore identified as the diploma disease four decades ago.27 Both the formal curriculum and its objectives are intentionally subverted in order to give way to an entirely new curriculum, an informal curriculum, overtly meant to guarantee success in examination. The sole criterion of educational quality, it appears, is high performance in national examinations. Whatever various education commissions and reports have stated about the importance of attitudes and values of practical skills and an all-round development is conveniently forgotten and is rather crudely replaced by a very opportunistic theory of education. As a result, we may speak of two distinct educational theories, one idealistic and another opportunistic, existing side by side. But only the second is put into practice, the first remains a highly formalized ideal, used solely for bureaucratic and political purposes. Given the predominance of this instrumental theory of education, and its subsequent practice, we cannot fail to observe a number of problems. One most noticeable is that the widely acclaimed (informal) theory of education and the practice thereof has given rise to false expectations. Due to this educational approach, presently schooling in Kenya is taken to be kind of ritual through which learners must honorably pass if they are to succeed in life. Schools are widely used as chief means of sifting each generation into those who get the prize jobs and those who dont.28 This selective function tends to dominate, if not obliterate, the schools basic function of providing education that is supposed to lead to societal development. It is important to note that in post-independence Kenya there has been a lot of political interference in the education reform process and the larger educational policy making. Some of the educational initiatives that illustrate political interference in Kenyas education sector include presidential decrees on: Harambee school system, free education, school milk programme, quota system, 8-4-4 system of education, model schools, the National Youth Service and higher education. Many of these initiatives according to Amutabi were introduced with little or no input from various relevant stakeholders and were undertaken as responses to certain pressures and

26

Eshiwani, Education in Kenya since Independence. Ronald Dore, The Diploma Disease (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976). Dore, The Diploma Disease, 9.
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crises to wade off public concern. It is no wonder then that many of their reports were discarded immediately the crises waned. 29 Because of political interference in the education process, policy environment has been characterized by lack of popular consultation, with decrees, circulars and political rhetoric replacing policy-making apparatus. The education sector has been the most affected in this regard. This over the years has initiated uneasy relationship between the political establishment and various educational stakeholders in Kenya and has had a negative impact on policy formulation and implementation of educational programs.30 It is a trend that requires re-thinking if education has to spearhead national development. Despite heavy investment in education by the government and various players, the corresponding educational indicators in school participation and achievement have been on the decline signifying limited returns on investment. Some of the critical challenges facing the education system include: declining enrolment and participation rates; low transition rates; declining gross enrolment rates (GER) at the secondary school; widening gender and regional disparities particularly in the Arid and Semi-Arid Lands (ASAL); declining quality and relevance of education; the rise in the costs of education and training; under-enrolment of the handicapped and gifted students; inefficiency, poor governance and management of educational structures and institutions. In order to address these challenges, this article contends that it is important to separate the management of the education from the national political process. Change and management of education process should be handled by relevant stakeholders and should follow appropriate procedures namely: examining educational historical trends, theoretical considerations, objectives of the education process, curriculum and administration demands. Above all, it is imperative to develop a clear educational policy and to correlate it to national, societal and global demands. To make this effective, it is vital that the Kenyan government tie its educational planning to its developmental agenda. Currently, there is widespread misalignment between the two which is a major source of ineffective use of existing resources and I argue a hindrance to Kenyas aspirations of a future medium sized developed nation. Take for instance, Vision 2030. The aim of the Vision is to make Kenya globally competitive and prosperous country with a high quality of life by 2030. It aims at transforming Kenya into a newly industrializing, middle income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens in a clean and secure environment.31 The Vision is anchored on three pillars: economic, social and political governance and has flagged out various projects addressing key sectors such as agriculture, education, health, water and environment. The three pillars of the Vision will be anchored on the following foundations: macroeconomic stability; continuity in governance reforms; enhanced equity and wealth creation opportunities for the poor; infrastructure; energy; science, technology

29

Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection, 141. Amutabi, Political interference in the running of education in postindependence Kenya: a critical retrospection Republic of Kenya, Vision 2030(MoP, 2007), vii.

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Kenya Studies Review and innovations (STI); and land reform; human resources development; security; and public sector reforms.32 A critical examination of Kenyas Vision 2030 indicate that there is minimal emphasis on the role of education in enabling Kenya become a medium size industrialized nation by 2030. Education is mentioned in generalities and its role in the process is ambivalent. From the contents of the document it is not clear how the education sector will be able to meet the objectives of the Vision creating sustainable development.33 Much of the emphasis in the document is placed on the role of economic and political pillars in advancing national development. In order to achieve Vision 2030, the role of education in the process will require redefinition. The truth of the matter is, Vision 2030 is unattainable without a robust investment in good education. The good news however, is that the core elements of the nascent developmental parameters are in Vision and hopefully, at an appropriate time, Vision 2030 will assume its proper role as an organizing framework for Kenyas economic governance. Conclusion Education is a central component of any nations developmental process and for it to facilitate this function the process should be: clearly defined, legislatively protected from any political dictates, owned by relevant stakeholders, adequately financed and constantly subjected to periodic technical consultations and reviews to ensure that it is in harmony with both local and global needs. For this to be realized, it is essential that a fundamental theory of education is conceived. From such an educational theory, one may derive a pedagogy of hope, and empowerment that is essential for development. This requires going beyond the myth of traditional pedagogy. Pedagogy of hope, almost by definition, will place great emphasis on both the creative and dialogical dimensions of education that utilize technological advances that are essential for societal growth. As such it is expected to assume the presence of an acting person, one who constructively acts upon problematic situations, and who thereby creates a new world and a new hope. Pedagogy of hope is expected to transform the learner into a problem-solving agent, a creator rather than a creature.34To this end, the education process must go beyond mere transmission of factual knowledge. Instead, educators must present knowledge, skills and values that are liberating in as far as they create new horizons and opportunities that are vital for development. The learners too must become critically aware of their potential as humans, of their power to use circumstances rather than being used by them.35 This requires a paradigmatic shift in the conceptualization and management of the education process. For this to be effective the education process must be multi-dimensional and should encompass cognitive and a normative dimensions.

32

Republic of Kenya, Vision 2030.

33 34

Republic of Kenya, Vision 2030, 99. Julius Nyerere, Adult Education and Development: The Tanzanian Experience, (Hamburg: UNESCO Publication, 1979). 35 Nyerere, Adult Education and Development: The Tanzanian Experience.
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Book Reviews
Rethinking Africas Globalization. Volume 1: The Intellectual Challenges. By Paul Tiyambe Zeleza. Africa World Press/Red Sea Press, Lawrenceville, New Jersey. 2003. xi + 496 pp. $29.95. (Cloth), ISBN 1-59221-038-4.

In Re-Thinking Africas Globalization Paul Tiyambe Zeleza breaks new ground in the analysis of postcolonial discourse on globalization. He asks new questions concerning the origins and course of the whole concept of globalization. The book lays a great framework on the whole idea of the intellectual history of Africa, which I think is his major contribution. The book already enjoys a special place not only in Africas intellectual history but also a fitting contribution on the current debate on globalization, especially its linkage with the Washington consensus. The first chapter represents Zelezas theoretical astuteness and intellectual articulateness, where he engages the idea and evolution of the concept globalization. As a historian and an African, Zeleza not only re-defines globalization and its dynamics in African perspectives, but also re-examines its attendant attributes and paradigms in a very interesting manner. By its size, the has surprised those who thought that Zelezas A modern Economic History of Africa of 1993 was too big, which is similar in many ways, especially in quality and genuinely new questions raised and answered. The second chapter looks at the history of African universities as sites of struggle. The book uses African universities and intellectuals, as sites of contestation, looking at their promises, perils and politics. Many of these institutions of higher learning in Africa are ailing while others are in advanced state of decay, in their death throbs. The third chapter looks at the uneven patterns of international academic exchanges between the North and the South. The fourth one looks at the troubled genealogy and future of area studies in the United States. The fifth chapter deals with assessment of knowledge production on the continent, which he curiously refers to as posts, and here Zeleza is at his best. In this chapter he examines post-modernism, post-colonialism among other posts. It is a scathing attack and indictment of what Zeleza calls posts. He lashes out at the problematic nature through which some posts such as post-modernism, post-industrialism, post-colonialism, post-globalism have been produced, seeing them as empty polemical and rhetorical lexicons that have no meaning, and add nothing new to the existing knowledge on Africa. He says that such
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empty, semantically sensationalized and linguistically seductive narratives of these posts seek to shift the focus from real things that matter, to mundane themes such as the body, sexuality, trauma, memory, where the real stuff is lost. From his analysis, it becomes clear that this is a critical monograph, in the deconstruction mode, that will no doubt remain avant-garde in the study of Africas intellectual history in very profound ways. This chapter is a trenchant but problematic critique of the relevance of postmodernism and postcoloniality to African studies. To be sure, the third, fourth and fifth chapters are heavily laden with intellectual mantle in their engagement with paradigm shifts and calling for re-orientation in writing and knowledge-production on Africa. But far from that, these chapters make it explicit that Zeleza not only embellishes but also valorizes Africa, returning it to the center as the cradle of man and the world civilizations, rejecting Africas marginalization in the larger schemes on knowledgecreation and not just a net-consumer of western-generated paradigms. In his sixth chapter, Zeleza ploughs through the massive publication history of B.A Ogot, the icon, through his work with UNESCO and the Historical Association of Kenya. It is not surprising as he later confesses that the idea for the book was born at Kenyatta University where Zeleza, who is currently based at the Penn State University, taught for almost a decade in the 1980s, together with Ogot. It is perhaps the first book of international repute that pays fitting tribute to Kenyan scholar and luminary B.A Ogot, right from his days as a Mathematics teacher at Alliance High School to Deputy Vice Chancellor at the University of Nairobi. The seventh chapter sarcastically entitled Out of America: the Television Wonders of a Gatekeeper is perhaps the most controversial. The chapter analyzes the tabloid debate that erupted on various H-Net discussion lists in response to Henry Louis Gates Junior's discredited six-part television documentary, Wonders of the African World - that premiered in the fall of 1999, a series which Zeleza describes as an atrocious and third-rate travelogue (p. 355). The chapter examines the Ali Mazrui versus Wole Soyinka debates based on the film. Ali Mazrui used his great intellectual endowment and experience in film industry to critique and rubbished the film, taking great exception to many claims made in the film and particularly what was left out. In his preliminary critique, Mazrui accused Gates of many sins of omission and commission: of lying about the level of Africans involvement in slave trade; of dis-Africanizing Egypt; ignoring Swahili experts on the Swahili people; generally relying on whites for scholarly authority and not Africans; being obsessed with race, and of imposing American conceptions of race on Africa; his snide remarks about other peoples values and practices, such as female circumcision. Many leading scholars agreed with Mazruis critique of the film. However, Gates friends led by Mazruis nemesis and great critic Wole Soyinka, attacked Mazrui like wounded lions. Zeleza points out for example, that For Molefi Asante, the doyen of Afrocentric scholarship, there was no doubt that the series was irredeemably Eurocentric, ironically saved from public outcry because Gates is Black (p.332). The debate between Ali A. Mazrui and Henry Louis Gates Jr constitutes the most exciting portion on hegemony in knowledge production, especially the role of the Western gallery. It gives Zeleza the opportunity clearly showing how the North determines how the North influences knowledge-production on Africa. He uses it to critique the scholarship of Wole Soyinka, Kwameh Anthony Appiah, Akosua Perbi, Achille Mbembe, among others, in the process. He revisits the issue of Black Orientalists who have a love-hate relationship with Africa that borders on derision, self-hate, masochism and disdain, no less than ignorance, curiosity and fascination. The Black Orientalists, he says, generally play to the European and American white gallery and are unable, perhaps unwilling, to understand Africa in its

Kenya Studies Review multifaceted and multidimensional capacity. Zeleza suspects that these Black Orientalists invest very little time and intellectual energy on the continent's history, but only skim the surface and declare themselves experts when in reality they know very little about Africa. The eighth chapter consists of a collection of short essay pieces in which Zeleza calls for a social contract between writers, publishers, and the reading public in order to domesticate knowledge production in Africa. Therefore, Rethinking Africas Globalization calls for the need to re-think globalization in very inclusive and wider terms, as a negotiated process rather than an imposition by certain forces. The book dialogues with many centers of knowledge-production in Africa. In this book, Zeleza takes issue with scholars that have been converted to these empty jargons whose high priest is the French scholar Michel Foucault. The book provides an invigorating, penetrating and wide interrogation of Africas engagement with knowledge production. It is a powerful and probing critique of the perils of globalization, especially the myths, meanings, promises, and futility of posts such as post-colonialism, and other contemporary discourses by interrogating their implications for Africa in particular and African studies in general. Zeleza challenges misrepresentations and misappropriations of Africa in academic texts and in the popular media. He makes passionate and persuasive arguments that reaffirm the importance of progressive nationalism, Pan-Africanism, and internationalism for Africas reconstruction, a project in which universities and African intellectualsincluding those in the Northhave a critical role to play in promoting productive trans-national literacy and conversations across the Atlantic. He reinforces the fact that the political economy approach and issues that the dependency school raised are still valid now as they were then as valid theoretical frameworks that cannot be ignored in the writing of Africas history, despite efforts to isolate these frameworks in the emergent post-colonial and post-modern discourses. Tantalizing, absorbing and multidisciplinary, this book offers critical reflections on the enduring questions of Africas intellectual history, her engagement with production of knowledge, development, nationalism, democracy, and self-determination, and it emphasizes the importance of deethnicization, education and radical scholarship in confronting the dilemmas and paradoxes of this century. This book is a must-read for all students and scholars on Africa.
By Maurice Amutabi, Ph.D Department of History

Central Washington University E-mail: amutabim@cwu.edu

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Kenya Studies Review The NGO Factor in Africa: The Case of Arrested Development in Kenya, by Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi. Routeldge, New York, 2006. Pp, xxxviii+238. $ 120. (Available from the publisher and www.amazon.com)

Conventionally, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are defined as social welfare groups whose chief function is to provide care, welfare, and improve all aspects of the lives of the service-recipients. It is within the above parameter that Maurice Nyamanga Amutabi analyzes the work of NGOs in Africa with special reference to Kenya. There are all kinds of NGOs, ranging from bogus entities to genuine aid agencies operating in Kenya. Various studies and reports indicate that whereas there were about 250 such aid agencies in the early 1990s the number has swollen to about 1500 NGOs currently operating in the country. A review of The NGO Factor in Africa: The Case of Arrested Development in Kenya is necessitated by the fact that aid business is booming in Kenya as never witnessed before since the countrys attainment of independence in 1963. Focusing on the Rockefeller Foundation (RF) as a case study, Amutabi illuminates the historical role of NGOs. He adeptly synthesizes the various sources of information including, oral interviews, archival materials, and scholarly works on the subject to provide a hitherto untold story in historiography of NGOs in Kenya. The study provides a linear explanation of what NGO-led development efforts of foreign donors mean to the inhabitants of Africa. The author sheds light on the desire of Euro-American institutions to dominate Africans by reproducing predatory capitalist tendencies in the name of
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initiating development and creating a global village. He sees the Euro-American tendency to globalize the world through NGOs as a euphemism for the recolonization of Africa. Drawing on the colonial archives Amutabi reminds the reader of the story to create an indigenous African elite class of individuals who were educated in colonial schools with the help of NGOs. Such individuals were educated both locally and abroad. The book provides specific instances of institutions where African under the auspices of the Rockefeller Foundation and other like minded organizations obtained higher education. A case in point is Dr. Josephat Karanja who was awarded a scholarship by Rockefeller to study at Princeton University in the USA. Amutabi argues that since World War II the everyday lives of the poor people in Africa have been thoroughly transformed by NGOs (p. xxiii). Nothing could be of poignant interest to the reader than Amutabis juxtaposition of NGO historiography with the escalation of the Cold War and the apparent end of the European empire in Africa. Amutabi shares a theoretical platform with Issa G. Shivji who has argued in Silences in NGO Discourse: The Role and Future of NGOs in Africa published in 2008, that NGOs are inextricably implicated in the neoliberal offensive. The balance-sheet interpretation of NGO presence in Africa sees the Euro-America as benefitting more from the aid agencies than Africa. That Amutabi, therefore, interrogates the neoliberal hegemony in Africa in the book is evident throughout the six passionately argued chapters. He correctly postulates that Euro-Americans stepped up NGO activities in the continent because of their national and international security anxieties of ensuring that they had a foothold in independent Africa. Yet in his attempt to capture the unheard voices of the masses, Amutabi the eclipses efforts of the local people of remaking the world in their own interest by laying stress on their exploitation than the benefits. Amutabi further analyzes the role and activities of Rockefeller Foundation in medical and health research, and its efforts to promote agricultural education in Kenya. He is critical of the organizations efforts to eradicate yellow fever in Kenya, arguing that their motives could only have been selfish, in the least. In his own words, East Africa provided human organ samples for RF scientists to develop yellow fever vaccines in their New York Laboratories (p. 114). Whatever the case, the local African communities appropriated the knowledge to remake their own world. While it is true that NGOs have a tendency to measure development in strictly western terms, the local aid recipients like the beneficiaries of the missionary overture in the heyday of colonialism attempted mould their own destiny in a fast globalizing world. They appropriated the knowledge that they were introduced to for their own benefit. The beauty of the monograph under review is the unapologetic rigor the author exhibits in the narrative. The book has made a remarkable contribution to our understanding of NGOs from a historical perspective. This text is a useful addition to teaching the social and economic history of Kenya. By Hannington Ochwada, Ph.D Department of History, Missouri State University, Springfield, MO (USA) E-mail: HanningtonOchwada@missouristate.edu

Kenya Studies Review Title of the book: Because of Honor ISBN-10: 1889431109. ISBN-13: 978-1889431109 Author: Maurice Amutabi

Because of Honor by Maurice Amutabi makes interesting reading, although like other novels on Africa, it raises more questions than answers. The novel touches multiple themes forced female circumcision, forced and arranged marriage, patriarchy, violence against women, rape and honor killing - many of which are very fascinating and important issues in the history of the Africa today. Some of the themes, such as female circumcision are related to my own research that has appeared in my recent book Female Circumcision: The Interplay of Religion, Culture and Gender in Kenya (Orbis, 2007). Amutabis novel discusses cultural challenges facing women in patriarchal societies as well as the possibilities women have of getting out of cycles of exploitation. The novel seems to suggest that education is one way through women can overcome marginalization. The central figure in the novel is Amina Babu, who defies her parents and society, by refusing to get married. Young Amina Babu is only 16 when she is forced to marry an 86 year old man as a fourth wife in an arranged marriage; because her father Isa Babu has received dowry from the old suitor. The drama unfolds when Amina with the help of her mother, devices a plot of escape from her rural Muslim home in Chelani. The idea of escape enters her mind after coming from a murder scene where a young girl has been killed for defying her parents, by refusing to marry a man of their choice. At the murder scene, Amina asks her mother does this man think that anyone believes him (p.1). Amina and her mother are right to be nervous because one of their own had disappeared mysteriously in the past after defying her father, and they believed that she was killed because of honor and are careful that this should not happen to Amina. Her escape lands her in Mombasa, a predominantly Islamic town on the seashores of the Indian Ocean. As one reads this, the fear is that this escape might lead the little girl from the proverbial frying pan to the fire, but this is not the case as Amina is rescued by a young progressive and liberal couple
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which has defied society in its own way, because the woman a Muslim married to a Christian man. The coupe is able to enroll Amina in school and she ends up at the university. The drama shifts to the university. At the university we come face to face with Aminas intellectual abilities and mental prowess, a witnessing that endears the reader to Amina, to her convictions, to her strengths. Just when the reader wants to sit easy and follow Aminas intellectual growth and walk with her through the university lecture halls, she is abducted by Islamic fundamentalists who take her to her husband who proceeds to rape her. The police and courts come in and Amina is rescued once more. What is important in this novel unlike, other novels like Chinua Achebes Things Fall Apart is that the victim, Amina has the last word, unlike Achebes hero Okonkwo who commits suicide. I was happy to see this choice of events in this novel, for making Amina a heroine and on whose shoulders the survival of the entire society depends. For that reason, Because of Honor sidesteps the convenience of simplicity, to deal frontally with issues of oppression and trauma, through the story of Aminas fight against sickening practices in the name of religion. There are three repugnant practices that the novel deals with female circumcision, vagina sewing and arranged marriage that directly touch on the plight of women in African societies. The novel discusses female circumcision in a detailed manner. There are many references to this brutal tradition in the book, a practice that continues to afflict African women, at home and abroad. I am happy to see the novel pointing out that female circumcision can cause permanent physical and emotional damage to women, just like I have argued in my book Female Circumcision. There many women in Africa who bear the scars of this practice. One can never fully recover from such a traumatic experience. It always leaves cracks in the mind of victims. The novel effectively debunks the centrality of maleness in some African and Islamic cultures while avoiding the discourse of victimhood by casting Amina in powerful trajectories from a very young age. While few non-Muslims could masterfully write a novel on Islam, Amutabis skills have created for Women and Islam in Africa what Chinua Achebe accomplished for the Ibo society in Things Fall Apart. But whereas Achebes project dealt with the dilemma of the native when confronted by a foreign culture, Amutabis project is one where the native or victim triumphs over oppression. The novel resolves itself and has total closure, because Amina emerges from the devastation of Chelani and her family heroically, literally walking through the smoke holding her emotional bazooka on her shoulder! To me, the use of Amina (and her mother Chiku) as agency and lenses through which to tell us the history of women and Islam in Africa is not a refutation of the positive aspects of Islam as a religion but rather dialogue with some aspects in the religion that need careful reflection in human rights discourse and natural justice. He uses the main character Amina effectively as a vehicle to observe and comment on the influence of Islamic culture in Africa. He deploys intricate literary and historical skills and styles to great effect by exposing the wounds that lie beneath the veneer of religion in Africa. The rigor and vigor of expression reveals perhaps Amutabis own anger with the oppression of women in Africa. One sees this in his lack of sympathy for male characters represented as oppressive. I have no doubt that this novel will be a permanent book on the required list of many of the courses on campus, religious studies and philosophy, gender and women studies, political science, anthropology, history and sociology, for it addresses many germane issues affecting the state of women in Africa and which other books have not cared to address. While many creative writers on Islam in Africa tend to have male protagonists, Amutabi chose to make Amina (a

Kenya Studies Review woman) the main character, and the only protagonist against the entire society; a society that operates as a collective antagonist, which is a hugely improbable task in any ordinary terms even for male characters. There are some issues which the author would have represented in a better and more appealing way. For example, the circumcision scene described in the novel is so gross and too scary. Some of the details are not really necessary. I think the novel also exaggerates some situations. For example Amina is presented almost like a superhuman and is often credited with actions than even adult women would not ordinarily do. The author shows hatred of some cultural practices without giving some reasons why, for example female circumcision is still rampant in many parts of Africa, which can easily cast the author as engaging in some form of intellectual activism and not presenting issues as disinterested and neutral observer. The other weakness of the novel is character development. I would have liked to see the development of other characters besides Amina. I would have liked to see Chiku, Aminas mother given more roles in society. One would also have liked to see Aminas brothers developed as characters in order to compare the growing up of women and men in this society. I also thought that some scenes were rushed, such as Aminas life as an undergraduate. The book has a few typos and grammatical errors that should have been addressed by the editors, because they can detract from enjoyment of the story. Overall, the novel has come at an opportune time, because it addresses some of the present anxieties regarding the state of women in Islamic regions of the world, especially with regard to human rights. There are some questions that were triggered in my mind as I read this book and which remain pertinent. Is Chikus infidelity with her brother in-law a moment of weakness or indication of defiance? Is Sango Manenos gentle side and what Aminas regards as an ideal man the way to go from here for men, and should we read in his actions weakness or strength? Is there need to reconcile (as Amina suggests in her eulogy to her father at the end of the book) before all bad people and societal evils have been defeated or totally removed? Is reconciliation a form of compromise and admission of defeat? Is there optimism for the future for women and Islam in Africa? As frightening as these questions are, they cannot be resolved by one novel, but are some of the questions that I know Amutabi will be called upon by other readers to attempt to resolve in his next novel. I liked this book and strongly believe that many teachers of philosophy and religious studies, gender and womens studies, history and anthropology as well as general readers keen to know more about women in Islamic societies will be intrigued with the issues raised in the book. I am sure that they will all be excited to see the manner in which Amutabis novel deals with female circumcision or the subject of female genital mutilation as well as an arranged marriage. Reviewer: Prof. Mary Nyangweso-Wangila, PhD. J. Woolard and Helen Peel Distinguished Professor in Religious Studies East Carolina University E-mail: wangilam@ecu.edu

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Kenya Studies Review

Submission Guidelines for Kenya Studies Review Kenya Studies Review (KSR) is an online journal. The KSR is the principal academic and scholarly journal of the Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA). The KSR appears two times per year in April and December, and is send to members of the Association as one of the many benefits of membership. Manuscripts submitted to the journal should be typed doublespaced, 12 point font (preferably Times New Roman). Submission must be in electronic version, saved as MS Word or RTF attachment (not as PDF). Articles should be between 6,000 and 7,000 words (25 to 30 pages). If copies of maps, charts and graphs are used, they should be provided in camera-ready form. For style manual, use the APA or Harvard Reference System (author - date) for bibliographic referencing, e.g.: The Kallu, as a recognized ritual figure and authority, is increasingly serving as a link between Borana in Kenya and Oromo in Ethiopia (Amutabi 2005: 234). Name and institutional affiliation: Authors should indicate their full name, address (including e-mail contact, fax and telephone), their academic status and their current institutional affiliation. This should appear on a separate cover page since manuscripts will be sent out anonymously to outside readers. Manuscripts should be submitted as Word or RTF documents via e-mail attachment to either the corresponding editor (Maurice Amutabi, amutabim@cwu.edu) or the editor responsible for a particular edition. Articles submitted to Kenya Studies Review should be original contributions and should not be under consideration by another publication at the same time. If an article is under consideration by another publication the author should inform the editor at the time of submission. Authors are entitled to 40 complementary (free) electronic off-prints in form of pdf file for either printing or distribution. Abstract and keywords: Authors should provide an abstract of their paper (not exceeding 150 words). The aabstract should state the main research problem, major findings and conclusions. Articles that do not follow this format will have their processing delayed. A maximum of six words should be given below the abstract. Line spacing: Articles should be double-spaced excluding abstracts, notes and references). Font: Articles, including tables and illustrations, should be submitted in 12pt Times New Roman font. Paragraphs: Authors should indent each new paragraph, except those immediately following a heading, which should be flush left. Do not leave blank lines between paragraphs. Mission: The mission of the KSR is to publish the highest quality articles, as well as book and film reviews in all academic disciplines that are of interest to the interdisciplinary audience of KESSA members. The editors welcome manuscript submissions from scholars everywhere,

Kenya Studies Review whether or not they are members of KESSA. Each submitted article is usually sent out to panels of peer reviewers whose verdict the editors rely upon in deciding whether to accept the script for publication. The articles that appear in the KSR are edited by Maurice Amutabi (Central Washington University), Kefa Otiso (Bowling Green State University), Francis Koti (University of North Alabama) and Charles G. Manyara (Radford University). Book reviews are commissioned and edited by Maurice Amutabi. The Review Process: Each manuscript received by KESSA for publication is immediately assigned a review number to facilitate tracking, and an acknowledgment is sent to the author. The editors read the article and decide whether to go forward with a peer review or to decline to consider it because it fails to meet the ASR mission or format. If the manuscript is to be reviewed, the editors consult the frequently updated reviewer database of members of Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA), to construct a unique panel of reviewers, whose expertise matches the content of the manuscript. Individuals on this panel are then invited to review the manuscript, and to return their reviews within 40 days. Once three peer reviews are received, the editors make a decision whether to accept, to decline the manuscript, or to invite the author to correct and resubmit it. The editors notify the author immediately, and in all cases, the reviewers' observations are sent to the authors, with the reviewers' personal identities masked. The revised articles are then published after satisfying remaining editorial requirements. Manuscript Reviews: The KSR is a double-blind peer-reviewed journal. The editors, while knowledgeable in African studies, cannot possibly command the entire breadth of scholarship on Kenya, and so depend on a vast network of experts to evaluate manuscripts and to write substantive reviews. It is double blind because neither the reviewer nor the author knows each other's identity. The peer review process is the best assurance that KSR will maintain its scholarly quality into the future. The title page: The title page of each paper or article should include, in the following order: Title of the article; Author name(s) (preceded by first names, but with no academic titles given); Name of the institution or organization (if there is more than one author or institution, affiliations should be indicated using superscript Arabic numerals); and an address for correspondence (including the name of the corresponding author with e-mail address and fax and phone numbers). Reference citation: Reference citations in the text and in the reference list proper should follow conventions listed in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association latest edition, referred to hereinafter as the APA Manual. Provide a reference or bibliography that lists every work cited by you in the text. Tables: Tables should be numbered. They must be cited in the text (e.g., As shown in Table 1). Below the table number, a brief descriptive title should be given; this should then be followed by the body of the table. Figures: Figures should be numbered. Each figure must be cited in the text (e.g., As illustrated in Figure 1). As online submission requires papers to be submitted as one file, figures and tables etc should be embedded or appended to the paper and not be sent as separate files.
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However, upon acceptance of an article, it may be necessary for figures to be supplied separately in a form suitable for better reproduction: preferably high-resolution (300 dpi) or vector graphics files. Where this is necessary, the corresponding author will be notified by the publishers. Figures will normally be reproduced in black and white only. While it is possible to reproduce color illustrations, authors are reminded that they will be invoiced for the extra costs involved. Scientific classification and style: Authors should follow the guidelines of the APA Manual regarding style and nomenclature. Authors should avoid using masculine generic forms in their manuscripts. Statements about groups of people should be written in gender-neutral form (See APA manual, 66-7). Language: It is recommended that authors use American English spelling. Standard US American spelling and punctuation as given in Websters New Collegiate Dictionary should be followed. Proofs: Proofs of camera-ready articles will be sent to the corresponding author for errors. Changes of content or stylistic changes may only be made in exceptional cases in the proofs. Copyright Matters: By submitting an article, the author confirms and guarantees on behalf of him-/herself and any co-authors that the manuscript has not been submitted or published elsewhere, and that he or she holds all copyright in and titles to the submitted contribution, including any figures, photographs, line drawings, plans, maps, sketches, and tables, and that the article and its contents do not infringe in any way on the rights of third parties. The author agrees, upon acceptance of the article for publication, to transfer to the publisher the exclusive right to reproduce and distribute the article and its contents, both physically and in nonphysical, electronic, or other form, in the journal to which it has been submitted and in other independent publications, with no limitations on the number of copies or on the form or the extent of distribution. These rights are transferred for the duration of copyright as defined by international law. Online Rights for Articles appearing in KSR: Authors of articles published in KSR may post a copy of the final accepted manuscript for noncommercial purposes, as a word-processor, PDF, or other type of file, on their personal web page or on their employers website after it has been accepted for publication. How to become a KESSA peer reviewer: because KESSA is a professional organization engaged in research, dissemination and mentoring, the editors of the KSR invite individuals, whether members of the Kenya Scholars and Studies Association (KESSA) or not, to participate in the process of reviewing manuscripts. No remuneration is involved, but you get to participate in shaping scholarship on Kenya by providing thoughtful and appropriate comments on research articles and assist editors to make accurate decisions.

Kenya Studies Review

Kenya Studies Review, Volume 1, Number 1 Contents 1. Foreword by Ambassador Peter Ogego 1 2. From the Editor-in-Chief 2 3. Editorial Board 5 4. From KESSA President 7 5. Constitution-Making in Contemporary Kenya: Lessons from the Twentieth Century by Robert Maxon 11 6. Post-Moi era Discourse Patterns in Kenyan Universities: A Nation crying for Organic Intellectuals by Mwangi Chege 31 7. Beyond Imperial Presidency in Kenya: Interrogating the Kenyatta, Moi and Kibaki Regimes and Implications for Democracy and Development by Maurice N. Amutabi 55 8. Horizontal Inequalities and Ethno-regional politics in Kenya by Raymond Muhula 85 9. Kenya in the Crosshairs of Global Terrorism: Fighting Terrorism at the Periphery by Kefa M. Otiso 107 10. Quality of Education and its Role in National Development: A Case study of Kenyas Educational Reforms by Peter Otiato Ojiambo 133 11. Book Reviews 151
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