representation

International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences | 1968 |

II. REPRESENTATIONAL SYSTEMS

By Giovanni Sartori In order to define a representational system one must first define representation, a many-faceted and elusive concept. The term is associated with three quite different meanings: (1) the idea of mandate, or instructions; (2) the idea of representativeness, that is, resemblance and similarity; and (3) the idea of responsibility, or accountability. The first meaning is derived from private law and belongs to the context of juristic representation, whereas the second meaning is derived from a sociological or existential context according to which representation is basically a fact of likeness that transcends all voluntary selection (Friedrich 1963, p. 304) and even awareness (unconscious representation; Gosnell 1948, p. 141). In the juristic meaning, we often speak of a representative as a delegate or a mandatory; in the sociological sense we say that somebody is representative of to mean that he impersonates (impersonare) certain existential features of the group, class, or vocation from which he is drawn. The idea of responsibility and its relationship to representative government, i.e., the third meaning, will be examined below. To be sure, we are concerned here only with political representation. But political representation cannot be dealt with in isolation from other kinds of representation. It is closely connected with sociological (or existential) representation on the one hand and with juristic representation on the other. The extent to which political and sociological representation are intertwined can easily be detected in the discussions about electoral systems and overrepresentation or wnderrepresentation: a debate that expresses a concern for representativeness and resemblance. Yet the distinction between political and existential representation must be kept firm; otherwise almost any political system may claim to be somehow a representational system: ruling groups are always representative of the sections or the strata of the society from which they derive. The extent to which political and juristic representation overlap is shown by the fact that the European theorists of representationGerman, French, and Italianhave reached the almost unanimous conclusion that political representation is not true representation, precisely by using the yardstick of a private law notion of representation (Laband 18761882; Orlando 1895; Saripolos 1899; Carre de Malberg 1922; Kelsen 1945). In fact, unless the distinction between political and juristic representation is kept firm, it is only too easy to reach the conclusion that no political system can claim to be a really representational system. Yet the distinction between political representation and juristic representation cannot be pushed too far because, among other reasons, political representation is formalized in our institutional arrangements and is part and parcel of constitutionalism.

Historical development
The emergence of modern political representation from its medieval phase was a gradual process best seen in the political history of England during the second half of the eighteenth century and in the writings of Algernon Sidney, John Toland, and Humphrey Mackworth. The French Revolution, however, provided a clear-cut break from medieval representation, a fact demonstrated in the constitution of 1791, which expressly forbade mandatory instructions to representatives because the representatives nominated in the constituencies do not represent a particular constituency but the entire nation. Two subtleties are worth noting. First, by saying nominated in, the authors of the constitution expressly meant that the representatives were not nominated by their electors; second, the authors deliberately used nation instead of people. The distinction has far-reaching implications. If the people are declared sovereign, the will of the representatives of the people is secondary to the will of a principal (dominus), and two wills, that of the people and that of the assembly, are actually postulated. But if the nation is declared sovereign as in article 3 of the Declaration of Rights of 1789then there is only one will, for the will of the nation is the very same as the will of those who are entitled to speak for the nation (Carre de Malberg [1922] 1962, p. 267). Thus the origin of the modern idea of political representation was vitally connected with the principle that the deputies represent the will of the nation, not the will of the people. Somewhat paradoxically, members of parliament took on the name deputies at the very moment that they ceased to be, properly speaking,

deputies. Not only were they declared free agents who should not be given instructions, but they were called to represent a will that did not exist before their own will. The idea of representation of the nation does not apply only to the origins of modern representation. The prohibition of mandates, sometimes explicitly connected with the principle of the sovereignty of the nation, is affirmed in the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century constitutions of most European countries: Belgium, 1831; Italy, 1848 and 1948; Prussia, 1850; Sweden, 1866; Austria, 1867, 1920, and 1945; Germany, 1871 and 1949; the Netherlands, 1887; and Denmark, 1915. Article 67 of the Italian constitution of 1948 is a good example: each member of parliament represents the nation and performs his task without being bound by a mandate. And the tortuous formula adopted in the French constitutions of 1946 and 1958the national sovereignty belongs to the peoplemakes little sense unless one is reminded of the declaration of 1789. The pattern in the United States may appear to have been different in that no state constitution expressly forbids mandatory instructions. But this omission means only that American constitution framers did not feel the need to state the obvious, since the United States did not have to break away from a medieval past. Likewise, the fact that the expression sovereignty of the nation has no legal meaning in English public law does not imply that British constitutional practice actually abides by a different presupposition. In effect, the French will of the nation entrusted to the assembly called for the same founding principle advocated by Burke in his Bristol address of 1774: that the representative should no longer be a delegate but a trustee acting according to his free judgment. Modern representation reflects a fundamental historical change. Until the Glorious Revolution in England, the Declaration of Independence in the United States, and the French Revolution, representation was not associated with government. Representative bodies were intermediary channels between their mandatories and the sovereign: they represented somebody to somebody else. But the more the power of parliament grew and the more a parliament was located at the very center of the state, the more representative bodies took on a second function. In addition to representing the citizens, they also ruled over them. Present-day parliaments are Janus-faced: they represent the citizens to the state and the state to the citizens. Clearly, a parliament cannot acquire its modern function, that of governing, without change in its former function, that of representing. A representative body that is inserted into the state must be allowed the discretion that enables it to act for the state. Yet this transformation raises a number of thorny problems. We are confronted with a puzzling fact: a point has been reached at which a representative body ends by representing somebody (the people, or the nation) to himself. The third party, the one to whom the second party was assumed to represent the first, has disappeared. Moreover, the principal of the representative relationship is hard to identify; for it is not easy to answer the question, Who is being represented? According to the constitutional prohibition of mandates and the emphasis on the representation of the nation, the representative does not, or should not, represent those who elect him. However, if a representative does not represent his electors, it follows that it is not the election that creates a representative. If this is so, the following question must be faced: Are elections a necessary means for the establishment of a representational system?

Representation and elections

Representation without elections. The query may be stated as follows: Can there be representation without elections? A positive reply is often given to this question on grounds that are irrelevant to the problem of political representation. If we refer, for instance, to existential or sociological representation, that is, to a merefact of likeness, then it is clear that this kind of representation does not require an election. If representation is defined merely as an idem sentire, as the fact of coinciding in opinion with (Bagehot 1859), any method of selection or even no method at all might do. What matters is not the procedure that may best secure the coincidence in opinion (and behavior) between the representative and the represented but the existence of such coincidence. Political representation, however, is concerned precisely with securing this coincidence. Aside from existential representation, one can still point to many instances in which a representative is appointed, not electedan ambassador, for example. Yet even this case is hardly pertinent, since other guarantees besides the method of selection assure that he will perform his duty qua representative. By contrast, a member of parliament cannot be recalled at will and is subject to democratic control only because he may not be re-elected. The more political representation outgrows juristic representation, the less the former maintains the guarantees provided by the latterexcept for the sanction of removal afforded by periodic elections. And this is why the method of selection appears all-important and becomes the peculiar concern of political representation. In principle there can be no representation (other than existential) unless those represented have some say and some way of protecting themselves; otherwise they would be at the mercy of their alleged representative. And since, ultimately, political representation provides only an electoral safeguard, in this case there can be no political representation without an election.

Elections without representation

The reverse is not true, for we can have elections without representation. Throughout history officials and rulers have been elected, but the election did not in the least imply that the elected represents his electors. This calls attention to the fact that representation is a think so, in the sense that it is only in terms of ideas that a person can be made present by another person (Friedrich 1962, p. 164). With the sole exception of the marginal case of existential unconscious representation, there can be no representation unless the representative feels the expectation of those he represents, and feels that it is a normative expectation. Not only does representation imply think so, but it is also inevitably linked with an ought. Therefore, if an election does not explicitly carry with it the meaning and the intention of electing a representative, not an absolute ruler, no representation follows from an electoral procedure. But this does not prove that elections are not a necessary means: it proves only that they are not, per se, a sufficient means.

Elective representation
Elections are one thing, and representation is another. Still, modern political representation is elective representation, for it is precisely this combination that makes representation both political and modern. The means (elections) cannot surrogate the animus (the idea of representation), but the animus by itself does not suffice. Nonelective representationvirtual representation in the vocabulary of Burkeneeds the support and the safety of actual (electoral) representation. Let it be emphasized that this conclusion applies only to political representation (not to juristic and even less to existential representation) and especially with reference to securing responsibility. The electoral theory of representation actually is the theory of responsible and responsive representation; it is not concerned with satisfying the requirement of similarity but with securing the obligation to respond. [See Elections.]

Representational systems defined Conditions

We may now attempt to reply to the question, What is, and what is not, a representational system? A survey of the literature indicates wide disagreement, for it would seem that any one of the following conditions is either sufficient or necessary: (1) The people freely and periodically elect a body of representativesthe electoral theory of representation. (2) The governors are accountable or responsible to the governedthe responsibility theory of representation. (3) The governors are agents or delegates who carry out the instructions received from their electorsthe mandate theory of representation. (4) The people feel the same as the statethe idem sentire, or syntony, theory of representation. (5) The people consent to the decisions of their governorsthe consent theory of representation. (6) The people share, in some significant way, in the making of relevant political decisionsthe participation theory of representation. (7) The governors are a representative sample of the governedthe resemblance, or the mirroring, theory of representation. According to the previous discussion, conditions 1 and 2 are joint conditions. The mere occurrence of elections does not indicate, in itself, a representational system; accountability to the people is a mere phrase if it cannot be enforced by the sanction of electoral removal. Condition 3 either refers to the premodern practice of representation or appears too exacting and impracticable. On the other hand, conditions 4, 5, and 6 are, per se, too vague. It is only too easy to presume consent and idem sentire; participation may well be obtained by manipulation and regimentation. It can be said, therefore, that these three conditions are more a consequence than a premise; they refer to something that is likely to be found in a representational system but not to a founding condition of a representational system. As for condition 7, the requirement of representativeness is an additional, not a necessary, requirement, which depends very much on the electoral system that is adopted.

Responsibility and representativeness

Nobody denies, to be sure, that one is likely to feel better represented if the representative is somebody like himself, that is, like-minded, somebody who acts the same because he is (existentially, or vocationally) the

same. While this explains the recurrent quest for a parliament that is related to the society (as Mirabeau said) like the map to the territory it represents (for example, Ross 1955, p. 51), the unfortunate thing is that one may conceive of a parliament that is a perfect mirror and yet does not perform a mirroring function. This is why accountability takes a procedural precedence over resemblance, at least in politics. The argument can be pursued: even if representativeness is not, by itself, a sufficient condition, it can still remain a necessary requirement. The difficulty is, however, that while responsibility and like-mindedness are easily combined in a one-to-one relationship, they are very difficult to combine in a many-to-one relationship (when the many amount to tens and even hundreds of thousands). In the context of political representation we are, therefore, confronted with a dilemma: either we sacrifice responsibility to representativeness, or we sacrifice representativeness to responsibility. This conclusion needs to be qualified, however, and calls for a closer look into the notion of responsibility. The idea of responsibility has two sides, or implications : (1) the personal responsibility to someone, that is, the obligation of the representative to answer to the principal and (2) the functional or technical responsibility of meeting given standards, such as capable and efficient conduct or the right course of action (Friedrich 1963, pp. 310311). The first is a dependent kind of responsibility; the second is an independentresponsibility. In the first sense, the representative is related to somebody; in the second sense, reference is made to his responsible conduct, thereby implying that the behavior of a representative is basically entrusted to his own conscience and competence. When the distinction is translated into political terms, it appears that the expression responsible government covers two different expectations: (1) that a government is responsive and accountable to the people for what it does and (2) that a government behaves responsibly by acting efficiently and competently. We may call the first a responsive government and the second an efficient government. And the difference between the two is no small difference. In our private dealings it matters little whether we lean more on personal or on functional responsibility, for in either case the representative has only one end in view: the sole interest of the principal, whatever happens to any other interest. But when political representation is concerned, another end is at stake: the interest of the whole, whatever happens to private interests. For this reason, the distinction between dependent and independent responsibility is, in politics, a crucial distinction, and it matters very much which kind of responsibility a representational system leans on. It is precisely on account of its independent margin of functional responsibility that a government is empowered to pursue the interest of the whole against partial and partisan interests. The more that independent responsibility gives way to dependent responsibility, the more likely it is that the general interest will give way to the claims of sectional, short-sighted, and contradictory interests. It is not a paradox, then, to say that a responsible government can also be a very irresponsible government. Actually, the more responsive it becomes, the less it is in a position to behave responsibly. Ultimately, a choice must be made between the representativeness and the efficiency of government. We cannot ask a government to do one thing and its very opposite, that is, to yield to the demands of the governed and resist the irresponsible demands of the governed. More exactly, we cannot have, at the same time, moreresponsiveness and more independent responsibility. [SeeResponsibility.]

Types of representational systems

The foregoing explains why representational systems belong to two main patterns originating in England and France. The English type of representational system is based on a single-member plurality system of electoral representation, which affords little electoral choice and favors, therefore, a two-party system; whereas the French type is based on proportional systems of electoral representation, which afford a large electoral choice and thereby facilitate multiparty systems. The English type sacrifices the representativeness of parliament to the need of efficient government, while the French type sacrifices efficient government to the representativeness of parliament. If the vocabulary of politics were updated, the English type of representational system could fittingly be labeled cabinet system and the French type could properly be called parliamentary government. Whatever the terminology, representative government poses a two-sided problem: governing and representing. The English (and American) type of political system maximizes the governing requirement, whereas the French (and Continental) type has maximized the mirroring requirement. To be sure, in a number of countries one finds a more balanced combination of efficient government and representative representation (for example, the countries having both proportional representation and a relatively limited number of parties, say from three to five). Nonetheless, from the viewpoint of institutional engineering the fact remains that we cannot build a representational system that maximizes at one and the same time the function of functioning and the function of mirroring. There is a point at which we must

choose, and the realistic alternatives are independent or dependent responsibility, rather than governed and governing democracy (Burdeau 19491957, vol. 6), or feigned and veritable self-government (Ross 1955, pp. 5051). The more developed and differentiated representational systems of the Western nations do not exhaust the range of all possible representational systems. Yet to the extent that the political structures of the developing nations are of a derivative nature, these nations are likely to be confronted with the issues and the problems that we have been discussing. The experience of the West does provide, therefore, a parameter for stating the minimal requirements for the existence of any representational system. A representational system cannot materialize unless electoral accountability makes the governors responsible to the governed. However, all that is required is personal or dependent responsibility, since functional or independent responsibility qualifies the performance, not the relationship. Even the requirement of dependent responsibility should not be taken too literally; it merely implies responsiveness, albeit a sanctionable and safeguarded responsiveness. In conclusion, a political system qualifies as a representational system whenever honest electoral practices secure a fair amount of responsiveness of the governors to the governed. This does not necessarily imply a large enfranchisement; but it does imply that no representational system can be based merely on virtual representation. Nor does a political system qualify as a representational system if it has one ruler (monarch or dictator) who monopolizes the claim of representing the whole. Unless the representative function is entrusted to some collective body that is free enough to express a diversity of views and interests, we may be confronted (at least existentially) with representative rulership but not with a representational system.

Contemporary issues Scale and scope of representation

When representational systems were introduced in England and on the Continent, the electorates were small and so were the governments. With the passing of time the electorate has grown from a few hundred to tens of thousands of electors for one representative. Correlatively the small government with simple problems and few functions has become a large government with complex problems and innumerable functions. Both developments combine to place an ever-growing strain on the relational aspect of representation, that is, on the link between those represented and their alleged representatives. As Bruno Leoni put it, the more numerous the people one tries to represent,and the more numerous the matters in which one tries to represent them, the less the word representation has a meaning referable to the actual will of actual people other than that of the persons named as their representatives (1961, p. 18). While political representation has always been a many-to-one relationship, the many have become so numerous that one may well wonder if, in a 50,000-to-l ratio, it still makes sense to say that each person is represented. The reply is related to the scope of representation and of representative government. As long as representation is considered basically a protective device that limits (among other things) the scope of government, the reply is still, Yes, it surely makes sense. But the wider the coverage and the larger the area of intervention that calls the representative to decide upon matters that fall beyond the understanding of the represented, the more one may be alarmed by the potential of arbitrariness that is involved and wonder whether the scope of representation can be stretched without end. At any rate, one can hardly escape the feeling that the initial link in the chain, the represented, has become an infinitesimal quantity.

Who is represented?
The problem may be stated as follows: The larger the size of the electorate, the smaller the scale of representation; and the smaller the scale of representation, the more we lose sight of who is being represented. At least, this seems an inescapable conclusion if the who of representation refers to the individual. While this conclusion is not always acknowledged in this form, it helps to explain the dissatisfaction with the individualistic or atomistic basis of the theory and practice of representation. The opposition to individualistic representation need not be explained as merely a nostalgic revival of medieval corporate representation. However, the fact is that whenever the anti-individualistic mood has prevailed (as in Italy and Germany during the 1930s), it has been used to justify an autocracy rather than to suggest new means or techniques of nonindividualistic representation. Without abandoning the starting point of the individual voter, we may scrutinize his voting behavior with reference to the representational message, or intention, that he transmits. It has been suggested that the act of voting expresses (1) what the elector has to say (or thinks), or (2) what the elector is (existentially), or (3) what

the elector wills. According to the first view, representation represents opinion; according to the second, it represents class or vocational appurtenance; according to the third, an individual may be represented even though he is inarticulate or silent. The first is the traditional view, and is apparently destined to succumb under the joint blows of electoral numbers and big government. Whether we like it or not, we are thus likely to fall back on the other two interpretations. Both make the individual voter less of an individual. For if we vote by identifying ourselves with a social class, the fact that we vote per capita does not mean that we vote qua individuals. And the will theory of representation not only can be conceived collectivistically but can, moreover, be put to use for any purpose whatever, since a will that is silent or not articulated can be said to wish anything that its interpreter thinks it should. These two approaches provide a way out precisely because they no longer attempt to answer the query concerning who is being represented. They actually provide an answer concerning what is being represented which is not quite the same thing.

What is represented?
Since all representational systems adopt a territorial criterion of electoral apportionment, what is actually being represented are the localities, the geographic areas. But acknowledgment of this only leads to a reformulation of the question, What comes to be represented through a territorial channeling? The reply is largely a matter of speculation (or of needed research), except for one definite conclusion: territorial representation does not satisfy and even impedes occupational or functional representation. The question of what is being represented can also be approached by discussing whether representation is focused more on ideal preferences or on material interests, more on values or on wants. And while territorial representation considers the citizen (not the homo economicus), thereby implying, among other things, that the voter should be encouraged to respond in terms of ideals rather than wants, the contention is that the adoption of vocational representation would definitely elicit a response in terms of material interests. In any case it should be pointed out that whether or not we believe in individualism, and whether or not territorial representation works as it is supposed to work, we are made to vote qua individual citizens according to a territorial criterion of apportionment because it is the safest way of getting the electoral business done. If territorial apportionment is already exposed to tricky manipulations (gerrymandering), vocational or any other kind of functional apportionment would allow no end of manipulative trickery. [SeeApportionment.] In free societies, the idea of replacing a political parliament with an occupational parliament (or parliament of experts) has only led to attempts to combine the two. Side by side with the political parliament, some kind of technical or vocational parliament was established expressing the views of special interests, for example, theReichswirt-schaftsrat of the Weimar Republic and the economic advisory councils established in the 1950s in Italy and France (but not in West Germany). The attempt has definitely failed in Italy while it has been relatively successful in France and in some smaller countries. Ultimately, however, great difficulties arise out of the relative positions of the technical and the political parliaments. There are three possibilities: either (1) the technical parliament has the final say, or (2) the two parliaments are made equal, or (3) the technical parliament is a subordinate consultative body. The first case would in effect eliminate the political parliament; the second would lead to systematic conflict and paralysis; whereas in the third instance the consultative body would be listened to only when the political parliament was in the mood to do so. What is being represented, then, in or by a political parliament? Local and community interests, class appurtenance, special and sectional interests, ideals, individual wants? Depending on the scale of representation, different combinations of all of these are represented. All sorts of voices that are strong enough to make themselves heard somehow find their way to a representative body.

The how of representation

Whatever the who or the what of representation, there remains the problem of the how. And, clearly, the how of representation feeds back on the what and even on the who. Broadly speaking, the how refers to the way in which a representational system is established and made to operate. Precisely who and what benefits from a given representational system may remain obscure, but one thing is clear: if the how is known, a system of elective representation (as defined above) allows more freedom and provides more responsiveness than any other known system. More specifically, the how of representation can be taken to mean the style of representation, as Wahlke and his associates (1962) call it. In this sense the how of representation is related to the role orientations of the representative, for example, whether he acts more as a delegate or more as a trustee or whether he is more a party man, a constituency servant, or a mentor (Eulau 1962).

From another point of view, the how of representation is related to the electoral system and to the party system. The relationship between electoral systems and representational systems has already been mentioned and is a relatively old problem (for example, Duverger 1951). A more recent problem is how the representational process is affected by party interposition. For the more mass democracy there is and the more mass parties there are in a political system, the more the how of representation hinges on the party system as a vehicle of the representational process.

Party representation
The scale of representation being as it is, parties are a means for reducing unmanageable numbers to a manageable size. Citizens in modern democracies are represented through and by parties. This seems inevitable. The troubling thing is, however, that a point may be reached, or even has been reached, at which, as Beer (1965, p. 88) concisely put it, the function of representing the national interest, once attributed to the Sovereign and later to Parliament, is now performed by party. Partyto echo Herman Finers phraseis indeed king. Now, to speak of the party as a filter for political representation is one thing; to speak of the party as king is quite another thing. The theoretical and constitutional problems that have resulted from this development are thorny; this is one of the reasons why even the more recent constitutions avoid giving formal recognition to party representation (the exceptions are the constitution of Brazil, the Bonn constitution, and the French constitution of 1958). A realistic view of the present-day representational process confronts us, then, with a two-step process or even with a process that is cut in two: a relationship between the electors and their party, and a relationship between the party and its representatives. And the contention is that party nomination, that is, party cooptation, tends to be the real election; for while the electors choose the party, the elected are actually chosen by the party. Of course parties, party systems, and countries are very different, and therefore generalizations can be very misleading. Yet it can be argued that whenever we are confronted with rigidly and powerfully organized mass partiesas is usually the case in Europethe representative is likely to be far more a spokesman for his party than for anyone else (including his electors), and party bonds are perhaps far stronger than any other bonds (including the ties of social class). Thus, according to Duverger (1956), the modern representative is entrusted with a double mandate, from his electors and from the party; and in practice the party mandate takes precedence over the electoral mandate. Representation has lost all immediacy and can no longer be viewed as a direct relationship between the electors and the elected. The process hinges on three elementsthose represented, the party, and the representatives. And the intermediary link appears to be so decisive that a point could be reached at which parliamentary representation would resemble party personnel, in the strict meaning of party career men, much more than the society it was asked to resemble. If so, the party would indeed be king and one could conclude that the who being represented is actually the party. In spite of the lack of adequate research, the available evidence suggests that this point has not yet been reached, although the parliamentary duplication of professional party politicians is progressing. [SeeParties, Political.] Although not unusual, it is perplexing that while actual political developments point in one direction, much of the prevailing theory and practice point in another. The scale of representation has become infinitesimal; the scope of representation bypasses the grasp of the common man; furthermore, parties have largely replaced the electorate in deciding what should be represented and how. All these developments seem to indicate that what is really at stake is responsibility and that the real problem is how to improve the performance of big government in terms of independent responsibility without too great a loss of accountability. Yet much of the recent literature still emphasizes the sociological approach to representation, and proportional representation still enjoys the reputation of being the one truly representative electoral system. Since both concerns imply similarity, or representativeness, they could be described as somewhat anachronistic.

Research issues
To the extent that representational systems are normative constructions, they are largely beyond empirical disproof. Representational systems also presuppose, however, factual assumptions that can, and should, be tested empirically. In this connection there are three main areas of inquiry that are relevant to the theory of representation: (1) public opinion, that is, what people really want and expect; (2) decision makers, that is, who is actually chosen (how) to serve as a representative; and (3) representational behavior[seeRepresentation, article onRepresentational Behavior]. Despite field surveys and opinion polls, we do not know as much as we should concerning what people really demand from a representational system. According to one author, the English people still like being

governed, and the evidence suggests that the order of priorities is, for the British, the following: (1) consistency, prudence, and leadership; (2) accountability to Parliament and the electorate; (3) responsiveness to public opinion and demands (Birch 1964, p. 245). Possibly this could also be the order of priorities in West Germany, while perhaps in the United States responsiveness ranks second. On the other hand, one might guess that in countries like France (during the Third Republic and Fourth Republic) and Italy, the order of priorities would be (1) responsiveness, (2) accountability, and (3) leadership (that is, independent responsibility). So far, the results of only one nation-wide study are available and they concern constituency influence in the U.S. Congress (Miller & Stokes 1963). As to the second focus of inquiry, decision makers in the legislative arena, there is growing documentation concerning who is who in parliaments (Meynaud 1967). While the data are very uneven and difficult to compare, we are now in a position to test at least some aspects of the resemblance theory of representation on a country-by-country basis: England (Guttsman 1961; Ber-rington & Finer 1967), France (Dogan 1961; Hamon 1967), United States (Matthews 1954a; 1954b; 1967; Miller & Stokes 1965), Italy (Sartori 1957; 1967), Israel (Akzin 1967). The sociological approach to representation that is implied by the foregoing documentation is seldom focused, however, on the problem of party representation: for example, the parliamentary duplication or projection of party career personnel has as yet received very little attention. In general, the role of the party as an intervening variable has remained a neglected area of research. The findings on whether (and if so to what extent) it is the party that administers the sanction of removal, or on whether the party is the real recruiter, are poor, peripheral, and widely conflicting (for example, Seligman 1958, p. 361; Sorauf 1963, p. 120). Likewise, the claim that parties receive an electoral mandate remains a matter of speculation, even though it could be warranted or disclaimed by ascertaining whether this is really the expectation of the voter. The resemblance aspect of representation has been explored far more than the aspects of accountability and responsibility. Possibly research in that area is easier. This is all the more reason for stressing that a reorientation of the focus of research on accountability is badly needed. For instance, whose sanction of removal is feared mostthe sanction coming from the electorate, from the party machine, or from other supporting groups? This is a rather crucial questionand a question that remains unanswered. Giovanni Sartori BIBLIOGRAPHY A penetrating analysis of the issues raised by political representation in the context of Continental constitutionalism, with particular reference to France, may be found in CarrS de Malberg 1922. Sartori (1957) 1962 includes a survey of the literature; Birch 1964 covers the British approach; and de Grazia 1951 is relevant for the American pattern. Concerning the medieval origins of representation, Clarke 1936 is still a valuable analysis, in addition to the classic Carlyle & Carlyle 19031936. With reference to the European constitutional development of the theory of representation, the most influential work has been Gierke 18681913. Akzin, Benjamin 1967 The Knesset. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Bagehot, Walter (1859) 1965 Parliamentary Reform. Pages 296347 in Walter Bagehot, Bagehots Historical Essays. Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor. Beer, Samuel H. 1965 British Politics in the Collectivist Age. New York: Knopf. Berrington, H. B.; and Finer, S. E. 1967 The British House of Commons. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Birch, Anthony H. 1964 Representative and Responsible Government. London: Allen & Unwin. Burdeau, Georges 19491957 Traite de science poli-tique. 7 vols. Paris: Librairie Gnral de Droit et de Jurisprudence. - See especially Volume 6. Carlyle, Robert W.; and Carlyle, A. J. (19031936) 1950 A History of Mediaeval Political Theory in theWest. 6 vols. New York: Barnes & Noble; London: Blackwood. -> See especially Volume 5, Chapter 9, and Volume 6, Part 2, Chapter 6. Carr de Malberg, Raymond (1922) 1962 Contribution a la thorie gnrale de Ietat: Spcialement daprs les donnees fournies par le droit constitution- nel frangais. Volume 2. Paris: Sirey. Clarke, Maude V. (1936) 1964 Medieval Representation and Consent: A Study of Early Parliaments in England and Ireland, With Special Reference to the Modus tenendi parliamentum. New York: Russell. de Grazia, Alfred 1951 Public and Republic: Political Representation in America. New York: Knopf.

Dogan, Mattei 1961 Political Assent in a Class Society: French Deputies 18701958. Pages 5790 inDwaine Marvick (editor), Political Decision-makers. New York: Free Press. Duverger, Maurice 1951 The Influence of the Electoral System on Political Life. International Social Science Bulletin 3:314352. Duverger, Maurice 1956 Esquisse dune theorie de la representation politique. Pages 211220 in Levolution du droit public. Paris: Sirey. Eulau, Heinz 1962 The Legislator as Representative: Representational Roles. Pages 267286 in JohnWahlke et al., The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior. New York: Wiley. Friedrich, Carl J. 1962 Representation. Volume 19, pages 163167 in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Chicago:Benton. Friedrich, Carl J. 1963 Man and His Government: An Empirical Theory of Politics. New York: McGraw-Hill. Gierke, Otto Von (18681913) 1954 Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. 4 vols. Graz (Austria): Aka-demische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt. - Volume 1: Rechtsgeschichte der deutschen Genossenschaft.Volume 2: Geschichte des deutschen Korperschaftsbe-griffs. Volume 3: Die Staats- und Korporationslehre des Altertums und des Mittelalters und ihre Aufnahme in Deutschland. Volume 4: Die Staats- und Korporationslehre der Neuzeit. Gierke, Otto Von (1881) 1958 Political Theories of the Middle Age. Cambridge Univ. Press. -> First published as Die publicistischen Lehren des Mittelalters, a section of Volume 3 of Gierkes Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. Translated with a famous introduction by Frederic William Maitland. Gierke, Otto Von (1913) 1934 Natural Law and the Theory of Society: 1500 to 1800. Translated with an introduction by Ernest Barker. 2 vols. Cambridge Univ. Press. -> A translation of five subsections of Volume 4 of Das deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. A paperback edition was published in 1957 by Beacon. Gosnell, Harold F. 1948 Democracy: The Threshold of Freedom, New York: Ronald Press. Guttsman, W. L. 1961 Changes in British Labour Leadership. Pages 91137 in Dwaine Marvick (editor),Political Decision-makers. New York: Free Press. Hamon, Lo 1967 Members of the French Parliament. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. II parlamento italiano, 19461963. A research project directed by Giovanni Sartori. 1963 Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. Kelsen, Hans (1945) 1961 General Theory of Law and State. New York: Russell. Laband, Paul (18761882)19111914 Das Staatsrecht des deutschen Reiches. 5th ed. 4 vols. Tubingen (Germany): Mohr. La Bigne De Villeneuve, Marcel De 19291931 Traite generale de Ietat: Essai dune thiorie rialiste de droit politique. 2 vols. Paris: Sirey. Leibholz, Gerhard (1929) 1960 Das Wesen der Re-priisentation und der Gestaltswandel der Demokratie im 20. Jahrhundert. 2d rev. ed. Berlin: Gruyter. Leoni, Bruno 1961 Freedom and the Law. Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand. Matthews, Donald R. 1954a The Social Background of Political Decision-makers. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Matthews, Donald R. 1954b United States Senators and the Class Structure. Public Opinion Quarterly 18:522. Matthews, Donald R. 1967 United States Senators: A Collective Portrait. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Meynaud, Jean 1967 Introduction. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Meynaud, Jean (editor) 1967 Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Earlier versions of the articles in this book were published in Volume 13 of the International Social Science Journal. Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. 1963 Constituency Influence in Congress. American Political Science Review 57:4556. Miller, Warren E.; and Stokes, Donald E. 1965 Representation in Congress. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall.

Orlando, Vittorio E. (1895) 1940 Del fondamento giuridico della rappresentanza politica. Pages 417456 in Vittorio E. Orlando, Diritto pubblico generate: Scrittivarii (18811940) coordinatiin sistema. Milan: Giuffr. Ross, James F. S. 1955 Elections and Electors: Studies in Democratic Representation. London: Eyre & Spot-tiswoode. Saripolos, Nikolaus N. 1899 La democratic et Vilec-tion proportionelle. Paris: Rousseau. Sartori, Giovanni (1957) 1962 A teoria da represen-tacao no estado representativo moderno. Belo Horizon-te (Brazil): Edicoes da Revista Brasileira de Estudos Politicos. Sartori, Giovanni 1967 Parliamentarians in Italy. In Jean Meynaud (editor), Decisions and Decision Makers in the Modern State. Paris: UNESCO. Seligman, Lester G. 1958 Party Roles and Political Recruitment. Western Political Quarterly 11:359361. Sorauf, Frank J. 1963 Party and Representation: Legislative Politics in Pennsylvania. New York: Atherton. Wahlke, John et al. 1962 The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior. New York: Wiley. http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/representation.aspx#1

"Representation." International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. 1968. Encyclopedia.com. 19 Apr. 2012<http://www.encyclopedia.com>.

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