Christine De Pisan and Thomas Hobbes Author(s): Karen Green Reviewed work(s): Source: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol.

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Vol. ThePhilosophical Quarterly 44,No. 177 ISSN 0031-8094

October 1994

CHRISTINE DE PISAN AND THOMAS HOBBES

BY KAREN GREEN
Recent feminist political theoryhas been highlycritical of the social contracttradition.1 Liberalism,in particular,has been deemed an inadfoundationfor feminism, and some have argued that feminist equate should be groundedin a non-contractual political theory understanding of society.2It has been suggestedthat in a feminist, non-contractual, political theory,relationsbetween citizenswould be modelled on those between mothersand children. In this paper I hope to illuminatethe between contractual and non-contractualconceppoints of difference tions of society by comparing the political writingsof the mediaeval feminist Christinede Pisan withthose of Thomas Hobbes. Christinede Pisan, I argue, can be interpretedas endorsing a more 'maternalist' conception of political authoritythan other monarchistthinkers.Her us writingthus offers one version of a non-contractualunderstanding of political relations. However, the consequences that she draws from her understanding political rightsand duties, modelled as they are of on maternaland filialobligations,are not compatible with the modern feministcommitmentto egalitarianism. In order to illuminate the and weaknessesof social contracttheoryI first discuss one of strengths Carol Pateman's criticismsof Hobbes and show thatit is flawed.I then offer own criticism Hobbes' reasoning,arguingthat the situation of my of women serves to demonstratea dramatic failurein his logic. Howto ever, the nature of this failureis not sufficient undermineall forms of social contract theory. What it shows is not that social contract but that it is incomplete.The nature of theoryis completelydefective, this incompletenessis further illuminatedthrougha discussion of the of political writings Christinede Pisan. Like Hobbes, de Pisan wrote a number of political treatises,includde ing Le Livredu Corps Policie,at a time of impendingcivil war, and in the hope of promotingpeace. Like him, she was interestedin upholdI See Pateman 1988, 1989. 2Jaggar1983, p. 50; also Held. OX4 IJF,UK ? The Editors ThePhilosophical of 1994. 108 Road, Oxford Publishers, Cowley by Quarterly, Published Blackwell MA and 238 Main Street, Cambridge, 02142,USA.

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of ing the authority the sovereign(cf. Hobbes EW vol. 2, pp. 78-80). Unlike him, she also wrote explicitlyand at length on the place of women in society,and her views cast a new lighton Hobbes' advocacy in of political subjection. There are further similarities their thought, which will be discussed below. And there is also an importantdifference, which resides in their assumptionsconcerningmoral psychology and moral education. Hobbes believes thatreason by itself mustbe able to give us a reason forbeing ethical,for'the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, and (in summe) doing others, weewouldbe done to as Modesty, Mercy Equity, ... are contraryto our naturall Passions' (L ch. xvII, pp. 87-9). to) De Pisan, by contrast, writes within the frameworkof a Christian Platonismwhich treatsthe love of the good as a natural tendency,distinct from reason. For her, moral motivationis sui generis, and is not identicalwithprudence. I shall argue thatfeminist objectionsto Hobbes are most cogent if they are understoodas objections to his moral psychology, but this moral psychologyis not an essential part of social contracttheory.This indicatesthe possibility developinga versionof of in which is both contractualand maternalist, a sense to political theory be developed later. I. THE FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF HOBBES Hobbes introduceshis discussion of commonwealthswith the observation that humans are by nature equal. They are all equally possessed of reason, the desire to preserve their own life above all thingsand, imfor the portantly his argument, capacityto preserveit (L ch. xIII, p. 63). to a standardinterpretation, then argues that humans are he According and self-interested thatthe state of natureis a stateof war. Since a state of war is in no one's long-terminterest, people are led by reason to enter into a social contractand to give up their freedomin exchange for the protectionwhich the state provides. Thus the existence of the state and its laws is justifiedin the light of the rational egoism of all humans. Reason leads to the recognitionthat the best way to preserve one's own life, liberty and material possessions is to submit to the power of a state that will protectthem (L ch. xvII, pp. 87-90). The existence of women and childrenposes an immediate difficulty for Hobbes' political views, for women in civil society are not men's equals, and it is extremelyodd to thinkof our ethical relations with childrenas based on contract(see Brennan and Pateman). Yet, unlike so many male theorists, Hobbes resiststhe temptation explainingthis of
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and he social inequality by postulating women's natural inferiority, as naturallyinvolvingwomen's subordinadoes not interpret marriage he tion. With admirable consistency, insiststhat in the state of nature that husbands have men and women are equals and that any authority of over wives is the resultof civil society.He points to the possibility a like the Amazons, who according to traditiongoverned themsociety tribesof men forintercourseand withneighbouring selves, contracting them any boy children who might be born, while retaining giving exclusivecontrolover theirdaughters(L ch. xx, p. 105; and EWvol. 2, over children p. 116). In the state of nature, Hobbes argues, authority that rests with mothers exclusively,for, without the social structures cannot be proved, and 'since everyman by ensure paternity, paternity to law of nature,hath rightor propriety his own body, the child ought of the mother,of whose body it is part until ratherto be the propriety the time of separation' (EWvol. 4, p. 154). Neverthelessit is not generation but preservationwhich entitlesthe mother to dominion over her child, and should she expose it and it be broughtup by some other, the right of dominion would pass to that other. Having made these observations,Hobbes says nothingexplicit regardingthe justice of the of usual relationship husbands to wives in the societyin which he lived. He observesmerelythat forthe mostpart civil law gives dominion over children to the fatherbecause commonwealthshave been erected by and not by the mothersof families(L ch. xx, p. 105). the fathers Somethingis clearlymissingfromHobbes' story.If his premiseswere true, and if societywere founded on a social contractbetween equals, we would expect women to be among the contractorsas well as men. Individual women are not, as Hobbes admits, necessarilyweaker than individual men, and in any case, weak men as well as strongones are partyto the contractthat foundssociety.So how did the subjection of women arise? Feministcriticsof liberalismhave suggesteda numberof places where the Hobbesian storyfalls down. Many have objected to his premises concerninghuman nature, and in particularto the claim that humans are rational egoists(e.g.,Jaggar p. 45). Some (e.g., Flax) have modified this claim by suggestingthat only men are rational egoists, and that is consequentlythe view of human nature that Hobbes offers distorted it of and purely masculine. In support of the first these criticisms can be pointed out that Hobbes' storyis not borne out by anthropology, and in order for infantsto survive,mothersmust be, at least partly, altruistic. So, it can be argued, Hobbes' assumption of universal rational egoism is not borne out by the facts.
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While the difference betweenthose social contracttheorieswhich are with feminismand those which are not depends, I shall compatible is argue, on whetherHobbes' moral psychology adopted, by themselves these observationsdo not take us veryfaras criticisms Hobbes' logic. of Humans may not be total egoists, but it is not reasonable to assume that they are total altruistseither. Althoughmost people act altruistically towards some individuals,many cannot be relied upon to extend this behaviour to a verywide group. If they could, there would be no need for laws and institutionsto protect our rights. As Hobbes observed, in response to contemporaryobjections to his jaded assessment of human nature, we shut our doors when we go to sleep and defend our coasts, thus manifestingour belief that others will not (EW vol. 2, p. 6). And in fact all necessarily treat us altruistically that Hobbes needs to assume forthe sake of his argumentis that even if we are by nature reasonably altruisticto those who are close to us, or by blood relationship,proximity in virtue of some other trait that excites our sympathy, we place our own self-preservation very high our interestsand that in fact, in general, it is an over-riding among consideration.3 Anothercommon criticism Hobbes is that there never was a state of of nature in which people lived as isolated individuals.But as it stands this falls shortas a compellingcriticism.One can read Hobbes as sugthat thereonce was a state of nature gestingthe implausiblehypothesis isolated individuals,but thereare places where he clearly populated by thinksof the state of nature as populated by familygroups, in conflict witheach other,who are broughttogether into a commonwealth the by social contract.This suggeststhe following developmentof the feminist critique. Either Hobbes accepts the unrealistichypothesisthat there was a state of nature in which humans lived as isolated atoms, or he must admit that the familyconstitutes the first society,and that since the familyis held togetherby natural altruisticsentiments, morality cannot simplybe grounded in reason. Yet Hobbes can be read as having pre-emptedthis criticism, and as it on the grounds that natural ties of affection are not having rejected sufficient hold familiestogether.He speaks of the familiesof 'the to savage people in many places of America' as being held togetheronly by 'natural lust', and he also says that thereexistsin the state of nature 'the natural inclinationof the sexes, one to another,and to theirchildren' (L ch. xIII, p. 65 and ch. xx, p. 105). But, he says, such ties are
3 See Coady.
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weak and easily broken. The familymust thereforebe held together in by a compact that reflects miniaturethe compact that founds civil of Members of a familyconsent to the absolute authority the society.4 familyhead in exchange forthe protectionprovided by membershipof the family.Since childrenowe theirlives to the protectionand nurture of the one who has brought them up, who need not be a natural parent, that person has dominion over them derived fromthe child's consent, 'either express or by other sufficient arguments declared' (L ch. xx, p. 105). So Hobbes understandsthe development of civil societyas a two-stageprocess. Individuals contractto come togetherin familygroups, which are, as a matterof fact,usually patriarchal;and then patriarchal familyheads contract togetherto form a commonwealth. The state of nature that exists in an abstract and theoretical as sense between individuals,exists historically a state of war between familiesand existseven now between nations. The resultingHobbesian explanation of the inequality of women in civil societyis that commonwealthsare set up by fathers, and civil accords dominion to fathers, because mothersare already subsociety evidence jugated withinpatriarchalfamilies.And thereis contemporary But thatthisis how the statewas formed.5 thisonlypushes the apparent inconsistencyback a step. For how is it that fathershave obtained dominion over mothers and hence over their children? One answer mightbe that Hobbes is simplywrong about the natural equality of all individualsand that men and women are not equal in natural liberty. Indeed Hobbes himselfequivocates over this,and at one place admits that the equality he has in mind is possessed by 'all men of riperyears' if (EW vol. 2, p. 115). This admission would be strengthened one took into account the fact that, although an individual man may not be strongeror more able than an individual woman, women as a group are less strong than men. It is also plausible given the particular because of pregnancy.Women wishingto disadvantageswomen suffer in theirinfants'lives are likelyto surrender the face of a threat preserve to theirchildren, even iftheycould sacrifice infant the and thenpossibly of theiraggressors.And, because of the possibility pregnancy, vanquish women are subjectto a kindof attack,rape, thatmay have consequences forthem different fromany that a man will ever suffer. Pregnancyalso has another consequence. So long as children are seen as an asset, women will be a valuable resource and so will be treated as booty, ratherthan enemies, in war. There is historicalevidence that the first
4 See Chapman. 5 See Lerner pp. 89, 121-2.
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slaves were women captured in battle and spared the death that automaticallyawaited the men of theirvanquished tribes(Lernerpp. 78-89). Since men have littlemotivationto kill women, women have little to to makes no explicit gain by attempting vanquish men. Hobbes himself mention of the natural disadvantages that women face due to childbearing, but theyremain in the backgroundof his account. In her book TheSexualContract Carole Pateman considersa Hobbesian withHobbes' genstoryof this sort,and argues that it is not consistent eral assumptionthat people are rational egoists.If choosing to care for infantsputs women at a disadvantage,and all individualsare rational and so the first generegoists,then women would not care forinfants, ation would be the last (p. 49). But this is too quick a rebuttalof the Hobbesian story.Hobbes' individualsare interested, first and foremost, in the preservation theirlives. In the face of conflict of witha potential enemy there are always three options: to flee; or, if it is too late for that, to submitto the otherpartyand contractinto theirservice; or to fightto the point where either the other is vanquished (killed or submits)or one loses one's own life.If it comes to battle,some women may take the former,some the latter course. Since the children of those women who take the option of fighting the death are less likelyto be to born, if the woman is childless,and more likelyto die, if she has children, over time there will be more children who are brought up by those women who have accepted submission. So the assumption that leads to the conclusion that, in the first aim of all is self-preservation the state of nature, if there is a life-and-deathconflict,the women whose childrensurvivewill tend to be those who are prepared to accept submissionin order to increase theirchildren'schances of survivaland at who are, in this sense, reasonably altruistic, least towardstheirown children. More recently,Pateman (1991 p. 70) seems to have given up her criticism the cogency of Hobbes' storyand to have recognizedin his of work in an early nineteenth earlier and twenversion theargument, of presented thelater tieth in and civilization centuries elaborate detail with much data, ethnographic that and of of andpolitical resulted theoverthrowmother-rightthetriumph from society patriarchy. This is surelyright.Hobbes, with his mention of the Amazons, shows some awareness of the very mythsof the historic 'defeat of women' which fuelledlater speculationabout the existenceof an originalmatriHobbes in this way throwsinto question the archy. But interpreting success of the Hobbesian project, just so long as we interpretthat
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project as involving a demonstrationof the rational justificationof obedience to the moral law. This emerges because we can establish that, while the Hobbesian framework does provide an explanation of the origin of women's subit ordinationwithinthe patriarchalfamily, cannot provide a justification in of that subordination.Pateman's intention, her early rejectionof the of Hobbes' argument,would seem to have been to preconsistency empt any rationalizationof the subjection of women which took it to be, like the subjection of servantsto masters,and citizens to the state, of groundedin consent,even consent obtained in circumstances duress. she interprets woman's historical situation as one of slavery Instead, of imposed upon women by the fraternity men in order to guarantee men's rightof sexual access. But her total rejection of social contract of leaves nothingin place forthe reconstruction a feminist theory theory of justice. Although social contract theory may be flawed, properly it interpreted can provide a plausible account ofjustice, understoodas fairness.It would be hastyto reject it in its entirety until such time as a betteralternativebecomes available. It therefore seems worthwhile to take a longer route in order to see what is at fault with such Hobbesian rationalizationsof women's historicalsubjection. There is in the literature Hobbes some controversy on over the interof his intentions(see Greenleaf). On one traditionalview, he pretation gives a descriptionof political society,based on what he takes to be scientificpremises, which leads him into ethical relativismand the claim that mightis right.He says that there is no justice outside civil societyand thatwhat is just depends on the civil law. This would apply, in particular,to matrimony. The civil law is whateveris promulgated the sovereign,and the sovereigngains its legitimacyfromits power by to protectthe citizenssubjectto it. Subjectionto the sovereign rational, is because it is only throughthe consent of each individual to be ruled that peace can be preserved, and peace is the precondition for the preservationof life. The subjectionof women to theirhusbands will be rational,by the same reasoning,if civil societyhas patriarchallaws. It will be rational in the state of nature also, in so far as it is a means of then,ifone is not one of the mighty, preserving peace. If mightis right, obedience and serviceto the powers that be is the most reasonable and prudentcourse of action, the best way of maintainingthe protectionof the mightyand the benefits theirgood favour. So, if Hobbes is corof rect,women's traditionalacceptance of submissionis grounded in their desire for self-preservation and their consequent desire for peace. this reading of Hobbes mightappear to rationalize women's Although
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historicalsubjection,it also has emancipatory implications.If men hold sway over women merelyon the grounds of consent obtained through the use of force,and women are able to reversethe situation,perhaps because changing technologyhas altered the importanceof muscle in the distribution power and diminished the disadvantages of pregof nancy, then women have a natural rightto do so. All spoils will go to the victorin the battle of the sexes, and woman must be expected to retrieveher natural dominion over her children and the fruitsof her labour whenevershe has the power to do so. But at the same time this of a reading undercutsthe possibility articulating satisfactory theoryof justice between the sexes that could be acceptable to both men and women, because it denies that there is any justice beyond the laws which are upheld by those in power. On another reading, Hobbes is arguing that there is a God-given naturallaw, the studyof which is the science of naturaljustice, and this law is perceptibleby the lightof reason (L ch. xxxI, p. 197). Such a law is ineffectual but at the same except when upheld by a civil authority, time a civil authority will ultimately ineffectual be unless it understands and obeys the natural law. Rational individuals subject themselvesto the state, in order to ensure that the natural law is upheld, and any state that is to preserveitselfmust have a civil law in keepingwith the law of nature (EW vol. 4, pp. 213-20). Because people entercivil socias etyin order to preserveas many of theirnatural rights is compatible witha recognition the rightsof others,a stable civil government of will extend libertyto its citizens. Hobbes elucidates (ibid.p. 215): I mean, there noprohibition without of thing any that be to Byliberty, necessityany restraintnatural of is but for liberty, what necessary thegoodofthecommonwealth. This reading of Hobbes has even more obvious emancipatoryimplications for women. If, as he allows, women in the state of nature have dominion over their children and the rightto their service, how can one justifytheirgivingup these rightsin civil society?If one gives the Hobbesian answer, that women submittedto men at a stage of the of developmentof societyearlier than the institution great states,since women's libertieswere not preserved,this now goes against the principle of natural law as spelt out by Hobbes, and so begins to look like a grave injustice. The picture that would fitbest with this edict of natural law would be one in which a woman gave up some liberty, notably the libertyto have sexual relationswithany man otherthan her husband,in exchange for the protectionof herselfand her children,while the husband gave
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up some comparable liberty,presumablythe libertyto dispose of his surplus production at will, in exchange for the secure knowledge of If is paternity. the institution to conformto the natural law, as characterized by Hobbes in this passage, it should involve the loss of no further liberties.So natural law would suggestthat, since this contract is between equals, it should guarantee the parentsjoint dominion over theirchildren.At least one earlier English commentatorseems to have seen the familyin this way (see Hinton pp. 292-3). Hobbes, however, for he assumes that either the husdoes not consider this possibility, that 'No man can serve two masters' band or wife must rule, insisting (L ch. xx, p. 105). If we emphasize the normative elements in Hobbes' work, which stressthe rational law of nature and each individual's equal rightto those natural libertiesthat are compatiblewitha like liberty others, for the subjection of women to their husbands stands out as a manifest injustice. In fact,it indicates a fatal flaw in Hobbes' reasoning,which undermineshis whole attemptto show how ethical behaviour and obedience to the state can be justified.What is interesting about Hobbes' argument is that it seems to provide reasons for behaving ethically As which are compellingeven an egoist. I pointed out above, one does for not need to attributeto Hobbes a belief in an implausible psychological egoism: he only needs to assume that a usually over-riding motive in human psychologyis self-preservation. This does not detract from the claim that the argument,if good, will convince an egoist. For the achievementof all aims, whetherthey are egoistic or altruistic, almost on one's own survival. However, whether one starts always depends withthe assumptionthat humans are by naturerationalegoists,or with the weaker assumption that self-preservation a primary motive, is Hobbes' attemptto place obedience to the natural law on a rational foundation fails. It is worth going into the reasons for this in some detail, for it shows where the limitationsof the attempt to ground moralityin reason lie. As already mentioned, feministwritershave insistedthat the attitudeof the rational egoist comes more naturallyto men than to women. But this observationby itselfdoes not show that Hobbes' argument collapses. Indeed, the Hobbesian explanation of women's subordinationsuggeststhatwomen will be more likelyto have to seek their self-preservation throughsubmissionthan men are, and that thiswill be particularly case if theiraims include the preservathe no of tion of theiroffspring; it offers criticism this situation,which but is perpetuatedat the expense of women. If we are to show the flaw in Hobbes' reasoning we need to show how a situationwhich does not
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accord withthe naturallaw, as Hobbes outlinesit, nevertheless can perwiththe consent, underduress,of thosewho are deprivedof petuateitself theirnatural liberties. We can see this once we admit that women have an equal natural rightto liberty.Since men do not have to take into account, to any very great degree, the threatthat women pose to men's survival,they do not need to recognize the natural rightsof women. For women, as a group, are disadvantaged in relation to men, as a group. Women clearly could murdertheirfathersand husbands, as they do in one of Herodotus' stories.6 But theyare unlikely, given theiraverage inferiority in physical strength, be able to maintain men in a state of submisto sion grounded in the threatof superiorforce. By contrast,men, since theyhave littlefear that women will succeed in any rebellion,are able, as a group, to maintain women in a state of submissionwithoutfully recognizingtheir equal natural rightto liberty.Hobbes attemptedto show that adherence to the natural moral law is rational,forboth suband ject and sovereign, given thatthe desire forself-preservation liberty is primary.The situationof women suggeststhat when the sovereignis a member of a group which is stronger than anothergroup in the socthe sovereigncan avoid such adherence in relationto membersof iety, the weaker group. This appears to be the historicalsituationof women, and of other subordinategroups or classes, whose rightshave not been recognized by the rulersof the societiesin which theylive. At the root of thisfailurein Hobbes' reasoningis an ambiguity the in of the equality of individuals.The argumentthat foundsmoral concept and political obligationon the desire forself-preservation depends cruon a claimed equality of power, which is plausible so long as we cially thinkof people as isolated individuals,but which breaks down because real power is not merely an individual attribute, but belongs to individuals partlyin virtueof the group to which theybelong. At the same time,Hobbes recognizesan equality of natural rightwhich existsindeof pendently our power to enforceit. It is our grasp of thismoral notion that enables us to recognize that there are situationsin which individuals may be forced to consent to unjust pacts, and that consent does not of itselfentail justice. It is the obviousness of this natural equal and, it is rightto libertywhich has been taken up by later feminists, to note, the notion can be defended independently of important implausibleassumptions concerningour actual independenceand equalin the state of nature, or our intrinsicegoism. Modern versionsof ity
6

See p. 114 in Rawlinson'stranslation (London: Everyman,1948).

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social contracttheory, epitomizedby Rawls, abstractaway fromclaims about actual equality of power in order to maintain that the principles ofjustice are those principlesthat we would consentto be governedby were we all rational and equal in power (see Rawls p. 11). II. CHRISTINE DE PISAN'S PROBLEMATIC FEMINISM Interestin the writingsof Christinede Pisan has been fuelled by her claimed status as the first known feminist. Yet her rightto be deemed has a feminist been hotlycontested.RecentlySheila Delany has asserted (p. 181) 'that she was not even by the standards of her own day a or reformer protofeminist'. And Delany is only one of a numberof feministwriters, back at least as far as Mathilde Laigle (pp. 120-3), going to question de Pisan's feminism.De Pisan ends The Bookof theCityof Ladies,her major defence of women against the slanders of men, with the advice (p. 255) that women who are married should not disdain being subject to their husbands. This pronouncementis quite inconsistent with modern feministdoctrine. Maureen Quilligan, who is interestedin defendingde Pisan against her critics,and who findsin is her writingan elegant defence of female authority, tempted(p. 244) to dismissthisending as 'the first effect the failureof will of a weary of author'. But thisresponseis quite superficial. failsto take into account It that de Pisan's advice to marriedwomen is part and parcel of her general political theory.If this theoryis, as I shall argue it is, plausibly deemed maternalist, then thisconsequence shows thatmaternalist political thoughtcan carrywith it some of the same dangers as paternalist in NeverthelessI hope to show that there are some strengths thinking. de Pisan's political philosophy which can be re-appropriatedby a 'maternalist'contracttheory. De Pisan's advice to married women is completelyconsistentwith her general understanding political subjectionand social duty.In her of earliestdiscussionof the function the sovereign,she gives (FBM p. 5) of ratherlike that given by an account of the originof political authority Hobbes: of earth, since to and the when human began populate fill countriesthe the race then, it the is natural thehuman to race,when is notmoderated reason, by perversity infinite against evil each no and people, having law,tookto extortion committed and to and without other, any regard justice without pillage, killing many outrages and of then thegift nature, experience by constraint; thepeople, long taught by in to that these that ofthem, decided itwould good, order avoid be ills, one reason,
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in and and knowledge, the mostdignified appropriate virtue shouldbe established and and and thus common consent they gaveauthority sovereignty superior prince by to thisperson.

She is thus quite clear, fromthe outset,that the role of the sovereignis to preservethe peace, and that dutiful subjectswill do what theycan to of the reinforce sovereign's power. In her biography Charles V legitimate she excuses the ratherrosy picture that she paints of the character of that forher to criticizethe ruling the French royal family suggesting by house in public would be inappropriate.Since people are much more likelyto notice otherpeople's faultsthan theirown, such acts are more likely to be dangerous than useful. Princes, she believes, should be criticized in private, by those who are close to them (FBM p. 33). The Insubordinationof all kinds is anathema to her way of thinking. which she describesis governedby a prince or princeswho body politic fromwhich derive all the movements correspondto the understanding, of the body. The knightsand nobles are the arms and hands which carry out the sovereign's decisions, and the ordinarypeople are the stomach, feet and legs (CP pp. 2-3). Each individual has an appropriate role to play, according to this hierarchicaland organic model. Different individualshave different duties,derivedfromtheirsocial posiand each position provides equal scope for the honour people tions, deservein proportionto theirvirtue(CP pp. 3-4). The justice which the a prince will uphold is, says de Pisan, quoting Aristotle, measure which will render to each his right,and, like Aristotle,she believes that difand obligations(CP p. 61). In ferent kindsof people have different rights men are more adequately equipped with 'strongand hardy particular, bodies' which enable them to uphold the laws by physical constraint laws and rule than and forceof arms,so men more naturallyadminister when they are marriedto do women (TCL p. 31). Women, then, even princes, are in the position of subjects, and like other subjects they should serve well, for their own sakes and for the sake of the general good. But de Pisan's endorsementof political subjectionshould not be obedience. It is partly read as an approbation of servileor thoughtless prudent,forin the societythat she describesmost people are both subject and sovereign. It is also exemplary, and, she believes, has the power to move the powerfulto recognize theirown duty of subjection to the moral law. The sketchso far provided of de Pisan's political thoughtdoes little it to distinguish from standard patriarchal thinking.There are, however, two related featuresof her treatiseson political relationswhich to warrantattributing her a 'maternalist'conception of the sovereign.
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The first has to do with the functionof love in her political thought. The second involvesher depictionof women as paradigmaticsovereigns and subjects. Because the functionof the sovereignis to protectthe countryfrom its externalenemies and to upholdjustice within,the health of the body politic depends on the sovereign'svirtueand love ofjustice. So de Pisan in Le Livredu Corpsde Policieturns early to the education of princes of (pp. 5-14). And in her manual of advice to women The Treasure the CityofLadies she also discusses the education of childrenand the best way to instil virtue (pp. 66-8, 85-9). She suggeststhat children will more easilylearn fromsomeone thattheylove and respect.The teacher who wants to teach virtuemust be a mirroror model of virtuefor the child, but at the same time should not be too solemn, but make sure the child has time to play. The teacher should win the child's affection The mother,tutor or governess with small presentsand story-telling. teaches largely by example. And, like the mother,the good prince is responsiblefor the moral welfareof his subjects,so he too has a duty to act as a moral exemplar. In contrast to Machiavelli, who (p. 96) answers the question 'Is it betterfor a prince to be loved or feared by his people?' in favour of fear, de Pisan (TCL pp. 71-4) advises the princessthat it is the love of her subjectswhich is her surestprotection views on and which she should workto deserve. De Pisan's enlightened education are plausibly seen as deriving from practical traditionsof to and are extendedin the sphere of government the stachild-rearing, motivated tus of a general principle,that subjectswill be more strongly to please and obey rulers they love and respect,than those they fear and despise. Within a good family,the position of child is not more onerous than the position of parent. Though the child owes its parents that go with parental power. obedience, it is freeof the responsibilities The greaterthe power that individualshave, the greatertheirresponfor sibility the moral and materialwelfareof those withintheircharge, and it is in the lightof these views that de Pisan can both be considered and consistently a feminist judge that women should not scorn their lack of independence. who have been influVirginia Held is just one of a numberof writers masculine and enced by Carol Gilligan's claim that there are different feminineethical voices and by Sarah Ruddick's related suggestionthat women have a sense of selfrelatedto theirpositionas potentialmothers. She uses a vocabularywhich this Reading de Pisan confirms hypothesis. farmore emphasis on love, virtueand ethical devotionthan that places of most male writers. Like modern proponents of the maternalist
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ethic, she also sees women as having an importantrole to play in the of ethic,when it is pursued by preservation peace.7 Yet thismaternalist those who lack power, can easily transmuteinto a quietist acceptance of virtuous subordination.This emerges from the way in which, for de Pisan, women's subordinationis exemplary.Like Hobbes, she sees And she is well aware of the Greek marriageas a political relationship. and Roman mythswhich, as suggested above, plausibly lay behind Hobbes' belief that there had been a historicaldefeat of women. The different from their usual way she treats these mythsis interestingly for treatment, she emphasizes women's active participationin the conof stitution the state in which individualsaccept theirsubordinationto the law. She repeats the history the Amazons in a number of places of BCL pp. 40-51). But, while the Athenians stressedthe defeat of (e.g., the Amazons, de Pisan uses them as proof that women are capable of and courage, and she leaves obscure the decline of their great strength which she says had lasted eight hundred years. She does not empire, mention the role that the defeat of the Amazons was alleged to have in played in the foundationof Athens.8She is, however,interested the Sabine women and the part they played in the foundationof Rome. She introducestheir storyin the second part of The Bookof theCityof Ladies,where she is dealing with the benefits broughtby women to the the world,and she uses it as one of a numberof storieswhich illustrate spiritualgood women have done (pp. 142-50). Like the Virgin Mary, Judithand Esther,the Sabine women bringa spiritualbenefitand save theirpeople fromdestruction. The rape of the Sabines is a storywhich in fits well withthe Hobbesian explanation of the subjectionof women. The Sabine women are captured by the trickeryand force of the Roman men. Their status as wives is the same as their status as captives. But de Pisan emphasizes those aspects of Plutarch's storywhich attribute the institution the law and peace to the intervention the of of women.9The Sabine men attemptto avenge themselves the Romans on and to win back theirwomen, but the women, carrying theirchildren, throw themselves between the battle lines in order to bring about for peace. They want neitherthe victoryof theirfathersand brothers, whom their children would be enemies, nor the victoryof their husbands, who will kill their fathersand brothers.Instead, they sue for peace and the recognitionof the rule of law. Whereas Hobbes makes in the subjection of women an act of self-interest the face of superior
8

7 See Ruddick 1984; and de Pisan TCL pp. 50-2 and EQF. See du Bois pp. 67-71; Tyrellpp. 113-28. 9 See Bryson.

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force,for de Pisan it is rathera conscious ethical choice made for the greatergood. In subjectingthemselvesthe women act in a way which has both material and spiritualvalue. There are many passages in de Pisan's writingwhich warn against the danger in doing evil, but she does not attemptto show, as Hobbes is does, that unrestrainedself-interest irrational in virtue of its bad in effects thisworld. She relies on two different argumentsto persuade the powerful to be ethical, one which stresses that true happiness of depends on honour, and a second which evokes the possibility punHer reliance on this second argument ishmentin the world hereafter. may seem to be a weakness in her work, as compared with Hobbes'. But, in fact, this apparent weakness could be taken to indicate an awareness on de Pisan's behalf that the claim that political immorality is is against one's rational self-interest simplyimplausible,if one considers only the consequences in this life. As the situation of women attests,and so long as what is meant by reason is merelyself-interested reason, the verypowerfulmay well never have reason to worryabout the rightsof the powerless. Unless one accepts that virtueand honour cannot be guarare intrinsicgoods, moralityand rational self-interest anteed to coincide. For our purposes,it is in the first argumentthat the more interesting of de Pisan's thoughtreside. She recognizesthat society,in the aspects end, depends on the promotion,in its powerfulmembers, of ethical motivation,or love of honour, and she attemptsto show the powerful how such love of honour is integralfor securinghappiness. Her arguments, grounded in her own experience, start out from a profound sense of our dependenceforhappinesson the good-willof others.Virtue, in her scheme of things,makes that dependence more secure, and, in the last instance,it can be an inalienable source of solace, in the face of the kinds of change of fortunethat it is beyond our power to preVirtue makes one's situationmore secure, partlythroughgiving vent.10 others no reason to hate oneself,and partlybecause we are creatures who learn by imitation.By practisingvirtuewe teach it to others,paron to ticularly our childrenand subordinates, whose virtuewe ultimately Hobbes begins with a state of nature in which it depend. By contrast, appears that we are all independentagents. Moralityis introducedas a which we accept only because we are restriction our natural liberty, on of forced to by a recognitionof the strength others. For de Pisan, we will have natural inclinationsin childhood which, if properlyfostered,
10 CLE

pp. 8-11, and Hindman pp. 123-8.

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lead us to virtue,and by discoveringthat virtueis an end in itself, we achieve not just the good of othersbut our own true good. Behind Christine de Pisan's philosophy it is plausible to find a of kind. It is in the interests those who are rethoughtof the following to fosterin others a sense of their duty towards the lativelypowerless powerless, for, being unable to force others to recognize their rights, they are constrainedto rely on reason and persuasion, on stimulating the sympathyor gratitudeof others, or on teaching by example, in order to achieve theiraims. Since we are all reallyquite powerless,no matter how our good fortunemight mask this fact at any time, we should all adopt thispath. The good prince should recognize that he is 'as frailas another man and no different fromothers except for good fortune' (CP p. 16). The political philosophy which resultsfrom this Its thoughthas a great weakness and a great strength. weakness is that the methodsit suggestscan be pursued fora long time withoutmaking is those who are powerfuland immoral change theirways. Its strength that there is no conflictbetween the means advocated to achieve the ultimateend of a good society,and the end aspired to. The end is a society in which those with power recognize and fulfiltheir duty to exercise theirpower in defenceof the well-beingand liberty all (with of the exception of those who threatenthe libertiesof others);the means is simplyto live, as faras possible,accordingto the principlesthatwould be adopted were all to aspire to this end. De Pisan's writingemphasizes love, dependence and the duties of those in positions of power to care for the less powerful.The kind of ethicalimpulsewhichis motivated love of the good cannotbe reduced by to rational self-interest, although it is in general in accord with prudence. But it would be a mistake to think that, having showed that Hobbes' attemptto reduce moralityto rational self-interest fails, we should simplyjettison social contract theory and replace it with the one's personal duties to care for others. For there imperativeto fulfil are significant limitationsto de Pisan's philosophywhich should give pause to recentfeminist justice to care. advocacy of a simple turnfrom Socialists and feminists of have pointed out the illusoriness the image of man, the independent, autonomous individual which is evident in in Hobbes' works." At the same time,much feminist thought, particular that of Wollstonecraft and de Beauvoir, owes much of its inspiration to thisconceptionof humanity, come and forthisreason it has recently under critical scrutiny.Many feminists now assert that women value
" E.g.,Jaggar pp. 39-46.
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connectedness,care and dependence. Yet Christine de Pisan reasons fromour dependence on othersto the wisdom of the acceptance of subjection in marriage,and this cannot be embraced by any who consider Not all relationsbetween citizens should themselvesgenuine feminists. that be modelled on the natural inequalityof power and responsibility exists between mothersand children.In the remainderof this paper I suggestthat the resolutionof this conflictis to combine the principles ofjustice that can be derived fromhypothetical versionsof social contracttheorywith a moral psychologyof the kind implicitin de Pisan. III. A MATERNALISTCONTRACTUALISM The moral psychologyarticulated by de Pisan involves an originally Platonic way of thinking the moral individual,in which it is assumed of thatthe soul is divided into threeparts. She followsa Christianizedversion of this traditionin her assumptionthat love of the good, and the pursuitof virtue,are the true ends of man, and the means to a happiLove is here associated ness which is not subject to changes of fortune. withthe forcethat motivatesus to do good. It can be love of the good, and the desire to do othersgood, as well as love of the beloved forwhat is good in them. The picture assumes that humans tend to have a natneeds to be stimulatedand ural desire to do good, which nevertheless and which makes us by nature moral beings. Within Hobbes' fostered, the suggestionthat there is a natural moral motivationis psychology, is motivation towards vigorously rejected.It is claimed thatour primary and power. Moralityis thoughtof as a system self-preservation, liberty of rules,whichreason dictatesit is in our interests adopt. But morality to to is not an end in itself. thusbecomes extremely difficult demonstrate It those who have freedomand power should bother about morality, why in the many situationsin which their immorality cannot rationallybe seen to threaten their self-interest. is ultimatelyto this feature of It are Hobbes' moral psychology that feminists objectingwhen theyreject his rational egoism. But the alternativeview, held by Christine de can be seen to be deeply problemPisan, that virtueis an end in itself, atic when it is pursued by individuals who themselves exist in a situationof oppression. Modern liberal thought has been deeply influencedby Rousseau's of consignment the reproductionof the citizen to the private realm of the family,governed by a femininelove and sentiment quite different from the rational justice of the public realm. Neither Hobbes nor
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between the private and the de Pisan operated with a clear distinction realm. Much of de Pisan's advice to women is directed towards public princesses,and she assumes that sexual moralityis just as importantto matters of state as are the virtues of justice, and the art of making peace. Her emphasis on the good that women have wrought casts a new lighton Hobbes' explanation of women's submission.If Hobbes is and citizenshipinvolvesacquiescence to the rule of the sovereign, right, and the first sovereignsare heads of families,then a woman's acquiescence to her husband can be taken to be a paradigm of citizenship.De Pisan remained unperturbedby women's subjection to their husbands just because she saw it in thislight.Her defence of women can be read the as a moral defencewhich highlights moral excellence of women, in theirdevotion to dutyand subjectionto the moral law. Her orientation gives her political philosophy a moralisticcast, noted by a number of In commentators. a sense, this makes her developmentof the parentalist metaphorin political life more consistentthan Hobbes'. One of the childweakest aspects of Hobbes' thoughtis his attemptto transform parent relationsinto relationsof consent. De Pisan, by contrast,takes for granted that the relation of parent to child is the paradigm of an ethical relation,and the situationin which the duties of the powerfulto the powerless and the consequent rewards of virtue are clearest. She sees quite clearlythatchildrenlearn by example and thatthe best means to encouraging a child to develop a good character is for it to love someone of good character.She extendsthisidea to the political realm. Thus at the centre of her political philosophyare ethics,moral education and the developmentof the love of God in those in positions of between members power. She sees these as bound up withrelationships and of the society which fosterethical behaviour, trust,truthfulness love. Her advice seems to have been naturallyadopted by many generations of women, who have seen devotion to the duties of wife and as of and care forthe physicaland moral well-being others, more mother, of than the overthrow structural injustice. important immediately What de Pisan's political philosophylacks, however,is a criterionof between those situathe difference justice which can be used to clarify tions in which such devotion to personal duty counts as consent under duress to servitude,and those in which it counts as the voluntarypursuit of virtue. Hypotheticalversions of social contract theory,such as Rawls', can fillthis gap. Because the focus of political philosophyhas since the time of de Pisan and Hobbes, fromreasons forpolitishifted the question cal subjection to the defence of individual sovereignty, in whichwas uppermost de Pisan's mind,'How to instilin the individual
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politicaland moral virtue?',has dropped fromsight.With Locke's introduction of the distinctionbetween political and parental power, and Rousseau's alignmentof the private ethical realm with women and of the public realm of justice with men, this question has been relegated to the sphere of the personal and sentimental.What the situation of women shows is that Hobbes was wrong: moralitycannot be identified and nature have lefta legacy because history withrational self-interest, in of greatactual differences power. In the wake of the failureof attempts to overcome the limitationsof liberalism,by abolishing all actual inback to the question which was centralin equalities, it is worthturning de Pisan's political philosophy.How does one promote in citizens,no matterhow great a portionof power fatehas dealt them,virtue,love of honour and subjectionto the moral law? As we have seen, one cannot turn back to this question without holding on to demands forjustice. But retainingliberal methods for which situationsare unjust does not imply an acceptance determining Actual liberal societieshave largelyrelied of Hobbes' moral psychology. on the subjection of women withinthe familyfor the reproductionof morally motivated citizens. But as women overthrowthat subjection, the questionof the subjectionof the individualto the moral law becomes of more urgent.Without an understanding the productionof the indiis vidual who loves honourand justice, social contract theory incomplete. of we But withoutsocial contracttheory, have littleunderstanding how contractualism we mightsettle questions of justice. A feminist should, of therefore, place the reproduction the moral individualat centrestage and could thus plausiblybe deemed maternalist. MonashUniversity
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