AWNVN: Historical Notes

The Vietnam War was a highly dynamic, transitional period in the development of various weapons systems, including aircraft as well as ordnance and ECM devices. Many weapons technologies that are today considered standard were just beginning development during the mid-sixties and early-seventies. Indeed, several key technologies were introduced into the SEA (Southeast Asian) theater only very late in the war. Thus, the weapons systems in use during the Linebacker campaigns of 1972 were often significantly advanced over those used during the opening years of Operation Rolling (1965-1966). In putting together the missions for "Air War: North Vietnam" (AWNVN) I have attempted to ensure that the aircraft and ordnance used are historically correct. Thus, for example, you will not find gun-nosed F4E Phantoms in missions before late-1968, nor will you find Paveway LGBs (laser guided bombs) or MK-20 Rockeyes loaded on aircraft in missions before mid-1968. Given the design and functionality of Fighters Anthology (FA), however, there is a limit to what one can do to impose historically correct limitations on aircraft, ordnance, and ECM devices. Although all missions are set for the historical period 1956-1976 ("historical era 1"), and although no mission allows players to choose their aircraft, players are still at liberty to select ordnance in the Loadout screen that may not be appropriate to the date of a particular mission. To help those interested in flying missions that are as historically accurate as possible, I have assembled some notes and guidelines on the use of aircraft, ordnance, ECM devices, seekers, and FA commands, options, and windows. First, I offer short discussions of several types of weapons systems and how the technologies for these systems changed from 1964-1972. These are intended to give players a broad overview of the development and deployment of these technologies and systems over the course of the Vietnam War. Next I provide a table of weapons systems with "first use" dates to allow players to select historically appropriate loadouts when flying missions. Finally, I offer a list of recommendations for using key FA options, commands, and in-flight windows. At the end of this document is a short dicussion on the limits of achievable realism in AWNVN and Fighters Anthology more generally.

The Development & Deployment of Weapons Systems During the Vietnam War Era
Air-to-air missiles: Both the United States and the Soviet Union had developed air-to-air missiles in the mid-late 1950s, and military experts had predicted the end of close-in dogfights between aircraft using guns. Air-to-air missiles, it was thought, had rendered the dogfight obsolete, as fighters would now engage each other beyond visual range (BVR) with sophisticated SARH and IR missiles. The experts proved to be wrong, however, as the first generation of air-to-air missiles exhibited serious problems in the skies over North Vietnam. The United States entered the war with three families of missiles: the AIM-7 Sparrow, a SARH ("radar guided") missile with a theoretical range of up to 20 miles; the AIM-9 Sidewinder, an IR ("heat seeking") missile used at shorter ranges of 1-3 miles; and the AIM-4 Falcon, which existed in a bewildering array of IR and SARH variants. The Soviets had developed the AA-1 Alkali, a "beam riding" missile, and the AA2 Atoll, which was a close copy of the early U.S. AIM-9B. To the chagrin of U.S. pilots, all three U.S. missile families proved highly unreliable. Many of the missiles simply failed at launch -- they either did not come off the rails at all or they went "ballistic" and did not track to the target. In other cases the missiles failed to guide to target because they were fired

AWNVN: Historical Notes

outside of the missiles' envelope (i.e., they were fired in high-G turns or inside of the missiles' minimum range), or the proximity fuse failed to detonate the warhead when the missile was close to the target. Failure rates were so high that the kill probability for these early air-to-missiles ranged from 5 to 12 percent. As a result, many pilots resorted to ripple-firing multiple missiles in the hopes that at least one would work properly and track to the target. Worse, U.S. fighter pilots flying the F-4 Phantom began to regret the lack of an internal cannon, which designers had neglected to build into the Phantom because of misplaced confidence in the aircraft's main armament of AIM-7 and AIM-9 missiles. By contrast, all the Soviet designed fighters used by the North Vietnamese carried large internal cannons -- either 23mm or 30mm -- and the VPAF enjoyed great success shooting down U.S. fighter bombers with the lowly MiG17, which carried no air-to-air missiles for most of the war. The USN quickly recognized the problems with the AIM-7 and AIM-9, and began an aggressive program to develop a more effective and reliable version of the AIM-9, which it thought the more promising of the U.S. missile families. The first fruit of that program was the AIM-9D, which was somewhat more reliable than the AIM-9B still carried by USAF fighters. Further Navy development yielded the AIM-9G and AIM-9H, both of which proved quite deadly during Operation Linebacker in 1972. Navy air crews came to rely the AIM-9 as their missile of choice and were trained in ACM tactics to set up optimal AIM-9 shots at MiGs. The USAF, however, continued to struggle, developing its own upgraded versions of the AIM-9B: the AIM-9E followed by the AIM-9J, neither of which proved as reliable or effective as the Navy's AIM-9 models. The USAF also developed the AIM-7E2 "dogfight" Sparrow, which was more maneuverable than the AIM-7D and AIM-7E models used at the outset of the war and had a lower minimum range. Nonetheless, the Sparrow continued to have reliability problems, many of which could be attributed to poor handling and maintenance by ground crews. Still looking for an effective air-to-air weapon, the USAF equipped the first F-4D Phantoms sent to the SEA theater in 1967 with the AIM-4D Falcon, an IR missile intended to replace the AIM-9B/E. The AIM-4D, however, proved to be an even worse performer than the early AIM-9s, and after an outcry from air crews the F-4Ds were rewired to carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder. The North Vietnamese did not enjoy any better success with the AA-2 Atolls carried by their Soviet supplied MiG-21 Fishbeds, which took to the skies over North Vietnam in the Spring of 1966. So unreliable were the Atolls that the NV began equipping their MiG-21s with unguided rockets in the hopes that Fishbed pilots might score a lucky hit after their Atolls failed (MiG-21 pilots often ripple-fired their Atolls without the missiles even attaining an IR "lock" on U.S. aircraft). The primary weapon for North Vietnamese pilots through the end of the war remained the large 23mm and 30mm internal cannons carried by all Soviet and Chinese supplied MiGs. Cannon pods: The first F-4 Phantoms to arrive in the SEA theater (the USN F-4B and the USAF F-4C & F-4D) all lacked an internal cannon, which was thought to be obsolete following the development of airto-air missiles such as the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-9 Sidewinder. In actual combat, however, the missiles proved extremely unreliable and ineffective, often leaving F-4s in close-in dogfights with NV MiGs but without a cannon to use (by contrast, all NV MiGs carried 23mm, 30mm, or 37mm cannons). The SUU-16 gun pod (an externally mounted version of the 20mm Vulcan cannon powered by a ram-air turbine) was available, however, F-4 crews initially shunned it because of the increased drag it caused and the fact that it replaced the 600 gallon centerline fuel tank. There were also doubts regarding its accuracy. When the first F-4Ds arrived in the SEA theater in May 1967, the USAF began experimenting with the SUU-23 gun pod -- similar to the SUU-16 but self-powered and connected to a lead computing gunsight. At the same time, the SUU-16 was combat tested on F-4Cs. The gun pods proved effective enough that some F-4C and F-4D crews began carrying the SUU-16 and SUU-23 on a regular basis. The next USAF F-4 model to arrive in the SEA theater, the USAF F-4E, was equipped with an internal Vulcan cannon. By contrast, USN F-4 Phantoms (the F-4B, F-4J, F-4N, and F-4S) continued to ship without an internal cannon, and Navy crews never made extensive use of the SUU-16 or SUU-23 cannon pods.

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Air-to-ground missiles: During the Korean the USAF and Navy realized that the U.S. attack aircraft needed an air-to-ground missile to hit targets accurately from stand-off distances. After several years of development work in the mid-late 1950s the AGM-12 Bullpup missile was delivered to USAF and USN squadrons, and the Bullpup remained the main U.S. air-to-ground guided missile through the early 1970s. The U.S. used two versions of the Bullpup in Vietnam: the AGM-12B Bullpup-A and the AGM-12C Bullpup-B. The AGM-12B proved disappointing early on the war, as its 250 lb warhead was simply too small to damage or destroy hardened targets. USAF F-105s attempted to take out the Thanh Hoa railroad & highway bridge in early April 1965 using AGM-12Bs with miserable results -- one Thud pilot reported that his Bullpups bounced off the bridge. The AGM-12C, which sported a 1000 lb warhead, was introduced into the SEA theater soon afterwards. Neither version of the Bullpup was especially liked by pilots, however, as the Bullpup had to be manually guided (or flown) to the target by the pilot using a mini-joystick, forcing pilots to fly their aircraft in a relatively straight and level fashion -- not a recommended practice in target areas heavily defended by SAMs and AAA. The Bullpup would eventually be replaced by the electro-optical guided AGM-65 Maverick in the early 1970s, but the Maverick would arrive too late to see any significant use in the SEA theater during Operation Linebacker. From 1967 onward the USAF and USN pilots relied on the new precision guided glide bombs -- the AGM-62 Walleye EOGB or the Paveway I LGBs -- to destroy hardened targets. Anti-Radiation Missiles U.S. aircraft flying Iron Hand missions against North Vietnamese SAM sites used two types of anti-radiation missiles (ARMs): the AGM-45 Shrike and the AGM-78 Standard ARM. Anti-radiation missiles were an innovation of the Vietnam War, developed in response to the threat posed by North Vietnamese SA-2 Guidelines. These missiles home in on the radio emissions of radars (i.e., the radar beam), esp. those of the "Fan Song" guidance radars used with the SA-2, following the radars beam straight down to the radar unit. The first generation of anti-radiation missiles, the AGM-45 Shrike (first used in March 1966), proved somewhat ineffective, as NV radar operators learned to turn off their radar units to break the lock of the Shrike. The AGM-78 (which arrived in early 1968) rectified this deficiency in that it had the ability to remember the location of a radar source even after the radar unit had been turned off. Anti-radiation missiles were standard ordnance for Wild Weasel aircraft flying Iron Hand missions against SAMs in advance of strikes on targets in North Vietnam. Air-to-ground bombs: During the first few years of the Vietnam War U.S. pilots used unguided iron bombs that were not that much different than the bombs used by Allied forces during World War II. The principle iron bombs used by the U.S. during the war were the Mk-81 250 lb bomb, the Mk-82 500 lb bomb, the Mk-83 1000 lb bomb, the Mk-84 2000 lb bomb, the M117 General Purpose 750 lb bomb, and the M118 3000 lb bomb. Although U.S. engineers had developed a variety of targeting systems to enable pilots to deliver their bomb loads more accurately, none were sophisticated enough to allow U.S. attack aircraft to bomb targets effectively in bad weather (seasonal monsoons plagued U.S. air operations throughout the war). Also, U.S. air forces experienced a bomb shortage for the better part of 1966, as the tempo of air operations increased over both Vietnam and Laos. During that time Navy and Air Force aircraft often carried ordnance loads that were "light" or not ideal for the target type being attacked. To address the problem, the U.S. government was forced to buy back thousands of bombs earlier sold to West Germany as scrap, even as it ramped up domestic ordnance production. Electro-Optical Guided Bombs (EOGBs) In early 1967 the first of a new generation of precision guided glide bombs became available: the AGM-62 Walleye EOGB. The Walleye was quickly put to use by the US Navy against targets in North Vietnam, with promising results. Under the right lighting conditions the Walleye proved deadly accurate. The Walleye's 825 lb warhead was insufficient to destroy hardened targets such as the Thanh Hoa railroad & highway bridge, however, which USN A-4 Skyhawks carrying Walleyes attacked in March 1967, with no better results than the USAF had enjoyed with AGM12 Bullpups or even M118 iron bombs. (A version of the Walleye with a 2000 lb warhead would arrive in early 1972.) Another problem with the Walleye was that it could be used only in lighting conditions that produced a high light/dark contrast on the target, effectively ruling out night time use of the Walleye.

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Laser Guided Bombs (LGBs) In 1968 the USAF introduced yet another type of precision guided glide bomb: the Paveway I LGB. To deliver Paveway LGBs on a target, one aircraft carrying a laser designator pod (at first the ZOT; later the Pave Knife) "painted" the target with a laser beam while other aircraft dropped Paveway LGBs, which tracked the laser to the target. These new LGBs were not only highly accurate but allowed attack aircraft to release their bombs above the reach of most AAA, though bad weather could still interfere with the laser designators. Paveway LGBs were used extensively by the USAF during Operation Linebacker I & II, though LGB strike operations in Route Pack VIa (the Hanoi region) were burdened with a chronic shortage of Pave Knife laser designator pods, forcing the USAF to husband the few pods it had and protect Pave Knife carrying F-4s with robust fighter escorts. (The USAF continued to use the less flexible ZOT pods for LGB strikes in Route Pack I.) Despite the shortage of Pave Knife pods as well as a spate of bad weather during the Summer of 1972, the LGBs proved very successful, enabling Air Force fighter bombers to reliably strike and destroy a number of targets that had frustrated to war planners during Rolling Thunder, including the infamous Thanh Hoa railroad & highway bridge (Ham Rung, aka the Dragons Jaw). Cluster Bombs The Vietnam War saw the first use of yet another new type of air-to-ground ordnance: the cluster bomb, which was initially developed by the U.S. Navy but also used by the U.S. Air Force. When dropped, cluster bombs open above the ground, dispersing hundreds or even thousands of grenadesized bomblets which blanket the target area. Anti-personel cluster bombs (the CBU-24 & CBU-49) were first used during the Vietnam War beginning in mid-1966; anti-armor and anti-vehicle cluster bombs (the MK-20 Rockeye and the CBU-52) became available several years later. Cluster bombs proved especially effective against SAM sites and AAA batteries, and Wild Weasels often carried a loadout of cluster bombs, unguided rockets, and anti-radiation missiles such as the AGM-45 Shrike or AGM-78 Standard ARM. During Operation Linebacker I & II, hunter-killer teams of F-105Gs and F-4Es attacked SAM sites in tandem. The F-105Gs would take out the radar vans at SAM sites with their Shrike anti-radiation missiles, after which the F-4Es would swoop in to destroy the launchers with cluster bombs. Napalm Finally, the U.S. used napalm (jellied gasoline or benzene), developed during World War II. Napalm bombs (aka "fire bombs") required aircraft to fly low and fast to achieve a good spread of the bombs' fiery contents across a target area, and "napes" were commonly used against "soft" targets, esp. dug-in troops and lightly armored vehicles. Napalm would become the war's most controversial weapon due to horrific images of civilian napalm casualties, and the U.S. generally abandoned the use of napalm following the withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from the SEA theater in the mid-1970s. RHAWR/RWR devices: RHAWR (radar homing and warning receiver) units are electronic devices that detect the radio emissions of enemy radars and warn pilots of radar "lock ons" and SAM launches. At the start of the Vietnam War few U.S. aircraft were equipped with RHAWR (often shorted to RWR) units, save the USAF F-105 Thunderchief (the Air Force's main strike aircraft). After North Vietnam began deploying and using SA-2 Guidelines against U.S. strike aircraft in mid-1965, the USAF and USN began equipping their aircraft with primitive RHAWR units, starting with the F-4 Phantoms, then other attack aircraft that were at risk of falling prey to the SA-2s. Vietnam-era RHAWR units indicated the strength of radar transmissions, the type of radar (i.e., the SA2's "Fan Song" & "Spoon Rest" radars or the "Fire Can" radar used for AAA batteries), and whether the target aircraft had been "locked on" by a radar. These early units also warned of SAM launches and indicated the relative direction of the SAM launch. The units provided audio feedback (a sound described by many pilots as that of a coiling rattlesnake ready to strike) as well as visual feedback (a cockpitmounted scope with three rings as well as "Activity" & "Launch" indicators, with a "three-ringer" indicating the strongest possible radar transmissions). Radar jamming devices: Radar jammers are electronic ECM devices used to deceive, confuse, block, and defeat enemy radars, esp. those used to guide SAMs. At the outset of the Vietnam War, few U.S. aircraft were equipped with even the primitive noise or deception jamming devices that had been developed in the late 50's and early 60's. Following the

AWNVN: Historical Notes

introduction of the SA-2 Guideline into the war by the North Vietnamese in mid-1965, the US Navy began equipping its fighters with basic deception jammers (though these would prove less and less effective as the war wore on). The USAF was slow to follow, however, despite the mounting losses of F105s to SA-2s. In the Spring of 1966 the QRC-160 jamming pod was introduced to several F-105 units operating from bases in Thailand, but the pods were not well understood and little used. In the Fall of 1966 a coordinated effort was undertaken to train F-105 air crews in the proper use of the QRC-160, including formations and tactics to optimize the protection offered by the jamming pods. This effort saw an immediate and dramatic drop in losses to SAMs of F-105s using the QRC-160 pods, and the pods were quickly adopted by all F-105 air crews. Due to a shortage in the number of available pods, which were carried on underwing hard points, USAF F-4C Phantoms did not begin carrying the QRC-160 until the late Spring or early Summer of 1967, and their losses to SAMs remained high, forcing F-4 bomber escorts to stay out of SAM-infested areas (effectively leaving the F-105s without adequate fighter cover around target areas). By the end of 1967, the QRC-160 pods were standard on most USAF aircraft flying missions over North Vietnam. Starting in April 1965, the USAF also used specially equipped EB-66 Destroyers to provide stand-off jamming of enemy radar sites and SAMs. The EB-66s flew a racetrack pattern at 30,000 ft roughly 20-30 miles northwest of Hanoi, jamming NV radars that posed a threat to ingressing strike packages and warning friendly aircraft of "hot" areas and SAM launches. The effectiveness of the EB-66s was limited by the fact that they could not accompany strike packages into the target areas. In June 1966 NV MiGs began attacking the EB-66s, forcing them to move their orbits further west towards Laos and further reducing the effectiveness of their jamming coverage. For similar stand-off jamming capabilities the USN used EA-1Fs, EKA-3Bs, EA-6As, and EA-6Bs orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin. IFF transponders: IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) transponders are electronic devices that enable friendly aircraft to identify one another as friendly. An IFF transponder not only queries transponders on other aircraft to determine whether they are friendly or not, but responds in kind to IFF queries from other aircraft. Both U.S. and North Vietnamese aircraft carried IFF transponders during the Vietnam War, however, U.S. pilots generally did not use them for a good part of the war, fearing that they would disclose their presence and location to the enemy. NV pilots, by contrast, did use their Soviet-built IFF transponders to assist GCI controllers in managing MiGs operations. U.S. cryptologists managed to crack the cipher used to protect NV IFF transponder transmissions, eventually allowing allowing U.S. aircraft to exploit the ability to query MiG IFF transponders and read their responses. Although College Eye EC-121Ds were equipped with the QRC-248 IFF interrogator devices in April 1967, they were initially forbidden to actively query MiG IFF transponders and could only read their responses to queries from VPAF GCI controllers. In October 1967, Rivet Top EC-121Ks began using the QRC-248s to actively query the tranponders of enemy aircraft that appeared on radar and warn friendly fighters and bombers of impending MiG attacks. In 1970 the USAF started equipping some F-4 Phantoms with Combat Tree APX-80 IFF interrogator equipment that also allowed them to query and identify NV MiGs using their IFF transponders. The North Vietnamese eventually caught on, and began restricting their use of IFF transponders. AWACS/ABCC/GCI: AWACS stands for Airborne Warning and Control System, an airborne radar and SIGINT platform used to detect and monitor aircraft across a large area in order to provide friendly commanders and pilots with a detailed picture of air activity and threats throughout a theater of operations. The E-3 AWACS platform currently used by the U.S. military was preceded by the Vietnam war era EC-121 and E-2 airborne command and control center (ABCC) aircraft that flew over NE Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin. Other significant predecessors from the war include the Navy's Red Crown radar picket ship and the Teaball system used during Operation Linebacker.

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GCI stands for ground controlled intercept, a command system for controlling and directing fighter aircraft. In a GCI system, trained radar operators monitor radar contacts and use their superior view of the skies to direct friendly fighters into advantageous positions to attack enemy aircraft. Soviet doctrine mandated strict GCI control over fighters, and the North Vietnamese largely adopted the Soviet methods for managing their MiG forces. The USN and USAF also used GCI systems (employing the USN's Red Crown radar picket ship and the USAF's Big Eye/College Eye EC-121s), however, U.S. GCI operators functioned more as advisors and assistants to pilots, who retained much leeway over the actual conduct of air operations. By contrast, NV pilots operated under the direct orders of GCI controllers, as dictated by Soviet doctrine. The Big Eye program was started in April 1965 to provide primitive AWACS and GCI services to U.S. aircraft operating over North Vietnam using USAF EC-121Ds orbiting over NE Laos and the Gulf of Tonkin. Big Eye radar coverage did extend to the Hanoi area, however, coverage of low altitudes was extremely limited if not non-existent. (Vietnam-era radars did not yet have the "look down" capabilities of more advanced radar systems developed in the mid-1970s.) Big Eye was renamed College Eye in March 1967 when the EC-121s moved from bases in South Vietnam to Thailand. The College Eye program incorporated the Rivet Top program (using EC-121Ks) starting in August 1967. The Rivet Top program used improved radio equipment to monitor enemy GCI communications. The Rivet Top EC-121s also began employing QRC-248 IFF interrogator devices to positively identify enemy aircraft that appeared on radar. The Rivet Top EC-121s were thus able to provide better information to U.S. aircraft over North Vietnam about MiG activity and impending MiG attacks on strike formations. The Rivet Top program eventually became known as Rivet Gym when the program switched to EC-121Ts. The College Eye and Rivet Gym EC-121s departed the SEA theater in mid-1970, only to return in late 1971 when the call sign for the EC-121s became Disco. During Operation Linebacker, Disco EC-121s were a vital component in the Teaball system, which began operations from Nakhon Phanom in July 1972. "Red Crown" was the call sign for a U.S. Navy picket ship (typically a destroyer or cruiser) located in the Gulf of Tonkin that provided GCI control for both USN and USAF aircraft operating over North Vietnam. Initially Red Crown provided only basic GCI control information (data on radar contacts, instructions for interceptions of bogeys, etc.). By Operation Linebacker in 1972, Red Crown had been equipped with more sophisticated radars and other improved ELINT & SIGINT equipment, allowing Red Crown to better confirm bandits and to pass along detailed more information about the types of enemy aircraft, their fuel status, and even their orders from NV CGI controllers. Teaball, a very late development in the Vietnam war, was a command-and-control operation started in mid-1972 at Nakhon Phanom RTAFB. It was designed to collect, collate, and integrate intelligence data from a variety of sources -- including USAF Rivet Top EC-121s, Combat Apple RC-135Ms, Burning Pipe RC-135Cs, Olympic Torch U-2s, USN Big Look EC-121s, Red Crown radar picket ships, and other sources -- in order to provide a more comprehensive and integrated real time picture of the air war over Vietnam to U.S. commanders and GCI controllers, who could then pass better threat information to U.S. air crews operating over North Vietnam. In practice Teaball proved very unreliable and problematic. Teaball MiG warnings were significantly delayed in getting to USAF F-4 crews over North Vietnam because Teaball's radio transmissions had to be relayed through Luzon, a KC-135 radio relay aircraft orbiting over the Gulf of Tonkin. Further, aircrews did not understand the provenance of Teaball's information and consequently gave it little priority. Worse, Teaball often went off the air, forcing Red Crown or Disco to step in as backup GCI controllers, creating confusion among air crews.

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Table of Available Weapons Systems by Date

What follows are tables that list "first SEA use" dates for the major weapons systems that appear in "Air War: North Vietnam." In cases where two dates are listed, the second date is a "withdrawal from use" date. Dates in parentheses are deployment dates for contemporary weapons systems that were not generally used in the SEA theater. As players fly U.S. aircraft for all but a few missions in AWNVN, these tables focus primarily on weapons systems used by the United States and its South Vietnamese ally. For maximum historical accuracy, players should not use weapons systems in missions dated prior to the dates listed below.
Aircraft (US\SVN) 1st Use/Withdr Notes ------------------------------ ----A-1E/H/J Skyraider Feb-64/Nov-72 USN withdraws Apr 68; last USAF use Nov 72 A-26 Invader Aug-64/Jun-70 replaced by AC-119 for interdiction missions A-37 Dragonfly Aug-67 "Combat Dragon" combat eval; VNAF deliveries 1968 A-4C Skyhawk Aug-64/Nov-70 heavy use 1964-1967 A-4E Skyhawk Dec-64 Project Shoehorn upgrades 1965; USMC use thru Linebacker A-4F Skyhawk Jan-68 only USN model for Linebacker raids A-6A Intruder Jun-65 the primary Intruder model for the entire war A-6B Intruder Dec-67 configured for Iron Hand missions A-6C Intruder TRIM May-70 configured for armed recon missions A-6E Intruder TRAM (Dec 71) no SEA deployment A-7A Corsair II Dec-67 USN model A-7B Corsair II Mar-69 USN model A-7D Corsair II Oct-72 USAF model A-7E Corsair II May-70 main USN model during Linebacker raids AC-119 Shadow/Stinger Dec-68 gunship; USAF a/c turned over to VNAF AC-130 Spectre Oct-67 gunship AC-47D Spooky Dec-64/Dec-69 gunship AH-1G/J Cobra/Sea Jun-67 attack helo; used for CAS in SVN B-52D Big Belly BUFF Apr-66 "Big Belly" mods begin Dec 65; Guam Apr 66; U-Tapao Mar 67; Okinawa Feb 68 B-52G Stratofortress Apr-72 Linebacker I & II only; Guam Apr-May 72 B-57B Canberra Aug-64/Oct-69 used primarily over Ho Chi Minh Trail C-123 Provider Jun-62 transport C-130 Hercules Jun-61 transport C-5B Galaxy Sep-70 transport CH-47 Chinook Sep-65 transport helo E-2 Hawkeye Aug-64 E-2A replaces E-1 Tracer 1964; E-2B 1969; E-2C 1973 EA-1F Skyraider Feb-65/Dec-68 ECM version of the Skyraider EA-6A Intruder Oct-66 ECM version of the Intruder; USMC use only EA-6B Prowler Jul-72 four-seat aircraft; not a simple upgrade of the EA-6A EB-66 Destroyer Apr-65 EB-66C; EB-66B Oct 65; EB-66E Aug 67 EC-121 Warning Star Apr-65/Aug-73 Big Eye to Mar 67; College Eye to Jun 70; Rivet Top/Gym Aug 67-Jun 69; Disco Nov 71-Aug 72 EF-10B SkyKnight Jan-65/Dec-69 USMC ECM platform; based at Da Nang EF-4C Phantom II May-72 1st SEA use during Linebacker raids EKA-3B Skywarrior Dec-67 ECM aircraft & tanker F-100D Super Sabre May-62/Jul-71 operated mostly in RP I, Laos, & SVN F-100F Super Sabre Nov-65/May-70 used as Wild Weasels & Misty Fast FACs F-101B Voodoo (Jan-59) no SEA deployment F-102A Delta Dagger Mar-62/Nov-68 used for base defense in SVN (Da Nang) F-104C Starfighter Apr-65/Jul-67 saw only limited SEA use; replaced by F-4Cs F-105D Thunderchief Sep-64/Nov-70 restricted to Laos 1969 F-105F Thunderchief May-66 two-seater; used as Wild Weasels F-105G Thunderchief Sep-67 F-105F w/ improved avionics F-106A Delta Dart (May 59) no SEA deployment F-111A Aardvark Mar-68 withdrawn Apr 68; reintroduced Sep 72 F-14A Tomcat (Sep-74) VF-1/VF-2 (USS Enterprise) receive; no SEA deployment F-4B Phantom II Aug-64 upgraded to F-4N Jun 72 F-4C Phantom II Apr-65/Dec-67 quickly replaced by F-4Ds from May 67 onward F-4D Phantom II May-67 Olds' 8th TFW 1st to receive; originally equipped w/ AIM-4Ds, later replaced by AIM-9s F-4E Phantom II Nov-68 Rivet Haste upgrades mid-late 72 F-4J Phantom II Jun-68 upgraded to F-4S Jul 77 F-4N Phantom II (Jun-72) upgraded F-4Bs; no SEA deployment F-5A Freedom Fighter Oct-65 Skoshi Tiger combat eval; all USAF SEA planes turned over to VNAF Jun 67 F-8C Crusader Dec-64/Dec-68 heavy use 1964-1967

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F-8D Crusader F-8E Crusader F-8H Crusader F-8J Crusader HH-3E "Jolly Green" HH-53 "Super Jolly" KA-6D Tanker KC-135 Stratotanker P-3C Orion RA-5C Vigilante RC-135M Rivet Card RF-101C Voodoo RF-4B Phantom II RF-4C Phantom II RF-8A Crusader RF-8G Crusader SH-3A Sea King T-28D Nomad UH-1B Huey UH-1D Huey Aircraft (NVN\China) -------------------J-5 Fresco J-6 Farmer IL-28 Beagle Mi-4 Hound MiG-15 Fagot MiG-17 Fresco MiG-19 Farmer MiG-21 Fishbed

Feb-65/Nov-65 Dec-64/Sep-68 Feb-68/Nov-70 Apr-69 Jun-65 Sep-67 May-71 Jun-64 Aug-64 Sep-64 Sep-67 Oct-61/Nov-70 Oct-66 Oct-65 May-64/Jul-66 Jun-66 Aug-64 Aug-64 Jun-62 Jun-63 1st Use/Withdr -------------Feb-64 Jun-69 Jun-65 Oct-60 Dec-62 Feb-64 Jun-69 Nov-65

upgraded to F-8H mid-1967 upgraded to F-8J mid-1968 upgraded F-8D mid-1967 upgraded F-8E mid-1968 "Jolly Green Giant"; upgraded CH-3s deploy Jun 67 "Super Jolly Green Giant" modified A-6A Intruder based mainly in Thailand mainly coastal patrols of SVN formerly a bomber; redesignated recon 1963 Combat Apple missions from Kadena AFB, Okinawa restricted to SVN & Laos Sep 67 onward USMC only (Da Nang) quickly replaces the RF-101C Voodoo over North Vietnam upgraded to RF-8Gs from mid-1965 upgraded RF-8As (performed mid-1965) transport helo U.S. planes turned over to VNAF & others 1969 onward gunship transport helo Notes ----Chinese MiG-17; did not carry missiles until Linebacker Chinese MiG-19; 1st encountered early 1972 never used in combat transport helo used primarily as a trainer did not carry missiles until Linebacker 1st encountered early 1972 1st sighted Jan 66; 1st shootdown Apr 66

Air-to-Air (US\SVN) 1st Use/Withdr Notes -------------------------------- ----20mm SUU-16/23 Gun Pod Jun-65 SUU-16 F-4C; SUU-23 F-4D; not widely used before May 67 AIM-4D Falcon Jan-65/Jun-69 (IR) used on F-102/F-106; F-4Ds May 67; withdrawn 1969-72 AIM-4F Falcon Jan-65 (SAR) delivered/deployed; used on F-102/F-106 AIM-54A Phoenix (Jun-72) F-14 Tomcat only; no SEA use AIM-7E Sparrow Jun-63 delivered/deployed; 1st kill Jun 65 AIM-7E2 Sparrow Jun-69 "dogfight Sparrow" AIM-9BE Sidewinder Jun-55 AIM-9E (USAF) Jun 67 AIM-9D Sidewinder Jun-63 USN only AIM-9GH Sidewinder Jun-70 USN only; AIM-9H (USN) Jun 72 AIM-9JNP Sidewinder Jun-72 USAF only; improved/upgraded AIM-9E Air-to-Ground (US\SVN) 1st Use/Withdr ---------------------- -------------AGM-12B Bullpup-A Jan-65/Aug-71 AGM-12C Bullpup-B Aug-65/Aug-71 AGM-45A Shrike Mar-66 AGM-62 Walleye Mar-67 AGM-65A Maverick Aug-72 AGM-78 STARM Mar-68 BLU-27 Fire Bomb Mar-65 BLU-67/B Clusterx3 Jun-68 CBU-24/B Cluster Jun-66 CBU-25/A Clusterx6 Jun-66 CBU-52/B Cluster Jul-68 GBU-10A Paveway I Jan-69 GBU-10E Paveway II (Jun-72) M117 GP 750 Aug-64 M118 Demolition 3000 Jul-65 MK-20 Rockeye II Sep-68 MK-36 Destructor Mine Aug-64 MK-81 250 x3 Aug-64 MK-82 Snakeye 500 Aug-64 MK-83 1000 Aug-64 MK-84 Slick 2000 Aug-64 Rox LAU-3/A 2.75 in Aug-64 Rox LAU-10 Zuni 5 in Aug-64 Notes ----operational 1960; 250 lb warhead 1000 lb warhead 1st use USN; USAF 1st use Apr 66 2000 lb "Fat Albert" version early 1972 delivered to USAF mid 72 AGM-78A Mar 68; AGM-78B in 1969 napalm anti-runway cluster bomb anti-personnel/material cluster bomb anti-personnel cluster bomb anti-material cluster bomb main LGB during Linebacker raids no SEA use for Paveway IIs standard iron bomb (along w/ MK-82) preferred for bridge strikes anti-armor cluster bomb mining of NV rivers/estuaries begins Feb 67 used primarily for CAS and soft targets standard iron bomb (along w/ M117)

unguided rockets unguided rockets

AWNVN: Historical Notes

FA Commands, Options, & Windows

Fighters Anthology offers players a number of commands (via key controls), in-flight windows, and options (via the in-flight menu bar), most of which are designed to mimic real world systems or to aid Situational Awareness. During the Vietnam War, however, many systems and capabilities that are now standard were just beginning development. Thus, many of the commands, options, and windows available to players in FA give virtual pilots information and advantages that air crews operating over North Vietnam simply did not have or did not enjoy until late in the war. What follows are a series of recommendations for utilizing key FA commands, options, and windows so that the information available to player more closely approximates that available to air crews flying over North Vietnam. Please keep in mind that these recommendations can only loosely approximate the information and capabilities available to pilots in the late 60's and early 70's. FA's design simply does not permit absolute realism in these matters.
Option/Command/Window --------------------AWACS/JSTARS Datalink (Shft-A): IFF Squawk (U): View Target/Target-to-Player (F8): Nearest Air Target (Ctrl-Z): Nearest Ground Target (Ctrl-X): IR/Laser Advanced Targeting (Shft-2): Recommendation -------------OFF (pre-Jul 72); ON (Jul 72 & later) DO NOT USE (pre-Jan 71); USE (Jan 71 & later) DO NOT USE (pre-Jan 71); USE (Jan 71 & later) DO NOT USE (pre-Jun 67); USE (Jun 67 & later) USE (major strikes); DO NOT USE (solo strikes) ON or OFF (player's discretion)

Target or Radar/Visual Target (Shft-4): DO NOT USE (pre-Jan 71); USE (Jan 71 & later) RWR Window (Shft-5) & Sound: ON (for F-105); OFF (all other pre-Jun 66); ON (all other Jun 66 & later) ON OFF (Do not use) OFF (Do not use) OFF (Do not use)

Authentic Radar CRT & Seeker: Easy Targeting: Easy Aiming: Show Target Info (Ctrl-T):

Notes on VID: During the Vietnam War U.S. air crews operated under ROE (Rules of Engagement) that generally required pilots to obtain visual identification (VID) of bandits before opening fire. These VID requirements effectively nullified the potential advantages of the AIM-7 Sparrow (the main SARH missile carried by U.S. fighters), which could theoretically hit targets BVR. In certain situations or circumstances U.S. fighters were permitted to fire before obtaining VID -- for example, a MiGCAP flight that was the first friendly air unit into a target area. Such situations were very much the exception, however. Players who are interested in flying historically accurate missions should avoid firing on enemy aircraft until visual ID has been obtained -- roughly speaking, not until bandits are within 3-5 miles range. Players may fire BVR missile shots if they are the first element of a strike mission into a target area or if the mission briefing text has specifically authorized BVR missile shots without VID requirements.

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Realism Limits
As noted earlier, the design of Fighters Anthology necessarily places limits on the level of "realism" that can be achieved in AWNVN. Still further, to maintain an acceptable level of gameplay, I have occasionally been compelled to make design decisions -- both in the construction of missions and the configuration of aircraft and ordnance -- that make AWNVN somewhat less than completely true to the air war that actually occurred over North Vietnam. Finally, although the vast majority of AWNVN missions are based on historical missions that were actually flown, information about certain particulars and details of these missions was often unavailable to me. Thus, in designing a "historical" mission I might know the date, the target, and the rough composition of the strike force, but I wouldn't know the precise ingress route and altitudes flown or even the particular loadouts of every aircraft (to say nothing of the weather). In such circumstances, the best I could do was make good guesses based on my knowledge of similar strike missions and the aircraft and ordnance available to the Navy and Air Force at the time of the mission. In the end, then, players should always remember that AWNVN is a game. Its purpose is both to inform and entertain. Thus, if players find AWNVN compelling enough to play and, in the process, happen to gain a better understanding of the air war over North Vietnam -- both its historical development and progression as well as the challenges and decisions confronted by its participants -- then AWNVN can be regarded as a success. What follows are some brief notes on the realism (or lack thereof) of particular aspects of AWNVN.

1. MiGs
For many students of the air war over North Vietnam, the VPAF's MiG force is the single most fascinating threat that faced U.S. pilots -- and understandably so, too. Even U.S. fighter pilots flying into the upper Route Packs regarded MiGs as the ultimate challenge -- the big prize. Among U.S. pilots there was quite a bit of competition to get a MiG kill, and pilots could became a bit too keenly focused (some might say obsessed) with collecting a MiG scalp -- sometimes at their own expense. An intense case of "MiG-itis" could prove terminal to pilots who lost situational awareness and were distracted from their actual mission. Nonetheless, MiGs were never the primary threat to U.S. pilots. AAA was the biggest killer of U.S. aircraft, with SAMs figuring a distant second. Nor were MiGs even a common feature of most strikes. The VPAF tended to husband its MiG force and use its aircraft sparingly in carefully planned attacks on U.S. planes that were deemed vulnerable. The VPAF never entertained any delusions of taking on U.S. air forces head-on. Rather, the VPAF worked to confuse, disrupt, and hassle U.S. air operations through an aerial form of guerilla warfare. Most attacks on U.S. aircraft were performed from the rear by small numbers of MiGs -- two to four aircraft. If the MiGs lost their initial position of advantage, they were usually directed by their GCI controllers to rapidly disengage and "bug out." Although there were several noteworthy "furballs" between MiGs and U.S. fighters over the years, these were very much the exception. And when the VPAF suffered unacceptable losses (as they occasionally did), the MiGs would stand down for months at a time for further training and planning, or even seek refuge across the border at bases in the PRC. Thus, while the MiG threat was an ever-present one, actual MiG engagements were a much more rare phenomenon. Many (perhaps most) U.S. pilots in the SEA theater never even saw a MiG during their tours of duty, and only a small percentage of U.S. pilots ever engaged in a dogfight with one. Many

AWNVN: Historical Notes

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months could go by in the air war without a single MiG kill, and when the MiGs did materialize to attack a formation of U.S. strike aircraft, they hit once, very fast, and then bugged out -- a tactic known as "one pass, haul ass." Rarely did they stick around for an extended fight. Thus, the daily reality of air-to-air combat over North Vietnam bore little resemblance to the epic air battles of World War II or Korea. The air war over North Vietnam was much more a stealthy game of tactical maneuverings and carefully planned feints, with the occasional parry and thrust when opposing aircraft mixed it up -- all orchestrated by players operating in an information twilight of poor radar coverage, faulty radio communication, unreliable air-to-air weapons, and the general "fog of war." Needless to say, you won't encounter MiGs in every mission of AWNVN. And you shouldn't expect to have to mix it up with MiGs even when they are present in a mission. But you will encounter MiGs much more frequently than any U.S. pilot ever did flying over North Vietnam. The prevalence of MiGs in AWNVN is very much the product of a design decision to enhance the entertainment and playability of the missions. Simply put, MiGs are fun -- and most players of FA come to the game for the thrill of virtual dogfights. When putting together AWNVN, I saw little point in completely frustrating players' expectations. So, MiGs there are -- in relative abundance. Nonetheless, players should bear in mind that MiGs were not so nearly as common in the skies over North Vietnam as they are in AWNVN.

2. ECM/EW
One of the more important yet little understood aspects of Vietnam air war was the significant development of ECM tactics and equipment that occurred over the course of the war. From April 1965, when the first SAM sites were spotted around Hanoi, through final days of the air war in December 1972, when B-52s rained destruction down on targets surrounding Hanoi, the U.S. and North Vietnam engaged in a deadly battle conducted over certain parts of the electromagnetic spectrum. To counter the threat of North Vietnamese radar-guided SAMs, the U.S. developed a number of electronic countermeasures (ECM), including RHAWR equipment to warn pilots of SA-2 and radar-guided AAA threats, jamming pods to protect individual aircraft or even formations of aircraft, stand-off jamming platforms (such as the EB-66) to blanket NV radars in a fog of electronic noise, and anti-radiation missiles to home in on and destroy the "Fan Song" guidance radars of SAM sites. During the Linebacker raids of 1972, "chaff bombers" lay chaff corridors to shield strike packages from NV radar. In response, the North Vietnamese continually developed their air defense network, adopting new tactics to thwart U.S. ECM and enable their SA-2s to find their mark. Still further, the U.S. engaged in other types of electronic warfare (EW) -- e.g., disrupting the radio communications so vital to the VPAF's GCI command and control system, and exploiting the ability to query and read the IFF transponders of VPAF MiGs. Put simply, the air war over North Vietnam was as much an electronic war as it was a physical war involving aircraft, pilots, and ordnance. Unfortunately, FA is completely deficient in modeling these key aspects of ECM and EW more generally, and there is very little that I have been able to do in AWNVN to rectify the situation. To be sure, players will encounter some aspects of this electronic war -- the RWR window warns virtual pilots of radar-guided SAM and AAA threats; jamming pods can reduce the threat to the player's aircraft; chaff can be used to confuse enemy radars. But that is about the extent of it. What's missing from the picture is tremendous. Stand-off jamming platforms are completely non-existent and non-functional in the world of FA (the EB66s you might spot in an AWNVN mission are purely decorative). The game fails to simulate shifting tactics and capabilities of the North Vietnamese air defense network. Worse, all aircraft have RWR windows (even those ancient A-1 Skyraiders), when in fact, the U.S. struggled to add RHAWR equipment to its aircraft once they started falling prey to NV SA-2s in 1965-1966. By default, IFF

AWNVN: Historical Notes

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transponders can be queried on any aircraft in the sky, whereas the U.S. ability to query MiG transponders and pass along threat information to pilots was constrained by a number of considerations, both practical and tactical. Finally, jamming pods are entirely player-centric; there is no modeling of the mutual protection offered by groups of pod-equipped strike aircraft flying in close formation. Again, I wish there were some way to rectify these tremendous deficiencies. Sadly, they are simply insurmountable problems built into the very design of FA itself.

3. A2A Missile Reliability

As discussed earlier in this document, the first generation of air-to-air missiles suffered from severe reliability problems. U.S. missiles offered a PKA (kill probability) ranging from 5-12%, with the AIM-9 Sidewinder being the most reliable of the three major missile families used by U.S. fighters (the other two being the AIM-7 Sparrow and the AIM-4 Falcon). Missiles used by the VPAF on their MiG-21s were just as prone to failure. To be sure, players of AWNVN will find that air-to-air missiles are much more unreliable than in the stock version of Fighters Anthology. In some cases players might find themselves firing a volley of missiles just to get a hit on a single aircraft. Nonetheless, missiles in AWNVN are less prone to failure than in real life. I estimate the PKA of air-to-air missiles in AWNVN to range from 20-30% -- still bad, but not nearly as poor as U.S. pilots experienced in actual combat over North Vietnam.

4. Mission Loadouts
As noted above, when designing historically based missions, I often lacked information on the precise loadouts used by aircraft that flew the real missions. In such cases, I made educated guesses on the loadouts used based on my knowledge of similar strikes as well as the capabilities of the aircraft involved. Still further, however, the design of aircraft hardpoints in FA makes it difficult to impose limits or parameters on loadouts that are absolutely and always historically correct (anyone who has used the FA Toolkit will be familiar with this problem). Thus, loadouts used in AWNVN missions may, in some cases, differ slightly from those actually used on a particular mission in Vietnam.

5. Alpha Strike Size

One of the more frustrating aspects of designing missions for FA is that one is constantly bumping into limits on the number of objects (aircraft, vehicles, scenery) than can be added to mission. Not only is there any absolute upper limit on the total number of objects, but a great number of AI-controlled objects (aircraft & vehicles) tends to cause missions to become unstable during play. There is little more frustrating to a player than to get half-way through a long and involved strike mission only to have FA crash to the desktop in the middle of play because the game engine ran out of resources. As a result, mission design becomes a constant game of trade-offs. In some cases, the unavoidable trade-off is fidelity to the actual historical mission flown versus the very real limits of FA itself. FA's limitations are felt most acutely in Alpha Strike missions. The early strikes by the US Navy and Air Force during Flaming Dart and Rolling Thunder tended to be huge -- typically 80-120 aircraft, or even more. The size of Alpha Strike packages fell over the course of Rolling Thunder (as U.S. tactics evolved and improved) to 20-50 aircraft. By the start of Linebacker, however, they were growing once more (esp. in strikes conducted by the USAF), as chaff bombers and their fighter escorts joined the existing mix of mission aircraft: pre-strike recon birds, Iron Hand SAM suppressors, Iron Hand fighter escorts, MiGCAP fighters, stand-off jamming platforms, fighter escorts for the jammers, flak suppressors, strike aircraft,

AWNVN: Historical Notes

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TARCAP fighter escorts, and post-strike recon birds -- to say nothing of the bevy of other support aircraft necessary for missions, such as KC-135 tankers, EC-121 ABCCC platforms, and SAR/SANDY forces. Needless to say, major U.S. Alpha Strikes were an incredibly involved affair, requiring the massing and coordination of dozens upon dozens of aircraft, each with a particular role to play in the mission. Simply put, FA cannot support such large numbers of aircraft. Thus, compromises in force sizes used for Alpha Strike missions in AWNVN have been unavoidable. In some cases, I simply dropped certain parts of a strike package on the assumption that the player would never see them anyway or notice their absence. In other cases, though, I was forced to use strike packages that are, at best, composites of those actually used against targets in North Vietnam. The use of "composite" strike packages is esp. common in the early strike missions of 1965. I strongly suspect that most players will not notice or regret the use of paired down strike packages once they actually get into the missions, which are still teeming with activity.

6. Maps/Terrains/Targets
One other great source of frustration for me while designing missions for AWNVN has been the map/terrain of North Vietnam. The terrain in FA only vaguely resembles the actual country itself, which is among the most spectacular and diverse terrains in the world. In the world of FA (and AWNVN), North Vietnam tends to be either flat and devoid of detail or mountainous and still completely barren. The thick jungles, towering karst formations, rolling hills and valleys, and sapphire-like river deltas so admired by U.S. pilots are barely suggested in the world of FA. I have tried to redress some of these problems in the custom maps/terrains built for AWNVN. While I tend to think that my efforts are an improvement on the stock FA map/terrain, they remain woefully deficient and still can only suggest the geographically lush country that Vietnam actually is. Similarly, target areas in strike missions are not nearly as rich and diverse as I had hoped to make them. One problem in designing target areas was the familiar lack of information about or photographs of the actual targets, forcing me to resort to my imagination. Just what does a POL storage area look like from the air? I've seen photographs of some of the larger POL targets around Hanoi and Haiphong, but surely not every one in North Vietnam was similarly constructed. How about camouflaged ammo dumps or a cement factory? Again, I often had to use my imagination. The design of target areas is constrained not only by my own imagination but also by the limited number of buildings and structures available for use in FA. Thus, despite my best efforts, players will notice a kind of homogeneity in the actual makeup of target areas.

7. Weather
If U.S. pilots flying into North Vietnam were struck by the beautifully lush countryside, they were also frustrated and awed by the extreme weather conditions they encountered, particularly the thunderheads. Weather played a critical role in dictating the pace and execution of U.S. air operations during the Vietnam war. Bad seasonal monsoon often prevented strikes into North Vietnam for months at a time. Even during the best of weather conditions, U.S. pilots struggled with the near constant haze that hung over the countryside in the early mornings and late afternoons (most Alpha Strike were conducted between 9:00 am and 3:00 pm to allow the air to clear). Strike packages were often turned back from their primary targets by towering, impenetrable thunderheads. MiG pilots eluded U.S. fighters by darting into thick cloud banks. And SAR operations often struggled to find a hole in the seemingly endless soup of clouds and haze through which the helos could penetrate to pick up a downed pilot.

AWNVN: Historical Notes

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As with the geographical terrain of Vietnam, FA is woefully lacking in its modeling of weather conditions. In the world of FA there are three basic weather conditions: clear (with an optional layer of light clouds), overcast (with a thick cloud layer rising from 5,000-10,000 feet), and foggy (with a thick cloud layer running from 8,000 feet all the way to the ground). That's it. No thunderheads. No mixed or broken cloud layers. No haze. In short, nothing like the spectacular weather conditions that U.S. pilots actually struggled with on a daily basis over North Vietnam. In designing missions for AWNVN, I have tried to use a mix of weather conditions. Nonetheless, players will never encounter the variety of conditions actually experienced by U.S. pilots over North Vietnam. Even "bad weather" in AWNVN is all too homogenous and monotonous -- FA's "overcast" weather can become quite dreary if only through over-familiarity. As with so many other aspects of AWNVN, these limitations are built into the very design of FA itself.

8. AI Behavior
Anyone who has played FA extensively will know that the AI logic that controls virtual (non-human) pilots has more than its fair share of quirks, and I have struggled to accommodate the occasionally devilish behaviors of AI-controlled aircraft when designing missions for AWNVN. Three particular AIpilot behaviors need to be called out and discussed: a) AI-controlled fighters fail to break off engagements. As noted above, MiG pilots usually attacked from a position of advantage, and if they lost the advantage, they were directed by their GCI controllers to swiftly disengage and bug out. AI-controlled MiGs in AWNVN don't behave that way. In most cases they will stand and fight until they run out of ammo, after which they begin executing strange, porpoise-like evasive maneuvers at low speed. b) AI-controlled strike aircraft make too many passes on ground targets. U.S. air crews learned early on to minimize the number of passes they made on a target, lest they fall prey to AAA or SAMs. When striking heavily defended targets, U.S. strike packages typically made one pass on the target, unloaded all their ordnance, then egressed. AI-controlled strike aircraft in AWNVN are not as aggressive and efficient, however. Although I have attempted to design AWNVN missions in such a way as to force AI-controlled strike aircraft to hit targets just as hard as possible, they will often require at least 2-3 passes on a target area to finish the job. c) AI-controlled fighters fight stupid without a gun. Most F-4 Phantom IIs used in Vietnam did not have an internal cannon. The first model to be equipped with an internal cannon, the USAF F-4E, did not arrive in the SEA theater until after the end of Rolling Thunder. Even as late as Linebacker I & II, the vast majority of USN and USAF F-4s went into battle without a gun, relying exclusively on their missile loadouts of AIM-7 Sparrows and AIM-9 Sidewinders. F-4 pilots were thus forced to adopt ACM tactics that allowed them to set up missile shots within the performance envelope of missiles themselves. When engaging MiGs, U.S. pilots were keenly sensitive to the minimum range requirements of their missiles -just under half a mile for the AIM-9 to just about one mile in the case of the early AIM-7s -- and worked to maintain enough separation on enemy aircraft to allow their missiles to function properly. AI-pilots in the world of FA, unfortunately, haven't a clue about how to fight without a gun. They maneuver to a position of advantage, then close aggressively on an enemy's tail, all too often putting themselves below the minimum range of their missiles. I have tried to compensate by lowering the minimum range of IR missiles to slightly unrealistic distances in order to give these clueless AI pilots a better chance when fighting without a cannon. Nonetheless, when engaging MiGs with a flight of F-4Bs, for example, you need to be aware of the weaknesses of your AI-wingmen and compensate accordingly.

AWNVN: Historical Notes

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9. Civilian Casualties
War is a messy, gruesome business. People die -- and not just military combatants. Even in an age of socalled "smart" weapons, innocent civilians get killed in air strikes -- sometimes hundreds at a time. Although the Vietnam War did see the advent of PGMs (precision guided munitions) such as the Walleye EOGB and the Paveway LGB, the vast majority of bombs dropped on North Vietnam were dumb iron bombs and cluster munitions, both of which are notoriously inaccurate. Although U.S. pilots strived mightily to put all their bombs on target so as to maximize damage to the target and minimize civilian casualties, and although U.S. pilots operated under burdensome ROE (rules of engagement) designed to avoid the needless deaths of innocents, thousands of North Vietnamese civilians died nonetheless. In the world of FA, however, there are no civilians. If you miss target with a string of MK-82s, you don't have to worry about innocent men, women, and children being slaughtered when your bombs mistakenly take out a nearby group of hooches. You don't have to worry about how many civilians might be inside the thermal power plant that you pulverize, or whether innocent children will be killed while playing with unexploded, dud bomblets left behind after you strike a column of trucks with CBU-24/B cluster bombs. No, combat in the world of FA is a fairly bloodless affair. It should go without saying that the real world of combat -- and the actual experience of civilians caught in the inferno that was the Vietnam War -- is and was quite different.

(C) Copyright 2008 Eric L. Howes All Rights Reserved.