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Jharkhand High Court

Rajmahal Pahad Bachao Andolan ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) on 19 August, 2005
Equivalent citations: 2005 (4) JCR 331 Jhr Author: A Kabir Bench: A Kabir, S Mukhopadhaya JUDGMENT Altamas Kabir, C.J. 1. Although the matter started out as public interest litigation, during the course of submissions, innumerable affidavits were filed rendering the litigation adversarial in nature. 2. The writ petitioners claim to have filed the writ petition as a class action litigation by the tribal Chiefs of Rajmahal Pahar Bachao Andolan, Amla Pahad Block, Pakur District, Jharkhand and some Human Rights Organisations in the State of Jharkhand for enforcement and protection of the fundamental rights of the villagers of the said area as guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 3. According to the petitioners, out of 22 districts in the State of Jharkhand, 12 districts fully and 2 districts partially comprise Scheduled Areas. Some of the areas are covered by the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 and the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, which are similar in nature. Furthermore the provisions of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution and the provisions of the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) also apply to these areas which have rich mineral deposits, including coal. 4. According to the petitioners, Parliament enacted the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 to enable the Union of India to acquire and develop land for coal mining 1

purposes in addition to the provisions of the Land Acquisition-Act, 1894. It is the petitioners' case that there has been a concerted attempt by the authorities to use the rich resources of the region for benefiting the State at the cost of the lives and the livelihood of the local population. 5. It is the further case of the petitioners that in the year 1988, a system of exploration for coal was commenced in and around the villages of Pachwara region by the Geological Survey of India, which is reported to have 562 MT coal reserves in an area measuring approximately 1300 hectares and comprising nine revenue villages whose inhabitants are essentially tribals. 6. According to the petitioners, land acquition notices have been issued in respect of a total area of 1704.69 acres, which has been notified for acquisition for the coal development project of Panem Coal Mines Limited. The break-up has been shown to include 640 hectares of raiyati land, 360 hectares of forest land, 2 hectares of home-stead land and some other lands comprising roads, nullas, rivers, bridges, etc. From the averments made in the writ petition, it appears that on 26th December, 2001, the Union of India in its Ministry of Coal and Mines, allotted 13 sq. kilometers of land in Pachwara Central Block to Punjab State Electricity Board for captive mining for supply of coal exclusively to the thermal power plant in the State of Punjab. The actual mining activity is to be carried out by Panem Coal Mines Limited, which has been made respondent No. 3 in the writ petition. It also appears from the averments in the writ petition that on 22nd February, 2002, the Union of India issued a notification specifying the supply of coal by Panem Coal Mines Limited for the Thermal Power Plant of the Punjab State Electricity Board. 7. According to the writ petitioners, when the said news was published in the local newspapers in the month of April, 2002, there was widespread protest and rallies by the villagers against the proposal because it would deprive them of their homes and ancestral properties. 8. While the said process was under way, the State Government issued several notifications dated 14th November, 2002 under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 specifying lands comprising Panchwara Central Block for the purpose of acquisition. The notification for each village was published separately and notwithstanding the provisions of the Jharkhand Panchayat Act and its Extension to the Scheduled Areas as also the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, the State of Jharkhand proceeded further to issue notifications under Section 6 of the aforesaid Act. 9. As mentioned hereinabove, this writ petition is purported to have been filed by the representatives of the villagers of the nine villages, which have been included in the proposal for acquisition.

10. Appearing for the writ petitioners, Mr. Murlidhar questioned the proposal of the Central Government and the State Government to grant mining lease for excavation of coal to Panem Coal Mines Limited on various grounds. It was urged that the proposed acquisition was in contravention of the provisions of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 wherein in Section 20, it has been provided that no transfer by a raiyat of his right in his holding or any portion thereof, by sale, gift, mortgage, will, lease, or any other contract or agreement, express or implied, shall be valid, unless the right to transfer has been recorded in the record of rights, and then only to the extent to which such right is so recorded. Sub-section (2) of Section 20, provides specifically that notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in the record of rights, no right of an aboriginal raiyat in his holding or any portion thereof which is transferable shall be transferred in any manner to anyone, but to a bona fide cultivating aboriginal raiyat of a pargana or Taluk or Tappa in which the holding is situated. 11. In addition to the above, it was urged that Section 41 of the above Act, prevented settlement of any vacant land or wasteland in a Pahadia village within the Damin-I-Koh Government Estate with a person who is not a pahadia. 12. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that any attempt to acquire the lands comprised in the area to which the aforesaid Act, applies would amount to violation of the aforesaid provisions, since the land would be acquired by the Government for the purpose of granting mining lease to the company, which is not an aboriginal raiyat within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the aforesaid Act. 13. Mr. Murlidhar then went on to submit that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, were not applicable in the areas comprising the lands in respect of which the acquisition notice had been published. Further-more, the declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, had been published without complying with the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that neither had any objection been called for, nor were the local villagers heard in the matter involving the acquisition. On the other hand, on coming to learn of the proposed acquisition from newspapers, widespread demonstrations and protests were held against such proposed acquisition. 14. Mr. Murlidhar then submitted that although acquisition proceedings have been commenced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and declaration had also been published under Section 6 thereof, it had come to the knowledge of the petitioner that no award had been made within the time specified under Section 11-A of the aforesaid Act and that as a consequence, the proceedings for acquisition of land in question had lapsed.

15. The next objection taken by Mr. Murlidhar was that some of the lands forming the subject matter of acquisition proceedings were pahadi lands and could not therefore be made the subject matter of the acquisition in view of the provisions of Section 41 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949. 16. During the course of hearing of the writ petition, an application was filed on behalf of the writ petition, being IA N No. 1591 of 2005 seeking an amendment of the writ petition. The same was considered and was allowed by order dated 1st July, 2005 for proper adjudication of the matter. 17. On the basis of the amendment, Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the No Objection Certificate granted by the Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board to Panem Coal Mines Limited on 15th March, 2003 under Sections 25 and 26 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 was subject to various conditions, including the condition that persons likely to be displaced should be rehabilitated with suitable compensation at a safe place before the activities at the site started. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the No Objection Certificate was valid only for a period of six months from the date of issue and it was not known as to whether the said certificate had been renewed or not, or whether the condition relating to rehabilitation had been complied with or not by the respondent No. 3 till date. It was sought to be urged that there is no valid and subsisting No Objection Certificate issued by the Jharkhand Pollution Control Board for the coal mining project of M/s. Panem Coal Mines Limited and in the absence of such no objection certificate, the project should not be allowed to proceed. 18. It was also submitted that the site clearance given by the Government of India in its Ministry of Environment and Forests on 5th January, 2004 was in respect of a total mining lease area of 1151.75 hectares, out of which 674 hectares is agricultural land and 369.8 hectares is forest land. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the said lands had been obtained by M/s. Panem Coal Mines Limited, even before the land had been acquired by the State Government and handed over to the Company. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that since the lands are located in the Santhal Parganas Area where the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 is in existence, the provisions contained in the said Act were binding and no clearance could be given without noticing such special law. 19. Mr. Murlidhar then submitted that the subsequent notification dated 4th January, 2005 issued by the Government of India in its Ministry of Environment and Forests in favour of M/s. Panem Coal Mines Limited was of environment clearance in respect of total mining area of 1151.7 hectares, subject to special conditions. According to Mr. Murlidhar, although clearance was given in terms of the Environment Impact Assessment Notification of 1994, as amended on 4th May, 1994 and 10th April,

1997 such clearance was in violation of the said notification, inasmuch as the procedure for disposal of objections by the affected population had not been complied with, nor were the provisions of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions), Act, 1949, even noticed. Furthermore, such notification clearance could not have been given by the Ministry of Environment and Forests at a point of time when the land had not even been acquired by the State Government and made over to Panem Coal Mines Limited. 20. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the aforesaid clearance was followed by another document dated 6th January, 2005 wherein permission was given to the Secretary (Forests), State of Jharkhand, to divert 461.09 hectares of forest land for captive coal mines to be handed over to Panem Coal Mines Limited for mining purposes. It was urged that such permission was in violation not only of the provisions of the Forest Conservation Act, 1980, but the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed from time to time in the case of T.N. Godavarman Thirumalpad v. Union of India, and was, therefore, unlawful and invalid. 21. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that this was a fit case for quashing the decision contained in the order passed by the Government of India in its Ministry of Environment and Forests dated 4th January, 2005 and the decision contained in the document dated 6th, January, 2005, whereby permission was given by the Ministry of Environment and Forests to the Secretary (Forests), State of Jharkhand, to divert 461.09 hectares of forest lands for captive coal mining for Panem Coal Mines Limited. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the entire land acquisition proceedings contained in the notification dated 14th November, 2002 and 24th April, 2003 are bad in law and had lapsed in view of the mandatory provisions of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, since no award had been passed within the mandatory period of two years after the notification dated 24th, April, 2003 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

22. In support of his aforesaid submissions, Mr. Murlidhar referred to and relied on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the power of the State of Andhra Pradesh to grant lease of land for mining purposes in respect of the land located in an area to which the provisions of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution applied. Mr. Murlidhar contended that Section 3(1)(a) of the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Area Land Transfer Regulation, 1959, places a bar on transfer of immovable property by a
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member of the Scheduled Tribe to a person who is not a member of the Scheduled Tribe. After noticing the provisions of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was of the view that the State Government stood prohibited from transferring by way of lease or any other form of gift to allot Government land in a scheduled area to a nontribal person, be it a natural or juristic person, except to an instrumentality or cooperative society composed solely of tribes as specified in the second part of Section 3(1)(a). 23. It was submitted that the law applicable in Andhra Pradesh is more or less similar to the specific bar contained in Sections 20 and 41 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 and Section 20 thereof would have to be read with Schedule B to the said Act which sets out the names of 10 aboriginal and semi aboriginal castes to be treated as aboriginal for the purpose of the Act.
24. It was lastly urged by Mr. Murlidhar that the notification of the Provisions of the Panchayat (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA) applies to the scheduled areas. In the instant case, what is significant is that under Section 4 thereof, there is a mandatory provision for consultations, prior to the acquisition of land in the scheduled areas for development projects, with the gram sabha or panchayat at the appropriate level. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the absence of such consultation amounts to violation of the provisions of Section 4 of the 1996 Act. Mr. Murlidhar denied that any proper hearing at all had been conducted and given by the agency concerned before a decision was taken to acquire the land in question and thereafter to grant clearance for the purpose of handing over the land to M/s. Panem Coal Mines Ltd. for captive mining of coal to be supplied to Punjab Electricity Board. 25. Mr. Murlidhar submitted that the entire exercise was illegal and all steps taken by the Central Government and the State Government to allot land or to grant lease of the lands in question to Pariem Coal Mines Limited were illegal and liable to be quashed. 26. Appearing for the respondent No. 3, Mr. S.B. Mukherjee submitted that the writ petitioners were labouring under a misconception that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 were not applicable to the areas to which the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary provisions) Act, 1949, extends. Mr. Mukherjee urged that the Schedule to the aforesaid Act clearly indicates that the whole of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, would be in force in the Santhal Parganas.

Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Government of Jharkhand issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in the newspapers and also served the notices to the individuals and after complying with the provisions of Section 5-A of the said Act issued notifications under Section 6 thereof. Thereafter, notices under Section 9 of the aforesaid Act were also served arid the Collector proceeded to make his award-under Section 11 and the amount of compensation has already been deposited by the respondent No. 3. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed in view of Section 11-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was totally misconceived as not only had the Collector made his award within the stipulated time, but many of the awardees had already received "compensation for the land acquired. 27. Mr. Mukherjee then submitted that the respondent No. 3 had put sufficient funds in the hands of the State Government for defraying the costs of the acquisition proceedings and had also offered a rehabilitation package to the affected people. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 was duly amended so as to permit the mining of coal for generation of power amongst other objects. The allotment of captive mine in the Pachwara Central Block to M/s. Panem Coal Mines Limited had been done strictly in accordance with law by the Ministry of Coal, Government of India by its letter dated 26th December, 2001, which also issued a Gazette notification in that regard as required under the law. 28. As far as the alleged violation of Sections 20 and 41 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, is concerned, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that in the instant case, there was no transfer of land involved so as to bring it within the mischief of Section 20 of the aforesaid Act. On the other hand, the State Government and the Central Government had acted in keeping with the powers conferred on them by the different enactments applicable to Santhal Parganas. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that both the Coalmines Nationalisation Act and the Forest Conservation Act, empowers the Central Government to grant sanction to exploit land in scheduled areas for mining purposes. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that none of the villages covered by the different notifications were Pahadia villages and hence the provisions of Section 41 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, would also have no application in the facts of this case. 29. On the question of extension of the Panchayat Act to the Santhal Parganas, it was submitted by Mr. Mukherjee that under Article 243-M(4)(b) of the Constitution, the Parliament was empowered to extend the provisions of Part IX of the Constitution to the Scheduled Areas falling under the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that as far as the consultation with the Gram

Sabha. before grant of the environment clearance was concerned, such consultation was necessary in the case of minor minerals. But coal being a major mineral, such consultation was not required. 30. On the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Samatha

case (supra), which was strongly relied on by Mr. Murlidhar, Mr. Mukherjee referred to and relied on the subsequent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balco Employees Union (Regd.) v. Union of India, , wherein a similar question regarding the right of the Central Government to acquire tribal land and to hand it over to a non-tribal company was under consideration. Upon reference to the earlier decision in the Samatha case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that it had strong reservations with regard to the correctness of the majority decision in the Samatha case. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, however, observed that the said decision was not applicable to the facts of the said case, inasmuch as, the law applicable in Madhya Pradesh was not similar or identical to the Andhra Pradesh Scheduled Areas Land Transfer Regulation.
31. Mr. Mukherjee then urged that before the clearance was given by the Central Government in its Ministry of Environment and Forests, the Jharkhand Pollution Control Board had conducted a hearing on 28th February, 2003 in the presence of the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, Government officials and public representatives of the villagers and no objection had been received objecting to' the proposed acquisition for the purpose of mining coal in the acquired areas. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the villagers had, on the other hand, prayed before the Deputy Commissioner, Pakur for. their rehabilitation and re-settlement and for an assessment of compensation and early disbursement thereof. It was submitted that the project would ensure employment and business opportunities for local inhabitants who would also be re-settled by construction of new houses and arrangements of all facilities, including school, hospital, market place and electricity, so as to benefit the villagers. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Government of India in its Ministry of Environment and Forests had, by its letter dated 4th January, 2005, set out the manner in which the project was to be executed, which included rehabilitation of families as per the State Government norms. It was also submitted that the said norms had been duly fulfilled by the respondent No. 3 company and the various allegations made on behalf of the petitioners from time to time were incorrect and without any basis. Mr. Mukherjee submitted that a proper comprehensive Environmental Impact Assessment and Environment Management Plan had been prepared by the Central Mining Research Institute, Government of India, on behalf of the respondent No. 3, which had been submitted to the Ministry of

Environment and Forests, Government of India, before the grant of environment clearance. It was submitted that widespread publicity had been given in several newspapers and the Company had also deposited large amounts towards the diversion of forest lands and had also provided 400 hectares of land for being mutated in the name of the Forest Department for the purposes of afforestation. The entire rehabilitation Scheme has been set out and annexed to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 3 on 20th July, 2005. 32. Mr. Mukherjee contended that the instant writ petition although filed as a public interest litigation could hardly be said to be a public interest litigation and was, therefore, not maintainable in law. In support of his said submission, Mr. Mukherjee referred to the decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India and Ors., and Guruvayoor Devaswom Managing Committee v. C.K. Rajan, , in which it has been observed that a public interest litigation could only be entertained if a segment of the public is interested. Mr. Mukherjee urged that in the instant case, the public were in favour of the acquisition proceedings and it could not, therefore, be said that the instant litigation was of a public nature. Reference was also made to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.P. Gupta and Ors. v. President of India and Ors., , wherein similar views were expressed. 33. On the concept of captive mining, Mr. Mukherjee submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had, in the case of Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, , sounded a note of caution since it involved technical issues and issues of policy. It was observed that the Courts of law have to be very wary and must exercise their jurisdiction with circumspection, for they must not transgress in the realms of policy making, unless the policy is inconsistent to the Constitution and laws. 34. Mr. Pradip Ghosh, learned Senior Advocate for the respondent No. 4, while .supporting Mr. Mukherjee's submissions, submitted that with the amendment of the Coalmines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 by the Coalmines (Nationalisation) Amendment Act, 1993 the Central Govt. had acquired a right to exploit coalmines for power generation amongst other objects. Mr. Ghosh submitted that under the 1973 Act, coal mining was exclusively reserved for public sectors, but considering the need to augment thermal power generation, the Central Government decided to amend the Act with effect from 9.1.1993 to allot coal mining for captive consumption for generation of power among other end uses. Such amendment, Mr. Ghosh submitted, was carried out in Section 3(3)(a)(iii) of the 1993 Act by a Gazette notification dated 9.6.1993. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in keeping with the provisions of the Coalmines (Nationalisation) Act, the Ministry of Coal, Government of India, allotted captive coal

mines in Pachwara, Central Block, to M/s. Panem Coalmines Private limited and had also issued a Gazette notification as required under the law.

35. Mr. Ghosh repeated the submission made by Mr. Mukherjee with regard to the provisions of Sections 20 and 41 of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, and urged that the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Samatha case (supra) hard been, to some extent, reviewed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Balco case (supra) where reservation has been expressed with regard to the majority decision in the Samatha case.
36. Mr. Ghosh then submitted that the concept of "transfer" as mentioned in Sections 20 and 41 of the 1949 Act could not be confined to the ordinary meaning of "transfer" as understood in the Transfer of Property Act. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in the instant case, no transfer of land as such was involved, since the State Government in exercise of its right of eminent domain was merely resuming possession of some of the lands which were being occupied by raiyats for the purpose of exploitation of its mineral wealth for the use of the public at large. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the entire coal to be mined from the area allotted to the respondent No. 3 was to be supplied for the end-use of the respondent No. 4, which also had a considerable stake in the affairs of the respondent No. 3 company. 37. Mr. Ghosh lastly referred to and relied on the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of N.D. Jayal and Anr. v. Union of India and Ors., where the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the concept of "sustainable development" as a means to achieve the object and purposes of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 as well as the protection of life/lives as provided under Article 21 of the Constitution. 38. Mr. Ghosh submitted that the concept of sustainable development had been developed as a strategy that was meant to strike a balance between the environmental protection and developmental activities. We agree with the submissions advanced by Mr. Ghosh that the concept of sustainable development has acquired a good deal of importance on account of preservation of the natural resources available as against economic development, and the concept as enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the N.D. Jayal's case (supra) has to be borne in mind while dealing with a problem of this nature. 39. Mr. Ghosh urged that the law had been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Narmada Bachao Andolan, 2000 (9) SCC 664, and the Balco Employees' Union case while observing that once a considered decision is taken to execute a project, the same should be undertaken expeditiously. Mr. 10

Ghosh submitted that a good deal of time and money had been spent on the project, which had received clearance from all the concerned authorities engaged in ensuring that the environment was duly protected, while, at the same time, there was scope for sustainable development. Mr. Ghosh submitted that in such circumstances, it would be against public policy if any decision was taken to reverse the process, which had been started in the interest of the public at large. 40. On behalf of the State of Jharkhand, the learned Advocate General endorsed the submissions made both by Mr. Mukherjee and Mr. Ghosh and added that the decision to allot the captive coal mine in the Pachwara Block to the respondent No. 3 had been taken by the State Government after a good dealt of deliberations and after all the requirements were duly fulfilled by the respondent No. 3. The learned Advocate General submitted that necessary clearance had been obtained from the Ministry of Environment and Forests and the State had also been empowered to divert a portion of the allotted land from forest use and that the payment of net value of the forest produces had also been received by the State Government from the respondent No. 3 company together with 400 hectares of land which had been earmarked for afforestation purposes near the same vicinity. Learned Advocate General submitted that at all stages, people of the nine villages where the land in question are situated, had been consulted and the only request made by the inhabitants of the said nine villagers was that they should be properly compensated for the loss of their lands. 41. On behalf of the Union of India, it was sought to be urged that none of the decisions taken to allot the captive coal mine in Pachwara Block to respondent No. 3 had been objected to by the writ petitioners, but that the same were only at the stage of proposal and a final decision would have to be taken in the matter after ensuring that the rights of the tribals who were the occupants of the nine villages were duly protected. 42. Having regard to the enormity of the project and the consequence involved in the rehabilitation process of the villagers of the nine villages comprising the lands acquired and proposed to be handed over to the respondent No. 3 for captive mining of coal for use in the thermal power station of respondent No. 4, we have given our anxious consideration to the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties, as regards the case made out for exploitation of the areas which are rich in coal which is required for national need of power generation. Of course, having regard to the case as made out in the writ petition and the different objections taken at the time of hearing, we are only required to see whether the Central Government and the State Government were competent to acquire the lands for allotting the same for the purposes of captive mining to the respondent No. 3 and if the State and the Central. Government were so entitled, whether all the conditions relating to the protection of

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the environment and forests as also the right of the tribals as contained in the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949 were duly complied with or not. 43. As far as we can see it was only after a proper survey was conducted on behalf of the respondent No. 3 and submitted to the Ministry of Environment and Forests along with the scheme for development and rehabilitation of the occupants of the region that the Ministry of Environment and Forests ultimately gave its approval to allot the land in question and to grant permission to the State Government to divert the use of the forest land included within the allotted zone. At the same time, the matter was also considered by the Jharkhand Pollution Control Board and in view of the

recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Balco's case, as also the decision in the case of N.D. Jayal (supra), it must be held that the ratio of the majority decision in Samatha's case has been watered down to a large extent.
44. We are also inclined to agree with the submissions of Mr. Ghosh that

the State Government in exercise of its right of eminent domain is entitled to acquire land falling within the ambit of the Santhal Parganas Tenancy (Supplementary Provisions) Act, 1949, and that such acquisition and allotment for captive mining purposes would not be hit by the provisions of Section 20 of the said Act. Inasmuch as, none of the villages are Pahadi villages, the provisions of Section 41 would also not have any application to the facts of the instant case.
45. The other submissions made on behalf of the petitioner regarding the lapse of acquisition proceedings is also without any substance, since the awards were made by the Collector under Section 9 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 within two years from the date of publication of the declaration under Section 6. It is obvious that such an application was made on behalf of the petitioners without having due regard to the facts and the decisions cited need not, therefore, detain us. As far as we can see, no illegality and or irregularity has been committed either by the State Government or the Central Government or the other respondents, which calls for any interference in the present writ application. It is obvious that the writ petition is based mainly on surmises. 46. In our view, the writ petition is devoid of any merit and "does not call for any interference by us and is disposed of accordingly. There will no order as to costs.

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