INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE METHOD OF RESEARCH

Other Important Methods of Research As against the above four methods, mentioned by Kerlinger, there are several methods other than these, which have not only be accepted as methods of research but have also been taught by professionals used and actually in research. These are the methods of 1. Induction, 2. Deduction, 3. Historical, and 4. Comparative Methods. Then there are other methods which are described as 1. Observational, 2. Participatory, 3. Experimental, 4. Experiential, 5. Trial and Error Method(s) and 6. Case Study method. There is a great deal of overlap in the above classification of methods, while some of these may only be a part/step involved in some other method. All these methods have been discussed below in detail. Deduction-Induction Both induction and deduction offer only one side of the general truths. If pure induction is inadequate, pure deduction is equally inadequate. The error of setting up these methods in mutual opposition, as if the employment of either of them excluded the employment of the other, is unfortunately very common. It is only by the unprejudiced combination of the two methods that any complete development of economic science is possible (Keynes, p-172). What is true for economics applies to other social sciences in equal measure. Dr. Cunnigham, Political Economy Treated as an Empirical Science, Pamphlet. Keynes stipulates a method of specific experience, which Keynes defines as that method that passes slowly from particulars to axiomatic media and there from to the highest generalization without any reversal of the order. However, personal experience mostly happens to be specific experience due to time-space configuration at individual level. Deduction Either logic as foundation or evidence as base but nature is general assumptions may be purely hypothetical or based on real life observations. By assumption S/he rules out two possibilities i) all ducks may not be of same color; ii) all ducks may not swim, iii) all may not tilt. Deduction proceeds from general to particular statement - G - P -> It has three implications (i) applicability to wide range of situations/ cases, (ii) each application enhances generality and power, if many particular cases are explainable, and (iii) particular evidence may be used for validation. Each instance of validation will furnish additional evidence to support the belief that the conclusion is general. Each instance of empirical validation lends credence to the view that the inference is true and valid both logically and empirically. Schindler opines that deducation proceeds from genral inference that is supposed to be conclusive in so far as the conclusion follows off necessity from the assumptions or premises adopted and logic used. The premises/ reasons and logic embody the inference and contain the proof. It implies that separate proof is not needed. There is a direct relation between assumptions and furnish base for premises and the final result or conclusion. Deductive inference, embodied in its premises, may be considered true and valid, if the logical structure is correct (Cf. Kahane, Howard (1973) Logic and Philosophy, p. 3, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth). For the above to be correct, deductive conclusion has to be true and valid for all cases. This will be true only if assumptions and the conclusion are congruent and consistent with each other on the one hand and premises and the logical for mat in which the same are used must be flawless on the other. In that case, inference will automatically flow from the assumptions and reasoning. This requires the assumptions and premises to be arranged brokenly in an sequentially appropriate logical structure or format. But to be valid, the reasons or premises used and logic applied must be in agreement or consonance with the real state of the world also. Since deductive inference is universal in nature and not specific or particular, this agreement should be independent of time and space on the one hand, and it should commonly prevail among a wide strata of phenomena on the other. The inference or conclusions will be true and valid only if the premises from which it is deduced hold. Fulfillment of these conditions ensure that the deductive inference is true and valid: (i) all the assumptions should be mutually consistent and hold together, (ii) premise in mutual consonance and should conform to assumptions, and logical structure should be valid. If the above conditions are not satisfied, the inference would not hold for reasons that are associated with the violation of either assumptions, or constructs premises or logical structure. Deductive inference attempts to forge a direct causal link between two factors/ variables or phenomena. For example, a deductive premise or assumption is that all consumers will prefer better quality product if a higher price is not charged. L.G. has offered its latest flat model of television at the price of all other models of its CTV. Hence, all customers of L.G. may be expected to prefer its recently launched product. Over and above this, if someone has compiled data about sales of L.G. TV since 2002 and reports that a) total sales of L.G. TV sets have increased in 2002 relative to say 2001; (b) more flat sets have been sold than its conventional sets, and (c) sales of conventional sets have decreased. But the decline in sales of conventional sets has been more than compensated by sales of flat sets. This will lend credence to the view that the deduction is so general in nature as will cover all products, including televisions and inference is valid both logically and empirically. The inference directly relates the consequence, that is, preference for a product with the proximate cause - better quality at the same price. Karl Popper (1968, p.30) considers deduction as 'the method of critically testing theories'. It means that deduction will be useful only if theory has already been formulated. According to some thinkers, there is 'no method' of formulation of theories. All theories emerge from 'embryonic ideas'. Conception of new ideas needs intuitive insights and/or 'creative imagination which leads to novel or even 'fanciful speculation' or 'anticipation', appealing for careful consideration'. Such fanciful imagination may, like Shelleys letters, appealing for peace that he is reported to have written to the leaders of the world of his time and put them into the seas in the 'fanciful hope or imagination' that some leader may get it and act upon the same'. Speculations, anticipations, and fanciful imaginations can never be definitive or certain and subject amenable to mehtod. Intuition plays critical role in this. These steculative ideas then are tentative in nature and uncertain in orientation. There is obviously no system or no method which can be adduced or associated with the conception or creation of such ideas. Most, if not all theories, have emanated from such creative ideas. Naturally, there can be no method of theorization. I agree with this view. However, we still strive to systematize and search for methods for therising. All theories are initially 'tentatively conceived ideas' which by no means or even stretch of imagination have been justified or proved either by logic or evidence in its intial form. The new or novel 'idea' is just an 'anticipation' or 'imagination' which may be put forward as a 'provisional hypothesis, a possible proposition, or even as a theoretical system' (Popper, 1968, p.32) It is 'formulated as a logical inference or conclusion. Thus, two initial steps in theorizing are 'conceiving an idea' and its translation into deductive inference. The second step requires the 'assimilation of premises and finalization of the logical structure' to forge causal link between variables/ factors or phenomena which fall within the realm of the 'initial idea' of plausibility. It is this stage at which method of deduction enters explicitly as a method of critical evaluation or testing. It may, however, be noted that deduction has stealthily or implicitly sneaked into the process of transformation of 'idea' into an 'inference' or theory. Next step is to compare all such conclusion(s) inference(s) if more than one exist with each other as well as with premises in order to determine (i) logical consistency and (ii) interrelations with a view to find their equivalence, or derivability, compatibility and coherence (Cf. Popper, 1968, p.32). Popper (1968) discusses four distinct steps involved in the critical testing and evaluation of theories by the method of deduction: first is the comparison of different conclusions with each other to establish internal consistency of the theoretical system of which these conclusions are a part. Second step examines the logical structure of theorv to find whether theory under consideration is empirical or scientific in nature. Sometimes what is purported to be theory may turn out to be tautology. Then, the newly formulated theory may be compared with other theories in order to find what respect the new theory differs from the existing ones and to what extent it constitutes an advance over others provided that it shall stand against rigorous testing to qualify as theory. Practical applications and/or empirical validation will come only in last stage of evaluation. Applications and empirical verifications may comprise of controlled experimentation or contrived experiencing. It may also be based on technological application or use of compiled data to examine its applicability to specific problems or situations (Cf. Popper, 1968). Interestingly even these last two steps of testing are purely deductive. In this deductive chain, these sequential steps may be involved. An attempt is made to deduce some singular statement/ inference, which may also be called prediction and which might have been accepted for approbation of the strength of accepted theories, in contrast from the new theory. Statements having property of applicability or testability may be preferred for this deduction. Then, these inferences, deducible from new theory, are classified into two groups: conclusions that either can not be derived from currently accepted theory or which are contradicted by current theory, and those conclusions which are deducible or approvable by current theory, second group of inferences deducible or derivable from new theory are compared with the results of applications, experimentation or experiencial. If the conclusion obtained from this comparison is that particular conclusions are verified or accepted, then new theory should be taken to have passed the test of evaluation. There is no reason to reject it. If, however, results of comparison are contradictory, then the inferences stand falsified. 'Falsified they (inferences) were logically deduced' (Popper, 1968, p.33).

Induction Induction and Deduction have generally been contrasted as methods of scientific investigation. It is a widely held view that 'empirical sciences' use 'inductive methods'. It implies that the 'contents of induction' are 'empirical in nature' while all sciences are considered to be empirical in orientation. This implies that induction is the only valid method of scientific research. Another implication, as Popper (1968) points out of this view, is that the logic of scientific discovery' is 'identical with inductive logic', that is, 'with the logical analysis of these inductive'methods'. In order to understand the purport of such assertions, or how does induction proceed one may pose the question what are the contents of inductive logic? Method of induction draws a conclusion or inference on the basis of one or more particular facts, or observations or experiences. Generally, an 'inference is called inductive of it passes from singular or particular statements, such as accounts of the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories (Popper, 1968, p.27). But the passage from particular observation, experience or experiment involves repetition of the same in several instances. A popular example, often cited in books, runs as follows Ram has died, Stella died, Paul died, Rahim also died.

All these were human beings. So one may conclude that all men die, irrespective religion, gender or place. Thus, induction may be taken to draw a definitive conclusion from practical or real life evidence that is furnished by one or more observations/ facts or experience. The logic as well as evidence contained in this example may be inverted. All human beings die. Since Stella, Sita, Ram, Rahim and Paul are human beings, so all of them died. This means that there is reciprocal muteality between evidence and inference. Does this mutuality not connote circular reasoning? Then, there is a serious limitation associated-with this inductive inference. All that is connoted by this inference is the statement of the 'fact that all men die'. But it does not explain how did Ram or Rahim, or any one else die? Did some accident, or an act of murder or suicide, or some disease who the immediate or proximate cause of death? This statement also does not furnish any prediction as to the age at which death tends to occur. Do men or women die at younger age? The inductive inference portrays, at best, 'statement of fact', it neither explains nor does it predict. Scientific research does not stop with the formulation of statement of fact, it goes much beyond this, it delves deep into causative and/or predictive structure of the phenomena under investigation (Cf. Cooper, 1998). One may deduce the facts or evidence from the conclusion which itself is supposed to be deduced from the evidence. This is obvious or circular reasoning (Cf. Schindler, Cooper, p.32, 1998). Induction involves another inversion. It is supposed to use empirical evidence has been used to test and verify or falsify the hypothesis. The method of induction is the method which seeks to establish the truth of such universal statements as are called empirical hypotheses and theories'. These principles or propositions are based on particular experience, specific observation and/or given experimentation. The truth or validity of these universal statements is supposed to have been discovered, known or established through experience. As the method of induction proceeds from empirical evidence, howsoever limited, partial or incomplete, all revealing or most concealing it may be, to an inference, the inductive inference can be only one among the many that may be plausible or compatible with the available evidence. One direct implication may be that no law, principle or theory can be developed by the method of induction. Induc tion at best furnishes some seemingly plausible statement of fact, or at the most some hypothesis. But there may be several other inferences that may be plausible or admissible on available admission. This is illustrated by the example of swimming ducks. First inference is that ducks can swim or like to swim. Ducks tilt towards the right while they swim. Since the evidence is extremely limited, one may speculate that (i) some ducks may tilt towards the left while they swim, (ii) some ducks may nicely balance without tilting towards left or right, while they swim, (iii) only lame ducks tilt since these have to balance the body weight only on one leg. Now it is plausible to support any one of these inferences on the basis of available evidence. It is a matter of evidence. So the validity of the inference depends on (a) nature and adequacy of evidence, (b) logical structure, and (c) use of both logic and evidence for interpretation. But the very fact of the multiplicity of the plausible inferences that are compatible with evidence makes the inductive inference highly provisional, susceptible to falsification. Even though the most likely inference is to be preferred, yet there are still more chances of its falsification than validation. This leads us to an important question. It is the function of research to determine the nature and extent of evidence that is needed for investigation. Once this is done, appropriate methods of marshalling evidence and its analysis have to be chosen induction does not address the question whether one could use whatever evidence is available gathered by whatever method irrespective of the nature and extent of data that are needed for a particular investigation. But a careful consideration will reveal that the validity of such empirical hypotheses or theories is, in fact, the validity of singular hypotheses or theories. However, the method has numerous supporters of the view that induction is the only valid method of science. Which should not and can not be taken as validation of a universal theory. Even a known deductivist, like Duhem (The Aim and Structure qf Physical Theory, 1954, p.34, Princeton) seems to support this view when he says that 'Only experiment, induction, and generalization have produced Descarte's law of refraction'. The logic runs as follows: An empirical science has to represent 'the real' rather than the 'hypothetical world'. The 'real world is the 'realm of possible experience'. The real world is not only the world of Possible but actual experience' relating to people, places, things, events or occurrences (Cf. Popper, 1968, p.39). Thus, empirical sciences have to (a) use facts as evidence to base upon, (b) distinctive logical form, (c) adopt particular structure to be compressed into specific method. Singular statements apply to specific situation/ phenomenon or a particular/ individual case, while universal statements are in the nature of hypotheses or theories that are generic in nature and coverage and these propositions are applicable a given class of phenomena/ cases. These pertain to an entire class or group of phenomena. The distinction between individual/singular/particular and general/ class universal may be further elaborated with some examples. 'Dictator', 'Planet', H2O are universal or general names or entities or concepts. Gaurav, Everest, Earth, Area are names particular of entities, or these concepts pertain to specific or entities. Particular conceptv or names are characterized by proper names as these relate to very specific entities, whereas general or universal concepts or names may need no use of proper names; these connote commonly present elements or features in a 'class' or group as a whole. But the critical question for niaking the particular converge lowardv the general is that of the extent of observation, experience, or encounter to enable movement from 'singular' to universal' statement. In other words, one wishes to know the number of times an observation/ experience or the same results are sufficient to enable the investigator to generalize without the fear of contradiction or denial of possibility of falsification. Though no definite number or frequency of observation or experience may be cited as the criterion, yet one single observation or experience may not suffice to test the validity of a singular statement and consider it to qualify as a universal statement. It may also be safely stated that perhaps one single experience or observation of a particular phenomenon by a single individual or one place or time may not probably be adequate. The tests of verifiability and falsiflabilitv require the particular observation and/or experience to have 'a frequency' so as to be encountered or enumerated by multiple observers/experimentors and/or experiencers. Probably the popular adage that 'one sparrow does not make the spring'; or ,appearance of a single cloud does not herald the otiset of the rainy season' capture the necessary condition of the method of induction; it is that the singular / particular observation / experience has to be encountered sufficiently repeatedly. The 'Necessary condition' for 'singular to qualify as general or universal Vatenient' need not necessarily be the sufficient condition for it being true. From the logical point of view, it is far from obvious that 'we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous are the instances in which particular experience or observation has occurred' since any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false' (Popper, 1968, p.27). Howsoever large the number of instances of white swans having been encountered are, the conclusion that 'all swans are while' may not be justifiable. It is always probable for someone to encounter somewhere non-white swans; black swans have, in fact, been observed by several persons. Many people have seen white lions of Rewa' in zoos, but it does not mean it can be inferred that all lions are white. It might have been observed by someone that the ducks tilt towards the right, while they swim. For example, the observer might have seen a dozen or so ducks in some lake at some time. The observation does not justify the conclusion that 'all ducks tilt towards the right, while they swim'. The reason is that it is probable that the right ward tilting ducks in swimming are lame having no right leg. But this facet of the evidence might have remained unseen, unexamined or concealed from the observer. It is, however, never possible for anyone to examine all ducks, swans or lions that exist. These examples highlight that a) it is probable that all aspects of the available evidence have not been evaluated. It is extremely difficult, if not improbable for any investigator to examine and comprehend all aspects of available evidence or experience at any point in time. Some aspects may remain unexamined or unobserved. This makes it improper to transform a singular into a universal statement on the basis of limited evidence that is likely to be available. In our view, method of induction may, therefore, be treated as a 'case method' rather than as a method of generalization (Cf. Popper, 1968). Popper raises doubts about the method when he opines that 'to ask whether there are natural known to be true appears to be another way of asking whether inductive inferences are logically justified' (p.28); b) howsoever numerous the instances or vast the available evidence, it can never be exhaustive, and hence, conclusive. c) The given state of knowledge and its probable development in future always make current evidence inadequate to furnish evidence to support newly conclusive a given inductive inference. In our view, inductive inferences may, therefore, be treated only as provisional propositions. These are in no nature of null hypotheses that are likely to be revised or even rejected in future, if more evidence and/or development of knowledge so warrants. The universe is too large to be exhausted completely in a finite number of instances. The possibility of contrary or contradictory evidence cropping up sometimes always remains; d) Scientific and technological development has already transported several improbable into the realm of reality. Therefore, in case of research, nothing is impossible. But there is a more basic limitation of the method of induction. What for do we need experience or results of experiments or observation? Two possible answers are that (a) experience, experiment or observation is needed to draw inference, formulate a hypothesis, law or theory. In other words, generalization or formulation of a proposition need the compi:ation of evidence about the truth as the base, and/or (b) evidence is needed to verify and validate or falsify and reject the proposition that has already been formulated. At a philosophical level, it is the 'statement of truth' rather 'than the truth itself" which may be verified or falsified. Whatever is true can not be shown to be untrue either by logic or evidence. It is our trust or belief in 'what purports to be true' may be belied, not the truth itself. Then, the comparison of 'evidence with the 'contents of theory' may, at best, show the 'concordance or discordance, 'consonance or dissonance', or 'agreement or disagreement' between these two, that is, theory and evidence. In case of dissonance or disagreement between these two, what does make one to conclude that theory or hypothesis is false or untrue? Evidence itself may be in the 'wrong'; it may be improper or irrelevant, or even not reliable, or adequate, it may be partial rather than complete. It is also probable that 'the true evidence' remained hidden or unknown'. Then, the question is what part of the contents of theory is to be evaluated for consonance with reference to given evidence. Theory comprises of (i) assumptions; (ii) cause(s), (iii) consequence or prediction, (iv) logical structure, and (v) form. What is testable or verifiable is the (a) fulfillment or nonsatisfaction by evidence of the assumptions or conditions on which the theory is based, since no theory will ever hold if any of assumptions of the theory is violated. For example, the mixture of hydrogen and, oxygen will not change into water if (i) the mixture does not contain hydrogen and oxygen in 2 : 1 ratio, and/or (ii) temperature is below specified level, and (c) consistency or conformity between different elements of theory, specially logical structure may have be evaluated. None of these has anything to do with experience or experiment. No tieory can ever be proved or disproved conclusively, particularly on the basis of experience or experiment. I construct a hypothetical example to illustrate that theory can neither be proved nor disproved: Suppose I tell you that I had had a black cat. I had put this cat in a pitch dark room. The room has only one single door for entry or exit. It had no windows, second door or even a ventilator. I had securely bolted the door from outside after putting the cat in the dark room. It is moonless night and the room has no lights. As there are no windows, ventilators or doors, except the one that I had bolted, the cat could not have moved out of the room. Now I postulate that the black cat is still there in the dark room. You can not verify the thesis by opening the door. If, however, the door is opened, the cat might disappear without being noticed, because the black colour of the cat and darkness in the room and outside make it almost impossible to see the moving cat. Obviously, the assumptions in this instance are: (1) (2) (3) one black cat has been bolted in the dark room; it could have not run out because the room was bolted; and darkness and black colour of the cat,vill not allow anyone to notice if the cat runs out of the room, the moment the door is opened. So the thesis can not be falsified unless these assumptions are tested and falsified. What you can do at the most is to subject these assumptions to some sort of test. If, however, the assumptions do not hold, the theory can not be expected to hold. It is probably this aspect of theory that prompts.

Popper (1968, p.50) to conclude that 'in point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable, or that the discrepancies which are asserted to exist between the experimental reality and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance our understanding', or that it is possible that new evidence will support the theory. According to Popper, the basic principle of induction is the formulation of a statement in order to transform inductive inferences into a logically acceptable form'. The objective of transporting limited or specific on to a universal plane is in itself illogical. How does one stretch finite into almost infinite? All the same, supporters of inductive method consider the Principle of induction to be of supreme importance for scientific method. This, in fact, induction considered to be the essence of scientific research. Some thinkers go to the extent that induction is the only method appropriate for scientific

investigation. For example, H. Reichenbach postulates that 'this principle determines the truth of scientific theories. To eliminate it, ftom science would mean no!liing less than to deprive science of the power to decide truth or falsity of its theories. Without it, science would no longer have the right to distinguish its theories from the fanciful and arbitrary creations of the poet's mind' (Quoted from Popper, 1968). But Popper does not consider the principle of logical truth to be either like tautology or analytical statements. Both these may be purely abstract constructs, and in that case, there shall be no difference between the inferences derived either from inductive or deductive logic (1968, p.28). The principle of induction may, therefore, be considered as a synthetic statement whose negation is neither selfcontradictory nor is it a logical impossibility. Detection of inconsistencies between logic and inductive inference has, therefore, to be accepted as highly probable. This probability high because induction bases itself more on evidence then logic, while restore back the Inductive inference is also likely to be thrown overboard by new evidence. Hume's postulate may also be used to show that 'attempt to base the principle of induction on experience breaks down, since it must lead to an infinite regress' (Popper, 1968, p.29). It is obvious that induction has given the importance as a method of science which it does not deserve. In order to restore the credibility of induction as a method, it may be accepted that, even without complete validity, inductive inferences may be moved to acquire certain degree of plausibility, probability' or even 'reliability through an extensive chain of experimentation or observation' (Keynes, 1921). Incidentally, Reichbach, notwithstanding his own earlier view, also seems to agree with Keynes, when he states that 'To be more exact, we should say that' induction serves to decide upon probability. For it is not given to science to reach either truth or falsity .... but scientific statements can only attain continuous degrees of probability whose unattainable upper and lower limits are truth and falsity' (p. 186, Quoted from Popper). Last part of this statement means that, if the probability approximates zero, the thesis is false; if, however, the probability converges towards unity, the hypothesis is true, since O p l, where p is probability. But unit value of probability denotes centainty and even the theory of most exact science has no absolute certainty of being true. It implies that any inductive proposition has to move back and forth like a pendulum between 'actual probability being zero, or it being unity'. But in either case, the refutation or acceptance of thesis is certain. These limiting values delineate only the theoretical minima and maxima, actual probability being between these two. Then, between these two limits, any value of probability is only a matter of degree. So an inductive inference should remain hanging between certainty and probable. But no one will like his theory to be true, say to an extent of 50 per cent, and false to an extent of 50 per cent. This type of statement will loop funny. However, 'the true', and 'probably the true' are not the same, not even similar phenomena. Naturally, Popper dismisses induction as an 'infinite regress' or an ultimate apriorism. Popper, therefore, incontrovertibly stands for deduction as the method of research. Even otherwise, think that empirical testing of a theory is preceded by its formulation or finalization. No theory can be tested and verified or falsified before its formulation. This is what induction precisely purports to do that is testing or verfication of theory by basing the inference on evidence. But empirical evidence furnishes the base of empirical research alone. Besides, the classification of facts needs concepts, whereas the inferences can not be drawn without formulating the assumptions to determine the analytical frame work. Than, application of logic may also lead to inferences which are purely theoretical nature. Most of the times, empirical evidence shall not exhaust all the facts. Hence, more often than nos., evidence tends to be too one sided and inadequate.