EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea

Annegret BENDIEK & Heinz KRAMER1

The EU as a Strategic International Actor: Substantial and Analytical Ambiguities PART I ARTICLE RSUM Written in 2010, Bendiek &Kramers article analyses the role and the political substance of the European Unions (EU) partnerships and inter-regional relations shaped within the European Security Strategy (ESS) lines. Their attention concentrates mostly on the expectations created by the use of words such as strategy or strategic and their actual translation in practice. After 2003 and, especially after 2008, the EU has tried to tackle with the emergence of new actors in the shaping of global governance, such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Japan and Mexico. Moreover it has tried to redefine its approach towards other regional organizations by giving them the statute of strategic partners. The questions to which the authors try to respond are about the accuracy of these strategic relations, about the criteria used by the EU to select its strategic partners, about the connection between the political relationships and the strategic partnerships and, moreover, about the role of the EU as a global policy actor civilian power, normative power or collective hegemon. Their initial hypothesis is that, despite the wide range of instruments the EU disposes of to shape its foreign policy, it often fails to put in practice its strategies and to translate them into real policies. They argue that there is a tendency to categorize all the established partnerships as being strategic without having a prioritization, a hierarchy or a difference of degree between them. Their examples concern the partnerships with China the failure of the human rights dialogue makes the relationship itself vulnerable and exposed to disruptions - and the African states (the EPAs) despite the historical connections and the involvement shown, the African states continue to have difficulties in implementing the agreed upon principles of good governance. The EU has established its support for the effective multilateralism as a global goal, but this concept is hardly mentioned in its
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BENDIEK, Annegret, KRAMER, Heinz, The EU as a Strategic International Actor: Substantial and Analytical Ambiguities, European Foreign Affairs Review 15: 453 474, 2010

EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea regional strategies; this fact further decreases the consistency of its strategic foreign policy. The lack of consistency is continuously fueled by three main aspects: the path dependency - relations with African, Asian or Latin-American countries have evolved ever since the creation of the EEC, but some of their former structures continue to influence the present partnerships. In the Mediterranean states case, for example, the resources used by the CFSP are considered to be modest and lacking coordination and comprehensiveness with the other foreign policy instruments, such as the CSDP/ESDP or the European Neighbourhood Policy. Moreover, the Member States usually have different interests in this area and, therefore, defining new priorities or directions to the existing relations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries becomes difficult to operate beyond the rhetorical update of partnerships to a strategic level; the lack of clear directions for the strategic partnerships - the political dialogue has proved itself insufficient in defining a strategic partnership; the EU is being criticized for not taking into account the positions of all the stakeholders and not paying attention to their different views on concepts such as effective multilateralism; and the lack of hierarchy among EUs diverse partners - the criteria upon which the EU decides to base its policies on a strategy have nothing to do with the institutional specificity of its partners, but they are rather based on geographical labeling. This might become a problem in the context of integrating the special relationships EU has with countries such as Brazil, China, Japan and India into the larger Latin America strategy, respectively Asia strategy. Bendiek and Kramer go even further in their attempt to analyze this complicated picture of EUs strategic partnerships. In their view, the EU is a three-dimensioned power, each dimension corresponding to three distinct lenses to look through: a civilian power, a normative power and a collective hegemon. The civilian power is, actually, the negative dimension of the military power and it refers to EUs capacity of encouraging more intergovernmental relations, promoting human rights, democracy, rule of law and economic liberalization by taming the use of military force.

EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea Troops deployment and missions in the CSDP/ESDP framework to support peace efforts (in African countries) or to assist peace agreements implementation (like the Aceh Monitoring Misson) are considered to be totally in accordance with the definition of a civilian power. Sometimes, however, acting as a civilian power is a subterfuge from the lack of military resources (like in the case of Asias hot zones) or the lack of coordination between the Member States (the case of weapons embargo imposed to China). Nevertheless, the civilian power dimension of the EU has its limits, which are obvious especially in EU-India relations - strategic partners, yet unable to establish a coherent cooperation in the civilian use of nuclear energy or on climate policies. The normative power refers to EUs aim to export its norms and values outside its borders and make them globally respected and recognized. However, as Bendiek and Kramer explain, it is quite difficult to find empirical proves for the efficiency of this dimension. The EU has failed to articulate a substantial strategy or strategic partnership and to deepen its relations with Latin America at political, social or economical levels; it was unable to overcome the cultural and political differences with China and materialize the human rights dialogue; it has failed to transfer its norms and principles through its EuroMediterranean Partnership. The collective hegemon point of view suggests that behind all its actions, the EU actually follows its own interest and imperialistic endeavors. Behind the promotion of the European system of rules lies the selfish desire of shaping an advantageous political and economic environment for the Members States. The EU is a benevolent hegemon that remains open to compromises and combines the hard power with the soft power in order to gain access to important markets (PCA agreements, EU-India confrontation within the WTO) or to energetic resources (bilateral agreement with Brazil). Bendiek and Kramer underline the existence of an expectation-capabilities gap within the strategic bilateral and inter-regional partnerships of the EU and claim that, unless the Lisbon Treaty puts in place a new approach, it will become a true impediment for the achievement of one of the Unions main goals: effective multilateralism. They believe

EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea that speaking with one voice, prevailing over the Member States national interests and defining a solid strategy behind the so-called strategic partnerships are essential conditions for the EU to reach its full potential as an important actor on the international scene. PART II COMMENTS Bendiek and Kramers analysis on the EUs role as an international actor is a pertinent one and they are not alone to claim that the European foreign policy lacks substance. However, we must take into consideration the internal structure of the EU, as a multi-layered system, which is also a constant source of inconsistency. The European Unions foreign policys decisions are based on the logic of consensus between the 27 Member States. The ideal scenario is, of course, one in which the European interest prevails national preferences, but can we really imagine such an evolution in the short and mid-term (even with the new provisions of the Lisbon Treaty)? I agree that we are facing a true inflationary use of strategic/strategy in EUs approaches towards its international partners and that most of the communications, papers, agreements issued or established bilaterally or inter-regionally do not have a clear direction and specific objectives. However, I think we should take a look from the inside, appreciate the decision-making process at its true restrictive dimension and admit that, considering the existing context, the EU has done great progresses and sometimes even went further than expected in its international relations. Let us take, for instance the EU-China relationship. We can not resume it to the failure of the human rights dialogue. There are high tensions between the two blocks that prevent them from advancing on the political and normative issues: the existing weapons embargo imposed in 1989, the firm American opposition to a too close EU-China relationship2, the divergent views on trade aspects (China remains mainly closed to foreign investment, does
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KEUKELEIRE, Stephan, BRUYNINCKX, Hans, The European Union, the BRICs and the Emerging New World Order, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds., International Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2011

EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea not have regulations on intellectual and property rights etc.), the negotiations approach (the EU has often been criticized for its patronizing attitude) and so on. However, this does not reduce the strategic character of EU-China partnership to zero China has participated in the European Gallileo satellite system (2003) and it remains the second larger trade partner of the EU3. It is not a fully-fledged partnership, but, considering the background, it is the highest common factor achievable for the moment. Moreover, the authors were claiming that, at Copenhagen climate chance conference, the EU has focused more on its relationship with China and left out India, who has afterwards blocked the negotiations. Improvements have been made at that level and the clearest example is the recent Durban climate change summit where the EU negotiators have managed to convince India to let itself legally bound, in a future climate treaty, to cut its emissions of greenhouse gases. The summit was also a proof of EUs diplomacy efficiency and its ability to speak with one voice mostly thanks to the fact that Member States were sharing the same interests. When the authors talk about consistency, setting priorities and hierarchies they talk about coherence. Ever since the Single Act, the EU has been trying to enhance coherence in its decision-making process. The Lisbon Treaty has brought in ambitious institutional innovations and raised expectations with regard to the EUs capacity of speaking with one voice. Bendiek and Kramer are looking forward to see if the High Representative can tackle with these issues. As far as we have seen, not only had Mrs. Ashton not made the European foreign policy look more coherent and clear, but she had often troubles in drawing a simple common statement on international events4. Nevertheless, she succeeded to create the diplomatic service (EEAS) despite divergences with the European Parliament. And this is where I wanted to get: it is not necessarily a lack of willingness from the Member States to apply the principles written in the treaties (as far as coherence and clearness are concerned), but a modus operandi developed by the Commission, the
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European Union Factsheet, EU-China Summit (Brussels, 6 October 2010), EU Relations with China, available online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/er/116848.pdf, consulted on 20/12/2011 4 HOWORTH, Jolyon, The New Faces of Lisbon: Assessing the Performance of Catherine Ashton and Herman van Rompuy on the Global Stage, European Foreign Affairs Review 16: 303-323, 2011

EURO22MS/EM - Andreea Flintoaca - Cojocea Council and their bureaucratic structures that maintains the strictly needed level of synergetic functioning across the pillars. Practically, it is impossible to attaint coherence.5 Last, but not least, I consider that Bendiek and Kramer are a bit harsh on the EUs capacity to impose itself as a normative power. Empirical evidence might be hard to find, but it exists. And if we take Manners6 example of death penalty abolition, we can see how the EU has played a crucial role in four different types of situation: Cyprus and Poland, Albania and Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan and Russia and Turkey. Even if the EU still faces opposition from its strongest partners - US, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Japan, China and India (rarely used), it has however managed to export its norms. We cannot expect the EU to be able to define what passes for normal in world politics; that would translate into being the greatest power of all, which is not its main goal. The EU cannot transfer its model to a global scale, but it can promote its instruments and mechanisms to reach effective multilateralism. All in all, despite the critics we can bring to the EUs way of shaping strategies, we must keep in mind that the CFSP is, at present times, a mainly intergovernmental domain and that drawing specific, clear, coherent policies in respect with the twenty-seven Member States preferences is almost a utopia. The key for more coherence is more integration and integration in CFSP domain will not come all of a sudden.

GEBHARD, Carmen, Coherence, in Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds., International Relations and the European Union, Oxford University Press, 2011
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MANNERS, Ian, Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?, Journal of Common Market Studies 40: 235-258, 2002