Chapter XXII Indian Penal Code -Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance Ss.

. 503, 504, 505 and 509

TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CASES AND STATUTES_ 2 INTRODUCTION_ 4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY_ 6

Aims and Objectives 6 Scope and Limitations 6 Research Questions 6 Chapterisation_ 7 Sources of Data 7 Method of Writing_ 7 Mode of Citation_ 7
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION- S. 503_ 8 Interpretation of S. 503_ 9 Comparison with English Law_ 15 PROVOCATION AND INSULT- S. 504 AND S. 509_ 17 SECTION 504_ 17 Interpretation of S. 504_ 17 Comparison with English Law_ 20 SECTION 509_ 21 Interpretation of S. 509_ 22 Comparison with English Law_ 26 OFFENCE OF PUBLIC MISCHIEF- S. 505_ 28 Constitutionality of S. 505_ 29 Interpretation of S. 505_ 30 CONCLUSION_ 33 BIBLIOGRAPHY_ 35 ARTICLES_ 35 BOOKS_ 35 WEBSITES_ 35 MISCELLANEOUS_ 36

TABLE OF CASES AND STATUTES

TABLE OF CASES INDIAN CASES

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

A.B.K. Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh MANU/AP/0052/1997. Abraham v. State AIR 1960 Ker 236. Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabhagana Behera 1995 CRI L.J. 3559. Anuradha R. Kshirsagar v. State of Maharashtra 1991 CRI L.J. 410. Bankey v. State AIR 1961 All 131. Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431. Deshbandhu Gupta v. Emperor AIR 1924 Lahore 502. E. Seshaiah v. State MANU/AP/0804/2000. Emperor v. Tarak Das Gupta AIR 1926 Bom 159.

10. Ghulam Muhammad v. Emperor AIR 1931 Lah 288. 11. Habib Khan v. Mazharul Haque AIR 1917 Pat 658. 12. In Re Doraiswamy Aiyar AIR 1925 Mad 480. 13. In re Selathu and others AIR 1936 Mad 549. 14. Jowahir Pattak v. Parbhoo Ahir (1902) 30 Cal 418. 15. K.P.S. Sathyamoorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu MANU/TN/0216/2003. 16. Kalicharan Mohapatra v. Srinivas Sahu AIR 1960 Orissa 65. 17. Kanshi Ram v. Fazal Mohammad (1932) 14 Lah 92. 18. Karumanchi Veerangaiah v. Katta Mark and others 1976 CRI L.J. 1690. 19. Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar AIR 1962 SC 955. 20. Khair Mahomed v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 271. 21. Muhammad Ahmad Khan v. Emperor AIR 1936 All 171. 22. Muhammad Sabed Ali v. Thulesver Borah AIR 1955 Assam 211. 23. Philip Rangel v. Emperor AIR 1932 Bom 193. 24. Prem Pal Singh v. Mohan Lal 1981 CRI L.J. 1208. 25. Priyanath Gupta v. Lal Jhi Chowkidar AIR 1923 Cal 590. 26. Q.E. v. Mangesh Jivaji (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom 377. 27. R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn AIR 1962 SC 1821. 28. Raghubar Dayal Misra and another v. Emperor AIR 1931 All 263. 29. Re A.K. Gopalan AIR 1949 Mad 233. 30. Rear Admiral (Retd.) Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v. Vandana Jhingan MANU/DE/0204/2002. 31. Romesh Chandra v. State AIR 1960 SC 154. 32. Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill AIR 1996 SC 309. 33. S.S. Sanyal and another v. K.V.R Nair and others 1987 CRI L.J. 2074. 34. Serei Behera v. Bipin Behari Roy AIR 1959 Orissa 155. 35. State of Punjab v. Major Singh MANU/SC/0295/1966. 36. T.G. Studdert and another v. J.F. Logan AIR 1937 Cal 367. 37. Vaz v. Dias AIR 1930 Bom 120. ENGLISH CASES

1. 2. 3. 4.
TABLE OF STATUTES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297. J Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch 255, Ca. R. v. Court [1988] 2 All ER 221. Thomas v. National Union of Mineworkers [1986] Ch. 20. The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Public Order Act, 1986. Sexual Offences Act, 1956. Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. Vagrancy Act, 1824.

INTRODUCTION
This paper attempts to elucidate and analyse the law relating to certain specific sections of the Indian Penal Code- namely, Ss. 503, 504, 505 and 509. These sections occur, along with certain others which are outside the scope of this paper, in Chapter XXII of the Code, which is entitled Of Criminal Intimidation, Insult and Annoyance. The chapter is intended to deal with those acts which are aimed at intimidating or insulting others, or are intended to be provocative, or which serve to foment public disorder and mischief. As such, their importance in the regulation of social interactions is indisputable. Four of the eight sections (Ss. 503-510) which are covered in Chapter XXII form the subject-matter of this paper. The relevance of these particular sections is not difficult to establish. Litigation under S. 503, which defines the offence of criminal intimidation, is

wide-spread.[1] The offence under this section, which is punishable under S. 506, and, in a special case, under S. 507, is a serious one, and is often complained of. Accordingly, an attempt will be made in this paper to throw light upon the interpretation which the Courts have given to the offence as defined in the Code. Further, certain aspects of the Indian law on this point will be compared to that in England, in order to appreciate the relative strengths and shortcomings of this provision. In addition to criminal intimidation, this paper deals with two offences concerning intentional insults- S. 504 and S. 509. These are sections which regulate the every-day interactions between people, and impose certain requirements of decent behaviour. The first of these sections is aimed at punishing those who intentionally give provocation to others, either to breach the peace, or to commit any other offence. The second, which punishes those who intentionally insult a womans modesty, is of particular importance in the Indian societal context, where instances of eve-teasing and molestation are rampant. The interpretation of these two sections will be studied, using the decisions of Indian Courts, and in relation to the equivalent English law. The last section that will be analysed in this paper is S. 505. This is a provision that was absent in the Indian Penal Code when it was first drafted, was added in 1898, and then further added to in 1969. The section aims at punishing those who spread false news and rumours with a view to causing mutiny and spreading disaffection, or inciting one community to violence against another, or with the intention of promoting hatred and enmity on any grounds between different groups of people. Clearly, this is a provision that assumes immense relevance in light not only of the fact that India is a land of diverse cultures and peoples, but also in the context of the communal tensions that are at hand today. At the same time, the section is a definite restriction on the fundamental right under 19 (1) (a)- accordingly, the interpretation which the Courts have given it, in order to prevent it from being misused, will be studied in this paper.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Aims and Objectives
This paper aims at studying the law relating to certain sections of Chapter XXII of the IPC. This has been done by analysing the Courts interpretation of these sections, so as to appreciate the essential features of the offences they punish. At certain points, important strengths/shortcomings of these provisions have also been studied, in relation to the equivalent law in England.

Scope and Limitations

The subject matter of this paper is the jurisprudence of Ss. 503, 504, 505 and 509 of the IPC. The scope of this paper, in studying this area, is restricted to an analysis of the interpretation given to these sections by Indian Courts, and in some cases, a comparative study of the Indian law with English law on the same point. Accordingly, one limitation of this paper is that it does not consider the law in foreign jurisdictions, besides England. A second limitation of this paper, which is an outcome of the fact that it is intended to be a legal study, is that it does not cover in detail the sociological aspects of the above sections

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Research Questions
How have Indian Courts interpreted S. 503 of the IPC? In relation to English law on intimidation, what are the strengths and weaknesses of this section? How have Indian Courts interpreted the sections relating to insults in Chapter XXII- i.e. Ss. 504 and 509? When analysed in comparison with the equivalent English law, what conclusions can be arrived at regarding How have Indian Courts interpreted S. 505, particularly in relation to the conflict between the right to free

the efficacy of these sections? speech and the need to maintain public order?

1. 2. 3.

Chapterisation
Criminal Intimidation- S. 503: In this chapter, the law relating to S. 503 of the IPC is elucidated and analysed, Provocation and Insult- Ss. 504 and 509: In this chapter, the two sections relating to insult in Chapter XXII are using Indian case-law, and the equivalent English law. analysed. By comparing the interpretation given to these sections by Indian Courts with the English law on these matters, certain conclusions are reached regarding the utility of these provisisions. Offence of Public Mischief- S. 505: In this chapter, S. 505 of the IPC is studied, with particular emphasis on the manner in which Indian Courts have sought to prevent it from being misused in the face of Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

1. 2.

Sources of Data
Books Articles

The sources of data for this paper are:

3. 4.

Case Reporters Legal Encyclopaedias and Dictionaries

Method of Writing Mode of Citation

The method of writing is mostly descriptive of the interpretation given to the sections under consideration, by the Indian Courts. Wherever English law has been analysed in relation to Indian law, a comparative style of writing has been adopted.

A uniform mode of citation has been followed consistently throughout the paper.

CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION- S. 503

The offence of criminal intimidation is defined in S. 503, and the punishment for its commission is provided in S. 506, of the IPC. Furthermore, S. 507 acts as a corollary for S. 506, by providing for an additional punishment when the person committing criminal intimidation does so via an anonymous communication, or otherwise conceals his identity. This is in view of the greater alarm caused by such a communication. Section 503 reads: Criminal Intimidation- Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation. This definition has two parts- The first part refers to the act of threatening another with injury to his person, reputation or property or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested; the second part refers to the intent with which the threatening is done and it is of two categories: one is intent to cause alarm to the person threatened, and the second is to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat.[2] This implies that there are two essential ingredients to the section1. i) ii) 1. i) ii) iii) There must be a threat of injury to a person, either To his person, reputation or property; or To the person, reputation or property of anyone in whom that person is interested. The threat must be made with the intent To cause alarm to that person; or To cause that person to do an act which he is not legally bound to do or To cause that person to omit to do any act which he is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of

such threat.[3]

Interpretation of S. 503
1.
1. Targetting of the Threat As implied by the words whoever threatens another, the section requires that a threat, in order to constitute criminal intimidation, must be communicated by one party to another. This is also necessary given that the basis of the offence is the effect of the threat on the mind of the person threatened, which presupposes that it must be either made to him by the person threatening or communicated to him in some way.[4] Communication of the threat need not be direct, and in the presence of the complainant- it is sufficient even if addressed to a third party, so long as it is intended to reach the victim. This was the case in Romesh Chandra v. State[5], where the accused had sent letters to a person X, threatening to make public nude photographs of his daughter, and thereby injure the reputations of both of them, unless he was paid hush money. He was charged and found guilty of criminal intimidation against both X and his daughter, although the threat had been directly communicated only to X. In addition, the threat made need not be targetted at any one person in particular. The offence under this section is made out if the threat is addressed to a class or group of persons. However, it must be aimed at a defined and ascertained body of individuals[6] In In Re A.K. Gopalan, the accused delivered a speech at a cinema shed, wherein he made several vulgar comments, strongly critical of the police force. His defence was that these comments pertained to the police force in general, and were not threats towards any particular group. This argument was not accepted, and the Court convicted him of criminal intimidation, holding that he had intended to frighten by threats members of the police force of Malabar, and especially those stationed at Badagara, where he had made the speech. In a case before the Bombay High Court[7], the facts were that a meeting of lady teachers was interrupted by the accused shouting that the teachers should leave the hall, and that they should be caught by the hair, kicked on the waist, and pulled out. To the charge of criminal intimidation, the defence he adopted was that these words were general, and not targetted at a specific individual or group. The Court struck down this argument, holding that the threats had been addressed to all the ladies in the hall.

To conclude, the section envisages that the threat be targeted at either a particular person, or a definite group of persons, and that it be communicated, either directly or indirectly, to such person or group.

1.
i) Injury

2. Injury to person, reputation or property

The section requires that the threat be of injury to person, reputation or property. The term injury is defined in S. 44 of the IPC as denoting any harm whatever illegally caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or property[8] Therefore, to attract liability under S. 503, the harm threatened must be illegal. In Priyanath Gupta v. Lal Jhi Chowkidar[9], the President of a self-constituted Arbitration Court served a notice to the complainant requesting him to be present at a certain time and place for the settlement of a claim, and stating that if he did not attend, the suit would be decreed ex parte. It was held that the threat of decree so made was covered by the section, since by no legal process or means could [the Arbitration Court] make or give effect to such a decree[10] This point was also upheld in Jowahir Pattak v. Parbhoo Ahir[11], where the accused had threatened to ruin the complainant by filing cases against him. The Court reversed his conviction on the grounds that although a threat to file false cases would amount to a threat of illegal harm, it was not clear whether by cases, the accused meant false cases. In a subsequent decision, the Calcutta High Court stated categorically that S. 503 is a section which deals with illegal threats.[12] The requirement of illegal harm has been considered by the Madras High Court in relation to a threat of social boycott[13]. In that case, the petitioners were a group of labourers who were trying to improve their conditions of work by going on a strike. They had been convicted under S. 506 of the IPC for threatening to enforce a social boycott against those of their colleagues who refused to strike, and also of threatening to deprive them of the services of the barber and the washerman. The Court set aside the conviction, ruling that these were not threats of injury within the meaning of S. 44, and that if it is not illegal, then the threat [to do it] is not punishable under S. 506[14] However, in an earlier case before the Allahabad High Court, a threat of picketing (which was not an offence at the time) was held to fall under the definition of criminal intimidation[15]. The accused had issued a notice and an agreement to the complainant, a shopkeeper. The notice held out a threat that the complainants shop would be picketed unless he executed the agreement, under which he would be barred from importing foreign cloth. According to the above interpretation, this could not amount to criminal intimidation, because the threat of picketing was not one of illegal harm. However, the Court held that the notice and the agreement should be taken jointly[16] On the basis of the fact that the shopkeepers business would suffer if he were to cease the import of foreign cloth, it ruled that the accused had been correctly convicted under S. 506. It is submitted that this is an incorrect reading of the ingredients of the offence. By reading the notice with the agreement, the Court was reading the threat with the demand. The harm that the shopkeeper would suffer to his property would arise from his complying with the demand made by the accused, not as a consequence of the threat of picketing. The correct interpretation is the one given in Selathu, according to which a threat to do a legal act, irrespective of the nature of the demand associated with the threat, is not punishable under S. 506. ii) Person, Reputation, Property As laid down in the section, the threat in the offence of criminal intimidation must be directed against person, reputation or property. These terms have not been precisely defined by the Courts, but their meaning can be gauged through the following examples. In Muhammad Ahmad Khan v. Emperor[17], a constable served a notice on the accused and asked him to make an endorsement at the back of the notice, acknowledging its receipt. The accused proceeded to write something on the back of the notice, and when the constable told him that nothing but a signature in acknowledgement was to be written, he reacted by throwing the notice at the constable, and shouting Go away, otherwise I will break your hands and feet. This was held to be an offence under S. 503, as it involved a threat to the person of the officer. Person implies simply the individuality of a human beingbodily form or substance[18] The case of Romesh Chandra v. State, mentioned earlier, is a clear instance of threat to reputation. Reputation can therefore be understood as credit, honour, character, good name[19]; it is the estimation in which one is heldthat by which we are known the total sum of how we are seen by others[20] As to property, the Supreme Court in R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi Admn.[21] opined that whether the offence defined in a particular section of the Indian Penal Code can be committed in respect of any particular kind of property will depend, not on the interpretation of the word property but on the fact whether that particular kind of property can be subject to the act covered in that sectionIt is not therefore necessary to consider in detail what types of property will be included in the various sections of the IPC.[22] In Raghubar Dayals Case, losses caused to a business were regarded as harm to property. Therefore, it can at least be concluded that a threat of injury to the material possessions or to the economic interests of a person, is a threat to property.

1.

3. Threats to persons in whom target is interested

According to S. 503, a threat of injury to the person or reputation of anyone in whom the target of the threat is interested can amount to criminal intimidation, provided that the rest of the ingredients are satisfied. This portion of the definition excludes property, so a threat to the property of a third party is not within the purview of the section. A threat to the reputation of a deceased person is specifically included in the section, under the Explanation, provided that the deceased be someone in whom the target of the threat is interested. In Q.E. v. Mangesh Jivaji[23], an ex-clerk of the Forest Department sent a petition to the Revenue Commissioner, purportedly written by the inhabitants of certain villages, threatening to kill a Forest Officer unless he was transferred to another area. It was held that this was not an offence under S. 503, as the Revenue Commissioner had neither personal nor official interest in the Forest Officer. A threat of suicide is also not within the section, unless the target of the threat is interested in the person making it.[24]

1.

4. Intention of the Offender

The second essential ingredient of the section is that the threat must be made with intent, either to cause alarm, or to cause the victim to do an act which he is not legally bound to do, or to abstain from an act he is entitled to perform. The question of whether or not the target of the threat was in fact alarmed, or whether he or she actually performed or abstained from performing any act, to avoid the execution of the threat, is immaterial. It is the intention of the speaker [accused] that has to be considered in deciding whether what he stated [threatened] comes within the mischief of S. 503[25] The Orissa High Court has held that the gist of the offence is the effect, which the threat is intended to have upon the mind of the person threatened.[26] In the case before it, the Court also stated that intention is a mental contention, which has to be gathered from the circumstances of the case.[27] If the threat is such as would overcome the ordinary free will of a firm and prudent man, or if, irrespective of the nature of the threat, it is made with the intention mentioned in the section, then the offence will be made out.[28] Practically, however, the intention must be gauged from the facts of the case. In Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabhagana Behera[29], the accused was acquitted on the grounds that a mere expression of words without any intent to cause alarm would not invite punishment under the section. An example of how intent is determined from surrounding circumstances is the case of S.S. Sanyal and another v. K.V.R Nair and others[30], where the President of a company threatened his employee, saying your days are numbered The Calcutta High Court decided that there was no criminal intimidation here, as the words are to be understood in the context of the circumstances in which they were uttered[31], and under such an interpretation the Presidents words meant simply that the service of the complainant under the company may be terminated. Although the meaning of the expressions any act which he is not legally bound to do and any act which that person is legally entitled to do is clear, the meaning of alarm was investigated inAmulya Kumars Case, where the Court held that though the degree of alarm could vary, its essential nature was to unsettle the mind of the person on whom it operates and take away from his acts the elements of free voluntary action which alone constitute consent[32]

1.

5. Avoiding the execution of such threat

In In Re Doraiswamy Aiyar[33], the Madras High Court took the view that the words as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat in S. 503 implied that the threat must be one, which can be put into execution by the person threatening.[34] In that case, the accused was sought to be punished under S. 507 of the IPC, which imposes an additional punishment for criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication, for sending anonymous letters to the complainant which read if you dont pay me the money demanded from you, God is going to punish you and your family with ruin and death.[35] Since a punishment by God was not one which the accused could inflict, or cause to be inflicted, he was not convicted. It is submitted that this decision is incorrect, as S. 503 does not require that the accused have the capacity to fulfil his threat. It only requires that there be a threat of a particular kind, backed by a particular intention. If capacity to execute the threat were a requisite for the offence, then a person who forced another to do something, by pointing an unloaded gun at him, would not be guilty of criminal intimidation.[36] Therefore, it is submitted that S. 503 does not require a capacity to execute the threat on the part of the person making it, just as it does not require that the threat be successful. The words as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat only constitute part of the required intention of the offender- i.e. he must intend that the victim act, or abstain from acting, so as to avoid the threat.

Comparison with English Law

The law in England in respect of intimidation is similar to that under S. 503, with some exceptions. S. 7(1) of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, reads: Every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing, or to do, any act which such other person has a legal right to do, or abstain from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority:

1.

1. uses violence to or intimidates such other person or his wife or children or injures his property

is guilty of an offence[37] The word intimidate in clause 1 of this section includes putting persons in fear by the exhibition of force or violence or the threat of force or violence; there is no limitation restricting the meaning of intimidate to cases of violence or threats of violence to the person.[38] The words without legal authority indicate that the intimidation must be outside the law to be covered by the section[39]. The word with a view to imply that if a threat is intended to compel the victim, then it falls under this section. But the compulsion exercised need not be effective, for this offence to be committed.[40] In these aspects, the position of law is similar to that in India. But there are at least two points of difference which will be considered here. One point of difference is that the expression anyone in whom that person is interested in S. 503 has greater scope than the equivalent in S. 7(1) which restricts third parties to the wife and children of the accused. It is submitted that the Indian position in this regard is superior, and permits the Courts to decide questions of intimidation based on the facts of each case, which would indicate which persons the accused is interested in. The second point of difference is that S. 7(1) contains no reference to intimidation with an intent to alarm. This type of case is covered by S. 5 of the Public Order Act, 1986, which punishes intentionally insulting behaviour that is likely to cause alarm to the person so insulted. It is submitted that since insults and abuses, even if they do not amount to threats, can cause alarm, S. 503 is too narrow to adequately deal with such cases. Such instances should have been dealt with, but have not been, in provisions relating to insult, which shall be considered in the next chapter.

PROVOCATION AND INSULT- S. 504 AND S. 509

The Indian Penal Code contains two provisions relating to insults aimed at people other than public servants. These are S. 504, which deals with provocation of offences, and S. 509, which defines a specific crime against women, and deals with insults to the modesty of women.

SECTION 504
Section 504 of the IPC reads: Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. The purpose of this section is to punish those who intentionally use insulting language, with the object of provoking a breach of the peace. The section has three essential ingredients1. 2. 3. The offender must intentionally insult the complainant. The insult must be such as to provoke the complainant. The offender must intend, or know it to be likely, that this provocation will cause the complainant to break

the public peace, or commit any other offence.[41]

Interpretation of S. 504
1.
1. Intentional Insult The first ingredient of the offence is that there must be an intentional insult. The insult referred to in the section need not be in the form of spoken words- it may be written[42], or it may arise from the conduct and actions of the accused.[43] However, irrespective of its form, not every kind of abusive language can be classed as an intentional insult. In Philip Rangel v. Emperor[44], the accused was a shareholder of the Central Telegraph Office Credit Co-operative Bank Limited, who muttered the words -you bloody bastards and cads, upon being expelled from a shareholders meeting. In considering whether this was an intentional insult, Beaumont C.J. held that when the charge is an insult by words, the words must amount to something more than what in English law is called mere vulgar abuse. If abusive language is used in such circumstances that the Court comes to the conclusion that it cannot possibly have been intended, and cannot have been understood by those to whom it was addressed to have been intended to be taken literally, the language cannot be held to amount to an intentional insult.[45] In that case, the fact that the accused had not shouted, and had not even intended to be heard was deemed vital in deciding that he had not intentionally insulted the complainant. It has also been held in Abraham v. State[46], that a mere breach of good manners does not constitute an offence under S. 504.[47] In that case, the accused was a jeweller who had not paid his electricity charges. He refused to allow the complainant (Resident Engineer of the Kottayam Electricity Agency) to remove the fuse from his shop, and told him Neither your master nor you nor your father will be able to remove the fuse from my building. All this is mere foul gas to me. The Court ruled that this was, at worst, vulgarity, and could not be called an intentional insult. It has been held by the Andhra Pradesh High Court that every case of abusive language shall have to be decided in the light of the facts and circumstances of that casetherefore, there cannot be a general proposition that no one commits an offence under S. 504, IPC, if he merely uses abusive language against the complainant.[48] Even if the abusive language is such as may lead to a breach of peace, if it does not amount to an intentional insult, it is not an offence.

1.

2. Insult must be provocative

The second essential ingredient of S. 504 is that the insult must be provocative- it must be likely to incite the person insulted to commit a breach of the peace[49] There is a requirement that the intentional insult should be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and the provocation given should be of the nature as would cause the person to break the public peace or commit any other offence[50] In Sisir Kumar Roy v. Udayanath Malik[51], a graduate student abused his companion using words like Chhokara and Badmash, during a dispute between the two over a criminal case between them. It was held that the words, in the context of the quarrel, were not provocative, and unlikely to cause a breach of the public peace. Therefore, to satisfy the second ingredient, the complainant must show that the abusive language was such as would ordinarily provoke the man or woman of his or her position to commit a breach of the peace.[52]

1.

3. Intention to Provoke

The third requirement under S. 504 is that the accused must either intend to provoke a breach of peace, or some other offence, or must know that his insult is likely to have this result. A hurling of mere insulting words does not satisfy the ingredients of the offence under Section 504 of IPC.[53] Therefore, it is immaterial whether the complainant was actually provoked or not, if the mental element required by the section is proved. In Muhammad Sabed Ali v. Thulesver Borah[54], the facts were that the complainant had been asked by a constable to take certain witnesses in a murder case to a neighbouring village, as the Inspector of Police was coming to investigate. The complainant was unable to do so, as the witnesses were too frightened to go. When the Inspector came, he abused the complainant and called him a dog. Although the complainant did not react by breaking the peace, it was held that his reaction was irrelevant to the question of the Inspectors guilt under S. 504. The Orissa High Court has held that the defence ( sic) of intentional insult punishable under S. 504 derives its criminality from the fact that it is intentional and gives provocation which is likely to lead

to retaliation. It is the likelihood of the complainants reaction to the insult leading to breach of the public peace and not the complainants actual reaction which is material.[55] In gauging whether the requisite mental element was present in the offender, the Court considers the actual words used, or their gist, along with the circumstances of the case. Where such material is not available, it is not possible to rule on whether the accused had the intention or knowledge required by S. 504.[56] This was categorically stated by the Andhra Pradesh High CourtThere must be some material to show or to involve that the accused had an intention to provoke the breach of peace. In the absence of any material on this aspect and the circumstances of the case also not indicating any intention on the part of the petitioner [accused] to insult the complainant to provoke breach of peace, the prosecution for the offence under Section 504 of IPC cannot also be continued.[57]

Comparison with English Law

Insults that provoke a breach of the peace are dealt with in England by the Public Order Act, 1986. Section 4 of the Act makes it an offence if a person: a) uses towards another person threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or b) distributes or displays to another person any writing, sign or other visible representation which is threatening, abusive or insulting with intent to cause that person to believe that immediate unlawful violence will be used against him or another by that person, or to provoke the immediate use of unlawful violence by that person or another, or whereby that person is likely to believe that such violence will be used or it is likely that such violence will be provoked.[58] Whether something is an insult or not has been interpreted as a question of fact-an ordinary sensible man knows an insult when he sees or hears it.[59] In this regard, the interpretation of the Indian Courts is similar. However, there is an important difference between the English and Indian law on this point. According to S. 6(3) of the Public Order Act, the accused must be proved to have the intention, or knowledge, that his words or behaviour are threatening, abusive or insulting. However, under S. 504, the prosecution must also prove that the accused had the intention or knowledge that his insult would be provocative, whereas under the relevant sections of the Public Order Act, the prosecution need not do so.[60] The tests of whether the person insulted was likely to be provoked is an objective test, included in S. 4 of the English Act, but missing in S. 504, which requires two degrees of mens rea- intention to insult, and intention or knowledge that the insult would provoke a breach of peace. It is submitted that the English position on this point is preferable to the law of S. 504. By including an alternative, objective test of provocation in addition to a subjective one, the aim of preventing insulting and provocative behaviour will be better served.

SECTION 509
Section 509, along with S. 354, which punishes a person who assaults, or uses criminal force on a woman, intending to outrage her modesty, aims at protecting the modesty of a woman. Its purpose is to address issues such as eve-teasing and the use of obscene words to women.[61] The section reads: Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman- Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending, that such word or sound shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both. It has two essential ingredients1. 2. i) There must be an intention to insult the modesty of a woman. The insult must be, by uttering any words, or making any sound or gesture, or exhibiting any object, intending that such words or sound

shall be heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen by such woman, or ii) by intruding upon the privacy of such woman.

Interpretation of S. 509
1.
1. Intention to insult the modesty of a woman The first requirement under the section is an intention, on the part of the accused, to insult the modesty of a woman. In the case of State of Punjab v. Major Singh[62], the Supreme Court went into the question of what modesty means. The accused had caused injuries to the vagina of a seven and a half month old female child, and was prosecuted under S. 354 of the IPC. The trial court held that the offence under the section had not been committed as an infant child was not possessed of a sense of modesty. On appeal to the High Court, this verdict was upheld, by a majority of two judges to one. The matter reached the Supreme Court, on appeal by the State. By a majority of two to one, the Court reversed the trial court and High Court verdict, and held that the accused had committed the offence defined in S. 354. Bachawat J., who delivered the majority judgment along with Mudholkar J., held that the essence of a womans modesty is her sexYoung or old, intelligent or imbecile, awake or sleeping, the woman possesses a modesty capable of being outraged[63] This interpretation of modesty, which leads to the conclusion that the modesty of a womanhas very little to do with the physique of the woman[64] implies that every female possesses modesty simply by virtue of her sex. This interpretation was sought to be justified, in light of the object of the section, by Gurdev Singh J., in his dissenting judgment in the High Court, who argued thus:

The object of this provision seems to have been to protect women against indecent behaviour of others which is offensive to morality. The offences created by Section 354 and Section 509 of the Indian Penal Code are as much in the interest of the women concerned as in the interest of public morality and decent behaviour. These offences are not only offences against the individual but against public morals and society as well, and that object can be achieved only if the word modesty is considered to be an attribute of a human female irrespective of fact whether the female concerned has developed enough understanding as to appreciate the nature of the act or to realise that it is offensive to decent female behaviour or sense of propriety concerning the relations of a female with others.[65] It is submitted that insofar as this interpretation extends the concept of modesty to females too young to have developed an awareness of sex, it is justifiable by the above reasoning. However, if it is taken as postulating a universal standard of modesty[66] for all females, then it is unrealistic and unworkable. This can be seen by considering the next issue involved in the first ingredient the determination of intention. The requirement of intention in the section relates to and qualifies each one of the acts subsequently mentioned in it[67]- in the absence of the requisite intention, there can be no offence under the section. The first point to be noted here is that there must be some individual woman or some definite group of women whose modesty is intended to be insulted, as was held in Khair Mahomed v. Emperor[68]. Secondly, whether the modesty of the woman or women was in fact insulted is immaterial to the question of guilt, so long as the necessary intent is proved. The Supreme Courts view that The culpable intention of the accused is the crux of the matter[69] under S. 354, applies also to this section. As to the determination of the necessary intent, the Supreme Court in Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S. Gill[70] held that if intention or knowledge is one of the ingredients of the offence, it has got to be proved like other ingredients for convicting a person, But, it is also equally true that those ingredients being states of mind may not be proved by direct evidence and may have to be inferred from the attending circumstances of a given case.[71] InMajor Singhs Case, it was held that when any act done to or in the presence of a woman is clearly suggestive of sex according to the common notions of mankind that act must fall within the mischief of this section [S.354][72] Since the basis of Ss. 354 and 509 was held to be the culpable intention of the offender, it is submitted that the above is a test to determine whether such intention existed. In Rupan Deol Bajajs Case , it was held that to establish intention, the question that requires answering is Is the action of the offender such as could be perceived as one which is capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman[73]. In the case before the Supreme Court, the accused was a high-ranking police officer who had slapped the complainant on her buttocks at a party, in the presence of other ladies and guests. The Court held that, given the facts of the case, the accused must be inferred to have had the requisite intention under both S. 354, and S. 509. In connection with this test of intention, it is submitted that a reasonable man, must, in order to gauge whether the accused had the intention of insulting the modesty of the woman, consider the standard of modesty of the woman concerned.[74] In the words of Kennedy J.C., it is quite obvious that it would depend very much on the age, experience, religious views and so forth of any particular woman whether an act committed was calculated to shock her modesty or not. Expressions used to an innocent girl or expressions used to a retired prostitute might have a very different effect.[75] Since this is the case, any attempt to put forth a universal standard of modesty is fallacious. It is further submitted that this would not defeat the purpose of the section, which is to criminalise certain types of conduct undertaken with an intention to insult the modesty of a woman. Since it is the wrongful intention from which the offence derives its criminality, the inference of such intention can only be made with regard to the particular woman concerned.

1.

2. The Manner of Insult

The manner of insult covered in the section extends to words, sounds, gestures, the exhibition of objects and the intrusion upon the womans privacy. Of these, the two types of insult that will be considered here are the exhibition of objects, and the intrusion upon privacy[76]. The words exhibits any object do not imply that the object must be displayed to the complainant, in the presence of the accused. The meaning of this phrase was gone into by the Bombay High Court inEmperor v. Tarak Das Gupta[77]. The accused had been convicted by the trial court under S. 509 for sending a letter containing indecent overtures to an English nurse. On appeal to the High Court, he pleaded that his act did not come under the words exhibits any object. The Court rejected this argument, and held that just because the accused had not personally shown the nurse the letter did not mean he had not exhibited it to her. Fawcett J. also held that, while the word exhibit does ordinarily express the idea of actually showing a thing to a personsuch showing need not be immediatea thing can be exposed or exhibited to a person, although at first sight it may be wrapped in something which prevents that person from actually seeing the object contained in the wrapper.[78] An example of intrusion upon privacy constituting an offence under S. 509 is the case of Bankey v.State[79]. The accused had entered a ladys apartment, made indecent gestures, and tried to remove her petticoat. The Court held that the action of attempting to remove her clothes clearly would amount to intruding upon the privacy of a woman[80], and that if it did not, then no action would. An intrusion upon privacy need not occur in a private place- even accosting someone in public involves an intrusion upon their privacy.[81]

Comparison with English Law

The English law on this point is contained in Section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, 1956, as well as S.4 of the Vagrancy Act, 1824, which deals with indecent exposure. Certain aspects of the law under the former provision are here considered in relation to S. 509 of the IPC. Section 14(1) of the Sexual Offences Act states: Indecent assault on a woman: It is an offencefor a person to make an indecent assault on a woman.[82] This provision was interpreted by the House of Lords in R. v. Court[83]. The accused was a shop assistant who had pulled a 12 year old girl visitor across his knees and smacked her on the bottom for no apparent reason. On being questioned, he said he had done so because of a buttock fetish. He was convicted for indecent assault under the above section, but appealed to the House of

Lords, pleading that his statement about the buttock fetish was a secret motive which could not make indecent an act that was not overtly so. This argument was rejected, and the evidence of his motive was allowed. The position of law regarding S. 14(1), following this judgment, is as follows: 1. 2. 3. Where the external circumstances of the assault include no element of indecency, it is not an indecent Where the circumstances are clearly indecent, it is an indecent assault, irrespective of the offenders Where the external circumstances are ambiguous, it is an indecent assault only if the offender had an assault, irrespective of how indecent the intention of the offender was. intention, but provided that he had knowledge of the circumstances. indecent purpose.[84] It is submitted that, on this interpretation, S.14 differs markedly from S.509. Even if a particular action could not be reasonably regarded as indecent/insulting to a womans modesty, should evidence as to the accuseds intention to insult modesty be available, then it is submitted that he would be guilty under S. 509, though not under S. 14(1), as indicated in case 1 above. Similarly, it is doubtful whether mere knowledge of indecent circumstances, without an indecent intention, is enough to convict under S. 509, which clearly requires an intention. Under S. 509, the circumstances external to the insult are relevant only in determining whether there existed the requisite intention, whereas under S. 14, the external circumstances are in themselves enough to constitute an offence. It is submitted that the Indian position of law on this point is superior to that laid down in Court,which is both too narrow and too wide[85]. This can be seen by taking two examples. First, consider a situation where a man is chasing a girl, but due to the appearance on the scene of a third party, runs away. When arrested, the man confesses to having had an intention to molest the girl. This kind of case is not punishable under S. 14, because according to the interpretation in Court, the incident would in itself be incapable of being regarded as indecent- it would fall under case 1 above. But it is clearly covered by S. 509. The other example is of a doctor who, without any actual necessity, conducts an intimate examination of a woman. According to Court, even if the doctor honestly believed that the treatment was necessary, his intention is irrelevant, because the situation falls under case 2 and the doctor is therefore guilty. However, under S. 509, since the doctor had no intention of insulting modesty, he is not liable.[86] In both these cases, the result that seems most just is achieved by S.509, but not by S. 14. It is therefore submitted that the Indian law in respect of insults to the modesty of a woman is both adequate, and superior to that prevailing in England.

OFFENCE OF PUBLIC MISCHIEF- S. 505

Section 505 of the IPC is meant to check and punish the spreading of false and mischievous news intended to upset the public tranquility. It was inserted by the Amendment Act 4 of 1898. Subclauses (2) and (3) were put in by Act 35 of 1969. The section reads: Statement conducing to public mischief- (1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or reporta) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or airman in the Army, Navy or Air Force of India to mutiny or otherwise disregard or fail in his duty as such; or b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the public tranquility; or c) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of persons to commit any offence against any other class or community, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. (2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes- Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity, hatred, or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine or with both. (3) Offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship etc.- Whoever commits an offence specified in sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in any assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. Exception: It does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this section, when the person making, publishing or circulating any such statement, rumour or report, has reasonable grounds for believing that such statement, rumour or report is true and makes, publishes or circulates it in good faith and without any such intent as aforesaid. This section can be divided into two parts, based on the effect of the news spread-

1.
persons

1. Where the publication is intended to, or is likely to cause mutiny amongst soldiers, army men and navy 2. Where the publication is intended to, or is likely to cause commotion amongst the public, or induce

2.

someone to commit an offence against the state or public tranquility.[87] Subsections (2) and (3) were added on the recommendation of the National Integration Council, to widen the scope of the section, in order to prevent the fomenting of communal and religious tensions.[88]

Constitutionality of S. 505
In the case of Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar[89], the Supreme Court considered whether S. 505 was violative of the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The Court ruled that that each one of the constituent elements of the offence under S. 505 has reference to, and a direct effect on the security of the State or public order[90], and accordingly that these provisions would not exceed the bounds of reasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech and expression[91] Therefore, the constitutionality of S. 505 has been upheld under Clause 2 of Art. 19(1)(a).

Interpretation of S. 505
1.
Interpretation of makes, publishes or circulates The words makes, publishes or circulates in S. 505 have, in the context of S. 505(2), been interpreted as supplementary to each other.[92] The Supreme Court ruled that in order to prevent redundancy with S. 153-A, which also punishes statements that promote ill-will between communities, this phrase could not be interpreted disjunctively, because then a mere statement would invite punishment under both sections. Therefore, S. 505 is interpreted as requiring that the statement should have been made, published and circulated, so as to give effect to the intent of the legislature.

1.

Strict construction in favour of defence

The Orissa High Court, in Kalicharan Mohapatra v. Srinivas Sahu[93] held that S. 505 must be construed strictly in favour of the defence, in view of the fact that it deals with the liberty of the subject. In that case, the accused were charged under S. 505(c) for the publication of a pamphlet which was critical of the administration of Talcher Town. The Court held that the contents of the pamphlet did not fall under S. 505 (c), as it did not incite any offence, and that in a democratic setup a citizen has a right, subject to certain restrictions, to point out, either by means of a pamphlet or by holding public meetings, what he considers to be the commission and omission on the part of the officialsin consequence of which the public of that place are suffering.[94] The Court also held that under the exception to S. 505, a person is granted immunity from prosecution if he has reasonable grounds for believing the allegations to be true, and if he lacks the intent required by the section. In connection with this aspect of the interpretation of the section, a 1924 Lahore High Court decision is instructive[95]. In that case, the author of a newspaper article was charged under S. 505 (1) (c), for allegedly promoting feelings of enmity between Hindus and Muslims, and for intending to incite the Hindus of Delhi to commit offences against Muslims in that area. The Sessions Judge convicted him of the offence, but the decision was reversed by the High Court. Zafar Ali J. noted that the article was factually correct, and further that it was irrelevant to S. 505 that it did not help improve relations between Hindus and Muslims, so long as it did not promote enmity or tend to incite offences by one community against the other. He added that those who suffer have a right to complain, and if the complaint is made in a sober language and is free from exaggerations and incisive comment, it can lawfully be published, for the consideration of public officers and others concerned, with a view to prevent a repetition of what has previously taken place.[96] Another good example of how the Courts have acted to protect the right to free speech in the face of allegations under S. 505 is the case of A.B.K. Prasad v. State of Andhra Pradesh[97]. A journalist had reported instances of election offences and rigging by TDP and Congress party members, with the active support of the Presiding Officer at the elections, and other officials. He was arrested and charged under S. 505, among others. The Court dismissed the charge, holding that it was not possible that a fearless and frank reporting of events in a newspaper would, for the reason of annoyance by the officials and the officers, attract Section 505[98] Further, the Court pointed out that the right under Art. 19(1)(a) included the freedom to carry on the business so that information may be disseminated and excessive and prohibitive burden restricting circulation may be avoided.[99]

1.

Mens Rea

The offence under S. 505(2) has been held to require mens rea by the Supreme Court, in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh[100]. The Court held that the words with intent to create or promote or which is likely to create or promote inserted a requirement of mens rea. Since these phrases occur in every clause of S. 505, mens rea is an essential ingredient of the section. In a recent case before the Madras High Court, K.P.S. Sathyamoorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu[101], it was alleged that the accused had committed an offence under S. 505(2) for publishing a circular in a Tamil daily wherein he had criticized Christians for converting to Hinduism, so as to enjoy job opportunities. The Court rejected this allegation, holding that, firstly, the statement was a fact, and secondly, that intention is the pre-condition for the commission of the offence[102] under S. 505(2), which intention had not been made out on the facts. By interpreting S. 505 so as to require intention as a pre-condition, the Courts have again sought to ensure that it is not used against those who, in the exercise of their constitutional right to free speech, innocently cause public disorder.. It is evident from the interpretation given by the Courts that S. 505 is to be construed in the defences favour, and applied sparingly. At the same time, its constitutionality in the face of Art. 19(1)(a) has been upheld by the Supreme Court- this makes it a valuable tool in the fight against communalism, among other evils. It is submitted that the Courts have been successful in striking a balance between the conflicting demands of freedom of speech and public order. There do not appear to be any fruitful points of comparison between the Indian and English law on this point, which would enable a better grasp of the relevance and import of S. 505.

CONCLUSION
The analysis of Ss. 503, 504, 505 and 509 of the IPC, conducted above, has yielded certain conclusions, which will now be summarised. With regard to S. 503, it was noted that based on the interpretation given to the section by the Courts, the essential features of the offence are a threat of a certain kind, coupled with an intention of either causing the target of the threat to do, or abstain from doing, something he was not legally bound to do, or had a legal right to do, or of causing him alarm. In connection with this interpretation, it was noted that although the Indian law is adequate in most respects, the inclusion of alarm in this section, as opposed to a section punishing insult, is incongruous and regrettable. This is because alarm can be caused very often, not by a threat, but simply by abuses and insults. In the study of Ss. 504 and 509, varying conclusions regarding the efficacy of these provisions were arrived at. As regards S. 504, the interpretation of the section requires three ingredients- an intentional insult, a provocation due to that insult, and an intention that the person insulted be provoked to breach the peace, or commit any other offence. In comparing these requirements with those under the English law on the point, it was noted that the third ingredient of S. 504 appears to be detrimental to achieving the purpose of preventing provocative insults. This is because, once someone has intentionally insulted another in such a manner as to give him provocation, and if that insult is objectively likely to provoke him to breach the peace, then the subjective test of whether the person who made the insult intended not just the insult, but also the particular provocation, only serves to complicate the application of the section. In relation to S. 509, however, the interpretation of the Courts was shown to be superior to that adopted by the English Courts in relation to S. 14 of the Sexual Offences Act. The reason for this is that the crux of S. 509, unlike that of S.14(1) of the English Act, is the culpable intention of the accused to insult a womans modesty- where such an intention exists, his actions will fall under the section, irrespective of whether or not he succeeded in his aim. An important point made in respect of the interpretation given by the Supreme Court to the term modesty was that although there are good reasons for extending the concept of modesty even to those females too young to have developed an awareness of sex, it is incorrect to use a universal standard of modesty in gauging whether the accused had the intention to insult it- such a determination of intent must be with regard to the particular facts of every case, including the particular standard of modesty of the woman concerned. Finally, in the analysis of S. 505, the point that emerged very clearly was that the Courts have endeavoured to construct the section so as to favour the defence as much as possible, without endangering its utility, in order to prevent its misuse. To that end, the Courts interpretation has been very successful in balancing the right under 19 (1)(a) with the purpose of S. 505. The section as it stands is a valuable instrument in the hands of the law-enforcement agencies, in combating the threats that communal and other divisive forces pose, to the goal of national integration. The above represent the conclusions and recommendations that have emerged from the analysis conducted in this paper.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ARTICLES
G.R. Sullivan, The Need for a Crime of Sexual Assault in 1989 Crim. L.R. 331. Jeremy Horder, Autonomy, Provocation and Duress in 1992 Crim. L.R. 706. Justice (Retd.) K.P. Mohapatra, Crimes against Women in 1991 Cri. L.J. Journal 33. Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones can put you in jail but can words increase your sentence? Constitutional and policy
dilemmas of ethnic intimidation laws in 1991 UCLALR 333.

BOOKS
A. Reed and P. Seago, Criminal Law, (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1999). J.C Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 6 ed., (London: Butterworths, 1988). Justice C.K. Thakker, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, Vol. 2, 26 ed., (New Delhi: Bharat Law House, 2002. K.D. Gaur, A Textbook on the Indian Penal Code, (New Delhi: Oxford IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1992). M.P. Tandon and Rajesh Tandon, The Indian Penal Code, 19 ed., (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 1994). R. Ranchhodas and D.K. Takore, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals The Indian Penal Code, 28 ed., (Agra: Wadhwa and Company
th th th th

Law Publishers, 1997).

Sir John Smith, Smith and Hogans Criminal Law: Cases and Material, 7 ed., (London: Butterworths, 1999). V. Suresh and D. Nagasaila, P.S.A. Pillais Criminal Law, 9 ed., (New Delhi: Butterworths India, 2000).
th th

WEBSITES
www.manupatra.com. www.westlawinternational.com.

MISCELLANEOUS
H.C. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, 6 ed., (Minnesota: West Publishing Co. Ltd, 1990). Lord Hailsham, Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 11(1), 4th ed. Reissue, (London: Butterworths, 1990).
th

[1] See Justice C.K. Thakker, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals Law of Crimes, Vol. 2, 26 [2] Per S.K. Das, J. in Romesh Chandra v. State AIR 1960 SC 154, at 157.

th

ed., (New Delhi: Bharat Law House, 2002), 2575.

[3] V. Suresh and D. Nagasaila, P.S.A. Pillais Criminal Law, 9th ed., (New Delhi: Butterworths India, 2000), 955. [4] R. Ranchhodas and D.K. Takore, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals The Indian Penal Code, 28th ed., (Agra: Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers, 1997), 709. [5] Supra note 1. [6] In Re A.K. Gopalan AIR 1949 Mad 233, at 234. [7] Anuradha R. Kshirsagar v. State of Maharashtra 1991 CRI L.J. 410. [8] S. 44, Indian Penal Code, 1860. [9] AIR 1923 Cal 590. [10] Ibid. at 594. [11] (1902) 30 Cal 418. [12] T.G. Studdert and another v. J.F. Logan AIR 1937 Cal 367. [13] In re Selathu and others AIR 1936 Mad 549. Also see Ghulam Muhammad v. Emperor AIR 1931 Lah 288. [14] Id. [15] Raghubar Dayal Misra and another v. Emperor AIR 1931 All 263. [16] Ibid. at 264. [17] AIR 1936 All 171. [18] Supra note 1 at 2578. [19] Id. [20] H.C. Black, Blacks Law Dictionary, 6th ed., (Minnesota: West Publishing Co. Ltd, 1990). [21] AIR 1962 SC 1821. [22] Id. [23] (1887) I.L.R. 11 Bom 377 cited from K.D. Gaur, A Textbook on the Indian Penal Code, (New Delhi: Oxford IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 687. [24] Nubi Buksh v. Must. Oomra (1866) PR No. 109 of 1866 cited from R. Ranchhodas and D.K. Takore, Ratanlal and Dhirajlals The Indian Penal Code, 28th ed., (Agra: Wadhwa and Company Law Publishers, 1997), 711. [25] Supra note 5. [26] Amulya Kumar Behera v. Nabhagana Behera 1995 CRI L.J. 3559. Also see In re A.K. Gopalan AIR 1949 Mad 233, at 234. [27] Ibid. at 3560. [28] Supra note 1 at 2577. [29] Supra note 24. [30] 1987 CRI L.J. 2074. [31] Ibid. at 2077. [32] Supra note 24 at 3560. [33] AIR 1925 Mad 480. [34] Ibid. at 481. [35] Id. [36] See Priyanath Gupta v. Lal Jhi Chowkidar AIR 1923 Cal 590, at 594, where the judge used this example to conclude that if capacity to execute the threat was necessary, then the section would be reduced to absurdity. [37] S. 7, Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. [38] Lord Hailsham, Halsburys Laws of England, Vol. 11(1), 4th ed. Reissue, (London: Butterworths, 1990), para 422. [39] Thomas v. National Union of Mineworkers [1986] Ch. 20. [40] J Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins [1899] 1 Ch 255, Ca. [41] Supra note 3 at 964. [42] See Vaz v. Dias AIR 1930 Bom 120. [43] See Habib Khan v. Mazharul Haque AIR 1917 Pat 658.

[44] AIR 1932 Bom 193. [45] Id. [46] AIR 1960 Ker 236. [47] Ibid. at 237. [48] Karumanchi Veerangaiah v. Katta Mark and others 1976 CRI L.J. 1690. [49] Ibid. at 1692. [50] Prem Pal Singh v. Mohan Lal 1981 CRI L.J. 1208, at 1211. [51] Criminal Revn. No. 227 of 1957 D/- 25-7-1958 (unreported) cited in Serei Behera v. Bipin Behari Roy AIR 1959 Orissa 155. [52] Supra note 1 at 2583. [53] E. Seshaiah v. State MANU/AP/0804/2000. [54] AIR 1955 Assam 211. See also Vaz v. Dias (1929) 32 Bom LR 103, and Kanshi Ram v. Fazal Mohammad (1932) 14 Lah 92. [55] Serei Behera v. Bipin Behari Roy AIR 1959 Orissa 155, at 157. [56] See Prem Pal Singh v. Mohan Lal 1981 CRI L.J. 1208. [57] Supra note 49. [58] See S. 4, Public Order Act, 1986. [59] Brutus v. Cozens [1972] 2 All ER 1297, at 1300. [60] See J.C Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law, 6th ed., (London: Butterworths, 1988), 791. [61] See Justice (Retd.) K.P. Mohapatra, Crimes against Women in 1991 Cri. L.J. Journal 33, at 36 where the author says that there is no section in the IPC which covers cases of eve-teasing. It is submitted that such cases can fall under S. 509. [62] MANU/SC/0295/1966. [63] Supra note 58. [64] Anuradha R. Kshirsagar v. State of Maharashtra 1991 CRI. L.J. 410, at 414, where the Court explained the Supreme Courts interpretation. [65] Cited by Mudholkar J. in State of Punjab v. Major Singh MANU/SC/0295/1966. [66] In his dissenting judgment, Sarkar C.J. argued against any universal standard of modesty. [67] M.P. Tandon and Rajesh Tandon, The Indian Penal Code, 19th ed., (Allahabad: Allahabad Law Agency, 1994), 507. [68] AIR 1925 Sind 271. [69] Supra note 58. [70] AIR 1996 SC 309. [71] Ibid. at 314. [72] Supra note 58. [73] Ibid. at 313. [74] This point was made by Sarkar C.J. in his dissenting judgment in State of Punjab v. Major SinghMANU/SC/0295/1966. [75] Khair Mahomed v. Emperor AIR 1925 Sind 271. [76] For an example of a case involving insult by words, by a Managing Director to an employee, seeRear Admiral (Retd.) Balakrishnan Ravi Menon v. Vandana Jhingan MANU/DE/0204/2002. [77] AIR 1926 Bom 159. [78] Id. [79] AIR 1961 All 131. [80] Ibid. at 132. [81] Supra note 1 at 2603. [82] See S.14, Sexual Offences Act, 1956. [83] [1988] 2 All ER 221. [84] Supra note 59 at 470 [85] A similar argument is made in G.R. Sullivan, The Need for a Crime of Sexual Assault in 1989 Crim. L.R. 331. [86] The first example is borrowed from the above article, and the second from R. v. Court [1988] 2 All ER 221, at 230. [87] See K.D. Gaur, A Textbook on the Indian Penal Code, (New Delhi: Oxford IBH Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1992), 690. [88] See Gazette of India, part II, S.2, 1535, 13 December 1968, cited in V. Suresh and D. Nagasaila,P.S.A. Pillais Criminal Law, 9th ed., (New Delhi: Butterworths India, 2000), 970. [89] AIR 1962 SC 955. [90] Ibid. at 968.

[91] Id. For an argument in favour of harmoniously interpreting rights to free speech, and laws against instigating communal tensions, see Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones can put you in jail but can words increase your sentence? Constitutional and policy dilemmas of ethnic intimidation laws in 1991 UCLALR 333. [92] Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997) 7 SCC 431, at 436. [93] AIR 1960 Orissa 65. [94] Ibid. at 66. [95] Deshbandhu Gupta v. Emperor AIR 1924 Lah 502. [96] Ibid. at 503. [97] MANU/AP/0052/1997. [98] Id. [99] Id. [100] (1997) 7 SCC 431. [101] MANU/TN/0216/2003. [102] Id.