* N. White Decolonisation.

The British Experience Since 1945 (1999) Hyam notes that economic recovery and Soviet expansion were dominating themes in Labours colonial policy a desire within cabinet to defend empire , 6-7 Certain colonies were considered as vital commodity producers, absorbing dollars for the sterling area Britain relied on political control to maintain sterling area so wholesale independence always unlikely, 7-8 The 40s witnessed a series of state led development projects, including the failed East African Groundnuts Scheme illustrating Londons imperial spirit, 9 The Colonial Development Corporation was expressly created to maximise the empires economic potential in Britains favour, 10 o The COs hopes of a colony centred policy aimed at their betterment gave way to Treasury concerns Labour foreign policy remained fixated on past glories , believed Britains weakened position was temporary and failed to recognize the rise of the US, 11 Bevins third force was intended to keep Britain on par with the superpowers a British led Western Union, 11-2 Illusory hopes that Africa could provide the imperial army in Indians place, 12 Britain hoped that she could keep both superpowers out of the Middle East, 13 Britain was obligated to continue and increase her diplomatic and military presence in the Far East at the onset of the Cold War, 14 The CO was conscious of a need for political advancement in the colonies to : 1. Accommodate African and Asian nationalism 2. Appease international enlightened opinion 3. Stimulate social and economic development 4. Contain communism, 15 Creech Jones believed that indirect rule was the only means by which Britain could maintain control over political change in the African colonies indirect rule infeasible in SA, 16-7 Britain courted moderate political groups in the ME to shut out the SU, 17-8 Indias admission into the Commonwealth was permitted partly to prevent Soviet influence from infiltrating the subcontinent, 19 M Dockrill British Defence since 1945 (1988) Before 1950, Britain avoided any major commitments to West European defence and concentrated on imperial crises in the ME and FE, 21 Post-war Britain was in charge of a larger empire than before the war, 22 Soviets begin to threaten British in Greece and Iran as well as Europe more generally, 23 America distanced herself from Britain and the empire after the war when Truman claimed presidency, Britain lost touch with the Manhattan Project , 235 o Without apparent American interest in the defence of western Europe against SU, Britain decided to develop her own A Bomb and brave the financial implications cabinet wanted to protect Britains great power status , 26 With the German and Japanese economies destroyed by the war, Britain seemed to be in an apt position to restore and expand her trade she needed US dollars and raw materials to do this, 27

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US attitude towards SU began to harden, re establishing the special relationship and American interest in western Europe, 27-8 While Ceylon and Indias independence alleviated a financial burden, it also closed an important source of troops for the subcontinents defence, 28 Attlees suggestion that Britain withdraw from the middle East (Suez Canal) provoked overwhelming hostility in cabinet and CoS (Iranian and Persian Gulf oil supplies would constitute 30% of British overseas investments in the 1950s) Britain still felt to be an important power for the region and its future Labour treated Arab on equal terms diplomatically, 29 The Suez Canal was an ideal base for British imperial military operations and policy was planned around it Egypt, however, was unhappy with the British presence, 29-30 Britain did not have sufficient resources to defend her position to the ME and found other governments reluctant to help, 31 The communist guerrilla insurgency in Malaya engaged Britain in a long military commitment from 47 to 58, 31-2 Initially, Britain and America planned to withdraw their troops from West Germany in the event Soviet invasion, and stage a second D-Day landing once their armies were built up, 32 NATO secured American involvement in Europe one of Bevins objectives, 33 o However, Britain was forced to focus on Europes defence rather than the ME Army run cheaply in the hope that the next major war would not break out until 58 at the earliest recruit difficulties (conscription ), a lack of funding for weapons technology research and development, 35-7 The cumbersome Committee of Imperial Defence was replaced by the Ministry on Defence which was still unsuccessful in co-ordinating the armed forces the Treasurys budgetary restrictions was the only real political curtailment to the militarys ambitions, 38-9 Howe Anti-colonialism in British politics: the left and the end of empire (1993) When elected, Labour lacked a coherent policy on the colonies, 143 Labour rhetoric argued that party values had liberalized conservative policy which explained their similar approaches to the colonies, 144 Treasury argued that colonial planning should be tied to domestic economic reconstruction, 145 CO was always on a tight leash because of bevins forceful enthusiasm for empire and Attlees lack of confidence in Creech Jones dominant cabinet figures to the key strategic decisions concerning empire, 147-8 During the war, Labour had been ardently pro Zionist but shifted its position in favour of the Arabs once in office according to British interests, 151 Left wing pro Zionism derived from sympathy for Jewish suffering, admiration for the movements socialist tendencies , and the belief that British opposition stemmed for the desire to maintain British power in the region and racism in the FO, 152 Independence in the subcontinent aroused little debate on the left, 153

Labour government agreed that moderate nationalists would keep Burma in the Commonwealth and protect British economic interests , but were deeply split on how the neutralize the radicals, 155 o Burma became independent in 47, 156 Post-war labours imperial policies have been subjected to some hostile criticism, 99 Bevin saw Britain as the last bastion of social democracy, alternative to the US and SU, 100 Attlee insisted that domestic reconstruction could only place by reducing overseas commitments, 100-1 Troops withdrawals from India and a 5% cut in defence expenditure reluctantly agreed to it 1947 failure to secure defence plans in India and Pakistan , 103-5