162

CROSS

CURRENTS

posing flood; for the abundance of the one has severed it from its real link with the other. Similarly, if through the character and the fate of his country, a writer's senses have been consi tently a aulred by the vast pre ure of a single i ue, it is not difficult for him to 10 eight, for a time, of the connection between the disaster which threatens to reduce him and the wider context and condition of which his disaster i but the clearest example. The egro in the United tate. symbolises an e ruial condition of Man, not merely in hi urgent need to correct a social injusuce through powers of law, but also in his need to embark upon a definiuon of himself as man in the world of m n.

For the third of his worlds th " ' e World which he tS condemned by th I .. . II e act o f hIS s'p'rlt ~s t e world of men. lIe share In thetr. community. What he c nnot escape rs the essential need
La

BEING AND SUBJECTIVITY

JOSEPH DE FINANCE

find meaning for his. destiny, and eve~ utterance he makes 10 this direction is an uuerance made On behalf of all men. And hi. re ponsibility to that other world, hi. ih ird world, will be judged on tonly by the authenticity and power with whi h his own private world is pre em d, but also by the honesty with whi h he interprets the world 01 his social r lations, hi COUntry, that is, for tho e who have no direct experience of it, but are moved by the power of hi p e h, his judgement and his good faith.

regarded by h.i I h as a p osop y . 01 the object. T'his judgment " not .I t foundation. For St. Thomas as WIt lOU for Aristotle, scientific knowledge deal on IY 'WIith the universal; truth 1_ found only in what is true for all. Being, the rea.I is that which docs not depend on my subjective dispo ition , on my good leasure, but that which hold. true for ~thers as well as for myself. Being is "out there," confronting my thought, opposing itself to it. ven if Thomi u concede ihat thought doe not ex, toutside of being-for thought, as, oncrete activity of the mind, is being-still they maintain a subtle difference, it seems, between thought, con idered a pure interiority, and the being which confronts it and which it is its function to reproduce within itsell. Ina word, the order Of being is tI,e order of objuls, and the subje t enter into the domain 01 being only in olar as it i. capable of being transformed into an object. In it' intimate depths, in the ab of its incommunicable and ineffable ubjec'ivity, the subject con tillite a domain into which the mClaphy ician- peci:tlist of being that he is-cannot ente.r.
SM
r

IS

GENEAALLY

HO'u

ir contemporaries Ol

[ect, always in peril either of being dissolved into its own representations or
of being volatilized into an abstract function 01 synthesis. We mean the human existent, which is not content with thinking but which wills and acts and seeks and doubts and suffers, gnaw-

ed by

ares and anxieties-the

existent

which is it se l/ and not this or that other, which is irreplaceable in the solitude 01

it liberty and in the uniqueness

of its

vocation and of its destiny. It is the subjeer thus understood which now emerges as the cen ter of philosophical preoccupation in 0 many modern thinkers. his brings along with it a whole new In ific, tion 0 value. Truth, formerly identified with the universal and the obje uve, now tends to become the privilege of ubjectivicy. 'What is true is above all what i [rue for me. "There is o Iy one truth," Bergson used to say. "Each man has his own truth:' replies Karl Jaspers. For truth is authentically truth only if it i incorporated into our own being. But Our truest being is not that pall of us which can be exposed to everyone, which belongs to the public domain alid which others can know a well r better than oursclves. Authentic existence belongs lO what is strictly my OWIl} to what is accessible to no other consc.iOllsness ave my own. "Subjec l.b'il is the truth."\! From this derives the jmpol"lance accorded to authenticity. The impol"lant thing is no longer how l conform oneself by thought to an impersonal and objective .befng. What ounLS is how to be myself, how to ex press fully my subjectivity in my own life, instead 01 losing myself in the amorphOUS and anonymous .mass of the "they," that is, of the eXIStent reduced to its objective surface.

One of the characteristics of contemporary thought, on the. contrary, is the ever-increasing importtlnce accorded to the subj,,/ as such. By subjeCt we do not mean merely (as in the 1 tems deriving [rom the Cogito) 1 a thinking mil-

Father Joseph d. Finance, .]. i a prOfessoy of philosophy at The Gr<gorzanUniversity in Rome. This arlicle is taken f~'om DOCTOR CoMM 1'lS (Rome., I, 1918, pp. 240-58). Til. author's book. XIST~r\C.E E.'r LIBERTE has recently been
pubhshed by JIitte.

164 It would be [utile to deny or minimize the deepening that the e new currents have brought to philosophical thought. to the advantage even cl those who oppose them. It is no longer pos ible today to deny their right[ul place to the value of interiority and of subjectivity, to all that makes the individual properly unique. True, the problem er individuality does not dale [rom yesterday. Scholastic should be Ie s tempted to [orget this than any ne else. BUl, when traditional philosophy did treat o[ the individual, it speculated about it as an object and expre ed i, elf in term proper to an object. The sui jecLivity hidden within remained outside o( i hori~ zon. FUrlhermore, in n ITIctaphy its haunted by the memory oC Platoni m, where ,he inclividual al peared a nothing but a limitation of an ldea, how could subjectivity ever have ucceeded i~winning full recognition {or iu po ilIve and original vallie? In ny velH)

CROSS

CURRENTS

JOSEPH PI fIN .... CI N If Thomism, ulere!ore, when it aflinns being is the obJetl of the intellect, th at interpret the ,... d 0bi 'or Ject in \Vere to h.s narroW sense, it could nor e cape t ' reproach of depriving being of its t he f . existential dimension! 0 rurnmg II urely and simply into an e enee. For ;he object or thing, as deprived of its interiority and capable of being taken possession of by anyone at all, i properly the essence as such. ( he word thing, res, remark St. Thoma. dcsignates a being considered according to its essence-De Veri/ate, q. I, a. 1.)

165

f what value arc its cons, rUCtions' D . t Ilese such as the doctrin I . 0 COact d potency, the principle of cau I. an .1 salty etc w lIC I are no doubt valid [ I ., I . or t" World ' objects, still preserve tl . c trud value .when applied to tlie domatnI . o f subject a such) In orh er word . . rr. this charge be true, d es not SIs, I c 101". uc " onto ogy turn out to be merely a . .. r glona! ontology. and would not the au mpt to , aplly it universall Y . Involve n enatn : flattening out" oC reality?

'e"

a differences, although vaguely and confusedly. In other words, the idea of being expresses in beings not only that which they all have in common but also that by which each one is incommunicably itself, This thesis of Ca jetan seems at first approach disconcerting. But it demands acceptance, it seems, once we admit that these differences, considered as "formally" as one wi hes, are not nothing and that there is no middle ground between nothillg and something. Since they are something. ince they are real. these dilrcrcntiating nOleS, down to their ulti mate irreducible singularity, are all expre cd in the idea of being. The latter pr ell" it el[ to us, accordingly. as signifying the communioll 01 singulars in tlleir very sillglllarity. Now t.her i no reason whi h obliges u to con ider these elilCerences only un der uleir obje tive aspe L Everything in\llle u r:illher lO inchlde a.1l the dellth of th ir ubjectivity. all that is unique, irreplaceable, and in omm.uni. c:lble in the On ci usness of Ollr ego "nd in the e"er i o[ Ollr liberty. It is illl1'0 ible '0 refll e the vallie o[ being to the IIbjC tive di ti"ctivene o[ each one [ll. ~I Y on i usnes of myself -1I0t a lh knowledge or il particular obj ct ",h ielt h. ppen, to be me, btlt as the ab lUlel in omffillni able presence of the '')''-i5 nOt nothing. ]" a ense C\' n it i c\'erylhing, sin e the \Ini,e, or objects exists (or me only through it. I", the idea of being must ll\'e1op wilhin iueJ( the value even of the Illotinlirmue !lubjcctivity, The "I" which thinks being, the act by whidl [ think it. the liberty which takes sides wilh respe t lO it, all that is most in lerior and 1110 t singular in my perj

TIII:IIA I,.F.NC is a serious one. It must be f~ cd squarely and calmly. The USt step' to make dear I exact ts
_ I

~mpo, t: Th.c tCrm "objcetive" carries with It a peJoratl\'c onn ta,ion today . ThISij . dtle m g d part. we feci, to the ae.

.eptCcl. meaning

thi

word has taken on

no one can deny that the mystery o[ ,he "j" in its uniquene S :.HI I IrlY (eriOll depths has never been app,eciated s

keenly as in

Our

own dnYJ or.

i(

it h:)

this appreciation ha had s arcely any repercussions in philosophy. (Exception must be made here for t. Augustine and Pascal.) It was undeniably bener,clal that a reaction ShOll1d set in to fo~ce ~ISto recognize lhe illlponan e of thIS dimension of the re.il. The consequence, howe,"er. is tne capable. If being include not only the object as such but also and even more so th.c subject in its very subjec:tivil)!, and If, on the other han I, traditiona.l philosophy-tO be more specific. TholllISHc philosophy-considers being only ll1 the manner of an object, then we ~uSl conclude that this philo,ophy is lllcapabJe o[ molding itsel[ to all ti,e Conto~lrs o( the real and capturjng all the nchne" of heing .. \VI,at 1 s nc.lest I '. In belllg elude, it. If this be the case ,

,n o,d,,~ary l"ng~,age. Jt calls up at once the notiOn f tllll/g, in the most opaque ense of th tern" ~ a reality which I an g't hold of and han Ile because it i nti,ely in f,ont of me and outside or me. in e 1 am nm involved in it it intclligibil ity i jndependelll o[ me: and anyonc el e in Illy place would see it ju l :u 1 d BUl this very univer5{l.lilY. nthi h cems to guarantee the Ll'ULh of our kllowle Ige, is, 011 the can lrllry. ju t ,,-lUll constitutes ,its !tmita lion :md its in urablc superficiality; ror il proves lh~u all I penetrate to in the bein in que tion i what it yields up lO all orncrs ",nd not the precious core o[ its intimate ingularity. No doubt, when it i a queSlion o[ things, in the slri tense o[ 1l1aterial things, lhis is of no great moment. A mere lhing as such has no del th, no interiority. To kn w it a ording to the mode o[ an object is to know it truly. or! at least, to know it insofar as the knowledge of it interests us. But it is quite otherwise when we are dealing with persons, wi th subiects. To understa~d them in the manner of an object is to reality to mi,understand them.

At this point it should be nOt d ulat the Thomistic terminology, Ie pite it precision, remains very nexible. he word obitct, among other. take on a less rigid meaning for it th, n for our contemporaries. The object of knowlEdgemeans whatever knowledge alt, in in any way whatsoever. But thi reply is not yet adequa,e. Met. ph i i nOt just any kind or knowledge. It is ra donal knowledge, proceeding by way of toncepts. Now the con cpt i objc(/i'fc. in the proper sense of the term. To sp k of a con eptual knowledg of being seems to imply that Stlbje tivit mu t he excluded definitely from itj gra p.
Let us admit it: the objection would be very telling j[ being had to bc itu"ed, without further qualifi tion, ~mongthe "sepamted f nns' (XCo>p",na) m the highest heaven of b tranion. ~Ut against 311lhenlic ThOllli ITl 'we beheve this difficult is inoperati,'e. BeIng, for a Thomist. is not t.he last degi e ~ the ascending series o( uni,ers.'ll . It IS not an abstraction, at least not in lhe same sense as other uni\'e~i;lls. Instead of exduding all differentiating notes {r~m. s comprehension, U it absorbs lhem Wlthm it . Th ey arc a 11 om:>.in d tI,ere. In, nOt only . . . In a \'lrlual manner and msofar as th . . . b,' '. elr OpposItion allows orne baSICSimilarity to :subsist between them lit actually aCCOr mg to their reality ' d

this i being. It follows e,'idently that the idea of being cannOt be totally obiectified. Not only Can I nOt j,olate it completely

""I attitude-all

166

CROSS CU~~ENIS

167

JOSEP~ PI FINANCE he eroplf1Cl t "ddition But In a

'SID

from the particular determinations of the beings which confront me, but I cannot even disengage it fully from the atmosphere, as it were, in which it is enveloped by the very act in which I think it. Neither can I exclude my own self from the domain of being to consider it as something alien, In other words, according to the remark and the terminology of M. Gahriel Marcel, being is a mystery, that is to say, "a qucs tion which encroaches on its own data." It is in those doctrines, Oil the contrary, where the idea of being is presented as capable of being isolated from its differ.

exercised" since, without referen . Ceto the latter, exrstence as signified (i e . " as mere Jy though, about without being fli . . a rrnd would be nothing but an e)

of the immedialely

gi"en, . to the fact that this

rive? Must it be taken

, . ever present in a pure slate evidence IS n .

ences that being appears far more as a mere object. There I can stand back ,t
a distance from it. It turns into a prOblem, the same author would say_ Reason is more at ease here, for being thus conceived is so much clearer and easier to handle. But we know well enough

empty form, But the apprehension of ex' - Istence 111 the concrete cannot be sepatated f fli . ,( rom ItS a. irma Laon.] we are using terms . _ In their (ull rtgor, existence cannot be the object o( a oncept. The mind does not po se It by a form impressed upon It, but by means of an act in which' U re Irves a cor d"mg to its own mode oEbe. ing the "ell' act itself of the other,' he idea of being implies, therefore, its own affirma.lion, and, up to this point! the ontologlcal argument is valid (that is l sa)!, in this one case, at least, the idea ne e (lrily implies the existence of its object) ,

1 affirm being only in affirmmg s?me ( I' articular bemg) > the mind, belOg,[lIS I' .., ... moment when II brings It at the ve.y , f s by reflection, cannot go on lIlto oell . . 'fy it without seemg II open out 1 to can , ~ultiple offirmations. I cannot aflOW Jll I firm being without affirming myse f , I being The affirmer, submerged
Wlt1tn ,

at first in his own affirmation, cmerg:s under the light of reflect.ion. I am In

bein" and being is in me. Or, i( one pre fers,Obeingpresenls itself to me at once as the object of my though' and as tonstitutive of my ubjectil'ity i t~elr. If the idea of being came to me from con sciousnessand the Cogilo alone, I would be in danger o( remaining locked lip within my ego. Descarte es.:ape ub jectivi,m only by discerning, in the mo t intimate depths o( his eon iou ne ,lhe liberating presence of the Iden o( 00. But in realilY there is no innate idea of Goel other than the mOl'ement o( the mind itself lOword the Absolute, irhich gives our affirmalion lh ir firmness and our idea or being iu tran-

BUL jUSL whaL is Lhis !'being" whose

,ffirm(ltion all our inteHec. u,,1, I a ti\dLY? h can be neilher subject nor objcet, for both subject and object ,I'e gra ped with in being. They share in being, hence lheir affirmation logic,Uy pre ul I e the affirmation of being ilself. he primttry ttffirmation-primary nOl in 'hi en c ,hat il precedes all other eh ronologically, but in the sense that it expre.se lhe fundamental reaction of the mind toward the empirical vari elY of whMcvcr it affirms-the primary oflirmation is the (ollowing: "There is an exi leiH," or, i{ yOli wish, "The existent xiSl" (but not in the same sense in. which one would say, "The square i square;" there is no questio~ here o( the logi al i nelusion of the predl' ate wilhin the subject; we are at the rOO of the logical order itself). Being at thi stage is posited neither as exterior nor a interior lO the intelligence. 1I is, purely and simply. onditions

what difficulties arise when we try to

apply this strictly objectified and uni"ocal I\Otion to reality it elL

as sufficient by itself to open up all the depths of be. ing? We do not think so. It is only through the medium of subjective reo flection that being reveals its dimension of interiority, In this light, and in this light on I)', does it appear as existent in the Iull ense of the word, Without the immediate grasp et the ego the idea ct being would remain as empty as the Kantian cmcgories deprived of intuition. The ego in its relation to the Absolute and the universal thus manifests it ell OS the datum which underlies the entire activity et the mind. We must nOt, however, di lin uish the ego and it relati n t the Absolute as tw eleme"t. which can be i olated. The ego i nothing wid, tl t ,hi relation, which nlCI'! into i[iIij inlimatc nSliUllion pre i 'Iy a, go (a more detailcd analysis would bring this out without difficulty) ," and lhi rehuion, on its part, is immediately gil'en to me only in the ego, in the xperience o( my OWil spiritu,1 ac-

tivit .
But, it may bc ,id, do s not the objecti"c pre encc o( bcing imply o( itself the exi tence o( being i" gene",I? Un doubtedly it docs. ince, as we have shown, it i impo ible to think bcing without referring to omc existent in ncl. But lhe point is lhat it is al 0 im po ible for me to think an exiSlcnt other",i e t.han in its relation to the ego. bje ti,'ely, bei"g presents il el( to me' thnt which imposes itself on my arr.rrtlntion, lhnt which I cannOt avoid, that which is nOl relative to my aprice or lO my contingent peculiarities, in a word, that whidl exislS [or every mjnd, lor Thought in its absoluteness. It should be noted that the e latter char acte.ris.tic which seem to eliminate the point o[ ,'iew of the ego, actually include it by that very (act. To say lhat being, objectively considered, is that which docs nOt depend on my ego is to
I

Itery/'

F THE

lOU of being is for us a "mys-

there can be no qu

ri n oE

making it perfectly clear, At the same time we should go as far as we can in laying bare its structure. But to ay, a we have So far, that it incJudes its own differentiating notes, that it envelop the very act which thinks it. is to sur round it with a question mark rather th,n to shed light on it. We mu t lake up at a deeper le"el the problem of ,he telations between the subject and being, Being, says 5t. Thomas, is ,he first ob. ject which falls under the apprehe"sion o[ the intellect.l~ But being is not an essence abstracted from existence. Genu~ne bein~, ens) is the existent and only III functlOn o[ it can the possible be con. ceived; for the possible is that which <an exist. The idea DE being implics, therefore, the apprehension of existence, and by this I mean existence as actually
J

scendence. By this presence of the bsolutc with in me, my cons iOll ness acquire' 0. firm foundation and a univer al validity: 3.
validity and a truth for all. ,f tooth ache cannot be communic~ued, bUl lhe knowledge that I ha"e o( it, objecLilely consLdered, can be. t the same lime the "I" insetts itself in an order ",ider n itselE: I am /lot being: I ,m witltin bemg, I share ill being. olipsis'" i radically excluded. The objecti"e pres ence of being, lhe Sign of the pre ence of the Absolule withi" us i indi pen' sa ble In order to save OUf 'thought [rom the asphyxiation o( subjeeti"i m.

th:

This primary evidence, constitutive of the very structure of lhe mind, alone permits the surmounting of ratio?alislie idealism, while making use oE It up
LO

a ertain

point

in order to transcend

Lo?"icallyeven, this objective presence ISpnorBl u must It e d'lssocialed from 'b , the other mo d e 0( presence, the lIbJec.

169

c~oss
168
wtIOC

CURRENTS

JOSEPH DE fiNANCE

e the ego itsel into the notion uc . of the objective. Besides, what e~pen. have of Thought outsIde ol ence can I . the experience of my thought? But It remains that being, apprehended solely as object! as correlative to the ego. ~s lacking in depth. I cannot endow it with a "third dimension/' so to speak. except by affirming an act whi h corresponds to my own act of affirmation and which the latter takes up a nd make interior to itse)L It is in the act ol the mind that I truly grasp the act o[ being.

the [udgr rent, which ol its very esse iru'olves a reflection on the bi nee . su Ject S ondly, SInce the relation to th . ec . I . e ab,o)ut lSI as we lave said, conSlitutiv e . .,. e of the ego, u IS ""po sible to grasp' . . I d It In all us mil' an depth indepe n<ently I 1 the latter. It is only by losin rn 0 in the Absolute and the Univ ersa lysell g that I find my elf. and discover my tr sel[ .. . tue III Its most mumrue privacy. But . . ' Can ver Iy. It 0 oIly by descending to the deepest level . of myself ' to what COmtl . uue me n I, lO this irreducible COte [ my personality, lhe shrine o[ h .' Wll I~ mO l Cl10US and authentic in me, I rll1d the llcntCr of my eternal commitmenu, th" t 1 n"lccr the niversal and the Absolute.

ndency towards the absolute. and my t e , th t is not all. If I do not a Ai rrn BU~ a .
. 'thout affirming myself, neither
. bell1(Y WI

Now the affirmation can be envisaged {rom 1\\'0 points oE view: ill itS ubjec-

live reality, as determination o( the ego and, in the la t analysis, as a modalily of existence; or in its intentionn} con1L i , th rdore, precisely insofar as it tent, its "objective being." n ler the i a modality (my own existence that latter aspect the act of existing is pre ent the :l l o( "lfIrm:lli n. enriches my no. in the affirmation in somewhat lhe ame don or being with the dimension of in way as the term of motion is pre Cln in t I iority. In th l' words, if Ihe allinna the motion itselL he analysis of judg ,ioll i in fa t .pable of seizing within ment and oE its objective i"'plicalioll i gra p lhe existence of the object,it could. indeed, lead uS to po it an is only b all e, a activity, it is rooted Absolute in the order o( exi tence, in the 'xi tcn c of the lIbject. I know which grounds the validity o( ollr parbing only bc a\l e 1 am myself a sham tial affirmations. Blit this Absolute and in being. Identity in the intentionalor the existences which depend 'llpon. it dcr 1'1 uppo e onnaltlrality in the would remain deprived oC trUe inlc:rior~ O' al 01 der. 1 know the being that I am ity [or us, if the ego did not make m::mi thinking aboul, nOt merely as therehe {est a new order of value thut objc live (ol'e m as one wil.h me in the act of thought, as such/ is unable to per eive. thought, but, "'Ore pro(oundly. as com In other words, not only is being, propmuning wilh me in existence, as par' erly speaking, incapable of being rep ti ipnting in iLS OW11 way in this same resented, of becoming an object} but our standing,ollt.frol1l-nothing which malo reAection of the affirmation, i[ it topped mc hete and nOW present. Subjective short at the intentional content of the thought and obje tive thought, c~n latter that is. if it attained to thoughl sciou 01es and knowledge l1IulllallylO; exclusively as thought, would delivel' to elude ach ther and can be isola~e us only an existence without depth and} onI by awaction. The idea o[ belOg in the last analysis} a nonexisting exi t in tudes at once being as present to dIe ence, mind in its role as object and be' The latter hypothesis. of course, is un. d' 1 as constltut ing grasped \lU111e,ate y . thinkable and, ultimately, self-contra' . . fl ego It Ill' 1Ilfl" the ,Ier)' reality 0 tlC . . o 'on as It dictory. First of all, the ego (despite volves a relation and a tenSI , what some may hold) is not absentlrom . ne ss of "II were, benveen my CD11SCWUS any of its acts, and especially IlOt frOID
l

do taflinll myself without affinnlng op. e an obJ'ecl In the narrowest pOS1te In ' c the ierm. The shock 01 some sense 01 bject whatever it may be, IS, [or sense 0 , . the human mind, the . necessary . rondl. 'or every affirmallon ext renee. non 1 ..' Thus the affirmation of bemg In us I~"I. valves essentially (and not merely on virtue of contingent circumstance) the affirmation both of subjec; and of b'ect, both of the ego and of the thing. J further analysis would be Tcquired A ~o ascertain that, if lhe ego ",nnOl a(firm being without affirming ilSelE and the object, this neces ity is duc to the fact that it is I, a human subject, who am making the affirmation. It i not due

or

to

being as such. Furthermore, it would perhap be more exact to say, in ompully with a good number o{ our onlcmporaric. that the first distinct datum, known ei~ ther a[ter or together with the ego itself, is another ego, a tholl. Expericnce seems to confirm thi view things, for the child does in leed eem to be interested in nnd to recognile per ons be [are recognizing thing. But. in any event, this communi aLion with per n! this affirmalion oE a thou con[ronting; an I, is made possible only tluough the mediation of a thing, an obje t. t the ;ery least, the ego muSt obje tiCy it cll m a slgn.

multiplicity affects being radically and in depth is assured me by the presence within being of the personal value of my own ego. which, by its very act of affirmation, lakes its stand in the pres ence of being, omrnits itself, and so manifest its irreducible singularity. l\foni m is thus ruled out at once, It is essential to being that it be open to participation by different subjects. To a,k the why of thi , to seek the means of passing from the idea of pure Being. subsisting in itself, to that o( p, rti ipntion. would imply that the idca of being ould be given to us outside of parti ipation. This would ome back to admitting the tOl<1l1yobjectified "otion o[ being, craped lean (all it liffcrenliating nOt, ",hi h w have "lre~ldy rcjc l d. rcntion, certainly. rcmaills a my tCry, a profOllnd mystery. But it is "one lhcr th"n lhc ml' tery (being elf. Thc t t, lily f oth r go and tl\ings m"k up the wor/<l. Thus we end lli> ".i,h ,he formula: mye)[-in.the-worldwitllin-being. he rclationship b twC n the e xpo'c ion. my )[.with inbei"g and m c)[in-tl,e-world, is "" ,Iy the "ame a that a knowledgcd by homislS betw en the /orlllal obje , o[ the numan intellcct, being, a",l its proper obje t, being "'ith its intelligibility itumer ed in the nsible (qlliddilOS seu 1Iotl/ra ill

or

materia rorpomli txi.stt:ns- llm, Theo/., I. q. I, a. 7). J otl,ing oblige liS to

reldct 'he meani"g o( the laller x pre ion to tl,at of inert things. Let liS nOt forget that mall, for tl,e hola ti a well a for Ari tot Ie, i a 'res J./lSilJiliJ (a tl,i"g belonging to the sensible or dcr) . allnollgh sui gtll .. is, and that the lre:uise 0" the Ott! remaLlls a branch of Physics. The u-aditional formula exeludes by right only the disinctrrnated spiritual [rom 'he proper object of human knowledge. H we were to set off, therefore, wilhin tl,e scope of ulis pl'Op-

Thus the affirmation of being opens l~to the affirmation or my elf.withmbemg, then into the affirmation of ~yself- and - others - and obje IS - withm - berng . It rs 11) tl way that Ule no. . . HS tron of plurality enters in. By ,his we do not mean a plurality that i merely u perficiaI, a plurality of mere aspeclS or modalities \ vI,' I1 wou Id rel'nam on lhe . It sll.rfaceof the corn pact mas. or other Wlse undiff erenllate d being. That . u\is

?ut

171 CROSS CUllENT! 170

JOSEr~p~ FIH,lHCE that there is nothing superior to jnow The idea of being appears rather !Inll. kind of perspective on the o:der as a. beings It is turned enurely of finIte . . God I them and deSIgnateS on y towar ds I I . I a. the mysterious source rom indIrect y, b hey emanate. It has God et whence hind it, sO to .peak. My self, other selves, things, the Absolute-ali these appear as SO many different types of being which have been revealed to us by the analy.SIS of the idea oEbeing, and SOmany diverse a~rmations into which the basic affirmauon unfolds as it passes to full explicitne 5. Still other types could be brought out without difficulty, and this could .er"e as a basis for a truly rational theory of catelTories.But whal has. sO far been sai/is enough to show that the idea I being is far from enjoying a perfect unity;rather it is pregnanl \\'iLh :0: procHgious diversity. ItS unity wn due only, it seems, to its eXLIeme indi tinclne . A fully distinct idea of being would involve nothing less than the xl1au ti,'e knowledge of all beings in their unity as well as in their distinClion, a lnowl~ edge in which the mOSl minute deGlil . tlle most individual particula.-iue , nd the most intimate secrets would bc ex posed in full light nnd grn ped in a singlelook. Now such an adequate and concreteidea of being doe indeed exi t. But it is the Word o[ God. And all the progress 01 human thought tenw bUI to one goal: to imitate in the least im perfect way po sible this inacee ible ideal. linked together extrin ically by a word?

er ob}ect, hl/man reality as the most proper ob}ect of our knowledge, we

'would no doubt be giving an unforeseen extension to the classic thesis, but would by no means be distorting i~. One could even hold that such a pOSItion is more in harmony with the principle invoked by St. Thomas himself: "The potency of a cognitive agent IS proportioned to the object of its knowledge"-on condition. of course. that It be expanded a little' Subject and object, ego and thing, evidently constitute two very different types of being. I exist for myself; the object, as such, exists i'n itsclf But not only is it a phenomenon relative to my knowledge of it; it does not truly exist for itself. I appear to myself, precisely insofar as I am an II as possessing a value incommensurable with th.H o{ mere things; by my thought I ilurodu e a kind of new dimension into the world; by my liberty I alll in SOOle manner cause of myself. It is quite evident thot this is a way of existing quite dillerent from that oE a mere thing. (It would not be to the point to object here that liberty and thought are on the level of accidental operation, not of substantial being. For operation, too} is in the Of der of being, And il the ego we ..e nOt radically diffe ..ent Irom a mere thing in its profoundest being, how could it be so in its activity?)
p

neglect this originality which [0' . 1 rerr wu I t I' existence, which is thrrns one . ,elr VCTlI eXIStenCe; for to exist both fo .] . ' r myself and for others, IS to be an l - A perfect . knowledge, one , which would match With ' com ptete fidelity the consciousne ss t I tat each !ubje~t has 01 himself, would see the being 1Il each one as differenti d I. 'J~ uom Wil lin. Our analysi of the idea of being can be pushed still further, Further reReelion wO.llld how-this is not the place to detail how-ahat the affirmation of m)'sell-in-the-wol'ld is not the adequate equivalent of myself-within-being. The being po ited in the latter, more basic affirmation tnnscend lhat of the uni verse nnd 01 s ciety. Only an infinite and ab olme reality can exhaust its virllIalitie . The affimlation of being without qualification, included in everyexislential affinnMion, lhus opens out, at a leeper le\ el 01 1 eflexive analysis, onto the affirmatioll 01 eing, the affirmation of od. (It i, without doubt the dim perception oC thi truth which was respon ible, a entury ago, lor the success [ ontologi 111. It errOl' was to mistake for n vi ion, even obscure. what was onl)' nn implicil affirmation. Of] better still perh,p , a transeendel1t,1 condition of e\-ery affirmation. Today, when the comro\'ersie have died down and the problem beeIl mOI'e carefully sifted out, "'e an nlford to be more equitable in our e um:ue: "It dated toO much, but it was noble in itS exce s,") It i evident that the term being as u ed in the last named affitmation involve yet another shift in meaning. The Being in relation to which both subject and object are aflirmed cannot exist in the S~lIne way as they do. ~n reality, if .ubject and object are Inc1uded within being, God is beyond It. It i. only Irom an incomplete and provisory point of view that God can be regarded as an "inferior" of being. We

If that is so, thCI1 there can be no more

talk of ontology. In all rigor we have no right to advance beyond the phenomenological description of particular exis-

lenL5.1

The word being. therelore, does nOt mean exactly the same when applied to the ego and to a thing. Subject and thing differ in the mode of their existing (in ratione e"endi) . In the propositions "I am" and "That is," the verb undergoes a shift in value; it is colored by its subject. For the same reason, I cannot affirm being univocally 01 myself and of others. For each subject the verb in the "I am" has an incommensurable value. To attribute existence to them in a univocal sense would be to

A a first $lep toward an answer we can point out that, if the affirmation of being were nothing but the indis,inctl)' per eived a emblage of [otally di paraie nffirmation~, the indi rinctne itself would have no explanation. -or it i brought about by an erra ing I the differenti,l el ment ill favor of orne common elernem. re we to ay that the c mmon element IX I1t i\ mething purely \Ibjecth'e, n mely, th imihrity, i( nOt the id nlity. of Ih nllimling attitude it If? But i thi similillld \" n oneeh'abl il th beill afflflned i I t, lIy diver I In reality. un Ie \ II' ar t r du e ur thought to , mcre ju"t. iti n of h I r 11 au ognith'c (, ultie -whi h would g ",.in t all the cviden -we .fiu t III int in that the id a f I; ing po 11 t 111 r l' the unity (:1 coli tion. th t i, 1 ill unily po'teri r t the plllr"lity it elcment, but a Ullity which ill me way I" d Ihi di\" I it l' nd nduf be)'(>I1d ii_ II Ih r "'ord . the affu m.tion o( lIbje t, I object, t .. unf lei \\'ilhill the radi ill nffirmlli 11, "There i " And ,be being thu primarily aIfu i nOt a "'hoi of "'hieh Ih ujec'. other wbj CU, Ihin , et.. are pari _ Being i prior to being b the pri"ilege of n unconditional neee it whid, l'Cmde i15 negation impl' un tllinl<"bl _ Far (rom Ih.inlul1 being again t a ba kground of nolllin ne . as SERIOUS DIFFICULTy mu t be faced is mClim imagined, it ,j r.ltller oOlhat this point. Doc nOt the abo"e ingne which we think-insofar fi.\ it ,fl analysisend up by doing awn with all be til ught-against 3 badgr tmd of bemetaphysical knowledge? II the affirma(IOnofb' elng sp I' open. on reOection ing. Being i llltre lir>t and it is witlufl , Its nto.multiplicity of affirmations is no; a its bo om thai bei" appear. When a lth eldeaofb" ell1g, 111 the last analy i ' rose born, it U Ilot exislence which ' notbrng b com t it; it i rather the rO e which uta sIlea I of dlspara te ideas '

moo

17]
CROSS CUR"!~TS 172 JOSlPH DE FINANCE

comes to existence. Being is there, en'veloping beings, penetrating them through and through, linking them together, coinciding with what is most in-

timate in each one, and yet always

stretching beyond, Thus the affirmation of being appears to us as animated, like the Stoic Pl1eUma) by a double moven,ent. one [rom the center towards the periphery and the other [rom the periphery toward the center. The unity of being, as it beco1l1es more distinct and explicit, orients us to'Nards the multiplicity of beings; but this multiplicity, no malLer how real it may be or how sharp the dif-

own eyes, we need to knot v th at we ac epted and supported by OUr eq are I Our reason would be in gr ua lave dan s. if everyL!,iIlg around us procl aImed ger ' , non.exlstenceAnd yet 'he k now led OUr of ' others reaches u only from Without . ge ' TI iere remains always the inn er f orlress I .' . o our inviolable Intimacy ,verewe wh could, srrictly peaking ' hold OUt alone agall1st everyone. But this very' mtunaey , would volalilizc into illusion and being i[ it we,e not laid hold a f non . and, as authenticated by ab so 1 ute there(ore, I were not m), sCI[In orne w, Y an object [or this hought. even lh ugh, of course, it wonld not know me according to the mode oC an 01 j cl,
H.

, h-ch stands up oppo,ile me. 0 betog w J stare 'ista1lal, s"hell) ' a5SeTt5 stan d up ( , 'dl <omething else than a mere asSU1e Y v , st'lte To think the object a asSive < P , ' g in itself-and we must do till , eXIStlO . del' pain of taking ",,'ay ItS very obun

interiority nor according to thtll 01 01.1jeclive eomrnunuy. Reing-e.er)' being~ at the me time, rhough unequally. Jncommunicablc and .el[ ornmuni rive, It follow that meraphy i , no

mauer

ho\,t "objecrivc,"

I1lU\[ .aIW~l)'\

in-

were,. hought-If, '

ferences and oppositions

which emerge

within it, can never break. out o[ the enveloping unity, and point back l . 'wards it in turn. The idea o[ bcil'lg im-

plies, accordingly,

a tension

bClwe n
it is the

the one and the many. But

ven without appealing to absolute h u yilt ,,'e would have to maintain lhat. sllbj thdlY can never divest itself o[ all objective lr. its, X can never speak lIL all lh:ac j in me; but, no matter h ,~ hidden ar lhc deplhs into which I plung within myel[, I can alwa)! ay sOIllClhin ~bout them, It is irnposibl to i aI.He within rnyseH a zone o( PUI'C subje tivilY. The "ery fact of isobling it would uffiec to Lllrll it into all objecl. ubjeclivi,y is present to u! only a a kind [impalpable atmos phere enveloping obje tifled being, " the Olher ha"d, lhe object is, b) deConi,ioIl. 'hal which i opposed to me, .1 , ..' it. annot. oppose it elf w me un Ie s it fU'Sl in orne manner asserts it selL In ou,el' word, it fulfills its func, tion only lhrollgh the mediaLion of an nCl by whi h it illserts itsel[ into being, This is equivalent to saying tbat the object is, on it part, also LO some degree a subje t, I can think it only by analOg) ub wilh my elf, as a. kind oE wunter-s j,ct. Etylliolo ilsel[ suggests this, Il Obj<etlllll evoke rau,er ,he passivity 01 llan a lhing tI,rowu. against mel the Gen term CegensUwd indicates dearly, on the contTary, an effort, a tension DEthe

one which is prilllaryIt should further be noted thaI .. e h diverse meanings of the word being nre not linked together solely by lheir com man roots in the basic affirmation. Or, at least, the unity which resull if n1 the latter does not remain extfin ic to them. There is between one being and another, between one type being al'\d another, an intrinsic similarity of SlrUCture in the midst of their very oppo i Han. Let us examine in particu13r lhe case of the ego and o[ the thing,

jectivity and turning j t mto a imp e immanent correlaLive of the subje 1means, therefore, 10 confer upon il n minimum of subjective deplh: i.e., the exercise of that act which in cribe in the order oE exislence. hll5 e"cry being! in its own way, is a ubject: \'cry being is a sell-asserti n, a sel[, ffi mation. M. Sartre is unwilling to allOh! that what is only "ini!sell" (and not "lor-itself') be said to nffirm itself; il just simply is, that's al1.8 But i n t to be precisely to aliiI'm Olle.tlp r rather, what else is the nffirmalion and the act of the ,,'ill save lhe rcilenllion b) the spirit, in its o"'n proper way, of the act by which the being i.1 Mela. physically speaking, both nllirm, lion, "d act oE will must be il1lelpret d on lhe basis o[ the act o{ exi lcncc. ut it i only through them, and hen e b \Urn ing back to my own IIbj ti,'ily, th. e this act reveals itsel[ tlnd all h' me t grasp its true characu~r,

'

tude n reflection on Ihe ubjecr, ~nd hen~e can never I ve ihe Inn r lotally out 1~le or it ope. ny the return to eXIH~ng. hO\l n 10 be n e,o,ar' in o,d r In g"e meaning I lhe word heing, I ha,c ,IT ady gra~ped nt Iheir r e II lI'e ,'atue o[ ubje ti'ity.

A n,

Ie I:uih)'

L ,.

ri

here,

r w n

I preading

on(1I ;011 r~,

or

our analysis ~nd on a

It should be noted, farst of all, that the ego cannot eLiminate all objective aspects. I exist [or mysel[, but in large measure, I exist also lor othe .... They can see me, hear me, touch me, Ctc., and e~en ~\fith regard to w hat escapes them III tlus way I can communicate to them by language a knowledO'e which already extends quite far. 'urthermore I do not gain [ull seU-assurance ex(ep~ through the opinion which others have of .me. The Traditionalists noted this pomt well. In oTder to be trul y 111 our .

at a pTcviou tdge 1 lin Illcwhl.lt superficial level, sllbject 'l1\d bj t appeared to LIS a lWO form o[ ~ing eh It were completely di parate, deeper analySiShas crncoveTed n lose link be:ween them. It is impos>iblc to tllink he one without conferring upon il to a greater or less degree the imelligihle structure of the other.9 A ubJ' 1 which would b e not h'1n but ubje t and an . object which would be nothing hUl obJect would both Ii olve into iIIu ion anc l nonbe mg_ T".,e reasOIl is lbat he_ lUg, o[ which su b'Ject and objeCl aTe both aspects, tran cend. their oppo i . U' ness neith es l~e In its complete. er accordn'g to the mode 01 t'

IE, therefore,

~her lh:n 1,,,,Co ~1I0n b)' "h~l I.e h~1 J~'I "d? III ,i'l nee in Ih h Illi IIC und f\l3nding of the w rd . -h ~l . h I I '. a tIl ins;. be idtntif,ed nt .. II "'Ieh lib; lhil '1 I il n t. cm Ih 11 IId' " Tdinlf eo eh flr 1.>\Ind , ,n,,1 k 01 lh~ Angeli I r, eh.lI "hi hillhnw I lh bond (II utli n 01 ,II I ,nil ' I t l' 10und,'lItlll O[ lh I. InIllU' nit 1'0 I\od wfluld Il(le '"bl IiI Jl ' II.,,' I look d [Ilr 'dlh r "111 'id III '~ ,ll~e 1>I,n 'Ill 01 Ii",ie,.ei n .Inll 1'.'111 ul.L1".Ilion? 11 i ;lIlm 1i.1l I ,i. dent lh.1t lIeh ,I po ilion w\1uld be 'u t lh Ie" I llhll h-Id Il)' \1\1r \111/ mpora~1 'or. lh III ;1 i' ,i lInR \, hi h eOll\lIlU t Ih in d h be in" lh ' . I I' ... 1"111'll IrIctlu ibl illl d ,;1 .,t'd.. tI' I r. "Inth I till , . illlUioril' il' II: IIh r ~ it i r, . n l\ (On' I lr.L1 'whi h rounds IHmuniC'" .. bihl! l

'\I

j.

dlld u,it. Mu t lie ton Iud I . t\,(J defml\l" 01'1 ilion bel" '11 tl ,.. Il''''llon 1 r i 1101eh tonlr. l bet" n th III due r,llher t II hardenin t n

?~j

( pIS? It i qu!c
)"".'" .) I

lnl ~ tlldt [r

f'

(lll

...

o[

lOnand express

h mi'llI 11\ prill '1,1" of. :um11uude and communit bet\\" n ~m . IIlIt i, i n t In II, milnller o[ a unh rwl. i len nOl u preme I tI b trtI. e nee. h i t1 lhe

17'
CROSS C:U~~ENTS 174 ~OSEPHDE fIN.ANCE

contrary. th at 1 .' being abstracted, conceptualized, obh)ec. ed as we ave .fi d It cannot be gra SP , u e . b a reflexive return to the seen, save y' .. d' n the last act which affirmS It, an 1 1 . . that radical affirroallon

in a being which

resists

Act of Existence. In the abyss 01' . bl bi .. Its 1[. rep Iacea e. su Jecllvlty each "only one" imJtateS Him "who admits no peer.
Yet it is in this same abyss th at H . . meets all other SIngulars. For this b lute subjectivity in which mine paa ~. rtlCl pates is also that in which all other sub. . J'ects participate. , And the more each One suives to be Hself and to advance towards perfect a ..llhenticity, the more also it enters into pro,[ound communion will' all the ol.hers, SInce it is L1le same Act which is acting in all and commu. nicatil\g itself to all. It is not, therefore, by some illusory renunciation at beil\g ol\e el tbnl. we bring about the mcetil\g with al\other, but in a deepen. il\g o[ one's own selL Nevertheless we muSt distingui h here between simple il\dividuality, which belongs to the or der of nature or e encc, and "ipseit( or scll1lood, "'hich belongs to the order of aCl, o{ cxi lit'g. while at lhe same time being onditioneel by the (onner. To cling tllbbo,."ly to the former is to impri on one elt in one's poverty. To de cend more deeply into Lhe latter is to make one ell e"er more open to oth ers. ne be orne truly hinlself not by ultivnting originalily for its own sake but by exi ting more intensely, that is. by om1l1ining ne's life to higher and highcr ,'alue ,Thi IDust not be undertood" the elbcing of my ego before some impel' 1\,,1 ideal. II. involve;, on L1le ontrory, an en,inently personal ad hesion to the OLlrce of all personality. I 1'001. 01 .self more firmly in existence in the mea ure in which I turn towards oel that I find my proper place under His eye. Bul. I.hlS jVlne which consolidates my being is also that which permiLS me to see others as true . . the beings a ,ub/ects. Essential as IS . , ~ U pre ence o[ oLhers for us, no 109 more difficult for uS to admit than that 'tIlearntO they really and tfU 1y exlS . th rs WItha go out of myself, to lo"e a e

analysis.

to

..

which underlies all the aeuvtty 01 the mind and is inseparable from :he ego. The act 01 existence presents Itself. al ways as a subjectivity which I c~n t.h~nk of only in terms of my own .subjeCllvlty. It is a principle of communIOn, yes~ but at the same time a principle 01 UnIque' ness. It is the act by which each bel~g ffiyms itself in its incommunicable Jn~ ~llarity, but alfifl,?s itseU witliin being, as sharing in bemgJ as hnk.e~ m Us very singularity with all other SIngulars. Such is the deeper meaning 01 the thesis which sees in the act of existence the fonnal principle by which an in dividual nature become a ConC1"ete subject, incommunicable once and .(or all (a suppesit) . The theologIcal OflgJn of this thesis is evident. But history has 01 ready shown us many times how striclly theological speculations lead to impor tant progress on the plane of pure phi losophy. The progress in this case con sists in bringing out into the open I.he supremely individualizing role 01 the act of existing. Let us make ourselves clear on Lhis point. The act of existing, as such, c;:tn, not play the role 01 individuating prin ciple. Though limited and distingui hed in itself-Eor it is in itself a relation to essence-it is not so by itself-since it is [rom the side of essence that its limitation proceeds. But it is precisely by it that a being is and posits itself as an absolute, a concrete totality that is henceforth incapable of entering as an element into the structure of anothet subject. The act of existing imitates, on the level oE the creature, that selfsuffi ciency, that completeness, that exclusiveness, which are proper to the subsisting

1 disinterested love, only when sin"re y the image of God, po ited I see in them ood W'1l . b 'n" by Lite same G I . [Il el 0 ' .' h deepening in SubjeClI"'Y' ThUS t e k . conscioUS ol what rna 6 th becollllfig . elves far from do ing us rn and us ourse , is on [he contrary. t Ite con. isolating us, I , ,,' .. .'thout which our rclauon with dwon wr never go beyond the lOge others WOll ld obJ'ective and superfiCIal ommu' o f an . . h nity, The reason, once again, l I [ the act of exisling is at one a~d the sametime the principle botho( Incom municability and o[ communion, Inversely, essence-we are pe,lking here evidently of the s;"glliar e .ence -at the same time that il limit bting to this particular being and so di,ti~. guishesit from all other, pr~'\{;rll . It self to us, basically, as Illal WIlICIl, w.llI.

mllnicabili. od incommuni loil" 'I would be beller to d. tingui h l",d. III communi(~tion. I here" the ounnunieauon 01 II hid' Wt IM\t ju.' tpo en, ,h~t o( net or 01 fo,m, .,hi,h i. "

'''0

ceprible ol I>c:"'~ represerued. M'd rhe,

i anoth r, qui. propcr 10 a t, to t"king LIlt ,elm and (orm.,1 n dillt,tlll, hlln.
~tt

IIh,.h

(Wt"'

in .he ,t of I n"i,,"1 t," IIl,h

t"I'
II ",1

" ht-It

dud fr"m ih "" n IlOtellli.IiI). In a ",~r

pf(JfM'T lint
11-<;Ib 1"

e ",n't ..r ~ho It.) ,\ SI. 1 Ilbllu pUI it: "It i 01 th "dtlllt- "' e'. I W ,,,,,,,,,unit le "",II" (I) I'ul. 'i ::.
,I.

I).

\1'

"ould Ih

lib.

lIu", I.u
UI

,'" "Ih~
lit

.mll"
p.1 ,,\

tlul IItd

"l'l""i""n loci" '(Jun. "(:iPIIUUUni ...hle':

fllrth
I

Ie

I,.c

, ",,,l.h

~llh"

fnl nt, "In

in a being, can

bt

cornmun;cDUd:

d"

look

"Everyform, precisely a fom,; 010' municable" (St. Thom"" 111 I till .. d. 4, q. I, a. 1). Even a pure form, which, according to SL Thoma, j not l11uhi. pliable according to its "natllt,ll" be ing, can be multiplied and c mmuni catedaccording to it "inlention I" being. ":"hchaelily" ub ists only in )It h ael; but it can be pre nt in lhe (lid r at ideas to an infinily 01 mind. Th rt isindeed a di[erence in the modc ot be ing. Michaelity in Micltacl i u,e I.l\" of the act Of txistjllg; in ~briel. in Raphael, etc., it is the law o( LIle arl of thinking. But in the (onnal line 01 quiddity the identity is absolute. i\nd It needs must be; olher\\' ise. it wou 1d not he Michael that abriel and Raph. ael woulel know (d. the celebraled p. sageof Kant on the hundred lholers in hISpocket and in bis idea) _ In ""Ott the esse . . nee IS representable, obJeetifia. bleandth b' . us commumcable, preci I ecause It is f' I . be a ase f Imper>onal and comes a person onl b ' municabl y Y tJ'e lI1com e act of exislence. Perhaps r tb , a er than distingui h com.

",nUl"ni t .. t )'''' IlIt.1. "., ".llt "f S. 'I h"","

dl II II," '" ,h '''It''U,," I 'm .ht , Ull'

" I

It I

uggt1lh
.If

"f.
dfl

I II the wmnlllni dlion "I "h h Huh J ""in' It h 1101 flU I un lu,m .. llId, I lei I I. tllhtt .1 n ,it.llll br 1111'''-'( II. , ""1,,, I" II

iOldli~lhl
",((llt

)/'11< til'
""

hlth

,.'t.lte.

"I . "hl

hUI nl " I, nl ",II, up It ,tt r I ,du' II I II "I"

t

I'" He H <II ~nnl"rr 111>1 I. I h" \1>",hlle d "', .... mmunl II II lire
Ih lI1.nll t "I m"d I, 1 ...111h Ih~ '., ;"u Im;1 I in , "Id I or I f Ithllli , pI lu I' n, lh- IIl.1l1l1 r ib( mu 1('.1 th m w""ld , IlC.tt I i htd in illltll "
.1 "101

p.mi.1

"tl

".1..

t Ir

r I dllllll1 t th t I nl

1>0111101 " ",

If" "i h d I 1",,1 pI " n. we h "Id 100 rdlh r 1.10 I r o( lo'e .nd ill, ,dIn; t w.ud th othu t rdlll~ t ter' own p pte i In. II ?n its Own d count I1d prol n l\:Hhlll I II tJ, "I "hi, the Ih I III tI it II in the rll T ( , t II I' now "p
j '"

whld,

"

II

11

177
CROSS 176 CURRENT! JOSEPtl DE fiNANCE

be a ee en ence This .

" I articil)ation in the existspmtua p . ' . but of which ihis existof anot Iier, . . uld rather be the expreSSIOn. ","0 b that comnlU is what we mean y. . . of act raised 10 'IS lughest mcatlOD' I 1. ' 11 is Creation. (At east t us degree, w I uc . 11 . h' hest degree which is ratlona Y IS the Ig . of the ibl t us The roystertes access! eO ., d the Incarnation present us Tnmtyan with incomparably higher Iorms of c~~filunication which the mind of man, e It to itself, would never have been ab e
10

suspect-)
The ' deepest relationship between and God is not one of resem-

. b emgs blance or of dillerence ([or all that I o[ the order of essence. and It.' the act of existing which is central 111 any being; it is this which is th~ [orll1al term of the creative act). It IS rather an "existential" relationship, and there [are one that is strictly speaking impossible 10 define. One can do no more than evoke it by suggestion. as that act by which beings are both made present and present themselves before God. and thus at once are distinguished [rom I-llm and turn towards Himl adhering to Him as to the Source on which they de pend. This relationship. once gra pe I by the spiritual subject, can [oUow ut two divergent paths within him, that of love or of hate, that oE c nf,dent adoration or oE rebellious pride.

which opposes them irreducibly to 't.r : rum, self. What else can this mean save that they are pre em to Him in the anI, , I.I . . ) manner III W 'lie 1 it IS possible for another, as other, to be present. namely according to the mode of thought and of love? This does not mean by a love somehow added on to the divine Be. ing. but by a love which is this very Being itself; [or, if there were any di;. uncuon between Love and Being, it would be neces ary to put first of ali into the latter .1I that had to be P"" em in the former. The absolute Act of Existing. preci ely because it precoruain, within itself all other acts of existence a cqrding to all their subjective depth, canl"lot be conceived save as an absolute L ve." d i Love." The metaphy,i" r existence thus rejoins in its own way the spiritual inLLlition o[ the apostle 01 1 ve.

What is more, if the divine Act communicates itself by calling forth other acts into existence in its presen e, then without doubt the lauer n1ust preexist within it in some manner, But it w uJd not be adequate to conceive this in terms oE tbe preexistence oE the image in the model. For the model contains the image only insofar as the latter re sembles it, whereas the divine Act, as the total cause of creatures, must con tain them according to all that tI,ey are, hence according 10 their very subjectivity, i.e., according to the very aspect

us NOW gather together the reo ult o[ ur refiectiolls. We have seen how the affirmation of being. since it includ s wil.hin itself the affirmation ot both subjeet and object. canllot un fold and clarify itselE without a reflec tion upon the subject. We have ,een how the object it elE. in order to be solidly real, in order to assure its own obj ti"ity, implie a kind of analogous subjeetivity that I can know only by reference to my own. And we. have shown how the opposition of obJectIv ity-subjectivity is founded on the .oppo , f subl,ctIv
ET

but that it is on the contrary sences, ' . d entirely towards exlstenCe, toowte . I' .. P II the word "existentIa ISm war d5 ess e . . exist it would have to be JIldi d no t ' characterize adequately ThornI \'entec to . , ' tllought We shall not employ It. IStIC' , . .ever precisely because it does exist lm~ , .. I d nOW carries a very special meaning. an . r No! Thomism is not an eXlstentla IS~. Bllt it is par excellence the metaphysics of existence. Through the medium of all the concepts that inevitably it has to manipulate-and what else can a humao science do?-it is the act of existinz that it is aiming at, in the inexhaustitle richness of all its virtualities (vil. IUS essendi). But the act of existing is immediately given in the depths of our subjective lHe; we meet it in the sanctuary where we work Ollt our destiny. It is in the guise of the ego that exist~ ence reveals itself to us. Hence a meta physics of existence worthy oE the name cannot get started without a plunge into Lbe depths of subjectivity. And this plunge is necessary not only at the beginning. Metaphysics is in danger of degenerating into verbalism if it is nOt con stantly revivified by contact with exist ence, Unceasingly muSt we recharge our concepts with this savor of being. ,,.rhich the play oE abstract thought causes 10 evaporate so quickly. Far [rom requiring. tllerefore, like scientific thought, the sel[~effacement of the ego before the universal, the objec~ tive, and the impersonal, metaphysical thought demands a subjective deepenillg pushed all the way to ti,e point where the ego finds itself opening out into communion with others_ Every solution of the one and the many will be artifi. ciaI which does not refer back in the last analysis to this primary fact. . By means oE such a deepening, ThomIStic metaphysics will be able to escape the reproach [rom which we started, namely, that it is valid only for ti,e

world of objects. It is not an adequate answer to the difficulty to point out that the subject is also object. It is, without doubt, but not in its totality; for it resists complete conceptualization. If that is true, is it not to be feared that in its subjective depths it will escape the laws of objective thought? The danger is removed if the idea of being! the starting point of metaphysics. necessarily includes an act of reflection, and on the condition, of course, that this perspective does not disappear from view thereafter. By the same means metaphysics will be protected against mallY of the distortions and inadequacies which are an inevitable consequence of a reilied (cllosiste) interpretation of spiritual being. I am thinking, in particular. o[ the problem oE liberty. This integration into its philosophy o[ the domain oE subjectivity in all its peculiar depth and mystery seems to uS t be one o[ the most urgent tasks which confronts Thomism today. It is not possible that the cultivation oE this imensi fled awareness of existence in its in~ communicable originality should not produce repercussions on our idea of being in the direction of bringing out cer tain traits which have heretofore re mained in obscurity. On the other hand, SUdl a method of reOection and deeper penetration wi]! make it possible for the notions and principles oE metaphysics to receive a more adequate expression. 1 the system of act and potency .nd the principles of sufficient reason or of caus~ ality meet with so much opposition and arOuse so luuch repugnance among OUI" contemporaries, is not one reason because they have been thought out too exclusively in terms of schemas based solely on objects as such? by nO means involves, it should go without saying, the setting up of an exterior and artificial concordance between Thomism and cer

sidon o[ e enceeK1Stenc.e; or ity in lhe suiue t sense of the word,as belonging to a subiect properly ,0 call

expressIon ed is nothing else but t I1e , , E tI ct of eXlstwilbin consclOusness 0 le a .' presses on ing in ofar as lhe latter an . dlVIu, . 'd I a being the seal of inalienab e III ality. This is the moment
to rero
lt1

This adaptation

. d tbe
,

I t Thomlslu reader once and for all t 13 of es' is not desiccated philosophY

178

rain present-day currents of th?ught, nor a mere dressing up of the jradirional doctrine to bring it into conformny with the latest mode of the day, nor even the attempt to discover what St. Thomas would have said if confronted with our problems. We have but little taste for all such Iuturibles- It IS we who have to answer these problems. and on our own responsibility. But it seems to us that Thomism, if we have not merely learned it superficially but pen etrated into it deeply, assimilated it personally and made it part of OU.Town substance, can be of marvelolls assistance in working out adequate solution. It is our belief that by building upon it and in continuity with it new developmentS and new integrations are po sible under the stimulus of the new problems brought up by modern thought. It is the characteristic of every great doctrine that it transcends the explicit intenlion of its authoT. Every work o[ ge"illS is the bearer of seminal ideas. It has perhaps been reserved for our lime LO exploit to the full the resources of the Thomistic doctrine of existence.

translated by w.

NORRIS CLARKE,

51

NOTES
1 Many nuanCt:S would h:lvC \0 be introduecd bere. Thu.s [he egO of De-5c;J;rt~ is "$Omtthing which thinks," but it is ;150 "~omethlng whic..h doubts. whicb conceive" which ~llirmJ, whic;b dCtliet, which wills, which reflJ~, which ~ginl::3 111$0ilnd senses" (Deuxieme M;JitdljafJ1 cd. Ad:l.m-T:l.nncrr. IX, 22). 2 Kierkegaud. COlleTf/djng Ururjtntj!ic POslJrfil'l. (Princeton Univ. Press, 1944), pp. 182S 3. 3 "Primo ;l.U[cm in conceptione inteUec;tu.$ co-die ens" (Sum.. TheaI., I, q. 5, :l., 2); "mud 2unm quod primo inrclleclus cwu;ipil qUl$i nouuiroum Cl in quo omnes conceptioncs resolvLl cst eD'" (DI! Vl'f'l q. 1.
<I..

4. Set on rhiJ, poinE the cI~llem p:l.ges Marillin in e.xiJlefll'~ d~J Ihe Existent (;; Jacquel 1!I'41). pp_ H .H. ew York, (l~, tor CI.:lmple. J. Laporte, l..4 ronrcie 18 /,bt,tl (Pm'. 1'47). pp. 178-8Q !lee d( 8 Sum. Thtot . I, q. $4, :I. 7. It would b 'pfi:ne to pOint out also, in addition to the ipptilobject, ""h;lil we miKht cell the Center 0) e jPtoper ~~ hire erNlCt o f O\lr k now I~,\fie (r e IJml08tdilln pritleep <~h I .) h ' I quoad nOJ 0 f che "'" 0 urlcS t It a, the type f be' considered iU the one molt immediately kn~'N" ln~ in tunccio~ of ,.,hic~ .11 ochctI 20re conceive/ ;~ censer UtlC'l I("cot'dln .. 10 ~he .mentality in vc u lind, l~e. dc~(ee of ,~ctnllon Into the depthlgof 'UblU~llr, ~ot' 'Intlqulc,Y. and x~Olutici$m, it lease {or pcnp:;lltuc Sc.holilJtIC1J~. btlng was COnceived of on. the m~d of the JrHJlbtt Ih;"8, ;l.nd nOt 'With. OUt 'I ccruin d.~&er o( ovcrobjcetification, which S~, Thomu uOlds think .. only [0 his exception 1 visor ~C I1"It~IP,hYlir:;I1 r1~ol,l.ht_ The modern epoc~, {ollo.-Ina: ccrtaln ,uSSr$lIOnl of Sr. Augustine t~kel the jub,cct a' che typicd inJtilnce ot btin~:th lh.inkin~ lubjeu with .oelc-mtt;. t~e moul sUbjec~ "'I~h Flchtc; ~hc lubJcct lI' U.lStmg, as concrete And .inluhr human. (tJliry, invoh'ord in tonl1ict in car,e .n~ ,in lIOIlUI.h. in the cue: of cont('mpo~rl' E:ltltuntllhun. Other., 61\111)', prefer to Consider Socitty IU tho {unthmenu,l reality (Cornte, Mm. Ourkhcim). On chi. whole ,ubjcct ste tht interest ins Inido of D, 11. Sd~n, "L~ mlJltiplici[~ d~ l'l!et'ot." R/Plj" dl'l ,tk"rrJ IlhJI. tl th~or,t H (1947), 17J-'" Ie ~ without uyin, chu the judicious c=hoic:o of ,hi, C:CIUtr of rc.l'crtDec i, nOt without tlTl:c:t on tho c1U(;t dCtcrminuiOfl o( the proper ob icet of Lha 1nttlltct. "Ri,ht here, iL jj well knowll, lies one of the Sf"C!U cillScu1LiCJ of uinc.nulliu philo~phy. Ill, De W.dhe", wriu:, ve.r'l Iptly, 1\ pfOpos of K, J~sperl: 'We mUll f~COJl:ni~ ~hiU II philosophy, no numt how- rtJpectful o( n;i,tornee it m:l.Y be, cannot help but pr~uppOSCl 0 ccruin .sencul nructure of exilt(nce- by ~hc Vtry bce that it ..pull a1>our cxhtence Ind tria to duc.idue it. Ie m:l.Y indeed ipe1k ill of it, bl,l.E it iJ obli,gc:d co luppOie it, (or my worw muninJl:lcs. H 1 do not :l.dmit [hat ~ certain nru(;CUrCl of e.:UJCtl'lctl is C()m,n'IQn to my interlOCUtOr s.nd rr'JYRIl'. Hmcc this phHo$Ophy is Corced to .dmit 'I tbtji, directly contrlLry to its own affirmationl, Detpitc iu {ormlll intent, ehe p,hi. lOJOph1 of JlIJpUl cannot r!;Strict itRlf t~ belli? putdy uinentl",l" (L,.l /lhl/o,oplJI, Ii, Martm Hel Jtn,r, louui.nl p. ,,"01). J. P. S:l.ntr:, L1llrll tI If' ".llInt. P:His, pp. )10;4 o Thi, il .. h)e DC'lC~1"LCJpernttd Ol,lt a pro~~~ mlltttr Ilnd .Jpirit (KC tot nUl\ple, Lettrt II Aout 1641 ~d. Ad.ll";.TMnC:(YJ III. 423-2S). But ., . .. f four he lIuriblJtcd '00 the pnm1t.lVc '-OD U$IOD 0 f thou.8hu what rnUy belongl to the structute 0

Notes on other Publications

THEPOLITICAL-CULTURAL SCENE
tional beings, with concrete situations and that very often historians, whe~ undertaking the role of judges, are ill the posi tion of condemning medieval serfs for not plowi"g with tractors. Ideas and concepts are often merely inadequate. Moreover, they "grow," Or are uans{onned in use. Knowle' reply goes to 'he heart of the malter and focuse, upon "judgment" on the perso,,: There is, indeed, a truth far too often ignored by historian, which loosens m""y problem. A ma,,'s characte,-, above all whe" the man is of no commOll mould, c"nnot I e analyzed by picki"g lip a" action of a characteristic here and there and tying them in a bunch. 0 one pa se lhr ugh time :and itS accidents and rer'llains Hllchal ged. man has free will and he can, indeed he must, exercise ie. Hi nalUre wil.h lIS characteristiCs rea main l-ecogniza Ie. as do his features, btll hi aim, his ideals, his sen e of values, a"d his directive strength of will may have changed entirely". The hi tOria" must recog"ize this, eve" if it seems '0 complicate his task. Knowle' o"tained say: A life is "ot a bundle of acts; it is a su:eam. or a landscape; it is the manifestation of a si"gle mind and of a pel- onality that may grow more deformed or more beautiful to the end .. _ The whole co"cept of the his torian as a judge in a trial is radically false. if only because a judge by his very office acquits, he does not praise and reward .. _ He watches the stream of eventS and the actions of men, alld records them as best he may, .. The historian is not trying the men and women of the past, he is conl.mplating them; he has to see them as in truth they were and to orrective would appear to be further alo"g in his short es-

The Historian and Character (Cam bridge). The publication of the inauural lecture of David Know les as Regi~s Professor of History at Cambridge is of prime importa"ce for itS modification 01 the inaugural lecture ("On the Study of History") of his great predece or, Lord Acton. Such a repl y has been needed, as against the te"de"cy to hold up Acton, the moral judge, as the prototype of "true" Calholic hiSlori al schoo larship. In his i"augural Acton had said
(italics added) : History compels us to [aste" 0" abiding issues, and rescues uS from lhe temporary and the transient. Politic' and history are inlenvoven, but are not commensurate. Ours is a domain that readIes further than oITairs f state, and is not subject to the juri. diction of governments. it is our function to keep in vi.w and to com-

.rcl

an

mand the movement of ideas, wllich are not the eUecl bill the calise 01 public events; and even to allow
some priority to over civil, .. _by issues concerned, quences of error ecele iastical history reaSOl1 of the grover and t.he vital con e...

He portrayed the duty of Ule historia" in no uncertain terms: I exhort you never to debase the moral currency Or to lower the w.odard of rectitude, but to try others by the fi~al maxim that govem' your own lIves, and to suDer no ,nan and

being Iml.
(C. Grill.,

10 "Ru lid il\viccm non distlf}guuntur .secu~ u" quod itllC hllNntl o,uill il\ hoc: ornni:l conVClllunt
I, (". 26).

1).

no calise to escape the undying penalty. which history has Ih. power 10
mfllct on wrong, " If we lower our Sla~dard in history we cannot uphold It In Church Or State. 'ct Something might be said to show that I. eas are to be understood also as deVtces whereb y men try to cope, as ra-