NORMALITY

AND

EXCEPTION:

LINKING UP THE SECURITY CHAIN

Dorothea Hilhorst and Jeroen Warner Disaster Studies group, Wageningen University Hollandseweg 1, Wageningen Corresponding author: email: Thea.hilhorst@wur.nl DRAFT PAPER WORK IN PROGRESS - PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION FROM THE AUTHORS Paper to be presented at the World Conference of Humanitarian Studies to be held at Tufts University, the Netherlands 2-5 June 2011. Abstract: In a crisis, the state of exceptionality is normally invoked, overturning normal rules of deliberation, accountability and human rights ('securitisation'). 'Securitisation ' empowers certain agendas, modes of interventions and actors which in normal times need to compete for attention and resources. This makes crises highly political, with at times - despite stated humanitarian objectives - inhumane consequences for vulnerable, disaster-affected stakeholders. The legitimation and organization of military, diplomatic and aid interventions, and the ways in which these interrelate, depends on the status of the situation as crisis or non-crisis. Such a separation rarely corresponds to the empirical reality at hand. This paper starts from the premise that 'normality' contains many everyday insecurities that require preparing for 'exceptionality', while proclaimed 'states of exceptionality' (e.g. disaster areas) often contain pockets of normality. It explores the tension between interventions driven by normality and exceptionality discourses, by discussing on the one hand the currently emerging 'security chain' (prevention, pro - action, preparedness, repression, aftercare) and on the other the challenges to link relief, rehabilitation and development. This may point the way to the integration of normal politics and the politics of exceptionality.

NORMALITY

AND EXCEPTION

the analysis of the political strategies surrounding the construction of insecurity is necessary to understanding some of the most influential social and political processes of our time. This is why more research on the politics of insecurity is needed (Bland, 2005: 20).

It seems so simple: we have crisis services for crisis events, after which normal life resumes. Liberal democracies have constrained the role of the army services to emergencies like war and natural disasters, and policing to public security. Normality and exceptionality are intimately linked. Normality and its institutions like states, law is built on the state of exception (e.g. war made states and states made war, Tilly 1985)1, while the state of exception in turn is predicated on the space these rules and institutions give to transgress them for the sake of survival. We associate exceptionality with crisis - disaster, war, terrorism, pandemics which upset the normal order. But what is the normal order? Empirically, the distinction between emergency and post-emergency or as we call it the distinction between

crisis and normality is hard to draw, and far from self-evident in many parts of the world. The definition of humanitarian crisis as a large scale immediate life threatening situation, is not at all clear-cut and is in practice highly situational. Mortality and morbidity percentages in war situations are often not different from those in urban slums or marginal rural areas around the world, and for many people the risk to be exposed to violence can be higher in peacetime than during conflict. Hence, when the Good Humanitarian Donorship initiative defines the objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, it incorporates an artificial restriction into what can legitimately be defined as a humanitarian crisis. It is not clear where natural disaster begins or ends in situations of long-term environmental and climate system changes. The definition of conflict is likewise increasingly unclear. A peace agreement is an international marker of peace and sets into motion a reconstruction response. Yet, conflict does not operate according to a single logic, and its drivers, interests and practices are redefined by actors creating their own localised and largely unintended conflict dynamics of varying intensity. Crises are the outcome of conditions that build up over long periods of time and the transition to normality is also often marked by long periods of no war no peace situations. Violence and predatory behaviour may continue long after war is formally over (Keen 2001). At the same time, conflicts and political states of emergency may last for decades (e.g. since 1990 in South Egypt), and assume many characteristics of normality. When the distinction between crisis and normality is not empirically given, the declaration of crisis becomes a political reality instead. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies has called attention to the constructed nature of crisis, emergency and security, and its potentially worrying political effects (such as the unnecessary diversion of resources needed elsewhere, and the de/emphasis of precautionary measures so that politicians can act as heroes and saviours when disaster strikes and voters call for action). This process of securitization, or constructing situations as crises, has strongly come to attention in relation to the war on terror, but can be identified in many situations. Another pressing question is whether it is possible to rethink and reform social organization in such a way as to accommodate the fact that crisis and normality are not dichotomous realities. How can the two spheres of life be integrated and what are the consequences if we do, for instance in relation to these securitization processes? In the past decades, agencies concerned with disasters and humanitarian action have started to address these questions in their practice. In this paper, we deal with two emerging body of practices that aim to bridge the realities of normality and exception: the security chain and linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD). Although these developments, as we argue, open up avenues to expand the space for deliberation and accountability for what happens in the state of exception, and enhance greater resilience in the state of normality, they also may carry problems in light of human security. SECURITY
AS POLITICAL CAPITAL: SECURITISATION

Security is a state of mind - the state of being since cura - without a care. What make one person secure may be highly risky to another, and highly intersubjective. A danger to security is rarely clear and present, and needs to be framed as such. Certain issues will become elevated to security status (securitized), while another remains unaddressed. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982) have argued that out of the

many threats we are faced with, we select only those that protect the (political) community. The Westphalian state system, instated in 1648 to put an end to several long European wars, vests the power to declare a state of exception solely in the sovereign state. Citizens have, in this system, delegated their security to the state. States can make, but also break the law for the sake of order in the face of perceived chaos. According the German political philosopher Carl Schmitt (Schmitt, 1922) this decision is even the very essence of the political: it determines the distinction between friends and enemies, reconstituting actors as political actors (those with rights) and outcasts (those without rights) who find themselves reduced to what the Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben (1998) has called bare life. They are outside civil rights - you can do with them what you want. Although state sovereignty continues to be the core of the global political system, securitization today is also instigated in other spaces, including the Security Council of the United Nations. With regard to disasters, it has even been suggested that media are the most effective in declaring a state of emergency (the CNN effect). Hardt and Negri (2004) and others have noted that the US have claimed a permanent state of exception, to act as the worlds self-interested policeman. Coaffee and Rogers note that in the UK likewise anti-terrorist urban resilience policy is at risk of creepingly disasterising all kinds of social undesirables, such as antisocial behavior (Coaffee and Rogers 2008)

Logic of Securitization ( war, emergency) Applicability Governance For extraordinary, urgent events Vertical (Top-down management, patronage in protection) Bypassing democracy and stakeholder participation Bypassing market mechanism and costbenefit analysis Compliance through force and rules

Logic of Non-securitized Policymaking (peace, routine) For ongoing concerns Network (co-management, negotiation among autonomous actors) Stakeholder participation and influence Market for security goods and services Compliance through persuasion and marketing of security Openness, free exchange of information, public accountability

Degree of power sharing Role of market

Mode of securing compliance Transparency

Secrecy, information distribution on need-to know basis, unaccountability FIG.1.3 Logics of securitized and non-securitized policy making. Authors interpretation of Buzan et al. (1998) and Roe (2004: 283).

Because states of emergency come with exceptional powers, the discourse of (in)security and its isotopes (threat, destruction, crisis, chaos) potentially has a

high political impact. Buzan, and De Wilde have influentially argued that successfully declaring an issue security means to legitimise a state of exceptionality, in which normal rights are pushed to one side for the sake of survival. It releases extraordinary measures and powers for actors who are endowed, or arrogate themselves, the wherewithal to ward off threats to core values. The securitisation of (still elusive) Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq obviously legitimised the state of emergency, a blank cheque and drafting of American troops. Securitization is rewarding for actors seeking to expand their power or resource-base. Politicians benefit from the high-profile decisiveness shown after a disaster, which is much more glamorous than prevention and preparedness (Bull-Kamanga 2003: 200). Military, seeking to legitimize their existence often seek to become more prominent in disaster response. Humanitarian agencies may inflate needs-statistics or expand the definition of crisis response to open up new charity markets and areas of intervention. Extreme measures thus benefit certain solutions, actors, institutions over others. An instrumentalist (strategic) analytical perspective holds out the possibility that actors project threats for their own political gain. As Blaug points out, power corrupts, and emergency power seems to corrupt even more.2 The power to close the frame not only ends quarrelling but also gives access to the resources of security (for oneself or ones constituency) legal, financial, informational, institutional. This makes it attractive to seek to shape the closure. As the political stakes in security are so high, it becomes an important question if emergencies are problems searching to be solved, or whether it is instigated by solutions in search of a problem. In light of the dictatorial powers it unleashes and the limits it imposes on civil liberties, the Copenhagen School sees securitization as mostly a bad thing to be avoided (e.g. Buzan et al 1998). Human security tends to be sacrificed at the altar of national security. Critical scholars such as Daniel Deudney and Keith Krause have also questioned if the apparatus of national security is adequate to further the expanding security agenda - can the army provide environmental security, can the police further human security? The Copenhagen School is therefore concerned with desecuritisation, a state in which war is no longer imminent, and normality is restored. However, it only takes a perfunctory look at humanitarian crises, to realize that securitization can also be valued in a more positive light: as the concentration of resources to protect people from starvation or violent death. Stefan Elbe has pointedly asked if securitization cannot be a positive thing when it concerns a health challenge such as HIV/AIDS. If successfully securitized its emergency status forces corporate actors to forego market profits and make medicine available at affordable prices in epidemic-stricken areas. Likewise, in the 1990s many argued that states failed to securitize environment crisis and climate change. With regard to humanitarian crises, political actors can commit the error of seeking an excess of control, but also the error of neglect - an excess of abandonment when faced with peoples vulnerability. Lukes (2005) blames the authorities of Louisiana for downgrading Hurricane Katrina, so that the National Guard was initially not called in. Looking at the systematic neglect of victims in creeping catastrophies, undersecuritisation of grave humanitarian concerns can be as much or more a problem than securitization. The normality of everyday life can therefore legitimately be punctured by temporary declarations of the state of exception to forestall disorder. In times of crisis, this state of affairs is defended on the ground of order, and even of

humanitarianism itself. Exceptional means are in order, but should always raise a lot of questions. Addressing crises commands exceptional means, that are often dehumanizing and may infringe on the most basic human rights, as critics of refugee regimes rightly point out. What measures are acceptable, and for what duration of time? How can emergency regimes be made accountable, and where are the checks and balances to limit the abuse of the large powers invested in the crisis managers? BLURRING

BOUNDARIES

Complicated as these questions regarding securitization already are, another layer to add is the blurring between exception and normality. The transition from normality to crisis and back does not constitute a break between two different realities. Instead, we can view them as new ways of ordering and disordering of spaces, power, regulation and interaction. Conflicts and disasters are breakpoints of social order, with a considerable degree of chaos and disruption, but they are also marked by processes of continuity and re-ordering, or the creation of new institutions and linkages (Hilhorst 2007). Normality situations do often not represent the ideal-normality that one should seek to restore. In many cases of protracted crises there is hardly a normality to go back to. After 30 years of consecutive conflicts, the majority of Angolan people has ever experienced normality. Moreover, conditions of conflict as well as vulnerabilities build up in the political, economic and social processes of normality, and it is there that the causes of crisis are to be found. Finally, as was already referred to above, in area of climatic extremes or dire poverty, it makes little sense to provide for exceptionality (Courtenay and Wilhite 2005). Van Dijk and de Bruijns study of the Fulbe (1995) and Katrina Allens study of the impact of floods on everyday life in Panay, Philippines (2002) are examples showing that a flood can be a minor inconvenience compared to the problems of everyday life. In most African urban areas, these [everyday hazards] remain the main cause of premature death and serious injury (Bull-Kamanga, 2003). During the violence and chaos of complex emergencies, on the other hand, there are considerable pockets of normality, a strange, tense kind of normality perhaps, but persistent and therefore, stable. Although economies may largely collapse during war, people hold on to normality as much as they can and continue planting their fields and trading their products (White and Nooteboom 2006).3 Informal safety nets continue to be operative to some extent. Where national governments have collapsed or are party in the conflict, line ministries in many cases nonetheless continue to be responsive to peoples needs, even though their services have become severely restricted (Hilhorst 2007). Even in todays total wars, opponent forces have been seen to exchange courtesies, make Christmas truces, or given space to new routines. The late Polish journalist Ryszard Kapuscinski (2008) for example relates African war scenes in which the fighting is in the morning only; in the afternoon, weapons are checked at reception so that everyone can go to the market. Much attention has been given as well on how treaties of international water management often are upheld despite ongoing conflict between the two parties. In the case of todays humanitarian crises, there is also a large continuity in the actors dealing with the two kinds of situations. Most of these crises are located in developing countries, that are for a number of reasons more vulnerable to crisis.

Despite the distinctions made on paper between emergency response and normal conditions of development, in reality the majority of actors is active in both fields. There are only few specialized international humanitarian agencies, and most intervening agencies have a dual mandate that also involves development activity. Nonetheless, there can be a large fissure in practice, because the two situations are dealt with by different departments that have little interconnection and because many agencies set up new programmes during an emergency and become active in areas where they have not been before (sometimes with the explicit objective to open up a new area for intervention). The blurring of normality and exception further complicates questions of securitization. Yet, in this blurring we may also find opportunity to define a new practice of emergency response. In the past decades, humanitarian response mechanisms have evolved that aim to bridge some of the gaps between normality and exception. We examine here the security chain and the LRRD debate. FROM TO SECURITY CHAIN

DISASTER CYCLE AND

While disasters continue to be depicted in press as Act of God, the control of disasters and adversity has increasingly become a concern for science, and for the state. The state is now expected to be \ providential - to see adversity coming, to prevent or control it and to provide for relief (cf. Ophir 200x) A desire to prevent people from any risk has invited a drive for control and routinization - Science and technology are deployed to prevent and control calamitous events. Restoring order in the middle of chaos legitimises a multitude of sins. Critical scholars have noted that this drive is conservative. Calamity and the madness of unruly masse (disorderly otherness) is very disturbing to those who have vested interests in the status quo ante (Hewitt 1983). Complex emergencies can also open windows of opportunity for social change, as did for example the Second World War for womens emancipation. The risk approach accepts that no matter how well protected, risks can still happen. This has also invited an economic and actuarial approach seeking to calculate acceptable risk to assets and people, expressed in cold indicators such as acceptable deaths per region in 100 years\ A very different human ecology perspective (Hewitt 1983 is a forerunner) has highlighted the degree to which hazard is human-induced a mutuality of natural and human factors together producing disasters. Human action triggers, precipitates or increases exposure and vulnerability to freaks of nature. Natural events moreover would not be disastrous if the humans exposed to them are not vulnerable to them Such a perspective also highlights that; a disaster process does not end with the death of the individual, or the repatriation or resettlement of a given population segment (Anderskov, http://www.anthrobase.com/Txt/A/Anderskov_C_03.htm) There are several points of intervention that can help reduce the frequency of, exposure to and impact of disaster events. This however should be done judiciously an overemphasis on one of these elements can have negative spillover effects on another. The work of Ulrich Beck on reflexive modernity(Beck 1992() (1992 etc) has alerted us to the risky side effects of our own intervention, even if they are aimed at making the world safer. In the Netherlands, for example, focusing on maximising protection against (coastal) floods (resistance, reduces the awareness of the residual risk communities living behind protective structures are still exposed. The lack of awareness means normality goes on without the

shadow of hazard, so that people are not resilient in the case disaster strikes4. Similarly in river areas, diking up a flood-prone area can create a bathtub, trapping embanked citizens with no escape in floods. High-incidence lowconsequence hazards become low-consequence-high-incidence events. As a consequence, events become more rare, the memory fades and if the inevitable happens, people are ill-prepared for it. The need for an integrated risk chain approach based on the disaster risk management cycle (Fig 2 below) has taken hold in disaster management. The security chain approach is reminiscent of the disaster cycle depicted below (Fig. 1). It seeks to reduce risk and increase preparedness for a mishap. This security chain reduces these phases to five steps - pro-action (where do you plan the safest place for potentially unsafe activities and vulnerable sites); Separating risk sources and occupation or economic activity to reduce extreme disaster scenarios. Many interests pull occupation towards risky locations. prevention (avoid and restrain unsafe activities - the choice of materials that can prevent an emergency or limit its consequences.); Ex ante measures to reduce the frequency of occurrence of a disaster, or their impact when it happens. preparedness (in relation to the object and subject of risk; the actual preparation of actions if a major emergency arises, such as planning, education and exercises, processes and procedures and the purchase of materials); response (incident handling - actual emergency management, such as salvage/rescue, firefighting, medical intervention, detecting dangerous substances, protecting the environment.) Implementation of disaster plan The Netherlands did not have such plans for floods until 1994. Then in 1995 it was implemented but the flood did not happen, see also the events in New Orleans in 2005 and 2008. aftercare (recovery to the safe situation - the provision of care for victims and relief workers, the restoration of normality, settling claims, and evaluation

Fig. 1 The Disaster Cycle http://www.developmentgateway.com.au/jahia/webdav/site/adg/shared/disaster_ris k_m anagement_cycle.jpg.

The security chain approach permits a more integrated approach to security including learning through evaluation that allows a rethinking of what a restored normal order should look like The proactive element rather than reactive approach has the potential of preventing great loss and distress. Yet the institutional consequences are substantial. A proactive risk approach has the builtin risk of labelling everything a security concern, and thus an extension of securitization, handing more powers and controls to the security sector. Concerned liberal scholars in France (Bigo and Huysmans at Sciences Po in Paris) and Britain (the Security and Liberty programme at the University of Birmingham, the Aberystwyth School of Security Studies) have warned against the risk of generating an atmosphere of fear and pormoting a security governmentality, of a technocratic state panopticon seeking to normalize the behavior of its citizens (e.g. Aradau 2001) practices such as risk profiling and preventive detention A technocratic interpretation of adaptivity in flood (and climate change) proaction and preparedness is likewise observable. Yet, the same integrated approach also harbours opportunities for widening the range of actors involved in hazard and risk governance and giving them a say in its decisions. It invites opening the arena of disaster management to a wider actor group exactly because public awareness has the potential of preventing false sense of security and as a consequence, inducing cooperative resilience.5 The below section will expound this point.

Security chain and networked security governance The first disaster response, salvage and debris removal usually falls to locally affected communities and social organizations (Kirschenbaum 2004). It is therefore disingenuous and even counterproductive to push civic initiative aside to give security services maximum room for manoeuvre. While disaster response will remain associated with dedicated relief services, as there is little time for deliberation, but there is more space for this in the context of disaster prevention, pro-action and preparedness, where the crisis is not imminent, as well as aftercare and evaluation. Indeed, because these are normally nonurgency phases, public involvement may also promote awareness and coordination which should also boost effective disaster response in an event. The urgency involved in developing and instating protection schemes and policies, rarely warrants full securitization. The research noted that other (social and environmental) agendas were co-opted and adopted in these schemes, and different alternatives possible for which there was no urgent reason to overlook. Flood preparedness provides an opportunity to arrange this institutionally, to guarantee democratic accountability in the aftermath of the next crisis. An integrated security chain management approach has the potential of mixing security and non-security modes of risk governance. In the integrated security chain, crisis response is the fourth phase out of five: prevention, pro-action, preparation, repression and aftercare. While the initial disaster repression phase is probably best tackled by actors with coercive powers, the other phases are not restricted by urgency. These desecuritised phases widen the range of actors and bring in diversity of likely candidates, whose roles and identities may differ between the stages. First, such mechanisms require a level of structural awareness (forewarned is forearmed) and engagement more likely to be raised in a conflict situation. In peacetime, security non-professionals tend not to spend time on the first three phases before the event happens. This privileges the professional state and NGO actors at the table until someone re-securitizes the issue. Second, functionalist and deliberative approaches to governance often assumes that actors will work well with each other because the task at hands requires this. A multi-stakeholder platform would seem a logical approach to facilitate coordination and fine-tuning between actors and actor capacities (Warner 2007). In the field of resource governance, however, Currie Alder (2007) has warned that participatory resource management can be a foil for resource capture, if it ignores underlying power differentials. In the same vein, Warner, Waalewijn and Hilhorst (2002) qualify their recommendation for a multi-stakeholder approach to disaster preparedness by emphasising the need to understand why cooperative platforms are promoted and how the interests of less powerful groups are safeguarded. The functional co-ordination mechanisms in network governance can easily overlook the hegemony element and thus exclude important actor identities, needs, interests. Third, the stages are likely to overlap and go back and forth in time, while the different links in the chain to be associated with different actors, institutions and practices. As argued above, exceptionality and normality are not so easy to separate out. This brings a level of complexity which the artifice\ial boundaries

between the exception itself and the pre- and post-exception stages simplify with potentially destructive effects. The below will delve more deeply into this in the context of post-disaster (and post-conflict) reconstruction.

10

LINKING RELIEF, RECONSTRUCTION

AND

DEVELOPMENT

The last decade has witnessed intensive discussion in academic circles of policy as well as practice on the links between relief, rehabilitation and development, known under the acronym of LRRD. Originally, the issue of linkage was represented as a continuum running from relief via rehabilitation to development. As such it originates from natural disaster responses. In this linear thinking the crisis has an immediate impact that triggers a relief response. After the immediate needs are resolved, a phase of reconstruction can be entered, followed by a period in which normal development can be resumed. It has been realized that such a continuum does not exist, especially in the case of complex emergencies. Nonetheless, reference to such a sequential approach lingers on and continues to be a common way in which agencies plan and organize their response in practice. For instance, when reference is made to the gap between relief and reconstruction, this usually refers to a moment in time. This is the imaginary moment of transition between conflict and post-conflict reconstruction, or between the first two weeks after a disaster and the period that follows. Once we let go of the idea of the continuum and take into account the continuities between normality and exceptionality, the gap issue turns into an amalgam of different issues. Firstly, when we accept the notion of normality in crisis, linkage issues become apparent during all stages of crisis. The common notion of social service delivery in crisis is centered on the life-saving assistance of international humanitarian agencies. A first question that must be raised in these conditions is how humanitarian activities be organized in such a way that they maintain or restore the foundation of future development? International agencies have committed themselves to work as much as possible through local channels, yet in practice often chose to implement relief programmes directly. There are many other ways in which agencies try to link to normality during crisis, for instance by working with community organizations, by working with micro-credit rather than free aid, or by providing cash relief more than food aid. The coverage of these approaches is not clear, and they have not become central in the mainstream humanitarian aid. A further implication of focusing on normality, is to expand the kind of services offered beyond mere relief and focus on the continuation of markets, education and normal health services. Jan Pronk, one of the early proponents of this idea makes a plea for a new form of international development cooperation, which in war-torn societies or failed states does not confine itself to short-term emergency relief, but instead promotes development cooperation during conflict. Such collaborative development assistance must reinforce the stabilizing role that local actors within civil society can play. (Pronk, 1996) Working on development in crisis is also controversial, when the continuation of such activities play into the hands of conflict parties, by legitimizing them or providing them with material power. Secondly, when we consider the continuity of elements of crisis once it is formally over, linkage becomes a question of how to cater to ongoing humanitarian needs and protection issues while reconstruction has started. Acute humanitarian needs often continue until long after the formal resolution of conflict. In some cases, humanitarian assistance continues for years into the peace era. The cut-off point is often not made on the basis of needs but on the basis of political considerations that steer attention away to other crises, or prioritizes institutional or sector development over the relief of immediate needs. Humanitarian aid is then considered as undermining normality (by creating dependency among its recipients) or gets backgrounded in view of other more structural development programmes. In Angola, for instance, many poor people consider themselves worse

11

off since peace was established: they have no resources for income generation and without the aid they received in the years before they can barely cope. (Hilhorst and Serrano, forthcoming) As was stated above, many situations of development hide large proportions of the population that live far below the poverty line and whose vulnerability to adverse conditions is extreme. The international humanitarian system is designed for emergency operations and cannot cater to these accumulated needs, whereas there are rarely alternative systems in place. Only recently, we can see a trend of social protection programmes, for instance in Ethiopia, that help populations in need with direct asset transfers, while enrolling them in development programmes to enhance their resilience. (Harvey et al.) Thirdly, in the many prolonged situations of no-peace-no-war, linkage issues are complicated by the fact that agencies are not clear under which modes they operate: the modus of exceptionality or that of normality? This is particularly visible in the complicated interfaces between international assistance and local authorities. Reconstruction is a fluid process, where social relations and the meaning of institutions are renegotiated while people carefully probe their room for manoeuvre waiting if the conditions of relative peace will hold. International actors face the challenge to meaningfully engage with local actors in these fluid constellations, while they are often unsure about the motivations of local actors and the extent in which they are indeed favouring peace. The often used slogan of local ownership in reconstruction is often not very helpful, as it remains unclear who should or could own these processes, and in practice external actors often end up taking more central roles than they claimed to have hoped for. Hence, there are different linkage issues that each in their own way has implications for the continuity between normality and exception. Linkage issues are associated with a developmental mode of service provision. In practice, however, we also see how linkage is drawn into the emergency mode of working. An example is the post-genocide reconstruction of Rwanda, when far-fetching development programmes for village formation were introduced that had vast implications for peoples use of space, their livelihoods, their social relations, and the environment. These long-term development interventions were, however, planned and executed in a clear emergency mode, with little time for feasibility studies or participation in decision-making. The powers that were concentrated to face the crisis were used to push through developments that would normally be subjected to much more scrutiny and political process (Hilhorst and van Leeuwen). In this case, the powers of exception invaded the processes and realities of normality. It has been suggested that in many cases the best way to achieve linkage is for the emergency humanitarians to withdraw from the disaster scene as soon as possible to leave linkage to existing development actors (Christoplos). CONCLUSION The artificial separation between the worlds of exceptionality and normality is unrealistic and often counterproductive. Emergency mode decisions and actions can easily create dependency and promote sidestepping democratic deliberation and accountability, leaving people worse off and disempowered as a result. The security chain approach in itself offers possibilities for integrating normality and exceptionality, which can enhance public accountability but also mean more unobtrusive controls and more

12

On the other hand, as we reiterate, the emergency mode also has distinct advantages in maintaining the sense of crisis that is needed to mobilize resources and political attention for humanitarian situations. The Catch-22 to be resolved currently seems to be that securitization leads to emergency measures that undermine normal development, yet mobilizing support for restoring order is usually impossible without securitizing the situation. We may need to think harder and out of the box to generate the sense of urgency and preparedness with a wider range of stakeholder to enable supple movement between the worlds of normality and exceptionality, and boundary spanning practices and institutions to support this.

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REFERENCES
Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer, Stanford, Ca.: Stanford University Press. Aradau, C. 2001. Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization Techniques, Rubikon, December. Blaikie, P., Cannon, T., Davis, I. and Wisner, B. 1994, At Risk: Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters. London: Routledge. Bull-Kamanga, L., K Diagne, A Lavell, E Leon, F Lerise, H MacGregor, A Maskrey, M Meshack, M Pelling, H Reid, D Satterthwaite, J Songsore, K Westgate and A Yitambe, From everyday hazards to disasters: the accumulation of risk in urban areas, Environment & Urbanization Vol 15 No 1 April 2003, http://eau.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/15/1/193 Coaffee, J. and Rogers, P. (2008) Rebordering the city for new security challenges: From Counter Terrorism to Community Resilience, Space and Polity, 12, 2, 101-118. Courtenay, L. and D.A. Wilhite, 2005 From Disaster Response to Risk Management. Currie-Alder; B. 2007. Unpacking participatory NRM: distinguishing resource capture from democratic governance in Warner, J. ed. Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management, Azhgate, pp Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. B. 1982. Risk and culture: An essay on the selection of technical and environmental dangers. Berkeley: University of California Press. Dijk, H. van & M. de Bruijn, Arid ways: cultural understandings of insecurity in Fulbe society, Central Mali. Ph D dissertation, Wageningen University. Elbe, S. 2006. `Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/AIDS and Security', International Studies Quarterly 50(1): 119144. Fassin, D. and P. Vasques 2008 Humanitarian exception as the rule: The political theology of the 1999 Tragedia in Venezuela, American Ethnologist 32 (3): 389 405. Kovats, S. and R. Akhtar 2008 Climate, climate change and human health in Asian cities Environment and Urbanization, Vol. 20, No. 1, 165-175. Hardt, M. and A. Negri, 2004, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire Penguin. Kalyvas, S. 2006 The Logic of Violence in Civil War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Keen, D. 2001 War and Peace: Whats the Difference? International Peacekeeping, Vol. 7, No.4, pp.1-22 Kapuscinski, R. 2008 The Other. Verso.

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Perry, R.W. 2003 Incident management systems in disaster management. Disaster Prevention and Management 12( 5): 405-412. http://higheredbcs.wiley.com/legacy/college/perry/0471920770/chap_resource/c h13/incident_mgtsystems.pdf Pronk, J. 1996. Development in Conflict: Key note address to the UNHCR/ IPA Conference: Healing the Wounds: refugees, reconstruction and reconciliation, 30 June 1 July, Princeton. Roe, P. 2004, Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization, Security Dialogue, 35 (3): 279-294. Tilly, C. 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. In P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and Th. Skocpol., eds. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Vrijling, J.K., M Kok ,. B. Jonkman en. R. Theunissen 2007 Schade door overstroming - ervaringen uit New Orleans Lelystad/Delft: HKV Lijn in Water. Warner, J., P. Waalewijn, D. Hilhorst. 2002 Public Participation in Disaster-prone Watersheds. Time for Multi-stakeholder Platforms?. Disaster Sites No 6.Wageningen University, Wageningen. Warner, J. ed. 2007 Multi-Stakeholder Platforms for Integrated Catchment Management. Ashgate, Aldershot.

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Historically, states have not always enjoyed supremacy, and have often needed to legitimize themselves through warfare (Tilly, 1985).
2

http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/research/abstracts/drrblaug-emergency-powers-correctabsolutely.pdf
3

For a satirised account of the continued normality of war, including economic opportunism. see the play of Bertolt Brechts (1898-1956) war play Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder.
4

In 1992 the Netherlands the home affairs department adopted a security chain approach the risk management, which is also encountered in different varieties in other countries. The Dutch water sector does not use the internationally current vulnerability concept. The myth of zero risk remains, boosted by a strong belief in technological solutions (engineerability of the environment) and, more recently, green engineering (working with nature), which has so far gone at the expense of land-use controls and investing in citizen awareness and preparedness. The sectors embracing of the security chain in part comes from an acceptance that accidents will happen.
5

Like the disaster chain, the security chain can be faulted for toogiving an uncomplicated [picture of separate stages THAT in fact overlap.