Phil. Association of Service Exporters v.

Torres, 212 SCRA 298 (1992) FACTS: Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI) filed a petition to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of DOLE and the Administrator of the POEA from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers. They reasoned out that: 1) that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; 2) that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and 3) that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with. HELD: 1) The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities. Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong. [public interest) The alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government. 2) Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987. o Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. o For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.

JMM Promotion v. CA, 260 SCRA 319 (1996) Assailed is the government's power to control deployment of female entertainers to Japan by requiring an Artist Record Book (ARB) as a precondition to the processing by the POEA of any contract for overseas employment. By

contending that the right to overseas employment, is a property right within the meaning of the Constitution, petitioners vigorously aver that deprivation thereof allegedly through the onerous requirement of an ARB violates the due process clause and constitutes an invalid exercise of the police power. The Artist Record Book requirement and the questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of the police power. Police power concerns government enactments which precisely interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare or the common good. As the assailed Department Order enjoys a presumed validity, it follows that the burden rests upon petitioners to demonstrate that the said order, particularly, its ARB requirement, does not enhance the public welfare or was exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. The requirement for a venue certificate or other documents evidencing the place and nature of work allows the government closer monitoring of foreign employers and helps keep our entertainers away from prostitution fronts and other worksites associated with unsavory, immoral, illegal or exploitative practices. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all

GTEB vs Court of Appeals Glorious Sun was recipient of a substantial number of EQ allocations from the GTEB. Glorious sun was charged before the GTEB and was found guilty of miseclaration of values of imported raw materials resulting in dollar salting, and other related frauds, in connection with its importations in 1983. Its export quotas were given two newly-formed corporations: 1) De Solei and 2) petitioner American Inter-fashion Corp., The cancelled EQs of the glorious sun which were given to AIFC are the subject of dispute between GTEB and petitioner. Glorious Sun which were given to AIFC are the subject of dispute between GTEB and petitioner Glorious Sun continues to claim its right over the aforementioned EQ. AIFC was able to maintain its EQ from 1984 up to the time the filing of this petition. With the establishment of a new government in 1986, Glorious Sun filed an appeal with the Office of the President, which, in turn, set aside the GTEB decision adverse to Glorious Sun and remanded the case for genuine hearings where due process would be accorded both parties. This decision was upheld by the SC. After further proceedings were conducted concerning Glorious Sun alleged violations and frauds, the GTEB adopted a resolution providing that the disqualification of Glorious Sun and its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in the garments export business is lifted. AIFC, on the other hand, prior to the Supreme Court denial of its petition for review of the cancellation of registration, requested the GTEB to release its EQ allocation for 1993. This request was however, refused by the GTEB. ISSUE: WON GTEB have the power and authority to grant or cancel export quotas or authorizations.

RULING: YES. The Court held that the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate on the questions of AIFCSs entitlement to the export allocations subject of the above-entitled petitions (be they export quotas or authorizations., which includes the discretion to grant and disapprove certain export allocations, belongs solely to the GTEB, and not to the regular courts. On the basis of the provisions of law cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun, that the power to adjudicate on the question of an entity's entitlement to export allocations was expressly granted to the GTEB, or at the very least, was necessarily implied from the power to cancel or suspend quota allocations, is beyond cavil. Semantics notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that GTEB Case No. 92-50 was instituted by Glorious Sun for the purpose of securing the cancellation of EQs then alleged by it as being illegally held by AIFC. This being the case, it likewise cannot be denied that, as Glorious Sun correctly observes, such a proceeding is clearly within the ambit of the GTEB's powers, more specifically, the power granted to it by Section 3 subparagraph (h) of Executive Order No. 537 (as amended by E.O. No. 952) to "cancel or suspend quota allocations, export authorizations and licenses for the operations of bonded garment manufacturing warehouses or disqualify the firm and/or its principal stockholders and officers from engaging in garment exports and from doing business with the Board," in case of violations of its rules and regulations. AIFC categorically declared in its "Motion to Dismiss," Civil Case No. 93-138[53] that "Executive Order No. 537, as amended by Executive Order Nos. 823 and 952, vests upon defendant GTEB exclusive jurisdiction to grant export quota allocations," and that "(u)nder the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, only defendant GTEB has the authority to award/cancel export quotas." In fact, it is noteworthy that in said motion to dismiss, AIFC relied upon the very principles cited by both the GTEB and Glorious Sun in the above-entitled petitions in support of their argument that it is the GTEB which has jurisdiction over the export allocations subject of said petitions, to wit: "Courts of justice should not generally interfere with purely administrative and discretionary functions; that courts have no supervisory power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative departments of the government involving the exercise of judgment and findings of fact, because by reason of their special knowledge and expertise over matters falling under their jurisdiction, the latter are in a better position to pass judgment on such matters and their findings of facts in that regard are generally accorded respect, if not finality, by the courts.

LEON MATEO and ANA VILORIA MATEO, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; G.R. No. 83354. April 25, 1991.* FACTS: 1) On November 9, 1978, the private respondents instituted an action for recovery of possession and/or ownership with damages against the petitioners of a two-hectare piece of land situated in Calamagoy, Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, . 2) Regional Trial Court of Digos ordering the petitioners to vacate Lot. 3) A copy of the said decision was served on the petitioners, defendants in the trial court, but since no appeal from this judgment had been filed within the reglementary period, or up to April 15, 1987, the same became final and executory. 4) the deputy sheriff attested in his delivery receipt the actual reconveyance of the land in question to the private respondents. 5) the petitioners received the said decision adverse to them, they filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment in the same trial court, in the same cause, alleging excusable negligence in their failure to appeal the said decision, and praying that the same be set aside. 6) the trial court denied the said Petition for Relief from Judgment. 7) The petitioners elevated the case to the respondent appellate court on a Petition for Mandamus alleging that the denial of their appeal was unwarranted and that the granting of the notice of appeal was a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. 8) the respondent appellate court denied the said Petition for Mandamus.

ISSUE: whether or not the approval of a notice of appeal by the trial judge is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. A petition for mandamus lies when any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. mandamus is a remedy available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. It cannot compel the exercise of discretion one way or the other. Indeed, mandamus does not lie to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by its nature requires the exercise of judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the act done. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment. x x x

In the present case, petitioner lost his right to appeal when he failed to perfect his appeal within the reglementary period. The Petition for Relief From Judgment granted by Section 2 of Rule 38, does not confer on petitioner the right to appeal which had been lost. And the remedy of relief from judgment can only be resorted to on any of the grounds mentioned by said rules, namely: fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. The determination of whether the element of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence is present to warrant the granting of the relief prayed for, requires an exercise of judgment and discretion by the judge. And the writ of mandamus can not be issued and is not available to control the discretion of the judge or compel him to decide a case in a particular way. The trial court, in exercising its discretionary authority, denied the Petition for Relief from Judgment on a finding that petitioners had no meritorious defense and that the failure to perfect the appeal on time was not due to excusable negligence. This is clearly an exercise of power or authority which cannot be controlled by a writ of mandamus. In this instance, the remedy available to the petitioners is to appeal the denial of their Petition for Relief from Judgment. o Hence, we agree with the contention of the petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to approve the notice of appeal. It must be observed that the petitioners had filed within the prescribed period a notice of appeal on December 1, 1987 when the petition in question was denied by the trial court in an order dated November 9, 1987, a copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 27, 1987. o The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to accept the said notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus.

TANADA vs. CUENCO FACTS: ( I copy and paste this from the net)

On Feb. 22, 1956, the Senate onbehalf of the Nacionalista Party electedrespondents Cuenco & Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal upon thenomination of Senator Primicias, an NPmember. The two seats, originally for minority party nominees, were filled with NP members to meet the Constitutional mandate under Sec.2 Art. 6, over the objections of lone CitizenParty Senator Taada. Consequently, the Chairman of the Tribunal appointed the rest of the respondents as staff members of Cuenco& Delgado. Petitioner alleges that the nomination by Sen. Primicias on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate, violates Sec. 2, Art. 6 of PC, since 3 seats on the ETare reserved for minority senators dulynominated by the minority partyrepresentatives. Furthermore, as respondents are about to decide on Electoral Case No. 4 of Senate, the case at bar is a violation not onlyof Taada's right as CP member of ET, but respondent Macapagal's right to an impartial body that will try his election protest. Petitioners pray for a writ of preliminary injunction against respondents (cannot exercise duties), to be made permanent after a judgment to oust respondents is passed.Respondents contend that the Court is without jurisdiction to try the appointment of ETmembers, since it is a constitutional rightgranted to Senate. Moreover, the petition is without cause of action since Taada exhausted his right to nominate 2 more senators; he is in estoppel. They contend that the present action is not the proper remedy, but an appeal to public opinion The issue before us is whether the Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the Senate. RELATED DOCTRINE: "There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute. Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes. Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and, when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction. Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such provision to be essential to the validity of the act

or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. REYES 219 SCRA 192 (1993) Note: Copied and Paste from the Net FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City. Shes married to Edgardo Montoya, a Filipino-American serviceman employed by the US Navy & stationed in San Francisco. Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity exchange manager. 1) Jan. 22, 1987 Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she had purchasing privileges. After shopping & while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her & told her that she needed to search her bags upon Bradfords instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on her person, bags & car in front of Bradford & other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. a. Montoya learned that she was the only person subjected to such search that day & she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-doing. 2) Montoya filed a formal protest w/Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. a. Montoya filed a suit against Bradford for damages due to the oppressive & discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt & ridicule causing her undue embarrassment & indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land w/c is a blow to our national pride & dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500k and exemplary damages of P100k. 3) May 13, 1987 Summons & complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that: (1) this is a suit against US w/c is a foreign sovereign immune from suit w/o its consent and (2) Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 & Military Bases Agreement of 1947. a. They claim that US has rights, power & authority w/in the bases, necessary for the establishment, use & operation & defense thereof. 4) July 6, 1987 Montoya filed a motion for preliminary attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country & was removing & disposing her properties w/intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. 5) July 14, 1987 Montoya opposed Bradfords motion to dismiss. She claims that: (1) search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus its improper, unlawful & highly-discriminatory and beyond Bradfords authority; (2) due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford cant rely on sovereign immunity; (3) Bradfords act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of Philippine courts; (4) the Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine WON Bradford acted w/in or outside her authority.

6) RTC granted Montoyas motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence & Bradford declared in default for failure to file an answer. 7) Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the scope of her authority. a. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts & he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under RP courts jurisdiction because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess diplomatic immunity. b. She further claims that RP courts can inquire into the factual circumstances & determine WON Bradford is immune. ISSUES/RATIO: 1. WON the case is under the RTCs jurisdiction YES Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of court (something like asking for Courts permission) to intervene in the present case. Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be deemed to have subjected itself to RTCs jurisdiction. 2. WON RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradfords motion to dismiss. NO Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1, Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss w/c fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. RTC should have deferred the resolution instead of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already brought this petition to the SC. 3. WON case at bar is a suit against the State. NO Doctrine of state immunity is expressed in Art. XVI, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution. This immunity also applies to complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in discharge of their duties since it will require the state to perform an affirmative act such as appropriation of amount to pay damages. This will be regarded as a case against the state even if it has not be formally impleaded. But this is not all encompassing. Its a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary to law & injurious to rights of plaintiff. State authorizes only legal acts by its officers. Action against officials by one whose rights have been violated by such acts is not a suit against the State w/in the rule of immunity of the State from suit. The doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice. It will not apply & may not be invoked where the public official is being sued in his private & personal capacity as an ordinary citizen. This usually arises where the public official acts w/o authority or in excess of the powers vested in him. A public official is liable if he acted w/malice & in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (Shauf vs. CA) Also, USA vs. Guinto declared that USA is not conferred with blanket immunity for all acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines merely because they have acted as agents of the US in the discharge of their official functions. In this case, Bradford was sued in her private/personal capacity for acts done beyond the scope & place of her official function, thus, it falls w/in the exception to the doctrine of state immunity. 4. WON Bradford enjoys diplomatic immunity. NO First of all, she is not among those granted diplomatic immunity under Art. 16(b) of the 1953 Military Assistance Agreement creating the JUSMAG. Second, even diplomatic agents who enjoy immunity are liable if they perform acts outside their official functions (Art. 31, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations).