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MCGILL UNlyERSITY
MAX STIRNER'S THE EGO AND
HIS'OWN AND
OF KARD MARX
A MASTER'S THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES
IN CANDIDACY' FOR THE DEGREE
OF MASTER OF ARTS
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
BY .
DAVID KRAWlrZ
.'
MONTREAL"QUBBEC'
MAY 1979
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ABSTRACT
This examines'a curiously neglected moment in the
intellectual development of Karl Marx. Our foeus nere, is the
interchange of ideas in the form of a textual dialogue 'between
Max Stirner in his book Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum (trans-
lated The Ego and CHis Own) and in his work The German
1
1
'1
. Ideology.,
After situating Marx and Stirner within the
o

YoungeJle-ge1lan '
context, which provided the common language and
"J
structred the substantive concerns of bth authors, there i5 a

thematic discussion of the diverse intellectual 5trands hidden
within Stirner's rather parochial visl?n. The dormant
intellectual anteeedents of Facism, Existentialism, and
Anarchism isola ted wi thin tings as a prelude
the
,
ideas
discussion of the and
.,A
'""

;
t then betomes .possible to demons.trate with some precisi0I?-,
"
the effect that Stirner' s wri tings had on the formation of.
.. ,
Marx's mature for3lations. Aftericarefully 1
1
the previously cognized role that Stirner in Marx's
j .
\
rej ection of Feuerbach, sorne insights are offe.red 'inte the
specific development f Marx's materialist conieption of
nistory and his understanding of ethics.
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Cette thse examine un curieusement
intellectuel de Karl Marx. Ce qui nous intresse ic est 'l'change 'I!l ' ides,
, , l 'l"
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qui eut lieu, souS la forme d'un dialogue textuel, Max Stirner, d'une
,
part, son livre, ner Einzige und sein Eigenthum,(L'Unique et sa Proprit)
,
et Marx,. d'autre part, dans son oeuvre, L"Idologie Allemande.
Aprs avoir situ Marx parmi les Jeunes Hgliens, lesquels
avaient f:urni aux auteurs un latage connnun et
contribu' la formulation des de fond, un dbat thmatique

s'engage autour des divers rants intellectuels qui les
visions plutt troi s de Stirner. Les qui
/
annonent le fascisme, et sont carts chez
1
Stirner pours servir de prlude la discus.sion qui porte sur le conflit
entre le marxisme et les ides de S,Umer.
Il s'avre donc possible d'illustrer en plus grand l'impatt que
l'oeuvre de SUrner .exer,a sur l'volution formative des 'axiomes dfinitifs
<
de Marx. Faisant suite tttle documentat'ion rigoureuse, du rle, jusqu'alors
ignor, que Stirner joua lors du rejet par Marx des thses de
, ,
quelquea.,.;Observations sont faites -sur l'volution de la conception nmtrial1ste
l' ,
de l'histoire chez ainsi que son interprtation' de la morale.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS"
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Page
PREFACE. . . .

. . . .

. . .. . i
INTRODUCTION
"

. . . 1
CHAPTER ONE. .

....
.

8
. . .




A. The Hegelian Legacy
.
'.
9
B. The'Polit{caf Context:
A Moment of
Transition.
.

Il

. . . . . . .. .
C. The Young Hege1ians!
The Discord That
"
Forms Their Unit y

1
CHAPTE R TWO " . .

1
2

''1 .
A. ". Stirner: The Illuminator

."
B.
!he Message: A Chronology of Influence.


J
-C.
Der nzige: ' AlI
Things Are Nothing To-Me
(Ieh h
,
Mein' Sach' auf Nichts gestell t) . 43

0'

,
\
CHAPTER THREE. . . \ .

. . . . , . .
.'
51 ,
. \
A. Stirner, and th Young He.gelians
,
53

. . .
B. Feuerbach - -The P oblem of the Break 5f>
C. Ethics - Marxism an
Modern ty
.
77
D. The Materialist Conee tion of History .
8"
1.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION. . . . . .

9:2
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.

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . .
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENts,
As with any intl1eotual enterprise which has taken shape
, over a number of years, the influen,ces become varied anl trans
Yet there ar clearly seve.ral indivduals whose intellec-
,
gidance an4 moral helped sus tain protracted
1 \.
s t'ud);" when the purpose behind it,5 complet ion 'became temporarily
out of focus.
Jt is to John Schaar nd Sheldon Wolin,_ whose genuine con-
cerns and first\stimulated my interest in
. . .
the vocati,on poli tical philosophy. 'Pro"fessors Charles Taylor,
l ' '" ,_ '
John Shing-ler and j"im Tully provided probing 'questions -and"
. , .
expert g.uidanc'e which helped me in' achieving any c1ari ty evident
in the text. is to Professor Sam Noumoff, who as adviser to
.' w07'k provided me, wi th the encouragement necessary, to see
,
the thesis to its completion. And fina11y, i t is to ,Professor
1
1
Bhikhu suggested the topic of this work and guided'
i tsdeveloprnent at every s'tage, that any metit that this
thesis might p'osses,s b'el.ongs. Ot' course, for any errors tbat
in,judgement or execution, the responsibility remains
Il-
entirely my own.
Washingtort, D.C. 1979
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-1'"""--
J>REFACE
(\
A crisis can be dis:erned in dontemporary ,pol i tial
philosophy. Working within the normative frameworks of earlier
1 1 - /
centuries, tontemporary political philosophy struggles against
a more vigorous and a more 'certain' claim to knowledge - social
scientific theory. It is within the context of this theoretical
conflict that political pnilosophy must secure a type of
reflection (from within the history of ideas), forcing aIl modern
perspec tives to take cpgnizance of their develoPVlental character.

For it is only after the salient features of previous and con-
1
- /,
temporary purviews are rendered lucid or completely rejected
that any novel of innovative understanding can emerge.
. .
The thesis that substantive progress is contingent upon \
rendering lucid or totally rejecting perspectives that compete
for acceptance, orgins deep within the philosophical
-.,
tradition. In the birth of western philosophy in
ancient Greece, we disover predilection in the form of the
Socratic method, the Platonic dialogues and in the Aristotelian
concern for prevailing opinion. The modern variant of this pre-
disposi tion becomes crystallize,d - al though in an abstract form -
in the Hege1ian dialectic. The most important, recent refor-
mulation of this ide a is to be found in Thomas Kuhn's influential,
work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,l which can be
, of Chicago Press,' Chicago, 1962. It is inter-
esting to note Kuhn's filure to recognize the Hegelian dimension
to his formulations.
"
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expanded of the
applicab1,e, the needs
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sp'eci fic domain of science and b,e made
, '"0 " " ' ',' , - 2
political philosopher.
we use the vocabu1ry of the most recent articulation of
this' (Le., Kuhn, Wolin, et then we might say that
"the crisis of contemporary poli tical philosophy, which we men-
bov'e, is in i ts to provide a co gent and coherent
alternative tosocia1 scientific theory. For if we look the
" , .
pofi tical, philosophica1 communi ty today, we wouid discover that
;rrat only is there a crisis, but aiso a vigorous conflict, which
'we eften - utilizing a prejorative vocabular.y - as
.'!n struggIe., Yet, social scientific theory, in
,
claiming to have moved beyond ideology, is unknowingly abandoning
, b
th'e doinain wi thin which poli tical solutions are formulated. ' Over-
"
,powered by a scientific (qua techno16gical) instrumental mentallty,
, .
'social scl.entific theory rej ontology as theological specu-
abandons ethicai issues under the guise of value- free- ,,"
, dom reduces the potential richness of epistemological expIor-
at10n a !terile and formaI methodologicai concern.
3
- , "1t...J
2See Sheldon Wolin, "Pol i tica1, Philosophy as a Vocation",
Ame.rical Poli tical Science Review, Dec., 1969, 1It'Paradigms and
Poh tical Theory"; Poli tics and EXi;erince, edi ted by Preston
King and B.C. Parlkh, (London, Cam ridge University Press,
i
nd Richard Ashcraft, "On the Problem of Methodology and the Nature
f POl-itical Theory", Politica1 Theo14' Feb. 1915. For some
, rob lems wi th t'bis explana:tion see, Rlch.r'd Bernstein rne >Restruc-
Urin of Social and Poli tical Theor , (Phil adelphia. " UniverSIty
0' ennsy vanla ress, , pp. 93-102 and passim. .
3See , Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interest, (Boston,
'neacon Press, 1911) ,pp. 67-69 and passim.
, ,
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The newIy scientific, rationality
"
, "
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which (becaus
1
it is emergent) rveals that an earlier. of
thinking -. was partIr a fuhc'tion" of the utiiitarian and
character of scientific thought. HQwever, the alledged fruits
. ,
J
of science were only realized in specifie domains. As a r'esult
\
of the,dramatic successes of science; in war nature,
scientific mentality slowly engulfed other realms and no
longer needed the utilitarian and pragmatic criteria to assure
success in'areas where its usefulness could only be
perceived. Such ts the caSe in- the study of society.
,-
Poli tical philosophy today, in the chaos o:fi&a
p!adigmaiic void.
"\
Political philosophy is forced to. remain
historical, for it is overpowered by a seientifie mentality which
although"'triumphant in specifie areas of study - has- failed to
.
provide the examination of society w th any organizing principles
. .
\
which even remot,elY,appraach Kuhnian status. Political
philasaphy is farced ta regress behind Socrates in the attempt
1
to linguistal meaning in a world existentially devoid
af o_n tent.
The above observations, in'itregard to the failure of socia1-
, .

1
thought in genera1, ean be validated by the cammon-sense con- } 1
viction,that we paradoxically exist in a world of scientific
exactitude in the midst of saial unc'ertainty,l Our society is
"
riddled with such ironies as intercontinental accuracy
existing alongside the poverty and squalor that continues to
1
characterize the majority of people on this globe. It can be
argued that the dominance of scientific, rationalty was1necessary
o
(and thereby justified), fot the attainment of certain objectives;
'.
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e. g., a more efficient utllization OP resourcesJarid hum an
energy, the overcoming of tnateriai scarci ty, etc., etc . How-
ever, thereJcomes 'a point when we must qu'estion this process by: ..
.
examining whether or not the exorbitantAcosts we epdure are
truly commensurate with the benefi ts we receive. Wheri the prob-
lematic is framed in svch a manner, it becomes fairly
that our scientifit and tools are practically
inadequate in dealing with the complaints we 50
casually calI 1 th*e social malise'. The world historical situation
that we revivify the vocation of political 'philosophy.
Since we cannat start to theorize ex nihilo, (for tne -
social maladies of today are both materially
and ideal1y), we must come to understand the failures of pre:
vious and theo'retical formulations, hefore we can
even suggest the, of any substantive forward move-
this i,n a manner more consistent with the frame-:
work we are utilizing heI'e, 'the task of poli tical philosophy

today is to understand the failure of pOlitical-theoretical
paradigm formation.
o central contribution tOWrd an undetstanding
of poli tics, available to philosophy is ta compete for
domination within the world political arena. For it is only
"
after the great theoretical issues, which captured the attention
of previous social philosophers, have either been resol ved or
superceded that any novel, insights or solutions can emerge . It
is with this understanding in mind, ttat I propose to
>! .-
the historieal milieu and several of the salient,theoretical
debates that characterize the development of Karl .
.

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If are to accept the above observations - _ ;
least in their general form - the question why
\l'
Marxism? To this question, and at the same time to justify
another study of Marx, it bec0mes necessary to make two obser-
'If we are willing to focus our attention on concrete
P
olitical realitie!, we are reminded that Marxism is th
" '
\
phiIosophical grounding of political !egimes which govern a
f
s ign.ificant percentage .of people on this planet. Whe.ther we
look at Sovie,t and Chinese communists, or
1" 1"
Social we are confronted with the
l , t
that at least sorne variant of Marx's thought dominates the
modern'political scene.
",,' 1.-'. "
Our second observation deals with the nature and
o'f the vocation of cntemporary poli tical philosophy; and this
point bears closer scrutiny. The recent Marxist
studies is in one a testimonial to tCendUring vital i ty
ci
of th,e Marxian legacy. However, more importantly - for our
purposes here - the modern .interest in Mrx's thought is also
indicative of the paucitY,of 'a1ternative' forms of thought and
action. The branch of political philosophy today, finds
itselt absorbed with Marx, finds' parallels-in earlier ages,
"
,
where failure to j Din thE! p,riesthood, cou,ld only be countered
by obsessive theological As Marx recognized early in
his life, theological criticism may free one from the fetters
L-...-------
of religiosi ty, but it offers liilitJe' cre, a ,positive
orientation toward future Mun of Marxist political
--l:lleory, like its' criti'al-historical 'counterpart, rema:i.ns locked
'. -
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within the realm of speculative battle, aga1nst, n enemy who
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wears a new disguise. The historica1 exigencies of his day
forced Marx to uncover the actual aren of potential political
change.
,
Marx's thought - consistent with its materialist predis-
positIon - is inextricably linked to the nineteenth century
historical conditions out of which it arose. : Strictly speaking,
".. -
{t is a theoretical absurdity to be an orthodox Marxist. As
..
was me,tioned above, unless we adopt a totafly'new conceptual
perspective, progress is impossible .whiJe uncertainties exist
within the present paradigmatic framework. Nowhere is this more
clearly revealed than in the modern Marxists to
incessently ignore - what 1 believe to be - a central Marxian
tenet: historical rootedness of Marx's thought.
These observations, together with a of other ambiguities


that continue to within Marxist writings, provide justi-'
fication for an indepth examination of the genesis
of Marx's framework. To quote from Jean Hyppolite's
'important work, Studies on Marx and Hegel:
There is need for research into aIl the
sources and the entire philosophica1 back-
ground of Marx's work ... [It-] will not be
possible to supersede Marxism until there
has been a serious examination of the
phjlosophical presuppositions of the
edifice.
4
1 am, of course, not making the claim that aIl the deb,tes
in Marxist political theory will be concluded as a result
l am nevertheless suggesting, that severa1 of the "of this essay.
r
salient issues upon which many of these disagreements depend, can
4Basic New York, 1969, p. 149.
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be understood with grejter lucidity, which, 1 hope
this thesis will offer a humble con4ribution.
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In this essay we will be examining a curiously neglected
moment of the intellectual development of Karl Marx. The German
Ideology, which is often cited as the transitional work between
the young and the mature Marx,'will be subjected to a
textual scritiny. It is in this essential document, which was

never pub11shed during Marx or Engel's litetime, that we
discover Marx's break with Feuerbach and the first (and only
detailea) description of the materialist conception of 'nistory
(t9 mention only two of its more dramatic elements). This never
completed manuscript (large parts of which are still missing)
\
comprised of.two large octavo volumes
l
is almost never read in
-
,its entirety. One of the reasons for this neglect, is that a
large bulk of the text (335 pages out of 539 (In MECW)
2
is
devoted ta a polemical criticism of an obscure and eccentric
Young Hegelian: Max Stirner.
Nowhere in Marx's prolific career did he devote such
energy in the form of a sustained analysis of one particular
lKarl Marx "Preface to A Contribution to the Cri tique
of Political Econorny", in Basic Writings on Politics and Phil-
osophy, (New York, Anchor Books, 1959), p. 45.
,2Karl Marx" Frederich Engels, Collected Works, (hereafter
to as MECW) , Vol. 5, (New York, International Pub- .
. lisher,
. '
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author, as we find in this massive chapter of The German
Ideology. Partial1y because this work was never published in
its entirety until 1932, with the fact that the Ideo1ogy
other 'more interesting' sections, in part explains
why very few Marxist scholars have bothered to decipher. this
dense and at subtle prolixity. One author has commented
recently that "J il t is nothing short of remarkable that this
immense work, which in fact represents Marx's definitive judg-
ment on the philosophical culture'which 'had incubated him, was
to remain virtually unknown for nearly a hundred years ... ,,3
The question which naturally emerges i5: 'wh y did Marx
design 5uch a 5izable polemic against Max Stirner, a relatively
obscure Young while at the sam time basically ignoring
other mor; infJuential Hegelian apostates, in particular, Ludwig
,
(While the first and famous chapter of the Idealogy
is entitled "Feuerbach", it substantively fails to deal with
Feue'rbach, and i5 instead' devoted to expounding the materialist
conception of history.)4 The other questions which emerge,

which will be dealt with in turn, revolve the question
concerning the influence, if any, that Max Stirner had on
the intellectual development of the Marxian revolutionary
problematic.
3RW. K Paterson, The Nihilist E'Oist: Max Stirner,
'(London, Oxford University Press, 197 J, p. 104.
(
4Frederich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical "
German Philosophy, (Moscow, Progress publishers, 1946), p. 8. '
..
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2
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Most of the answers offered by Marxist comrnentators ta
'this understandable query into Marx's intent, seem either sim-
plistic, misleading, or confused. Franz Mehring, in his weIl
kndwn biography of Marx, claims that Marx's relation to Stirner
of much interes't because no intellectual connection
existed between them. ,,5 Isaiah Berlin dismisses any ,important
intellectual or political connection between Marx and Stirner
when he says that Marx t'l'eated Stirner's "doctrine" ... as a
pathological phenomenon, the agonized cry of a persecuted neuro-
tic, the province of medicine' rather than ta that
of political theory. ,,6 By contrast, David McLellan, in-ohis
The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, tells us, " ... the only
li " 1
reason for Marx and Engels devoting a large part (three-
quarters) of the Deutsche Ideologie to a criticism of Stirner '
was that Stirner was cansidered by them as the most dangerous
, '
enemy of socialism at that time. Il 7 At the same time, we find
Karl Lowi th claiming in his From' ta that
Marx wanted ta demonstrate that Stirner was simply the, "most
radical ideologue of decayed bourgeois society, a society of
5 .
Franz Mehring, Karl Marx: The 'Stary of His, Life, trans-
lated by Ed,ward Fitzgerald, (Ann Ar,bor, .. univ\er!ity of
Michigan Press, 1962), p. 18.
;
6Isaiah Berlin, Karl Marx: His Life and Environment,
(New York, Oxford Uni vers ity Press, A Galaxy 19,59),
p. 144. . ,
7David McLellan, The
(London, MacMillan
MECW, op.cit., Vol. 4, p.
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isolated individuals".8

,
A of showing confusion, and
,
disagreement, could go on for pages. An even longer list could
be assembled of authors who, while claiming to be exploring,the
of Marx's thought, never even mention Stirfier.
In the last few years, however, this century-long neglect
especially acute in Mar:lcist literature in English
(with which this essay will almost exclusively deal) - is
slowly coming to an end. Lawrence Stepelevich, in his brief
article, "The Revival of Max 'Stirner", underscores the impor-
,
tance of a reconsideration of Stirner, and claims that the
effects of Stirner's writings "particularly uDOn the wark of
Karl Marx, have yet to be fully assessed."
9
, In addition, Paul
1
Thomas, in his article, "Karl Marx and Max Stirner" says: -,\"The
Qtask remains both to credit Marx's critique of Stirner with
"
the importance it deserves, and ta consider this critique
in cantext."lO
Howver, bath authors of these articles gathered their
.as to the importance of Marx' 5 relationship ta Stirner

"
"
""\ .
\" Lowi th, From He el,
ih Nineteenth
Constable and Co., 1965), p. 105.
\ 9Lawrence Stepelevich, "The Revival of Max Stirner",
of the Histor* of Ideas, 35 (1974), p. 325. Also see
. vLawrence Stepelvich, Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach",
Ibiq. 1 39 (1978).
t lOpaul Thomas, "KaTI Marx and Max Stirner", Political
3 (May 1975), p. '160. '
,
,
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, from a s lightly earlier work by _Nicholas Lobkowicz, Theory and 'I
,
History A Conceptfrom Aristotle to Marx. Lobkowicz
'. ,,)
is the, first author in:"Bnglish who suggests the potentia1 rich-

that an examination of Marx and Stirner m/ght revea1.
Lobkowicz asserts that Marx "must have realize,d immediate1y"
that Stirner' s position was "a serious to his own
profan.ization' of Hegelianism."ll He also asserts "that
Stirner had called in question the very motives of Marx's
., ,,12
own posItIon. In the course of our discussion, we will'
hav the opportunity to scrutinize Lobkowicz's assertions in'
.
his book, together with his Jfollow-up' article on Stirner
entitled, "Karl Marx and Max Stirner" .13
At the time of this writing, there is book which
exclusive1y dea1s with the crucial re1ationship Marx
and Stirner. In fact, in English, there are only two books

(both recently pub1ished) on ptirner himself. One of these
, , 14
books, The Nihilistic Egoist, by R. W. K. Paterson attempts
llNicholas Lobkowicz, Theor racticel Histor
C oncep t f rom Ar i s't 0 t 1 e ta M-a-r-x-, --><P""-""---+---a-m-e-,-""'U=-n"""'l'-v-e-r-s-lr-
t
""y-'-O""""-n-
o
t re
Dame, 1;67), p. 395.
12 '
Ibid., p. 397.
W. H. 'aterson, op.cit.
r
,
1
1
i
"
1
1
(. )
fr
.. _-_._----
-6-
to characterize Stirner as a pI\oto-exisfentia1ist, and the
15 '
other, ,Max Stirner's .Egoism, by John Clark, explores Stirner's
egoism and' briefly touches on his relationship to
tradition. Neither work deals in any Stirner's
'influence on Marx.
The tas'k that remains in front of us then, to
lfavoid many of the difficulties that entators
.
on ..... this subjeot, demands a type of inteilectuail d' Before
f
it is possible to disFuSS many of the
of' Stirner suggests, (which, in essence, is the main
objective of this essay), it will first be Qecessary to c9nfront
.
Ir- "
Stirner's philosophiea! problematlc. A rough program of our
discussion then, will initially focus on the Young Hegelians,
with a specifie emphasis on Stirner' s role within that histodca!
context. Ne will,then direct our attention to Stirner's
ifttellectua1 contribution (in par icu1ar, his on1y important
work, Der Einzi e und sein Ei
His Own)16 to the
, translated, The Ego and
theoretical issues which
dominated most of the 'progressive.' inds in Germany during the
1840'5. After we have aceomplished these objectives, we will..,
then be in a position to th?roughly analyze Marx's critique of
Stirner, and to offer insight$ into the way in which Marx's
onfrontation with Stirner dramatically affected his own
theoretica1 and poli tical formulations.
lSJohn P. Clark, Max Stirner's Egoism, (London, Freedom
Press, 1976).
1
16Max Stirner, Der und sein
Wigund, Aiso see The go and His, translated by Steven
T. ,Byington,1 edited with and introduction by James J. Martin,
(New York, Dover Publications, 1973). '
"
.f
t
t
o
1
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---- -------- ---
- - ~ -
---------_._----
-7-
Marxism, like its paradigmatic harbinger Hege1ianism,
, .,
( h
' , h f d . '. . h )17
W 1ch'cla1rns ta ave a un amentally monlstlc c aracter
is ridd1ed with interpretive dualities, many of which can be
linked to a series ot interpretive ambiguities. A few of these
interpretive dualities comprise the core of Marxist polemics.
The only tao familiar debates over the young Marx vs 'the
mature Marx, alienation vs exploitation; philosophy vs
\
.political economy, the individual vs the collective, deter-
minism vs free will, ethical theory vs sciehtific (value-
free)' socialism, etc., etc., can aIl be seen, with varying
, degrees of relevance, to 'be linked with a particular render-
ing o ~ ambiguous moments within the Marxian corpus. It is
t
, our Kope, in the course o'f thi's thesis, ta better understand
the status of these theoretical anomalies, through a detailed
examination of the theoretical and political 'issues out of
which they dialectically arase.

\
i
17Istvan Meszaros, Marx's The6ry of: Aliena.tion, (London,
Merlin Press, 1970), p. 85 and passim.
!
1
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___ .. ______ ...... ' .... Ilitla_._. -------
CHAPTER ONE
!
The investigation we are about to will offer
,
us many rich rewards before we reach our conclusions.
, ..
However, like any atlempt to traverse unexamined
1 ..
we will have to be esp'ecially sensitive in selecting our mode
,
of transport. In regard "to theoretical analysis, this requires
forethought, not only in carefully isolating our in-
tended objectives, but also in remaining conscious of our
methodological presuppositions.
In our introductory remarks,. we were careful to attempt
to root this study within a larger body of material
that has its being.. grounded on something more than
mere curiosity. Rather, it was suggested, that there was a
need to clarify and better the ambiguities
that continue ta exist within the various paradigmatic frame-

works that compete for universality in the world political
arena. It was also mentioned (and this is implitit in the
,
vocabu}-ary of paradigms) that there is a deep continuity within
the history (succession) of ideas, that demands lucidity before
substantive (i.e., practical) progress can be achieved.
As we explained above, this essay will have a rather
specialized focus within this larger program of study. Ne will
be exploring the cultural, political and most impQrtantly - for
our purposes here - the intellectual milieu, out of which the
Marxian theoretical framework developed. After a brief
-8-
o
-9-
examination of this intellectually fertile period, we will
seek a more' circumscribed focus by concentrating our attention
on the transitional work, The German Ideology, concluding this
seminal period of the development of ,Marx's thought. For while
Many scholars rely on The German Ideology to clarify
severai of Marx's central formulations, (as we attempted to
demonstrate above), the larger bulk of this text remains

.-,,1
i.e., Marx's critique of Max Stirner. However,
','
Ir v./
before we can examine Max Stirner, or Marx's criticisms of him,
it will first be necssary to explore the general climate
of the period which was captured by the legacy of Hegel.
A. The HegelianlLegacy
Il\, whllt is sometimes referred to as Marx' s early 'Hegelian'
perod, (Marx before Marxism), he tells us in his Notebooks on
Epicurean Philosophy, (written as "preparatory material for
his future work on ancient philosophy" and "widely used in his
doctor's thesis,,:l
.. as Prometheus, having stolen fire from
begins to build houses and to
settle upon the earth, 50 philosophy,
expanded,to be 'the whole world,
against the wotld of appearance. The
same now with the of Hegel.2

, Marx is explaining to us in this section of his NotebooKs, that
in the wake of philosophie' it remains the task of
those who follow, to make practical, the ideas of the masters.
3
i
lKarl Marx ,and Frederick Engels, Collected Wor1cs ,1 (MECW) ,
, (New York, International Publishers), Vol. 1, p. 755.
2Ibid., p. 491.
3
N
LivergOod, in Marx's Philosophy, (The
Nijhoff ,19_67), p . 1x. _ '

1
t
\
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>,
. "
. \
1
1

Ci
-._- 1
-
,-----_.
--_._---,-_._-------
-10-
. ,
A philosophy which forms a total world, does -50
, -
sealing itself off from practical relationships toward '-
.
0
,
rea1ity; a reality which is inherently divided within itself.
Even at this of Marx's intellectuaf develop-

m,ent, he was aware of the fimitations of 'total pilosophies 1
Ce.g., Aristotelian, Hegeiian philosophies, etc.), but more
importantly, he was acutely conscious of the unique opportunities
\
which tread on the heels of woild philosophies.
The wor1d a philosophy total
in itself a world torn apart.
This philosophy's activity therefore also
appears torn apart and cont,radietory; i ts
objective universa1ity is turned back into
the subjective forms of indlvidual conscious-
ness in which it has life. \But one must
not let oneself be misled b
l
' this storm
which f 110ws a great philos phy, a world
philosop . Ordinary harps lay under
any finger , harps 0 ly when
struck by t e storm.
4
'
1
(
World philosophies set, the stage by casting the drama which
fol1ows ;in their pafh. The dawn of absolute, philosophies
form nodal points within which the contradictory'and divisive
nature of rea1ity surfaces again forging the domain
which transformation becomes possible.
... titanic are the tirnes which fcil10w
in the wake of a philosophy tgtal in -
itself and fif its subjective developmental
forms, for gigantic i5 the di5cord that
forms their unity .
. when the universal sun has gone down,
the moth seeks the lamp1ight of the, pri- -
vate individual.
5
.
4
M.B.C.W.,
p.
'\
op. cit.
492.

. .
a
,
t
"l" '
T
o
)
,
o
..
-11-
Marx of course, in this very stage of his develop-
ment, did nt-realize that later he would design a philosophical
vision tnt would exempt his philosophy from the subjectivist
impulse he felt characterized ,a11 post-Hegelian phi1osophies.
- .
However, as these very early passages indicate (they were
written in 1839), Marx had an almost prescient sensitivity
....,
to the prob1ems that demanded solution, before substantive'
progress - in the form of social transformation - could be
achieved. It was only,. hawever, by deeply immersing himself
\l
in the discussions-and debates that followed the death
of Hegel, that he was aBle to reach clari ty about\.. the 'nature
o( this problematic.
B. Po1iticaI Context: A. Moment of Transition
The constellation of events that coincided with the
,
death of Hegel clearly demarcates this period in German history
as a moment of transition. The members of the German con-
in the 1806 Confederation of the Rhine,6
and then in the "largez: 1815 Germanie Ctmfederation
7
) provided
the semb1ance of a natibnal and united Germany, while
,
representing a curious admixture of feudal and reformist
tendencies.. While both and France had openly challenged
their feudal heritage - albeit not with 'equaI
or complete success - the Germanic forces of reaction had
..

6Koppel Pinson, Modern
za ti,ori' t (The Macmi11an ..... .....
Agatha Ramm, "The Making of Modern Germany, 1618-1870", in'
Germany: A Companion to German Studies, Malcolm Pasley,
editor, (L'Ondon, and Co. L19gZ11 p. 222 and passim.
, 7Ramm,"" Ibid., p. and Heinrich von Histoiy
of Germanr iii'tli'e Century, ,(Chic o. The .Unive.r,sity.,
of p." 109 and paSSlm, l'lnson,_ Ibl_id., p. -S3
<.
. \
l
1
\
()
,
. ___ ____ __ ..... _ .. _ .. _n.""' ...... ___ _
-12-
successfully :j.nhibi ted th; f.orces of poli'tica1 reform through
the century-old techniques of patriarcal and arbitrary rule
administered by absolutist princes.
8
The July Revolution in France in 1830 (a year before
Hegel's death), had repercussions among libera1s and democrats
. .
in Germany', although it was not manifest in any progressive
9
social changes. The examples of liberalism and democracy in
France and other countries instead had the practical
<1
of nurturing the seeds of reaction.
lO
Under the influence
.....
of Metternich (the Minister successively of Franis rand'
v
Ferdinand l of Austria) the Carlsbad decrees were issued (first
....
in 1819 and then renewed in 1824) wherein the universities
were discip1ined and censorship was 'Although
originally aimed at newspapers and pamphlets, the 'Carlsbad
,
decrees subjected aIl printed under twenty Bogen
<f Q12
(320 pages) ta carefu1 scrutiny under the censars' ominaus gaze.
10Edmund Wilson,
Writing and Actint of
Git:oux, 1949) ,p. 1:3.
ll
R
. 236
amm, Op.CLt., p. .
Farl.ar,
12
Oscar Hammen, The Red '48er5: Karl Marx and Friederich
(New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969) , p. 16.
.1
1
----'-" ---,_. ,------
b
____ ___ .... 1O"'..... ___ .... ___ --.--.-.-. __ .w __ ... _
."
,')
1
1.
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t
/
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-1'3-
\
The diet at. Frankfurt, again under the preponderant influence of
. ..
Metternich, in its decrees of 1832 ,retarded the state parliaments
and banned po1itica1 societies and public
IJ
While wre of progressive liberal and
demQcratic movement dUTing and forties, there wls
one event that was later to prove decisiveofor the eventual
ascendancy of the bourgeoisie., 'What one historian caUs "the
"-
most epoch-making economic event during this period" was the estab-
lishment in 1834 of the German customs union, known as the Zollyer-
ein.
14
The Zollverein was designed to e1iminate the customs and
tol1s that aIl but paralyzed economic deve10pment within the
t
German confederated states. The Zollverein emanated from Prussia
aniinCtbded aIl of the German states except three; however,
Aus ria was excluded.
15
(Of course, the significance of the
Zo lverein on the later of Germany was decisive.)16
The laissez faire ,ideo1agy that was the foundation of the
Zollverein was not representative of this but rather proved
\
to be a harbinger of a new age . .., It would be fair ta state that
in a in'Austria, Prussia
"'-.' 1
,
and mst of the states within German' confederation,'especia11y
o 0
after 1830.
17
While very few ;dvances were evident the
political rea1m iD thirties, the perceptive observer could
, 0
find evidence within the intellectua1 and academic wor1d that
13 r
Rarnm, op. ci t., p. 236.
14
p
' ., . t 76
op. Cl ., p.
lS . '
Rarnm'eeP.Clt., p. 238. ,
16Treitschke, , op.cit., 232-240. o
.Y
pp. '47-48.
. ,
J
1
-".,., ..... -....
()
()
-11+-
the forces of restoration reaction would soon confront
serious challenges. One historian would go on to repeat the
claim that "the prophecy made years before ... [was] ... that as a
necessary consequence of the lack of the
speculative sciences would acquire a usurped value" :18
The impact of Hegel's death'in 1831 was accented in the
-
fo110wing year by the death of Goethe. A large vacuum was
sensed within German intel1ectual circles.
, '
The responsibility
of continuing the unsurpassed intellectual activity now passed
to a new generation of German academics. It' is within the new
historical context, f9stered by the rise of popu1ar
the nascent,develqpment of industrialism (the first railroad
line was established in 1835), together w,ith the increase of
political repression, that challenges against the intellectual
orthqdoxy began' to surfae. -There is one aspect of this
",
development that has re1evance for our study; the emergence of
the Young Hege1i,ans.
C. The Young Hegelians: The Discord That Forms Their Unit y
Any attempt at that seeks easy answers
through a rigid deterrninism, or a mono-causal theory oJ deve1op-
ment, would have extreme difficulty not on1y Jin exp1aining Marx's
own historica1 context, but more importantly, such a historiography
would fail to grasp many of the essential elements of the
..
intellecturumilieu out of which Marxism developed. Many Marxists,
18Treitschke, op.cit., p. 240.
\,
1
.
U'
1
1
'j
i
-- - ------
---------------- --
f
C)
in attempting to substantiate what they believe ta be Marx's
materialism, often discoant or entirely dismiss the raIe that
ideas Ce. g., in the form of social and poli tical theory) play


in historical While this is not the place ta
h
' l f M ' h' , h 19 l't' h
cuss t 1S e ement 0 arX1S t 1S tor10grap y, lS nevert e- .
less important to mention that the world of ideas was an essential
element of aIl important post-Hegelian philosophies, and that
includes the social theory of the Young Marx.
ZO
We mention this central ambiguity in modern Marxist theory
,
simply to emphasize the observation advanced in the preceding
section. There, we mentioned that as a result of the repressive
poli tical atmosphere that prevai1ed during the thirties ... and
...
forties, it was mainly in the 'speculative sciences' (i.e., the
Michael Harrington, The TWili,ht of caiitalism,
,New York, Simon and Schuster., 1976, pp. 3 -46, 84- 9, 93, 99,
157, 196, and 360. Also cf. Snell, op.cit., p. 42 and F. Engels,
Germany, Revolution and Counter-Revolution, London,
pp. 13-14.
ZIt 1s my belieL-that--Mal'-*--R-e-Y-e-r held a simple (undialectical)
materialist conception of history. A deterministic or rigid
materialistic historiography was the product of those Marxist
'commentators (perhaps even including Engels) who fai1 to empha-
size the dia1ectical elements in Marx's mature materialist
conception of history. Yet, aven they would be willing to
admit that before 1844, Marx deeply believed in the importance
of ideas with regard to historical development.

_v.
,
\
C
o
-
.. _._--.------------_.
1

the world of ideas) that substantive progress could be achiev.ed.
-
.
The important point to 'emphasize here, is that this was
how it was Eerceived by those who participated in the debates
during this periode The failure to recognize what might be-see&

as a trivial point would result in depreciating the most uniform
element of the Young Hegelian movement; the belief that theory
always preceded action.
2l
<'-
The important Marxist question of the theory's r,elationship
to practice, (which if properly understood would render obsolete
the vulgar materialism discussed above), was initially cast
within the intense intellectual debates which followed the death
of Hegel. Still captured by the ethos of the Enlightenment, with
its concrete manifestation revealed by the French Revo-
lution, the Hegelianepigones originally satisfied with the
H egelian (and certainly German) idea tianal frame of reference. 22
It is sornetimes suggested that Marx, disturbed by the con-
servative, or at least the quietist elements in Hegel's philoso-
phy, utilized Feuerbach's transformative method and his materialism
to arrive at a theory of social action (praxis) cannonized
in "l'heis XI", of the Theses on Feuerbach. In fact, the first
theory of praxis, which bears a resemblance ta Marx's' formu-
lation, was introduced in 1838 by the Polish philosopher August
Cies zkowski, in hi s Die Prolegomena zur His toriosoEhie. -A.l-t-ho-ugh

Cieszkowski was not a 'political1y conscious' Young Hegel,ian,
(for he was firmly ensconced within a theological and an
don,-

Macmillan, 1969),
22
Ibid
., p. 7.
'The YoUng Hegelians -and Karl Marx, \ (Lon-' .
p. 8- 9.
,
1
- 1
1
f
1
,
:
1

"
1
i
-
1
J
o
...
........ .....
'-<;:...:::---'
-11-
esehatological frameworkl, he nonetheless anticipated manY'Qf
th central issues which would later prove essential in defining
the Young Hegelian metaphysic.
23
Cieszkowski - who unfor-
r 24
tunately has been negleeted by Marxist scholarship - demonstrates
that the power of the Hegelian pradigm was in structuring the nature
of the debate that was to follow _fter the death of Hegel. For
....
in Cieszkowski's messianic tatholieism we find Many of the same
concepts and ideas that later flow - although with a secu-
)
lar gloss - from the pens of the Young Hegelians ..
The preponderant inflenee of the Hegelian architectonie in
Germany at this time is demonstrated'by the fact that practieally
1
aIl religous and political persuasions could (and did) success-
fully utilize, the Hege1ian paradigm for th formulation of their
h
" 1 h' 25
P 1 osop les. For even those 7pigones who were critical of
Hegel, but nevertheless used his methodological tooIs, the proper
interpretation of the master was a criterion of truth.
26
23-
Ibid., p. 11.
24For ,the authors who briefly discuss Cieszkowski and
his relationship ta Marx, see, Shlomo Avineri, The Social and
POlitiral Thought of Karl (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1968) , pp. 124-134, Nicholas Lobkowicz, "Eschatology and
the Young Hegelians", Review of Poli tics, Vol. 15, pp. 434-439,
and for a more general discussion, Benoit Hepner, "His tory and the
Future", Review of Politics, Vol. 15, pp. 328-349.
2SEdward Cajrd, Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh,
1933), p. 220, nd Wi lam Brazill, The Young Hegelians, (New
Haven, Yale University passim. ,
26
Braz
'ill, Ibid., p. 30.

c
,"
'<
,
1
1
__ e ........ _ __ .. _ ........... _. _.."
,
-
.
deaI has been written about the eIeavage of Hegel's
1eft, center an right schools. The division,

at th time it occured, was' first announced by David Strauss,
who i 1837 claimed th,at the ehrisfo,logical question was the
c) decisi ve element the schism. C' . . thse on the right
aecepted thel evangelieal history of Jesus as the union of divine
- ,., i 27
and human, those on the left did not. ") Engels explained
1
the di by pointing to an ambigui ty in Hegel' s famous
aphorism, is rational is real and what is rea1, is rational. ,,28
Hook cla ms that the Young Hegelians s tressed "the element of
continuou dialectica1 change", 29 whereas Brazill believes the
decisive e ement in the scission reVolved around whether or Jot
the" histori al process was seen as 'saered or seeular.
30
H.
Harris, in a article exploring this difficult and complex sub-
jeet, suggests that the split is most easi1y explained by the
, .
'right' eoncern wi th Hegel' s Logic, (" ... treating i t
as if it were an old-fashioned system of metaphysics and for-
getting i ts essentially historiea1 charaeter. "), white the 'left'
Hegelians primarily focused on the Phenomenology. 31
27
Ibid
., p. 51.
28Frederich Ludwig Feuerbach and the End ,of Classical
German Philosophy, Progress Publisher, 1946), pp. 11-12.
29Sidney Hook, From 'Hegel to Marx, JAnn Arbor, The Univer-
si ty. of Michigan Press, ,p. 78.
30Brazi11, op.cit., p.
3lH S. "Hegeliansim of the 'Right' and -' Left "' ,
in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. Il, 1958, p. 606.
1
1
!
1
1
o
- -------------------
, -
- \9-
Obviously, none of these capsule explanations '(and there
, .
are others'we cite), fully capture what in actuality was
an intricateseries of events, coupled wi a diverse set of
personalities. What is usually not mentioned in these studies on
post-Hegelian philosophy, i5 that Hegel predicted and interpreted
the fate of his philosophy in anticipating the dissension and
in seeing it as evidence of his sueeess.
A party first truly shows itself [Hegel
tells us] to have won the victory when i t
breaks up into two parties: for 50 i t proves
that it contains in itself the principles
with which at first it had to confliet, and
thus that it has got beyond the one-sidedness
which was i-ncidental to i ts earliest expression.
The interest whi1ch formerly divided itself
between i t and t:hat to which i t was opposed
now falls entirely wi thin i tself, and the'
opposing prineiple is left behind and for-
gotten, just because.ft is represented
by one of the s ides in the new controversy
which now ocCtWies the mind of men .... At
the sam time, it i5 ta ,be obseryed that
when the old principle thus reappears, i t
is no. longer wha t i t was before; for i t
is changed and purified by the higher
element in ta which i t i5 now taken up. lJ1
this point of which appears
at fi rst te }te a lame'htable breaeh and
dissolution of thb ... uni ty of a party A is really
the crowning proo'rof its success. 3,t;
, For our purposes here, it is imp'ortant to 1
the magnetism and seduetiveness of tqe Hegelian paradigm. As
any eareful examination of'this period would reveal, it was
within the Hegelian context that solutions for the pressing \
, l
social and poli tical problems were sought. Any fo'l'm of Marx sm
that attempts to 5imply eschew Marx's debt te Hegel, misses -
l be.lieve - the single most important element in Marx-'
\
32Quote of Hegel taken from Caird, op.cit., pp. 221-222.
/'"
,
1
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- .... _- ., - .......\--,... ... _--..
,
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intellectual deve10pment.
33
Once we move from the split that
divided the 'right' from the 'left' Hegelians to the division
between the Young ('left') Hegelians themselves, we discover
that the path that Marx clearly demarcated early
in his intellecutal career.
It, is commonly known that when Marx became 'converted t to
Hegel' s philosophy, he j oined the Doktorklub where the religious
dimension of Hegrl ' s thought, together with the latest' issues
of ay were ected to vi gourous scrutiny. 34 H is also
weIl known that most important Young Hegelian texts that
were pub1ished during this period were David Strass' Das Leben
Jesu (The Life of Jesus, 1835), Bruno Bauer' 5 Kri tik der
Enangelischen Geschicthte der Synoptiker (Critique of the
Evangelical History of the Synoptic Gospels, 1841-42) and
"'"
ipdwig Feuerbach's Das Wesen des Christentums (The Essence of
'\
1841). What is not so weIl known is that Marx's
bitter polemics aga-inst the Young Hegelians are simply one
slfce of an ongoing vi trioUc pamphleteering that perhaps
best characterizes the Young Hegelian,movement.
"
Unless one constantlycontrasts the Young Hegelians
against the grouping of post-Hegelian intellectuals who sought
"
33See Avineri, "The Hegelian Origins of Marx' s Poli ticat"
Thought", Review of Metaphys:i"cs, Vol. 21, pp. 33-50. While much
has been written on this important topic, which has developed
an ideologica1 content, Avineri adequately establishes that
several of Marx's central concepts were arrived at through
'a confrontation (cHique) wi th Hegel, not simply a rej ection of
him.
34See , "let ter From Marx to His Father", op .cit. ,
Vol 1, pp. 10-21.
1
t
J
1
o
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to reconci1e Hege1ianism and Christianity together with
the protean poli tical orthodoxy of the Prussian' st,ate, Ci. e. ,
'the 'right Hegelians), i t would be difficul t to discern a
.distinctive and unifarm character of the Young Hegelian movement.
The main unifying elements that enab1e historians to Tender ths
disparate grouping of intellec tUflls into a coherent whole are
the series of journa1s which (at least for a few years) gave
shape ta this aggregate of idiosyncratic thinkers. The first
such journal was the,Hallische Jahrbucher founded in 1838 by
Ruge and In 1840,.with the accession of Frederick
William the IV,35 and'with the death of the minis ter
- who was rep1aed by the uncooperative Eichhorn -
,r
a reaction deve1oped. In 1841, the Prussian government supprejsed
the Hallische Jahrbucher, which forced Ru,ge to issue the journal
out\of Dresden under'the new name Deutsche Jahrbucher.
36
in 1843, when the Saxon government banned this journal,
Ruge, collaborating with Marx, issued its - now famous - one
issue successor, The Deutsche-Franzosische Jahrbucher, out of
Paris in 1844.)
Besides the Ha11ishe Jahrbucher and its various successors,
there were two other important journa1s that gave shape and
substance to the Young Hegelian.--D1ovement. One was the
Rheinische Zeitung, issued from Cologne from January 1842 ta
March 1843. (In October, 1842 Marx btcame editor until its
suppression in 1843.)37 The other journal was the Bauer
(----
Ramm, Germany A Po1itical History,
(London, Methuen and Co., 96? J, p. 1W';-- -
36Brazil1, op.cit., pp. 74-94.
37
H
. t 42 63
ammen, op. c . 1 pp. - .
... ,... -..,
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brother' s Allgmeine Li teratur- Zeitung, founded in \late 1843
and was issued for exact1y one year.
38
While it is important ta see the Young Hegelians con-
trasted against the other poiitical and intellectuaT forces
in Germany at this time, such an approach often fails to accord,
importance to the disputes among the Young.Hegelians themselves. '
One such dispute - which has importance for our study -
revolved around whether or not reality was seen as fundamentally
39
objective or subjective in nature. The debate over the
objective and subjective nature of reality is not however
,
similar ta the disagreements we often encounter today (especially
in Marxist literature) focuses on the problem from within
a Kantian framework. was believed by the Young Hegelians
\
that Hegel had clearly surpassed the Kantian phenomena-noumena
dichotomy with his all-embracing synthesizing Geist.
40
What
was at issue in the Young Hegelian context was the status to
be afforded ta Geist itself. Is Geist evident (and thereby

revealed) in the concrete "'IIlaterial world ," of which the human
person was one sma11 but significant element; or is Geist
instead so intimately the unique human consciousness
thatperceives it, that ultimately the material reality must
be seen as a projected product of consciousness itself?4l
'f
.
38McLellan, op.cit., pp. 39, S, and Franz Mehring, Karl
Arbor, The Unive-rsftY or Michigan P"rss, 1962)', pp.97-98.
39
B
'Il ' "64
raZ1 , op. Cl t., p. .
l
40J . N. FindlaL.,Hegel: A Re-Examination, Geori!'e
Allen and Unwil1r,-Ltd., pp. 22-23.
41 For discussion, see Brazi11, op.cit., pp.' 64-68, although
Brazill is not sensitive in his analysis of the unique position
Marxist materialism plays in this debate.
..
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Whether or not such questioning presupposes a spurious
grasp of the Hegelian vision will not detain us here. What is
important, is to recognize that the manner in which each Young
Hegelian emphasized the subjective (ideal) and the objective
(material)dimension of reality had important implications for
J
the type of formulations which would eventually emerge in their
respective rendertngs of reality. (It is crucial to note tha t
at this juncture we are not dealing with the materialism- idealism
disjuncture that alleged1y separates Hege1
from
Marx. For
even those materialistically oriented Young Hegelians, e.g.,
Strauss and Feuerbach (to mention only two); the world was
,
still rendered thr'ougp. a passive contemplation and not prac-
\\ticall
Y
grasped as in the mature active materialism (praxis)
of Marx.
The Young Hegelian faction that best exemplifies the
subjectivist approach is the group of intellectuals who deveL-
oped around the 'critical cri tic' , Bruno Bauer. Unlike Strauss,
"- .
who argued that the Gospel narrat1ves were the projected desires
of the early Christian community manifested in the form of
myths, Bauer denied bath the divinity and the historicity of

The theological analysis (contained in Bauer's
Kritik der evangelischen Geschchte der Synoptiker - 1841)
reveals the subjective of Bauer's formulations; for
Jesus - who for Hegel represented the unit y of the div1ne and
human elments - now became-a product of man alone.
Feeling that the ego of Fichte and the substance
Spinozawere left unreconci1ed in Hegel,42 Bauer sought to purge
42
McLellan, op.cit., p. 59.
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the ambiguity of Geist's inner and outer autho!ity by p1acing
man in the divine throne. This was done by emphasizing the
of the dia1ectic andthereby elevating the
re " 43
subjective side of Hege1's phi1osophy of identity. P1acing
thought in the center of his system, self-
consciousness which is unleashed thl'OUg\fhe power of criticism.-
Bauer tells us: "Criticism is the crisis that breaks the

.,'
delirium of humani ty and lets man understand himself once more .,,44 "
, 45
Bauer' s of pure theory" reverled to man that
the only relevant knowledge is self-knowledge.
46
The power
for social therefore remains firm1y locked
within the rea1m of ideas. And this is what 1eads Avineri to
say (in a somewhat Feuerbachian fashion):
Bauer's critical schoo1 thus limits itse1f
to emancipating consciousness, as if con-
sciouspess were the
46
eal subject and man
its mere predicate.
Bauer"s distinctive beHef in the exclusive power of ideas to
transform social reality, coupled with his dogmatic denia1
of dogmaticism, led him F breal< wi th the Doktorklub in 1841.
In that same year he formed his own group which came to 'call
43 .
Ibid., PI? 52,53.
44 .
Quote taken from Brazi1l, op.cit., p.-198.
()
4S
McLellan, op.cit., p. 62, and Ibid p. 80.
46Avineri, Social 'and Political Thought, op.cit., p. 100.
...... -..-------;-_._-- . ..
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- ---- ------
o
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-25-
itself "Die "Die Freien" together wi th the founding
"
of his own journal, ThevAllgemeine Literatur'- leitung in'1843,
clearly created a faction wi thin the Young Hegelian rnovement,
which never achieved the defini ti ve character we uS'blally
associate wi th movements and parties.' In '1844,' when the
'Allgemeine Li teratur':'Zei tung 'stopped publication and "Die
,
ceased meet,ing, the Young movement was dead
as an intellectual and political force, 4
7
It is within the context of "Die Freien" tnat we final1y
i
arrive 'at the Young wl,lo i5 the ,central. character of
this thesis: Max Stirner. Stirner "who to Bauer was ["Die
Frien t s] mast important membe,r", 48 wll be' examined in
in. the chapter that fo1lows,
. ,
47 McLe11an, op p. 47.
48
B
'raz' .1'1"':1, op c' t P 81
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CHAPTER TWO
ln the preceding chapter we coneentrated our attention on
Young Hegelian mileu, largely.esehewing the substantive
philosophieal 'issues that made the Young Hegelian movement a
in the history Our purpose in
-
that chapter was to emphasize several of the less familiar

elements of the Young. Hegelian movement, which have reeeived
ORly eursory tratment in the' more comprehensive texts. In
that ehap'ter we emphasized the power and dominance of the Hegelian
paradigm (n structuring t)1e Young Hegelian weltansclrauung
r\
and their conomitant philosophieal queries. In Fact, it was
even suggested that what the Young Hegelians saw as their
rejection of Hegel, was the force responsible for the fragile
.
,unit y they enjoyed for the few years that they were a cohesive
movement.
In this chapter, we shal1 establish the preeminent position
J
that Max Stirner occupies in the logical unfolding of the Young
.
Hegelian negation of Hegel. Little attention is paid to the
,fi
fact th appearence of "Stirner's book preeisely coineids
with whkt most historians would calI the disintegration of
lIn English, there are four bpoks which together provide
a satisfactory and comprehensive overview of the philosophieal
eonteftr,of the Yo g Hegelian movement. See,;Hook, McLellan,
Brazill, P:cit: ,From Hegel to Nietzsche:. __ .
The nth Centur Thou ht'(London, Con-' _.
and' l,CO. }965J.... l>
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,-2'1-
the Young Hegeiian movement. We argue that the
tion 0t Stirner's Der Einzige did not fortuitously arrive at
, v "
the conclusion of tfi.e Young Hegelian movement, but-rather that
- "
i t represents the most radical Jormulation possible wi thin the
Young Hegelian framework, th,etebyexhausting the possi'bli ty of
cl
future development. The radical cri tique of Hegel,"- in the Young
,
Hegelian form of the demystification 0, Geist, could only
lead to the unconscious and concealed positing of a
Geist (e.g., Feuerbach's 5pecies-being, or self-con-
or - in following with Stirner its immanent logic
to its extreme conclusion - the attempted total annihilation of
Geist and aIl that is sacred.
Therefore in this chapter, it will be necessary to closely
examine Max Stirner, his life as weIl as his theoretical con-
cerns and to root him within the Young Hegelian context, to which
he 50 rightfully belongs. We will argue that additional move-
ment within ;oung Hegelian framework
only represent retrograde movement, and therefore substantive
-
progress was only possible by abandoning the 'Young Hegelian
"
o
structures of reasoning. This will in turn lead us ta the dis-
cussion, in our and final chapter, wherein we will document
Stirner's ftirect influence on Marx, in forcing him ta recognize
" .. . 2
the ultimate futility of Young mlSSlon. There
it will be argued that the logical finality of the Young
Hegelian movement (discovered by Stirner and understood by Marx)
1
2David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, (New York,
Harper and Row, 1973), p. 148.
o
----------_._ .... -----"' .....-...... - ...--------- -
,
r
1
led Marx to reject the inh'erently sterile elements of the
.
Hegelian, Young Hegelian paradigm, which in turn provided the
impetus for the dialectical creation of an alternative theoreti-
cal framework: the materialist conception of history.
First it will be necessary to examine in detail Stirner's
role within the history of ideas.
A. Stirner: The Chaotic Illuminator
....
Stirner is one of those individuals, in the history of
,
thought, who neat classification within the traditional
3
categories available to us. Besides this being a testimony to
. his originality, Stirner's amorphous nature is consonant with
his theoretical captured in this characteristically
epigrammatic sentence:
- '
My concern is neither the divine nor the
human, not the good, just, fre, etc.,
but solely,what iS,mine, and it is not a
general one, but is - unique.
4
It is Stirner's which has caused a great deal of
confusion when attempts are made to render his thought through
the prism' of one particular perspective as opposed to
In fact, very fw thinkers can claim to have captured the
attention from such a wide-ranging spectrum of ideologies as
Stirner fias received.
3John catro1l, "Introduction", The Ef,0 and His Own, by
Ma\ Stirner, (London
J
Johathan Cape, p. 16.
4Max Sti;n,r, The Ego and His Own: The Case of the
Individual Against AuthoritYt translated by Steven T. Byington,
edited with and introduction by James J. Martin, (New York,
Dover Publications, 1973), p.S.
'1 ' ----
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(1) Stirner and Marxism
The role that Stirner within the intelleetual
,... ,-
of Marxism is of course the particular focus of this
essay and the specifie foeus of our third chapter. Brazill
offers us an important insight when he points-out in referenee
ta aIl the Young Hegelians; "Them is no doubt that the essence
and significance' of the Young Hegelians have been obseured by
questions formulated solely wth referenee to Marx".
5
Our
myopie agenda we feel is justified - as we mentionedo above - due
ta ihe--n-ee-,_to better understand the genesis of Marx' s thought
together with the relative neglect of MarJist
scholarship. However, way toward our destination we feel
i t is impartan t to ,lllfl se and bri-;f"!y--consider severai main
-------------
are as of academic interest that have been enamored by! Stirner's
,
idiosyncratic pondering.
(2)
<
Fascism and Stirner
By putting to one side the important role Stirner pIayed
within post-Hegelian philosophy and the intellectual development
of Marx, we discover that there are several other traditions wherein
Stirner is believed to have a signifieant impact. John
Carroll, in his introduc"tion to a recent edi tion of The Ego and
His Own, attempts to root Stirner within the intellectual
tradition that gave birth ta twentieth century fasciSffi Carroll
elaims that Stirner' S condenmation' of .liberalism and soeialism "as
the twin vehicles of aIL that is degenerate and poisoning in
, 1
life is one of the distinguishing marks of fascist
5William Brazil1, The Young Hegelians, op.cit., p. 15.
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ideology".6
---.::
Carroll finds suport in Laura Fermi's Mussolini
wherein she
From Stirner's writing Mussolini received
permission and encouragement to in<hl ge his
ambitions without considering their effects
on others, to follow his instincts without
stopping to think which were good and which
bad, Mussolini's Irreverence toward religious,
social and moral principles may weIl have been
the consequence of Stirner's teaching.
7
Citing an author's influence on a leader of a political
movement does justify placing that author wi thin that poli tical
The issuing of Stirner's Ego in a series of reading,
in fascist, racist and adds little to the
clarification of intellectual lineage, while adding much con-
fusion toward the uncovering of Stirner's significant intellectual
influence. A qui'ck reading of Carroll' s "Introduction" is
aIl that is needed to see that his arguments are totally absurd
and utterly without justification. Carroll even admits that
Hitler probably never even heard of Stirner.
9
(3) Egoism and'Stirner

In another area Stirner's influence has been more
accurately evaluated is in the study of philosophical egoism;
6John' Carroll, "Introd':lction", op.cit., p. Il.
7Laura Fermi, Mussolini, (Chicago,'The University of
Chicago Press, 1961), p. 70. '
8
See, John Car,roll J op. ci t.
p. 14.
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1
While the space is not available to us here to properly explore
this involved philosophieal subjeet, it is nevertheless impor-
tant,..t.o mention that in works available in English" Stirner has
captured the attention of su ch weIl known philosophers as Eduard
Von Hartmann in his Philosophy of the Unconscious, 'and George
. Santayana in his Egoism in German PhilOSophy.lO Two other
works in English are James Huneker, EgQists: A Book of
Supermen, and the indepth study focusing in solely on Stirner,
John Clark's Max Stirner's (Certain facets of Stirner's
egoism, in regard to his overall theoretical mission and its
relationship to Marx, will be discussed below.)
(4) Existentialism and Stirner
A fourth domain of Stirner's influence, and one that needs
i
greater study and research is in the field of existentialism.
As we will explore below in our historical of Stirner's
influence, the intial impact of Stirner's thought, outside the
1
Young Hegelian was in part occasioned by the apparent
similarity'between Stirner's central thesis and that of Nietzsche's.
Stirner's unrelenting castigation of Christian morality, his
adulation of the uncompr9mising guidance of the will, and his
constant reliance on the emergence of the Un-Man (Unmensch)
in the form of the Unique (Der Einzige) aIl striking
resemblance to several of Nietzsche's central themes.
lOEduard Von Hartmann, PhilOSOth
Y
of the Unconscious, Vol. III,
translated by William C. Tr.1bner and Co., 1884).
George Santayana, Egotism in German Philosophy, (J .M. Dent and
Sons, Ltd., N.D.)
11James Huneker, Egoists:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909).
Egoism, (London, Fteedom Press,
A Book of Supermen, (New York,
John Clark, Max Stirner's
1976)
.\.
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Yes, so i t is that knowledge itself' must
die in order.to blossom forth again in death
as will. .. 12
entrance of the modern time stands
.....rh;w;;God-man". At its exit will only the
God in the God-man.evaporate? And can the
God-man rea11y die if only the God in him
dies? .. they did not notice Man has
ki11ed God in order to become now - "sole
Goq. on
These and other quotations, taken out of context, without a
--- thorough of Stirner's thought as a whole, were
taken by several arthors to demonstrate that Stirner was a
,
precursor of Nietzsche. Besides the actuai affinity between the
thought of Stirner and Nietzsche
l4
, research has revealed
that with the possible exception of-a single instance, Nietzsche
had no know1edge of Stirner's work at a11.
15
The difference
"
between the two -thinkers was dramatically rendered by James
Huneker who wrote:
Nietzsche's flashing epigrammatic blade
often snaps after.is i5 fleshedj the grim
old Stirner, after he makes a jab at his
opponent,' twists the steE:\il in the wpund.
16
----.
12Max Stirner, The False Principle of Our Education, trans-
1ated by Robert Bube, edited by James Martin, (Colorado Springs,
Ralph Myles Publisher, 1967), p. 19.
13Max Stirner, Ego, op.cit., p. 154.
14For sober but 5uprficial accounts, see Paul Carus, Nietzsche
and Other Exponents of Individualism, (Chicago, Open Court, 1914).
George Chatterton-Hill, The PhilosohY of Nietzsche, (New York,
Haskell House Publishers, Ltd., 197 J. The best revealing
interesting intellectual- similarities between Stirner and
Nietzsche is, John Carroll, Break Out of the Crystal Palace:
The Anarch- s cholo ica1 Criti ue: Sttrner Nietzsche Dos-
toevs y, outre ge an agen
l5A1bert Levy, Stirner et (Paris, 1904). Aiso
;
\ see R.W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Efoist, op.cit., VII,
"Stirner and Nietzsche", for an excel ent discussion from a
position sensitive to Stirner's own perspective.
/')
. 16
James Huneker, "Max . The North American Review, 185
(June 1907), p. 334.
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perfPs this can be best summarized by Karl LO:ith
claimed that Stirner and Nietzsche can be seen as "separated
,
by an entire world and yet be10ng together throughthe inner con-
sistency of their radical cri ticism of Christian humani tarianism" .17
The most fruit fuI avenue of approach in regard to Stirner's
relationship to extstentialism, is found not on the levei of
influence, but rather on the level of the concidence and con-
vergence ,of ideas.,. In forcing the Young Hegelian negation of
Hegel to its extreme (on which more will be discu5sed
below), Stirner premature1y encountered th"e incredible vacuum -
50 indicative of twentieth century existentia1ism - that results
when the absence of Gad and morality are seriously confronted.
Copleston clairns that Stirner bears "sorne sp-iri,tual affini ty
with whi1e Paterson emphatically c1aims that
"without doubt Stirner occupies a unique point of vantage within
-
the universe of existentiali'sm. His Unique One is the polar
point from which aIl the longitudina! lines of the existentia1-
ist world start or in which they terminate.
1I19
The connection between Stirner and Existentia1isrn is by
no means a forced comparison even if we exclude his relation-
ship to Herbert Re ad , although a/greater
. 1
affinity with ,the anarchist reading of Stirner (which, we will,
discuss below), nevertheless claims that there are sirnilarities
between Stirner and Sartre,20 asserting that many of the
17Kar1 Lowith, From Hegel to Nietzsche, op.cit., p. 187.
18prederich A Histor* of Phi1osophy: Volume VII
Fichte to Nietzsche, (Westminster, T e Newman Press, 1963), p. 303.
19R. W. K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, op.cit., 171.

20Herbert Read, Anarchy and Order:Essays in Politics,
(London, Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1954), p. 147.
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c aracters ln artre s pays are lrnerlan. Martin Buber pro-
vides us with a discussion of the relationship between
"
Stirner's One' and Kierkegaard's 'Single One', however
much to' the detriment of Stirner's original contributions.
22
And finally, Camus found use in Stirner's vision when he reported:
Stirner, and with him aIl the nihilist
rebels, rush to the utmost limits, drunk
with destruction. After which, when the
desert has been disclosed, the next step is
to learn how to live
l
there.
Z3
.'
A thorough examination is needed, evaluating the similarities
and dissimilarities of central ideas with those of the J'
modern existentialist, the atheis tic va'riety. Whi1e 1
Paterson devotes over 150 pages toward this objective, his
1
analysis is large1y vitiated by his failure to percieve the latent
politica1 e1ements modern existentia1ism when it is seen as
a description of modernity. As a resu1t, of such a predisposition
Paterson abstracts the 'po1itical' out of Stirner's thought
(which is certain1y not in keeping with Stirner's objectives),
,
21Herbert E. Read, The Tenth Muse: Essa s in
(New. York, Books for Librarles Press, 19 ,p. . Iso see
Jean-Paul Sartre, Search for a Method, translated by Hazel E.
Barne!i.;...-.(New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 114, and R.W.K.
Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, op.cit., p. 168.
22Martin Buber, "The Question to the Single One", Between
Man and Man, (New York, Collins, pp. 60-108.
23 1
Albert Camus, The Rebe1, translated by Anthony Bower,
(New York, Vintage Books, 1956), p. 65.
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whose egoism is meaningless outside of a social and
poli tical co'ntext.
, ,
Eugene Fleishmann c1aims - follow ing in the
i
m.!nner of Camus - that the "'great refusaI' of Herbert Marcuse
is clearly prefigured in Max Stirner 1 s }work ... ,,24 wherein "the
individual consciousness preserves a sort of autonomy ... [al1owing]
the individual to reject his society whi1e remaining in - in
other words, he can .become a
The potentially profound insights whicn might be derived
by historically rooting existentialism as a descr-iption of
bourgeois anomie C a path on which Sartre recently - albiet
lightly - treads), cou1d emerge as a result of an
historically and poli tically conscious anal ysis of Stirnet 1 s
formulations and their relatioQship to the existentialist prob-
lematic. Stirner's thought, although is dominated by a
thorough- going negati vism, nonethe1ess is inextricably bound
to the poli tical domain; a quali ty unfortunately, so often absent
in modern existentia1ist thought.
(5) Stirner and Anarchism
Consldering was sald It Is not surprising that
Stirner has received the most attention in the anarchist tra-
dition, within which he is seen by sorne. as one of its
founding fathers. Plekhanov goes as far to, say in Anarchism
24Eugene Fleischmann, "The Role of the Individual in Pre-
Revolutionary Society: Stirner, Hegel", Politicai
Philoso h: Problems and Pers edited by.
n1vers1ty 0 Press, 1971),
226.
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and Socialism: "Max Stirner has thererore a well- defined
c1aim to be the father of anarchism".26
, .
,.
was apparently placing Stirner within the anarchist
tradition as a of Engel's 1888 statements in
Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy.
Finally came Stirner; the prophet of con-
temporary anarehism - Bakunin has taken a
'great deal from him - and capped the sovereign
'l'self-consciousness'' by his sovereign "ego"27
,Jito
However; both Plekhanov and Engels' overtly partisan tracts
,
fail to accurately isolate the anarchie elements in Stirner,
\
as the fo110wing - rather unbelievab1e - from
Engels reveais.
Stirner remained a curiosity, even after
Bakunin him with Proudhon and
labelled the blend
Engels' that Stirner's thought eould in sorne way be
"blended" wi th Proudhon' 5 C' ... whose whole career bore the
stamp of moral fanaticism")29 is just one example of the many
fantastical claims asserted with regard to Stirner's theories.
As a result of Engels' (and other Marxists') failure to
distinguish the effect of Stirner's thought from Stirner himself,
together with the
1
belated 1932 publication of the German Ideology,
has led Many within the Marxist tradition to Stirner's
role within the history of political thought. (On this we will
have mQre 'to say in the fOllowing

26 '. \
George Plekhanov, Anarchism and Socialism, translated by
Eleanor Marx Aveling, (Chicago, Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1912), p.
39, emphasis added. Here, Plekhanov contrasts Stirner w'ith
P"roudhon. Ibid., p. 38.
27P;ederich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach, op.cit., p. 19.
28
Ibid., p. 42. (
29 '
_ ... _ R. W :.!.: __ Tee Bgoist. QP. cit., p, 141.
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A proper unders'tanding of Stirner' 5 role within the anarch-
\
ist movement revolves around the distinction between
Stirner's effect on anarchism (which was considerable) and the
narchic elements in Stirner's thought (which l believe are
mollified when seen' in the proper context of his thought as
- a whole). The fact that Siirner is seen as playing a promi-
nant theoretical raIe in the founding of anardhism is such
works as GeoTge Woodcock's Anarchism: A History of
Libertarian Ideas and Movements and Paul Eltzbacher's Anarchism:
Exponents of the Anarchist PhiiOSophy30 (to mention only two),
in no way helps us to come to terms with this ideologically
<. ; ..l.paded problem. For example, Atindranath Bose in A History
""
of Anarchism tells us:
...
lt was not [Stirner) but Proudhon who
inspired whatever thought was
perpetuated in Germany through Moses Hess,
Grun and Marr.
31
If
Eugene remarks that "Stirner does not ... advocate
anarchism
3
[but rather] .. ". the most powerful form of individual
dissent conceivable, and a radical complement to more or less
passive resistanc& ta the This is consistent with
30George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian
Ideas and Movements, (New York, New American Library, 1962).
Paul El tzbacher, Aarchism: -_ Exponents of the Anarchist Philos-
translated by Stevn T. Byington, edited by James J.
Ma:ftin, (New York, Chip's Bookshops, Booksellers and Publishers,
n.d.) ,
3lAtindranath Bose, A History of Anarchism, (Calcutta,
World Press Private Ltd., 1967), p. 173.
32Eugene Fleishmann J "The ROl,e of the Individual ... ",
op . c i t., p. 2 2 3
1 p. 224.
The ,
J
1
f
-.--- --------------------------------------
-'39 -
Paul Thomas' contention (who in further deve1qJing Marx' s 'ob-
34
servations in the German Ideology says
What distinguishes Stirnet both from other
anarchist5 and from other egoists i5 his
typically Young Hegelian notion of the
dominance of consiousness in history,
together with its,Young Hegelian corol1ary
that aIl we need to do to change reality
i5 to master our thoughts.
35
While an exacting examination of Stirner's role within the
anarchist movement cannot be undertaken in the space available
to us here,36 it is nevertheless important to briefly explore
the historical events that 1ead many calI The Ego and His Own
'1r
"the anarchist bib1e".37
B. The Lost Message: A Chrono1ogy of Influence
[Stirner is] [r]ead only by a'few scholars,
the book is buried in obscurity, but is
destined to a resurrection that perhaps
will mark an epoth.
38

34MECW, op.cit.; Vol. V, p. 62.
35pau1 Thomas, "Karl Marx arid Max Stirner", op. ci t., p. 163.
36A11 the two opposing interpretations offered by
R.W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, op.cit., Chapter VI,
"Stirner and the Aarchists" (who ultimately rejects the ren-
dering of Stirner as an anarchist) and John Clark, Max Stirner's
Egoism, op. ci t., Chapter VI, "Stirner and Anarchism" (who
argues the opposite position).
37Thomas A. Riley, German 's Poet-Anarc'hist John Henr
MacKay, (New York, The ReV15lonlst Press, 19 ,p.' O.
38Benjamin R. Tucfer, Individqal Liberty: Selections from
the writinls of BenjamIn R. Tucker, edited by C.L.S., (New
Vork, The eviFst Press, 1972), p: 24.
;!
il
Il
- ____ __ .... ____ ___ _ ____ h ____ ._..._I_
1
, !
o
"
" The chronology of the interest and influence of
StiJner's philosophical ideas, provides us with another curious
aspect in the hist9ry of this most unusual thinker. After a brief,
yet intense interest in Sttrner's Der Einzige, during the
final rnonths of the Young Hegelian period, very little attention
.c
was focused pn Stirner within philosophical or political circles.
Paterson explains this surprising change of heart by clairning
that what at first had been "regarde"d as an audaCous philosophi-
'""
cal tour de force soon came to be depreciated as a piece- of
eccentricity, 50 that even the serioushess of the
, ,
author's intentions was .questioned; at last" aflter a
, spasm of astounded curiosity, the public consciousness moved
. 39
on to their preoccupations" As a footnote in the
of philosophy, Stirner was seerningly destined to be

relegated to obscurity, perhaps even oblivion, save as a

passing fancy of such w,ell.- known philosophical 'petsonali ties
as a Marx or a Feuerbach. During his lifetirne is no
record of anyone adopting Stirner's extreme and ecentric ideas,
perhaps with the sole of the inconsequential individ-
ualist, Julius Faucher, who proffered Stirnerian ideas in
the Abendpost.
40
1
While Stir,her reveled in the brief fame that immediately 1
the publication of Der Einzige, his rneteoric to
c,elebri:ty status. - as we mentioned above - was
.
, , .....
39 )
R.W.K. Paterson, The Nihilistic Egoist, op.cit., D. 13."
40 '
Andrew Carlson, Anarchisrn in Germany, Vol. 1: The Early
Movement, (Metuchen, New Jersey, The Scareerow'Press, Ine., ,
1972), pp. 65-66.
.
1
e
t,
l,
\
'1
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"
l
t.
1
1
[/
"

'.
...
.r
,
... .. .................. "" ... ..! ... _ ...... _ ......... ,, __ .. __ "

,,'\.
,
0

/
/
,
,

o ,
o

p
-40-
\
followed by to reLative obscurity. Stirner died
, ,
never he woulq occupy the unique status of the
diverse interest and appeal that discussed in the preceding
section. name, in aIl probability, would have
remained blanketed inmystery and obscurity if it was not
for the Scottish born, turned Ger-man John Henry Mackay.
the goes, Mackay, ,a poet and noveli,t with anarchistic
and. individualistic leanings', ran across the ever-so brief
.. . f
mention of Stir.ner in Frederich Lange's History of Materialism;l
which in turn stirnulated his about this ll but for-
-
'Sot 42
gotten ego.1::> .
t
Lange's mention of Stirner, most likely in-
dicative of the Stirne\ would have received
.
oit not been for the intervention of Mackay, was simply few
brief sentences in a' three volume work over 1600 pag es. In
, patt Lange says:
'The who in German
preachedcEgoism recklessly and logically -
Max Stirnr - finds_himself in distinct
opp,.osi tion to Feuerbach: . What a pi ty that
this book [Der Einzige] - the
that we - a second positive
part was not added [,sic] 43 -
l '.
41Frederich Albert Lange, History of Materialism, trans-
1ated by Ernest C. Thomas, Vol. l, (London, Trubner and Co.,
1 1877), 256.). .
..
42See , Thomas . Riley, Ge?many's Poet-Anarchistj op.cit.,
pp,. pkssim and'Lawr'ence Stepelevich, "The Revivai of
Max S" . 3 2 4 .
r tl.rner , Op.C1t., P', .
43prederich Lange, History of Vol. II, op.cit.,
Jp; 256.} \
-.
j' Il

"
,

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't
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..
..
1 l'
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......
0
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)
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1
o
. ,
-41-
a year af'ter Mackay read this passage in Lange, he managed
ta secure a capy of Der Einzige, and "immediate1y be<=:ame a
disciple of "Stirner".44 This was certainly a fortunate re-
discovery af Stirner - at 1east as far as Stirner's memory is
"onc;erned - for research has shown \ii th the exception of
Lange's brief mention of Stirner, on1y four books written before
1888 even mention Stirner's Mackay's passion and
dedication ta this unknown author resu1ted in more than ten
o
of research into th works and history of Stirner's life.
product of these 1abors was Mackay's, Max Stirner, Sein.
.. Leben une);, seip Werlc (1889),46 which until this day s prac-
tica11y the on1y source of biographical information relating
'"
to Stirner's life.
47
Mackay's popularization of Stirner was concurrent with

the emergence of the interest in Nietzsche. And, is no
44Lawrence Stepe1evich, "The Revival of Max Stirner",
op. ci t., p. Z 56.
45Thomas Riley, Germany's Poet-Anarchist, op.cit. J p. 66.
46John Henry Max Stirnet: Leben und"sein Werk,
(Berliri, Bernhard Zach's Verlag, 1889, 1910 .
1 47The suggestion by ;ohn Carroll, "Introduction" J op.cit.,
p. 26, that Han von Bu1ow's resignation speech as conduetor
of the Berlin Philharmonie Orchestra - which had an exp1icit
Stirnerian theme - was of "much greater significance" than
Mackay in the popularization of Stirner, is just one of the
many examp1es of how inadequate his essay i5. To my know1edge, .
no other work on &tirner has even found Bu1ow's speech
important enough ta mention in with the nineteenth
century Stirner ,revivaI.
/ \
__ ----____ -
, ,.1.
':\
. (
(
, ..
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question that the apparent simi1arit{es between Stirner's
and Nietzsche's ideas stimu1ated the curiosity of those in
of Nietzsche's inte1lectual antecedents.
"
Lobkowicz, in his pioneering essay on Stirner and Marx,
adds a third element, besides Mackay and Nietzsche, in 1
the late n:imeteenth century revival of StJrner. In this
general1y excellent article Lobkowicz would like us to be1ieve
that Engel's claim in Ludwig Feuerbach, characterizing Stirner
as a precussor of anarchism, was a third decisive element in the
d
. , S' 48 R'l d h
renewe lnterest ln tlrner. l ey emonstrates t at
Stirner, even before the time of Mackay, had a small, but
,
significant, anarchist fo1lowing in America, among thellikes
of James Walker and Benjamin Tucker. And, Tucker us
in his "Publishers Preface" to the first English transiation
of Der .Einzige that his desire to translate Stirner dates
back'for more than twenty years.
IISO
,
Since Tucker' s "Preface"
is dated February 1907, and since he c1.aims his knowledge
dates back "far more than twenty years, this wou1d place his
interest in Stirner before Engels' Feuerbach, which was pub-'
lished in 1888. In addition, among German speaking anarchists,
,
.,
it was not unti1 Mackay's book and articles were read, that the
48Nicholas Lobkowicz, "Karl Marx and Max
op. ci t. , . p. 78.
Riley, Germany's Poet-Anarchist, op.cit.
amin Tucker, "Publisher' 5 The BiO" and His
Own, translated by Steven Byington, (London, A. C. T1field, 1913),
P:-VII, emphasis added. of
cn

.....

o
. -_ .... _._. -- -.---- -... --1-----------
1
-43-
renewed interest in Stirner among European anarchists began.
51
At the beginning of the twentieth century, Stirner's
name was successfully salvaged from oblivion, for within
the sixteen years fol1owing the publicaton of Mackay's biography,
no less than eighteen translations of Der Einzige
appeared, seven of them in Russian alone.
52
Stepelevich argues
that "once again, as before, interest in Stirner faded, and
from the [nineteen] thirties to the present, he had remained
virtually u.nn9ticed". S3 Stepelevich th en goes on to ask, that
with the recent publications of the works by Paterson, Braziii
and McLellan; "Are we wi tnessing the beginning of an-other
cycle of interest in Stirner?".54 1 s 'comments are
somewhat misleading, fo.r the wide-ranging interest in Stirner
(which we documented in the previous section), especially
among the anarchists and the existentialists, reached its
height toward the middle of What Stepelevich
might have asked iSj Are we a revivai of concern
Stirner among those,interested in Hegel and Marx? The answer
\ .
to that question would cIearIy be.yes, with this author's
essay providing one such example.
c. Der Einzige:
----
AIl ThiMs---Ai Nothing To Me (Ich hab' Mein'
.--------
Sach' auf Nichts geste11t).
Outlining the history and nature of Stirner's influences,
51Thomas Riley,
52
Ibid
., 'p. 71
G'ermany's Poet-Anarchist, op.cit., p. 70.
,
"lfr
53Lawrence Stepelvich, n.The RevivaI of Max Stirner" ,op.cit.,
p. 324.
p. 325 .
... __ .... \ __ ._-- ..---_ ...
c
o
-4If.-
tells us little about the substantive issues which directed
,j' .
and structured his thught In addition to pro-
vi ding the bedrock upon which several theoretical move-
ments wouid find their primitive beginnings (e.g., anarchism
and Stirner's Der Einzige had a life,and a
philosophical mission that can only emerge when viewed as
Sui generis. (Incidentally, and qui te obviously, this is the
,
only type of inspection that would find satisfactory.)
It is with this mind that we will, in the remaining section of
this chapter, sketch in broad outline the central themes of
Stirner's Der Einzige und sein Eigentum, with reference to
the range of (i. e., the Young Hegelian prob-
lematic). out of which it dialectH::allv emend. S5
i t will'ftiot be necessary to provide an analytical
, l ,,t
summary demonstrating the intricate structures and logical un-
folding of Stirner's .arguments,56 it will nevertheless be
desirable to isolate severai of bis central illuminations
55Tltis particular approach is especially crucial this
essay, for these issues the same\concerns dominant in Marx's
thought during this period.
56David McLellan is mistaken when he claims that "there is
no rectilinear development ... no attempt at coordination" in
Stirner's book,' The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, op.cit.,
p. 119. As much as Stirner might protest tQ the contrary,. he
is still heavily influenced by Hegelian structures. Henri
Arvon, in Aux Sources De L'Existentialisme: Max Stirner (Paris,
Presses Universitaries de France, 1954), translation from
Paterson, The Nihilistic'Egoist, op.cit., p. 62 says:
"If ideas do not succeed each other according to a determinate
logical order, theyare nevertheless ce8;Selessly deeping as
they unfold. McLellah has confused is a criticism (and
a valid one at that) of Stirner' 5 work, with tha,t which was Stirner' s
intention in designing'the structure of Der Einzige.
,
'"
1
..
o
i
,

------------

on the Young, Hegelian vision of theory and action,57
The Young Hegelians in adopting Hegel
1
s of a
purposive history,58 in varying ways to discover a
secular grounding or a metahistoricai vantage point from which
it becomes possible ta say something meaningful about this his-
,
torical unfolding. For Strauss, it was "communal consciousness,,59
. h f fIl b l d h' . 60
ln t e orm 0 ,cu tU,ra sym 0 s an myt opoehc representatlons.
oPor Feuerbach it was an anthropologie al (and thereby allegedly
materialist humanism;6l for Vischer it was the aesthetic
domain; for Ruge, the politicaI
62
j and for Bauer and Stirner, -
who were distinctive within the Young Hegelian context by
emphasizing the subjective "side of Hegel's dialectic - it was,
. 57RW. K Paterson, Ibid., provides us with an admirable
-texturaI summar)Jo. See h1sChapter IV, "Der Einzige und sein
Eigenthum. '
The Hegelians, op.cit., p. 34.
59Sidney Hook, From He el

Development of Karl Marx,
Press, 1950), p. 113.
60William Brazill, The Young Hegelians, op.cit., p. 109,
passim.
!
)-
6lLudwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianitr, trans-
lated by George Eliot, (New York, Harper and Row, 1957), pp.
338-339, " ... the nature of faith, the nature of God, is itself
nothing eise than the nature of man p1aced out of man, concei ved
as external to man".
62William Brazill) The Young Hegelians, op.cit.
,
,
i
i
;'
\
, :
o
-
1
, ,
-4"-
,
in the case of Bauer, the general category of the ego and
self-conscious criticism (as a transpersonal experience) and
in the instance of Stirner, 'i t was the particular and unique
ego (that as an indi vidual ego, ",. .. perculiar to him. alone,
"'that gives [him] 50 to speak, life"and significance),63
1
1
( This was the intelleetual context which struetured Stirner's
\ attempt to capture the most radical formulation of the Young
1
H
. h . l .. h d / 'f' , f G' 64
egel1an t mlSSIon; t e emystl lcatlon 0 e1st.
From this perspective, the anarchic elements Stirner's
Der Einzige are reduced simply to a politicl corollary, and
existentialist elements are redueed to an ontologieal
1
logically flowing from his radical of what
was seen as Hegel' s pantheism.
65
The ,important point i:ru this
regard, was that Stirner's vision of his own intellectal
, ,<
activity was governed br his deeply he Id belief that he had
somehow gotten to the bedroek of theological critieism, and
thereby brought the Young Hegelian critique of theology and
Hegl to its inescapable conclusion.
63Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, op.eit., p. 273.
64David The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx,
op. ci t .
. 65See Walter Hegel: A Reinterpretation, (New
York, Anchor Books, -1966) t pp. 294-295. For reasons why this
is perhaps a mistaken reading of Hegel, see W. T. Stace,
w The Philosophy of Hegel, (New York, Dover 1955},
pp. 489-490.
" .
-
j
1
,1
/.1
1
!
c
o
, -
-- - -

1
What is not supposed ta be my concern!
First and foremost, the Good Cause, then
God's cause, the cause of mankind, of
truth, of freedom, of humanity, of justice;
further, the cause of my people, my prince,
my father and finally, even the cause
of Mind (Geist), and a thousand other
causes. Only my cause is never to be my
concern.
66
'.
And in showing that Stirner saw himself as the last Young
Hegelian:
But who, then will dissolve the spirit into
its nothing? He who by means of the spirit
set forth nature as the null, finite, trans-
itory, he al one can bringaown the spirit.
too to like nullity. 1 can; each one among
you can, who does his will as an absolute
1; in a ward, the egoist can.
67
then preceeds to show that God's concern is a
1
68. h
pure y egolstlcP cause ,ln t e sense that for example,
/
proselytism, worshi,p and ri tuaI are aIl designed ta exhal t
and 'satisfy' God'and only God. The same must be true for
humanity, truth, freedom, justice, etc., which aU demand "that
you grow enthus iastic and serve them. ,,69 1 This ruth1ess and
..,
devastating -logic resulted in what Paterson calls
only idea:
70
In Stirner's own words;
66
Max
Stirner, The
67
Ibid
., p. 72.
68
Ibid
., p. 4.
69
Ibid

-
Ego and His Own, op.cit., p. 3.
70R W. K. Paterson, The Nihi1istic Egoist, op.cit.,
pp. 61- 62.
. - ---_. ------...;. ............ ....
i
l
,
f ,
o
The divine is God's concern; the human,
man's. My concern is the divine
nor the human, not the true,' good, just,
free, etc., but solely what is mine, and
it is not a general one, but it is unique,
as l am unique. Nothing is more to me
'\ than myself.
7l
of crucial interest in evaluating Stirner's Der
Einzige and what is not recognized in the diffuse secondary
{
literature, is that aIl of his other perhaps more interesting -
insights, spring from his 'attempt to logically. justify this
\
d
' l ' 72
ra Ica egolsm. For example, in att'empting to fores tall
what in any case turned out to be the most prevalent criticism
'>
of Stirner's position, the deification of the ego, Stirner
\
was compe11ed to demonstrate how the ego was different from God,
,'\
humani ty, man, !'truth, etc. It was in the process of attempting
to circurnvent tliese types of criticisms that Stirner retreated
into the first modern articulation of an existentialist ontology.
The ego is not' 1 ike God, man, truth, or any "fi,xed idea" (this
being another derivative formulation from his radical egoism)
for " ... 1 am the creative nothing, the nothing out of which l
myse1f as creator reate everything".
73
In addition, Stirner's scathing rejection of morality - to
the point of legitimating such acts as incest
74
and

71Max Stirner, The Ego and His Own, op.cit., p. 5,)
emphasis.
7ZThis understanding is in John Max
Stirner's Egoism, op.cit., yet It is deliberately ignorea-
50 that Clark can ext.pll the individual ana,rchism inherent
in Stirner's position. .0
73Max The Ego and His Own, op.cit.
p. 45.
p. 190.
y
\
0
-together with'what was Iater seen as his anarchie rejection of
the state (as weIl as aIl forms of authority), flow directly
from his attempted defense of the ego (i.e., creative nothing-
ness) as the only secure bastion against the sacred:
Because this moraiity completed into humanity
has fully settled its with the
religion out of which it historically came
forth, nothing hinders it from becoming a
religion on its own account.
76
And in another passage where Stirner directIy recognizes
the logical necessity of his account of morality and society,
,
"
he states:
Morality is incompatible with egoism, because
the former does not allow validity to me, but
on1y to the Man in me. But, if the State is
a societ* of men, not a union of egos each
of whomas only himself before his eyes,
then it cannot last without morality, and must
insist on morali ty. 77

.... In short then, what we are arguing here is that the parochial
focus of the Young Hegelian problematic,
\ of Stirner an existentialist and ontology and a political
anarchism, if he was to philosophically and logically secure
his radical egoism against his own trenchant criticisms of
c
'the sacred'. It is as if the attack against'Hegel's
cosmic Geist couid only come to rest with the exhaustion of
,
its internaI dynamic in, the positing r of a unique, singular,
one-sided, particular ego; in being totally unpredictable,
76
Ibid
.,
p. 57.
.77 Ibid ,
<J
p. 179.
\
1
l '
Il
o
-50-
provided the precise counterpoint to the organic telelogy
in Hegel's (and his disciples!) thought, up to' this
point.
As we have shown in the earlier pages of this chapter,
Stirner has usually been seen as a precursor of several important
strands in twentieth century thought. What is usually ignored
in these studies is that'Stirner at tpese prescient for-
mulations simply by being one of the first modern thinkers to
seriou?ly confront a world totally lacking in either a trans-
cepdent ot rnminent structure.
It is with this Stirner in mind a Stirner rooted in his
own (1) social cultural and historical milieu - that will
enable us to illuminate one in Marx's development; for
this ws the only Stirner with whom Marx was familiar.
,
\
!'
-,
.... .. I.I.liJII!ll,.l.1,1 ,

o
/
/
CHAPTER THREE
In the previous chapters we have attempted to briefly portray
the""context of one aspect of the German intellectual scene in the
first half of the 1840'5. We focused our attention on Max Stirner
1
and suggested reasons why it is essential to seriously consider

this iconoclast, especially within the same milieu that gave
rise to his amazingly modern views of reality and of the indi-
vidual. These brief sketches were designed to fulfi11 the specifie
tfunction of illuminating the background of a particular confron-
,
tation, which is our central concern in this thesis. It is in
- 1
this final chapter that we will turn to center stage and explore
tte relationship between Max Stirner and Karl Marx.
\
The narrow objective of this chapter is ton examine Marx's
development in light of his reading and consideration of
the thought of Ma! Stirner. In eventhough there is an
"
.
abundance of on Marx and Marxism, - tapidly increasing
1
with every year -, there is only a handful of materials
l
that
SEfe Marx' 5 contrapoJsi tion to Stirner as anything more than
i self -clarification'; the rather vacuous 'self description Marx
offers in Preface to a Contribution to the ritique of Political
Economy.2
a brief review of thes,e works, see my "Introduction",
pp. 4 - 6.'
to of
anguages ,
---- -_._-' - -
- ... _-_ .. _._-
-,-
.
.-
.... -.<
....__ ..._ ... ____ ._
---------------------
1
1
o
.. t
-52 ..
It is our intention ta show, in the pages that follow, that
a great deal more can be said about this intellectual repartee
than had -previously been thought'possible. In'the process of
meeting this specifie objective, we the opportunity

to further explore a%pects of Max Stirner's thought, often in
areas ignored in the heaviJy circumscribed secondary literature.
There is a large qUaftity of prima facie evidence justi-
fying an examination of ,the relationship between Marx and Stirner,
beyond that mentioned iri our introductory remarks.
3
'While it
has been bften understood that the Young Hegelian problematic
\
played an essential raIe in Marx's intellectual development, the
significance of Max Stirner 1 s position wi th in that
circle has never been fully appreciated.
As we mentioned above in the previous chapter, Stirner, in
pushing the Young Hegelian to tueir extreme logical
conclusion, made additional movement within the Young Hegelian
framework impossible. The apparent shift in Marx's perspective"
\
,at this time (e.g., of Feuerbach and the devel-
opment of the materialist conception of history) compel US to
examine rin sorne depth Stirner' s role within the Young Hegelian
movement, together ,with Marx 1 s understanding of Stirner' 5 position'.
The length of Marx's pOlemic against Stirner does not in itself
make it significant. However, when this i5 considered along
with the other factors mentioned above, we are certaLnly jus-
"
tified in suspecting the uncovering of significant insights in a
detailed examination of the relationsh\p hetween Marx and Stirner.
see our' "Introduction.", pp. 4--6.
.") .. "
o
---- ----------------------------
-53-
A. Stirner and the Young Hegelians
The place to begin our discussion is in exploring our earlier
,
assertion that additional movernent within the Young Hegelian
(
framework after Stirner could only r-epresent retrograde movement,
and tJ:lerefore substantive progress was only possible by ahan-
doning the Hegelian of reasoning. This is not
a nove! insight, for it has been mentioned by rnany of the commen-
4>
tators on Stirner. Lobko.wicz tells 'us:
.. Sti-rner was first of aIl, namely-;. the
man l'Alo had carried the profanization 'of
aIl Hegelian iieas further than any other
Left Hegelian.
McLelian argues: il
Stirner can thus be seen as the last of
the Hegelians, last perhaps because he was
the most logical, not attempting to replace
Hegel' 5 'concrete uni verosal' by any,
humanity' or 'ciassiess' society since
he had no universal, onlr the individual,
al1-powerful ego ... Hegelianism was thus
at an end: Stirner only used the form not
the content of the Hegelian system ...
S
Paul Thomas ffers us the correct but undocumented assertion
/
that, "Marx, for his part considered Stirner' s book to be the
consummation of Young Hegelian thought, embodying and exernpli-
fying its worst featurs to the point of caricture". 6
In surveying The German Ideology we find passages wherein
Marx does indeed express this sentiment. For example Marx
writes:
, "
4Nicho1as LObkowicz, Theor
Concept From Aristotle to
bame. Press, 1967), p. 395.
SDavid McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx, 1 (London,
Macmillan, 1969), pp. 8-9.
. 6pau1 Thomas, "ICarl Marx and Max Stirner", Poli tica! Theory,
Vol . 3, No. 2, May 1975, p. 159.
.'
,1
1
\.;, __ b; .-..-....... ___ ..... ,_ .. ". ___ ' _ . ____ -",.-. __________ .... ___ ._ ... ..:.!_" _. __ _
G
"
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"

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."


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J
1

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il.
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The entire body German philosophical
criticism from Stiauss to Stirner i5 (
confined to criticism of religious concep-
tions ... The world sanctified to an
extent till 'at,last the
,Saint Max [Max Stirner] was
able ,!!h canonize it en bloc and thus
of it once for a11.7
,
...
1
.
;.
7

As we mentioned ab;ove,\ the whole Young Hegelian movement
, .
can be seen as a progressive radicalizing of HegeliJn categories
- . > ,.
with the objective of abstracting the mystical out of
..
Hegel's thought. To the extent that this' movement was initia1:ed
'by Strauss' demystification of the Gospel narratives, we can
..
. )
discern an increasing profanization of re).igious cate-
\. t , l- B' ,,;
gories - and in particular Geist - through Feuerbach, Bauer,
.etc. until we reach an abrupt hlt,. with S,tirner' 5 trenchant
\
nihilism. Stirner tells us:
r
",' . 1,
-
1

t
')0
"
any
Now but mind [Geist] rules in
world .. An innumerable multitude of,concepts
buzz about in peoples' hj:!ds, and what 'are
those doing who'endeavor to get further?
They are these concepts to put
new ones in They are saying:
"You form a c,oncept of. right, of
State, of man, of liberty, of truth, of
marriage; the concept,of right, etc., is
rather that one which we now set up." ,
"Thus the confusion of concepts mo\;es forward.S-
From the point' of' rner i5 rej ecting
substantive about the wod, only its spiritual
aspects, but also its logical structure, its etc.,
with the sole' the true, concrete
. "
(Einzelneit) of the 'unique one'. Stirnei would like
\
\
7 '
t Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected (MECW), j
(New York, International Publishe,rs, 1976), Vol. 5,.p. 2g, emphas:ls
added. Also see passages on pp. 56-57.
8Max Stirner, 0 and His Own, Translated by Steven
Byington, (New York" :\Ter Pu lications, 1973), p.
1
: r,
,e
)
0
1
o
---- ----------------------
, -55-
,
us to believe that the 'unique one' i5 not just anothen category
designed 'to replace earlier and inadequate concepts, but
.J
rather he sees it as a thoroughgoing repudiation of aIl ideas
and concepts. For the 'unique one' is "the creative nothing,
the nothing out of which l myself as creator create everything".9
For Stirner, the individual ego is ontologically grounded
t-
on the self-reflection of ,its own existence and is fettered
saon subardinates itself to qualities or
"" .1
'Any idea, thought, cat.gory, or concept that is no)suQject
ta the whimsical enjoyment of 'unique one,ll (at,times refered l
". ,
to as the un-man (Unmensch), is a "fixed imea", "a spook",
'lia cri terion of the sacred", or "wheels in th head". In
developing the notion of "Ownness" (Die Eigenheit) 1 Stirner
. ,
legitimates ideas, beliefs and the like, are pleasing

to you and egotistically sati'sfy a need of the moment. But if
you are in possession of this "Ownness", that is, if
, .
an "Owner" (Der Eigner), you can just as
cast off h,eld today in
""'"
, j
easily capriciously
the same menner as you
t
J '
adopted them yesterday. \
,
9
Ibid
., p. S. ;
r
10 '
Johnr Carroll, Break-Out from P$lice: The
Anarcho:"psychological Cri tique: StirJJ.e,r ,ietzsche'i Dostoevsky,
a.ondon, Roulledge. and Kegan , ,1974), p. 21.
IIIt has that Stirner adopts Shil1er's
concept"of play. 'See Ibid., pp. 138,-139.
J \. - \ Dl

1
'" /
,
"
,
..... ,.

, <
....... _ .. ____ .. _______
-. -- - -
o
(
1
1
-Sb-
l am entitled by myself to murder if l
myself do not forbid'" it to myself, if l
myself do not fear murder as al"wrong" ...
l decide whether it is the right thing
in me; there is right outslde me. If it
is right for me, it is right.
12
,
,.
Stirner, in keeping within the framework established by the
Young Hege1ian movement, attempted to isolate the source of
spirituality. In doing so he was not satisfied by the nswers
offered by Strauss, Fererback or even his one-time al1y Bruno
\ '
Bauer, aIl of whom, felt, simply replaced one 'abstract
and non-existent concep Geist -, with another; "projected
myths", "Man" and "self-c sciousness". In carry\ng this search
to its logical extreme, Sti er ended his query'with u1tirna\e
,
reduction of abstr'act thought, and the most atomized of entities,
the 'unique one'.
B. Feuerbach - The the H'
Srner was in .. "positio within 'the
Hegelian movement such that, he' would be 'mpo,ssib1e for Marx
\
a
to ignore. In fact, have been
to Marx in his initial reading of The,Ego amd Own,
Stirner' s scathing criticism of read J

The Ego only a month or 50 after completing the manuscript of
The Holy Family against Bruno Bauer company.13 In thet
1
'work, Marx and Engels iPprovingly mention-Feuerbach no_less than
19 tiJtes, calling his expositions "brillia;t",14 and stating
12S . 190 Il
. t
1r
\ '"
13We know the Marx rfad Stirn:t,s work
. by examining Marx and Engels' which we Will do
below ..
i4 }
MECW, op'.cit., p. 94.
..
i '

0-
o
-5'7-
that " ... the old anti"thesis betl'leen spiritualisll). and materialism
has"been fought but on aIl sides and overeome once for al! by
F b h
,,15
erer ae ...
Something happened between November 1844 (the month that
Marx and Engels eompleted the manuseript of The Holy Family)
1
and April 1845 (the probable month that Marx jotted down his
highly critical and now famJus Theses on Feuerbach] whieh in sorne
f
way functioned as a cat\yst compelling Marx to
\ standing of In attempting ta confront
this transition, we entering the domaln ofi the protracted
\ "\
aner eontroversial debate slirrounding "the break" between
the "arly" and or "ma ture" Marx, whic'h has captured the
" attention of sa mny eommentators on Marx. We believe the
political issues, whic)t are 50 intimately,intertwined with most
of the discussions of \. "break" or "non-break", have clouded
1what eould more realistically be seen as a dynamic or dialeetical
process of maturation. Without attempting ,tq
"'"
'side' with one ittterpretation, perhaps it would be more
, '
illuminating ta briefly outline the salient issues that are at
stake with regard to the Marx's eventual reje,tion of Feuerbach,
and how we think they are related to Marx's confrontation with
,
.....
Stirner.
!
During this per!od, Feuerbach was clearly the most impor-
tant philosopher who cornpellingly erected a humanist framework
within which the whole of German Idealist philosophy could be
.,
lSIbid., p. 94.
....
1
-

(
) .
.... _ , ____ ....... \ ____ . ____________________ =--__ .
\

rendered in a totally different light.
16
In a certain sense,
Feuerbach was able to preserve thebrilliance of
sophical insight by reducing the Leibnitzian Monad. the Fichtean

Ego and the Hegelian Ab50lute into human qualities through his
now farnous transformative method. In Feuerbach'5 own words:
AlI speculation concerning right, will,
freedom, and personality without regard to man;
i.e., outside of or even above man, is
speculation without unit , necessit , sub-
stance, groun ,an rea 1t. Man 15 t e
eX1stence of freedom, t e existence of
personality, the existence of right.
l7
There was a dialectical progression in Feuerbach's thought,

for he needed to pass through Hegel who revealed the human being
as the only animal capable of being the of Geist (where
Absolute Spirit takes on the form of self-consciousness
18
)
"together with Hegel's philosophieal embodiment of Christian
humanism as the highest expression of God's will.
another level, Feuerbach represented a regression
gehind Hegel. Firstly, Feuerbach's reduction of onto1ogy ta
,,\
anthropology resul ted in a one.- sided grasp of an-thropoligical
$
,
princip1es, which could have been historically explained,
than. becorning "self-5ustaining axioms of the syst'em in question
d [th b ] d
. . h' ., t " 19
an ere y to un ermlne 1tS lstorlfl y
".
,
Second1y,
16A1fred Schmidt, T.h Concept of Nature in Marx, (London,
New Left Books, 1971), p. 25, ana
17Ludwig Feuerbach, "Pre1iminary Theses on the of
Philosophy", in The Flery Brook, (New York, Doubleday and Co.,
1'972)"p.172.
,
G.W.F." Hegel, The Mind, (New yrirk,
" Harper ltow, 1967), p. 757.
191 am indebted to I. Meszaros, Marx's Theorr of Alienation,
(London, Merlin Press, 1970), p. 42, 'for tbis ins1ght. .
...... -
-.
.
)
o

Feuerbach's materialism contained a concealed 'undialectical
impulse' by utilizing an' of sociological
factors. This is what Marx is criticai of in his first Thesis
on Feuerbach, wherein he states:
/
1
... things, reality, sensuousne5S are con-
ceived only in the form of the object, or
of contem{>lation, but no,t as sensu,ous
human act1vity, practice, not subjectively ...
Feuerbach wants sensuouS objects really ,
distinct from conceptual objects, but he
does not conceive hum an activity it5elf as
objective activity.20
Again, in a more specific and concrete fashion, Marx states in
Thesis VI:
But the. essence of man is no abstraction
inherent in each single individual. In
its reality it i5 the ensemble of the
social relations.
ZI
The crucial insights of Theses l, II, VI and XI aIl indi-
cate Marx's awareness and rejection of Feuerbach's two-pronged
regression Hegel: with Thesis VI being'the most succinct
and foreceful representation of Feuerbach's errors.
AlI of the above observations naturally lead to the
) If"-"'
question. What was it specifically at this juncture in Marx's
intellectuai development that led him to rec9gnize these inade-
quacies in FeueTtlfi1ch' s formulations? While it is nearly
, f '..J
to discern with any assurante a precise causal relationship in any
1
intellectualarchaeriLogy, it is nevertheless possible closely
scrutinize Marx and Engel's intellectual activi!y this
crucial period until April 1845. SO,
1
we 'will establish the preeminent (yet highly circumscribed)
,.
'Jo.
20
MECW
,,/.
, 0
7
'<,,:1 t. ,
21
Ibid., p. 4.
Vol. V., p. 3.
..
./
1
"" - -----
(

o
-60-
role that Max Stirner played in motivating Marx to modify his
understanding of as weil as several other significant
, 22
issues which we later on in this chapter.

In attmpting to the events'between The Holy
Family and The Theses on Feuerbach, several intefesting insights
emerge. Even though The Ego was not re1eased from the
publisher.Otto Wigand until December Engels had managed to
...
secure a copy probably sometime in ear1y 1844. We know
this from Engels' ,let ter to Marx dated November 19, 1844, in
\ 0 ... .10 l
which Engels st is correct, in rejecting Feuer-
bach 1 s "Man" since
oncept' derived God. Engels goes
On to. state:
But what is true in his [Stirner's] principle,
we, too, must accept. is true is
that before we can be in any,tause we
must make it our own, egoistic cause - and
that in this sense, quite aside from any
material exp,ectations, we are communists in
of our egoism, that out of egoism we
'want to be human beings and-not merely,
individuals.
23
, '
22
1
'd Il . ., . J. ',Jo.
nC1 enta y, 1t 1S to note ln pass1ng tnat
none of ,the major commenta tors (with whom we (are familiar) 'who
written on the problem of a break ln Marx's thougnt, have
attached any significance t9 the possible role that Max Stirner
mighthave played in affecting any type of or break.
That includes tHe Most popular participants, the like of Avineri,
Ollman, Meszarcs, Mandel, Fromm, Hook, Althusser, and Bell.
A few of the above authors never even mention Stirner at al11
23Eng1ish translation from Andrew Crlson, AnaFchism in
Germany, Vol. l, (New The Press, 1972),
p. 61. \
J
"
,
(
\
,
... ____ --...... - .. ' ... '1 ---... -. __ ......... .... .... \
"
)
\
,-

r
0

v-------.'

In the same letter Engels alsa offers:the following curious
il
comment. "It should be a trifle ta prove to Stirher that his'
egoists because of their very egoism, nece$arily have ta become
11 24
communlsts.
o
Marx's response to Engels' first reading of
Stirner has not ben preserved. However, from a second letter
Engels wrote to Marx about two months la ter" it' becomes clear
that disagreed with Engels' initial
Engels' second letter in part reads:
As ta Stirner, I thoroughly agree with you.
When l wrote ta you, r still was under an
Immediate impression of the book; since
then, l had time ta put it aside and ta
1 think it through, and l find the same as
you do.25
At this point we know ,that Marx,had read Stirner's The Ego
before his arrivaI in Brussels in February 1845. We aiso know
(from Engels' second letter) that Marx protested Engels' earlier
....
and hast y Feuerbach, which is evident
)' .' '
when we elamine .Engels' in The New Moral World which was
written in February 1845. In that article, Engels" more con-
A '
sidered judgement on Feuerbach.is" ... that Dr. Feuerbach, the most
eminent gnius in Germany at the present time,
has declared himself a Communist
n

26
..#"
24En ish tran'slation tken from N. Lobkowicz, "Karl Marx
and Max tirner", in Marxism, (The
.tinus Nijhoff, 1969), . 70. $-, ,
1 ,
25Quote taien from N. Lobkiwicz, Theory and Ptactice, op.cit.,
p. 391. .;.,
26
MECW , op. cft. , Vol.
4-
'"
\ .\
IV,

p.
"
235.
\
\
\
,.J'
\
)
)
'.
\
/ \
f
.',
,
,.' 1
'-
'0
'(
,.,
/
\
-62-
We are safe(in that Marx. in
fi.
his no longer Teply ta Engels' first letter, was critical
of Engels', headlong rej ection of Feuerbach, simply based upon
a cursory reading of Stirner's The Ego.
27
The or purpose behihd the chronicle of vents
during critica1 transformative period, was ta demonstrate
that the 'simple thesis', '(that Sti rner' s cri tiqu'e of Feuerbach
F
motivated Marx to reject FeuerbaGh), is in itself misleading and
1 _
therefore inaccuratd. (What we are cal1fng the 'simple thesis'
represented by the position by Lobkowicz he
c1aims:
Wh en Marx read The and Its Own (sic)
he must have realize that this Feuerbachian
menta1ity could not possib1y be defended against
Stirner's c1aim that Feuerbach's Man was as
mu ch of a "rligiou's" abstraction as the
Christian Spirit or
For if this thesis
J
were the case, it would be difficult
explain Engels' praise of 'Feuerbah in the February'1845
cited above, writterf several Jonths afte'r bath his
, )
and Marx 1 s reading of Stirner. In addition, in 'another article
written as late as April S,
by Marx and himself
1845, Engels alludes ta a work being
on a refutation of the theories
, 29
of Max Sti-rner. In that article, Engels says Bauer and
,
27
1
'. . . . ( ( : '"h M H
t 15 lnterestlng to note ln passlng t at oses ess was
the first ta.overcome_the "cult of abstract man" by noting in the
article "On the ?o c:i'fa 1 ist Movement in Germany" wri tien in the
summer of 1844, that Feuerbach' s "species essence" ,pas
mystical". See Lobkowicz, Demythologizing, 6p.cit., -p. 66fnS.
28 ' ,
Lobkowicz, "KaLI Marx.anl Max Stirner", op.cit., p. 80 .. \
This also seems to be the posit1on Ca;roll, Break' Out of the
Crystal Palace, op.cit., p. 64.
, \
2 9 'l"r.1::r-. " 241
l.O.lll. .
....--
;
, '
"
J
!
.;
,\

:\
___ _____ 3}

1
........ ______ -____ __ ..... __ .... F--_-----------


\
o
-63 -
Stirner repr,esen't "the ul timate consequences of abstract
German philosophy, and therefore the only important philosophical
opponents of socialism",30, Feuerbach's name is not even mentioned.
1
While we fet1 the 'simple thesis' i5 misleading, we aiso
have difficu1ty in/accepting the more.papular and 'philosophical'
e.xplana tian of an' br/eak'i' offered by Louis
Althusser. For, while there is sbme truth in Althusser's
1 /'< ." p 1
the way in which he has developed it in works such
. il. ,.,
as For Marx, is riddled with vacuaus sophistry, that t ulti-
mate1y 1eaves us unen1ightened as to the actua1 course of events .
..--
For examp1e, consider the fol1owing fundamenta\ passage.
Marx' s fate in the years fram 1840 ta 1845/ ",
was nat decided(by an idea1 debate between
characters ca1led Hegel, Feuerbach, Stirner,
Hess, etc ... Nor was it decided by the same
Hegel, Feuerbach, S\irner and Hess as they
appeared in Marx's at that time... (
It was decided by concrete ideological
characters on whom the ideological context
imposed determinate features which do not
.necessari1y with their literaI
historica1 ident!tles Ce.g., Hegel), Wh1Ch
are much more extensive than the exp1icit
\., representations Mllrx gavE1 them of (sic) in
these same writings, quoting, invoking ang
criticizing them (e.g., and, of
course the genral characteristics outlined
. , by Engels fort y years later. 31
.. ...
-Al thusser' s poipf,' if t can be from the above
" 32 us about the substantive issues that ......
lad, to the al terations in Marx "'s position. - Wi thout, 51 ipp"'il"g
.. into an overly simplistic answer for a complex series of events,
p. 241. '1
J'lLouiS A1thusser, For Marx, (HarmondS-Wortb.,
Penguin Books, 1969), p. 65. 9
32See J. Carroll's interesting disussion of Althusser in
bis Break Out of the Crys t-al Pala,ce J op. ci t. J p. 64 .
......
1
, 1
G
\
.; .
\'
/
o
---------- -------------------------..... -.
. -_. ..
-61+-
\
or rising to a level of abstraction, at the ignoring
substance, it will be necessary ta present the detai1 of the
arguments and examine them very closely.
;
The place to natura1ly begin such a discussJon is to
precisely delineate Stirner's critique of Feuerbach. (This type
"
of is tota11y neglected
/ P'
in aIl of the commenta ries
1
we are familiar with, which attempt to ana1yze Marx's rejection
of Stirner's.complaints gainst Feuerbach can be
roughly reduced to four distinct arguments.
'\
;
Stirner's first and major of attack Feuerbach
focuses in on the'specific properties nd status of Feuerbach's
"Man". Stirner wri tes:
...

The being is indeed the essence of
but, just because it is his essence and
:Q.ot he himself, i t" remains quite .immaterJ.al
whether we see it outside him and view it
as ''G od" or find i t in him and calI it
"Essence of Man" or r am nei theJt
God nor Man, neither the supreme essence
nor my eSSnce, and therefore it is aIl one
in the main (sic) whether l think orthe/
eSsence as in me or outside
,
At a point further on in his book, Stirner more poignantly
c1aims that:
'- "
... because Man represents oRly
Being, in fact has taken place but a
metamorphosis the Supreme Being, and the
fear of Man an altered form of the
fear of God.
34
Stirner wants to *hat regatd1ess of the name one chooses,
whether it be God, Apollo, Geist, Man, or even Nature, effect
op.cit., p. 33.
1
!
34 /.
Ibid., p. 18'5. Also see, pp. 38, 4Z, 79,111,.143; 145, 182.
,
(_f\
';
1
o
\
\
o
- -" .._----- ----------
-65'-
remains the same. There still exists a level of abstraction, an
1
alien entitr, capable of depriving Stirner, of restricting hjm,
of the full use of his and the ultimate achievement
of his pleasure.
35
interesting to note that the idealism
inherent in this position is an aspect not neglected by Marx in
his critiqe of Stirner.)
"
This leads us to Stirner's second major criticism of
Feuerbach. Here Stirner adopts Feuerbach's use of sensuality and
turns it against - what he believes ta be - the hidden spiritual-
.
ism implicit in Feuerbach's position .
... the sacred is not for your senses - and
you nevey as a sensual man discover its
trace -', But for your fai th, or more definitely
still, for your spirit; for it itself, you
know' is a spiritual th!gg, a spirit - is
spirit tor the ,spirit.
How can we Se?sually experience this 'species essence' the "Man",
Stirner asks. Stirner believes that sensuality, if properly
understood, negates the world of ideas, and is a guarantor of
our potential satisfaction and enjoyment.
In another context, Stirner's third line of attack is
upon Feuerbach's trans;ormative method, which Stirner sees as
capturing and revealint the llitimate idealist impulse inherent
in'Feuerbach's arguments.
If we further put in plae of the predicate
"divine" the equivalent "sacred", then, as far
,as .concerns the sense, aIl the old COrnes back
again .. Consequently, by the transformation of
the predicate into the suhject, the Christian
essence .. would onlY he fixed yet more
(/ oppressively. Gad and the divine would entwine
themselves aIl th more inextricab1y with me.
37
35
Ihid
., p. 95.
p. 36.
37Stirner, The Ego, op.cit., p. 48.
, ..
\
,i
1
- 1

1
i
/
o


Stirner is convinced that not only is Feuerbach's method in-
capable of achieving what it was to accomplish, but
in addition, it has the deleterious consequence of concealing
the 'divine' within the 'human'.
The last distinct argument Stirner develops against the
position articulated by Feuerbach is perhaps most' interesting
for the consequence it has to bear on Marx's ultimate rejection
of Feuerbach. Here Stirner argues that, in essence, what Feuer-
bach has done is to simply create a new religion.
, ..
Then the predicate has indeed only been
changed into the subject, and, instead of the
sentence "God is love", they say "love is
instead of "God has become man",
"Man has become God", etc ... 1t is no.thing
more or less than a new religion ... Feuer-
bach' s proposition, "Theology' is anthro-
pology", m,eans only "religion must be ethics,
ethics aIone. is religion. ,,38 ' ,
Stirner asks, if we' have God and on what
basis then,can we argue for the retentfon the old ChrisFian
forms of behavior? Why of marriage sa
important to Feuerbach, and friendship as weIl? Why are the

maxims (i\ e., the ethicaI duties) which govern these ,moraI
t#, '
the same old rules we find in Christianity? The
:7
answer Stirner offers is t.Jlat in reali ty l1as chang'ed; A......
Feuefbach has simpl; erec'ted a new ediflce.
The main purpose behind tKis elaboration of
Stirner's critique of Feuerbach, was to aflow of
"Q";.
criticisms with thse of .Marx. For if the 'simple
theSi}' is correct 0 Ci. e., that Stirner' 5 1 of Feuerbach r "
pp. 58-59.
"'-
,
i
1
,
.,
i
, .
:1
.......
------------------------------0
o
tlSJ. UllIH\ ...................
c.
6
7
-6'1-
is what motivated

Marx to rej ect then
expect te find similarit'Y between the
by Marx and those" of Stirner. However, in actuali ty, this is'
not the case. For example,. inl the Theses on Feuerbach
(the synoptic presentation of Marx's criticisms against Feuer-
,pach), Marx does not even mention Feuerbach 1 5 'Man 1 t his trans-
i4tmative method, nor his alleged creation of a new religion .
. ' .
In addition, the one point upon which appear

to be somewhat similiar, reveals upgn closer impor-
tant differences. For Marx's of use and
"'"
understanding of sensuality is not based upon a 'hidden spirit-
caused' Stirner so much but rather,
Marx is critical of passive idealism in
position leads ta contempJ.at'ian rather than "sensuous
human activity", that is IIpractie",.3\9
\
A detailed understanding of the motivationa! factors in
Marx's transformation will not only the issues
involved in the 'young' vs tlate' Marx but will
also help us better apprehend wott as a
, f;!
argue and attempt to demonstrate in the pages
, .
tht
.. ---
fol1ow, that this CrUCial transformation in Marx's 'position was
not- a' result simply of Stirnr's critique of Feuerbach, but
,
, .

rather, it emerged as a response to F.euerbach's attempted defeuse
against s vehement and caustic 1(e
-characterized <j"in the paragrap'h.$" above.
\
1
.)
"- ------_----;'"." :r-- - ------ - .-


) \
' ,
.14)P;_
1& Uij
u
1 "
o
, '.
.' \
,1
, .
..
'\
J ' 0-
o
J

. ,1
,)
/
/
(
\
\
" A$ we };lave shown above, s'tirner ',5 The Ego, which lias read
(by' MarJ and Epke1 s t,004''ward the end of 1844 ,_s j not a sufficient
in rn.otivting' Marx to rej ct Feuerbach, even thougJY.
" ' .

were in' thaJ direction. We
"Ir- "..
lit '",as "not' nti1 ,as the m'idcl1e of 1845 ,"
<b
,., 1 .. ,J
'tesponse to Stirner in Wigand's
2, that Marx's position to change. In a brief 18 para-
"
articJ.e tled ,,'On the Essence of ,Christianity in i ts
, , l "1
Relation tb The Ego and His Own" das 'Wesen des Chriols-
" \ 4
) in Beziehung, aufden,\'Eint,igB und sein Eigenthum"'),
did
.
'. . in a
much alter his earlier positions, as to
different light, he
,
had previously misunderstood formulations intentions.
(The argument could be that this article does 'not represent
a, 'shift in Feuerbach 1 s,position. Howevr '. l am nJt familiat'
o '
, ,
with any persuasive discussion that attempts to argue that a
. (
shift does take,piace. ,Paterson, however, is mistaken
. . t "!
....,\ in: making the cl'aim
)1 "
t\at Feuerbach:s.response to was ,to
l '
...
. ,
J be expected.)40
.{i ,q,r (' ( \./'
Up to this Marx haaf probab1' been utilizing an
, 1
f interpretation of Feuerbaoh
.. .
which was if"not
"
- .J
'/' identical, to that of Moss
... . , ,
Hess.
41
Hess argued: (
i
'\
40
R./W.K. T,he NihUistic Egoist, (Oxford, 1971),
'Il ." 9 1". l, " / ,;
101 41See "Kar,! 'Mar.x op. cit:':, .
p. 81' convincing1y argues) point. L
-y......
.1
,. '
(
1
i
, ,
.
.",
.. .
\
" ..
,
__ ,., ""IU.__ ...;... ________ . ___ ________ --._---_____
:
\. .. IV","
Theology is anthro!ulOgy. This ii s correct,
but is not the ,whole One must add
that the essence of man is the social
being, the cooperation,of various individuals
for one and the same end ... true doc-
trine of man, true humanism, is the doctrine
of umanpsocialization, ,that isoanthropology
_fl is '.
J 1
The bl}e'f by F,euerbach which
never been into Engljsh, has been recognized by
Feuerbach ,scho1ars as an important work for understanding
'Il
Feuerbach's er1ier writings,43 which include aIl of his works
.., ,,' , A
which had such a influence on the young Marx., In
that artic1, speakiFg himse1f in

perso:, does no: deny legitimacy and necessity of
his theory.'
[Feuerbach] sho.ws that faith in ,God (truly
understood, and not in the imagination and
reflection of tlie believers) i5 on1y faith
iIf man himself ..
4
.4 "
,() ,
,
\
Hess, "Uber di Bewegung. ii Deutsch-
, land", Anekdota, ed. by K. Grun, (Darmstadt, 1845), p . 203,
translation found in Ibid.', p. 75. For a detailfi!d look at
the young Marx's understanding of MEeW, Vol 3.
op.c:it., p. 328. Mrx SfY5 in part:)?"Feerbach\s
great chievment i5: the Rroof that philo50phy is nothing
eise but religion rendered into and'axpounded .
2: the, establishment of true materialism and of real science ... "
43S Kamenka, The Of LudWif Feuerbach,
(London, Routledge and Kegan Pau!, 197 ), pp. 91: l'9.
\P
, 44Ldwig "Uber das des 1
in Beziehung '9J:1fden 'Einzigen und seia ... '" t in Kleine
Philosophisch Schriften (1842-itS), '(Leipzig, Felix .
r Mein.r, ISO), ftransiated, the direction of Greg',ClaeysJ,
para. 4.' , '"'---
'f',,'"
..


,
t'
1
..
. )
"',
, 1
F
o
l'
,

-70-

, .
In a more direct, and what mus4 have been to Marx, a surprising
, --\
passage, Feuerbach states:
(
l ,
The proposition, Man is God, the supreme
be,j.ng 0:( man, confounds consequently
with the proposition: i5 no God,
supreme being in tne sense of
1
theo10gy,
But this ,last p:roposition is none other. than
the expression of that is to say
nefative, the first is the expression of
re 19ion, that i5
"1
The inferences in the above passages, which might simply be
j'
xplained "Hegelian", are exp li ci tl/ confinned "in la1!er
..
1
passages from the artlcle. After calling the being",
"absolute being", 56 Feuerbach, for the first tim.e in
." -.
writings, explicitly aCkno,ledges the re1igious dimension to his
In a passage, Feue1bach

1
..
To not have religion mean5: think only of
yourse1 f;'- to have religion means to 1?hink
of othe'rs besides yourse1f. And this religion
/ shan be the only permanent one, at teast 50,
far as there will not exist on the earth
the 'unique' man; it suffices that
two human beings exist, man woman,
or there also to exist religion. Two beings
a d their distinction, there is th origin
of eligion - the you is the G,d of me
beca se without you, 1 don't exist ...
tI;'ls i:terestin ta in arguing that Feuer'
G l ...
bach had erected a w religion,,. felt 'he was offering a criticism.
, \.
Here Feuerbach assertion attempts to it'to
. \
\
his own advantage.) '\
. ? . "
45
Ibid
.
'\
para. 5, 7 .
46.!lli. ,

47 Ibid. ,
-
para., 10."
. ,
, -,
'1 \
\
._.-_______ . __ __ .L 1 ___ _
---,-..... -..
1
1
.
.
, .

'.
.'
. /
, .
o
j
..
! '''"'''--.
... ::: 71-
\
In addition to the of empha5is we find
. \
in Feuerbach's article, we also have isolated several other
supporting. our claim that it was Feuerbach's response
.
to Stirner that Marx to reject his Feuerbachian 1
leanings. In whole of The German Ideology, as the
full title is a critique of Feuerbach, B. Bauer, and \
Stirner, Feuerbach ',5 brief article in response to Stirner is
quoted 'and mentioned in the text more often than Feuerbach's
\
more substantial texts J. such as The Essence of Christianity
.. the Principles Qf the Phhosophy of the 4
k
,.' In
addition, the short middle section bn Bruno Bauer is
" exclusively devoted to Bauer's and Feuerbach's to

......
Stirner J (incri,cating, perhaps, that this is the source of the
significant theoretical change necessitating the inclusion of
Bauer in The German deology 50 recently'after the thOTOUgh
treatment he received in The Family.)49
"'Howevf1r, the convincing evidence we ha"e in our'
attempt to document our position)','is ta be found by examining
,
the few specifie criticisms Mari develops. agains\ Feuerbach
in The German Ideology.- In two central statements, found in
the same paragraph, which we will quote together, Marx
<:1
48See the "Index of .. Quoted and Mentioned Li terature." in
MCW, Vol. V, 0K,cit., p. 63,2, where an additional reference
ta the Feuerbac article (to be found on p. 57) i5 mi5sing .
.JI
'49Incidently, it is interesting to note that, Marx two
passages attempts ta himself with specific'criticisms
against 'Feuerbac{l, ta be found il]. The.
while in actuality the credit belongs to Stirner. ee tbi "
Va 1. V, p. lOI .and 105. '"
,
1
..
1
,2 1
.
o

1
\
1 1
1
(
1
_,J" _ '
-72-
the important question which has been under .....
recent how exactly one
the realm of G,d to the realm
of Manil - as if this "realm of God" ever
existed anywhere save the imag3.ipation.
"
For these Germans, it 'is altogether sirnply
a matter of resolving the ready-made nonsense
find into sorne other freak, i.e., of
'} presupposing t;hat a11 this nonsense has a
sense which can be discovered; while
really it is only a question of explaining
these theoretical phrases from the actual
existing relations.
50
Two important points can be gleaned fro' tl1ese passages. J F:rstlY,
" .
Marx attempts, in the first passage that have cited, to
ridicule Feuerbach simply by paraphrasing passages taken from
his article against Stirner, while aIl of the references to
,
Feuerbach's other works are treated more earnestly. More
importantly, in the second passage we have cited, Marx adopts
1
a p'sition very. similar to Stirner' S ,the
Hegelians have simply metamorphosed' .the Christian supreme being
, '-rf't-
and the Hegelian Geist into other manifestations of the same
entity.51
r
, It is this aspect of ,Marx's critique of Feuerbach which is
,
perhaps responsible for leading Lobkowicz and otheri'into the
faise belief tht Stirner's critique was 'the sufficient cause in
\ .
motivatirig.Marx ta reject Feuerbach. However, lt was only
after Mai"x had read 1 s attempted defense against Stirner,',
" -'P'
that realized. several of Stirner! s to be
correct.
In one' final attempt to prove this will be
neFessary to examine an aspect of Feuerbach's article which we
SOMECW, Vol. V, op.cit., ... p. 56.
'1"
The Ego, op.cit.,p. 185 and passim.,
,

e'
t
..
!'

J
ti,
f'


it
'!-

"
t
,<
(1



i,
t


i

'r
1
.,
,

"
1
i
/ 't ............ ____ . __ __ , ... _____ __ ..._ ..._____ *_ . _ .. ;a:; ...... ..,1, __ .,.,.,.".,_......... g ____________ ._
G
/
1
-73 -
S'
\
beli:j'to be the in our effort's to retrospec-
tive1y decipher this cr4t al junctur.e in Marx's intellectual
, " -
development. In doing 50, we will be able to present Marx's
<
rat ionale for rej ectin'g Feuerbach (and la ter humanism and tra-
,
ditional in a totally diffferent 1ight
rather tedious and exegetical approach to this problem).
Pirst of aIl, it should be recalled that in an
written by Engels on February 2, 1845 (which we have cited
"above), EngelS approving that Feuerbach,' "the most
),
eminent philosophical genius in Germany" ... "has declared himself
a Communist". 52 In his article against Stirner, wri tten only a
couple of months 1ater, the same declaration.
However, at this juncture and in this context, Marx must have
the firsp"i!time realized how potntially dangerous an ally
?:r
Feuerbach had become! In concludinghis article, again speaking
....,!\'
of himse1f in the third prson,
1
Hence E[euerbach] is a
nor an idealist, philosopher of
identity. What is he then? He is the same in
his thought as he is actually "'the same in.
spirit as in the flesh, the 5ame i5 in his
essence as in his - he
a man or, 'rat.her, sinc' F[euerb'ach] simply
p1is the essence of man ih the
he is a communal man, a cornmunist.
In attempfing to validate that this a'rticl e, and this
ll
....
passage in particular, a crucial helping Marx
ta overcome his Feuerbachian will
'\ .....
,,' q
52MECW, Vol. IV, op.cit., p. 235.
53Ludwig Feuerbach, "Veber 'das "Wesen
op.cit., para. 18, from, MECW,
p. 592.
'i:.l
..
des Chris"tenthums 1 !' ,
op.cit., Vol. V,
t
..
f
...
..... ---------\J----
, '
,.
-7tf--
..

0
(
fragments as evidence from' rde9logy, and orie from
put our concerning
" '-

Marx' s Marx's'notebooks, and

"
'rejection of to rest.
,/'" --'" \
f' \
.> \ ,In whaf' amolmts "to a defensive reaction - Marx was
.c f 1 h h 1-' f Il B 54. ' t' , h
t at ot ers wou a 0 ow auer ln equa Ing t e
.,
\
communist view of Feuerbach with those of Marx and Engels)-
\ '
Marx expliitly refers to Feuerbach's final'declapation in the
first section of The German Ideology.
(
1
virtue of the 'qua'iification "common
man" he) [Feuerbach] declares himse1f a .
communist, transforms the latter intp a
predicate of tlMan" and thinks that i t is
thus possible to clwnge the word "commun:kst" ,
whlch in the real world means the follower
of a defini te revolutionary party, into a
mere cat.e'gory. 55
In the same paragraph, Marx dlineates the specifie and practical

problem with this position, borrowing from the notes he had
<,
.,. 1
lb ' , ,
jotted down, as the Theses on Feuerbach .
. . . like the other theorists, he [Feuer'bach]
merely to p!oduce a correct
about an whereas for the
Communist :Lt is a question of overthrowing .
the existing state of things. 56 ,
l' ..i
\, 1
!.. 54 ,,//
In the same issue of Wigand's as
Feuerbach's article, Bauer attempts to get sorne mi1eage out of
claiming that there is no difference between the communist views
expressed by Feuerbach and those of Marx and Engel.s. See W. O.
Henderson, The Life of Friedrich Engels, Vol. l, (Lond0n, 1
Frank Case, London, 1976), p. 83.
5"'5 l ' .' \.
ME CW, V q 1 V., .jP . Cl t., p. 5 7 .
,6Ibid., p.
..
_._-------
G
.
\

v
0'
,.
, \
... _.1 ..
\
A more interesting excerpt 'can be found the very end
" 1
the first volume of Ideology, where Marx - after '.notin.
l 57
IIreu\erhach' s, op'iniort .. tha t "the individual is a cO'mmunist If ,
, , \ "'-
offers us most extensive elaboration of Marx's\most famous
\
aphorism, XI" 1 of the Theses F\uetbach.
One of the.most difficult tasks confrlnting
philosophers ta from the world of
thought te the actual world. Language
i5 the actuality of thought. Just
existence, 50 they were bound ta make
language into an independent realm. This i5
the secret of philosophical language, in
which thoughts in the farm of words have
their own content. The problem of descending
from the world of thoughts ta the actual
world is turned into the problm of descending
from language to life.
58
(
\
There is one other additional piece of information we might
include before concluding our of this topic, although
Il
i t is epigramatic and virtually impossible to decipher. ,Immediately
preceding on Feuerbach in,Marx's notebooks is th
curious ph'i-ase: "The divine egoist opposed' egoistical
o
man. ,,59 While any interpretation of thi5 would be
to def;nd, to me thi5 passage reveals an
.\ . .
aspect of th tension in Marx's mind just prior to tris formulation


of the;.!heses on Feuerb'ch; namely, the' the
divine egoi5t and the egoistical man, the opposition between
\
1
Stirner' s egoist and Feuerbach' s egoism (as humanism) .
\
"

'j
"'t
\
57
Ibid
.,
...
,
,
\ .
p.
\
,
0'
.

59
Ibid
. ,
Vol. IV, 668.

0
p.
.. -..
\
1
r
, '
f

"
,
\
\
\

.
! \
\
o
\
\
\
\
. __ ._, ... __ ....._ .... _____ ._k,.,'__. _____ + __ . _

The majpr purpose behind our citing these few passages from
. . ,
t e and Marx's was to the very
,
e connection and betwen Feuerbach's against
and Marx's Theses on Feuerbach (which Marx's
-, 60
first known cri tical comments on Feuerbach). In., doing 50,
i
we have documented in detail, a highly probable explntion
..
.
the dynamic which motivated Marx to his position
toward Feu In the process, we render-ed
many of the discussions of Marx's rejection 'of Feuerbach that
fail ta incl the role that Stirner played in the
. .{-
process.
One consequenc of our discussion above, is to shed new light '
on '"the ongo ing
'\
conc,erniI).g a tbre ak' 'between thJ'" early"
'mature' Mar . For example, have dem9nstrate" that it
1
\
was theoris per se, that motiyated to
rejeet them "en bloc it was a combination of pr'1tieal
an? s .and Marx, calling them-
selves communists), to with distasteful theoretical
position when stretched

its logical extreme.
The change in Mapx' s viewpoint during thi$ period was, o.f
/ .
not exclusively in regard to Feuer'bach. The .German
, ' ,
, as a whole, repre ents significant innovations from
---'r"""- ,- , ,

here are a few passag s in Marx's early writirlgs that
chQose to see as eritieal .. For example in 1843 Marx
41'
Rug-e, "1 .aRP'rove of Feuer:bach' s aphorisms except foi"
e poin: he directs himself tO'Of'mueh to nature and too 1ittle
t
l
politi 5", (Mar/x 13 March 1843 (Werke, XXVII;' p.
417) in A . eri',s "The Ffegelian of Marx's Politida1.
Th ught" , eview otMeta h sies, No. 81, Sept.\l967, p. 3\5.)
Ne ertheles , we ee 1t is acebrate see the Theses
as he criti-cal wr-itings, 1east from a substantive
poi t of vie
" \
l
,-
, ,
1
... '
G
j
.... .
'.
, ,
.


Il'
\-
. .......... _ ....
----- ----- - --_._- - ---------- -- _________________ _=__";..;.......c __ =_""_;.;;..;;- -
'"
__ lM_
\
-77 -
Marx's e,arlier writings, l:n the areas of Marx's understanding
of ethics, political activity, (i.e., praxis), in his the ory
-.;.
of alienation, and most importantly in his for.mulation of the
, {
conception of history. In each an'e of these areas,
, ..
'
f
a clear understanding of Marx's reaction to Stirner
illuminate of that had
-
only been partially visible, or completely blocked from our
;
The piace to continue our discussionof Marx and 5ight.
is in area of
, <, t
- Marxism and Modern Mo{ality
""
As we noted above, there i5 anoth:r shift,
, .. \ ...
which we can discern, coincident with Marx's rej of
Feuerbach. many of the other central s::oncepts "*hich have
center in the vs 'mature' Marx contro-
ver5y, (e.g., humanlsm, alienation, Marx's,
. /
and use of and morality as concepts emerges in
",'
an altered farm in The' German 1
of Feuerbach, which'c
Ji
And unlike Marx's
5imply' dismr5sed as' an
adolescent squabble - al though, would
.
hole! - the MJ?;' s unrlerstanding of ,has had sig-
. --y f'
o nificfLnt ramifications in Marxism a poli tic*al doq'ipe .
Before thefoappearance of Marx's unpublished manuscripts
+
(in particular the Eonomic apd -Philosophie Manuseripts and The
, 1'W !,
l 'Grundrisse) there very little eonfuiion }
. '
eerning 'the' MarxisJ; view on this subjeet. T,flday, however,
theTe are eommentators.', ittempting to etplore Marx' s
eon'eption of ethies, elearIy distort the subj eet by 'failing to renain
/
/
/

)
... l'il j , __ ....!!..li .... _______ ... __ .. _ .... eg ...... _. ________ ...... .., __
,

e
,
,"
.
... .
o
/'
,
.,
cognizant of Mal'x's to have these,writings pub-
0
lished any point during his 1ifetime, especil1y the EPMs.
-
"
author!
r
For example, EugeJ)e Kamenka, one of ,the best known on
"4
this
'.
clearly
. \
confu;;es the issue wheR,he c1aims that in
1ight of Marx's early unpublished works hthe ethic running
,.
through s is best understood". 61 While the argument
(') .,...,A
can be made that an inherent ethic remains dominant throughout
a\l of Marx's work, it is nevertheless essential to
of the significant shift that we Hnd in Marx' suse anJ
of ethic5 and from The German Ideologr

onward.' ,
..
1t is possible that Marx, .in 5eeing a confEct between'
politicai and theoretical objectives, chose 't9 have a public and
.['
a private vocabuiary. (This 15 an interesting topic
" beyond the scope of "'thi5 work.) In any ca,se, in The German
Ideology: which Marx and Engels diid writ,e fox
p 1
poses of we find a ctearly articulated position on
ethics, i5 not only fairly consistent with ll of their'
-',
later publ"ished writings on the sUDject,62 but in addition -
,
accurately circumscribes
, 1.
the position taken by almost aIl.
Marxist have attempted ta put Marx's theories
into . practice.
In th EPMs, which is/'perhaps best known for its deeply
1 d h
\. . ((. . .
mora an uman1St or1entat1on, Marx caiis polltlcal economy
and
./. .

,
61EUg'ene Kamc;mka, Marxism and Ethics, (London,
Co., London, 1969),pp. 7-8, emphasis added.
further
Macmill:'an
\ ,
\
' 1
,
,1
1
,
)

.
, ,
, .
r '
T
.................____ _____ _fi;Z _ ....... _ __ "' __________ -.... ____ ' .... 11___ _
v'
G

. 0
y ...... \.
'l'
r
"despi te i ts worldly a,nd yoluptuous appe8:.rance" ... lia true moral
science, the most moral of aIl the sCiences".63 manher in
whih Marx uses morality in that early unpublished work, is
entirely consistent with the usage employed in the published
The Holy Family.'''' For example, consider the fOl1"'owing passage
from The Holy Family. -
If man draws aU his knowledge, sensati,on, etc .. ,
from the worl!! the' senses an9 the.,'experiences
gained in it, then what has ta re dohe i5 to
alrange the empirical world in such a way
that man and
to what is truly human fn it and that he'
becomes aware of himself as man. If correctly ,
understood interest th principle of aIl
morality s private interest must be t,
made to coincide with the interest of
humanity.64 .
)
1
POlitfcal,economy has the of, becoming a science
," '
because" through such a scienc,e man has the power to "arrange
the world" in a "tr
r
human" fa sl1iOft . ",
A transition takes place' -in The German Ideologx. In
.. '
that Marx quite V\arefUll
Y
and avoids,
'
:he use of
the terms ethics and J except in a pej orative manner.
r 'r
nlike in The' Fa: 1 , where Marx enunciates "the prtnciple
,
of aIl in th'\ Ideology he asserts that "communists
/ do nC?Ot preach ,moraIity t aIl". 65 Morality is no longer the
reconciliation of "priv te interest" with those of "humanity",
"but rather it is a produ tive idea
66
lia theoretical product,,67
1 ,

"
"
)
Vol III,
309.
64
Ibid
.,
Vol
(
IV" pp'. 130 -


, t
.'
Vol. V, p
p. 36.
8
67
Ibid
.,
, 1
p. 53.
i
1
, \
'.

"-
,,' ,
" __ (l..._ 1
- .. ---_ ..... - ... -- -
, ' ,
,
'r'
)
, .
. ) , :. "
"---r.---- _. ...... ------,
> ' c :
'. -80-
, ---
J
emergoot from "the material.production of life", guiding a
.. forro of intercourse 'connected wi th 'created by a
,1 68 ,.
of production. J
(i\ J They [L e. t communists] do put to ,the
people the moral demand: love another,
do not be egoists, etc.; on the contrary,
they are very weIl aware that egoism, just as
much as selflessness, i5 in definite cir-
cumstances a necessary-rorm of the self-
assertion of individuals.
69
It is quiteblear that in The German Ideology Marx has
developed a totally new framewotkowithin which aIl of man's
activity" - and that includes theoret'ical and ideational
,
,0
,
creations (such as morality) - is seen as being intimately
1 inl<ed to the of production. AlI of this is

qUlte obvious
familiar

materialist conception of to anyone with th,e
...
which Marx introduces in the Ideology.
"
The question lik to address at juncture,
is: what are the intellectual stimuli that le'd Marx to
recognize 'the inadequacies in p!e\iously unde,rstanding
, -
of ty which he to 'correct' through the global
. '
compass of the materialist cnception ,of history?

Here again we will argue Stirner played a vital role
4in inciting Marx see the severaI problems inherent in h'is
previously neld position. However, unlike in th. case of '
Feuerbach, we believe, it i5 on'the issues'of and morality
vas direct and Ne r'
believe that Stirner helped Marx recognize the of
,
moral judgments" and the' intirlate between mO,ral
""

68
Ibid
.
)
p.
--1
\ ,
.
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...' 1.
-_ .... -_._--;-... , "--- .
1
,-il


.
" q -.u""JO"JIiJ wriM l n 1l!L
_ ._. 1 nzuot .1111 1 1.
Il 8'
,
o
c
r,
, -J.-
and frameworks.
70 ..
.
Very few commentators on Marx have ackttbvledged Stirner's
or
role in influencing Marx's of mbrality. However, credit
,
must he given to George Plekhanov, in his and
Socialism say{ , 'n
<t. .' the
in-his haYing QpenlY and energetically
combated the of '
bourgeois and of manr of the
Socialist, according to whiclf the e,.ancipatiolll
of the proletariat would be about by
the virtuous activity of' 'devoted' persons il
of aIl classes, a9f especially those of the,
possess1ng class. . .
When Stirner' s views on moraloity !n The
.
1[ ,
Eto in 1845, they served as a sobering indicator of vliat "a
would look lib witr totally stripped of any interper
botdS, whether connections be religious. social or ' '0' '-
po Hical n nature. For it 'vas Stimer who first sav hUJllsnism
'. as a last attempt to saJvage .. politiCs ,'.3
. ,
"y simply another way of an". denring
. Stitner us: 1
-' l \
70 ,!' ..
We are indebted.to John Crroll Crystal Palace, op.cit.,
p. 38,'for this insight. In Tbe Ide d ,lMrx repeatedly
luaps morality, not Te Ion, ut also with philosophy,
pol'i tics, law, etc.; in shor,t al theoretical products and
of consciousness. See MECW, V. op.dt.,' p. 36,) 53 and
passim.'

71George PlekhnOV, Anarchisa Jnd Socialis., translated by
Blenor Marx Avelin"g.JCliicafO, C-:rliS KerT 'a CQ., 19,'1-2)', :, "
p. 4S. . " .
. 72pattel'SOD, op.cit ., p. 92.'
73UnleS$ pOlities is totally
ttatur,O.
If) ... - \
t.
spontaneous an4 in
,.
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. l '
1
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..
,
E itatt.'.",l)J ... .,.4 '; .... "...... "Ai
'" 1
lit.!: iIltneu !1f&I'1)lStdl _ t U aa u 4. 4
...
o
u
"
-82-
1
Take ft 'moral behaves. who
today .often he i5 God
and throw5 Christianity as a bygone
thing. If ask htm whether he has ever
doubted that t e,copulation f brother and
sister is*ince5t, that monogamy is truth
of marriage, that filial piety is a sacred
dut y, then a moral shudder will come ov,er
hirn at the conception of one's being alfbwed
to touch his 5ister as wife also.
74
Stirner confronts aIl of the crltics of religion by claiming
that if any of these acts cause a wince a shudder, then
surely you remain a Christian!
"\,
Because this morality complete"-into humanity
fully settled its accounts with the
religion out of which it historically came
forth, nothing hinders it from becoming a
religion on its accouht.
75
<
Whether it be theft, incest or murder, Stirner tells us in
'\
a summary of his position:
Morality i5 the 'idea' of morals, their
their power over the
conscience ... rnorals are too rnaterial ta
rule the mind, and do not fetter an 'in-
tellectual' man, a so-called independent,
a freethinker. 70
If it i5 for me, it is right.
77
74
St
'
1rner,
7S
Ibid
., p.
Ego, op.cit., p. 45.
57.
76
Ibid
., p. 88.
190. Stirner's apparent ethical relativism
represenrs-o of the earliest modern formulations of this
position. It the most powerful and extreme
position articulated during Marx's formative year5.
"
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,
, 1
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,
-83-
attempted thoroughgoing repudiation of mora1ity

recognized no boundaries, "recognized no 'oughts'. 78 What one
h Il
" h d . 1 . f" " f " " 79 " '
aut or ca s a r apso g lcatl0n 0 crIme, IS more pre-
cise1y described as an extreme egoism, where the criteria of.
total1y detached fram any meaningfu1'context,
becomes e1evated
c
to a princip1e of guidance. 80
'Several authors have claimed that Stirner has simply turned the
individual ego into a categorical imperative,81 whi1e another
sees Stirner as elaborating the position of Callic1es in P1ato's
Perhaps no other aspect of Stirner' s phi1osophy
elicits for Max the man, who must have
,
lived a truly isolated and solitary existence to have seriously
proffered such an extreme position of atomism and iso1ationism.
It is not hard to understand why a 1903 article was published
in,a journal of psychopathology, trying to show that Stirner's
ideas were simply the product of a paranoid mind.
82
78pau1 E1tzbacher, Anarchism, (New York, Chip's Bookshops,
Boose1lers and Publishers, n.d.), p. 62. "
79George Woodcock, Anarchism, (New York, New American
Library, 1962), p. 103.
the latent ethical basis of this position. This
is most insistent point in his critiqu\ of Stirner.
8 ames Huneker, "Max Stirner", The North American Review,
Vol. 1907, p. 335, and J. Carroll, Crystal Palace, op.cit:,
p. 12.. ._'
Si-a- - .-
Carl . ed:t:ich, over Violene",
Zeitschrift Fur .
---------------_ .. ... ---...... __ ... _--.. _ ... '
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____________ ----------------;.,r---


Marx of course did not and could not accept Stirner's under-
of moraiity and the role of ethics in soial
for in an immediate sense, Stirner's total rejection of any
ideal construct preciuded the possibility of human ?ialogue
or community, not to mention revolutionary activity. Yet, Stirner
did force Marx to reflect upon the nature of ethical constructs,
which helped him to recognize the degree to which his previously
held beliefs in 'humanism'" to a large extent Christian
in origin. (It is interesting" to note that authors like Robert
Tucker,83 who attempt to argue this thesis for the whole Marxian
dTpus, fail to recognize that Marx became aware of this dimension
of his thought.and sought to rectify the situation with correc-
tive measures, the most prominent being the materialist con-
ception of history.)
Stirner, whose thoroughgoing nihilism only legitimates a
reality bf immediate experience, forced Marx into a type of
exercise, wherein Marx sought after.the secure
grounding necessary for his revolutionary enterprise. (Inci-
-
dentally, foreshadows the modern phenomeno-
10gical problematic when his position of total denial forces
him to 10gical1y affirm his theoretical point.
l
, t f 1.. .
on my part s art rom a presupposltlon ln
myself; but my presupposition
does not for its perfection like
"Man struggling for his perfection", but
only serves me to it and consume it.
84
and My th in Karl Marx, (New York, Cambridge
University, 19 1, 1972).
84
5
. E . 150
t1rner, Op.C1t., p. .
------ -< --
1
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j
J

l
;
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1
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1

(
1
1
1
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!
!
f
1
'"
,-
0 ;.
- 85"-
It is 4ar from being coincidence that Marx for the fir"S"! time in
The German Ideolagy clearly stated a presentation of his pre-
suppositions. "We must begin by 'stating the first premise of
aIl human existence and therefore, of al! history, the premise',
namely, that men must be in a position ta live in arder ta be
able to 'make history,,,.85 This statement of Marx's pre-
which sits at the head of the formulation of
the materialist conception of histo:r.y.." -provides Marx with an
;.
answer, enabling him to incorporate 5tirner's critique of
morality (i.e., the negative moment), while simultaneously
superceding Stirner's parochial perspective by positing a new
broad-sweeping theory of social explanation (i.e., the positive
moment). We believe (although we cannot demonstrate this point
here) , that the new version of Marx's understanding of morality
accepted the Stirnerian insights that aIl rnoralities were rela-
tive and in essence no different than theology. Only now Marx
was armed with a theory which not only explained the origin and
function of religious (an aspect cornmon to aIl
of the theories offered by the Young Hegelians)., but in
addition could aiso explain - for the first time - the relativity
and grounding of moral (as weIl as political, etc.)
attitudes. '"
85
MECW , op. ci t. , Vol 5, p. 41.
,
,
.
-
, ', ____ ....l"-,,,
1
1
l
, 1
,
,
1
1
L_
o
... ___ ....-1 __ __ ...... ____ .....:: _______ , ___ .......... _ .. _ ..... _, _. __ ___ , .... ,"' .... _. __ . _. __ ..... , __ _ .. __ . ______ .. ___ _
-8(,-
The production of ideas, of con:ceptions, of
consciousness, is ... directly interwoven
with the material activity and the material
intercourse of men ... 86 ,"
\
Consciousness, is, therefore, from the very
beginning a social product, and remains 50
as long as men exist at all.
87
D. The Materialist Conception of History
In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have focused
our attention on the specifie role which Max Stirner played,in
Marx' s rejection of Feuerbach and in Marx"s ul timate understanding
of ethies. 'Wliile these observations eertainly shed new light
on the 'young' vs 'mature' Marx eontroversy and the evolution
of Marx's ideas, it remains a type of technical
inquiry, only of immediate interest to the archaeologist of

ideas. roday, Marxism is an active and dynamic political
doctrine guides the social and political behavior of a
significant proportion of the world' s population.
i t can j ustifiably be asked, what, if any, ins'ights does an
understanding of Stirner's role in the evolution of Marx's
idea?, provide us in better grasping the function of
Marxism as an alive and active political ideology?
We hope to be able to aJ;lswer this question in several dis-'
tinctive ways. In utilizing the detailed observations we have
eatalogued above, together with additional insights, we will be
ovide supplementary evidence the never fully
86
Ibid
., p.
87
Ibid
., p.
suggested by N. Lobkowicz in the two
\
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!,
1
1.
1
1
1
,
1
1
1
1
o
0'
/
\
,.
- 8'7-
. .
. . .,.
pioneering stucHes we have utilized th.roughout our ry.
While we disagree with Lobkowicz on certain points of detair, we
, 0.-\
nevertheless fully accept the general thrust of his observations, !
\ c
and shall attempt to briefly dEfvelop thern more fully in this j .
final section.
,
The Lobkowicz thesis to which we are refering
but dramati: claim that Marx did not formulate the
conception of. history s imply after a "detailed and
is the simple

objective
study of so'cioeconomic reali ties", but rather MarX' was moti-
.>
vated "by a desire to defend philosophy of
total disillusionment the ideals,
issuing from the dissolution of Hegel's philosophy of Absoute
, 88
Knowledge". Lobkowicz goes on 'ta argue, that what at 1
first appears to be the of aIl Ideals to
.
historical necessities"'is in actuality an attempt to preserve
/'
/
/
/'
/
/\
. . 89
revolutionary ideals" by incorporating them in.to actual' hlst'ory".
Lobkowicz more precisely formuiates the distinction when he
1
claims that in Marx's rnaterialist conception of history he is J

)J
able "to retain the content of these Ideals without at the
same time refering ta thei'r norma ti ve haracter". .In correctly
'90
seei1).g The German Ideology as a defense, rather an attack,
Lobkowicz argues that Marx had to crete a theoretical framework
,
wherein reality was neither rendered in an ideal fashion, nor
totally rejected and denied, as in the case of Stirner.
lS8i.obkowiCZ, Th.ory and Practice, 401 a1so
see "KatI Marx and Max Stirner", op. ci t., p. 89.
t
89Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice, op.cit., p. 408.
90
Ibid
., p. 403.
,
1
1 1
i
1
1
{
i
\
- --- -- --------------...,..,-----
, 1
---- -'-,----

)
-
..
The interesting aspect of this thesis is its
,power. Not only does 1t pinpoint what motivated Marx to develop
""
the conception of historiat this particular juncture
(:
in his intellectual development, but it also illuminates a
centr.al' inconsistency which has- Marxi#t scholars over
the last century. Marx's onJy against Stirnerts vigo?ous
1
- renunciation of aIl was t,b explain proletarian activity
1
1 -
"completely independent of philorsophical ideas. ,,91 What has
often been critically as determinism, or his eschatol?,
can -now fe explained as Marx'/ unsuccessful attempt to deny
/
any proscription for revolutionary action, while simultaneously
seeing activity as inscribed in the natural
history of man. f
What earl r had been as an
ideal is now dscribed
necessi ty a.ndf the revolutionry role of
the has been replaced by a
historical dialectic entirely independent
of ide as. 92
The implication of this thesis is that Stirner's arguments
'1
forced Marx -iflto a pos i tion where he fei t it was necessary to,
reject aIl ideals. The result was -
author on to force Marx "to move part of
toward method"; 93 an aspect exaggerated
of the practi tioners of Marxism.
o
1..
can, cite passages from The Grundrisse or Capital with the
objective of demonstrating Marx tempered the position
/
91Lobkowicz, and M. Stirner", op.cit., p. 88.
92 .
90.
Palace, op.cit., p. 66.
1
--_. - _.--_.-
,
..
Il'
()
Ii
outlined in The German Ideology, we beleve the arguments Marx
developed in response to Stirner remained, throughout his
.
t,he guide.ne for distinguishing between science on hand
andif philosophy as id:ology on the other. 94
Marx, in responding to Stirner's throughgoing rejection
of any re
formulated
(almost dialectically)
eality - in its only acceptable
becomes the sole ground for
The cri tique
- which is contained in the second
volume of The Idelogy - fouses in on the True Socialists'
"unscientific" assumptions and "crude empiricism" 96 From
this point on in his intellectuai career, Marx drops any
explicit discussion of ethics. And as the section on "True
Social ism" reveals, Marx is critical of those who openly articu-
late an ethic. However, we believe, Marx is simply disguising
his own moralJPosition as historical and developrnental laws. It
is simply to deduce the type of detailed prognostica-
tion of social d,eve-lapment that Marx offers ,us in The Ideologr,
from empirical observations that he (or anyone else) could
i.salate. What Marx has' done is to hypostasi ze his deeply
94This could be demonstrated by examining the shift we
find in Marx's use of the and 'philosopher' 1
in the Theses on Feuerbach a'fter.
, know a science, the science of history".
MECW, Vol. V. Op.C1t., r
96 Ibid., p. 455. \
:
!
i
1
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t
f
f
t
t
1
1
f
~
1
~
o
tl
felt belief"s about the all-Found development of the individual
into the basic fabric of social development. In denouncing
..
,
\
even the shadow of Hegelian idealism : which Marx felt com-
peiled to do in response to Stirner - Marx becomes dependent on
another Hegelian cdncept of immanent development (i.e., progress),
which ironically is an idealist construction as weIl. Although
Marx's analysis is superbly argued, the problems aIl emerge
when he'attempts to deduce future events and behavior from
history. This is clearly beyond the s c o ~ e of any known 'science',
and, as the last century has demonstrated, it has been the
greatest source of Marx's errors. For example, consider the
following passage .
... from the conce tion of histor set forth
br us we obtain among several ot er 0 ser-
vations, that] a class is called forth which
has to bear aIl the burdens of society wi thout
enjoying its advantages, which is ousted from
society forced into the sharpest contra-
diction to aIl other classes; a class which
forms the majori ty of aU members of society,
and from which emanates tne consciousness
of the necessity of a fundamental revolu-
\. 97
tlon ...
. Marx was clearly and simply wrong about several specific aspects
of soiai and political development in the western capitalist
world. However, Marx's method cannot be faulted when it is the
object of that method that has undrgone unexpected alteration.
However, as modern exploration in the method of social research
\
has' revealed, the mul'tifaceted presuppositions and theoretical
assumptions latent in Marx's theory of immanent development
9'Ibid., p. 52.
---------_. -- ." .. --. -- _.
\ J
!
i
,
,
1
.. ...... - ........ --------------
o
,
"
i
-91-
are in tension with a ffrm1y grounded human axiology.98
In conclusi?!) then" it is certainly not possible at this
point to provide conclusive evidence documenting Lobkowicz's
thesis about the behind the development of the material-
ist conception of history, (assuming such conclusive evidence

does exist). We can nevertheless softIy assert that Marx's
new understanding of history does a remarkable job at meeting
aIl of the objectives delineated.by Stirner with regard to
aIl previous Young Hegelian formulations.
In adopting the position of the materialist eonception
of history at this juncture, Marx left the highly suspected
realm of politics and gained the tremendous prestige and power
-,
of science, whih received the tmost respect at aIl levels 1
of society. Yet, added benefit - from an
mehtal point of view - into disaster, as the
events of the first half of the Twentieth century document.
With the cold and nard objective 10gic animating the scientific
socialist, the greatest absurdities and atrocities were per-
perpetrated in the name of human liberation.
98While we cannot explore this interesting topic at this
juncture, see the insightful in Albrecht WeIler,
Critical Theory of Society, (New York, Seabury Press,
1976) and Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human lnterest,
(Boston, Beacon Press, 1971)
L __ . ______ --
!
f
i
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!
l,
1
-j
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o
IV CONCLUSION
"
In the preceding chapters we have seen the
, '
unfolding of an untold aspect of the intellectual development
. .
of Karl Marx. In a sense, we have isolated what had previously
been seen as an insignificant moment in Marx's development,
and have hopefully altered that assessment by careful historical
documentation. While the calI for a reevaluation of Max
Stirner's role within Marxist studies was the main objective of
,this thesis, we also took the additional step of attempting to
inteypret precisely what role Stirner played in
toward Marx's formulations: It is in this second, and
more interpretive domain, that it becomes necessary ta emphasize
the speculative and highly tentative nature of our conclusions.
cl ,
In the brief remarks that follow, we will attempt to sepcyrate
the substantive from the speculative aI1;d thereby characfeTi ze
the area's requi ring addi tional exploration. -
o
In the earlier chapters it was necessary to situate, both
,
biographically and intellectually, Max Stirner's raIe within
, ,
the 19th century political and social philosophy. This was
required due ta the pauity of material and a' general lack of
awareness of Max Stirner's theofY of individuality, and the
social and intellectual context out of which it developed. We
were then position whete it was possible, through a
<l&reful ,exegetical examination, to document the previous;y
unrecognized impact that Max Stirner had on Karl Marx during a
- ...... _--_. -- -- .. ------- . ,- -- - --1
"
..
.
f,. .... r_,,, .._____ ... _,_ .. ,... ..... _ .. _. ______ ._,_, ______ _
-
o
.
-93-
"-
sensitive and formative period. By attemptirig an intellectual
1
-
reconstruction activity during this period,
through the use of published and unpublished manuscripts, private
-letters and notebook en tries, we were able to sketch a series
1
of interchanges between Marx, Engels, Feuerbach and Stirner,
'Vihich clearly reveals a' previous.1y unrecognized role tha t Sti rner' s
thought played in Marx's rejection of Feuerbach.
"
,
We were careful to avoid the hast y assumption that Stirner' s
critique of Feuerbach was a sufficient catalyst in helping
initiate Marx's rejection of Feuerbath. While the prima facie
evidence seems to t this assumption, w: provided addi tional
information which instead, closely linked Marx's rejection of
with Feuerbach's response to Stirner's critique.
This, in essence, .is a thematic recap itula tron of what w"'e have
called above, the substantive contribution of this thes is.'
It is in the other area, what we have calle.d the interpre-
ti ve domain, wherein our attempts of recons truction and asses smen t
, "J \
are grounded on more and.less exacting data,
and are subjectto substantial revision contingent upon additional
research in area and in Marxist studies in general. It ois
in this context that we have suggested that the mature Marx's
understanding of the raIe and status of ethics and his for-
mulation of the materialist conception mf history was influenced
, ,)
by-his reading of Stirner.
, ,
There little doubt that there are signi,ficant shifts in
Marx 1 s exposition of ethics from The HOly Fami,ly to The German
'C
.. ___ _____ ... -_ ...
1
- 1
. .
o
..

- 9lt- '.
:
Ideo1ogy.l
Q J'
Yet we suggested in our. discussion of that tapie" that
Stirne'r forced Marx "to ref1ect upon the of ethical Gon-
, ,
structs, which helped to the i\1egree to which his
previously held beliefs in 'humanism' were to a large extent'
Christian in origin". 2 This must remain simply suggestion until
1 ,
additional research' is undertaken in Marxist ethics
,
Our discussion of the rnaterialist concption of history
is !qually limited due to the 1ack of preliminary research in
"
this area. In this section of our thesis
3
we attefnpted to argue
that the materialist conception of histo'ry can be seen a defense
agains the idealist tendencies thought he had uncovered
in aIl previous Young Hegelian formulations: inc1uding Marx:s.
Ta what extenCt we can view the materialist conception of history
as arising out of this dynamic, must await additional research.
,
It is important to emphasize that the issues that lie beneath
the surface of these topics go far beyond the scope of intellectual
clilriosity and l:ike Marxism itself, force us to challenge and
"" ,
explore the social exi'stence we t.ake for gral1ted.
fsee
Chapter 3, Section C, "Marxism and Modern Moral i ty" .
0
2See
Chapter 3, p. 86. ,
,
3
0ur Chapter 3, Section D, "The Materialist Conception of
His tory"
,.
, .
1 \
"
.'
o
- --- - - --- - ---,..--- --... ---
..

BIBLIOGRAPHY
(f'
q
The works presented in this bib1iography are divided into
c1early defined categories for1easy reference and examnation.
No work is repeated mq,!e than o,pce, even though i t may 10gicallY I:i "
fa11 into two 01, more categories. such instances, a work
is 1isted in its primary grouping, its use in
this thesis. 1
.
A. WORKS BY STIRNER (AND SELECTED
,
..
1
Stirner, Max. Der . teipzig:
Wigund, 18'T":'S-.,-......... ...--.-..,.-...,........-,-,.-----:-t'-----+-re au by Marx and
1
Enge,ls. ]
Max. The Ego and is Own: The Case of the 'Individua1
Authoritr, translated by Steven T. Byington,
e ited with an by James J. Martin. New York:
Dover Publications, Iftc., 1973.
Max. The Ego His Own, trans1ated by S. Byington
.with an introduction hy J. L. Walker and a
Preface" by B. Tucker. London: A. C. 1913.
1
Stirner. Max,- The Ego and His Own,oedited and introduced by
Carroll. London: Johathan Cape, 1971. brief
se1ect>ons from Sti rner
1
? "IVi t and Religi6n"," ... Fa1se,
E<1lcation" and "Recensenten Stirners".)
'"
Stirner, le of
by Robert u e, e Ite y mes
Ralph Myles Pub1isher, 1967.
Kleinere Schriften und
Kr1tik seines Workes: Der Einzige und
Berlin: Schuster and
B. WORKS WITH REFERENCE TO STIRNER
,
tion,
0, orado
l
\ Springs:
,
,
Entgegnngen auf die
sein Eigen,thum.
l'9 " d.l l'l
Apter, 'David and James JolI, editors. Anrchism Today. London: -dl
Macmillan Press Ltd., .1_970, 1971.'
Stirner.
!
l

--
,
i
1
o
o
Nicholas. The Beginnin
t
and the End. Gloucester,
Mass.: Peter Smith, Publis er, 1952.
Berdyuev, Niko1ai. S1avery and Freedom. _New York: Charles
Scribner's S0ns, 1944.
,
Bodenheimer, Edgar. "Philosophica1 Anthropo1ogy and the Law",
Law Review, Vol. 59, Ig72, pp. 653-682.
Bose, Atindranath. A History of Anarchism. Calcutta: The
D ' Wor1d Press Ltd., 1967.
Buber, Martin. "The Question to Single One" in Between
Man and Man. Collins, 1947.
"
Camus, Arbert. The Rebe1. Trans1ated by Anthony Bower.
New YQrk: Vlntage Books, 1956.
Carlson, Andrew. Anarchism in Germany. Vol. 1: The Early
. Movement. Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, 1972' .
..
The Anarcho-
Dostoevs
Carter, April. The Political Theory of Anarchism. New York:
Harper and Row, 1971.
r:.!
Carus, Paul. and Other Exponents of Individualism.
Chicago: Open Court, 1914.
Casseres, Benjamin De. Fort y Immortals. New York: Joseph
Lauren Publisher, 1926.
Georges. The Philosophy of Nietzsche. New
York: Haskell House Publishers, 1971
Clark, John P. Max Stirner's Egoism. London: Freedom Press,
1976.
Cop1eston, Frederick. A History of Philosophy, Volume VII,
Fichte to, Nietzsche., Westminster: The Newman Press,
1963.
E1tzbacher, Paul. Anarchism: Exponents of the Anarchist ,
Translated by Steven T. Byington, edited by
James J :artin. New York: uChip' s Bookshop, Booksel1ers,
. apd Publisheis, n.d.
Fermi, Laura. Mussolini. Chicago: The Qniversity of Chicago
Press, 1961.
Fleischmann, Eugene. '''The,Role of the Individual in Pre-Revolu-
tionary Society: Stirner, Marx, Hegel", in Hegels' Political
Phi1osophy: Prob1ems and 'Perspectives, edited by Z.A.
Pelczynski. Cambridge, 1971.
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Fow1er, R. B. "The Anarchist Tradition of Politica1 Thought",
The Western P01itical Quarterly, Vol. 25, pp. 738-752, 1972.
Friedrich, Carl J. "The Anarchist Controve:sy over VIolence",
Zeitschrift Fur P01itk, Vol. 19, pp. 167-177, 1972.
Gide, Charles and ChrIes Rist. A History of Economie Doctrines.
Boston: D.C. Heath nd Co., 1915.
Helms, Hans G. Die Ideologie der Anonymn Geselschaft. Koln:
Verlag M. DuMong Schauberg, 1966.
Horowitz, Irving Lewis, editor. The Anarchists. New York:
Dell Publishing Go., Inc., 1964.
Huneker', Egoists: A' Book of Supermen. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909.
Huneker, James. "Max Stirner" in The North American Review, Vol.
185, June 1907, pp. 332-337.
JolI, James. The Anarchists. New York: Grosset and'Dunlop,
1964.
Jordan, Z. A. "The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Sti rner", The
American Po1itical Science Review, Vol. 68, 1974, pp. 776-
768.
Krimerman, Le6nard I. Patterns A of

Writings on the Anarc New or .
BOe>ks, 1966.
Lak6ff, Sanford. Equa1ity in Political Philosophy. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1964.
Levy, Altert. Stirner et Nietzsche. Paris, 1904;
Lobkowicz, Nicholas.
from Aristotle ta
Dame Press, 1967.
Lobkowicz, N. "Karl Marx and Max Stirner" in
Marxism: A Series of Studies on Marxism, Fredericn J.
Adelmann, editor. Tne Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.
John Henry. Max Stirner: Sein Leben und sein Werk.
Berlin: Bernhard Zach's Verlag, 1889, 1910 .
. Masaryk, Thomas G. 'Humanistic Ideals. Translated by W. Preston
. Bucknell Unlversity

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Paterson, R.W.K. The Nihilisti'c Egoist: Max 5tirner.
Oxford University Press,' 1971.

Read, Herbert. and Order: Essays in Po1itics.
London: Faber & aber, 1954.
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Read, Herbert Edward. The Tenth Muse: Essays in Criticism, 1
Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Pfess, 1959.
\
Riley, Thomas A. "Anti-Statism in German Literature, as Exern':'
plified by the Work of John Henry Mackay", in PMLA,
Volume 62,1947, pp. 828-843. --
Riley, Thomas A. Germany's Poet-Anarchist John Henry Mackay,
New York: The Revisionist PrSs, 1972.
Russell, Max Ernest: Life & Work. London: Thames
and Hudson, 1967.
G. Egotism in German Phi1osophy. J. M: Dent and
Sons, Ltd., n. d.
Stepe1evich, Lawrence S . "Max Stirner and Ludwig Feuerbach",
in Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3.
(Ju1y-Sept. 1978), pp. 451-463.
Stepelevich, la.,wrence. "The Revivai of Max Stirner", Journ1
of the History of Ideas, "Vol. 35, 1974, pp. 323-328.
Thomas, Paul. "Karl Marx and Max Sti rner", Poli tical Theory,
Vol. 3, No. 2, May 1975, pp. 159-179.
Tucker, Benjamin R. Individua1 Selections From the
Writings of Benjamin R. Tucker, e ited by C.L.S. New
York: The Revisionist Press, 1972. (First pub1ished 1926)
Willoughby, Weste1 W. The Ethical Basis of Politica1 Authority.
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1930.
Woodcock, George. Anarchisrn: - A l.sfor{ of Libertarian Ideas
and Movernents, New York: New ffierlcan Library, 1962.
, ,.
, Woodcock, George. Herbert Read: The Stream and the Source.
London: Faber and Faber, Ltd., 1972.
C. WORKS ON HEGEL AND THE YOUNG HEGELIANS

Avineri, Shlomo. Hege1's Theory of the Modern State. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1972.
,
Avineri, Sh10mo. "The Hegelian Origins of Marx's Political
Thought" Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, Septernber 1967,
pp. 33- 50.
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Brazill, William J. The Young Hegelians. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1970.
Caird, Edward. Hegel. Edinburg: William Blackwood and Sons,
1933.
Caton, Hiram. "Marx',s Sublation of Philosophy into Praxis",
in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 26, Dec. '1972, pp. 233-
259.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Essence of Christianit. TranSl,ated
by GDrge Eliot. New Yor: Harper an Row, 1957.
Feuerbach, Ludwig. The Fiery Brook: Se1ected Writings of Ludwig
Feuerbach. Trans1ated with an Introduction by Zawar Hanti.
New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1972.
.r
Feuerbach, Ludwig. IIIIUber das Wesen des Christentumsllllin Bezielhung
auf .den "Einzigeri und sein Eigentum" (1845) in Kleine
Philosohische Schriften (1842-1845). Leipzig: Verlag
Felix Miner, 1950.
Findlay, J. N. Hegel: A Re-Examination. London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1958.
Harris, H. S. "Hegelianism of the JRight
'
and 'Left'" in The
Review of Metaphysics, (11),.1958, pp. 603-609.
Hegel, G.W.F. The Phenomenology of Mind.
duction by J. B. Baillie. New York:
Translated with intro-
Harper and Row, 1967.
Hepner, Benoit. "History and the Future: The Vision of August
Creszkowski", in Review of Poli tics, Vol. lS (July 1953),
pp. 5 2 8 - 349 .
Hook, Sidney. From Hegel to Marx: Studies in the Intellectual
of Karl Marx. Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press, 1950.
Hyppo1ite, Jean. Studies on Marx and Hegel.
-introduction by John O'Neill. New York:
Inc., 1969.
Translated with an
Basic Books,
Kamenka, Eugene. The Philosophie of.Ludwig London:
Rout1dge & Kegan Paul, 1970.
Kaufman, Walter. A,Reinterpretation. New York:
Anchor Books" 1 66.
Lichtheim, George. From Marx ta Hegel.' New York: Herder and
Herder, 1971.
Lobkowitz, N. "Eschatology and the Young Heg\elians", in Review
of Politics, Vol. 27, No. 3, (July 1965), pp. 434-439.
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Lowith, Karl. From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in
Nineteenth Century Thought. Translated by Davi Green.
London: Constable & ,Co., 1965.
McLellan, The Young Hegelians and Karl Marx. London: Macmillan,
-- 1"%9.
Taylor, Charles. Hegel. Cambridge: University
Press, 1977.
Stace, W. T. The Philosophy of Hegel. New York: 'Dover
Publications, New York, 1955.
D. WORKS BY MARX AND ENGELS (WITH REFERENCE TO STIRNER)
Engels, Frederich. Germany: 'Revolution and Counter-Revolution.
London: 1933.
Engels, Frederich. Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical
German Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1946.
Marx, Karl and Frederich En'gels and V.' I. Lenin. Anarchism and
Anarcho-Syndtcalism. New York: International Publishers,
1972.
Marx, Karl and Fredeiich Engels. Collected Works, Volumes
New York: International Publishers, 1975-77.
Marx, Karl, and Frederich Engels. Selected Correspondence.
Translated by I. Lasker. Moscow: Progress Pu6lishers
Third Edition, 1975.
Marx, Karl. Writings of the Marx on /Philosophy and Society.
Translated and by Loy P. and Kurt H.
Guddat. New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1967.
E. WORKS ABOUT MARX AND ENGELS, MARXISM
Acton, H. B. The Illusion of the Epoch. London: Colmen &
West Ltd., 1955.
Adams, H. P. Karl Marx in His' Earlier Writings. New York:
Atheneum, 1972. [Firih edition, London, 1940).
,
Althusser, Louis. For Marx. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, Englaria:
p'enguin Books, 1969.
Ash, William. Marxism and Moral Concepts. New York: MonthlY
Review Press, 1964.
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Avineri, Shloms. The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
Ber.lin, Isaiah. Karl Marx: His Life and Environment. New York:
Oxford University Press, A Galaxy Book, 1959.
Block, Ernst. On Karl Marx. New York: Herder and Herder, 1971.
COTnforth, Maurice. Dialectical Materialism: An Introduction .
. London: Lawrence & Wishart Ltd., 1955.
Dietzgen, Joseph. Sorne of the Philosoehical Essays on Socialism
and-Science, Re!lglon, Ethics; CrItique of Reason and the
World-at-Large. Translated by M. Beer and T. Rothstein.
Chicago:- Charles H. ferr & Co., 1912.
Dupre, Louis. The Foundations of Marxism.
New York: Harcourt, Brace &.World, Inc., 1966.
Fedoseyev, P.N., et. al.
by Uuri Sdobnikov.'
Karl Marx: A Biograthr. Translated
Moscow: Progress Pu llshers, 1973.
Fetscher, Irving. "The Young and the Old Marx", in Marx and the
Western World. Edited by Nicholas Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1967.
Fe'uer, Lewis. "Ethical Theories and Historical Materialism"
in Science and Society, Vol. 6, 1942, pp. 242-272.
Hammen, Oscar. The Red '48ers: Karl Marx and Fredrich Engels.
New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969.
Harrington, Michael. The Twilight of Capitalism. New York:
, Simon and Schuster, 1976.
W. O. The Life of Friedrich Engels, Volume I.
London: Frank,Case, 1976.
Hodges; Donald Clark. Socialist Humanism: The Outcome of
Classical Morality. St. Louis: /Warren H.
Green, Inc., 1974.
1
Hook; S. Towards an Understanding of Karl Marx: A Revolutionary
Interpretation. London: Victor GolJ_ncz, Ltd., 1933.
Howard, Dick. The Marxian Dialectic. llinois: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1972.
Jordan,-Z. A. Tge Evolution of Dialectical Materialism. London:
Macmillan, 1967.
Jordan, Z. A., ijditor with I.ntroduction. Karl Marx: Economy,
Class and Social Revolution. London: Michael Joseph

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Kamenka, Eugene. Marxism and Ethics. London: Macmillan and
Co., 1969.
Henri. The Socio1ogy of Marx. New York: Vintage
Books, 1969 .
. -, ,--
Gordon. Tyranny of Concepts: A Critique of Marxism.
\ London: The Merlin Press, 1961.
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Norman. The Tragic Deception: Marx Contra Engels.,
'1 Ox"f 9rd : Clio Books, 1975. '
Livergood, Norman D. Activity in Marx's Philosophy. The Hague;
Martinus Nijhoff, 1967.
McLe11an, David. Karl Marx: His Life and Th(Ught. New York:
Harper and Row, 1973.
/
McLe11an, David. Marx Befere Mprxism. New York: Harper
Row, 1970.
-
Mandel, Ernest. The Formation of the tconomic Thought of Karl
Marx. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
Mehrin,g, Franz. Karl Marx: The Story ef His Translated
by Edward Fitzgerald, new introduction Max Shachtman.
Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan -Press, 1962.
Meszaros, Istvan. Marx' s Theory of Alienation.' London:" Merlin
Press, 1970. )
Mquire, John: Paris Writing: An Ana1ysis. Gi,l! and
Macmillan, 1972. -
Boris and Otto Maenchen-Be1fen. Karl Marx:
Man and Fighter. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England:
. Penguin Books, 1973.
Peekhanov, George. Anarchism and Socialism. 'Trans1ated by
Eleanor Marx AveHng. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Co.,
1912.
Schoff, Adam. Marxism and tQe Human Individual. New York:
1970.
Schmidt, Alfred. The Concept of Nature in Marx. London:
New Left Books, 1971.
Sowe11, Thomas. "Karl Marx and the Freedom of the Individual",
in Ethics, Vol LXXIII) 1962-63, pp. 119-125.
Tucker, Robert C. anti in Karl Marx. Cambridge:
Cambridge ress, 19 7.
Venab1e, Vernon. Human Nature: The Marxian View. l' York:
Alfred'A. Knopf, Publisher, 1945.

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G. HISTORlCAL SETTING
Gay, Peter and R: K. Webb. Modern Europe. New York: Harper
an d Row, 197 3 .
Hamerow, T1aeodore E. -Rest ration Revolution
Princeton: Princetdn Iverslty Press, 1958.
.. Hammen, Oscar. "The Spect of Communism in the 1840' s" in
Journal of the History of ldeas, Vol. 14, 1953, pp. 404-420 .
Hobsbaum, E. J. The Age of Revolution, 1789-1848. New York:
New American Library, 1962.
lA
Mann, Golo. The History of Ge/many Since 1789. Trans1ated by
Marian Jackson. London: Chutts & Windus, 1968.
Pasley, Malcolm, Editor. Germany: A Companion to German
Studies. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1912.
l. Modern Germany: lts History and Civi1ization.
New York: Macmillan Co., 1966.
Ramm, Agatha. Germany 1789-1919: A Po1itica1 History.
London: Methuen & Co., 1967.
Snell, John L. The Democratie Movement in Germany 1789-1914.
Edited and comp1eted by Hans A. Schmitt. Chapel Hill:
The University of North Caro1ina Press, 1976.
Stadelmann, Rudolph. Social and Political History of the German
1848 Revolution. Translated by James G. Chastain.
Athells: ohio University, 1975.'
Treitschke, Heinrich von. History of Germany in the Nineteenth
Century. Trans1ated by Eden & Cedar Paul, edited by
Gordon A. Craig. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Pre s s, 1975.
Ward, Adolphus William. Germany 1815-1890. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1916.
Wilson, Edmund. To the Finland Station; A Study in the Writing
and Actin! of History. New York: Fariar, Straus and Giroux,
1940, 197 .
G. OTHER RELEVANT WORKS
Cervantes, Miguel de, Suavedra. The Adventures of Don uixote.
Trans1ated by J. M. Cohen. - Ba tlmore: Penguln Boo s, 1950.
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Lange, Frederick Albert. History of Materia1ism. Translated by
Ernest C. Thomas, in three volumes. London:- Trubner &
Co., 1877.
MacPherson, C. B. The Polittcal Theory of Possessive Individua1ism.
Oxford: Oxford University, Press, 1962.
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