Professional Documents
Culture Documents
e DOI: 10.1080/09592296.2010.482472
Diplomacy Statecraft 1557-301X 0959-2296 & Statecraft, Vol. 21, No. 2, Sep 2010: pp. 00 FDPS
The article has two main theses: first, that from 1958 to 1967 Charles de Gaulles presidencythere was a typical patron-client relationship between France and Israel that lasted until the Six Day War. It challenges the frequent claim in the literature that relations between Israel and France did not essentially change after de Gaulles rise to power. Second, it argues that the basis on which this relationship was founded was rocky from the start since as a client, Israel was not ready to accede to French demands that it restrain its security policy to conform to key French interests.
There is a tendency in the literature to regard FrancoIsraeli relations between the Fourth Republic, which collapsed in May 1958 over the Algerian problem, and de Gaulles regime that followed, as a continuum. The literature sees different factors like the amount of military aid, which France supplied to Israel, or cooperation between the countries armies as proof of the relationship staying the same. But the political documentation suggests that the transition from the Fourth to the Fifth Republic witnessed a change in the French governments view of the relationship that considerably influenced the interaction between France and Israel: from an equal partnership to a less equal patron/client pattern. The features of the patron-client relationship in international relations is important to understanding the research topic and therefore the first section of the article sets out a brief theoretical analysis of this concept. The second section gives a short survey of FrancoIsraeli relations during the later years of the Fourth Republic and the carry-over of arms supplies to Israel in the de Gaulle period. The main body of the article is devoted to examining the spheres in which patronage was evident in Frances relationship with Israel. The theoretical term patron-client relationship is useful to better understand FrenchIsraeli relations from 19581967. Although in politics patronage/clientilism is generally studied in the interpersonal context, its relevance to understanding the relations between cooperative bodies such
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as states has been recognised. Eisenstadt and Roniger have identified numerous distinct characteristics of patron-client relationships. Such relationships involve an exchange of different types of resources between sides that are ill-balanced in power terms and where the patron holds positions that are crucial from the clients point of view. Generally speaking, these relationships are not founded on a formal contract but based rather on a mutual understanding, a certain degree of solidarity, and the expectation of loyalty.1 Shoemaker and Spanier argue that patron-client relationships are intended first and foremost to promote the security of the parties involved.2 Thus, in many instances, the end of these relationships ties in with a change in the strategic importance of one of the parties.3 The literature in international relations stresses two key features of the patron-client relationship.4 First, patron-client relationships involve a pattern of exchange of services. The patron responds to what the client regards as its supreme interest mostly securityand in return expects to be paid in a variety of coins.5 So, for example, the patron expects political support from the client say in international forums, economic opportunities such as opening its markets to goods produced by the patron or services it supplies,6 or improvement of its international standing through the demonstrations of loyalty and obedience. Above all, the client must refrain from undermining important interests of the patron, namely by giving up its freedom of movement to some degree. Second, patron-client relationships are based on unequal duties. Normal relations between countries are based on the principle of reciprocity. Accordingly, if one country makes a gesture to another country it expects the other country to pay, usually in the same coin. If Country A votes in line with Country Bs wishes in the UN it is entitled to expect that Country B will vote for it on issues that it feels are important. In contrast to this, patron-client relationships are based on an asymmetrical equation: it is based on an unwritten contract for the exchange of non-comparable goods or services.7 The client cannot expect such symmetrical reciprocity. Often it is expected to show sensitivity for a variety of the patrons interests and to help the patron to achieve themeven if it is not requited in the same coin and even if at times those interests clash with its own.8 The more vital the assistance given by the patron to the client, the more dependent the latter is on it and the more willing it will be to meet the demands of the former even to the detriment of its own interestsas long is they are not harmful to interests that are more crucial than the assistance it receives. The two years from the Suez War and the end of the Fourth Republic were a honeymoon for the FrenchIsraeli friendship.9 That friendship relied on a shared interest regarding the conflict with Nassers Egypt over his aid to the Algerian rebels and his commitment to the struggle against Israel. But very soon the relationship became a strategic partnership with unique characteristics. The last government of the Fourth Republic spoiled Israel in a way that was very rare in international relations. Noteworthy in this
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context was its willingness to supply Israel with a nuclear reactor and even more astonishingly a plutonium extraction plant for obvious military purposes that could have caused trouble for France.10 The defence establishments of the two countriesShimon Peres, the Director General of Israels Defence Ministry had an office at the French Defence Departmentenjoyed the closest, one could say intimate, relationship. France supplied Israel with large quantities of arms, some of it at no charge. France also gave Israel almost unqualified support at the United Nations (UN).11 Finally, France helped Israel economically despite its meagre resources during that period. The depth of this aid was of course tied to French strategic interests, though that was not the only motive. It had a powerful ideological and emotional dimension which was expressed among other things in testimonies by the key figures of the French government at the time, for example, prime minister Guy Mollet, defence minister and subsequent prime minister, Maurice Bourges-Maunoury, and foreign minister Christopher Pineau. We cannot fathom the depth of French aid and the unusual conditions in which it was given without recognising the ideological-emotional dimension. This dimension and the nature and amount of aid that France gave Israel during this period have led researchers to see their relationship as that of allies and friends. That was also how their relationship was described when de Gaulle came to power in June 1958. The existing literature mostly sees the continuation of Frances massive military aid to Israel in the de Gaulle era as proof that the relationship stayed the same. Indeed, in this area, no major change occurred in French policy. Thus, in June 1958 a few days after de Gaulle came to power the new government approved the sale of Vautour bombers to Israel. A month later during the Middle East crisis France agreed to Israels request for the sale of new Super Mystere aircraft. France also made a special gesture toward Israel and loaned her a large quantity of urgently needed mortar rounds in return for promising that France would receive munitions produced by Israels military industries in the future. Shimon Peres saw this as a special favour and conclusive proof of Frances ongoing friendship toward Israel.12 In November 1959, Israel and France signed a joint cooperation agreement to develop short-range rockets.13 In 1962, Israel received delivery of the most sophisticated aircraft that France could supplyMirages fighters. Overall during the early 1960s Israel received a flow of weapons whose quality and quantity were no less than in the period before de Gaulles election.14 In 1964 Israel persuaded France to sell 25 Ouragan fighters that the French air force had planned to remove from service, for a negligible sum of money.15 In early 1966, after consultation with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), Israels political echelon decided to order a further fifty fighter-bombers from the French Dassault company, which was asked to modify the technical specifications of the Mirage III to the special requirements of the Israeli theatre.16 In April 1967, the Israelis once again managed to obtain the
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agreement of the French Ministry of Armieswith de Gaulles approvalto lend Israel six Super Mystere fighter-bombers at no cost.17 Besides the supply of weapons, the general staff of the two countries maintained a close relationship throughout the period. Their intelligence branches held joint meetings every six months to exchange intelligenceat one point the meetings were cut back to once a year. France and Israel also developed a plan for French military intervention should Israel be attacked.18 Nuclear cooperation also continuedfull cooperation to the end of 1960 and then partial although ostensibly the decision was taken in principle to end it. In fact, de Gaulles claim in his book that he decided to end the excessively special relationship with Israel after he came to power,19 saw no practical expression in the years 19581961 and in several areas also up to 1963, leading one to suspect that this was a post-June 1967 construction.20 The facts listed above clearly show that, in terms of military aid, the de Gaulle era was a continuum of the Fourth Republic. However, these facts tell us nothing about the nature of the relationship between the two countries at this time. A reading of the political documents reveals that the transition between the Fourth and the Fifth Republic led to a change in the French regimes take on the nature of the relationship which had a substantial impact on the interactions between them. Increasingly, these interactions assumed the characteristic appearance of the classic patron-client relationship. French defence aid to Israel could be used by France to gain economical advantage. Israel quickly found that the new government was far less diffident than its predecessor about putting an economic price on patronage and sometimes being very direct about it. Israel found this hard to digest at first since it was used to expressions of French goodwill, including financial largesse, in the latter years of the Fourth Republic. The tanker affair was an obvious example of this and therefore it is described here in detail. Following this affair, Israel discovered that France expected it to make economic gestures and it was forced to accept the new rules. This is evident from Frances conduct also on other matters, such as the order for the passenger ship, the construction of the Port of Ashdod, the contract for the undersea cable, etc. After the Sinai War, Israel experienced an energy crisis. The Soviet Union, which had supplied Israel with about third of its oil needs, stopped its deliveries. The major oil companies gave in to the pressure of the Arab embargo and left the country. Fortunately for Israel, it found an alternative cheap source of oil: Iran, which for several of reasons was prepared to supply Israel with its oil requirements. To transfer Iranian oil to Eilat, Israel needed tankers. The five American tankers with a total tonnage of 93,000 tonnes that Israel hired did not supply the amount of oil Israel wished to transfer.21 It therefore decided to buy two 50,000 tonne tankers, which represented a massive financial outlay in those days. Given the great cost, it was important to obtain the most favourable possible conditions for
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purchasing the tankers. In December 1957 a French company called Chantiers Navals de La Ciotat (CNC) offered to build the first tanker.22 The Israeli government wanted to give the contract to a French company since it had a loan of thirty million dollars from France that allowed it to buy goods on favourable credit terms. In January 1958, the Israeli company Delek and the French company reached an agreement in principle over the sale of a tanker. But the French treasury department objected to buying the tanker using the thirty million dollar loan, thus greatly reducing the profitability of the deal to Israel, which could buy tankers more cheaply from other countries.23 As a result, Israel ordered the tanker from a Japanese company. When Israel indicated its intention to purchase a second tanker from Japan, de Gaulles new government went into action. It was leaked to Israeli ambassador Yaakov Tsur that, at a meeting of the top French government officials in which Israels defence purchases were discussed, bitterness was expressed over the fact that Israel seemed to think its friendship with France was unilateral. The ambassador warned his foreign ministry that failure by Israel to purchase the second tanker from France might seriously harm Israels acquisitions program and jeopardise further political aid from France.24 It was clear to him that new rules had been drawn up by the French administration, and that Israel should take it under consideration. But Israeli finance officials were not too concerned by this warning.25 The France government then took the offensive. It engaged in deliberate foot dragging over a special loan of fifteen million dollars, which Israel urgently needed for an oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashdod.26 In early October 1958, the loan transfer was approved in principle on condition that two million dollars would be spent buying a tanker from France. A few weeks later, the Israeli delegation in Paris for the annual bi-lateral trade negotiations agreement discovered that the French were refusing to increase the export quotas above previous years. The head of the French negotiating team openly explained that the quota problem would certainly be resolved if Israel ordered a tanker. The Israeli ambassador to Paris, who was closely involved in the negotiations, fully understood the message and described the situation bluntly: I see no possibility to ignore the French demands. Our relationship with France has reached the stage where our decisions must be dictated by the principle of reciprocity. This is true regarding the political, economical and cultural fields . . . the French government is entitled to expect that its political and defence aid will result in its industries gaining entry to Israel.27 It was a clear equation: the patron had the right to demand economic advantages from its client in exchange for the vital services it gave. However, the decision makers in Jerusalem were still used to making decisions with another equation in mind and had difficulty internalising the new rules of the game. Finance minister Levy Eshkol did not understand all the fussat the end of the day the French were to blame for not adapting themselves to the
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international market.28 Eshkol was stating a basic principle in the world of economics: the principle of not mixing business with friendship. For some reason, Eshkol overlooked the political reality. On 28 October, the charg daffaires of the French embassy in Israel informed a senior Israeli diplomat that: Israels refusal is creating an atmosphere of mistrust [toward Israel] in the upper echelons [in France] and if we do not find a way to halt this dangerous process we could face a grave crisis in a matter of months.29 Flooded with warnings and signals, the Israeli decision makers could not fail to grasp the message. On 29 October a meeting was held in Ben-Gurions office to discuss the matter, which was attended by Golda Meir, Eshkol, and the minister of trade and industry Pinchas Sapir. Ben-Gurion advised Sapir to go to France to settle the matter with the authorities. Sapir suggested raising the matter first with the French diplomats in Israel.30 At this juncture, the French charg daffaires was invited to meet with Meir and Sapir. The two Israeli ministers promised that the question of the tankers would be settled to Frances satisfaction.31 They also promised that, in the future, they would personally monitor all developments concerning Israels commercial ties with France.32 Coincidentally or not, a few days later on 5 November, the French government agreed to sign the pipeline loan.33 The tanker affair made it clear to Israel that the French government expected economic gestures in return for defence aid. The greatest economic attraction that Israel could present at that timeapart from equipping the armywas the project of building its merchant fleet. Because Israel could not utilise overland trade routes due to hostilities with its neighbours, the only possibility for trade with the rest of the world was via sea. Israel therefore decided in the late 1950s to invest massively in a sizeable merchant fleet financed in part by German reparations. In 1960 Israels merchant fleet totalled 280 thousand tonnes, with an additional 250 thousand tonne in constructionincluding three tankers: two from Japan and one from France. Israel allocated an additional $30 million for ships, giving a total tonnage of 700 thousand tonne. The acme of the new project was a massive 22,000 tonne passenger ship for almost $15 million. Since shipbuilding was at low ebb at this time, hope of gaining these massive orders drew attention from shipbuilders around the world. Israel naturally benefited from this competition, which it used to improve the purchase terms. These terms boiled down to three main elements: overall price, technical quality, and credit terms. From Israels standpoint, credit terms were the most important as the country had not capital to pay in the short term and needed to spread payments out and have a low rate of interest. French shipbuilders, competitive on the first two elements, offered poor terms of credit relative to other shipbuildersprobably because their shortage of orders had reduced their financial flexibility. However, the French shipbuilders enjoyed a very strong card vis a vis the other competitors: Israels wish to appease France by directing its
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orders to French firms. The large passenger ship was eventually ordered from a French shipbuilder even though the Belgians offered to build a ship of similar quality on conditions that undercut the French offer by $470,000. The economic attach at the French embassy in Tel Aviv admitted that for political reasons the Israeli government had tipped the balance by pressuringwhich included personal intervention by Ben-Gurionthe relevant persons.34 This was reiterated even more strongly at an Israeli government session.35 Some months later, the French shipbuilder won the order for two 10,000 tonne merchant ships. On this occasion as well political considerations were an important element in awarding the contract to the French firm rather than its Japanese and Dutch rivals.36 The clearest case of awarding a contract to French companies on political considerations was the case of Ashdod port. Israel required a commercial port that was located in the centre of the country and more proximate to its citrus orchards than the northern port of Haifa. Because Israel had received finance for this project as a World Bank loan, the Bank had the right to oversee the tender for the project. Some twelve companies responded to the tender. But quickly, just two companies were left in the race: the American Kaiser company and the French S.N.T.P group. Despite the apparent equality between the two companies, Israel decided to award the contract to the French company, and in order to justify its choice to the World Bank, calculated the dollar rate differently in each proposal: 1.80 Lira to the dollar in the French proposal and 2.20 Lira to the dollar in the American proposal.37 Israel ultimately paid dearly for this when the French project floundered when the quarry it worked with was unable to supply the raw materials for the breakwater.38 Moreover, in terms of the two countries balance of trade, Israel accepted the fact that the balance was clearly slanted in Frances favour, a trend which became distinctly unbalanced in time. In 1956 the ratio was 1:2.5 in favour of France, in 1958 1:3, in 1959 1:6, in 1960 1:8, and in 1961 it was as high as 1:10.39 For comparisons sake, at this time, the ratio of Israels imports to exports was 1:2; in other words, exports covered half the imports.40 France did not help to close the gap by refusing to liberalise its tariffs for Israel. So, for example, before the end of 1961 France refused to lower tariffs on agricultural goods to protect French local produce and North African merchandise from Israeli competition. Naturally, Israel was displeased about this and in negotiations sought to use this imbalance to squeeze concessions from France. Usually, however, such efforts failed though Israel never ignored its need to win Frances heart by making economic gestures. If in the sphere of trade Israel was willing to make gestures designed to win the heart of France, this was even more obvious in the cultural sphere. Whereas trade was still largely seen as outside politicsIsrael was happy to go toward France only if French prices were attractive and reasonably close
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to the best offer obtainedit understood that French pride lay in cultural matters and therefore saw concessions in this area as more legitimate. Thus we observe that in the early 1960s there was a definite attempt to introduce French language studies into Israeli schools despite being incongruent with Israels needs and its school populations wishes. In 19581959 the Israeli foreign ministry pressured the Quai dOrsai to sign a cultural agreement that basically rewarded France by introducing the French language into Israel.41 Nevertheless, the French delayed signing the agreement but eventually succumbed to the pressure by Israel and not wishing to break an explicit promise they had made. But once the agreement was signed, the Quai began pressuring Israel to implement the agreement and significantly increase the number of elementary schools and high schools in which French was taught as a first language. However, introducing French into the school system was no simple thing. In fact it was an artificial act, which was not possible to justify in terms of the Israeli markets needs. During its thirty years of rule the British mandate had established the primacy of English as Israels main foreign language. In any case, English was more important internationally than French, so that for reasons of usefulness no less than tradition Israel wanted to keep it. The ministry of education therefore took an unfavourable view on attempts to force French into the school curriculum at the expense of English. Needless to say, parents were less happy about it still.42 For these reasons, the education ministry decided to limit introducing French as a first language to only six elementary classes. When the joint IsraeliFrench commission for implementing the cultural agreement first convened in June 1960, the French were highly critical over the lack of impetus in teaching French in schools. Defensively, the Israelis agreed to add six more classes and to establish a pedagogic commission to examine ways of expediting the process.43 The foreign ministry found itself between a rock and a hard place: with Israels desire to please the French on the one hand, and on the other hand the intransigence of the education ministry and public criticism over what was seen as an attempt to make political capital on the backs of children. That summer, Davar, a newspaper linked to the party of government Mapai, published two articles containing a scathing attack on the new policy of forcing schools to teach French.44 This prompted the new French ambassador, Bourdeillette, to express concern to Israeli officials at what was seen as second thoughts by Mapai over the cultural accord. Consequently, a letter was sent to the editor of Davar by the foreign ministry gently requesting that Davar refrain from publishing things which produce a backlash in French circles, and give the impression that Davar is questioning an agreement signed by the Israeli government and which the government values.45 In the field, a special pedagogic commission set up for the purpose of introducing French into Israeli schools began to work. But, by the end of
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1960, the results seemed so unsatisfactory that the proposal was made to postpone the next meeting of the joint committee for fear of incurring the wrath of the French participantsfears of their reaction to postponing the meeting were even stronger and the idea was rejected.46 In fact, the speed at which French was introduced was faster than Israeli concerns would have indicated. Whereas in 19591960 seven classes studied French as a first language in five elementary schools and 32 classes in 6 high schools, in 19601961, the number rose to 34 classes in 16 elementary schools and 63 classes in 8 high schools. To this we should add in increase of 50 percent in the number of high school classes studying French as a second language.47 Israel, however, only saw weak gestures on Frances part. The lack of reciprocity became concrete when France would not recognise Israels high school matriculation (bagrut) as the equivalent of Frances baccalaurat, although Israel had fulfilled its side of the bargain by awarding French high school matriculation parity with its own.48 Though Israels education ministry grumbled about this, the foreign ministry insisted that it accept what the French had offered and not make a fuss over it.49 To Frances great disappointment, Israels rapid progress during 1961 in introducing French into Israeli schools proved short lived. This was due to the impetus given to the matter and the absorptive capacity of the education system. But once this absorptive capacity was filled, the Israeli foreign ministry had problems persuading ministry of education inspectors and school principals to adopt French as a first language without coercion. Yet, in coming years, the Israeli foreign ministry continued its efforts to introduce the French language into Israeli education system. Whilst Israels foreign ministry could not fully grant Frances wishes concerning the study of French, it found it easier to satisfy French demands of a less grand scope. These demands were made periodically always at the suggestion of the French ambassador who regarded granting cultural requests as justifiable payment for French patronage.50 Early in 1961, Voice of Israel (Kol Yisrael) radio decided to cancel its French program slot, as it could not be justified professionally. Bourdeillette fought this decision and raised the matter in discussions with the Israeli foreign minister and prime minister.51 As a result, the decision was made to continue French programming, for purely political reasons, and the programs were instead funded by the foreign ministry.52 A similar question arose with Israels French language newspaper, Information, faced with closure for financial reasonsinsufficient demand. For the same reasons, the foreign ministry temporarily agreed to fund the newspaper; in the end another arrangement was found. It would be wrong to minimise the significance of this move, which came at a time when the foreign ministry was chronically short of funds and needed finance for new projects in Africa. However, the belief that the spread of French culture was a key French interest and thus important instrument of gaining its goodwill made the sacrifice worthwhile.53
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France also expected payment in political coinage from Israel for the vital military aid that it supplied. This meant accepting the principle that Israel had to support French issues in international forums, particularly the UN, whilst France had no obligation to repay Israel on issues that were detrimental to its efforts to improve ties with the Arab world. At first, Israel, which had grown accustomed to a different type of equation in the couple of years between Suez and de Gaulles election, had difficulty accepting it, though in the end it was forced to tow the line. In December 1959 France refused to vote with Israel on two extremely important matters for Israel: the first was a vote in the UN General Assembly and the second was a vote in the World Bank Commission. These affairs clarified for the Israelis that they could not hope for symmetry in the way the two countries voted in international forums either. Whilst Israel was obliged to vote for France on matters of French importance, for example its tests in the Sahara and on Algeria, and to pay a political price for it, France felt under no obligation to repay Israel as in the past. The first incident was over the renewal of the UNWRA mandate, which was set to expire in 1960. In November 1959, Pakistan and Indonesia submitted a resolution to extend UNWRAs mandate for a further five years. The United States, which funded UNWRAs budget, decided it would submit an amendment reducing the mandate to just three years. To ensure that the Arabs would vote for the amendment, the United States added a paragraph calling for new measures to be examined to help the Conciliation Commission perform its role under UN Resolution 194 (11 December 1948).54 Israel considered this clause extremely dangerous, as its aim was to revive a body whose activities ran counter to Israeli interests. The Conciliation Commission was expected to propose concrete solutions to the problem of the refugees, of whom Israel would be required to admit a fair number. Israel therefore tried to persuade the United States to change the resolution amendmentin vain. At this point, Israel turned to France with the request that it would abstain in the vote on the problematic clauses. Israel put great store on Frances abstention. Not only would it help Israel avoid total isolation, but support for Israels position from a member of the Conciliation Commission would carry added moral weight. France found itself in a cleft stick: on the one hand it felt obliged to repay Israel for voting for France on the Sahara tests and Algeria and realised how crucial this issue was to Israel. But on the other hand, France did not wish to separate itself from the other western Powers and stand out in the Arabs eyes as the only country supporting the Israeli theses. Also, abstention could undermine its legitimacy as a member of the Conciliation Commission, which demanded impartiality, at least formally.55 Initially, the scales seemed to tip in Israels favour. Whilst recognising the difficulty that Frances abstention would cause, Frances UN ambassador, Berard, announced that unless he received contrary instructions he would accede to
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Israels request following its support for France on other issues.56 Couve de Murville refused however, to approve the French position agreed with Israel.57 The Israeli foreign minister was extremely disappointed. Yahil, the foreign ministry director general, asked the Israeli charg daffaires to convey the disappointment and anger of Israel, which on many occasions had unreservedly supported France against its own African interests, whereas France was utterly letting Israel down on the only issue it considered vital.58 In that days government session, ministers Peretz Naftali and Israel BarYehuda condemned France for its ingratitude, asking whether this could indicate a new position of France. Ben-Gurion as usual insisted on seeing matters in cold political terms. Israel did not have France in its pocket and must recognise this. Israel values Frances friendship because it supplies the weapons it needs for its survival: economic support was marginal as long as France continued to sell Israel arms.59 Concern over the emotional and moral aspects of the relationshipfor example, the talk about ingratitudewas not to the point. Ben-Gurions statements are truly fascinating as they may point to a change in the decision makers thinking on the nature of the relationship between the two countries. In the end, Israel was the only country to object the clause concerning the Conciliation Commission. Some days later, Israel turned to France with a further request. On 21 December 1959 there would be a meeting of the World Bank of which France was a member. One agenda item concerned a massive loan to Egypt of $56 million to widen the Suez Canal. Israel vehemently objected to this loan. For about six months, Israel and Egypt had been locked in a heated political battle following Egypts blockade of the Suez Canal to Israeli shipping and cargos.60 On this ground, Israel called for the Egyptian loan to be cancelled or at least suspended. President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, strongly objected to politicising the loan. The Americans and British, as predicted, also expressed their objections. The French were not happy about giving the grant to the Egyptians in general, but were afraid of being isolated from the other western Powers and appearing to Egypt as specially biased toward Israel. The only country that regarded Israels request favourably was Holland, a board member of the World Bank. However, the Dutch demanded that another country join the initiative to avoid appearing the only one to cause the Arabs problems. The most realistic partner was France. Frantic calls were made to the Quai, but with no results. The officials at the UN Department were reluctant to decide on their own and waited for Couves decision. Finally, just hours before the board of the Bank began its debate, Couves ruling was delivered: France would not set itself apart from the other western Powers. If Blacks address allowed any room for rejecting the loan, France would vote for it, but would not call for rejection alone.61 In the end, the board passed the loan to Egypt, unanimously. Bourdeillette, the new French ambassador in Tel-Aviv, was forced to absorb Israels
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frustration. Two high-ranking Israeli diplomats vehemently complained to him personally about what they considered French exploitation of Israel. Whereas Israel was called on to deliver the goods, France had no responsibility to pay Israel back. Friendship cannot be divided, stated one of them, asking the ambassador to convey this message to his government.62 But the warnings did not change the overall trend. In the following years, the French vote in international forums continued to reflect a neutral and often restrained policy toward Israel owing to French concern of upsetting the Arabs. In UN debates on various border incidents between Israel and its neighbours during the mid-1960sthe Almagor incident in August 1963,63 the Tel Dan incident in November 1964,64 and the Samu Operation in November 1966France criticised Israel and positioned itself more favourably toward the Arab theses compared to the Americans and British.65 During the entire period, Israel was required to support French affairs in the UN and almost always agreed.66 The Israelis were extremely bitter about the lack of equality in this area. However, they clenched their teeth and accepted the situation as long as France continued to supply Israel with arms. Aba Eban, Israeli foreign minister, expressed this clearly in the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee. Responding to complaints about Frances lack of support at the UN the foreign minister bluntly said: The fact is that France gives us the kind of help with our most vital interests that we never dreamed of even in the most important honeymoon days between our two countries.67 One advantage sought by France through its support for Israel was influence in the Middle East at a time when it enjoyed few remaining areas of influence. Its ability to influence Israeli policy was an asset to French relations with both the Great Powers and the Arabs. But, a patrons ability to pull its clients strings is always a function of the importance a client ascribes to a given question. Israel was ready to sacrifice its political and economic interests in order to keep France happy and pay it back for the materiel it supplied. However, it did not feel free to make concessions over issues it felt were of no less consequence to its security than the aid France provided. Unfortunately for France, those very issues were those it saw as vital to its interests. The de Gaulle government did not have long to wait to see just how little influence France had over Israeli security policy. The Middle East crisis of July 1958, which erupted weeks after he came to power, showed this very clearly.68 The background to the crisis was the 14 July revolution in Iraq, when nationalist extremists expelled the pro-Western Hashemite royal family, and the possibility emerged that the revolution would spread to two others pro-western Arab states: Lebanon and Jordan. Given the new developments, the United States and Britain decided to intervene. On 15 July, United States Marines landed on the beaches near Beirut. The next day the British began transferring troops to Jordan. One question that concerned the
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Western Powers, including France, was if revolt broke out in Jordan, Israel would conduct a pre-emptive strike and occupy the West Bank. Such a move could throw the region into further turmoil and even lead to war.69 During the crisis, French diplomats tried repeatedly to learn from their Israeli colleagues whether Israel was planning such an attack.70 They attempted to hint that it would be counterproductive for Israel to complicate matters still further. To their frustration Israel returned an unequivocal message: Israel would not stand by if King Hussein of Jordan went down. This was avowed by Shimon Peres, director general of the Israeli defence ministry, in his late July visit to Paris71 and again by Golda Meir when she visited in early August.72 Israeli clarifications did not stop de Gaulle from informing the Italian prime minister when they met that France has advised Israel not to cause any incidents, especially vis a vis Jordan, and Israel has understood Frances position.73 This remark shows Frances need to seem able to restrain Israel. With the end of the Algerian affair, after the Evian Agreement in March 1962, France sought an opportunity to re-establish a warm relationship with the Arabs. France thought that its relationship with Israel boosted its value in the eyes of Israels Arab neighbours, which assumed it was in a better position than any other country to restrain the Israelis. In this sense, not only were positive ties with Israel not an obstacle to Frances entry into the Arab world, but were actually an asset to achieving this. Already in September 1962, when France and Syria renewed diplomatic relations, the new French ambassador in Damascus was asked that France curb what was termed aggressive plans by Israel, following intelligence of Israeli troops amassing on Syrias border.74 A week later, Libya approached France on the same subject.75 Indeed, the French ambassador to Israel was ordered to contact Ben-Gurion with a personal message from de Gaulle saying Israel should avoid reprisals on the Syrian border. Ben-Gurion replied that Israel was determined to seek justice for itself and punish anyone who harmed her.76 Again, as in the 1958 crisis, there are indications of a major gap between the influence that others thought France had over Israel and Frances real ability to influence Israel on matters of its own security. But, the credit given to France could not last long without cover. A build up of hostilities between Israel and its neighbours marked the period from 1963 to the Six Day War. Ongoing attacks against Israel, mainly on the Syrian and Jordanian borders by irregular and regular units, produced harsh Israeli reprisals. These were often disproportionate to the original attack and proved how ineffectual the Western Powers were, and France especially, in forcing Israel to show restraint. In December 1964, Lebanon appealed to France to use its influence and convince Israel to agree to the diversion of more waters from the Hatzbani River than was specified in the Johnston Plan.77 Israel refused.78 Troubled, Lebanon appealed again to France to intervene with Israel. But Israel refused again, and asked France
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to instruct Lebanon to stop digging, saying that if it refused military measures would follow. Bowing to pressure from France and the US, Lebanon stopped digging in October 1965. In November 1965, an Israeli parachute unit raided the Lebanese village of Hula following an attack by Lebanese terrorists.79 Israels ambassador was summoned to the Quai and subjected to a harangue over Israels rash employment of disproportionate force when it fully realised the Lebanese government was trying its best to prevent such operations.80 It was the first time since the Suez War that France had formally protested against an Israeli operation against an Arab country.81 And this was no coincidence. The Hula reprisal was one more slap in the face for Franceproof of her inability to restrain Israel. Indeed, whereas from 19621964 the Arabs appealed to France on several occasions to use its influence with Israel and urge restraint, such requests ceased after 1965. Frances failed attempts to influence Israeli security policy toward restraint from July 1958 to May 1967 produced no important results for France. But in May 1967 a new crisis erupted in the Middle East, this time jeopardising French regional and global interests. De Gaulles concern was that the deployment of Egyptian troops into the Sinai and the blockade of the Tiran Straits might provoke Israel into launching a preventive strike. He saw this development as a serious threat to Frances political interests. First, an escalation in regional tension would enhance the superpowers influence in the region as only they could afford the huge cost of massively subsidised military aid. Second, an attack would require France to condemn Israel publicly to prevent confrontation with the Soviet Union and the Arabs. This would finally put paid to any appearance of a special regional status on Frances part due to its close relationship with both sides of the conflict. Even in this, the chances of France coordinating the four Great Powers in achieving a settlement would evaporate, since French pretensions of orchestrating a settlement stemmed directly from the belief that both sides, Israelis and Arabs, were attentive to Pariss voice. Worse yet, the fact that France could not stop an Israeli attack would weaken its image as a Power with influence in the Middle East, an image to which the Americans, and the Soviets in particular, apparently still subscribed.82 Therefore, in this crisis, it was not accidental that unlike the past, de Gaulle was prepared to bring direct and intense pressure to bear on Israel to convince it not to attack. When he met with Israeli foreign minister Aba Eban on 24 May 1967, de Gaulle called on Israel not to fire the first shot. This was restated at every meeting between France and Israeli diplomats prior to 5 June. When the Quadruple initiative and international maritime force proposal to which de Gaulle objected collapsed, the French premiers fears that Israel would ignore France and go for a pre-emptive strike grew. This led to a desperate last-ditch effort to stop an almost certain Israeli strikethe arms embargo. The arms embargo was designed to force Israel to reconsider the profitability of a military strike by raising the long-term
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cost to it for ignoring France. De Gaulle had no wish to undermine Israels ability to fight. Rather he signalled his readiness to use the ultimate weapon a patron can wield to force its client into obedience: threaten to cut off military aid. However, Israels dependence on French arms was not so complete that France could force it to ignore a perceived vital interest. New sources were already available; we must bear in mind that Israel had received Patton tanks and Skyhawk planes from the United States. Israel could also hope that after the war it might mend its rupture with France and get the decision revoked, but the point was that the danger it now faced it was more present and real than the problem of who would supply it with arms in the future. The fact was that Frances patronism failed at the moment of truth: with major French interests in the balance. De Gaulle confessed this later in a bitter comment to his government that Israel can demand nothing from us and we have nothing to offer her.83 Contrary to popularly opinion, the change in French leadership of 1958 did alter the relationship between France and Israel. But the question is how? Mostly, it took the form of demands, sometimes explicit, sometimes implied, that Israel pay for the crucial aid supplied by France in different coinsfor example by awarding contracts to French firms or teaching French in Israeli schools. Then, there was Frances insistence that Israel was not equal and that France had no obligation to repay Israel for favours when they clashed with French interests. Israel, however, had no such option. This explains the lack of reciprocity in their UN voting patterns. Third, France would decide on the outward appearance of the relationship, and how public it would be, by flaunting or minimising its strength according to its need. How can the change be explained? It was certainly linked to de Gaulles rise to power. But it was not because de Gaulle was less supportive of Israel than his predecessors or that he questioned Israels strategic importance. Rather, it stemmed from his philosophy of international relations. De Gaulle was every inch a political realist. Although he still related to Israel as our friend and allyhe used this phrase twice to different Israeli prime ministershe nevertheless regarded Frances relationship with Israel as not on an equal footing: Israel needed to pay France in various ways for vital French military aid.84 But there was one area in which France was unable to force Israel to place French interests before her own: in matters of Israels security. To de Gaulles frustration, these also coincided with matters of great importance to France. To a degree, the prestige France enjoyed through Israels clientism was based on the assumption that France could influence Israel. At times, the Western Powers, the Soviet Union, and the Arabs each sought Frances assistance to control Israeli policy. But not only prestige was at stake and France did not only act from a desire to please those seeking its help. It was very keen to calm the ArabIsraeli conflict, among other things because a calmer Middle East would improve conditions
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for the expansion of French influence in the region. In almost every high level meeting between French decision-makers and Israeli politicians from 19581967, Israel was called upon to demonstrate restraint toward its neighboursoften following requests by Israel on various issues. But Israel doggedly rebuffed every effort to bend its proactive security policies to an outsiders needs. Important as it was, French aid could not force Israel to curb activities it considered crucial to its survival. The refusal to heed De Gaulles dramatic request on 24 May 1967dont fire the first shotwas just one in a series of French failures on this score at the time. This explains therefore why from 19581967 FrancoIsraeli relations found themselves on shakier ground than before. But perhaps the real surprise is that they actually survived for a decade.
NOTES
I wish to acknowledge the useful comments and suggestions of Uri Bialer and Binyamin Pinkus. Funding was provided by the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and the French ministry of foreign affairs. 1. S. N. Eisenstadt & L. Roniger, Patron-Client Relations as a Model of Structuring Social Exchange, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22(1980), pp. 4950. 2. C. C. Shoemaker & J. Spanier, Patron-Client State Relationships: Multilateral Crisis in the Nuclear Age (New York, 1984), pp. 1415. 3. Ibid, pp. 4857. 4. A third characteristic is symbolic acts, in other words, a complete range of ceremonial and quasi-ceremonial norms that express and build the special relationship between the patron and its client. For want of space, however, this article will not explore this dimension of the relationship. 5. O.G. Afoaku, U.S Foreign Policy and Authoritarian Regimes: Changes and Continuity in International Clientlism, Journal of Third World Studies, 17(2000), pp. 1340. 6. J. Bercovitch, Superpowers and Clients States: Analyzing Relations and Patterns, in M. Efrat and J. Bercovitch, eds., Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence (London, 1991), pp. 1718. 7. Afuak, Authoritarian Regimes, pp. 1340. 8. C. Carney, International Patron-Client Relationship: A Conceptual Framework, Studies in Comparative International Development, 24(1989), pp. 4255; M. Handel, Weak States in the International System. (Totowa, NJ, 1981), pp. 13235. 9. On IsraelFrench relations in this period, see A. Crosbie, A Tacit Alliance: France and Israel from Suez to the Six-Day War (Princeton, 1974); B. Pinkus, Mambivalentiot lbrit bilti ktuva: Tsarfat vIsrael msuetz ad Milhemet Sheshet Hayamim, 19471957 (Beer Sheba, 2005). 10. On the nuclear cooperation between France and Israel, see A. Bendjebbar, Israel, la France et larme Atomique, in M. Abitbol, ed., France and the Middle East: Past, Present and Future (Jerusalem, 2004), pp. 20321; A. Cohen, Israel and the Bomb (New York, 1998); P. Pan, Les deux bombes (Paris, 1982); B. Pinkus, Atomic Power to Israels Rescue: FrenchIsraeli Nuclear Cooperation, 19491957, Israel Studies 7(2002), pp. 10438. 11. For example, Frances broad support for Israel regarding its withdrawal from the land occupied in the Suez War. See Pinkus, Mambivalentiot, pp. 66465. For a survey of Frances efforts and their importance, see A. Eban, An Autobiography (New York, 1977). 12. Shimon Peres, 21 October 1958, ISA [Israel State Archives], FASCK [Foreign Affairs and Security Committee of the Knesset]. 13. AG [Archives de la Guerre], SHAT [Service Historique de lArme de Terre, Paris, France] 10T817. 14. See Peress report to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on this subject: 3 April 1962, ISA, FASCK.
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15. M. Zur, Moka Limon (Tel-Aviv, 1988), pp. 10407. 16. E. Eyal, From Mirage to Kfir (Hod Hasharon, 1979), pp. 67. 17. Zur, Moka Limon, p. 109. 18. This was the Joshua Plan discussed by the General Staffs of France and Israel. See U. Narkis, Soldier of Jerusalem (Portland, OR, 1998). 19. C. De Gaulle, Mmoires despoir- Le Renouveau (19581962) (Paris, 1970), p. 279. 20. See I. Bar-On, Le Gnral de Gaulle et la Scurit dIsral, in De Gaulle et son sicle, tome 6 (Paris, 1990), p. 437. 21. U. Bialer, Oil and the ArabIsraeli Conflict (Oxford, 1999), p. 228. 22. Racine to CNC, 30 December 1957, ISA, FM [Foreign Ministry], Records 3121/16. 23. Gali to Kimhi, 21 February 1958, ISA, FM, 1952/11. 24. Tsur to Eshkol, 20 August 1958, ISA, FM, 3121/6. 25. Dinstein to Eshkol, 26 August 1958, ISA, FM, 3121/6. 26. For a full discussion on the function of the pipeline and its history, see Bialer, ArabIsraeli Conflict. 27. Tsur to Eshkol, 24 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2348/6. 28. Eshkol to Tsur, 24 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2349/1. 29. Elishar to Fischer 28 October 1958, ISA, FM, 209/6. 30. Ben Gurion diary, 29 October 1958, BGA [Ben Gurion Archives, University of the Negev, Israel] Record: 2250. 31. In the end Israel ordered a third tanker from France which was smaller than the two that it ordered previously from Japan. 32. Fischer, 31 October 1958, ISA, FM, 2349/1. 33. 5 November 1958, ISA, FM, 1952/1 (annex of the treaty). 34. Pouchard, 18 October 1960; 31 October 1960, AMAE [Archives de ministere des affaires etrangeres], (Nantes), TA [Tel Aviv]-18. 35. Ben-Gurion, 20 November 1960, ISA, PMO [Prime Ministers Office], GS [Government Session]. 36. Pouchard, 13 July 1961, AMAE (Nantes), TA-18. There was also an economic reason for this since Israel wished to gain Frances good will prior to negotiations between the Israeli airline El-Al and Air France. 37. 13 February 1962, AMAE (Nantes), TA-18. 38. On other occasions Israel awarded France projects although it could get better terms elsewhere. In 1965 it decided to award the project for laying an underwater cable which cost $20 million to a French firm even though, for several reasons, the Italian alternative seemed more attractive. See 19 August 1965, 19 November 1965, p. 22 November 1965, AMAE (Nantes), TA-14. 39. Memorandum, 22 August 1961, ISA, FM, 952/1. 40. Memorandum, 16 November 1961, ISA, FM, 952/1. These figures exclude Israeli arms purchases from France. 41. Israel sought a cultural understanding with France for mainly political reasons: by signing the agreement Israel wanted to show its friendship with France and perhaps to bind itself to France more strongly. This was precisely the reason the French foreign ministry hesitated and why it delayed signing the accord for so long. 42. These points were mentioned in a detailed memo from the foreign minister on this subject in which he refers to the data he received from the ministry of education. See Protocols of the Commission for the intrusion of French Language in Israeli Schools, 21 November 1960, ISA, FM, 941/4. 43. Protocols of the inter-ministerial Commission, 2224 June 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 44. Davar 13 June 1960, 8 July 1960. 45. Shlush to Shorer, 19 July 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 46. Yaffo to Harpaz, 15 December 1960, ISA, FM, 939/16. 47. Rapport of the Commission for the intrusion of French Language in Israeli Schools, May 1961, ISA, FM, 939/18. 48. France only announced that applicants with Israeli matriculation certificates could gain admission to French universities similar to any high school graduate from any other country. However, holders of Israeli high school certificates could not teach in France or engage in certain professions like medicine. 49. Shlush to Rinot, 4 January 1961, Harpaz to Yaffo, 19 January 1961, both ISA, FM, 939/17. 50. In late 1960, the French ambassador to Israel jokingly said something that offers insight into the mentality of the French embassy in Israel at the time: that France needed to reward Israel: For every thousand students learning French you get one Mirage IV! See 23 December 1960, ISA, FM, 3340/40.
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51. Bendor, 13 April 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5. 52. Bendor to Meir, 16 July 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5; 24 July 1961, ISA, FM, 3340/40. 53. Shek to Bendor, 12 October 1961, ISA, FM, 935/5. 54. The commission consisted of representatives from the United States, France, and Turkey. Its role was to advise on solutions to the refugee problem and other issues such as the internationalisation of Jerusalem. It is interesting that, when formed, the commission membership was considered hostile to Israel although, as time passed, it actually proved most amenable. 55. Berard, 4 December 1959, AMAE, NU [Nations Uni]-234. 56. Shneorson to Yahil, 5 December 1959, ISA, FM, 211/13. 57. 5 December 1959, AMAE, NU-234. 58. Yahil to Schneorson, 6 December 1959, ISA, FM, 211/13. 59. Ben-Gurion, 6 December 1959, ISA, PMO-GS. 60. On the subject of this affair, see E. Barak, On the Power of Tacit Understanding: Israel, Egypt and Freedom of Passage through the Suez Canal. Middle East Journal, 58(2004), pp. 44468. 61. Schneorson to Tsur, 21 December 1959, ISA, FM, 208/13. 62. 24 December 1959, ISA, FM, 2349/5. 63. Seydoux, 30 August 1963; 3 September 1963; Sebilleau, 7 September 1963, AMAE, NU- p. 723. 64. Orders from Paris to the French Security Council representative show a clear desire to appease the Syrians. See Lucet, 8 December 1964, AMAE, NU-723. Israel compared the French position to that of the Soviet Union, in other words an instinctive pro-Arab stance regardless of the facts. See Shek, 22 December 1964, ISA, FM, 962/1. 65. The case of Frances response to the Samu operation is interesting. Whereas its position in the UN was rigid, France showed considerable moderation in its bi-lateral discussion with Israel. This conforms to the French strategy of showing coolness toward Israel in public whilst supporting Israel behind closed doors. 66. For example, in a letter from the Israel foreign minister to his French counterpart in November 1966, he took pains to remind him of the unstinting support in votes in the UN on issues close to Frances heart. See Eban to Couve de Murville, 20 November 1966, AMAE, NU-720. 67. Eban, 1 November 1966, ISA, FASCK. 68. A vast body of literature exists on the 1958 Middle East crisis. For example N.J. Ashton, A Great New Venture? AngloAmerican Cooperation in the Middle East and the Response to the Iraqi Revolution, July 1958, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 4(1993), pp. 5989; G. Heimann, A Hot Summer: France, Israel and the Middle East Crisis in 1958, in C. Nuenlist, A. Locher and G. Martin, Globalizing de Gaulle: International Perspectives on French Foreign Policies, 19581969. (Harvard, 2010); D. Little, His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis, Diplomatic History, 20(1996), pp. 2754; J.M. Nadaner, Strife Among Friends and Foes: The 1958 AngloAmerican Military Interventions in the Middle East, UCLA Historical Journal, 17(1997), pp. 82123; M.B. Oren, The Test of Suez: Israel and the Middle East Conflict of 1958, Studies in Zionism, 12(1991); N.D. Tal, Seizing Opportunities: Israel and the 1958 Crisis in the Middle East, Middle Eastern Studies, 37(January 2001), pp. 14258. 69. Oren, Test of Suez, p. 77. 70. In a conversation with director of Afrique-Levant at French Foreign Ministry on 27 July, with Couve on July 28, and with the director of the Israel Desk at the French Foreign Ministry on 1 August 1958. See Schneorson to Fischer, ISA, FM, 208/11. 71. 19 July 1958, AMAE, AL [Afrique Levant], Is [Israel]-50. 72. Conversation Meir-Couve de Murville, 5 August 1958, Documents Diplomatiques Franais [DDF], 1958, Volume 2. 73. Conversation: De-Gaulle-Fanfani, 7 August 1958, Ibid.. 74. Boisseson, 25 September 1962, AMAE, AL, Lib [Liban]-950. 75. Bucco, 3 October 1962, AMAE, AL-Lib-950. 76. Bourdeillette, 26 October 1962, AMAE, AL, Is-110. 77. On the Johnston Plan and water diversion, see E. Kafkafi, Ben-Gurion, Sharett and the Johnston Plan, Studies in Zionism, 13(1992), 16585; M. Shemesh, Prelude to the Six-Days War: The ArabIsraeli Struggle over Water Resources, Israel Studies, 9(2004), pp. 1819. 78. Kahana to Herzog, 28 December 1964, Kahana to Maroz, 30 December 1964, Maroz to Kahana, 5 January 1965, all ISA, FM, 979/13. 79. Israels decision-makers decided to respond in this case although they know that the terrorists goal was to embroil her with Lebanon and via Lebanon with France. In practice, Israels insistence on
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action stemmed largely from her desire to demonstrate to the terrorist organisations that Lebanons relationship with France would not give it sanctuary status and prevent Israel from attacking. See 19 July 1966, ISA, FASCK, Levi Eshkol quotation. 80. Soutou, 6 November 1965, AMAE, NU-718. 81. Maroz, 10 November 1965, ISA, FM, 967/6. 82. Several times during this period, the United States called on France to use its influence to restrain Israel. With regard to the Johnson Plan, for example, see 26 April 1962, AMAE (Nantes), NU-50, 14 June 1962, AMAE, Am [Amerique], EU [Etats Uni]-432. Intelligence that reached the Israeli Foreign Ministry also showed this effort occurring in the May 1967 crisis: 17 May 1967, ISA, FM, 4084/2. Soviet illusions regarding Frances ostensible influence over Israel were evident in the period preceding the Six Day War and in the post-war period. See Wormser, 20 May 1967, AMAE (Nantes), Mos [Moscue]-464; 28 May 1967, AMAE (Nantes), Mos-464. 83. A. Peyrefitte, Ctait de Gaulle (Paris, 2002), p. 1492. 84. The patron-client model was much more congruent with de Gaulles philosophy of political realism than the ideal of friendship between nations. De Gaulle used to say that a self-respecting nation had no friendsechoing Palmerstons famous dictum. According to de Gaulle, there were two types of nations: Great Powers and dependent states. The relationship between the former and the latter was not a relationship between equals. Moreover, nations are not obligated by the same ethical system that governs humans as individuals. See H. E. Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY, 1974), pp. 4748.
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