Pub Cor Notes 2010

I.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence. Public Corporation is one formed and organized for the government of a portion of the State. Classes of Corporations 1. Public or municipal a body politic and corporate constituted by incorporation of inhabitants of city or town for purposes of local government thereof or as agency of State to assists in civil government of the country; one formed and organized for the government of a portion of the State. 2. Private one formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end. 3. Quasi-public a private corporation that renders public service or supplies public wants. 4. Quasi-corporation public corporations created as agencies of State for narrow and limited purpose. Elements of Public Corporation 1. legal creation or incorporation; 2. corporate name; 3. inhabitants; and 4. territory Under the Local Government Code of 1991, inhabitants and territory, as elements of public corporation, are referred to as population and land area, respectively. Dual Nature of Municipal Corporation 1. Public or governmental it acts as an agent of the State for the government of the territory and the inhabitants within the municipal limits; it exercises by delegation a part of the sovereignty of the State. 2. Private or proprietary it acts in a similar category as a business corporation, performing functions not strictly governmental or political; it stands for the community in the administration of local affairs. It acts as a separate entity for its own purposes and not as a subdivision of the state. The operation of a public market is not a governmental function but merely an activity undertaken by the city in its private proprietary capacity. (Figueroa vs. People, 498 SCRA 1
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
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Criterion to determine whether corporation is public: The relationship of the corporation to the State, i.e., if created by the State as its own agency to help the State in carrying out its governmental functions, then it is public; otherwise, it is private. De Facto Municipal Corporation is a corporation that may exist in fact although not in point of law because of certain defects in some essential features of its organization. Elements/Requisites of a De Facto Municipal Corporation 1. a valid law authorizing incorporation; 2. an attempt in good faith to organize under it; 3. a colorable compliance with the law; and 4. an assumption of corporate powers. --o0o--
II.
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES
Four Major Parts of the Local Government Code of 1991 1. Book I General Provisions 2. Book II - Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters 3. Book III - Local Government Units 4. Book IV - Miscellaneous and Final Provisions Effectivity: January 1, 1992 Scope of Application of Local Government Code Applicable to: 1. all provinces 2. cities 3. municipalities 4. barangays 5. and other political subdivisions as may be created by law, and 6. to the extent provided in the Local Government Code (i.e, devolution of powers): a. officials b. offices, or c. agencies of the National Government Aims of the LGC of 1991 The Code is meant to transform LGUs into self-reliant communities and active partners in nation-building by giving them more powers, authority, responsibilities and resources. Rules of Interpretation 1. provision on power: liberally interpreted in favor of LGU; in case of doubt, resolved in favor of devolution of powers; 2. ordinance or revenue measure: construed strictly against LGU enacting it and liberally in favor of taxpayer; 3. tax exemptions, incentive or relief granted by LGU: construed against person claiming; 4. general welfare provisions: liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic development and upgrading quality of life for people in community; 5. rights and obligations existing on date of effectivity of LGC of 1991 and arising out of contract or any other source of prestation involving LGU, shall be governed by the original terms and conditions of said contract or law in force at time such rights were vested; and 6. resolution of controversies arising under the LGC of 1991 where no legal provision or jurisprudence applies, resort may be had to customs and traditions in place where controversies take place. 3
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Declaration of State Policy over LGUs 1. Guarantee genuine and meaningful local autonomy to local government units or political and territorial subdivisions;
Local Autonomy is self governing. It is the granting of more

powers, authority, responsibilities and resources to the lower or local levels of a government system. The principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means decentralization. It does not make the local government sovereign within the state or an imperium in imperio. (Basco vs. PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52) Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local officers are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. Policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress. Municipal governments are still agents of the national government. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) The Supreme Court, in Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180, upheld the power of the local government units to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on the availability of local funds if only to ensure the genuine and meaningful local autonomy of the local government units. Section 3, paragraph (e) of the Local Budget Circular, by outrightly prohibiting LGUs from granting allowances to judges whenever such allowances are (1) also granted by the national government or (2) similar to the allowances granted by the national government, violates Section 447 (a) (1) (xi) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Likewise, it is elementary in statutory construction that an administrative circular cannot supersede, abrogate, modify or nullify a statute. (Ibid.) In affirming the constitutionality of the power of LGUs to reclassify areas through a zoning ordinance, the Court ruled: The least we can do to ensure genuine and meaningful local autonomy is not to force an interpretation that negates powers explicitly granted to local governments. To rule against the power of LGUs to reclassify areas within their jurisdiction will subvert the principle of local autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution. As we have noted in earlier decisions, our national officials should not only comply with the constitutional provisions on local autonomy but should also appreciate the spirit and liberty upon which these provisions are based. (SJS vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92)
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The State is mandated to ensure local autonomy of local governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes, fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to congressional guidelines and limitations. (City of Davao vs. RTC Br XII, Davao City, 467 SCRA 280) 2. 3. Ensure accountability of LGUs through institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum; and Require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultation with appropriate LGUs, NGOs and Peoples Organizations and other concerned sectors of community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdiction.
Application of the Policy. Under the Local Government Code, two requisites must be met before a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local communities can be implemented: (1) prior consultation with the affected local communities and (2) prior approval of the project by the appropriate sanggunian. Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project implementation is illegal. (Province of Rizal vs. Executive Secretary, 477 SCRA 436)
The prior approval of local government units affected by the proposed conversion of a Timber License Agreement (TLA) into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement (IFMA) is necessary before any project or program can be implemented by government authorities that may cause depletion of no-renewable resources, loss of crop land, rangeland or forest cover, and extinction of animal or plant series. (Alvarez vs. PICOP Resources, 508 SCRA 498)
When the Policy Does Not Apply. The requirement of prior

consultation applies only to national projects and/or programs which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Although sanctioned by the national government, the operation of lotto is neither a program nor project of the national government but of charitable institution, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. The projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted to mean projects and programs whose environmental and ecological effects are among those mentioned in Sections 26 and 27 of the LGC. (Lina vs. Pano, GR No. 129093, August 30, 2001)
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Decentralization has three (3) forms: a. Devolution is the transfer of power and authority from the national government to LGUs as the territorial and political subdivisions of the State. The nature of power transfer is political and the approach is territorial or areal. Under the Local Government Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers powers and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. (Plaza II vs. Cassion, 435 SCRA 294)
b.
Deconcentration
is the transfer of power, authority or responsibility, or the discretion to plan, decide and manage from central point or local levels, but within the central or national government itself. The nature of transfer is administrative and the approach is sectoral.
c.
Debureaucratization is the transfer of some public functions and

responsibilities, which the government may perform, to private entities or non-governmental organizations; it is peoples empowerment or participation in local governance.
Decentralization of Administration (Administrative Decentralization)
the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power.
Decentralization of Power (Political Decentralization) involves abdication of

political power in favor of LGUs declared autonomous. (Limbonas vs. Mangelin, 170 SCRA 786) Among the regulatory powers of National Government Agencies (NGAs) transferred or devolved to the LGUs include the following: 1) the reclassification of agricultural lands DAR municipalities 2) 3) 4) 5) 6) to cities &
enforcement of environmental laws DENR to all LGUs inspection of food products and quarantine DOH to cities & municipalities the enforcement of the National Building Code DPWH to cities & municipalities the processing and approval of subdivision plans - HLURB to cities and municipalities the operation of tricycles- LTFRB to cities & municipalities
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Under Sections 129 and 133 of the LGC, empowering the local government units to create sources of revenue and, in particular, to collect registration fees and charges, the power of the Land Transportation Office to register tricycles and to issue licenses for the drivers thereof, has not been devolved to the local government units. What was devolved is the franchising authority of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board over the operation of tricycles but not the authority of the LTO to register all motor vehicles (including tricycles) and to issue to qualified persons the license to drive such vehicles. (LTO vs. City of Butuan, 332 SCRA 805) 7) the establishment of cockpits and holding of cockfights - Philippine Gamefowl Commission to cities & municipalities
2.
5.
Among the basic services and facilities devolved to LGUs include: 1. Agricultural extension and on-site research of the Department of Agriculture; Community-based forestry project of the DENR; 3. Field health and hospital services and other tertiary health services of the DOH; 4. Public works and infrastructure projects funded out of local funds of the DPWH; The school building program of the DECS; 6. Social welfare services of the DSWD; 7. Tourism facilities and tourism promotion and development of the DOT; 8. Telecommunication services for provinces and cities of the DOTC; 9. Housing projects for provinces and cities, and 10. Other services such as investment support.
How Local Autonomy Enhances Governmental and Corporate Powers of LGUs Every local government unit shall have: 1. 2. Full autonomy in their exercise of proprietary rights and management of economic enterprises. Full authority to secure domestic or foreign grants without the approval of the NGAs concerned, unless these are projects with national security implications, and Financial undertakings for LGUs for mutual advantage thru loans and assistance to calamity-stricken LGU --o0o--
3.
III. 1.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
National Government and Local Government Units

While the Constitution guarantees autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of control by Congress and the power of supervisions by the President. Thus Section 4, Article X of the Constitution provides that the President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Section 25 of the Local Government Code also provides that the President shall exercise general supervision over local government units. i. The President shall exercise supervisory authority directly over provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. ii. The President shall exercise supervision over component cities and municipalities, through province, and over barangays through city and municipality. Consistent with the principle of local autonomy, the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs to one of general supervision. This provision has been interpreted to exclude the power of control. (Province of Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736) In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body it does not include any restraining authority over such body. The heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, the heads of political subdivisions are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers, and by the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is the scope of the Presidents supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of his alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President or any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local 8
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autonomy and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal corporations. (Ibid.) In the case of Dadole vs. Commission on Audit, GR No. 125350, December 3, 2002, the Supreme Court also declared void Local Budget Circular 55 for infringing on the local autonomy by dictating a uniform amount that a local government unit can disburse as additional allowances to judges stationed therein. The said circular is an inappropriate way of enforcing the criterion found in Section 458, par (a)(1)(xi) of RA 7160 and not supported by any law. The DBM overstepped its power of supervision over local government units by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with the law it sought to implement. The prohibitory nature of the circular had no legal basis. It is also void on account of its lack of publication. Power of Control and Power of General Supervision Over LGUs Distinguished Power of Control 1. As to nature of power 2. As to who exercises the power legislative Congress Power of General Supervision Executive
3. As to what the power includes
President Assisted by the DILG Secretary *Creation, conversion of *Oversee whether LGUs LGUs and alteration of are performing their its boundaries; duties in accordance with law; *Allocate powers, responsibilities and resources *Investigate and impose among LGUs; disciplinary measures *Provide for qualifica(suspension or removal) tions, election, appointupon erring elective ment, removal, term, local government salaries and functions & officials duties of local officials; *Provide for other matters *concurrent power to relating to the organiimpose preventive suszation and operation of pension upon elective LGUs local government *Amendment of charters of officials LGUs
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Other distinctions The distinction between the two powers was enunciated in Drilon vs. Lim: An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinates or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for doing the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. By constitutional fiat, the heads of political subdivisions are subject to the Presidents supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate powers, and by the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them by the Constitution and the law. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) Also, the DBM, by issuing Local Budget Circular 55 which dictated a uniform amount that an LGU can disburse as additional allowance to judges stationed therein, overstepped its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with law it sought to implement. (Dadole vs. COA, GR No. 125350, December 3, 2002) Power of Supervision Over Liga. The Presidents power of general supervision, as exercised by the DILG Secretary as his alter ego, also extends to the Liga ng mga Barangay. It is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or his alter ego. Hence, when respondent judge appointed the DILG as interim caretaker to manage and administer the affairs of the Liga, she effectively removed the management from the National Liga Board and vested control of the Liga on the DILG. The acts of the DILG went beyond the sphere of general supervision and constituted a direct interference with the political affairs not only of the Liga, but more importantly of the barangay as an institution. What the DILG wielded was the power of control which even the President does not have. (National Liga ng mga Barangay vs. Paredes, 439 SCRA 130) General Responsibilities of the National Government towards LGUs a. Formulate policies and set standard and guidelines; b. Provide funding support; c. Augment basic services assigned to LGUs; d. Provide technical and other forms of assistance and coordinate on the discharge of NGA functions; e. Ensure the participation of LGUs in planning and implementing national projects, and f. Conduct mandatory consultations with LGUs.
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Extent of the LCEs Authority over NGAs and their Functionaries a. The LCE can call upon any employee stationed or assigned in his locality to advise him on matters affecting the LGU as well as coordinate with said officials, plans, programs and projects. b. The LCE can enlist the attendance of the national official stationed in the LGU on a meeting of elective and appointed officials of the LGU treating matters in the promotion of the general welfare of the residents. c. The LCE can also initiate proper administrative or judicial action against national government official or employee who may have committed an offense while stationed or assigned in the LGU.
2.
Inter-Local Government Relations

a. The province, through the governor, shall ensure that every component city and municipality acts within its powers. (Sec. 29, LGC) b. The city or municipality, through the mayor, shall ensure that barangays act within the scope of their powers. (Sec. 32, LGC) c. The governor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the mayor. The mayor shall review all executive orders promulgated by the punong barangay. (Sec. 30, LGC) As part of its delegated power of general supervision, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of a province exercises the quasi-judicial function (administrative disciplinary authority) of hearing and deciding administrative cases involving elective municipal and component city officials under their jurisdiction. In turn, the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan exercise disciplinary authority over elective barangay officials within their jurisdiction. The Governor, upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, and the City/Municipal Mayor, upon the recommendation of the Sangguniang Panlungsod/Bayan, may impose preventive suspension upon local elective officials falling under their delegated administrative jurisdiction. d. Review of component city and municipal ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (Sec. 56, LGC) e. Review of barangay ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. ((Sec.57, LGC) Under RA 6734, executive power in the ARMM is vested in the Regional Governor, who has control of all the regional executive commissions, board, bureaus and offices, and exercises general supervision over the local government units within the Autonomous Region. (Arimao vs. Taher, 498 SCRA 74)
f.
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3.
Relations with POs and NGOs

Section 23, Article II provides that it is the policy of the State to encourage non-governmental, community-based, or sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation. a. Debureaucratization: Governance Private Sector Participation In Local
Purpose: to ensure the viability of local autonomy as an alternative strategy for sustainable development. LGUs shall encourage privatesector participation in the delivery of basic services. b. Role of POs, NGOs in the LGUs: LGUs shall promote the establishment and operation of peoples and non-governmental organizations as active partners. LGUs may enter into joint venture and cooperative undertakings with peoples and non-governmental organizations particularly in the following: delivery of certain basic services; capability building and livelihood projects, and 3. developing local enterprises designed to improve productivity and income, diversifies agriculture, spur rural industrialization; and enhance the economic and social wellbeing of the people.
c. 1. 2.
Special Local Bodies where the Private Sector may Participate in Local Governance 1. Local Development Council a duly constituted body which shall assist the corresponding Sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts in its territorial jurisdiction. Relationship of the LDC with the Sanggunian and RDC: -All programs and policies proposed by the Local Development Council shall be submitted to its Sanggunian for appropriate action. -The local development plans approved by the Sanggunian may be integrated with those of the next higher level of the Local Development Council. -All approved local development plans shall be submitted to the Regional Development Council which shall be integrated into the regional development plan to be submitted to the National Economic Development Authority.
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-The Department of Budget and Management shall provide the Local Development Councils the information on applicable financial resources and budget allocations to guide their planning. 2. Prequalifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC) -Primarily responsible for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of bids, and the recommendation of awards concerning local infrastructure projects. 3. 4. Local Peace and Order Council, pursuant to EO No. 309, as amended, Series of 1988. Local School Board Functions: 1) determine the annual supplementary budget needs for operating and maintaining public schools; 2) serve as advisory committee on educational matters to the Sanggunian; 3) recommend changes in the names of public schools within the territorial jurisdiction of the LGU for enactment of the Sanggunian concerned and 4) authorize local treasurers to distribute funds pursuant to the budget prepared in accordance with existing rules and regulations. The DECS shall consult the Board on the appointment of division superintendents, district supervisors, school principals, and other school officials. However, the requirement in Section 99 of the LGC of prior consultation with the local school board does not apply to a mere designation of a schools division superintendent which partakes the nature of reassignment. It only refers to appointments made by the DECS. (Osea vs. Malaya, 375 SCRA 285) The following shall be given priority in the annual school board budget: 1) 2) 3) construction, repair and maintenance of school buildings and other facilities of public elementary and secondary schools; establishment and maintenance of extension classes where necessary; and sports activities at the division, district, municipal and barangay levels.
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The Special Education Fund may be expended only for salaries and personnel related benefits of teachers appointed by the local school board in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension class. Extension classes are referred to mean additional classes needed to accommodate all children of school age deserving to enter in public schools to acquire basic education. Likewise, the local Government Code reveals that expenses for college scholarship grants are not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be appropriated. While Secs. 100 c and 272 of the LGC reproduced Sec. 1 of RA No. 5447, the granting of scholarship to poor but deserving students was omitted in Secs. 100 c and 272 of the LGC. (COA vs. Province of Cebu, GR No. 141386, November 29, 2001) 5. Local Health Board Functions: 1) propose to the Sanggunian the annual budgetary allocation for health services according to the DOH criteria; 2) 3) serve as advisory committee on the health to the Sanggunian; and create its own advisory committees to advise local health agencies on personnel selection and discipline, budget review, operations review, bids and awards, grievances and complaints and similar functions according to technical and administrative standards of the DOH.
6.
Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) a disciplinary body for erring police officers. (RA 6975)
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IV.
CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION, AND ABOLITION OF LGUs
Creation of LGUs A local government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundaries substantially altered by law enacted by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or other political subdivisions, or by Sanggunian Panlalawigan (provincial) or Sangguniang Panlungsod (city) ordinance in the case of a barangay. (Sec. 6) The nature of the power to create LGUs is basically legislative, hence it is conferred by the Constitution upon Congress and delegated to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod with respect to the creation of barangays. The President has no power to create local government units. (Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya, 166 SCRA 70). While the power to create barangays has been delegated to Sanggunian Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Panlungsod, Congress, in order to enhance the delivery of basic services in indigenous cultural communities, may create barangays in such communities notwithstanding the requirements set forth by law. [Sec. 385(a), LGC] In Sema vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008, the Supreme Court voided the creation of the Province of Sharif Kabunsuan under MMA 201 enacted by the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly. Under RA 9054, or the Expanded Organic Act for Muslim Mindanao, the Regional Legislative Assembly (RLA) has been delegated the power to create barangays, municipalities and provinces. While there is no constitutional prohibition for the ARMM RAL to create municipalities and barangays within its territorial jurisdiction, this is not so in the case of the creation of provinces and cities. The Court ruled that Section 19 of Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because legislative power of the ARMM Regional Legislative Assembly operates only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution (Ibid.) The creation or conversion of a local government unit to another level shall be based on the following verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services: a. Sufficient income and b. Population and/or c. Land Area 15
CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs
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Compliance with the above-cited indicators shall be attested by the Department of Finance, the National Statistics Office and the Lands Management Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, respectively. Necessity of Fixing Corporate Limits As a matter of general rule, municipal corporations cannot, without legal authorization, exercise its powers beyond its own corporate limits. It is necessary that it must have its boundaries fixed, definite and certain, in order that they may be identified and that all may know the exact scope or section of territory or geographical division embraced within the corporate limits and over which the municipal corporation has jurisdiction.. A description of the boundaries of a municipal corporation is said to be an essential part of its charter and necessary to corporate existence. An incorporation is void where the boundaries of the municipal corporation are not described with certainty (2 Mc Quillin, Mun. Corp. 3rd Ed. 256). Any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the peoples welfare. (Pasig City vs. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179) The requirement that the territory of newly created local government units be identified by metes and bounds is intended to provide the means by which the area of the local government unit may be reasonably ascertained, i.e., as a tool in the establishment of the local government unit. (Mariano vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211) Creation of Barangays
Role of Barangays. As basic political unit, the barangay serves as the primary planning and implementing unit of government policies, plans, programs, projects and activities in the community, and as a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed, crystallized and considered, and where disputes my be amicably settled. (Sec. 384, LGC) Who Creates Barangays. A barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered by law or by an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod. Where a barangay is created by an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the recommendation of the Sangguniang Bayan concerned shall be necessary. Congress, in order to enhance the delivery of basic services in indigenous cultural communities, may create barangays in such communities notwithstanding the requirements set forth by law. [Sec. 385(a), LGC] Under RA 9054, the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao is now empowered to create barangays within its territorial jurisdiction.
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Substantive Requisites. 1) Population - at least 2,000 inhabitants except in cities and municipalities within Metro Manila and other metropolitan political subdivisions or in highly urbanized cities where such territory shall have a certified population of at least 5,000 inhabitants; 2) Income no minimum income requirement; and 3) Land Area no minimum requirement, but it must be contiguous but it need not be contiguous if the barangay is comprised of two or more islands. In Herrera vs. COMELEC, 318 SCRA 336, the Supreme Court said that contiguous and/or adjacent means adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries often for considerable distances.
The creation of the new barangay shall not however reduce the population of the original barangay to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. (Sec. 386, LGC) A case involving a boundary dispute between local government units presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. (Pasig City vs. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179) Creation of Municipalities The municipality consisting of a group of barangays, serves primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction. Sec. 440, LGC)
Role of Municipalities.
Who Creates Municipality. A municipality may be created, divided,

merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered only by an act of Congress, subject to the criteria established in the Code. (Sec 441, LGC) Likewise, under RA 9054, the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao is now conferred with the power to create municipalities within its territorial jurisdiction. The President has no power to create local government units. (Municipality of Kapalong vs. Moya, 166 SCRA 70). However, in Municipality of San Narciso vs. Mendez, 239 SCRA 11, the validity of the creation of the Municipality of San Andres by the President through an executive order pursuant to Sections 68 and 2630 of the Revised Administrative Code was upheld by the Supreme Court. Even if Executive Order No. 353 creating the Municipality of San Andres is a complete nullity for being the result of an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in the case hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality to have at least attained the status of a de facto municipal corporation.
CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs FIRST, on technical grounds:
(a)
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Suit not brought by the proper party. When the inquiry is focused on the legal existence of a body politic, the action is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto. It must be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines and commenced by the Solicitor General. While the quo warranto filed by the Municipality of San Narciso has so named only the officials of the Municipality of San Andres as respondents, it is virtually however, a denunciation of the authority of the Municipality or Municipal district of San Andres to exist and to act in that capacity; and Prescription. It was only after almost thirty (30) years that petitioner San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of EO 353. In the meantime, the Municipal District and later the Municipality of San Andres began and continued to exercise the power and authority of a duly created local government unit. Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court which sets a five-year limitation for filing a quo warranto action if its purpose is to bring about the forfeiture of charter of a corporation, that period to be counted from the time the act complained of was done or committed.
(b)
SECOND, certain governmental acts pointed to the States recognition of the municipality: (a) (b) (c) Executive Order No. 174 classified it as a fifth class municipality; pursuant to the Judiciary Act, the municipality was included in the establishment of Municipal Circuit Courts; under the ordinance appended to the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives, the municipality was included in the third district of the Province of Quezon. Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code provides that municipal districts created by executive orders shall be considered as regular municipalities. Congress exercised its power to create political subdivisions when it incorporated Section 442 (d) in the Local Government Code. This is a curative law which is retrospective and aimed at giving validity to acts that were invalid under existing law.
(d)
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Likewise, in Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182, the Supreme Court ruled that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. A municipality has been conferred the status of at least a de facto municipal corporation where its legal existence has been recognized and acquiesced publicly and officially. However, in Camid vs. Office of the President, 448 SCRA 711, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code does not serve to affirm or reconstitute the judicially dissolved municipalities such as Andong in Lanao del Sur which had been previously created by presidential issuances or executive orders. The provision affirms the legal personalities only of those municipalities such as San Andres of Quezon which may have been created using the same infirm legal basis, yet were fortunate enough not to have been judicially annulled. On the other hand, the municipalities challenged in actual cases before the Supreme Court and subsequently judicially dissolved in cases such as Pelaez, San Joaquin and Malabang, remain inexistent unless recreated through specific legislative enactments, as done with the eighteen (18) municipalities certified by the DILG. These municipalities derived their legal personality not from presidential issuances or executive orders which originally created them or from Section 442(d) but from the respective legislative status which were enacted to revive them. The legal effect of the nullification of Andong in Pelaez was to revert the constituent barrios of the voided town back into their original municipalities.
Substantive Requisites. 1) Average annual income of at least two million five hundred thousand pesos for the last two consecutive years based on the 1991 constant prices; 2) a population of at least twenty-five thousand inhabitants; and 3) a contiguous territory 50 square kilometers. The creation of the new municipality must not however reduce the income, population and land area of the original municipality to less than the minimum requirement prescribed in the Code. (Sec. 442, LGC)
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of the LGC shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective elective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the LGC shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. [Sec. 442 (d), LGC] Creation of Component Cities
Role of Cities. The city, consisting of a group of barangays, serves

primarily as a general purpose government for the coordination and delivery of basic, regular and direct services and effective governance of the inhabitants within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 448, LGC) CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER,
CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs
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Who Creates Cities. A city may be created, divided, merged or abolished,

or its boundary substantially altered only by an act of Congress subject to the criteria provided in the Code. Sec. 449, LGC) Thus, in Sema vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008, the power of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao under RA 9054, to create cities within its territorial jurisdiction has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Substantive Requisites. 1) Income locally generated average annual

income of at least one hundred million pesos for the last two consecutive years (as amended by RA 9009); and 2) Land Area contiguous territory of at least one hundred square kilometers; or 3) Population of at least one hundred fifty thousand inhabitants. The creation of the city shall not however reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed in the Code. [Sec. 452(a), LGC] The territorial boundary of a local government unit must be defined with precision, because any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which will prejudice the people. In enacting RA 7854, Congress did not define the territory of Makati by metes and bounds and simply provided that the territory shall comprise of the present territory of the Municipality of Makati. With existing boundary dispute with Taguig under court litigation, Congress felt that the resolution of the said boundary dispute be left to the courts to decide. (Mariano vs. COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211) Inasmuch as RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the ruling of the Supreme Court in Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA 695, that the Internal Revenue Allotments (IRAs) shall be included in the computation of the average annual income of the municipality for purposes of determining whether the municipality may be validly converted into a city, is deemed superseded by the amendatory law. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the LGC. Section 450(a) of the LGC which provides that a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code. Thus, a city may be created by merging two municipalities even if one of the said municipalities already qualifies to be upgraded to a component city. (Cawaling vs. COMELEC, GR Nos. 146319 & 146342, October 26, 2001) CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs
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In League of Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008) sixteen municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills which contained a common provision exempting all of them from the P100 million minimum income requirement in RA 9009 which earlier amended the pertinent provision of the Local Government Code . The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature. The League of Cities of the Philippines filed a petition to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. The Court ruled that the Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10 of Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement to the present case is a prospective, not retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, The Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article 10 of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to the local government units. Fourth, The criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. To be valid, the classification in the present case, must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to the purpose o the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of income requirement. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City If a component city shall have met the minimum requirements for a highly urbanized city, it shall be the duty of the President to declare the city as highly urbanized city upon: (1) proper application and (2) upon ratification in a plebiscite by the majority of registered voters therein. (Sec. 453, LGC) CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs
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Substantive Requisites. (1) A minimum population of two hundred thousand inhabitants and (2) the latest annual income must be at least fifty million pesos.
Creation of Provinces
Role of Provinces. A province, composed of cluster of municipalities, or municipalities and component cities, and as a political and corporate unit of government, serves as a dynamic mechanism for developmental processes and effective governance of local government units within its territorial jurisdiction. (Sec. 459, LGC) Who Creates Provinces. A province may be created, divided, merged or abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, only by an act of Congress, subject to the satisfaction of the criteria set forth by the LGC. Thus, in Sema vs. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008, under RA 9054, the power of the Regional Legislative Assembly of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao to create provinces within its territorial jurisdiction has also been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Substantive Requirements. (1) Average annual income of at least twenty
million pesos; and (2) contiguous territory of at least two thousand square kilometers, or (3) a population of not less than two hundred fifty inhabitants. The creation of the new province shall not however reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of the said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed by the LGC. (Sec. 461, LGC) BP 885, which created the Province of Negros del Norte was declared unconstitutional because it did not comply with the land area criterion prescribed under the LGC. The use of the word territory in Section 17 of the Local Government Code refers only to the physical mass of land area, not to the waters comprising a political entity. It excludes the waters over which the political unit exercises control. (Tan vs. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727) Status of Sub-provinces Existing sub-provinces are converted into regular provinces upon the approval by a majority votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the said sub-province and the original province directly affected. (Sec. 462, LGC) Division and Merger of LGUs The division and merger of local government units shall comply with the same requirements for their creation. The income, population or land area shall not be reduced to less than the minimum requirements. Likewise, the income classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current income classification prior to such division. (Sec. 8, LGC) CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs /23
Summary of Substantive Requirements in the Creation of LGUs LGU Created Barangay Income No minimum Requirement PhP 2.5 M and PhP 100 M and
(locally generated)
Population 2,000 but 5,000 for Metro Manila & highly urbanized cities 25,000, and 150,000 or 200,000 250,000 or
Land Area No minimum Requirement 50 sq. kms.

100 sq. kms.
Municipality Component City Highly Urbanized City Province
PhP 50 M and PhP 20 M and
No minimum Requirement 2,000 sq. kms.
Autonomous Regions. The Philippine Constitution mandates the creation

of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, and economic and social structures. (Sec. 15, Art. X, PC) RA 6734, the organic act establishing the Autonomous Regional Government of Muslim Mindanao was held valid by the Supreme Court. (Datu Firdausi Abbas vs. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287) However, the sole Province of Ifugao which, in the plebiscite, alone voted in favor of RA 6766, cannot validly constitute the Autonomous Region of the Cordilleras. (Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100)
Special Metropolitan Political Subdivisions. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, but the component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executives and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will be thereby created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination. (Sec. 11, Art. X, PC) With the passage of RA 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a special development and administrative region and the administration of metrowide basic services affecting the region was placed under a development authority referred to as the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), whose functions were without prejudice to the autonomy of the affected local government units. The law does not grant police nor legislative powers to MMDA, even the Metro Manila Council, the governing board of the CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs /24
MMDA has not been delegated any legislative power. Clearly, MMDA is not a political unit. There is no grant of authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. MMDA cannot open for public use a private road in a private subdivision. (MMDA vs. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. GR No.135962, March 27, 2000). In MMDA vs. Garin, the Supreme Court reiterated that RA 7924 does not grant MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Beginning of Corporate Existence When a new local government unit is created, its corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a majority of the members of the sanggunian, unless some other date is fixed therefor by law or ordinance creating it. (Sec. 14, LGC) Abolition of LGUs A local government unit may be abolished when its income, population or land area has been irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum standards prescribed for its creation under the Local Government Code, as certified by the national agencies to Congress or to the Sanggunian concerned. Likewise, the law or, ordinance abolishing a local government unit shall specify the province, city, municipality, or barangay with which the local government unit sought to be abolished will be incorporated or merged. (Sec. 9, LGC) General Effects of Annexation/Consolidation of LGUs
On the legal existence of the territory annexed. Unless otherwise provided for by law, the annexation of one municipal corporation to another will dissolve the annexed territory. It shall become part of the annexing corporation and will fall under the jurisdiction of the latter. On the laws and ordinances of the annexed corporation. - In the absence of any provision of law to the contrary, when a territory is annexed to a municipal corporation, it shall become subject to all the laws and ordinances by which the annexing corporation is governed. On the right of officers or employees of the annexed or consolidated territory to continue to hold their offices. Subject to what the legislature may
provide upon annexation, the officers and employees of the annexed or consolidated territory shall terminate their official relation with their offices.
On the title to the property of the annexed territory. - When a municipal corporation is annexed to another, the annexing territory shall acquire title to the property of the annexed territory at the time of annexation without compensation unless the annexing statute provides otherwise. Where the annexed territory, however, forms part of a municipality from which it is taken, the legislature may provide for the payment of compensation for the indebtedness
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incurred on account of the property taken. With regard to public buildings and improvements located in the annexed territory, the annexing territory is not required to pay for said buildings or improvements as they have already been paid for by the annexed territory. It would be otherwise if there exists an indebtedness on said buildings in which case, the annexing state may be required to share in the payment of said indebtedness.
On the debts and obligations of the annexed territory. - It has been

stated that debts and obligations of a municipal corporation contracted before its annexation to another territory shall be assumed by the annexing territory in the absence of any provision to the contrary. The same rule applies of consolidation where the consolidating municipal corporation is held responsible for the indebtedness and obligations incurred by the territories which are consolidated. General Effects of Division of LGUs
On the legal existence of the original corporation. The division of

municipal corporation extinguishes the corporate existence of the original municipality.
On the property, powers and rights of the original corporation.

Unless the law provides otherwise, when a municipal corporation is divided into two or more municipalities, each municipality acquires title to all the property, powers, rights and obligations falling within its territorial limits. Personal properties of the original corporation shall be equally divided between or among the newly created units, while real properties shall be acquired by the unit where it is situated. Plebiscite Requirement
When Conducted. Section 10 of the LGC provides that the creation,

division and merger, abolition or substantial alteration of the boundaries of local government units must be approved by a majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political unit or units directly affected. Such plebiscite shall be conducted by the COMELEC within 120 days from the date of the effectivity of the law, not from its approval The word approval could only mean effectivity as used and contemplated in Section of the Code. The completion of the publication of the law (September 1, 2000) should be the reckoning point in determining the 120-day period within which to conduct the plebiscite, not from the date of its approval (August 16, 2000) when the law had not yet been published. Since publication is indispensable for the effectivity of a law (Tanada vs. Tuvera146 SCRA 446)), a plebiscite can be scheduled only after the law creating a city took effect. (Cawaling vs. COMELEC, supra)
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Which Unit Shall Participate. General Rule: voters in the political unit or units directly affected. Section 10, LGC) In case the creation is by reason of division of a political unit, the plebiscite for the creation of a new province or municipality shall include the participation of the residents of the mother province or mother municipality in order to conform to the constitutional requirement. (Padilla vs. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735)
When the law says the plebiscite shall be conducted in the areas affected this means that residents of the political entity who stand to be economically dislocated by the segregation of a portion thereof must have the right to participate in the said plebiscite Logically, those to be included in such plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. Thus, BP 885, creating the Province of Negros del Norte is declared unconstitutional because it excluded the voters of the mother province from participating in the plebiscite. (Tan vs. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727) In the conversion of a municipality into a component city, however, only the registered voters of the municipality sought to be converted into a component city, shall participate in the plebiscite. Necessity of Plebiscite RA 8528 changing the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city is unconstitutional for its failure to provide that said conversion should be submitted to the people of Isabela in a proper plebiscite, as required by Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. A close analysis of the said constitutional, provisions will reveal that the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator material change in the political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as well as the people therein. (Miranda vs. Aguirre, GR No. 133064, September 16, 1999) The Constitution imposes two conditions: (i) the creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of local government unit must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land area; and (ii) the law must be approved by the people by majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (id) The requirements of income, population and land area in Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the Local Government Code are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local government unit concerned. They were not imposed to determine the necessity of a plebiscite of the people. (id) CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs /26 The changes that will result from downgrading the city of Santiago from an independent component city are many and cannot be characterized as insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The city
mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor. The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be shared with the province. (id) Reiterating the necessity of a plebiscite, the Supreme Court in Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 601, ruled that substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one, there is material change in the political and economic rights of the local government unit when it converted from a municipality to a city and undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this reason why Section 10 of Article X of the Constitution mandates that no province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered without approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Prejudicial Question A case involving a boundary dispute between local government units presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held. Merely because a plebiscite has already been held in regard to a propose barangay does not necessarily render a pending petition for settlement of boundary dispute involving said barangay moot and academic. (Pasig City vs. COMELEC, 314 SCRA 179) Attack Against Invalidity of Incorporation A quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture for of its charter is reserved to the State must be commenced within the reglementary period of 5 years from the act complained of was done or committed. (Municipality of Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182).
--o0o--
V.
POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS
Classifications 1. Express, implied and inherent 2. Public or governmental, private or proprietary 3. Intramural or extramural; and
4.
Mandatory and directory; ministerial and discretionary
I.
Governmental Powers of LGUs

A. General Welfare - Sec. 16, LGC Police Power .
The GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE is the statutory grant of police power to local government units. It has two branches: (1) the general legislative power authorizes the municipal council to enact ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon by the municipal council by law; and (2) the police power proper authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants, and for the protection of their property. Essential Requisites in the Valid Exercise of Police Power by LGUs A local government unit is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. (SJS vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92) The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. Thus, a municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed a resolution recommending the closure or transfer of a gasoline filling station maintaining that the same was lees than 100 meters away from the nearest public school and church when the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, and that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of the zoning ordinance. (Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85) The following are limitations on the exercise of powers under the general welfare clause: 1. Express grant by law (e.g., Secs. 16, 391, 447, 458 and 468, LGC) 2. Exercisable only within the territorial limits of the local government unit, except for protection of water supply. 28

3.
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Equal protection clause. (The interests of the public in general, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the exercise of the power.
4. 5. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
6.
Due process clause. (The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive on individuals.) Must not be contrary to the Constitution and the laws. The following are the requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance: must not contravene the Constitution and any statute; must not be unfair or oppressive; must not be partial or discriminatory; must nor prohibit, but may regulate trade which is not illegal per se; must not be unreasonable; and must be general in application and consistent with public policy. (Solicitor General vs. MMA, 204 SCRA 837; Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994 and Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157) must not only be within the corporate powers of the city or municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law. (Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279 and City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308))
7.
VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES AND ACTS OF LGUs

Appropriation Ordinance for the Poor An ordinance extending burial assistance of P500 to a bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2,000 a month, has been upheld by the Supreme Court as a valid exercise of police power. This power is organic and flexible. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of common good. The police power of a municipal corporation is broad and xxx commensurate with, xxx the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs and in a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. (Binay vs. Domingo 201 SCRA 508.) Prohibiting Legalized Gambling An ordinance prohibiting the issuance of a business permit to any establishment allowing its premises to be used for the operation of a casino and prohibiting the operation of a casino was declared by the Supreme Court unconstitutional. The ordinance contravenes PD 1869, which authorizes the PAGCOR to operate casino. PD 1869, which has the force and effect of a law,
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should not be deemed to have been repealed by the LGC. Implied repeal are not likely presumed. (Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp. 234 SCRA 255) Zoning Ordinance
The Supreme Court upheld the validity of a zoning ordinance reclassifying an area as commercial despite contractual stipulation limiting the use of the parcel of land to residential purposes which is annotated in the title thereof. The Local Autonomy Act empowers a municipal council to adopt zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulation. The exercise of this power need not be done through an ordinance. A restriction in the contract cannot prevail over the zoning resolution, because the enactment of the resolution is a valid exercise of police power. The area where the two lots are located has become industrial and commercial. Traffic, noise and pollution are not conducive to health, safety or welfare of the resident. It would now be hazardous to health and comfort to use the lot for residential purposes, since a highway crosses the subdivision. (Ortigas & CO vs. Feati Bank 94 SCRA 533) In United BF Homeowners Association, Inc. vs. The City Mayor of Paranaque City, 515 SCRA 1, it was held that Ordinance NO. 97-08 providing for the reclassification of certain portions of BF Homes Paranaque form residential to commercial zone is reasonable and not discriminating or oppressive. It is also constitutional because it does not impair the contracts between the developer of BF Homes Paranaque and the lot buyers. The constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Like in Ortigas, supra, the Court held that contractual restrictions on the use of property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise of police power through zoning ordinances. Likewise, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 13 series of 1952 which prohibited the construction of warehouses that store inflammable materials within 200 meters from any block of houses. Herein petitioner constructed a warehouse which stored copra and abaca within 200 meters of a residential neighborhood. The municipal council passed an ordinance declaring the warehouse of petitioner a nuisance and directing him to transfer it. Petitioner contended that the ordinance violated due process. The ordinance is a valid exercise of police power. Its purpose is to avoid the loss of life and property in case of fire. (Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157) The enactment of a zoning ordinance which reclassified the area where the oil depot is situated from industrial to commercial and that the continued operation of the businesses of oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted, is a legitimate exercise of police power. Its purpose is to promote sound urban planning ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of terrorist attack of the Pandacan oil terminals. Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
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rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGUs exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals right to property, the former should prevail. Both law and jurisprudence support the constitutionality and validity of the
ordinance. Without a doubt, there is no impediments into its enforcement and implementation. Any delay is unfair to the inhabitants of the City of Manila and its leaders who have categorically expressed their desire for the relocation of the terminals. Their power to chart and control their own destiny and preserve their lives and safety should not be curtailed by the intervenors warnings of doomsday scenarios and threats of economic disorder if the ordinance is enforced. (SJS vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92) Franchising, Registration and Licensing of Tricycle Units An ordinance requiring tricycle owners to register their unit with, and their drivers to obtain license from, the City Government was likewise declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. The authority to register tricycles and to issue licenses for the drivers thereof remains with the Land Transportation Office and has not been devolved to the local government units. What was devolved is the franchising authority of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board over the operation of tricycles but not the authority of the LTO to register all motor vehicles (including tricycles) and to issue to qualified persons the license to drive such vehicles. (LTO vs. City of Butuan, 332 SCRA 805) Admission Fee to Movie Houses It was held that the ordinance penalizing persons charging full payment for admission of children ages 7 to 12 in movie houses was an invalid exercise of police powers for being unreasonable and oppressive to theater owners and not justified by public interest. While a reduction in the price will mean savings for parents, it is the theater owners who are made to bear the cost of those savings. A ticket is a property right. The owner has the right to sell it at such price as he can obtain. (Balacuit vs. CFI of Agusan del Norte, 163 SCRA 182) Moratorium of Fishing The Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of two ordinances banning the shipment of all live fishes and lobsters for five years, as well as the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling organisms. One of the devolved powers of LGUs is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters. This includes the enactment of ordinances to carry out such fishery laws. While Section 4 of the Fisheries Decree requires all ordinances and resolutions affecting fishing and fisheries be approved by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, Executive Order 967 transferred the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources to the Department of Agriculture. The requirement has been dispensed with. The local government units have the power to enact ordinances to enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology and to protect the environment. (Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 144)
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Imposition of Conditions to Business Permit In the case of Acebedo Optical Co. Inc. vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, GR No. 100152, March 31, 2000, the Supreme Court held that the imposition of special
conditions on the business permit is ultra vires. Police power is essentially regulatory in nature and the power to issue licenses and permits, if exercised for a regulatory and revenue-raising purpose, is within the ambit of this power. While the City Mayor can issue or grant licenses and business permits and impose conditions or restrictions thereto, such conditions must not amount to a confiscation of the business. A business permit is issued primarily to regulate the conduct of business and the city mayor cannot, through the issuance of such permit, regulate the practice of profession, like that of optometry. Such function is within the exclusive domain of the administrative agency specifically empowered by law to supervise the profession, i.e., Professional Regulations Commissions and the Board of Examiners in Optometry. Issuance and Revocation of Permits and Licenses The ordinance imposing licenses and requiring permits for any business establishments for the purpose of regulation enacted by the municipal council of Makati falls within the purview of the first branch of the general welfare clause. Moreover, the ordinance of the municipality imposing annual business tax is part of the power of taxation vested upon local government units under Section 8 of BP 337. (Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati, 443 SCRA 602) While the power of the mayor to issue licenses and permits necessarily includes the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of those licenses and permits. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue licenses and permits is premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. The mayor must observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to be heard. (Lim vs. CA, 387 SCRA 149) Likewise, even as the mayor has the power to inspect and investigate private commercial establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses and permits, he has no power to order a police raid on these establishments in the guise of inspecting or investigating these commercial establishments. Finally, a mayor has no authority to close down a business establishment without due process of law there is no provision in the Local Government Code or the Revised Charter of the City of Manila expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The regulatory powers granted to municipal corporations must always be exercised in accordance with law, with utmost observance of the right of people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. (Id.)
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The Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional an ordinance revoking all permits and licenses previously issued to operators of night clubs, cabarets, dance halls and prohibiting the issuance of new permits and licenses for such kind of business in the municipality. The Local Government Code authorizes the local
government units to exercise police power yet this power does not include the power to prohibit the establishment of businesses which are not per se illegal. LGUs can only regulate but cannot prohibit, the ordinance is ultra vires and unconstitutional. (Dela Cruz vs. Paras, 123 SCRA 569) In City of Manila vs. Laguio, 455 SCRA 308, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an ordinance which forbids running of nightclubs, sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars and similar business establishments, and instructs its owners/operators to wind up business operations as it amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property and is practically confiscatory. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of property without just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without just compensation. Nature of the power to issue/revoke permits and licenses. The Local Government Code is unequivocal that the municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which licenses or permits had been issued. The limits in the exercise of such power can be contained in the law or ordinance. Section 444 (b) (3), whereby the power of the Mayor to issue licenses and permits is circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated power of municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of certiorari, but certainly, not mandamus. (Robles Arrastre, Inc. vs. Villaflor, 499 SCRA 434) Foodstuffs Petitioner questioned the validity of ordinance No. 142, which prohibited selling perishable foodstuffs outside the public markets; Ordinance No. 145, which required all perishable foodstuffs to be inspected by the City Health Officer; and Ordinance No. 150, which prohibited anyone other than the city to operate a public market. The Supreme Court ruled that Ordinance No. 142 is a regulatory ordinance. Ordinance No. 145 is intended to promote general welfare. Ordinance No. 150 was enacted by the city to prohibit the operation of public markets by anyone other than the city. The claim of petitioner that her market is not public, because it is privately owned is unmeritorious. The test of public market is its dedication to service of the general public and not its ownership. (Javellana vs. Kintanar, 119 SCRA 627)
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Massage Parlors The City of Manila passed an ordinance prohibiting the operator of a barbershop from conducting the business of massaging customers in any adjacent room of the barbershop or in a room in the same building where the barbershop is located. Petitioner claimed that the ordinance deprived them of their means of
livelihood without due process. The Supreme Court ruled that the ordinance is valid. It is a police power measure. The objectives behind its enactment are to impose the license fees for engaging in the operation of massage clinics, a business entirely different from that of barbershops, and to prevent immorality which might arise from the construction of separate rooms for the massage of customers. (Velasco vs. Villegas. 120 SCRA 968) Grant of Franchises to Operate CATV System There is no law specifically authorizing the local government units to grant franchises to operate CATV system. What ever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn by PD 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for operation of CATV system previously granted by the local government units. EO 205 and EO 436, both of which are general laws that mandate that regulation of CATV operators shall be exercised by the National Telecommunications Commission including the power to fix the subscribers rates by CATV operators. Hence, Res. No. 210 approved by Batangas City, granting petitioner a permit to construct, install and operate a CATV system in Batangas City, and approving increase of subscribers rates, is defective as it contravenes EO 205 and EO 436. An LGU cannot enact and ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of a general law. It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in stature and subordinate to the laws of the State. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. Under a general grant of power, municipal corporations cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the State. It must be consistent with the general law. (Batangas CATV vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326) Disposition of Public Land The City of Baguio enacted an ordinance declaring all public lands occupied by squatters as city government housing project to be sold to them. Petitioners challenged the validity of the Ordinance. The ordinance is a patent nullity. No disposition of public land can be made by the City of Baguio without prior Legislative authority. The law has given the Director of Lands the exclusive power of disposition of public land. (Baguio Citizens Action, Inc. vs. City Council, 121 SCRA 368) Closure of Banks A rural bank not engaged in any illegal or immoral activities does not warrant its outright closure by the municipal government for its failure to pay annual business tax. The order of closure violated the banks right to due process. The violation of a municipal ordinance does not empower a municipal mayor to
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avail of extrajudicial remedies. The appropriate remedies to enforce payment of delinquent taxes or fees are provided for in Section 62 of the Local Tax Code. (Rural Bank of Makati vs. Municipality of Makati, 443 SCRA 602)
Burial Lots In City Government of Quezon City, vs. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, the Quezon City ordinance which required commercial cemetery owners to reserve 6% of burial lots for paupers in the City was held to be an invalid exercise of police power, but was instead an exercise of the power of eminent domain which would make the City liable to pay the owners just compensation Municipal corporations cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the State. It must be consistent with the general law. (Batangas CATV vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326) Cockfighting License It is the Sangguniang Bayan concerned alone which has the power to authorize and license the establishment, operation and maintenance of cockpits, and regulate cockfighting and commercial breeding of gamecocks within its territorial jurisdiction. But its discretion is limited by PD 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, in that it cannot authorize more than one cockpit per city or municipality, unless such cities or municipalities have population of over 100,000, in which case two cockpits may be established. Cockfighting is a valid matter of police regulation, as it is a form of gambling essentially antagonistic to the aims of enhancing national productivity and self-reliance limitation on the number of cockpits in a given municipality is a reasonably necessary means for the accomplishment of the purpose of controlling cockfighting, for clearly more cockpits equals more cockfight. A municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution and any statute. Ordinance No. 7 contravenes the Cockfighting Law in allowing three cockpits in a city. (Tan vs. Perena, 452 SCRA 53) Lease of Stall in Public Market It was within the ambit of the Sanggunians authority in the exercise of police power to regulate the enjoyment of the privilege to lease the market stalls. The enactment of the ordinance was a valid exercise of such governmental authority to regulate the possession and use of the public market and its facilities. The lease and occupation of a stall in a public market is not a right but a purely statutory privilege governed by laws and ordinances. The operation of a market stall by virtues of a license is always subject to the police power of the city government. This power could be exercised anytime to change the provisions of the contracts or even abrogate them entirely, for the protection of general welfare. Such an act did not violate the non-impairment clause which is anyway subject to and limited by the paramount police power. (Lucero vs. City Government of Pasig, 508 SCRA 23)

Operation of Common Terminal
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The subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and allow the operation
of only one common terminal located outside the city proper, franchise for which was granted to Lucena Grand Central Terminal Inc. The assailed ordinances are characterized by overbreath they go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Bus terminals per se do not impede or help impede the flow of traffic. In the subject ordinances, the scope of proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating at all. The operation of bus terminals is a legitimate business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. Unless a thing is a nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via and ordinance, without judicial proceedings. Also, such ordinances were declared unconstitutional as invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. The compulsory use of the terminal was held to be oppressive because it would subject its users to fees, rentals and charges. (Lucena Grand Terminal vs. JAL, 452 SCRA 174 Abatement of Nuisance While a Sanggunian is empowered under the Local Government Code to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or abating noise and other forms of nuisances, it cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance with such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor it can authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. These things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law. If a thing be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of a Sanggunian. (AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Corp., 506 SCRA 625) In Parayno vs. Jovellanos, 495 SCRA 85, it was held that a gas station business could not be considered a nuisance which a municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising police power. The abatement of nuisance without judicial proceedings is possible only if it is a nuisance per se. A gas station is not a nuisance per se or one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, hence it cannot be closed down or transferred summarily to another location. A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive. The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause. Respondent municipality failed to comply with due process
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clause when it passed Res. No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was
actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
B.
Power to Generate and Apply Resources - Sec. 18, LGC (Power of Taxation)
All LGUs are empowered to create their own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to the provisions on local taxation consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. The power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress. Local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges, pursuant to Section 5, Article X of the Philippine Constitution. (NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259) The Sanggunian concerned through an ordinance has the power to impose a tax, fee or charge. The procedural requirements of public hearing and publication must be observed for purposes of compliance with the requirements of due process. Only guidelines and limitations that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local governments. (Philippine Petroleum Corp. vs. Municipality of Pililia, Rizal, 198 SCRA 82) See Section 133 of the LGC for common limitations. The Constitutional mandate that every local government units shall enjoy local autonomy, does not mean that the exercise of power by local government units is beyond regulation of Congress. Thus, while each local government unit is granted the power to create its own sources of revenue, Congress, in the light of its broad power to tax, has the discretion to determine the extent of the taxing powers of local government units consistent with the policy of autonomy. (PHILRECA vs. Secretary of DILG, 403 SCRA 558) Under existing law, local government units, in addition to having administrative autonomy in the exercise of their functions, enjoy fiscal autonomy as well. Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by the national government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their own priorities. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) Under Section 133(o) of the LGC, local governments have no power to impose tax, fees or charges on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and local government units. However, indicative of legislative intent to carry out the constitutional mandate of vesting broad powers to local government units, the Local Government Code effectively withdrawn tax exemption or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities. (MERALCO vs. Province of Laguna, 306 SCRA 750) The limited and restrictive nature of the tax
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exemption privileges under the LGC is consistent with the State policy to ensure autonomy of local government units. Hence, Cebu City has the power to collect taxes from the MCIAA. (Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority vs. Marcos, GR No. 120082, September 11, 1996)) But in MIAA vs. CA, GR No.155650, July
20, 2006, 495 SCRA 51, the Supreme Court declared that no taxes, fees, or charges of any kind may be imposed by any local government unit against the National Government, its agencies, or instrumentalities and that their properties shall not be subject to levy, encumbrance, or sale. This would include real estate taxes on properties intended for public use and for some public service. One of the most significant provisions of the Local Government Code is the removal of the blanket exclusion of instrumentalities and agencies of the national government from the coverage of local taxation. Section 193 of the LGC provides for withdrawal of tax exemption privileges by certain entities, including GOCCs, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits an exception, i.e., when specific provisions of the LGC authorized the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities. (NPC vs. City of Cabanatuan, 401 SCRA 259) Section 133 of the LGC, was not intended to be so absolute a prohibition on the power of LGUs to tax the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities. The exemptions from real property taxes are enumerated in Section 234, which specifically states that only properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions is exempted from payment of the tax. Clearly, instrumentalities or GOCCs do not fall within the exception under Section 234. The express withdrawal of all tax exemptions accorded to all persons natural or juridical, as stated in Section 193 of the LGC applies, without impediment to the GSIS. (City of Davao vs. RTC Br XII, Davao City 467 SCRA 280) Section 193 of the LGC is indicative of the legislative intent to vest broad taxing powers upon local government units and to limit exceptions from local taxation to entities specifically provided therein. There is reasonable classification under the LGC to justify the different tax treatment between electric cooperatives covered by PD 269 as amended, and electric cooperatives under RA 6938. Sections 193 and 234 of the LGC permit reasonable classification as these exceptions are not limited to existing conditions and apply equally to all members of the same class. (PHILRECA vs. Secretary of DILG, 403 SCRA 558) The grant of taxing powers of local government units by the Constitution and the Local Government Code does not affect the power of Congress to grant exceptions to certain persons, pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local government means that in interpreting
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statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations. Tax exemptions must be interpreted in strictissimi juris
against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. (PLDT vs. City of Davao, 363 SCRA 522) Main sources of revenues of LGUs
A. 1.
2. 3.
Under the Constitution

Taxes, fees and charges. (Sec. 5, Art. X) Share in the national taxes Internal Revenue Allotment (Sec. 6, Art. X) Share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national wealth within their areas. (Sec. 7, Art. X) Section 4 of the Administrative Order 372 which directs the withholding of 10% of the local governments Internal Revenue Allotments pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, although temporary, was held by the Supreme Court unconstitutional. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the National internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever purpose. Such withholding by virtue of an administrative fiat clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law. (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201) To allow the President to withhold the IRA share of LGUs would contravene the declared policy on local autonomy. Devolution includes transfer of resources, including IRA share. Likewise, in Batangas vs. Romulo, 429 SCRA 736, its was held that under the same constitutional provision, the legislature like the executive, is mandated to ensure that the just share of the local government in the national taxes are automatically released and that it is barred from withholding the release of the IRA through the General Appropriations Act, the same being an inappropriate provision. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of the local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from performing this duty. Since Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution only just share of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to
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hinders or impede the automatic release of the IRA. (ACORD vs. Zamora, 459 SCRA 578) In Lucman vs. Malawi, 511SCRA 268, it was held that the
right to demand for the funds belongs to the local government itself through the authorization of their Sanggunian.
B. 1.
2.
Under the Local Government Code

Floating of Bonds Grants/Aids
Fundamental Principles on Local Taxation 1. Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit; 2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall: a. be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayers ability to pay; b. be levied and collected only for public purposes; c. not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory; and d. not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade. 3. 4. The collection of taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private persons; The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of the LGC shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
5.
Public hearings are conducted by legislative bodies to allow interested parties to ventilate their views on a proposed law or ordinance, but these views are not binding on the legislative bodies parties who participate in public hearings to give their opinions on a proposed ordinance should not expect that their views would be patronized by their lawmakers. (Hagonoy Market Vendors Association vs. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, 376 SCRA376) Failure of the City of Manila to follow the procedure in enactment of tax measures as mandated by Section 188 of the Local Government Code, in that they failed to publish Tax Ordinance No. 7988 for three consecutive days in a newspaper of general circulation renders the same null and void. If an order or law sought to be amended is invalid, then it does not legally exist, there should be no occasion or need to amend it. (Coca-cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 493 SCRA 279)
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Where the Secretary of Justice reviews, pursuant to law, a tax measure enacted by the local government unit to determine if the officials performed their
functions in accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers under the Local Government Code, the same is an act of mere supervision, not control. While the Secretary of Justice is authorized to review the constitutionality or legality of a tax ordinance and if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government. (Drilon vs. Lim, 235 SCRA 135) An appeal of a tax ordinance or revenue measures should be made to the Secretary of Justice within 30 days from effectivity of the ordinance. Failure of a taxpayer to interpose the requisite appeal to the Secretary of Justice is fatal to its complaint of refund. (Jardine Davies Insurance Brokers, Inc. vs. Aliposa, 398 SCRA 176) And even during the pendency of such appeal, the effectivity of the assailed ordinance shall not be suspended. (Hagonoy Market Vendors Association vs. Municipality of Hagonoy, Bulacan, 376 SCRA376) The time frame fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is not a mere technicality that can be easily brushed aside the periods stated in Sec. 187 of the LGC are mandatory. (Id.) Sec. 6c.04of the Municipal Revenue Code and Sec. 191 of the LGC limiting the percentage of increase that can be imposed apply to tax rates, not rentals. (Id.) A memorandum issued by the Secretary of Justice directing the Chief State Counsel to refrain from acting on or accepting appeals filed under Sec. 187 of the Local Government Code and to inform the appellants to file their appeal directly with the court amounted to an abdication by the Secretary of Justice of his jurisdiction over the appeal such that any subsequent action before the RTC cannot be anything but an original action whereby the function of the trial court cannot be limited to reviewing the evidence adduced before the Secretary of Justice. (City of Olongapo vs. Stallholders, 343 SCRA 705) Shares of LGUs in the Proceeds of National Taxes The share of the LGU in Internal Revenue Taxes is 40%. The 40% Internal revenue Allotment is allocated to LGUs as follows: for provinces and cities 23%; for municipalities 34%; for barangays 20%. No less than 20% of the Internal Revenue Allotment is allotted for development project by the local unit from the IRA. Shares in National Wealth Forty (40%) of the gross collection from mining taxes, royalties, forestry and fishery charges, and from each share in any joint effort in utilizing and developing the national wealth within the LGUs jurisdiction and shall be remitted without need for further action to the local treasurer on a quarterly basis within five (5) days after the end of every quarter.
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LGUs shall receive 1% of the gross sale or receipts of the preceding calendar year and 40% of taxes, fees or charges that GOCCs would have paid if not tax exempt, whichever is higher. How National Wealth is Distributed If the national wealth is located in one province, the province shall receive 20%, the component city/municipality shall receive 45% and the barangays 35%. If the national wealth is located in two or more LGUs, distribution shall be based on the following: Population 70% and Land Area 30%. If the national wealth is located in Highly Urbanized City or Independent Component City, the HUC or ICC shall receive 65% and the barangays shall receive 35%. Fundamental Principles of Local Fiscal Administration Among the fundamental principles governing the financial affairs, transactions and operations of the LGUs are: 1. 2. No money shall be paid out of the local treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation ordinance or law; Local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes; Section 335 of RA 7160 is clear and specific that no public money shall be appropriated or applied for private purposes. This is in consonance with the fundamental principle in local fiscal administration that local government funds and monies shall be spent solely for public purposes. The use of LGU funds for the widening and improvement of privately-owned sidewalks is unlawful and it directly contravenes Section 335 of RA 7160. Only the construction, improvement, repair and maintenance of infrastructure facilities owned by the LGU may be bankrolled with local government funds. (Albon vs. Fernando, 494 SCRA 141, GR No. 148357, June 30, 2006) 3. Local revenue is generated only from the sources expressly authorized by law or ordinance, and collection thereof shall at all times be acknowledged properly; All monies officially received by a local government officer in any capacity or on any occasion shall be accounted for as local funds, unless otherwise provided by law; Trust funds in the local treasury shall not be paid out except in fulfillment of the purpose for which the trust was created or the funds received.
4.
5.
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NOTE: Pursuant to Section 16 and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of local government units as provided for under Section 22, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod/Bayan shall approve ordinances and pass resolutions for an efficient and effective local government, in this connection shall adopt measures to protect the inhabitants of the province/city/municipality from harmful effects of man - made or natural disasters and calamities, and to provide relief services and assistance for victims during and in the aftermath of said disasters and calamities and their return to productive livelihood following said events. (Sections 648,458 and 447 (a)(1)(iv), LGC)
C.
Eminent Domain (Sec. 19, LGC)
Nature. The right of eminent domain is usually understood to be an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any private property within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose upon payment of just compensation. It is the Governments right to expropriate, in the nature of compulsory sale to the State, private property for public use. Eminent domain is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. (The City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, 380 SCRA) The power of eminent domain is inherently possessed by the State. It is lodged in the legislative branch of the government which has the authority to delegate the exercise thereof. By delegation, the power may also be possessed by the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private enterprises performing public services, subject only to Constitutional limitations. Indeed, local government units themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature. Section 19 of the LGC prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain and lays down the parameters for its exercise. Thus, strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principals will or modify the same. (Beluso vs. Municipality of Panay, Capiz, 498 SCRA 113) An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of sum of money. It deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use. (Bardillon vs. Brgy. Masili of Calamba, Laguna, 402 SCRA 440) Purposes and Limitations. The taking of private property by local government units shall be for public use, or purpose, or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and the landless. The exercise by LGUs of the power of eminent domain is not absolute and is subject to the usual constitutional limitations such as necessity, private property, taking, public use, just compensation and due process of law and equal protection of the law. (Barangay Sindalan vs. CA, GR No. 150640, March 22, 2007) POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS /44
Taking. The taking of private property is not absolute. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be expropriated. (Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279) Coverage. Only private property can be the subject of expropriation.
Private property already devoted to public use can still be a subject of expropriation by Congress but not by LGUs. (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349) Corollary to the expanded notion of public use, expropriation is not anymore confined to vast tracts of land and landed estates. (Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173) It is therefore of no moment that the land sought to be expropriated in this case is less than half a hectare only. (Pulido vs. CA, 122 SCRA 63) A property that is intended for the construction of a place of religious worship and a school for its members may still be expropriated. (Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig MM, 466 SCRA 235)
Genuine Necessity. The right to take private property for public purposes
necessarily originates from necessity and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character and must also be shown to exist. (Masikip vs. City of Pasig, 479 SCRA 391) The ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany and not follow, the taking of the land. (City of Manila vs. Chinese Community, 40 Phil 349) As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise of the power of eminent domain is a justiciable question, including the exercise by LGUs. However, when the power is exercised by the legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. (Municipality of Meycauayan vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 640 and Manapat vs. CA, 536 SCRA 32) There is a failure to establish that there is genuine necessity when the basis for passing the ordinance authorizing the expropriation indicates that the intended beneficiary is a private non-profit organization, and not residents of the locality the purpose thereof is clearly not public. (Masikip, supra.) Where property is expropriated for the purpose of constructing a road, the expropriator is not mandated to comply with the essential requisites for an easement of right of way made under the New Civil Code case law has it that in the absence of legislative restriction, the grantee of the power of eminent domain may determine the location and route of the land to be taken unless such determination is capricious and wantonly injurious. (Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig MM, 466 SCRA 235) The testimony that although there were other ways through which can enter the vicinity, no vehicle, however, especially fire trucks, could enter the area except through the property sought to be expropriated is more than sufficient to establish that there is genuine necessity for the construction of a road in the area absolute necessity is not required, only reasonable and practical necessity will suffice. (Ibid.)
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Public use, purpose, welfare; not for private use. In this jurisdiction, public use is defined as whatever is beneficially employed for the community. Expropriation is justified so long as it is for the public good and there is genuine necessity of public character. That only a few could actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character. It is simply not possible to provide all at once land and shelter for all who need them. (Sumulong vs. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461)
The expropriation of property intended for the establishment of a pilot development center and housing project of the Province of Camarines Sur was held valid in consonance with the public purpose requirement of the Constitution. Likewise, local government units can expropriate agricultural lands without prior authority from the Department of Agrarian Reform as the determination of the public use of the property subject for expropriation is considered an expression of legislative policy. (Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA, 222 SCRA 173) Conversely, expropriation can not be exercised for private use or purpose. Where the property sought to be expropriated was allegedly intended to benefit the residents of Sitio or Purok Paraiso but it would actually benefit the owners of a subdivision and incidental benefit to homeowners within the sitio, the same involves expropriation of private property for the benefit of private individual which is clearly proscribed by the constitution. In this case, the owners of the subdivision will be able to circumvent the commitment to provide road access to the subdivision and relieved from spending their funds for a right of way. Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. This proposed condemnation, government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without any legal mooring. (Barangay Sindalan vs. CA, supra.)
Just Compensation. The government must pay the owner thereof just compensation as consideration therefore. Just compensation means the fair market value of the property or the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything beyond, that is more anything short of that is less, than just compensation.
When eminent domain is exercised by a local government unit, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value of the property at the time of actual taking. While Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides that just compensation shall be determined at the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, such law cannot prevail over Section 19 of RA 7160 which is a substantive law. (The City of Cebu vs. Dedamo, 380 SCRA) It was also held that the value of the property shall be ascertained as of the date it was actually taken, because it is as of that time that the real measure of the owners loss may be fairly adjudged. (Nepomuceno vs. City of Surigao, GR No. 146091, July 28, 2008) Once the value of the property is fixed by the court, the amount shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected. (Ibid.)
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An expropriation suit falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation. (Barangay San Roque, Talisay, Cebu vs. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, 334 SCRA 127 and Bardillon vs. Brgy. Masili of Calamba, Laguna, supra) The additional limitations on the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units are, as follows: 1. Exercised only by the local chief executive, acting pursuant to a valid ordinance; Expropriation is the procedure or action for carrying out that right of eminent domain. The right extends to property partly or entirely personal and the procedure is substantially the same. An LGU shall file a complaint for expropriation on the strength of an ordinance and not a mere resolution passed by the Sanggunian. (Municipality of Paranaque vs. VM Realty Corp., 292 SCRA 676; Heirs of Suguitan vs. City of Mandaluyong, 328 SCRA 137 and Antonio vs. Geronimo, 476 SCRA 340) The legislative acts of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the exercise of its law-making authority are denominated ordinances. (Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 400 SCRA 279 The promulgation of the ordinance authorizing the local chief executive to exercise the power must be promulgated prior to the filing of the complaint for eminent domain with the proper court, and not after the court shall have determined the amount of just compensation to which the defendant is entitled. (Heirs of Suguitan, supra) Sec. 9 of RA 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, provides for priorities in the acquisition of land for socialized housing. Private lands rank last in the order of priority for purposes of socialized housing. Expropriation proceedings are to be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted. Compliance with these conditions must be deemed mandatory because these are the only safeguards in securing the right of owners of private property to due process when their property is expropriated for public use. (Filstream International Inc. vs. CA, 284 SCRA 716 and Langcao vs. City of Cebu, 440 SCRA 279)) Expropriation as a mode of acquiring lands for socialized housing under RA 7279 is subject to two conditions: 1) it shall be resorted to only when the other modes of acquisition have been exhausted; and 2) parcels of land owned by small property owners are exempt from such acquisition. (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350 SCRA 487)
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RA 7279 expressly exempted small property owners from expropriation of their lands for urban land reform. The two elements defining small property owners are: 1) those owners of real property whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas, and 2) they do not own real property other than the same. 2. For public use or purpose or welfare, for the benefit of the poor and the landless; The power of eminent domain must not be exercised arbitrarily even if purposed for resolving a critical problem such as squatting. (Antonio vs. Geronimo, 476 SCRA 340) 3. Only after a valid and definite offer had been made to, and not accepted by, the owner. The purpose of the requirement of a valid and definite offer to be first made to the owner is to encourage settlements and voluntary acquisition of property needed for public purposes in order to avoid the expense and delay of a court action. It permits the land owner to receive full compensation, and the entity acquiring the property, immediate use and enjoyment of the property. A single bona fide offer that is rejected by the owner will suffice. (Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation vs. Municipality of Pasig MM, 466 SCRA 235) A letter offered to prove that municipalitys desire or intent to acquire a property for a right of way does not prove that the LGU made definite and valid offer to acquire the property for public use as an access road before filing the complaint for expropriation. In the absence of competent evidence that indeed, the municipality made a definite and valid offer to all co-owners of the property, the declaration in an ordinance that the property owners were notified of the intent to purchase the same for public use as a municipal road is not in compliance with Section 19 of the LGC. (Ibid.) There are two phases of an expropriation proceedings: 1. the determination of the authority of the plaintiff local government unit to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise, which ends either by an order of dismissal or condemnation; and
2.
the determination by the court of just compensation for the property sought to be taken. (Barangay San Roque, supra)
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In expropriation proceedings involving local government units, the requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and (2) deposit of the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration. Hearing is still to be held to determine whether or not petitioner indeed complied with the requirements provided in RA 7279. (City of Iloilo vs. Legaspi, 444 SCRA 269) The issuance of the writ of possession becomes a ministerial matter for the expropriation court once the two foregoing requisites are established. (Bardillon vs. Brgy. Masili of Calamba, Laguna, 402 SCRA 440) The determination of whether the taking of the property is for a public purpose is not a condition precedent before the court may issue a writ of possession. (Francia vs. Municipality of Meycauayan, GR No. 170432,March 24, 2008)
D.
Reclassification of lands Sec. 20
A city or municipality may, through an ordinance passed after conducting public hearings for the purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their utilization and disposition: 1. when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as determined by the Department of Agriculture, or 2. where the land shall have substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, as determined by the sanggunian; provided that such reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance: a. for highly urbanized cities and independent component cities: 15% b. for component cities and 1st to 3rd class municipalities: 10% and c. for 4th to 6th class municipalities: 5%; provided that agricultural land distributed to land reform beneficiaries shall not be affected by such reclassification.
E.
Closure and Opening of Roads
A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction, provided that in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least 2/3 of all the members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility shall be provided. Temporary closure may be made during an actual emergency, fiesta celebrations, public rallies, etc.

Additional limitations in case of permanent closure:
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1. 2.
adequate provision for the maintenance of public safety must be made; and the property may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property may be lawfully used or conveyed, but no freedom park shall be closed permanently without provision for its transfer or relocation to a new site.
Properties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon them by Congress. Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic principle that properties of public dominion devoted to public use and made available to the public are outside the commerce of man and cannot be disposed o or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the requirement of due process which should be complied with before closing a road, street or park, the closure should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing the road or other public property from public use when the circumstances show that such property is no longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes a patrimonial property of the local government concerned. (Article 422; Cebu Oxygen vs Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481) It is only then that a municipality can use or convey them for any purposes for which other real property belonging to the local government unit concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed. Thus, the roads and street which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular traffic are still considered public property devoted to public use. In such case, the municipality is bereft of any authority to close them for the establishment of a flea market. (Macasiano vs. Diokno 212 SCRA 464)
F.
Naming of LGUs, Public Places, Streets & Structures
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan, in consultation with the National Historical Commission, may now change the name of the following within their respective territorial jurisdiction: component cities and municipalities, and barangays, roads avenues, boulevards thoroughfares and bridges, public schools, hospitals, health centers, and any other public place or building. (Sec. 13 LGC). The same section of the Code provides the following guidelines in the naming of the foregoing local government units, institutions, places, or buildings, to wit: 1. They shall not be named after a living person, nor may a change of name be made unless for a justifiable reason;

2.
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Such change of name be made not oftener than once every ten years;
3.
4. 5.
6.
7.
Those with historical, cultural or ethnic significance shall not be changed unless by unanimous vote of the sanggunian concerned and in consultation with the NHI; A change of name of a public school shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local school board concerned; A change of name of public hospitals, health centers, and other health facilities shall be made only upon the recommendation of the local health board concerned; A change of name of any local government unit shall be effective only upon ratification in a plebiscite conducted for the purpose in the political unit directly affected; In any change of name, the Office of the President, the representative of the legislative district concerned, and the Philippine Postal Corporation.
The National Historical Commission issued the following additional guidelines: 1. Honorific titles like Don or Father or Jr. or Sr. should be deleted in naming or renaming of streets and/or plazas for practical, aesthetic and historico-literary reasons; 2. A genuine, indigenous, non-hispanized spelling should be used at all times with reference to the naming or renaming of streets and /or plazas the spelling of which does not conform to official Pilipino orthography; 3. The Filipino terminology, should be encouraged in naming or renaming of streets and/or plazas; 4. Street names with indigenous names should be retained. However, those with no historical significance should be replaced; and 5. Streets bearing the names of religious personalities identified with national movement will be retained or to be recommended for street names.
G.
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
Section 118 of the Code spells out the policy that boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. Nature of the Power The power of the provincial boards to settle boundary disputes is of an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities. It is a power to fix a common boundary, order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities. The agreement between the municipalities of Jimenez
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and Sinacaban (embodied in a resolution of a provincial board declaring certain barrios part of one or another municipality) is invalid as it would effectively amend EO No. 258 creating the Municipality of Sinacaban. It is contrary to the technical description of the territory of a municipality as per EO 258, and therefore not binding. The power of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to settle boundary disputes is limited to implementing the law creating the municipality and, any alteration of boundaries not in accordance with the law is not implementation but amendment of the law, which would exceed their authority. (Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182) Jurisdiction The Local Government Code confers jurisdiction in settling boundary disputes to the following: 1. Sangguniang Panlunsod or Sangguniang Bayan those involving two or more barangays in the same city or municipality; 2. Sangguniang Panlalawigan those involving two or more municipalities within the same province; 3. Joint Sanggunians of the provinces concerned those involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces; and 4. Joint Sanggunians of the parties those involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other, or two or more highly urbanized cities. Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for settlement to the Sanggunians of the provinces concerned. (Section 118, LGC) The RTC cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case since there was no petition that was filed and decided by the Sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. Neither can the RTC assume original jurisdiction over the boundary dispute since the LGC allocates such power to the sanggunian panlalawigans of Davao Oriental and Surigao del Sur. (Calanza vs. PICOP, GR No. 146622, April 24, 2009) When LGC is Silent. Section 118(d) of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not an independent component city. While Kanaga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118(d) does not apply to them. Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of the same province, the general rule governing jurisdiction should be used. The applicable provision is found in Section 19 (6) of BP 129, the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by RA 7691, which provides the Regional Trial Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. (Municipality of Kanaga vs. Madrona, 402 SCRA 330)
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Procedure (1) Amicable settlement - Boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. (2) Formal Hearing - In the event that the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within 60 days from the date the dispute was referred to it, it shall issue a certification to that effect. The dispute shall then be formally tried by the sanggunian concerned which shall decide the issue within 60 days from the date of certification. In case no settlement of boundary dispute between municipalities is made, the dispute should be elevated to the RTC of the province. Failure of the court to decide within the period prescribed by law does not divest it of its jurisdiction to decide the case but only makes the judge thereof liable for possible administrative sanction. The Supreme Court declared that the RTC was correct when it ordered a relocation survey to determine to which municipality the barangays belonged. (Jimenez vs. Baz, 265 SCRA 182) (3) Appeal - within the time and manner prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the decision to the sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute which shall decide the appeal within 1 year from the filing thereof. In Municipality of Sta. Fe vs. Municipality of Aritao, GR No.140474, September 21, 2007, it was held that it is only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal, should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same.
H.
Authority Over Police Units
Section 6 of Art. XVI of the Constitution mandates the State to establish and maintain one police force which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. Under RA 6975, local government units exercise the following authority over the PNP within their territorial jurisdiction: (1) (2) (3) Through the Local Chief Executive, except barangay, the power to appoint the Municipal/City Chief of Police or Provincial Director; Through the Local Chief Executive, except barangay, the operational control and supervision over the PNP; and Through the Peoples Law Enforcement Board, a local special body, exercises concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over erring PNP personnel.
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LOCAL LEGISLATIVE POWER

(1) (2) (3) (4) Local legislative power shall be exercised by: Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the province Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city Sangguniang Bayan for the municipality, and Sangguniang Barangay for the barangay Two categories of power conferred to the Sanggunian by the Local Government Code: Legislative Power the power to propose, enact, amend and repeal ordinances (2) Quasi-judicial Power except sangguniang barangay, the power to: (a) (b) to settle boundary disputes, and the power to investigate and impose disciplinary actions to the elective officials upon the next lower level of local government units.
(1)
There is no provision in the Constitution or in the Local Government Code granting local legislative bodies the power to subpoena a witness and the power to cite them for contempt, either pursuant to its legislative power or quasi-judicial power. (Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete, 156 SCRA 421) Products of legislative action (1) Ordinance the legislative acts of the sanggunian in the exercise of its law-making authority are denominated ordinances. They prescribe a permanent rule of conduct; with force and effect of laws and requires approval by the local chief executive (2) Resolution an expression of sentiments of the members of the sanggunian; they are of temporary character and does not have the force and effect of a law Presiding Officer The vice-governor, the vice-mayor, and the punong barangay shall be the presiding officer of the sanggunian but shall vote only in case of tie. In case of inability of the presiding officer, the members shall elect a temporary presiding officer from among themselves. Being the acting governor, the Vice-governor cannot simultaneously exercise the duties of the latter, since the nature of the duties of the Provincial Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them. The creation of a temporary vacancy in the office of the Governor creates a corresponding vacancy in the office of the Vice - governor whenever the latter acts as Governor by virtue
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of such temporary vacancy. This event constitutes an inability on the part of the regular presiding officer (Vice-governor) to preside over the SP sessions, which thus calls for the operation of the remedy set in Sec. 49(b) of the Local Government Code the election of a temporary presiding officer from among themselves. The continuity of the Acting Governors (Vice-governor) powers as presiding officer of the SP is suspended so long as he is in such capacity. (Gamboa vs. Aguirre, GR No. 134213, July 20, 1999) A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the latter who can vote only in case of tie. Thus, while acting as presiding officer, a Board Member may not, at the same time be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member, including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. (Zamora vs. Caballero, 420 SCRA 384) Sessions The minimum number of sessions shall be once a week for the sanggunang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan, and twice a month for the sangguniang barangay. On the first day of session immediately following the election of its members, the sanggunian shall by resolution, fix the day, time and place of its regular sessions. A special session may be called by the local chief executive or a majority of the sanggunian members. Unless concurred in by two-thirds vote of the members present, no matter may be reconsidered at the special session except those stated in the notice. A majority of all the members of the sanggunian shall constitute a quorom. Quorom A majority of all members of the Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. (Section 53, LGC) Quorom is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. (Zamora vs. Caballero, 419 SCRA 384) Majority when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. (Id.) entire membership, including the presiding officer and ex-officio members, must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the Constitution merely states that majority of each House shall constitute a quorum Section 53 of the local Government Code is more exacting as it requires that the majority of all members of the Sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum. (Id.)
The
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Making and approval of ordinances On the first regular session following the election of its members and within 90 days thereafter, the sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules of procedure which shall provide for the following: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) organization of the sanggunian, election of its officers and creation of standing committees; the order and calendar of business for each session; the legislative process; the parliamentary procedures; discipline of members, and other rules as the sanggunian may adopt.
The Local Government Code requires is the on its first regular session xxx the Sanggunian concerned shall adopt or update its existing rules or procedures. (Section 50, LGC) and by resolution, fix the day, time and place of its regular sessions (Section 52, LGC). The law does not require the completion of the updating or adoption of the internal rules of procedure before the sanggunian could act on any other matter like the enactment of ordinance. It simply requires that the matter of adopting or updating the internal rules of procedure be taken up during the first day of session. There is nothing in the language thereof that restricts the matters to be taken up during the first regular session merely to the adoption of updating of the house rules. If it were the intent of Congress to limit the business of the local council to such matters, then it would have done so in clear and unequivocal terms. But as it is, there is no such intent. (Malonzo vs. Zamora, 311SCRA 224) An ordinance may be enacted in one session day because the Local Government Code does not prohibit the same, unlike in Congress where a bill must undergo three readings on separate days. (Ibid.) An ordinance shall be approved by the local chief executive by affixing his signature in each and every page thereof. The governor or mayor may veto any item in the following cases: (1) Appropriations ordinance (2) Ordinance adopting a local development plan and public investment program (3) Ordinance directing the payment of money or creating liability. The grounds for veto are:
(1)
the ordinance is ultra vires, or
(2) that it is prejudicial to public welfare.
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How a vetoed ordinance can become a law (1) (2) The sanggunian may override the veto by two-thirds vote of all its members. Failure of the Local Chief Executive to communicate the veto to the sanggunian within 15 days in the case of a province and 10 days in the case of city or municipality. The ordinance shall be deemed approved as if he signed it.
Ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang barangay shall, upon approval by a majority of all its members, be signed by the punong barangay. The latter has no veto power. In De los Reyes vs. Sandiganbayan 281 SCRA 631, where a municipal mayor was charged with falsification of a public document for approving purportedly appropriating money to pay for the terminal leave of two municipal employees when actually no such resolution was actually passed, he argued that his signature in the resolution was merely ministerial. His contention was unmeritorious because the grant of the veto power accords the mayor to sustain a resolution or to veto it. Review of Ordinances The sangguniang panlalawigan shall review ordinances and resolution of cities and municipalities to determine if they are within their power. (Sec. 56) The sangguniang panlungsod or bayan shall review sangguniang barangay ordinances to determine if they are lawful. (Sec. 57) The sanggunian concerned shall review the ordinance within 30 days from receipt thereof. If no action is taken within 30 days, the ordinance is presumed consistent with the law, and therefore valid and deemed approved. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without authority to review and disapprove a Sangguniang Bayan resolution authorizing the mayor to expropriate a lot for a farm center and government sports facilities on the ground that the expropriation was unnecessary since there were still available lots for the purpose. The municipality has the power to exercise the power of eminent domain pursuant to the Local Government Code. The resolution is valid and can be used as authority to petition for the condemnation of the property of petitioners. (Moday vs. CA, 268 SCRA 586) RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This is only found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72 expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No. 8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead it is a very specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No. 8119 which was explicitly
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formulated as the Manila (CLUP) and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 CLUPs are the ordinances which should be submitted to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines and policies. (SJS vs. Atienza, 545 SCRA 92) Enforcement of disapproved ordinances/resolutions Any attempt to enforce an ordinance or resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, after the disapproval thereof, shall be sufficient ground for the suspension or dismissal of the official or employee concerned. Effectivity of Ordinances a. Unless otherwise stated in the ordinance, it shall take effect after 10 days from posting at the provincial capitol or city, municipal or barangay hall and two other conspicuous places. b. The gist of all ordinances with penal sanction shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. In the absence of such newspaper, the ordinance shall be posted in all municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated. c. In highly urbanized and independent component cities, in addition to posting, the main features of the ordinance shall be published in a local newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such newspaper, it shall be published in any newspaper of general circulation. Enforcement of Local Ordinances The Local Government Code imposes upon the city mayor the duty to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the city. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to enforce ordinances as long as they have not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so. (Social Justice Society vs. Atienza, 517 SCRA 657) In City Engineer of Baguio vs. Baniqued, GR 150270, November 26, 2008, it was held that the issuance of notice of demolition by the City Mayor is never a judicial, ministerial or rule-making function. It is strictly an act of law enforcement and implementation.
II.
Corporate Powers Section 22, LGC
Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary functions and in the management of their economic enterprises, subject to limitations provided in the Local Government Code and other applicable laws. The corporate powers of local government units are:

(1) To have continuous succession in its corporate name.
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(2)
To sue and be sued.

a.
Who Initiates Suit. The rule is that a suit is commenced by the local chief executive. In City of Caloocan vs. CA, 489 SCRA 45, it was held that the mayor has the authority to file suits for the recovery of funds and property on behalf of the city even without prior authorization from the sanggunian. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that nowhere in the enumerated powers and duties of the sanggunian can one find the requirement of such prior authorization in favor of the mayor for the purpose of filing suits on behalf of the city
b. Who Represents the Unit. The local government unit must be represented by the Legal Officer or the Provincial Prosecutor and not by a private lawyer. (Municipality of Pililla, Rizal vs. CA, 233 SCRA 484) The rational of the prohibition is to relieve the LGU of the burden of hiring a private attorney. Likewise, the interest of the municipality would be best protected if a government lawyer handles its litigations. It is also expected that the municipal attorney and fiscal would be faithful and dedicated to the LGUs interests. Furthermore, civil service employees, such as a government lawyer could be held accountable for any misconduct or dereliction of duty. (Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 447). c. The legality of the representation of an unauthorized counsel may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The fact that the fiscal would collaborate with private counsel does not legalize his representation of the municipality. However, the Municipal Attorney may validly adopt the work already performed in good faith by a private lawyer, provided that no injustice is committed against the adverse party and that no compensation has been paid to the private counsel. (Ramos vs. CA, 269 SCRA 34) c. By way of exception, local government units may be represented by a private attorney only:
(1)
when the provincial fiscal is disqualified from representing the municipality. (Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 447)
(2) when the jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality lies with t he Supreme Court Mancenido vs. CA, 330 SCRA 419) (3) when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province (Id.)
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(4) when in a case involving the municipality, the provincial prosecutor, his spouse, or his child is involved as a creditor, heir, legatee, or otherwise. (Id.) d. In resolving whether a local government official may secure the services of private counsel in an action filed against him in his official capacity, the nature of the action and the relief sought are to be considered, as where the complaint contained other allegations and prayer for moral damages, which, if due from the defendants, must be satisfied by them in their private capacity. (Id.) e. A trial court cannot issue a writ of execution ordering a municipality to pay damages because public funds are not subject to levy. They are held in trust for the accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal corporations are created. (Municipality of Makati vs. CA, 190 SCRA 206) f. Where an ordinance has already been enacted appropriating money for payment under a construction contract, garnishment should not be quashed. (Pasay City Government vs. CFI, 132 SCRA 156) (3) To have and use a corporate seal. Local government units may continue using, modify or change their corporate seal; any change shall be registered with the Department of Interior and Local Government. (4) To acquire and convey real or personal property a. LGUs may acquire real or personal, tangible or intangible property, in any manner allowed by law such as sale, donation etc. b. A local government unit may alienate only patrimonial property upon proper authority. The Revised Administrative Code requires the approval of the President for the conveyance of title to real property. If such approval was not obtained, the conveyance was void. (City of Naga vs. CA, 172 SCRA 13) c. Public streets, thoroughfares and town plazas are properties of public dominion, outside the commerce of man, and may not be subject to lease or other contracts, and cannot be disposed of to private persons. (Macasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464) d. PD 957, as amended by PD 1216, mandates that open spaces in a subdivision shall be donated to the local government unit where
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the subdivision is located. The decree does not prohibit the imposition of conditions on the donation provided that the same are not contrary to law, morals, good custom, public order or policy, although it prohibits any construction to be made on the minimum area required for an open space in a subdivision. Considering that the area donated is less than the area required to be allocated for an open space, there is no excess area on which to construct the sports complex demanded by the subdivision owner as a condition for the donation. Thus, the condition for the donation is contrary to law and should be deemed not imposed. But the donation cannot be revoked for failure to comply with the condition. Otherwise, the subdivision owner would be able to evade its obligation to donate the open space. (City of Angeles vs. CA, 261 SCRA 90) e. The reconveyance of property of public domain is subject to strict legal requirements, foremost among the requirements being that the public property sought to be reconveyed be alienable. (Figuracion vs. Libi, 539 SCRA 50) (5) Power to enter into contracts Requisites of a valid municipal contract: i) The local government unit has the express or implied power to enter into the particular contract.
ii) The contract is entered into by the local chief executive on behalf of the local government unit with prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned. There is nothing in the powers and functions of the city treasurer that gives the city treasurer authority to sign contracts for the city government. (Mallari vs. Alsol, 484 SCRA 148) iii) The contract must comply with certain substantive requirements, i.e., when expenditure of public funds is to be made, there must be an actual appropriation by the Sanggunian and a certificate of availability of funds by the local treasurer. Where the cost of a construction contract was beyond the appropriated amount as certified by the city treasurer, the contract was void from the very beginning. (Osmena vs. COA, 230 SCRA 585) iv) The contract must comply with the formal requirements of written contract, e.g., Statute of Frauds.

Ultra viries contracts
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When a contract is entered into without compliance with the first and third requisites (above), the same is ultra viries and is null and void. Such contract cannot be ratified or validated. Ratification of defective municipal contracts is possible only when there is noncompliance with the second and/or the fourth requirements above. Ratification may either be express or implied. Authority to negotiate and secure grants The local chief executive, may upon authority of the sanggunian, negotiate and secure financial grants or donations in kind, in support of the basic services and facilities enumerated in Section 17 of the LGC, from local and foreign assistance agencies without necessity of securing clearance or approval from any department, agency, or office of the national government or from any higher local government unit; Provided, that projects financed by such grants or assistance with national security implications shall be approved by the national agency concerned. (6) To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the limitations provided in the Code and other laws.
--o0o--
VI. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
General Rule: Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. (Sec. 24, LGC) 1. Specific provisions of the Civil Code making LGUs liable: a). Art. 2189 : The local government unit is liable in damages or injuries suffered by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings and other public works. The City of Manila was held liable for damages when a person fell into an open manhole in the streets of the city. City of Manila vs. Teotico, 22 SCRA 267) Despite a management and operating contract with Asiatic Corporation over the Sta. Ana Public Market, the City of Manila is still solidarily liable fort injuries sustained by an individual who stepped on rusted nail while the market was flooded. (Jimenez vs. City of Manila, 150 SCRA 510) The liability of the city for injuries due to defective roads attaches even if the road does not belong to the local government unit, as long as the City exercises control or supervision over said road. (Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan, 171 SCRA 382 and Municipality of San Juan, MetroManila vs. CA, 466 SCRA 78)) Art. 2180, par. 6: The State is responsible when it acts through a special agent. (Merritt vs. Government of the Philippines, 34 Phil 311) Art. 34: The local government unit is subsidiarily liable for damages suffered by a person by reason of the failure or refusal of a member of the police force to render aid and protection in case of danger to life and property. Liability for Tort: Under Sec. 24 of RA 7160, local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property. a) If local government is engaged in governmental functions, it is not liable. In Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, 195 SCRA 692, it was held that the municipality cannot be held liable for torts committed by a regular employee, even if the dump truck used belonged to the municipality, inasmuch as the employee was discharging government functions, i.e., road construction. This ruling was reiterated in Jayme vs. Apostol, GR 165060, November 27, 2008, where it upheld the trial courts ruling that the municipality of Koronadal, the true and lawful employer of Lozano may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and , hence, immune from suit.
b)
c)
2.
62
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If engaged in proprietary functions, local government unit is liable. In Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 599, The Municipality of Malasiqui was held liable for the death of a member of the zarzuela group when the staged collapsed, under the principle of respondeat superior. The holding of a town fiesta managed by the Municipal Council is a proprietary function. In City of Manila vs. IAC, 179 SCRA 428) the North Cemetery is a property which the City of Manila owns in its proprietary capacity. The maintenance of the cemetery is a proprietary function. Hence, for breach of contract, the City of Manila is liable for damages. The City of Manila is liable for tortuous act committed by its agents who failed to verify the duration of the contract of lease.
c)
Personal liability of local officials. Where public officers act maliciously and wantonly and injure individuals rather than discharge a public duty, they are personally liable. Thus, the Provincial Governor and the members of the Provincial Board were held liable for damages in their personal capacity arising form the illegal act of dismissing employees in bad faith. (Rama vs. CA, 148 SCRA 496)
3.
Liability for violation of Law The Municipality of Bunawan, Agusan del Sur, through the Mayor, was held in contempt and fined P1,000.00 with a warning, because of the refusal to abide by a Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court. (Moday vs. CA, 243 SCRA 152) But, no liability, whether criminal or administrative, may be imputed to a mayor who, in entering into a contract, merely complied with the mandate of resolutions passed by the Sangguniang Bayan. (Constantino vs. Desierto, 288 SCRA 654))
4.
Liability for Contracts General Rule: A municipal corporation is liable on a contract it enters into provided the contract is intra viries. If the contract is ultra viries, the local government unit is not liable. Doctrine of Implied Municipal Liability. A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power to contract. Thus, in Province of Cebu vs. IAC, 147 SCRA 447, it was held that the Province of Cebu cannot set up the plea that the contract was
ultra viries and still retain benefits thereunder. Having regarded the contract as valid for purposes of reaping benefits, the local government unit is estopped to question its validity for the purpose of denying answerability.
VII. LOCAL OFFICIALS

Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of the officers active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably challenged. Loss of any of the qualifications during incumbency will be a ground for disqualification and termination. (Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 and Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1) Common Qualifications For Local Elective Officials Filipino citizen either natural born or naturalized For local elective officials the Local Government Code requires that they must be citizens of the Philippines either natural born or naturalized. The law, however, is silent as to when must the required citizenship be possessed by a candidate. Repatriation. In Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655, the Supreme Courts reiterated its ruling in Frivaldo, 257 SCRA 727, that repatriation under PD 725 retroacts to the date of filing of ones application for repatriation. Accordingly, petitioners repatriation under RA 8171, which repealed PD 725, retroacted to the date he filed his application in 1997 and was, therefore, qualified to run for mayoralty position in the government in May 2004 elections. Section 5, Par. 2 of RA 9225 Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 provides that those seeking elective public office shall meet the qualifications required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing of certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Mere filing of certificate of candidacy cannot operate as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. The law mandates that a candidate with dual citizenship must make a personal and sworn statement of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer oath. Absent an evidence that will show that Lopez complied with the provision of RA 9225, he is disqualified to run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. For the renunciation to be valid, it must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an officer of law who is authorized to administer an oath. The affiant-candidate must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be effective. For failure to prove that he abandoned his allegiance to the United States, he is disqualified to from running for an elective position in the Philippines.(Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No.182701, July 23, 2008)
An oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made by a candidate before the Los Angeles Philippine Consul General does not 64
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substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. The oath of allegiance is a requirement in reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural borncitizens who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country as required by Section 3 of RA 9225, further there is nothing in the said oath that expressly makes a renunciation of the foreign citizenship. Section 5(2) of RA 9225 categorically requires persons seeking elective public office who either retained their Philippine citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before filing of the certificate of candidacy. Similarly the certificate of candidacy merely provides for an oath of allegiance but there is no express renunciation of foreign citizenship. The same oath of allegiance in the certificate of candidacy is merely a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections, while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under R 9225 who seek elective posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. (Jacot vs. Dal, GR No. 179848, November 27, 2008) ii. Residence therein for at least one year immediately before the election The term residence as used in the election law, imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Papandayan, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 382 SCRA 133) The term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence, that is, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at a given time, eventually intends to return and remains (animus manendi) A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the childs parents reside until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of origin). (Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607) The rationale of requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they seek to be elected is to prevent the
possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter from seeking an elective office to serve that community. (Torayno vs. COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574)
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The residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves, and a very legalistic, academic and technical approach to the resident requirement does not satisfy this simple, practical and common sense rationale for the residence requirement. (Ibid.) Hence, in Torayno, the Supreme Court upheld the residency qualification of Governor Emano, inasmuch as he has proven that he, together with his family had actually resided in a house he bought in 1973 in Cagayan de Oro City; had actually held office there during his three terms as provincial governor of Misamis Oriental, the provincial capitol being located therein; and had registered as voter in the city during the period required by law he could not be deemed a stranger or newcomer when he ran and was voted as city mayor. Petitioners put much emphasis on the fact that Cagayan de Oro City is a highly urbanized city whose voters cannot participate in the provincial elections. Such political subdivisions and voting restrictions, however, are simply for the purpose of parity representation. The classification of an area as a highly urbanized or independent component city, for that matter, does not completely isolate its residents, politics, commerce and other businesses from the entire province, and vice versa; especially when the city is located at the very heart of the province itself. (Ibid.)
Repatriation and Residency. In Coquilla vs. COMELEC, 385

SCRA 607, it was held that once a Filipino loses his citizenship or becomes a citizen of another country, he also loses his domicile of origin or residence in the Philippines. Should he reacquire his citizenship, it would carry with it the reacquisition of his residency in the Philippines. However, the period of his reacquired residency shall be counted from the date he reacquired his Philippine citizenship or actually took his oath of allegiance as a repatriated Filipino citizen.
Property Ownership and Residency. In Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, 475 SCRA 290, the Supreme Court ruled that property ownership in not indicia of the right to vote or be voted for an office. A beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Further, domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and (3) acts which corresponds with the purpose. Without clear and positive proofs of the concurrence of those 3 requirements, the domicile of origin continues. To effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for indefinite period of time,
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the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The Supreme Court agreed with the Second Division of the COMELEC that Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. iii. Ability to read and write Filipino or any other local dialect iv. Registered voter of the local government unit, or of the district where he intends to be elected in the case of the members of the sanggunian Age Qualification a) b) c) d) e) Candidates in provinces and highly urbanized cities at least 23 years old Candidates for mayor and vice mayor of component cities or municipalities at least 21 years old Candidates for Sanggunian member in component cities and municipalities at least 18 years old Barangay officials at least 18 years old Sanggunian Kabataan at least 15 to 17 years old
The required age qualification must be possessed by any candidate, national or local, on the day of election. Disqualifications Under the Local Government Code Sec. 40 a. Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by imprisonment for at least one year, within two years after service of sentence. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary right and duty between man and woman or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good faith. In Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, 258 SCRA 483, it was held that violation of the AntiFencing Law involves moral turpitude. In Moreno vs. COMELEC, GR No. 168550, August 10, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that those who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation are not disqualified from running for local elective office because the two year period of
ineligibility does not even begin to run. The grant of probation merely suspends the execution of the sentence. The Supreme Court made no pronouncement in Lim vs. People, 340 SCRA 497 which reiterated the ruling in Vaca vs. CA, 298 SCRA 565, that with the deletion of the prison sentence for violation of BP 22, the offense no longer involves moral turpitude.
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In People vs. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692, the Supreme Court did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer, nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when committed by a member of the Bar but not so when committed by a non-member. (Villaber vs. COMELEC, 369 SCRA 126) Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Local Government Code is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specifically and definitely provides for disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of the Local Government Code insofar as it governs the disqualifications of candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. (Magno vs. COMELEC 390 SCRA 495) b. Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case. An elective local official who was removed from office prior to January 1, 1992 is not disqualified from running for elective local office. (Grego vs. COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481) c. d. Those convicted by final judgment for violating his oath of allegiance to the Republic. Those with dual citizenship. The phrase dual citizenship in RA 7160, Sec. 40(d) and RA 7854, Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. For candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. (Mercado vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630) However, if dual citizenship is acquired voluntarily pursuant to RA 9225, The Dual Citizenship Law, the same can be a ground for disqualification to the right of suffrage. e. Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases.
The term includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment, but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Marquez vs. COMELEC, 243 SCRA 538)
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Permanent residents in foreign country or those who have the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of it. A Filipino citizens immigration to a foreign country constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. In other words, the acquisition of a permanent residency status is a foreign country constitutes a renunciation of the status as a resident of the Philippines. (Caasi vs. CA, 191 SCRA 229) The act of a person surrendering her greencard to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the US Embassy is clear indication of her intention to abandon her US residency. (Gayo vs. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504) When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. In this case, considering the purpose of the residency requirement, i.e., to ensure that the person elected is familiar with the needs and problems of his constituency, there can be no doubt that private respondent is qualified. (Gayo vs. Verceles, citing Perez)
g.
The insane or feeble-minded.
Date of Election Unless otherwise provided by law, the elections for local officials, except for barangay officials, shall be held every three (3) years on the second Monday of May. Manner of Election a. The governor, vice governor, mayor, vice mayor, and punong barangay shall be elected at large in their respective units by qualified voters therein. Sangguniang Kabataan chairman for each barangay shall be elected by the registered voters of the katipunan ng barangay. (Sec. 41.) b. For provinces and cities with two or more legislative districts, the elective member of the sanggunian shall be elected by legislative districts. Provinces, cities and municipalities in Metropolitan Manila with only one legislative district shall be divided into two districts by the COMELEC. [Sec. 3 (a) and (b), RA 7166; Sec. 1, RA 7887] c. Regular elective members of the Sanggunian of cities and municipalities shall be elected at large. (Sec. 1, RA 7887)
d.
Sangguniang barangay members shall be elected at large. e. The president of the league of sanggunian members of component cities and municipalities shall be ex officio member of the sangguniang panlalawigan.
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f. The president of the liga ng mga barangay and the pederasyon ng mga sangguniang kabataan shall be ex officio member of the sanggunian. g. There shall be a sectoral representative from the women, workers, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, disabled persons, or any other sector determined by the sanggunian. (Sec. 41) Term of Office The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Section 8, Art. X, PC) Under Section 2 of RA 9164. the term of office all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials shall be three years. The counting of the three consecutive terms shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections. Thus, Laceda who has served as Punong Barangay of Panlayaan for three consecutive terms, was disqualified from running for the fourth time as punong barangay. (Laceda, Sr. vs. Limena, GR 182867, November 25, 2008) In this case, while it is true that under RA 8806, the municipalities of Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the former and creating Sorsogon City as new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose of applying the prohibition in Section 2 of RA 9164, the Office of the Punong barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of Punong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong barangay for three consecutive terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay. Moreover, RA 8806 did not interrupt Lacedas term. Three consecutive term limit
Rationale. The three-term limit is an exception to the peoples freedom to

choose those who will govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of
a prolonged stay in the same office. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574) It is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. (Laceda, Sr vs.Limena, supra)
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Requisites For the prohibition or disqualification to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. (Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157; See also Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574; Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473 and Laceda Sr. vs. Limena, supra)
Assumption by Succession. The term limit for elective local officials must
be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. (Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 reiterated in Adormeo vs. COMELEC GR No.147927, February 4, 2002)
Involuntary Severance from Office. Voluntary renunciation of a term of office does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from the office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Thus, in Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SACRA 602, thought proclaimed as winner by the Board of Canvassers, he is not considered duly elected for that particular term because he was unseated when there was a declaration of failure of election and his proclamation was a nullified. Also, he did not fully serve the term, hence, he was qualified to run for a third term.
But in Ong vs. Alegre, 479 SCRA 473, the Supreme Court held that Ongs assumption as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Sur from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, constitutes service of full term and should be counted as full term served in contemplation of the three term limit prescribed by the Constitution While Ongs opponent won in an election protest in the 1998 mayoralty race, and therefore was the legally elected mayor, that disposition was without practical and legal use and values, having been promulgated after the term of the contested office has expired. Ongs contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers as duly elected mayor in 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from the
start to finish of the term, should be legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule. This case equally applies to Morales because he was the mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga continuously for the entire period without any break notwithstanding the decision in the electoral protest case ousting him as mayor. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term, hence he is disqualified. (Rivera III vs. COMELEC, GR No. 167591, May 6, 2007)
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SFP was elected and served three consecutive term as municipal councilor. During his second term, he succeeded as vice-mayor due to the retirement of the incumbent vice-mayor. His assumption as vice-mayor was considered an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor resulting an interruption in his second term of service. It was held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law, hence qualified to run again as municipal councilor. (Montebon vs. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50)
Voluntary Severance from Office. Punong Barangay who had already

completed two consecutive terms of office and ran for a third term in the Barangay elections of 2002, and while serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he subsequently ran and won and assumed the position of a Sangguniang Bayan member, has effectively abandoned the position of a Punong Barangay and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary. When he voluntarily relinquished his office as a Punong Barangay, there is voluntary renunciation of said office. Such circumstance does not constitute an interruption in serving the full term, hence he is disqualified. (Bolos vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184082, March 17, 2009)
Conversion of a Municipality to a New Component City. While a new component city which was converted from a municipality acquires a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality, this does not mean however, that for the purpose of applying the constitutional provision on term limits, the office of the municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city mayor. Accordingly, the municipal mayor is barred from running for city mayor under the three-term limit rule. (Latasa vs. COMELEC, 417 SCRA 574) This prohibition also applies to the office of a punong barangay of a municipality merged with another municipality to create a city as a new political unit. The territorial jurisdiction of such barangay is the same as before conversion and the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. The voters who voted for the punong barangay are the same group of voters. The prohibition applies to prevent him from running as punong barangay for the fourth time, there being no break in the continuity of the terms. (Laceda vs. Limena, GR No. 182867. November25, 2008) Eligibility in a Recall Election. Section 43 of RA 7160 provides that no
local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall
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election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. (Socrates vs. COMELEC, 2002, 391 SCRA 457) A necessary consequence of the interruption of service is the start of a new term following the interruption. An official elected in recall election serves the unexpired term of the recalled official. This unexpired term is in itself one term for purposes of counting the three-term limit. A local official who serves a recall term should know that the recall term is in itself one term although less than three years. This is the inherent limitation he takes by running and winning in the recall election. (Ibid.) Vacancies and Succession I. Permanent Vacancy 1. a. b. 2. a. b. Governor and Mayor Vice Governor and Vice Mayor Sanggunian members according to ranking Punong barangay Highest ranking sangguniang member Second Highest ranking sangguniang barangay member Ranking in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained to the number of registered voters in each district, and not merely on the number of voters who actually voted. (Victoria vs. COMELEC, 229 SCRA 269).
3.
4. 5. Sanggunian
Ties will be resolved by drawing of lots. (Sec.44) a. Provinces, highly urbanized cities and independent component cities appointment by the President Component city and municipality appointment by governor Under paragraph (a) of Section 45 of the Local Government Code, it is the Provincial Governor who fills any permanent vacancy in the Sangguniang Bayan by appointment. (Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396))
c.
b.
The last vacancy in the Sanggunian refers to that created by the elevation of the members formerly occupying the next higher rank which in turn also had become vacant by any of the causes enumerated, and the term last vacancy is thus used in Section 45(b) of the Local Government Code, to differentiate it from the other vacancy previously created. In Navarro vs. CA, 355 SCRA 672, with the elevation of Tamayo who belonged to
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Reforma Party, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian that should be filled up with someone who belongs to the political party of Tamayo. To argue that the vacancy created was that formerly held by the 8th Sanggunian member, a Lakas Party Member, would result in the increase in that partys representation in the Sanggunian at the expense of Reforma Party. Thus, the appointment of Navarro to fill up the vacancy in the Sanggunian is valid. The reason behind the right given to a political party to nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is to maintain party representation as willed by the people in the election. Otherwise, Reforma Partys representation in the Sanggunian would be diminished. d. Sangguniang barangay appointment by mayor Except for the sangguniang barangay, the appointee shall come from the political party of the member who caused the vacancy. (Farinas vs. Barba, 256 SCRA 396))
e.
If the member does not belong to any party, the appointee shall be recommended by the sanggunian. (Ibid.)
f.
Neither petitioner nor respondent is entitled to the vacant seat in the Sangguniang Bayan. While petitioner was appointed by the provincial governor, he was not recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan. Such recommendation is a condition sine qua non for the validity of the appointment. Although respondent was recommended by the Sangguniang Bayan, it was the municipal mayor and not the provincial governor who appointed him. (Ibid.) g. The appointee for the sangguniang barangay shall be recommended by the sangguniang barangay. h. Vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the sanggunian shall be filled by the official next in rank of the organization. (Sec. 45) II. Temporary vacancy
1.
When the governor, mayor or punong barangay is temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties, the vice governor, vice mayor, or ranking sangguniang barangay member shall exercise his powers except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees, which can only be exercised after 30 working days.
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3.
Since the Local Government Code is silent on the mode of succession in case of temporary vacancy in the position of vice governor, because of the exigencies of public service, the President, through her alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, may extend a temporary appointment to remedy the situation. The President is authorized by law to make temporary appointments to vacant appointive positions. In the absence of a contrary provision, there is no reason why this cannot be applied to this case. The appointment of petitioner is in accordance with the intention of the LGC, which provides that in case of permanent vacancy in the office of the vice governor, the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan who obtained the highest number of votes shall assume office. The contention the its the SP who should make the appointment has no merit. As between the President, who has supervision over local governments, and the members of the SP, who are junior to the vice governor, the former should prevail. Even if the President has no power to appoint petitioner, at the very least he is a de facto officer and is entitled to compensation. (Menzon vs. Petilla, 197 SCRA 251) 2. When the local chief executive is traveling within the Philippines for not more than 3 consecutive days, he may designate an officer-in-charge. The authorization shall specify the powers of the officer-in-charge except the power to appoint, suspend or dismiss employees. If the local chief executive does not issue the authorization, the vice governor, vice mayor, or highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall assume his powers on the fourth day of his absence. (Sec. 46)
Powers of Vice Governor In Atienza vs. Villarosa, 458 SCRA 385, it was held that the Vice Governor, as presiding officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, has administrative control of the funds of the said body and it is he who has the authority to approve disbursement vouchers for expenditures appropriated for the operation of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The power of the Vice Governor to approve disbursement vouchers necessarily includes the authority to approve purchase orders covering the same applying the doctrine of necessary implication. In the same case, the Supreme Court also ruled that the Provincial Governor has no authority to appoint officials and employees of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. The union of executive and legislative has been disbanded under the Local Government Code. Compensation
The compensation of local officials and personnel shall be determined by the Sanggunian concerned and may be based upon the pertinent provisions of RA 6758. Increase in compensation of elective local officials shall take effect after expiration of the term of those approving the increase. Elective officials shall be entitled to the same leave privileges as those enjoyed by appointive local officials, including the cumulation and commutation thereof. (Sec. 81)
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Initiation. RA 9244 effectively amended Section 70 of the LGC and thus,

eliminated the preparatory recall assembly as one of the modes of initiating recall and provided a new procedure in the conduct of recall initiated through the written petition of registered voters according to the following schedule: -25% - where the voting population of LGU does not exceed 20,000; -at least 20% but not less than 5,000 - for LGUs with at least 20,000 but not more than 75,000 voting population; -at least 15% but not less than 15,000 for LGUs with at least 75,00 but not more than 300,000 voting population; AND -at least 10% but not less than 45,000 for LGUs with over 300,000 voting population. In Angobung vs. Paras, 269 SCRA 245, it was held that only a petition signed and filed by at least 25% of the total number of registered voter, and not only by the respondent, may validly initiate recall proceedings.
Recall Election. The official sought to be recalled is automatically a

candidate. (Sec. 71)
Effectivity of Recall. Recall shall be effective upon the election and

proclamation of successor receiving the highest number of votes. (Sec. 72)
Prohibition against resignation. The official sought to be recalled cannot

resign while the recall process is in progress. (Sec. 73)
Limitations. An official may be subject of recall only once during his term. No recall shall take place within one year from assumption of office or one year before the regular local election. (Sec. 74) The phrase regular election should be construed as referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested. (Paras vs. COMELEC, 264 SCRA 49) Another limitation is the prohibition to conduct recall election within one year from the date of assumption of office of the official concerned. The purpose of this limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an elective local official. As long as the election is held outside the one year period from assumption from office of the local official sought to be recalled, the preliminary proceedings to initiate recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of said local official. (Claudio vs. COMELEC, 331 SCRA 388)
Resignation
Acceptance by Proper Authority. Resignation of elective local officials shall be deemed effective only upon acceptance by the following authorities: a. The President, in case of governors, vice-governors, and mayors and vice-mayors of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. b. The governor, in case of municipal mayors and vice-mayors, city mayors and vice-mayors of component cities. LOCAL OFFICIALS
d. c. Sanggunian concerned, in case of sanggunian members The city or municipal mayor, in case of barangay officials.
/77
Effectivity. Resignation takes effect upon acceptance. It is deemed accepted if not acted upon within 15 working days. Irrevocable resignation by sanggunian members takes effect upon presentation before an open session. (Sec. 82)
Practice of Profession 1. Governors or mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation. 2. Sanggunian members may practice their profession, engage in any occupation, or teach except during session hours. VGR, a lawyer and a Punong Barangay and Chairman of the Lupong Tagapamayapa, presided over the conciliation proceedings in an ejectment case. The parties to the case were not able to amicably settle their dispute. Then one of the parties sought his legal assistance and handled her case. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with counter claim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. He is sued for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court held that the Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left the government service in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service. Accordingly, as Punong Barangay, he was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department (DILG Secretary), as required by civil service rules and regulations, particularly Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules. In acting as a counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, he not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility. (Catu vs. Rellosa, AC No. 5738, February 19, 2008) 3. Sanggunian members who are lawyers shall not: a. Appear as counsel in any civil case where the local government is the adverse party.
The complaint for illegal dismissal filed against the city engineer is in effect a complaint against the city, who was the real employer of the dismissed employees. A judgment against the city engineer would actually be a judgment against the city. By serving as counsel of the dismissed employees, petitioner, a city councilor violated the provision against representing interests adverse to the city. (Javellana vs. DILG, 212 SCRA 475)
LOCAL OFFICIALS
/78
b. Appear as counsel in a criminal case where the accused is an officer of the national or local government accused of an offense committed in relation to his office. c. Collect a fee for appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official. d. Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member is defending the interest of the government.
4.
Physicians may practice their profession even during office hours only on emergencies and without monetary compensation. (Sec. 90)
Prohibited Appointment 1. No elective or appointive local official shall be eligible for appointment or designation to any public office during his tenure.(Flores vs.Drilon, 223SCRA 568) 2. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary function of his office, no elective or appointive local official shall hold any other office. 3. Except for losing candidates in barangay elections, no candidate who lost in any election should be appointed to any office within one year after election. (Sec. 94) Disclosure of Business and Financial Interests Every sanggunian member, upon assumption of office shall make a full disclosure of his business and financial interests. He shall also disclose any business, financial or professional relationship or any relationship within the fourth degree which he may have with anyone affected by any ordinance or resolution of the sanggunian which involves a conflict of interests. Such relationship includes: i. Investment in the entity to which the ordinance may apply ii. Contracts with any person to which the ordinance may apply.
Conflict of interests refers to a situation where a sanggunian member may not act in the public interest due to personal consideration that may affect his judgment to the prejudice of the public. (Sec. 51) Disciplinary Action for Local Elective Officials
1.
a. b.
Grounds
Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Culpable violation of the Constitution. c. Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty.
LOCAL OFFICIALS
d.
/79
j.
Commission of an offense involving moral turpitude or punishable by at least prision mayor. e. Abuse of authority. f. Unauthorized absence for 15 consecutive working days, except sanggunian members. i. Application for, or acquisition of, citizenship or residence or immigrant status of another country. Other grounds in this Code and other laws. For disorderly behavior and absence without justifiable cause for four consecutive sessions, a member of the Sanggunian may be censured, reprimanded, excluded from the session, suspended for not more than 60 days, or expelled. Suspension or expulsion shall require concurrence of at least two-thirds of all sanggunian members. A member sentenced by final judgment to imprisonment for at least one year for a crime involving moral turpitude shall be automatically expelled. (Sec.50) In the performance of his duties, the Mayor should act within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony a public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of the law and ordinances. (Maderazo vs. People, 503 SCRA 234)
2.
Filing of complaints Jurisdiction (Political Disciplinary Authority)

Elective provincial or city officials Office of the President b. Elective municipal official sangguniang panlalawigan, whose decision may be appealed to the President c. Elective barangay official sangguniang panlungsod or bayan, whose decision shall be final. (Sec. 61) 3. No investigation shall be held and no preventive suspension shall be imposed within 90 days before any local election. (Sec. 62)
a.
4.
a.
Preventive suspension
Political Disciplinary Authority
ii. iii. b.
i. Official of province, highly urbanized city or independent component city President Official of component city or municipality Governor with recommendation of the Sanggunian Panlalawigan Barangay official Mayor with recommendation of the Sanggunian Bayan/Panlungsod Grounds i. Strong evidence of guilt. ii. Probability that continuance in office can influence or endanger safety of records.
LOCAL OFFICIALS
c. ii. Duration i. Single suspension 60 days Several suspension 90 days within a year
/80
In criminal cases, a 90-day preventive suspension imposed by the Sandiganbayan on a local elective official instead of the maximum 60 days provided by Section 63 of the Local Government Code is not flawed where the same was based on Section 13 of RA 3019, malversation of public funds being an offense involving fraud against government funds and is clearly included among crimes contemplated under that section. The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act implicitly recognizes that the power of preventive suspension lies in which the criminal charged is filed. The provision pendent lite applies to all persons indicted upon a valid information under the Act, whether they be appointive or elective officials. It applies to a Municipal mayor, a Governor, a Congressman. It is mandatory for a the court to place under preventive suspension a public officer accused before it. (Nicart vs. Sandiganbayan, 495 SCRA 73)
5.
Right to Due Process.
The respondent has the right to appear and defend in person or by counsel, to confront the witnesses against him, and to compulsory process to require the attendance of witnesses and production of evidence in his favor. (Sec. 65) In Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 279, the Supreme Court ruled that the denial of the motion of the Governor for formal investigation is erroneous. His right to formal investigation is spelled out in Administrative Order No. 23. He has the right to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel, the right to confront the witnesses and the right to compulsory attendance of witness and the production of documentary evidence. The
right of the Governor to formal investigation was not satisfied when the complaint was decided on the basis of position papers.
6.
Decision
To render a decision in administrative cases involving elective officials, the decision of the Sanggunian must be in writing and stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for such decisions. (Malinao vs. Reyes, 255 SCRA 616) The so-called decision of a member of a Sanggunian cannot be regarded as decision of the Sanggunian for lack of signatures of the requisite majority. (Ibid.)
LOCAL OFFICIALS 7. Penalty and Power to Remove
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a. The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent, or a period of 6 months for every administrative offense, nor bar his candidacy as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. b. Removal from office shall bar candidacy of the respondent for any elective office. (Sec. 66) The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials since such power is exclusively vested in thr proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. (Salalima vs. Guingona, 257 SCRA 55) Likewise, in Pablico vs. Villapando, 385 SCRA 601, it was held that the power to remove erring elective local officials from service is lodged exclusively with the courts. Hence, Article 124 (b), Rule XIX of the rules and regulations implementing the Local Government Code insofar as it vests power on the disciplining authority to remove from office erring elective local officials, is void for being repugnant to the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government. Such grant to the disciplining authority of the power to remove elective local officials is clearly beyond the authority of the Oversight Committee that prepared the rules and regulations. No such regulation may alter, amend or contravene a provision of law, such as the Local Government Code. The law on suspension and removal of elective public officials must be strictly construed and applied, and the authority in whom such power of suspension or removal is vested must exercise it with utmost good faith, for what is involved is not just an ordinary public official but one chosen by the people through the exercise of their constitutional right of suffrage. Their will must not be put to naught by the caprice or partisanship of the disciplining authority. When the disciplining authority is given only the power to suspend
and not the power to remove, it should not be permitted to manipulate the law by usurping the power to remove. (Ibid.) The removal from office of local elective officials must not be tainted with partisan politics and used to defeat the will of the voting public. Congress itself saw it fit to vest that power in a more impartial tribunal, the court. Furthermore, the local government units are not deprived of the right to discipline local elective officials; rather, they are prevented from imposing the extreme penalty of dismissal. (Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, NV vs. Punong Barangay Martinez, GR 170626, March 3, 2008)
LOCAL OFFICIALS 8.
a. b.
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Administrative Appeal
Period 30 days Appellate authority i. Sangguniang panlungsod of component cities and sangguniang bayan sangguniang panlalawigan ii. Sangguniang panlalawigan and sangguniang panlungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities President
iii. c.
President final (Sec. 67) Execution The decision shall be executory pending appeal and the respondent shall be considered as under preventive suspension should he win the appeal. In the event that the appeal results in exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal.(Sec. 68) The decisions of the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are immediately executory even pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandated them so. In sum, the decisions of the Office of the President are final and executory. No motion for reconsideration is allowed by law but the parties may appeal the decision to the Court of Appeals. The appeal, however, does not stay the execution of the decision, Thus, the DILG Secretary may validly move for its immediate execution. (Calingin vs CA, 434 SCRA 173) The phrase final and executory in Sections 61c, 67 and 68, respectively, simply means that the administrative appeals will not prevent the enforcement of the decisions. The decision is immediately executory but the respondent may nevertheless appeal
the adverse decision to the Office of the President or to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, as the case may be. (Don vs. Lacsa, GR 170810, August 7, 2007)
9.
Concurrent Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman

Under RA 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies including members of the cabinet, local governments, government - owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries,
LOCAL OFFICIALS
/83
except those who may be removed only by impeachment. On the other hand, RA 7160, the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan have disciplinary authority over elective barangay official. Thus, the Office of the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction with the local government units over administrative cases against elective local officials. (Laxina vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 471 SCRA 542) Power to Impose Preventive Suspension. RA 6770 empowers the Ombudsman to impose a preventive suspension of a longer period of not more than six (6) months. All appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases may be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Order of One-Year Suspension Not Final and Executory. A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding respondent provincial governor administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is not among those listed in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and unappealable, hence immediately executory. There is no general legal principle which mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory. Sec. 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative decisions rendered by the Office of the President or appropriate Sanggunian against elective local government officials. Similarly, the provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service Commission involving members of the civil service. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application. (Gov. Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA 738) Decisions Considered Final and Unappeallable. Any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing the penalty
of public censure, or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one months salary shall be final and unappeallable. The only effect of the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper forum and of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court as the proper mode of appeal; all other matters provided for in Section 27 of RA 6770, including the finality and the non-finality of decisions, are not affected and still stand. (Barata vs. Abalos, GR No. 142888, June 6, 2001,Herrera vs. Bohol, GR No. 155320, February 5, 2004)
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT 10. Effect of reelection
/84
The reelection of a local official bars the continuation of the administrative case against him and the case is deemed dismissed under the Doctrine of Condonation. Any disciplinary proceedings against a respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.(Malinao, supra) A Provincial Governor cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application to criminal cases against petitioner. (Aguinaldo vs. Santos 212 SCRA 768) A reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeed. (Mayor Alvin B. Garcia vs. Hon. Arturo C. Mojica, 314 SCRA211, GR No139043, September 10, 1999)
---oo0oo---
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT

A. Casual Employees The local chief executive may employ casual employees without approval of the Civil Service Commission for not more than 6 months. (Sec. 77) Prohibited Interests 1. It is prohibited for any local government official to directly or indirectly: a. Engage in any business transaction with the local government unit of which he is an official or over which he has supervision, whereby money is to be paid or property is to be transferred out of the resources of the local government unit to him. b. Hold interest in any cockpit or game licensed by the local government unit. The Local Government Code which specifically prohibits local government officials from possessing pecuniary interest in a cockpit licensed by the local government unit and, which in itself, prescribes the punishment for violation thereof, is paramount to the AntiGraft Law which penalizes possession of prohibited interest in a general manner. (Teves, vs. Sandiganbayan, 447 SCRA 309) Absent any evidence that the mayor divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature. (Ibid.) c. Purchase property forfeited to the local government unit for unpaid taxes or by virtue of a legal process at the instance of the local government unit. Be a surety for any person contracting with the local government unit.
B.
d.
e. 2.
Use any public property of the local government unit for private purpose. (Sec. 89)
It is unlawful for any public official and his relatives within the fourth civil degree of consaguinity or affinity to enter into any contract for the construction, acquisition, operation or maintenance of any project or procurement of materials or equipment with the local government. (Sec. 520) 85
HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT

C. Appointments and Limitations
/86
Midnight Appointment. The constitutional prohibition on the socalled midnight appointments, specifically those made within two months immediately prior to the next presidential elections, applies only to the President or Acting President. There is no law that prohibits local elective officials for making appointments during the last days of their tenure absent fraud on their part, when such appointments are not tainted by irregularities or anomalies which breach laws and regulations governing appointment. (De Rama vs. CA, 353 SCRA 650)
However, Memorandum Circular No. 9 s. 2003 issued by the Civil Service Commission pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 030918 dated August 28, 2003, states that all appointments of whatever nature or status issued within 45 days before any national or local elections shall be disapproved, subject to the exception pursuant to Section 262 (g) of the Omnibus Election Code. The CSC MC further states that all appointments issued by elective appointing officials after elections up to June 30 shall be disapproved except if the appointee is fully qualified for the position and had undergone regular screening processes before the Election Ban as shown in the Personnel Selection Board (PSB) report or minutes of meeting. CSC Memorandum Ordr No. 19, S. of 1992, provides that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. (Lameyra vs. Pangilinan. 322 SCRA 117) The Lo cal Government Code explicitly vests on the Punong Barangay, upon approval by a majority of all members of the Sangguniang Barangay, the power to appoint or replace the barangay treasurer, the barangay secretary, and other appointive officials. The power to appoint is to be exercised conjointly by the punong barangay and a majority of all the members of the sangguniang barangay. Without such conjoint action, neither appointment nor a replacement can be effectual. Applying the rule that the power to appoint includes the power to remove, the questioned dismissal from the office of the barangay officials by the punong barangay without the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the
Sangguniang Barangay cannot be legally justified. (Alquisola vs. Ocol, GR No. 132413, August 27, 1999)
Appointment of Devolved Personnel. Since Section 17 of the LGC authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets, liabilities, records of basic services and facilities of a national government agency to local government units, the City Mayor has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head. (Plaza vs. Cassion, 435 SCRA 294) HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT /87 Appointment of Assistant Provincial Treasurer. The Provincial Governor is without authority to designate the petitioner as Assistant Provincial Treasurer for Administration, because under Section 471 of the Local Government Code, it is the Secretary of Finance who has the power to appoint Assistant Provincial Treasurer from a list of recommendation of the Provincial Governor. (Dimaandal vs. COA, 291 SCRA 322) Prohibition on Nepotism. No person shall be appointed in the
career service if he is related within the fourth degree of consaguinity or affinity to the appointing or recommending authority. (Sec. 79) However, merely having the same family name, or middle name with the appointing authority, does not nepotism make. Besides, the law does not absolutely prohibit persons from being appointed to an office the appointing authority of which is a relative so long as such relation, by consanguinity or affinity, is not within the prohibited third degree. (Municipality of Butig, Lanao del Sur vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 115) Administrative Discipline for Appointive Officials Generally, the power to appoint includes the power to remove employees removed by a municipal mayor without having to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan may be similarly terminated by him without the need to secure the concurrence of the Sangguniang Bayan. (Municipality of Libertad, Negros Oriental vs. Penaflor, 453 SCRA 883) Investigation and adjudication of administrative complaints against appointive local officials and employees including their suspension and removal shall be in accordance with the civil service law and rules and other pertinent laws. Preventive suspension The Local Chief Executive may preventively suspend for a period not exceeding 60 days any subordinate official or employee under his authority pending investigation if the charge against such official or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there is reason to believe that the respondent is guilty of the charges which would warrant his removal from service. b. Disciplinary jurisdiction Except as otherwise provided by law, the Local Chief Executive may impose the penalty of removal from service, demotion in rank,
a.
suspension for not more than one year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding 6 months salary, or reprimand. If the penalty imposed is suspension without pay for more than 30 days, his decision shall be final; if the penalty imposed is heavier, the decision shall be appealable to the Civil Service Commission which shall decide the appeal within 30 days from receipt thereof. --o0o--
VIII. LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

A. Initiative 1. Procedure a. Number of signatures of voters i. At least 1,000 in provinces and cities ii. At least 100 I municipalities iii. At least 50 in barangays Period to collect signatures i. 90 days in provinces ii. 60 days in municipalities iii. 30 days in barangays The power of initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year It shall extend only to matters within the power of the sanggunian to enact In delineating the scope of an initiative or referendum, Section 32, Article VI of the Constitution includes any act of a local legislative body. The Constitution includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. Section 3(6) of RA 6735 expressly includes resolutions as subjects of initiative on local legislations. Section 124 of the Local Government Code includes all matters within the legal powers of the Sanggunian to enact in the scope of initiative, which includes resolutions. (Garcia vs. COMELEC, 237 SCRA 279) c. 3. If the sanggunian adopts the proposition, the initiative shall be cancelled. (Sec. 124)
b.
2.
Limitations on Initiatives a. b.
Limitations on Sanggunian a. Any proposition or ordinance approved through initiative or referendum shall not be repealed or amended by the sanggunian within 3 years by three-fourths vote of all members.
b. B.
In case of barangays, the period of 18 months after approval. (Sec. 125)
Referendum By referendum, the voters may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian. (Sec. 126) 88
LOCAL INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM
/89
Distinction Between Initiative and Referendum Initiative is the power of the to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislations through an election called for the purpose. Local initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without participation of their elected representatives, while referendum consists of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been enacted by a legislative body. (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. Commission on Elections, 262 SCRA 492)
--oo0oo
REVIEW NOTES
LAWS ON PUBLIC CORPORATION
By Atty. Hilario Justino F. Morales Law Professor & Head, Department of Political Law SLU College of Law Pre-bar Reviewer, Powerhaus Law Review Center CPRS Bar Review Center & Lex Reviews & Seminars
November, 2010
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. General Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 1 II. The Local Government Code of 1991: Salient Features. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 2 Rules of Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. P 2 Declaration of State Policies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... P 4 Inter-Governmental Relations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 8 Power of Control and General Supervision, Distinguished. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P 9 Special Local Bodies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P12 Creation, Conversion, Division, Merger and Consolidation of LGUs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P15 Powers of Local Government Units General Welfare Police Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . Validity of Ordinances and Acts of LGUs. . . . . Power to Generate and Apply Resources. . . . . . Eminent Domain. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Reclassification of Lands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Closure and Opening of Roads. . . . . . . . . . . . . . Naming of LGUs, Public Places, Streets And Structures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Settlement of Boundary Disputes. . . . . . . . . . . . Authority Over Police Units. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Local Legislative Power. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Corporate Powers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI. VII. P28 P29 P37 P43 P45 P48 P49 P50 P52 P52 P57
III.
IV. V.
Municipal Liability. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P62 Local Officials. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Common Qualifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Disqualifications. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vacancies and Successions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Resignation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . P64 P64 P67 P73 P76 P76
Practice of Profession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Prohibited Appointment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. Disciplinary Action. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Human Resource Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
P77 P78 P78 P85
VIII. Local Initiative and Referendum. . . . . . . . . . . . P88

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I.

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES

Local Autonomy is self governing. It is the granting of more

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES

When the Policy Does Not Apply. The requirement of prior

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES

Debureaucratization is the transfer of some public functions and

Decentralization of Administration (Administrative Decentralization)

Decentralization of Power (Political Decentralization) involves abdication of

THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991: SALIENT FEATURES

National Government and Local Government Units

3. As to what the power includes

Inter-Local Government Relations

Relations with POs and NGOs

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER AND CONSOLIDATION, AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

Who Creates Municipality. A municipality may be created, divided,

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

Role of Cities. The city, consisting of a group of barangays, serves

CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

Who Creates Cities. A city may be created, divided, merged or abolished,

Substantive Requisites. 1) Income locally generated average annual

Land Area No minimum Requirement 50 sq. kms.

Municipality Component City Highly Urbanized City Province

PhP 50 M and PhP 20 M and

No minimum Requirement 2,000 sq. kms.

Autonomous Regions. The Philippine Constitution mandates the creation

On the debts and obligations of the annexed territory. - It has been

On the legal existence of the original corporation. The division of

On the property, powers and rights of the original corporation.

When Conducted. Section 10 of the LGC provides that the creation,

CREATION, CONVERSION, DIVISION, MERGER, CONSOLIDATION AND ABOLITION OF LGUs

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Mandatory and directory; ministerial and discretionary

Governmental Powers of LGUs

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

VALIDITY OF ORDINANCES AND ACTS OF LGUs

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Under the Constitution

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Under the Local Government Code

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Eminent Domain (Sec. 19, LGC)

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS

Reclassification of lands Sec. 20

Closure and Opening of Roads

POWERS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS