Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Isolationism
or the self-preservation
of Burma’s military regime
Book Layout and Cover Design by Mikael Brodu
ISBN 978-974-383-406-6
The opinions expressed in these papers are solely those of the author(s).
A collection under the supervision
of Benoît de Tréglodé
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 7
Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 85
Academic References ......................................................................................... 88
5
Authors’ Biographies
6
Introduction 2
For many observers, the Burmese junta’s (or State Peace and
Development Council - SPDC 3 ) xenophobic response to the
humanitarian crisis caused by the devastating impact of Cyclone
Nargis in May 2008, clearly reflected the paroxysm of the paranoid
and isolationist tendencies of a military regime which has been
cleverly clinging on to power since 1962. By shunning international
(or more specifically Western) aid, the Burmese Army (Tatmadaw)
intended to prove it was the sole saviour of the country and its
people, while protecting them at the same time from a potential
foreign military invasion or at least from foreign influence. From the
reclusive, political and administrative new capital of Naypyidaw (or
“Royal City” in Burmese), to which the centre of power was
transferred from Rangoon in November 2005, the Burmese military
government has developed a skilfully calculated isolationism which
enables it to consolidate its power while protecting itself from both
internal and external potential threats.
Every political and diplomatic step taken by the junta in the past
two decades has indeed illustrated this isolationist policy that is well
suited to the geo-strategic position of the country. Since the third
2 For ease of linguistic simplicity and without any political connotation, the
Council (SLORC), which had taken power through a military coup on September
18th, 1988, changed its named into “SPDC” after another internal purge.
7
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
arrest on May 30th, 2003 of the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi and the
crackdown on the pro-democratic civilian opposition she has led
since 1988, the Burmese generals have gradually planned their
withdrawal from the regional scene. By first sacking its more
pragmatic and open-minded elements (especially General Khin
Nyunt’s Military Intelligence Services in 2004), then relinquishing its
rights to the ASEAN Chairmanship in 2006, entrenching its centre of
power at the heart of the “Burman” country in a newly-built capital,
and finally surviving two major political crises by resisting the
international pressure and condemnation that followed the
repression of the so-called “Saffron Revolution” (September 2007)
and the devastation caused by Cyclone Nargis (May 2008), the
Burmese regime showed that its deliberate isolationist strategy has so
far been extremely successful.
9
Chapter One
Isolation chosen or endured?
A Burmese history of isolationist
withdrawals since Independence
4Here the English language makes the distinction between the term “Burman”
(or Bama’r), designating the ethnic group which today constitutes two thirds of
Burma’s 55 million-large population, mainly inhabiting the Irrawaddy valley
and delta, and the term “Burmese” which is more inclusive, designating the
citizenship, language or any country’s aspect as a whole.
11
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
12
CHAPTER ONE
Indeed, the main resource of the country being its rice exports
(Burma, partly with Thailand, was then known as the “rice-bowl” of
Asia), it had to establish good relations with any power willing to
buy and import its main agricultural asset. Half a century later, the
same logic still prevails: Burma still needs to maintain good
neighbourly relationships to benefit from the commercial dynamism
and economic opportunities offered by China, Thailand, and also
gradually India, and further south Malaysia and Singapore, in order
to sustain its still under-developed economy.
7 A few thousand Chinese troops from the Kuomintang (KMT) entered Northern
Burma in 1949 fleeing Mao’s People’s Liberation Army. They remained in the Shan
States, Eastern Laos and Northern Thailand (the “Golden Triangle” region) to
continue their struggle with a welcome American support. See LINTNER
(Bertil), Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948, Chiang Mai, Silkworms
Book, 1999, p. 111-113.
8 MAUNG MAUNG, “The Burma-China Border Settlement”, Asian Survey, Vol.
9 VON DER MEHDEN (Fred), “The Burmese Way to Socialism”, Asian Survey,
Vol. 3, No.3, April 1963, p. 129-135.
10 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and Strict
Burma thus swiftly broke away from its two big neighbours:
India and China. It opted for “quiet” neutrality during the October
1962 Sino-Indian war. India then watched with some bitterness the
rise of a popular “indophobia”, cheered by the new Burmese military
regime12. Rangoon consequently lost a strong economic partner and
diplomatic friend. China, whose minorities settled in Burma were
violently targeted in 1967 during nation-wide anti-Chinese riots13 ,
gradually stigmatized Ne Win as a “neo-fascist”, despite his strong
socialist outlook. At the end of the 1960s, more than a 300,000
Chinese, Indian and Anglo-Burmese “foreigners” had left the
country14.
(1948-1962): A Study in the Foreign Policies of Burma and India and Burma’s Policy
towards India, New Delhi, Oxford & IBH Publishing Co., 1979.
13 BADGLEY (John), “Burma’s China Crisis: the Choices Ahead”, Asian Survey,
15 BUTWELL (Richard), “Ne Win’s Burma - At the End of the First Decade”,
Asian Survey, Vol. 12, No. 10, October 1972, p. 901-912.
16 AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979…”, p. 93-117.
17 SILVERSTEIN (Josef), “The Military and Foreign Policy in Burma and
coast20. The Chinese strategy in Burma paid off quickly and in just a
few years, China became Burma’s sole patron in the region, its main
commercial partner and its strongest diplomatic and military
supporter, enabling the junta to consolidate its control over the
country throughout the 1990s21.
Burma Relations”, China Report, Vol. 30, No. 2, April-June 1994, p. 187-202 and
SINGH (Udai Bhanu), “Recent Trends in Relations between Myanmar and
China”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 18, No.1, April 1995, p. 61-72.
22 LINTNER (Bertil), “Different Strokes - Divergent reactions to Rangoon’s
Rivalries in Burma – The Rise of Economic Competition”, Asian Survey, Vol. 30,
No.6, June 1990, p. 587-601.
20
CHAPTER ONE
Isolation”, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 17, No. 11, February 1995, p. 1341-1352.
21
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
20th, 1992.
29 MANCHANDA (Rita), “Reasons of State”, Far Eastern Economic Review, May
30 For a full analysis of the gradual courting of the Burmese junta by India and its
motivations in the 1990s, see EGRETEAU (Renaud), Wooing the Generals – India’s
New Burma Policy, New Delhi, Authorspress, 2003, 234 pages.
31 MUNRO (Ross), “China’s Waxing Spheres of Influence”, Orbis, Vol. 38, No.4,
too -- a close China ally and India’s archrival -- rapidly entered into
Burma’s strategic field. As early as 1989, military connections
between Islamabad and Rangoon were revealed in reports of ethnic
rebels seizing Pakistan-made weapons along the Thai-Burma
borders35. But it was only in June 2000, with General Khin Nyunt’s
first official trip to Islamabad that this relationship began to flourish.
It was furthered in May 2001 by the Pakistani President General
Musharraf’s landmark visit to Burma, an official trip which fully
revealed Pakistan’s interests in the still ostracized Burmese junta36.
Although it only had a tiny diplomatic and business community in
Burma, Pakistan is one of the non-regional powers that developed
cordial relations with the Burmese, as a result of high-level military-
to-military contacts37.
35 LINTNER (Bertil), “Burma: the Islamabad link”, India Today, September 10th,
1989, p. 60-61.
36 KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.), “China-Pakistan-Myanmar: the Triangular
Relationship Needs Careful Watch”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper n°401,
January 29th, 2002.
37 Interviews, Embassy of Pakistan in Burma, Rangoon, December 4, 2002 and
41 A “reaching out to the World” strategy for GANESAN (N.), “Myanmar’s Foreign
Relations: Reaching out to the World”, in TAYLOR (Robert) (ed.), Myanmar:
Beyond Politics to Social Imperatives, Singapore, ISEAS, 2005, p. 30-55, or a “search
for security strategy” for JAMES (Helen), “Myanmar’s International Relations
Strategy: the Search for Security”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 26, No. 3,
December 2004, p. 530-553.
26
Chapter Two
The entrenchment of the Burmese junta:
the return of nationalist hardliners since 2003
Fifteen years after its 1988 military coup, the Burmese regime
seemed confident enough to open its doors to the International
Community and released the charismatic Aung San Suu Kyi on May
6, 2002. Yet, without any concrete dialogue afterwards, or any serious
intention to establish a credible political agenda to start the much-
needed transition process, the second liberation of the pro-
democracy opposition leader was seen as a complete failure42. The
efforts and concessions made by General Khin Nyunt and his
Military Intelligence Services (or “MI”) during the 2000-2002 secret
talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, her political party (National League for
Democracy, or NLD), and the United Nations’ Special Envoy for
Myanmar, Ambassador Dato Ismail Razali (April 2000 – January
2006) soon became a burden for the Burmese military top leaders43.
42 JAGAN (Larry), “A year after Suu Kyi’s release, little has changed”, Inter Press
Service, May 5, 2003.
43 Interview with Ambassador Dato Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20,
2005.
27
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
chose to return to its old habits. Now that the strategic partnerships
with its Indian, Chinese or ASEAN neighbours were in place and the
ethnic insurgencies seriously weakened since the mid-1990s 44 , the
Burmese junta was now in position to truly keep control of its
internal affairs and the SPDC gradually opted for a tactical
“entrenchment” from the outside world. The marginalization of a
civilian opposition, often stigmatized by the official press as a
“minion” of the international community – especially the US, was
then a crucial part of this policy.
On May 30th, 2003, barely a year after Aung San Suu Kyi’s
second release from house arrest, the Depayin incident marked a
brutal return to Burma’s policy of intransigence that had
characterized the regime’s conduct in the early 1990s. Travelling in
North-western Burma, Aung San Suu Kyi and her convoy largely
made of NLD members and pro-democracy supporters was attacked
by an orchestrated mob of the military regime’s sympathizers near
the town of Depayin, in Monywa’s Township. While official
statements announced a death toll of four people, exiled activists and
Human Rights organisations put the toll much higher, between 50
and 80 killed45. Later a regime’s spokesman however admitted that
the death toll was probably around 20 and three times as many
44 Three factors contributed to the weakening of the ethnic threat by the Burmese
Military throughout the 1990s: (1) a skilfully bargained cease-fire policy with 17
groups initiated by the MI, (2) a strengthened Tatmadaw able to contain the
military force of any ethnic guerrilla along the border areas, (3) a “divide and
rule” strategy applied to the strongest rebels groups, especially the Shans and
the Karens.
45 See for instance the Preliminary Report of the Ad hoc Commission on Depayin
46E-mail exchanges with Lt-Col Hla Min,, Information Officer, Defence Ministry,
June 6th, 2003.
29
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
47 Phone interview with Dato Ismail Razali at the end of his visit on June 10th,
2003. For further official details see The New York Times, Critic of Burmese Junta
Not Hurt, Envoy Says, June 11th, 2003.
48 Interview, Ambassador Ismail Razali, Kuala Lumpur, September 20th, 2005.
49 The Hindustan Times, India asks junta to free Suu Kyi, June 19th, 2003.
50 The New York Times, Myanmar: Japanese Press Junta, June 24th, 2003.
51 Interview, Embassy of Japan in Burma, Rangoon, January 24th, 2005. The death
Burma had faced and pledged to stabilize the internal situation and
revive the reconciliation process52. Bangkok, Singapore, Beijing, New
Delhi, Kuala Lumpur and Tokyo were consulted in a broad charm
overture. In the letter from General Than Shwe to his regional
counterparts, he told them that the Burmese opposition movement
had planned an “assignation campaign” to coincide with Aung San
Suu Kyi’s birthday (on June 19th). The foreign ministers in these Asia
countries were also presented with an embossed bound album
containing a series of pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi meeting senior
representatives of the junta – meant to prove their goodwill to the
opposition leader and blame her for the collapse of the reconciliation
process53.
52 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma on diplomatic offensive, little effect so far”, Inter Press
Bangkok (July and August 2003) and at the ASEAN Bali Summit (November
2003).
31
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
54, Burma’s military rulers obviously fears Nuremberg-style trials; General Than
Shwe told the Timor Leste leader Xanana Gusmao, of his fears when they met.
Interview with Xanana Gusmao in Bangkok, October 2004.
55 In WILSON (Trevor) (Ed.), Myanmar’s Long Road to National Reconciliation,
2004, pp.171-184.
32
CHAPTER TWO
at the same time the regime leaders began a concerted clean-up of the
elements within the Army that were most connected to the influence
of the outside world, starting with Khin Nyunt’s Military Intelligence
Services.
63 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s generals now have the upper hand”, Inter-Press
Services, September 22nd, 2004.
64 HHe even admitted that Khin Nyunt feared for his future in 2004, and had
Perhaps the “kiss of death” for him was when the Chinese
leaders playfully dubbed him the “Deng Xiaoping of Burma”. On his
final visit to China in June 2004 he reportedly told the Chinese
politicians he met that he planned to be Burma’s first President under
the new constitution that was being drawn up at the time66. That may
have been the last straw for General Than Shwe when he heard about
it from Khin Nyunt’s deputy (Major General Kyaw Win) who
accompanied him on the June 2004 trip67. At the same time as the
junta top leader became increasingly disillusioned with Khin Nyunt
and doubted his loyalty, many senior officers within the Tatmadaw
began to resent the privileged position of the Military Intelligence
wing and their growing economic wealth. It was seen as a threat to
Strongman of the junta since 1992, Than Shwe thus followed the
same successful policy that Ne Win had been famous for during the
1962-88 era. Just like Ne Win sacked in 1983 by its most popular
contender General Tin Oo 68 , Than Shwe swept out a potential
internal threat he had been watching grow suspiciously. The forced
resignation and trial of “MI” Tin Oo and the purge of its Intelligence
staff in May 1983 indeed presents many parallels with that of Khin
Nyunt’s69. The purges of the potential rival and apparent heir to the
supremo were conducted in the same way and, for the same reasons
in 1983 and 2004 70 . Both also led to the fatal dismantling of the
intelligence apparatus given the fateful consequences witnessed soon
afterwards. Just as Rangoon was hit by the North Korea bombings in
October 1983, the city was rocked few months after Khin Nyunt’s
Mis were purged by a series of bombs in May 2005 that officially left
11 dead and four times as many injured71 . Rumours even spread
suggesting the possible involvement of Khin Nyunt’s loyal
followers72.
68 Or “MI” Tin Oo, not to be confused with U Tin Oo, former Defence Ministry
and Tatmadaw Chief of Staff (1974-76) who became NLD Vice-president and
Aung San Suu Kyi’s closest partner in 1988.
69 For a detailed analysis of the 1983 events: TIN MAUNG MAUNG THAN,
“Burma in 1983: From Recovery to Growth?”, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1984, pp.
116-119.
70 Interview with Nyo Ohn Myint, grand-nephew of General Tin Oo, Chiang
36
CHAPTER TWO
Myanmar State since Independence“, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 15, No. 1,
June 1993, p. 24-63.
75 JAGAN (Larry), “Gains by hardliners could isolate Burma further”, Inter Press
79 JAGAN (Larry), “Fearing invasion, junta plans a new capital in the hills”, Inter
Press Service, July 20, 2005.
80 JAGAN (Larry), “Uneasy lies the crown in Myanmar”, Asia Times, April 3,
2006.
39
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
81 See for instance MYA MAUNG, “The Burma Road to the Past”, Asian Survey,
Vol. 39, No. 2, March-April 1999, p. 265-286, or in French language : DE VIENNE
(Marie-Sybille), “La Birmanie en quête de rois », Outre-Terre, No. 6, 2003, p. 127-
140.
82 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar’s generals build their ‘Xanadu’”, Asia Times, July
22, 2005.
40
CHAPTER TWO
and civil servants, who are the core of regime, were thus to be
effectively insulated from “contamination” of rebellious civilians83.
representatives who were “brought in” by the Burmese authorities for official
meetings, between 2005 and 2008.
85 For a more detail analysis, see MAUNG AUNG MYOE, “The Road to
opting for isolation amid increasing division”, The Bangkok Post, June 30, 2005.
92 JAGAN (Larry), “Power expected to pass to next-generation generals”, Inter
command that the hierarchy94 (within the Army or within the junta)
helps maintain the country’s stability, integrity and unity (as it is one
of the motos tirelessly repeated by the official propaganda).
But rivalries over the Road Map initiated by Khin Nyunt in 2003
do persist within the top leadership, as many military officers fear
the prospect of a new future where the armed forces will be swept
out of Burma’s political, and above all, economic landscape95. They
see it as a “leap into the Dark”96. What if the whole transitional process
slips out of the Army hands? What if a revengeful civil opposition
gains power after the parliamentarian elections planned by the fifth
point of the Road Map? Many top army officers are indeed very
afraid not only of losing the financial backing and economic
networks they have built through nepotism and tight control of
Burma’s state natural resources and formal economy since 1988, but
also of a possible “witch hunt” once a powerful opposition of
Burman and ethnic “revanchists” access civilian power and got
external backing from Western chanceries or hardline exiled groups.
They need further assurance both from inside (from the leaders in
favour of a gradual withdrawal of the Tatmadaw from the political
scene) and from outside. Few scholars and diplomats have put the
taboo issue of amnesty on the table -- talks of reconciliation by
forgiving (but not forgetting) in a truly Buddhist spirit97. Escaping
94 Within the Army, as within the junta. For instance, Generals Khin Nyunt, Soe
Win and Thein Sein followed the same path through hierarchy : from SPDC
Secretary 2, to Secretary 1, to Prime Ministership…
95 JAGAN (Larry), “Power struggle stalls constitutional reforms”, Inter Press
27, 2008.
97 DAVID (Roman), HOLLIDAY (Ian), “Set the Junta Free: Pre-transitional Justice
But General Ne Win too opted for the same policy approach
from the late 1960s, once the brutal autarchic decisions of his
Revolutionary Council had dramatically damaged the country’s
economy and society. Though shunning external influence and
100 See for instance AUNG KIN, “Burma in 1979: Socialism with Foreign Aid and
temptation for the SPDC to back away from the ASEAN club --
which they believe is too closely linked to the Western powers
especially in its economic activities – and move closer to India, Russia
and individually Singapore, with the added advantage of counter-
balancing Chinese influence. Yet, the nationalist and xenophobic
tendencies of both a regime and a society marked by years of
colonialism, political instability and Ne winian internal autarchy still
constitutes a more powerful tool to effectively resist the outside
world, including the immediate Indian or Asian neighbourhood, as
the failure of the “Saffron Revolution” (September 2007) and the
disastrous impact of Cyclone Nargis (May 2008) recently proved.
in its dealing with Burma’s regime in recent years, see: GANESAN (N.), “Thai-
Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: the Politics of Face and Grace”, Asian Affairs, Vol.
33, No. 3, Fall 2006, p. 131-149.
49
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
103 SEEKINS (Donald M.), “Burma-China Relations: Playing with Fire”, Asian
Survey, Volume 37, n°6, June 1997, p. 525-539.
104 Interview with Poksak Nilubol (Ambassador of Thailand to Burma, 1994-98),
major thorn for every party concerned: Burma itself, ASEAN and its
diplomatic and commercial partners, especially the Western ones.
A thorn finally for the SPDC itself, which finds it more difficult
to accept the growing pressure coming from ASEAN as an
institution, which had first warmly welcomed it, but gradually
offered less and less in return to the regime and tends to focus
outspokenly on its “internal affairs”. If Burma needs bilateral
commercial partnerships with each of the ASEAN members, it does
not see the Association itself as a source of crucial interests. As proof,
Senior-General Than Shwe himself, though Head of the Burmese
108 The International Herald Tribune, Historic Asean charter reveals divisions,
52
CHAPTER THREE
111 Various interviews with UN and Asian diplomats, Bangkok and Rangoon,
2003-2004.
112 Interview, Thailand Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, February 27th, 2008.
113 JAGAN (Larry), “Rangoon lets Asean off the hook”, The Bangkok Post, July
29th, 2005.
53
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
114 Interview with Malaysian Foreign Minister Syed Hamid, Bali, July 6, 2003.
115 Various discussions with Indonesian, Cambodian, Malaysian and
Singaporean diplomats based in Rangoon, October 2005 and March, 2006.
116 Reuters, Laos and Cambodia slam Myanmar sanctions, November 18th, 2007.
117 The Irrawaddy-On-Line, Burma remains the bad boy in the ASEAN family,
118Reuters, Myanmar may free Suu Kyi in six months: Singapore minister, July 20,
2008.
55
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
promises from the Burmese leadership 119 . The fact that Indonesia
joined the UN Security Council in 2007 had though seen Jakarta
pursuing its leading diplomatic activities dealing with the Burmese
issue. On their side, the Philippines remain the junta’s most vocal
opponent, thus having no potential influence within the country.
That leaves Thailand and Singapore as the most crucial partners of
the Burmese regime. However, frustration remains also in the
diplomatic and commercial elite of the two countries.
119 Kyodo News, ASEAN has better way to deal with Myanmar, Indonesian envoy
Kawthaung/Ranong (2003-2008).
121 Discussion with Pr. Sunait Chutintaranond, Head of the Southeast Asian
Thaksin’s Burma trip a disgrace, August 5th, 2006 and The New Light of Myanmar,
Goodwill delegation led by Commander-in-Chief of Royal Thai Army General Sonthi
Boonyaratglin concludes visit, September 14th, 2006.
57
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
125 AFP, Thai PM’s Myanmar visit invites uncomfortable comparisons, November
23rd, 2006.
126 AFP, Thai junta leader arrives in Myanmar, August 27th, 2007.
127 The Straits Times [Singapore], Thai PM defends investments in Myanmar, March
25th, 2008.
128 Interviews, Embassy of Thailand in Burma, Rangoon, November 13th, 2007
Singapore”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1998, p. 32.
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CHAPTER THREE
130 Including Lee Kuan Yew himself: The International Herald Tribune, Report:
Singapore leader criticizes Myanmar junta for mismanaging economy, October 10th,
2007 and Reuters, Singapore’s Lee criticises Myanmar rulers, January 8th, 2008.
131 Various discussions with successive Singaporean Ambassadors and
60
CHAPTER THREE
Neutralism”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 72, No. 2, June 1957, p. 266.
61
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
135 DESHPANDE (G.P.), “India and Burma: Two More Steps to End Insurgency”,
of Upper Burma”, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No. 5, May 1994, p. 447-459.
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BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
the 2000s. After the MI purge, the transfer of the capital from
Rangoon to Naypyidaw in November 2005 further participated to
this strategy. Like the sacking of Khin Nyunt, it too came as a shock
to China, obviously unprepared for this new astounding decision of
the Burmese regime 141 . Unwilling to move its Rangoon embassy
there, though it is not definitely ruled out, China has witnessed a
further alienation of the Burmese regime, whose top leadership
clearly opted for a strategic entrenchment that concerned the Chinese
too, and not only distrusted UN Agencies, Western embassies and
NGOs settled in Rangoon142. Access to the leaders of the Burmese
junta or the Tatmadaw has now been far more complicated for the
Chinese, although the Ambassador, Political Counsellors and
Military Attaches are regularly brought to Naypyidaw on special
aircrafts for regular meetings with the junta’s representatives143.
141 Reuters, China expresses surprise at Myanmar capital move, May 23rd, 2007.
142 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s uneasy alliance with Myanmar”, Asia Times,
February 24th, 2006.
143 Interviews, Embassy of China in Burma, Rangoon, November 9th, 2007 and
the SPDC can rely if the latter gives back valuable incentives146. But
the Chinese embarrassment has become increasingly evident in face
of the stagnation of economic and political reforms in Burma.
Though having strong interests in following the Chinese model of
political authoritarianism mixed with liberal economic opening-
ups147, the Burmese generals have failed to efficiently implement it in
the past two decades. Burma remains far behind its neighbours or
ASEAN partners in terms of development and economic progress,
which hinders Beijing’s global ambitions in the region.
146 JAGAN (Larry), “China’s thumb in every Burmese pie”, The Bangkok Post,
2007.
65
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
The two crises borne out of the monks demonstrations and the
cyclone Nargis highlighted again the peculiar Sino-Burmese
relationship, as Beijing was seen by the international community as
the sole regional power able to exert any real influence on the
Burmese junta, in order to prompt it to moderation. No other
country, even Thailand or Singapore, appeared to be in position to
influence in 2007 or 2008 the military regime, unwilling to publicly
face international pressure on what it considered to be internal
matters. China’s role proved to be crucial in the very first days
following the brutal crackdown of the swiftly-called “Saffron
Revolution”. It is clear that Beijing facilitated the UN Special Envoy
for Burma, Ibrahim Gambari’s first visit to Rangoon (between
September 29 and October 3, 2007) since November 2006 149 . The
appeasement was brought about by the mediation of Chinese
diplomats and officials in New York, Beijing and Naypyidaw (to
where the Chinese Ambassador in Rangoon had been flown in
regularly since the beginning of the crisis150). The Chinese were also
influential in arranging further official trips to Burma by Mr.
Gambari between November 5-10, 2007 and by the UN Special
Rapporteur on Human Rights for Burma, Paulo S. Pinheiro
(November 11-15, 2007) – his first time since November 2003.
2007.
150 Interviews with Chinese diplomats, Bangkok, October 2007, and Rangoon,
November 9th, 2007. In the days before I. Gambari was granted a visa, while
waiting in Singapore en route to Rangoon, the Burmese ambassador to China
was called to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs several times a day to meet
the Deputy Foreign Minister to discuss the visa issue.
66
CHAPTER THREE
suspicion that the United Nations’ could not help solve Burma’s
current political deadlock151. Though China gained the assurance of
seeing the Sino-Burmese partnership furthered 152 , the diplomatic
embarrassment caused by the pressure of Western powers, which
considered Burma as a Chinese pawn that could be easily
manipulated by its “patron” and allowed the ASEAN countries to
off-load their responsibility or Burma onto Beijing irritated many
Chinese officials 153 . The gradual isolationist withdrawal of the
Burmese generals once the immediate problems of the September
2007 crisis vanished -- a policy that has proved very effective over the
last two decades, illustrated the limits of China’s overall influence on
Burma’s leaders. The Chinese awareness of the dormant sinophobia
inherent to both the Burmese regime and society impedes the
development of a stronger stance by China towards the Burmese
junta, yet frustrated and annoyed Beijing may be154. Despite common
ideas that a sinophobic outburst is always on the brink even today155,
anti-China attitudes in Burma had been so far “managed” since the
early 1990s as no anti-Chinese pogroms similar to the ones that
erupted in 1967 had been witnessed.
151 JAGAN (Larry), “Burma’s Stonewall”, The Bangkok Post, March 6th, 2008 and
JAGAN (Larry), “Swansong visit for UN’s Myanmar envoy”, Asia Times, March
7th, 2008.
152 United Press International, China arms Myanmar Military, March 14th, 2008.
153 Interview, Embassy of China, Rangoon, February 26th, 2008.
154 Xinhua News Agency, Chinese Premier expects Myanmar to care about overseas
67
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
The Burmese junta indeed takes great care to offer the Indian
authorities a seductive face, even if China remains the main loyal
partner. Burma has continued to play this “India card” ever since the
first two landmark visits of General Maung Aye to India in 2000. But
Burma has defined its Indian policy according to its own interests,
thus not letting India alone delineate the Indo-Burmese partnership
on its own terms. For the Burmese regime, it remains crucial to
secure much needed investments in the key-sectors (Natural Gas,
pharmaceuticals, infrastructure with the construction of roads and
ports, where the Chinese or Thai neighbours are not investing),
valuable military cooperation from one of the strongest regional
armed forces (especially along the Indo-Burmese borders where anti-
Indian and anti-Burmese insurgents have established strong
underground networks) and a tacit silence on its internal affairs,
avoiding disturbing diplomatic criticism from an emerging regional
power that had pushed for a further integration of Burma into the
regional institutional scene through the BIMST-EC and MGC
organisations, and to a lesser extend, the SAARC159.
160 The New Light of Myanmar, Senior General Than Shwe receives Indian External
163 See for instance: RAMACHANDRAN (Sudha), “Myanmar power play leaves
India smiling”, Asia Times, October 21st, 2004 and KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.),
“Myanmar: the shake-up and the fall out”, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No.
1161, November 9th, 2004.
164 KUPPUSWAMY (C.S.), “Myanmar: Visit of the Indian President”, South Asia
Analysis Group, Paper No. 1732, March 13th, 2006 and LEVESQUE (Julien),
“Maung Aye’s India Visit”, IPCS Article No. 2549, April 15th, 2008.
165 The Indian Express, Fleet expansion in mind, Myanmar looks to India for expertise,
January 13th, 2006, The Hindu, India to supply military equipment to Myanmar,
January 22nd, 2007, BEDI (Rahul), “Indian transfers more Defenders to
Myanmar”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 16th, 2007 and Indian Defence, India to
transfer three Islanders aircrafts to Myanmar; Train Myanmarese Officers at Kochi
Naval Base, June 24th, 2007.
166 See for instance the declarations of the Indian Defence, then Foreign Minister
it low-key, September 28th, 2007 and The New Light of Myanmar, MOGE, Indian
oil company sign production sharing contracts, September 26th, 2007.
170 AFP, India on defensive as pressure mounts over Myanmar, September 14th, 2007.
72
CHAPTER THREE
years171. The image of a greedy India rushing into Burma before the
Chinese rival get too much of a stronghold, while showing little
interest in the Burmese internal upheavals, has been widely diffused
(and accepted as such) in international diplomatic, political and
economic circles172.
171 MOHAN (C. Raja), “South Block’s Burma Shell”, The Indian Express,
September 28th, 2007.
172 Various interviews with foreign diplomats based in Rangoon, November
2007. See also the Bangkok Post, Visiting Indian hits storm of Burma critics,
September 14th, 2007.
173 The Hindustan Times, India tells Myanmar to probe crackdown on protest,
175 The Hindustan Times, India votes against UN resolution on Myanmar, November
21st, 2007.
176 SRIVASTAVA (Siddharth), “India lays out a red carpet for Myanmar”, Asia
9th, 2004.
74
CHAPTER THREE
Along with the Thais, Indian medical teams were the first to be
granted visas and allowed onto Burmese soil. Several tonnes of
humanitarian assistance were also sent from India to Rangoon178 .
Even Bangladesh and Laos were able to send vital aid and personnel
to Burma in May 2008, while most Western countries were kept at
bay by the regime, extremely suspicious of any assistance proposed
by the Powers that had always publicly wished its collapse amid
vitriolic criticism. Although its diplomatic caution is often
interpreted as tacit support, India was able to get aid and medical
teams through Burma’s tightly controlled doors during the post-
cyclone crisis period. But this remains a meagre consolation. India’s
frustration with the global Indo-Burmese partnership has been too
evident. New Delhi has not so far achieved all its expectations in the
Burmese field, while the Burmese government has been getting much
more than a viable counter-balance to China’s overwhelming
presence179. By letting India in, but controlling nonetheless all the
Indian tentative thrusts in various key sectors of Burma’s landscape
(energy, commerce, military affairs), the junta has mastered a smarter
perspective on the way it manages its geopolitical background.
178 Xinhua News Agency, Second foreign medics allowed in cyclone-hit Myanmar,
May 17th, 2008.
179 EGRETEAU (Renaud), “India’s Ambitions in Burma: Towards an Overpriced
Russia has become in recent years another key partner for the
Burmese junta. Although having very little economic presence in
Burma, a humanitarian assistance much lower than during the Soviet
Union period and military cooperation limited to only a few sectors
(notably the Air Force), Moscow has acquired a crucial importance
for Naypyidaw as it offers strong support in all international
organisations where Russia is still influential180.
182 BLAGOV (Sergei), “From Myanmar to Russia with love”, Asia Times, April 12,
2006, available online at <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/
HD12Ae01.html>.
183 Eight MiG-29B and two MiG-29UB according to NOVICHKOV, Nikolai,
“Myanmar signs for surplus MiG-29s”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 11th, 2001. See
also SELTH (Andrew), Burma and Nuclear Proliferation: Policies and Perceptions,
Griffith Asia Institute, Regional Outlook, Paper No. 12, 2007.
184 Interview, Russian Embassy in Burma, Rangoon, April 25th, 2005.
185 JAGAN (Larry), “Myanmar woos China, Russia”, Asia Times, April 12th, 2006.
77
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
Apart from the crucial support of these key players, the Burmese
generals have been patiently developing others linkages with a few
strategically chosen countries willing to enter Burma’s opportunist
market, get closer to a little-known country or establish important
strategic connections with another authoritarian military regime.
Relations with North Korea, Asia’s other “pariah state”, have
gradually been re-cultivated in the past few years. Diplomatic
relations were cut-off between Ne Win and Kim Il-Sung’s similarly
autarchic regime, following the 1983 Rangoon bombings of a South
Korean delegation visiting Burma by North Korean agents. However,
after two decades, the “retirement” of Ne Win and the death of Kim
Il-Sung (1994), many logical incentives led to a gradual underground
rapprochement of the two ostracized countries which both benefited
from the support of their Chinese patron 186 . Discreet commercial
links, agricultural assistance, technical advice, alleged military
cooperation and illicit trafficking of legal and illegal products would
have been profitable for both the junta and the communist regime187.
The ousting of General Khin Nyunt accelerated the pace of
rapprochement to the point where diplomatic relations were re-
186 LINTNER (Bertil), CRISPIN (Shawn W.), “Dangerous Bedfellows”, Far Eastern
Economic Review, November 20th, 2003.
187 AUNG ZAW, “Burma’s North Korean connection”, The Bangkok Post, August
3rd, 2006.
78
CHAPTER THREE
188 Xinhua, Myanmar names first ambassador to DPRK after resumption of ties,
August 1st, 2007.
189 SELTH (Andrew), “Pariah Partners in Arms”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 3,
March 2004 and LINTNER (Bertil), “North Korea’s burden of crime and terror”,
Asia Times, April 20th, 2007.
190 Xinhua, Myanmar forges diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia, September 1st, 2004.
191 Xinhua, Myanmar to open embassy in Saudi Arabian capital, July 30th, 2007.
79
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
Burma; The Myanmar Times, Saudis send machinery, Vol. 22, No. 421, June 2-8,
2008.
195 KOZICKI (Richard J.), “Burma and Israel, A Study in Friendly Asian
Relations”, Middle Eastern Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 3, March 1959, p. 109-116.
196 Interview, Israeli Ambassador to Burma, Rangoon, March 7th, 2006.
80
CHAPTER THREE
197 ASHTON (William), “Myanmar and Israel develop military pact”, Jane’s
Intelligence Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, March 2000.
198 Although any tangible proof of it hasn’t come out: The Jerusalem Post,
200 ASHTON (William), “The Kiev Connection”, The Irrawaddy, Vol. 12, No. 4,
April 2004.
201 The Taiwan Journal, Relief efforts to assist Myanmar get under way, May 16th,
2008.
82
CHAPTER THREE
even Australia has any potential leverage on the country. Yet, a sort
of fascination of the US -- a mighty power with huge military
strength and cultural appeal -- has developed among the Tatmadaw
and the Burmese elite in the past years, combining admiration and
fear or even hatred202, though no real linkages were built-up. The
arrest of Khin Nyunt in October 2004 also led the Americans to lose
significant entry points in Rangoon203. A change in the Washington
Administration after 2008 might prompt the United States to
reconsider its approach, especially if Senator B. Obama who has
already expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue with what
the Bush Administration labelled “rogue states” (starting with Iran),
wins. Tentative talks were offered through Chinese diplomacy,
which managed to gather senior American and Burmese officials in
Beijing in June 2007204. But the US’s critical reaction to the September
2007 repression and May 2008 referendum sank this initiative,
though a similar round of talks in the future has not been completely
ruled out.
On its side, the European Union, remains stuck in its common
position impossible to revise unless the 27 countries accept it
unanimously. Given the strong commitment of few Northern or
Eastern Europe countries to completely isolate the Burmese junta, a
position strongly favoured by European public opinion over
sensitive to the views of the pro-democrat movements, efforts to
engage the Burmese regime are likely to be severely hindered. The
poor record of the Piero Fassino mission, the former Italian minister
of Justice who was appointed as the European Union Special Envoy
for Burma in November 2007, shows the lack of credibility of this
European initiative. Unable to get access to the Burmese leadership
202 One can read daily in the state-controlled New Light of Myanmar many articles
dealing with the US, whether in Afghanistan, Iraq or America…
203 Interview, Embassy of the United States in Burma, Rangoon, January 26th,
2005.
204 Xinhua News Agency, US, Myanmar officials hold talks: spokesman, June 29th,
2007.
83
BACK TO THE OLD HABITS
(or even a Burmese visa) and trapped by internal divisions within the
EU, Fassino has an impossible mandate to pursue, thus drawing
much criticism205.
205 JAGAN (Larry), “EU envoy on Burma has nothing to offer the democratic
For the past decades, regular purges within the Tatmadaw and
the politico-administrative structure, as well as a powerful but
effective xenophobic and nationalist propaganda have helped the
Burmese military to increase its grip on the country by rebuffing
most foreign influences. Used as a tool since U Nu’s parliamentary
regime (most of its leaders having been influenced by the nationalist
movements that emerged in the first part of the 20th century207), a
calculated nationalism offers Burma a powerful means to keep its
isolationist credo. It has then all the chances to be perpetuated, even
in the case of a return to a civil and democratic rule of law. It can
87
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