Executive Briefing

Vying for Supremacy: The Battle of the Mobile Platforms

A Look at the Business Models of Apple, Google Android, and Microsoft/Nokia Mobile Platforms

Charles H. Ferguson March 2011

For Value Creation and Business Model Innovation Aalto Executive Education Professor Goran Roos

Executive Summary

The premise of this brief is to compare and contrast the overall business models of four firms and platforms leading innovation and market penetration for mobility in the world today: Nokia/Microsoft, Apple, and Google/Android. It will, at a high level, explore the key elements of the business models approach, scale, core value propositions, and the elements that make them unique and competitive. The biggest new computing trend since the Internet boom of the 1990s is the rise of smartphones, the mobile mini-computers that are taking over the old "cellphone" market. On these phones, the "phone" is an after-thought: What matters is the functionality of the handset itself. Specifically, the quality of the screen and Internet connection, and the number of "apps" that run on the phone. Apple and Google will win the smartphone war, as the iPhone and Android continue to gain market share. The iPhone and Android phones provide the best multi-media experience thanks to a wide variety of apps. Realistically Google will keep moving ahead in market share because 100s of different handset manufacturers make the Android, the platform is open, the ecosystem is expanding at incredible speed, and the development is feeding the needs of a multitude of Independent Software Vendors who create these apps; to them, it is a philosophical issue, akin to the software dev days of open-source Linux versus, well, everyone else. Based on the research conducted in the exploration of this topic and the firms concerned, I am making a prediction as to the outcome of the current expansion, consolidation, and jockeying for position that these companies are currently undertaking. My assertion, which this paper should support, is that within a five year window the dominant player in the field with the greatest penetration and market share will be Google with the Android platform. I will leverage the key dimensions of business modeling as a guide to expose the relative strengths and weaknesses of each firms market play. The Overall Strategies Nokia/Microsoft Lets take a look firstly at the latest news making event in mobility that has really set tongues wagging and opinions flying in the market. Nokias billion dollar partnership agreement with Microsoft may be an early 2011 event, but the transition will take several years. Nokia have stated it will take until 2013 before the majority of its phone portfolio moves to Microsofts Windows Phone 7 platform. During the transition, Nokias already declining market share is likely to accelerate; it expects to only sell 150 million phones using its Symbian platform in the coming years. The expectations set by Nokia come from a nearly 200-page Form 20-F filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. In this document, Nokia and Microsoft state several risks and considerations regarding this partnership. It is standard procedure to do so, but here are a few key risks that illustrate some fundamental issues moving forward:

 The Windows Phone platform is a very recent, largely unproven addition to the market focused solely on highend smartphones with currently very low adoption and consumer awarenessrelative to the Android and Apple platforms. Our expected transition to the Windows Phone platform may prove to be too long to compete effectively in the smartphone market longer term given the ongoing developments of other competing smartphone platform Our ability to innovate and customize on the Windows Phone platform may not materialize as expected to enable us to produce smartphones that are differentiated from those of our competitors. We may not be able to change our mode of working or culture to enable us to work effectively and efficiently with Microsoft in order to realize the stated benefits of the proposed partnership in a timely manner. Basically, Nokia has decided that its best option to stay viable is to risk it all on an unproven, immature platform praying that it can survive the transition. And it hopes that its current customer base will come along for the ride, saying theres an opportunity to retain and transition the installed base of approximately 200 million Symbian owners to Nokia Windows Phone smartphones over time. And ironically, the current version of Windows Phone 7 isn't geared for business users. Microsoft (MSFT) is only now starting to roll out support for some web-based work applications and a feature that lets people cut and paste text -- table stakes for corporate types. Indeed, Microsoft intentionally designed its gaming-centric operating system to appeal to everyday smartphone buyers, not IT departments, in the hope that consumers would fall in love with the device and ask their companies to support it. After all, that's how Apple's iPhone and phones powered by Google's Android operating system found their way into enterprises, a topic which I will discuss here in a moment. The proliferation of phone systems adds to the costs of CIO budgets in large and small companies, and it makes it hard for them to negotiate deep discounts for buying devices in bulk. More importantly, devices that aren't designed with corporate clients in mind often lack the security features IT departments demand. This is one of the key gating factors for the new evolution cycle sweeping the market place with cloud computing, and its even more serious with an environment of small devices running rampant across the enterprise. There are a number of issues with the strategy, but perhaps the biggest one is that of time. As Nokia retools its handset portfolio, sales of iOS and Android devices are likely to continue growing, perhaps at a faster rate than today. Apple has already sold 100 million iPhones since mid-2007, so how many will it have sold by 2013 as Nokias transition takes place? Even with one handset model released per year, another 200 million iPhones sold by then isnt out of the question. And Androids growth rate is currently even higher. Nokia realizes this, and again admits defeat in thinking that Symbian would be a viable response to competitors, saying this in the SEC filing:

Other smartphone platforms with their related ecosystems have gained significant momentum and market share, specifically Apples iOS proprietary platform and Googles open source Android platform, and are continuing apace. Until very recently, we believed our competitive position in smartphones could be improved with Symbian, as well as MeeGo, and our strategy based on those platforms. We are now of the view, however, that for the longer term our Symbian platform is not sufficiently competitive in leading markets. Nokia isnt partnering with a company known for moving quickly in the mobile market. Microsoft took nearly three years to respond to Apples iPhone. The platform offers a fresh take on user experience, but lacks many features offered by competing operating systems. And perhaps even worse: adding those features to the platform is taking too long. Apple For the Apple strategy and my predicition of its trajectory to make sense, we must look back at the history of this firm and draw some analogies, and I'm going to make a bold prediction: Apple's iPhone will lose the mobile device wars (but it will come in 2nd place). Put another way: iPhone is to Android -- and somewhat Symbian OS -- handsets as Macintosh was to the DOS/Windows PC in the 1980s and 1990s. The Mac's rocky start in 1984-85 gave way to great success because of several killer applications, with desktop publishing being among the most important. But by the mid 1990s, Windows PCs pushed down Mac market share. The iPhone is poised to track similarly. Parallels between the past and present foreshadow iPhone's future. The IBM PC launched in mid1981. About 18 months later, Compaq announced its 12.5 kg clone, nicknamed the "luggable." A year after Compaq started selling its IBM PC clone, Apple announced the Macintosh, in January 1984. Desktop publishing was the Mac's first killer application, contributing to sales growth over the next five years. But Apple couldn't win the "Clone Wars" against DOS -- and later Windows -- PCs. The resulting clone attack, essentially every other PC manufacturer against Apple, was too much for Macintosh. The PC ecosystem overwhelmed Apple. To reiterate: In the 2000s, like the 1980s, Apple successfully launched industry-changing platforms iPad, iPhone and Macintosh, respectively. Like Macintosh, iPhone's end-to-end licensing model is poised to limit the supporting ecosystem's growth. Meanwhile, Google, Microsoft and Nokia license their mobile operating systems to third parties. While DOS/Windows was more open than Mac OS during the 1990s, Windows Mobile is more closed because Microsoft has failed to establish standards around the software. By comparison, Android, which Google open-sourced, is to mobile devices more like DOS/Windows was to PCs in the 1980s and 1990s: A more open operating system around which third parties make money and an ecosystems thrive. Clearly, the mobile device market will be bigger than just handsets, which is where Android already is gaining adoption for use on other connected devices. Barnes & Noble's Nook ebook reader and Verizon's Droid phone are but recent examples of where Android is going, and where Apple is again innovating with iPad. Meanwhile, the current wave of analysts report show how Android emphasizes information interoperability -- openness that should grow the ecosystem, like DOS/Windows did for PCs decades ago.

Google Android Googles strategy is to weaken other companies businesses (say, email) by offering something quite good or good enough for free, take over that market, and then use their new dominant position to rake in advertising revenue. This helps explain Googles motivation for Android. Google could, of course, just extend their search advertising to mobile phones, Adsense for mobile devices and build mobile versions of their web applications so anyone can use them. That might make for a fine business, but it would also be a rather weak position to be in compared to where Google is now. Phone makers could change the default search engine on their phones to something other than Google; mobile devices might change how people find informationthey might switch away entirely from using a search engine, and in that case, Google would be dead in the water; or, worse, perhaps mobile devices could move people away from using advertising-supported web applications, and toward primarily using paid-for applications. So thats not what Google is doing. Instead, theyve built an entire mobile device platform and given it away for free. But how are they going to make money from it? All of those things listed above could or are happeningsince carriers and phone-makers are free to modify Android, they can (and have) removed Google search entirely from the device; people are increasingly using context-specific applications like Yelp to find information while on mobile devices; and Apples App Store, even if it encourages low price-points, has tens of millions of users perfectly willing to purchase applications. To understand why Google has bet so big on Android, its first necessary to understand that mobile devices are the next big growth market. This is a market growing dramatically, fueled by widespread adoption in the developed world and growing demand in the developing world, where a smartphones lower price-point is within reach of billions going forward. This is important for Google because while Google isnt licensing Android (and thus doesnt directly benefit from increased phone sales), smartphones are effectively replacing computers for many people, and thus are upsetting the computer industry. This not only means that Google must be prepared for itmobile devices mean that Google must adjust their advertising business from its computer-focusbut that it provides an opportunity for them. This is an inflection point in the computer industrys history, and an opportunity for Google to dominate the next big industry, and thus to realize even greater advertising revenue. Google is building Android not so they can make great mobile devices and sell them to consumers. Rather, they are making them for these two simple reasons: (1) to disrupt Apples growing dominance of mobile devices, both so Google doesnt have to rely on Apple for access to their users and to eliminate their paid-for application model; and (2) so Google can control the mobile industry and thus secure advertising from it. Android isnt an attempt to build the best mobile platform and sell it on its merits; its a play to control the vast majority of the mobile market, secure eyeballs for Google advertising and eliminate any threat to Google.

Revenue Models There are a lot of ways to make money off the shift to mobile computing. Some companies have found several ways to profit from mobile like Apple. Microsoft in particular seems to be in a tough spot due to its late start in mobile, a very small market share, lack of leverage with the all-powerful carriers, and a revenue model based on licensing the operating system. The new Nokia alliance helps to some degree, but the alliance pains are going to take a few years to sort out. Google appears to offer its platform for free, but lets never forget that Google is not a non-profit organization, and its core business is advertising. Nokia/Microsoft The model for these firms is centered on the software licensing model. The disturbing part of all this for the Nokia/Microsoft alliance is that thus far, Windows Phone 7 is a failed product without a business model. Steve Ballmer used to criticize Google as being a business model that he could not sell to shareholders. However, the failed business model is not Google, but Microsoft's Windows Phone 7. Microsoft not only paid Nokia ($1 billion). Microsoft also paid the other Windows Phone 7 OEMs, covering all their handset development and marketing costs. Microsoft is also paying software developers, who would otherwise not be interested. The billions of dollars that Microsoft pours into keeping Windows Phone 7 on life support makes it even more unsustainable. That Windows Phone 7 is suffering lackluster and declining sales shows that Microsoft failed. Nokia would have been better to go with Android or at least stay with MeeGo, their open source effort. Steve Elop, Nokia CEO, was indoctrinated with the Microsoft belief that the only way to enter a market is with brute force using billions of dollars. Elop, believing Microsoft's fallacy, got scared and didn't think Nokia was capable of making a phone platform work. However, a natural ecosystem that open-source MeeGo would have had would attract more developers, apps, and consumers. The Nokia deal appears to have all the hallmarks of failure before it even gets started. Windows Phone 7 has no business model, and its very existence has heretofore appeared to be unsustainable, even for Microsoft and its billions. It is very easy to see the strategic alliance becoming a merger wherein Nokia would become Microsoft's portable hardware division. That would seem to give Microsoft, at least in its own eyes, the ability to compete with Apple head-on and Apple sets a very strong example of what you can do when one company has absolute control over everything in its product range. Based on this, its not difficult to predict the state of the union one year from now: Nokia will have changed: some of its best people will have left, taking their expertise onto the market or into start-ups. Some senior software people will have moved to the US: it's that or move Microsoft's Windows Phone team to Finland. Both companies have plenty of experience of trying to run large R&D efforts across time zones, and thus plenty of reasons not to do it. There will be little or no work on software, let alone alternative platforms, within Nokia. Microsoft, however, will be much the same. All it needs from this deal is a compliant partner who can work miracles in hardware design, which Nokia is exceptionally good at. Provided it can resist meddling, Microsoft will get some great handsets out of this, an unparalleled worldwide distribution

network and a huge potential presence in the developing world that, at the moment, is hard to call. Its hard to imagine the Nokia/Microsoft will be making much profit in the next 12 months. Apple only works because it makes enormous margins of the order of twice Nokia's and can thus throw reality-bending amounts of cash at R&D, marketing and supply line management in maintaining the Apple brand. Nokia can't rebuild its brand on the back of someone else's software. Further, Nokia's margin will now be split with Redmond, whereas Apple keeps the lot. The game is played in the margins, and Microsoft is under huge pressure from investors to keep those up. (Investors including one Stephen A Elop, listed as seventh biggest individual Microsoft shareholder, see below). Absorbing a large hardware company dependent on the cut-throat mobile market will hit the books a lot harder than having an arms-length relationship which just delivers software profits. Microsoft's recent and expensive experience with gaming underlines that logic: while the Xbox franchise may look healthy, that's purely on the Xbox Live billion-dollar, 60 percent margin business. The consoles themselves are basically break-even. This does not bode well for the hardware side of the partnership. If Windows Phone 7 doesn't deliver the numbers, then cutting loose the devastated hulk of Nokia will be much easier than having to soak up the pain internally. And if it does make money, it will be for Microsoft alone. The investment needed for Nokia to survive in anything like its current form will be unavailable; Microsoft remains free to discard the deal if Windows Phone 7 is a winner and pick up with a lower-cost, far Eastern partner. Apple When it comes to making money off mobile computing, the expert is Apple. How do they profit? Let us count the ways. First, they sell iPhones and iPads directly from their stores. Second, they sell accessories for those devices in their stores. Third, they get a kickback for devices the carriers sell at their stores. Fourth, they take a cut of every app purchased through the App Store. Fifth, they take a cut of any in-app sale or subscription. Sixth, they run the iAd network for displaying in-app advertisements and receive revenue from advertisers. This model clearly delivers on the theme from our class around designing a model that appropriates the maximum amount of profit with the minimal use of resources. It's not just a case of having many channels to make money, but also a question of how much money you can squeeze out of each one. Apple's release cadence for the iPhone is an example of how the company maximizes profits. There is an artificial scarcity created by Apple's insistence on just one current model of the phone. You can be sure that there will be a new model out every summer with a few nice new touches, and it will be improved enough to make you want to trade in your previous iPhone. Accessories are another opportunity for very high profit margins. If you buy a low-end iPad it will cost $500.00 USD. Here is where the accessory strategy begins. You dont want to damage the beautiful device, so you look for a cover or sleeve for it. Apple answered with the Smart Cover, a $40.00 USD slip that covers the screen. If this is not high end enough for the device, there is an Italian leather version is available for $70.00USD. There's no standard video output port, so you will have to lay out $40.00 for an HDMI dongle if you want to show video on a TV screen. Need a cable to

show your iPod video on a VGA display? No problem if you have another $40.00 for yet another dongle. This model just goes on and on, and its replicated with virtually every Apple product, iPad included. Give Apple their due credit; they basically reinvented the smartphone category when they released the original iPhone in 2007, and have done it again with the iPad. Because of that, AT&T was willing to pay Apple a pretty decent kickback for exclusivity in the U.S. market. Although that exclusivity has expired now that Verizon has the iPhone as well, it no doubt piled some serious dollars onto Apple's bottom line during those years. Regardless, Apple still gets its share of revenue from every iPhone or iPad that either AT&T or Verizon sell. So let's turn our attention to the software and services side. The only way a non-rooted phone can get apps is to use the App Store, controlled by Apple. The company uses a heavy hand to control what appears in the App Store. The Internet is full of sad stories from developers who have had their apps rejected by Apple for reasons that were vague, arbitrary, or non-existent. Yet that is just one more way that Apple controls their iPhone and iPad ecosystem, creating a walled garden that has served their business pretty well to this point. To round off the revenue model story for Apple however, I must mention the new subscription service they have just announced. The gist basically is this: any service offering an app with any sort of subscription component must now offer it within the app using the new in-app subscription options. Those companies are welcome to offer subscriptions outside of the app as well, but they must also have to option to do it in-app and it must be for the same price (or cheaper) than the outof-app option. If a subscriber signs up in-app, Apple keeps 30 percent of those revenues. If they sign up outside of the app (still granting them accesses to the app), the company keeps 100 percent of the revenues. Apple clearly knew this announcement would spark controversy, and you can see that very plainly in Apples press release on the model. Just look at this quote from CEO Steve Jobs: Our philosophy is simplewhen Apple brings a new subscriber to the app, Apple earns a 30 percent share; when the publisher brings an existing or new subscriber to the app, the publisher keeps 100 percent and Apple earns nothing. All we require is that, if a publisher is making a subscription offer outside of the app, the same (or better) offer be made inside the app, so that customers can easily subscribe with one-click right in the app. We believe that this innovative subscription service will provide publishers with a brand new opportunity to expand digital access to their content onto the iPad, iPod touch and iPhone, delighting both new and existing subscribers. This is Jobs and Apple explaining why this policy makes sense, and theres no question that it does make sense for Apple. A ton of third-party developers and ISVs both large and small have becomes increasingly upset by this move because it totally changes the game. Companies with subscription elements of their content had been accustomed to leveraging Apples platform for free, similarly to Googles Android. Now there will be a very significant fee for this. Among technology platforms, the Windows PC is classic example of a robust and vital ecosystem. The Google informational/search platform is another. Around either platform, there is a discernible

ecosystem of third parties -- not just software developers -- making lots of money. The two ecosystems are broad and deep. By comparison, Apple's App Store/iPhone/iPod touch/iPad platform is narrower and shallower, despite the depth of applications, because the ecosystem depends on a closed, end-to-end technology platform. Apple controls everything. Apple's monopoly on the iPhone and iPad ecosystem has raised plenty of controversy, but up to this point the user-opposition has offered a lot more words than action. Things have turned ugly in the past months with Apple's insistence that they get a 30% cut of any subscription revenue generated by apps. Yet it's not clear that app and content developers can vote with their feet as long as users are enamored with Apple's products, even if the "Apple tax" is incredibly high. Google/Android When Google announced they were buying what eventually became the Android operating system -an operating system intended for cell phones -- everyone immediately thought that Google was getting into the cell phone business, maybe even the cellular carrier business. Rumors of a "Google Phone" began to circulate. It was to be free, and you'd never have to pay another cell phone bill again. Google released Android as Open Source, basically giving it away for free to anyone that wants to use it. How can you make money when you're giving it away for free? In a nutshell, Google doesn't really make any money from Android -- not from the OS. With all the hours they spend contributing to the Android Open Source Project, Android actually costs Google a lot of money. Some would say they're a search engine company. Others would say they're an email company, or a web host, or a content distribution network (CDN) provider, or an application provider for businesses, or... the list goes on. At the end of the day, Google is an advertising company. They sell ads that they include on their search results. They sell ads that they include in email. They sell ads that run on websites consumers visit. They sell ads that show up in the apps that are run. To sell ads you have to match advertisers with potential customers. The better you can do this -- the more relevant the ad is to the person viewing the ad -- the more likely that customer would be to act on that ad. The way they know who you are and match ads to you is Google's real value proposition. Google looks at your web habits by offering Google Analytics and Google Adsense to webmasters and content providers. These two bits of code on various pages help build a profile of what your interests are based on what sites you're browsing. But not all websites run either of these. To capture those viewers Google offers their own web browser (Chrome) with an integrated search bar and address bar in one. Google even offers DNS services -- servers that resolve computer names into it's computer address (the IP address). By letting tech savvy users use Google's DNS and web browser, Google can see where people are going without the resulting site using any of Google's services. Those users get faster DNS resolution times and faster web surfing, and Google gets the data. But web surfing isn't everything. Searching for stuff on the web is becoming more and more relevant to good, old fashioned reselling. Before you go out and buy that big-ticket item, you want to find out if it's a good buy. You search for reviews, you search for opinions, and ultimately you search for prices. At that point why not buy right now, online, and have it delivered tomorrow? Ta-da! Google works! Both for you (the researcher turned buyer) and the advertiser (turned seller). Google got their cut along the way (for selling the ad, and by learning more about you on the way).

Oh, and if you used Google Checkout, they got more money that way, too! But why would Google be so interested in giving away a mobile operating system? Google makes money (and justifies giving away the OS) by licensing the Google Apps that come on most Android phones (but not all). Apps like Gmail, the Android Market, Google Search, and others come in something called GAPPS. The Market is really where Google is interested. Sure, the other GAPPS add value to the phone (hence why carriers license their inclusion on Android-powered phones), but Google is making money with every app sold through the Market. Even free apps make Google money. Developers have to pay to have an account to list their apps under. Even ad-sponsored apps are likely using Google Mobile Ads, so Google's getting revenue from that source as well. That's not the elegance of Google's mobile revenue stream. Google isn't so much after making money from apps sold through their Market, or even by charging developers an admission fee to get their apps listed. Instead, Google saw that computers were getting smaller and smaller, more and more mobile, and connected to the internet in more ways. Now, instead of trying to remember something to look up on your desktop computer later, pull out the laptop... or better yet: your phone. But Google didn't stop at just having their search engine in your pocket. They made search easier. You can search through Google's database by using your keyboard, using your voice, and even by using the camera on your phone. You can "scan" a barcode and see who has the best price (getting ads along the way) before you make your purchase. Google even knows where you are, so your search results are even more relevant to you. Google can tell you that you can buy that item for $5 less at a store 1.5 miles away. They'll even give you turn-by turn directions to get there. Google knows that searching using input other than text is the next big thing. Spoken search is important, but people speak very differently all over the world, even across the country. To address this, Google bought a company called Grand Central (now Google Voice) to get voice samples from people -- and give you "free voicemail transcription" along the way. You can even call Google (+1-800-GOOG-411) to get free 411 information from your phone -- any phone albeit in the US only for now. They'll even connect you for free. Google knows that searching by taking a picture is going to be big, too. So Google Goggles was created. Tie this in with the new face-recognition feature of Google Picasa and you may soon be able to search for someone just by snapping a picture of them. How does Google make money? By learning who you are, what you're interested it, and how you search for stuff... then helping you find it in an intuitive manner anywhere you are. The Bottom Line The trend was obvious for quite some time, and now it finally happened: Android is the most popular smartphone platform among U.S. subscribers. According to comScores data, Googles Android rose from 23.5% market share in October 2010 to 31.2% in January 2011, enough to securely grab first place from RIMs BlackBerry, which fell 35.8% in October 2010 to 30.4% in January 2011. A recent report from Nielsen also claimed that Android is now the number one smartphone platform in the U.S., albeit with slightly different numbers. Apples

iOS experienced a minute growth in the same period: from 24.6% to 24.7%, while Microsoft and Palm continued losing market share, ending at 8.0% and 3.2%, respectively.

Recent data from Canalys showed that Android is also the worlds most popular smartphone platform, and with the onslaught of Android smartphones this year, were sure that Android will continue doing well throughout 2011. My prediction in summary is that Android will, primarily because of its open dev/open source play become the evangelical platform of choice, and as more device makers take it up, Android will begin to permeate across the wide spectrum of connected devices at a rate superseding that of both Nokiasoft and Apple. Apple will come in second with gorgeous design and elegant software, not to mention continually brilliant ways of appropriating profits at every turn. Nokia/Microsoft I fear is doomed to continue to set false expectations and disappoint share holders. I also see Nokia merging with Microsoft to become a device division; the writing there is on the wall, and the fact the Steve Elop is also MSFTs 7th largest individual shareholder certainly alludes to his possibility. Reference Sources Nokias lastest financial results. Viewed March 9th http://www.nokia.com/aboutnokia/financials Nokia SEC filing for 2010 viewed March 9th http://www.nokia.com/NOKIA_COM_1/About_Nokia/Financials/form20-f_10.pdf Overview of analyses from the comScore 2011 US Mobile Market viewed on March 10th http://www.comscore.com/Press_Events/Press_Releases/2011/3/comScore_Reports_Janua ry_2011_U.S._Mobile_Subscriber_Market_Share Overview of the Android Operating System and Google involvement viewed March 8th http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Android_%28operating_system%29 Overview of open article on the Nokia Microsoft alliance viewed March 7th http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nokia#Alliance_with_Microsoft Overview of Apples iOS viewed March 7th http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IOS_%28Apple%29 Overview of Apples iPhone business viewed March 7th http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IPhone

Apples lastest financial results. Viewed March 9th https://www.apple.com/investor/ Apples new subscription policy press release viewed March 7th http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2011/02/15appstore.html Quick view of the overtaking by Android of Apple and Symbian via US subscribers viewed March 16th http://www.betanews.com/joewilcox/article/Canalys-Android-tops-Symbian-insmartphone-shipments-twice-as-many-units-as-iPhone/1296491375 Discussion on Android business model viewed March 9th http://signalnews.com/how-doesandroid-make-money215 Discussion of iPhone margins viewed March 13th http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2010/03/02/what-doth-it-profit-an-iphone/ Discussion of MSFT Mobile margins viewed March 13th http://blogs.forbes.com/greatspeculations/2010/10/08/microsoft-could-push-30-with-ifwindows-profit-margins-shrink-more-slowly/ Amazing document on Apple preferred supplier arrangements viewed March 16th http://www.wikinvest.com/stock/Apple_%28AAPL%29/Long-term_Supply_Agreements Mobile Wars: After Nokia's software surrender, the five-way struggle for mobile dominance heats up viewed March 16th http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_09/b4217037985749.htm Stock positions for MSFT; amzing to see the 7th largest shareholder is Nokia CEO viewed march 18th http://www.dailyfinance.com/company/microsoftcorporation/msft/nas/institutional-ownership Making money from Android viewed March 18th http://mobilephonedevelopment.com/archives/1116