Published on U.S. Naval Institute (http://www.usni.

org) Home > Hanoi and the Pentagon: A Budding Courtship, Posted June 11, 2012

Hanoi and the Pentagon: A Budding Courtship

By Carlyle A. Thayer Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has just completed a major trip to Asia that included visits to th Singapore, Vietnam and India. In Singapore he delivered a keynote address to the 11 Shangri-La Dialogue that focused on the ends and means of the new U.S. defense strategy of rebalancing towards the Asia-Pacific. The media picked up on his statement that by 2020 the Navy will re-posture its forces from todays roughly fifty-fifty percent split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a sixty-forty split between these oceans.

April 24 photo of Vietnamese People's Navy officers aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Chafee U.S. Navy Media attention quickly shifted as Secretary Panetta departed Singapore for consultations in Hanoi with Vietnams Minister of National Defense Gen. Phung Quang Thanh. In a surprise development Secretary Panetta made a quick detour to Cam Ranh Bay before meeting with his counterpart. Secretary Panettas call in Cam Ranh Bay was the first visit to this former American base by a U.S. Secretary of Defense since the end of the Vietnam War. Cam Ranh Bay is judged to be one of the best deep-water ports in Asia. It is strategically located facing the Spratly Islands in the middle of the South China Sea. The purpose of Secretary Panettas trip was to visit the USNS Richard E. Byrd, a dry cargo ship undergoing minor repairs in the commercial section of the bay. In 2009 Vietnams Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung announced that the commercial repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay would be open to all navies of the world. The U.S. was the first country to take up the offer.

The USNS Richard E. Byrd underwent repairs Vietnam in February-March 2010 and again in August 2001. According to Greg Torode of the South China Morning Post a total of five voyage repairs have been carried out which included U.S. ships USNS Walter S. Diehl in October 2011 and the USNS Rappahannock in February 2012. Very little publicity accompanied these visits. When Secretary Panetta addressed the crew of the USNS Richard E. Byrd he took this opportunity to acknowledge how far U.S.-Vietnam defense relations have come since normalization of diplomatic relations in 1995. Secretary Panetta linked the U.S strategy of rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific with developing a partnership with Vietnam. In particular, Secretary Panetta focused on the possibility of future visits to Cam Ranh by U.S. Navy ships. Access for United States naval ships into this facility is a key component of this relationship, and we see a tremendous potential here for the future, Panetta said. We look forward to working together with the country of Vietnam to achieve our shared objectives and to take this relationship to the next level. Secretary Panetta then flew to Hanoi for consultations with General Thanh. Media reporting focused on the carefully choreographed exchange of war artifacts, letters recovered from the remains of two fallen soldiers, one Vietnamese and one American. Vietnam used this occasion to announce that it had removed restrictions on U.S. missing in action search and recovery efforts from three sensitive areas. The symbolism of Secretary Panettas trip to Cam Ranh Bay and the attention-grabbing exchange of war artifacts must be placed in context. Secretary Panettas consultations in Hanoi were part of an agreement reached between the United States and Vietnam in 2003 to exchange visits by defense ministers every three years. In 2003 Defense Minster General Pham Van Tra visited Washington. In 2006 Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Hanoi. In 2009 Defense Minster General Phung Quang Thanh visited Washington. The October 2010 visit to Hanoi by the then Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was to attend the inaugural meeting of the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM Plus). It was not part of the formal exchange visits by defense ministers. The timing of Secretary Panettas visit was related to his participation in the Shangri-La Dialogue. As Panetta noted in his Singapore address, he was the third U.S defense minister to attend this forum. The United States and Vietnam have been conducting a defense dialogue for eight years. The first US-Vietnam annual defense dialogue took place in 2004. This dialogue has evolved over time to involve senior officials. Four years later this was raised to a Political, Security and Defense dialogue involving officials from their respective foreign affairs and defense ministries. In 2010, the US-Vietnam defense dialogue was upgraded to a Defense Policy Dialogue between officials from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) and Vietnams Ministry of National Defense at deputy minister level. The United States conducts a strategic dialogue with Vietnam as part of official U.S. Department of Defense engagement policy. The United States hopes to institutionalize defense cooperation across a number of areas and to habituate Vietnam into cooperating with the United States. In other words, the U.S. hopes to evolve the relationship from one-off arrangements to regular activities that become a normal part of defense cooperation over time. For example, Vietnam restricts all foreign countries to one naval port visit each year. The U.S. gently prods Vietnam to lift this restriction. The main purpose of the consultations between Secretary Panetta and Minister Thanh was to review progress on their first formal memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation reached in nd September 2001 at the 2 Defense Policy Dialogue. The MOU included five priority areas: regular high-level dialogues between defense ministries; maritime security; search and rescue; studying and exchanging experiences on United Nations peacekeeping; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. At a joint press conference held after the two ministers met, Secretary Panetta noted in prepared remarks that the new U.S. defense strategy entailed developing the capabilities of our Asian partners, such as Vietnam and to try to take this relationship to a new level. He noted that

agreement had been reached to expand some very important cooperation in the five key areas outlined in the 2001 MOU. Secretary Panetta proposed establishing an Office of Defense Cooperation to meet these objectives. Panetta also revealed that he discussed how the United States and the ADMM Plus group could improve the maritime rights of all nations. In prepared remarks to the press, General Thanh confirmed that the bilateral talks focused on the implementation of the 2001 MOU. He flagged future cooperation in addressing non-traditional security issues such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief and search and rescue. General Thanh also noted a long-standing Vietnamese concern to elicit further support from the U.S. to address legacies from the Vietnam War. This was a reference to the Agent Orange and unexploded ordnance disposal issues. During the question and answer period queries were raised about U.S. access to Cam Ranh Bay and U.S. arms sales to Vietnam. It was clear from the replies given that these were sensitive issues. For example, General Thanh ended his prepared remarks by noting that Vietnam would promote bilateral cooperation with the U.S. without doing harm to any third parties. This was a thinly veiled reference to China. During the Q&A session, when asked if Asian nations had to make a choice between China and the United States, General Thanh replied that Vietnam would like to expand defense cooperation with all countries And Vietnam would like to have fine relations with neighboring countries, with regional countries and with the major powers of the world, and especially the United States and China. With respect to Cam Ranh Bay, General Thanh emphasized that Vietnam would welcome U.S. logistics ships (Military Sealift Command) in Vietnams commercial ports. This was a polite way of saying that visits to Cam Ranh Bay by U.S. Navy warships was not an immediate prospect. In 2007 President George Bush amended the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to permit the sale of non-lethal defense articles and defense services to Vietnam on a case-by-case basis. Otherwise ITAR prohibits the sale of lethal defense articles and services and non-lethal crowd control defense articles and services, and night devices to end-users with a role in ground security. General Thanh made it clear that Vietnam wanted the U.S. to lift ITAR restrictions in order to fully normalize relations between the two countries. General Thanh indicated that Vietnams first priority would be to obtain spare parts to repair and overhaul U.S. weapons and equipment left during the war. Next, depending on Vietnams financial situation and the needs of the Vietnam Peoples Army, Vietnam would purchase certain kinds of weapons for the potential modernization of our military. Secretary Panetta did not address the question of arms sales at the press conference. After meeting General Thanh, Secretary Panetta was received by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung. PM Dung canvassed the positive development in bilateral relations and expressed Vietnams hope to strengthen cooperation in the field of economics, trade, investment, science and technology and education. But PM Dung stressed that both sides needed to make a greater effort to build mutual confidence in order to take bilateral relations to a new height. He laid down two markers for future cooperation: continued U.S. assistance in overcoming the consequences of war and a complete removal of all restrictions on weapons sales to Vietnam. Secretary Panetta also met with Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh. They agreed to broaden cooperation on safety and security of navigation in the South China Sea and sustainable development of the Lower Mekong River. Secretary Panetta did not address U.S. policy on arms sales to Vietnam in public remarks. In addition to the ITAR restrictions, State Department officials have made it clear there can be no progress on this question unless Vietnams domestic human rights situation improves. Recently Senators John McCain and Joe Liberman visited Vietnam where they were given a wish list of military equipment that Vietnam would like to acquire. The Senators told their hosts that there would be no progress until Vietnam improved its human rights situation. There have been no signs of improvement since their visit.

Secretary Panettas visit to Vietnam demonstrates the closeness in political relations between Vietnam and the United States. His visit was also rich in symbolism. By permitting the SecDef to visit Cam Ranh Bay Vietnam was quietly sending out the message that in its view the U.S. is a legitimate player in regional security. This contrasts with Chinas view that the U.S. is an outside power whose meddling in regional affairs only complicates matters. A net assessment of Secretary Panettas visit must include more than an ounce of caution. Vietnam is likely to develop further defense cooperation with the United States at its own gradual and cautious pace. Vietnam and the U.S. share a convergence of views on a number of regional security issues. But constant reference by all of Vietnams leaders to mutual respect and sovereignty are an indication that Vietnam will cooperate with the U.S. but not align with it. Vietnam is internally divided about how to manage relations with China and the United States. There are a number of party ideologues who still believe the U.S. is promoting the plot of peaceful evolution to overturn Vietnams socialist regime. These ideological concerns have surfaced from time to time in remarks directed at the Peace Corps and American universities wishing to operate in Vietnam. The conservatives maintain that Vietnam can manage its sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea without aligning with the United States. The conservative also point to an improvement in relations with China since the October 2011 visit to Beijing by party Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong. Trongs visit followed the dispatch of two special envoys in January and June. During Trongs visit China and Vietnam reached agreement on Guidelines on Fundamental Principles to Resolve Maritime Disputes. Since then all has been quiet in the East Sea, the Vietnamese term for the South China Sea. Other members of the Vietnam Communist Party are committed to the policy adopted by the eleventh party congress in early 2011 of proactively integrating with the world. This policy is designed to promote Vietnams multifaceted engagement with all the major powers including the United States. Defense cooperation is one aspect of proactive integration. Secretary Panettas visit will be judged a success if it meets two competing objectives. First, increased U.S.-Vietnam defense cooperation must not trigger a conservative backlash over fears that Vietnam is being drawn into an anti-China containment policy. Second, increased defense cooperation must not raise unrealistic expectations among Vietnamese officials who are promoting proactive integration. Achieving these twin objectives will be no easy task. Vietnamese party conservatives are only too willing to play on the human rights issue to impede the development of closer defense relations with the United States. Carlyle A. Thayer is the Emeritus Professor of Politics, The University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra. Include in RSS Feed: Exclude from feed

Source URL: http://www.usni.org/news-analysis/hanoi-and-pentagon-buddingcourtship