The Evolution of Post Maoist-Insurgencies: Do modern insurgencies have a common trajectory? In Malaya...

during the long tropical evenings we theorised about the phase we had reached in the Maoist interpretation of peoples war.1 John Mackinlay (Late 6th Gurkha Rifles) In his book The Insurgent Archipelago, John Mackinlay seems at times to long for the relative conceptual simplicity of the Maoist era. Yet he argues convincingly that [by the 1990s+ Insurgency was no longer a monolithic concept it had branched into several different categories whose disparity challenged the tenets of Western Doctrine.2 In contrast, Maoist insurgencies had broadly followed a recognisable model as detailed by Mao, (an academic himself) known as Peoples War. The key differences between Maoist Peoples War and the evolved forms of insurgency that are prevalent today are: (i) their lack of reliance on a clearly identifiable (singular) population, (ii) their use of mass communications, especially the virtual dimension, to coerce and subvert alike, (iii) their use of Propaganda of the Deed (POTD) as their central operational technique (iv) their lack of a convincing alternative to the order which they oppose. However, despite these widely agreed characteristics there is still no consensus on a complete concept of post-Maoist insurgency with rival terms such as globalised insurgency, Type 4 insurgency and transnational terrorism creeping in and out of vogue. This leads to confused policy making and ill-considered responses to the threat, as Mackinlay puts it: Governments legislate against terrorism and military staff write doctrine to counter insurgency as though they were completely separate things. They are not. and furthermore; lumping them *Maoist and post-Maoist insurgencies+ together as terrorist organisations leads to the self fulfilling disaster of using the same response for both.3 This essay proposes looking beyond the characteristics of post-Maoist insurgency and the ensuing confusion. Instead, it is suggested that an examination of the trajectory of post-Maoist insurgencies could determine a common life-cycle. This in turn could be instructive for policy making. Classic Maoist insurgencies follow a three-phase model outlined by Mao in 1938.4 Such insurgencies should be countered in different ways depending on what phase they have reached. David Galula was the first to set out a corresponding counterinsurgent doctrine in 1964.5 He expanded Maos phases into five steps6 before recommending four over-arching laws of counterinsurgency, four counter-steps for countering cold revolutionary war (steps 1 & 2) and eight counter-steps for hot revolutionary war (steps 3-5).7 David Galulas work is considered a classic text and is still highly influential today; indeed the US counterinsurgency field manual (which was re-written in 2007) acknowledges it as the most influential book in the field.8

1 2

John Mackinlay: The Insurgent Archipelago, (Hurst & Co. 2009) p.2 Ibid. p.42 3 Ibid. p.161 4 See Mao Tse-tung: On Protracted War, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II (Foreign Languages Press, 1967) p.136-137 5 See David Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Praeger Security International, 2006) 6 The five steps of what Galula called The Orthodox Pattern were: 1) Creation of a Party 2) United Front 3) Guerrilla Warfare 4) Movement Warfare 5) Annihilation Campaign. See Galula, op. cit. p.30-39 7 See Galula, op. cit., especially pgs. 43-47, 75-94 8 US Army & Marine Corps: Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (University of Chicago Press, 2007) p.xix

The problem for the modern counter-insurgent is, as alluded to above, insurgency has grown evermore complex and now rarely follows the Maoist model. Further, no modern model has replaced it. Academic debates go round and round in circles trying to establish some common description of modern insurgency based upon certain characteristics. This essay argues that instead of focusing on the characteristics of insurgency we should be analysing their trajectory. Indeed, part of the reason why there is no agreed definition of Post-Maoist insurgency is because they exhibit different characteristics at different stages of their life-cycle. If modern insurgencies can be described to follow a common trajectory, then perhaps a phased model roughly analogous to Maos doctrine can be developed, and counter-insurgent strategies could consequently be shaped to fit each phase, just as Galula proposed for classic insurgencies. In order to assess the validity of this thesis, a number of case studies will be considered. These all feature one or more of the characteristics outlined above, but whether they fit any existing concepts is unimportant. Instead of assessing their characteristics against a checklist, they shall all be placed on a phased-model with the following life-cycle stages: 1) Social movement 2) Subversion & growth 3) Coercion phase 4) Collapse (lose) OR collapse of rival (win) 5) Social movement. See Fig.1 (below) for a graphical representation. This essay will describe a different insurgency at each stage of this model and explain how they fit it conceptually.
Figure 1 - The Evolution of Post-Maoist Insurgencies

6 5 Coercive Power 4 3 Successful Insurgency 2 1 0 Social Subversion Movement & Growth Coercion phase Time Collapse Social Movement Failed Insurgency

Stage 1 in the post-Maoist life-cycle is labelled social movement. At this stage the organisation in question is essentially a political pressure group. Although it has an agenda opposed to the status quo, it does not have the means to achieve it and is acutely aware of this fact.9 Usually it blends in with a myriad of other activist groups and will not be regarded as particularly dangerous to the existing order. At this early, underdeveloped stage, it may be considered a proto-insurgency and
9

Insurgency always has and always will be a strategy of the weak. John Mackinlay notes: It is the option of the weaker side whose towering ambitions are not matched with the commensurate power to translate them into reality. See Mackinlay, op. cit. p.5

has a number of difficult tasks to accomplish before it is ready for the next phase. Daniel Byman has identified six potential proto-insurgents tasks: (i) identity creation; (ii) finding an appealing cause; (iii) offering social service(s); (iv) overcome rivals; (v) hiding and sanctuary; and (vi) acquiring outside support.10 In this authors view, the first two tasks are the most important and the only crucial tasks for the post-Maoist insurgent. This is due to the fact that all post-Maoist insurgencies originate as social movements. Whereas antecedents required a strong revolutionary leader to turn small, inconsequential revolt into insurgency (e.g. Mao) or even jumpstart the process with a small revolutionary vanguard (e.g. Che Guevara) the modern age of mass communications has allowed social movements to organise themselves organically, without a clear structured leadership. Karatzogianni and Robinson note: the information revolution is favouring and strengthening networked organisational designs, often at the expense of hierarchies, reinforcing the persistent powers of indigenous and everyday resistance.11 Of course, within these networks there are leading figures who are more active and influential than the core membership, yet ...what todays insurgent gains by immediate connection to the population, it sacrifices on command-and-control. Thousand, perhaps millions take up the struggle as political outriders, but the movement becomes subject to the lurches of ephemeral enthusiasm.12 The so-called hacktivist movement which includes groups such as Anonymous and LulzSec is a good example of modern proto-insurgency. Both are anti-establishment movements which have launched several high-profile cyber attacks against government and security industry targets. Their techniques are mainly Denial-of-Service attacks (for which they can count on the support of thousands of supporters who willingly mobilise their computers to form bot-nets) and basic hacking exploits such as SQL injection. According to Steve Mansfield-Devine these attacks have not been cause for undue concern, as little serious damage has been done. He comments: [Anonymous] use the vocabulary of revolution, even though their activities are commonly perceived as little more than juvenile stunts or vandalism.13 While this may currently be the case, there is little doubt that hacktivism has the potential to issue a real and serious challenge the existing order in the cyber domain, perhaps in the very near future. One information risk management professional warns: Wait until the next LulzSec...this is nuisance hacking, and the next guys that come along are going to take it to a new height and somewhere a line is going to be crossed. I think its a year away myself.14 The crossing of such a line would graduate the hacktivist movement to the next phase of postMaoist insurgency. This is labelled Subversion & Growth and is the process by which a social movement cum proto-insurgency spreads its subversive message and grows its capability, to the point where the organisation has the ability to threaten the existing order. In the case of hacktivist movement, this would mean a capability to launch sustained attacks of the scale seen against Estonia in 2007, which practically brought the county to a standstill and in the days it took to fight off the attack, it is likely that the country lost billions of Euros in reduced productivity and business downtime.15 If an insurgent organisation could sustain that scale of attack, they would have
10 11

Daniel Byman: Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, (RAND, 2007) p.11-17 Athina Karatzogianni & Andrew Robinson: Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social movements, networks and hierarchies, (Routledge, 2010) p.265 12 Neville Bolt: The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries, (Hurst & Co. 2012) p.8 13 Steve Mansfield-Devine: Hacktivism: assessing the damage, in Network Security, (August 2011) p.5 14 Richard Hollis quoted in Ibid. p.12 15 Aviram Jenik: Cyberwar in Estonia and the Middle East, in Network Security, (April 2009) p.4

palpable leverage over the state. Whereas a social movement or proto-insurgency can only apply pressure to the state to make policy changes, a fully-developed insurgency threatens the capability of the state to enforce policy and instead forcibly dictates its own terms. In conventional terms, this would usually mean challenging the states monopoly of violence, economic and/or political authority, perhaps usurping control in certain areas. The Subversion & Growth period has comparable outcome to Maoist political work and other preparations for the strategic offensive, such as a growth in capability. However the process is very different for post-Maoist insurgencies. Particularly notable is the phenomenon of self-subversion, which is rare in Maoist insurgencies, but common in post-Maoist insurgencies. Isolated (rural) population centres are not turned with a few political cadre well trained in the art of generating revolutionary fervour via propaganda, as practised by Maoists. Modern societies are universally predominantly urbanised, and the insurgents who are dependent on them for food, information, concealment, and support...have no choice but to follow them into the diverse and disjointed city, where even the most astute political workers face an insurmountable task in securing anything more than a small conspiratorial cell.16 Furthermore, due to factors such as migration, sympathetic diaspora populations could be located anywhere worldwide. Hence, post-Maoists are obliged to communicate their subversive message across vast distances, and new fighters volunteer themselves (usually with a little social encouragement) rather than being recruited by a top-down organisation.17 There is but one tool which has been proven effective in that capacity time and time again Propaganda of the Deed (POTD). POTD is a necessarily shocking act (usually violent) which demands attention. When insurgents employ POTD tactics at this stage they are trying to reach sympathisers, in order to encourage them to act themselves. Conceptually, they are manipulating the OODA loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act) of others a skill Bin Laden was particularly adept at. Bin Laden knew that Muslims around the world would observe the 9/11 attacks, as the spectacularly violent images would be disseminated far and wide by the world media, he said: These young men...said in deeds in New York and Washington, speeches that overshadowed all other speeches made everywhere else in the world.18 He knew that some would orient themselves with Al-Qaedas narrative of a just and defensive response to a war against Islam being led by the United States. This was rapidly borne out by the increased number of websites for disaffected Muslims in 9/11s aftermath. One survey of the web suggested how persuasive POTD could be. Of 1,500 Islamic websites in 2000, 150 might be termed jihadi. By 2005 those 150 had grown to 4,000.19 Bin Laden also knew that some of them would decide that it was the duty of a good Muslim to support AlQaeda, particularly if the US and her allies responded violently. Finally, he knew a few would be driven to act by joining the global jihadist movement and in time launch their own attacks, such as those seen in Madrid in 2004 or in London in 2005. Research also shows that since 9/11 there has

16

See Bruce Hoffman & Jennifer Taw: The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to US Army Operations, (RAND, 1994) p.7, 10 17 For a detailed study of the mechanisms of modern subversion see Marc Sageman: Understanding Terror Networks, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) p.99-135 18 Osama bin Laden quoted in Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari: Propaganda of the Deed 2008: Understanding the Phenomenon, (RUSI, 2008) p.6 19 B. Raman cited in Ibid. p.6

been a significant increase in the number and diversity of terrorist plots against the US20 , including a spike in home-grown jihadist plots.21 Hence subversion and growth is clearly a phase that the global jihadist movement has experienced as a result of 9/11. POTD is also just as crucial in post-Maoist popular (national) insurgency, such as those that have arisen from the Arab Spring movement. Incidents such as the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia, the violent death of Khaled Said at the hands of Egyptian police and the brutal military crackdown in Libya and Syria were all promulgated far and wide, partly by the traditional media, but the unregulated new media such as social networking and media-sharing sites were particularly important in spreading an accompanying subversive message. Groups like We Are All Khaled Said played a significant role in mobilising protestors. An Egyptian activist put it succinctly in a tweet: we use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world.22 The growth in the capability of the insurgency is an equally important aspect of this phase, and is a prerequisite for increasing coercive power to the point where it challenges the existing order. In the case of the Arab Spring, the gradual arming of the Libyan and Syrian resistance movements and the corresponding slide into civil war is demonstrates this process in action. In both cases the defection of military units and the trafficking of arms across porous borders were key drivers in increasing the capability of the insurgencies. Furthermore, in the case of Libya the insurgents could count on intelligence, airpower and special operations forces from an international coalition, which massively enhanced their capability (by proxy) and undoubtedly swayed the war in their favour.23 At the peak of its coercive power, an insurgency reaches the third phase in its life-cycle, the coercion phase. It is not always clear at what point an insurgency reaches the coercion phase as the distinction between the previous phase can be somewhat blurred at times. However, by this phase the insurgency will usually be the primary security concern for the state concerned, albeit perhaps jointly with other co-existing insurgencies24. The difference between Maoist and postMaoist insurgencies at this stage is primarily the use of POTD as the central operational technique and the setting of unrealistic goals. Mackinlay notes: Post-Maoist insurgents strive for long-term objectives which have an unrealistic or intangible character. Their tactical success should not be measured by the achievement of these stated objectives, but by the activation and animation of a huge diversity of supporters. For them, success is continuing to survive, to challenge their adversaries in a violent and highly visible manner, to globalise their campaign and to compel nations and organisations to recognise them.25 Notably, the insurgencies of the Arab Spring have not subscribed to this characteristic. Indeed, their goals were very specific and entirely realistically aimed at the overthrow of particular regimes. The

20 21

See Lauren OBrien: The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11, in FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (Sept. 2011) See Jerome Bjelopera: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, (Congressional Research Service, 2011) 22 Global Voice Advocacy cited in Habibul Haque Khondker: Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring, in Globalizations, 8:5 (Routledge, 2011) p.677 23 See Cahal Milmo & Kim Sengupta: Rebels claim the victory but did the Brits win it? (The Independent, 23/8/11) 24 For example one study of insurgent media in Iraq identified six main insurgent groups. See Daniel Kimmage & Kathleen Ridolfo: Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas, (RFE/RL, 2007) p.40-42 25 John Mackinlay: The Insurgent Archipelago, (Hurst & Co. 2009) p.161

degree of their success is also entirely palpable. Yet, despite not fitting the above description we know they are a post-Maoist insurgency due to the way in which they were organically organised. Exceptions such as this are a problem for models based on a list of traits. However, they still fit the phased model. An example of an insurgency which is likely to be currently approaching the peak of its coercive power, and is therefore in the coercion phase, is Boko Haram of Nigeria. Boko Haram passed through the subversion and growth phase between July 200926 and January 201227. Boko Haram employs terrorist POTD tactics almost exclusively and has stated the unrealistic goal of imposing strict Shariah law across the ethnically and religiously diverse nation, which includes a large Christian population. At the time of writing, Boko Haram commits several acts of terrorism per week and is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of Nigerians in 2012 alone. Furthermore, there are some links between Boko Haram and the Islamic revivalist movement, including possible ties to Al-Qaedas global insurgency. Indeed, a VBIED (Vehicle-Bourne IED) attack against the UN headquarters in Abjuba in August 2011 suggests that at least one Boko Haram faction has interests beyond the Nigerian state. US analysts have concluded that this insurgency could prove costly for the stability of Africa, the Sahel and American interests.28 This highlights another weakness with traditional models which attempt to de-lineate popular (national) insurgency and global insurgency. In reality, there is often a blur between the two. Boko Harams terrorist campaign could end in a number of ways. Currently the Nigerian government has recognised them as a political entity and is pursuing a strategy of engagement with moderate elements in the hope that this will lead to ceasefire negotiations and a peace process. Alternatively, fighting could continue until one side or the other collapses. Whatever the outcome, the insurgency as we know it will eventually return to its roots as a social movement. Should a peace process take place, it is probable that Boko Haram would form a legitimate political party in order to represent itself, just as the Irish Republican movement did. Should the state collapse, Boko Haram would likely form the de facto government in certain areas, akin to the Islamic Courts Union and later al-Shabaab in Somalia. On the other hand, if the government manages to crackdown successfully, or otherwise sap the strength of the insurgency through political and economic policy, the social movement that remains will likely resemble the political-religious pressure group that it once was. This process reflects the final two stages in the post-Maoist life-cycle: the collapse of the struggle and a return to social movement whether as a (governing) political party or a grassroots pressure group. Once it has been determined what stage a post-Maoist insurgency has reached in its life-cycle, particular policy recommendations can be made. During phase one, the state cannot realistically direct policy at any one group, as there could easily be many hundreds of proto-insurgencies in existence at any one time. Instead a general strategy for countering radicalisation at the community

26

In July 2009 a brutal crackdown by the Nigerian military and extra-judicial killings of sect members (including the leader and founder Mohammed Yusuf) provided Boko Haram with a POTD event which they duly exploited, leading to their re-emergence as a fully-fledged insurgency in 2010. 27 In January 2012 Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan declared an indefinite state of emergency in the worst affected states. Later that month a Boko Haram rampage in the northern city of Kano left at least 185 police and residents dead the deadliest attack to date. 28 Patrick Meehan & Jackie Speier: Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland, (US Gov, 2011) p.28

level is needed. This is exactly what the PREVENT workstream of the UKs CONTEST strategy is intended to do. It has three main objectives: 1) Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face from those who promote it; 2) Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support; and 3) Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation which we need to address.29 Although PREVENT claims to be exclusively dedicated to counter-terrorism it is actually more broadly focused on countering the subversive message of post-Maoist globalised insurgency. In essence, Prevent is the UKs own attempt to influence the aforementioned OODA loop. For instance, challenging the Al-Qaeda narrative of a western war on Islam interrupts the subversive effect of POTD between the Observe and Orient stages. One way of challenging the AQ narrative is better promotion of Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and Department For International Development (DFID) work making the point that, far from being at war with Islam...[the UK is] making great efforts to address deprivation, human rights issues and governance in Muslim-majority countries.30 Concurrently, by working with sectors of society where there are risks of radicalisation (e.g. faith groups) and identifying those who are at risk of or who are undergoing a radicalisation process, Prevent aims to interdict the OODA loop between the Decide and Act stage. For example, Andrew Ibrahim was jailed in July 2009 for plotting to blow up a shopping centre in Bristol...after members of the Muslim community who had attended a workshop on Prevent raised concerns about him to the police.31 During phase two, the state can direct policy more specifically. Scalpel-like operations to remove key activists driving the movement forward are crucial. This is essentially the kind of operation that the UKs PURSUE workstream is intended to organise. In order to achieve this, the majority of work under Pursue focuses on the investigation of insurgent organisations and accordingly significant intelligence gathering and processing. Frank Kitson is widely recognised as the first theorist emphasise the place of intelligence at the centre of counterinsurgency operations. He clearly articulated three main points: (i) have an effective domestic intelligence organisation in place at all times; (ii) in the case of expeditionary (proxy) counterinsurgency, for one to be set up as quickly as possible; (iii) For intelligence efforts to be carefully coordinated.32 Pursue is a coordinating strategy for the domestic operation. However, there remains some distance between intelligence operations carried out in Afghanistan and in the UK. It is fair to say that there is an inverse correlation between the availability of actionable intelligence and the use of sweep operations. Those militaries that do not have extensive intelligence networks and good analytical capabilities frequently find themselves using force or disruptive techniques in all directions, rather than on a precise target.

29 30

HM Government: Prevent Strategy, (TSO, 2011) p.7 Ibid. p.48 31 Ibid. p.56 32 See Frank Kitson: Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping, (Faber and Faber, 1971) p.71-77

By phase three, something has already gone badly wrong with the states counterinsurgent strategy. It has probably failed to adequately respond to stresses on the involved populations, including economics, demographics, and ethnic/religious tensions. Furthermore, Intelligence has been ineffective in identifying insurgent organisations and interdicting their subversive message. Consequently the insurgency has grown to the stage where it now challenges the states monopoly in certain policy areas perhaps most obviously the states monopoly of violence. Generally the state should mirror the level of violence exhibited by the insurgents. As recent history has shown violent crackdowns are rarely little more than a futile sweeping under the carpet exercise with the insurgency reasserting itself in due course. The expeditionary counter-insurgent operations of the so-called war on terror had a similar effect. Regardless of whether Iraq and Afghanistan eventually become stable democracies free of terrorist training camps, the process has been undeniably painful and has arguably been unintentionally counter-productive by generating a regular flow of POTD events for the insurgent to exploit. Instead of attempting to leverage its traditional strength of overwhelming military might, the state should endeavour to take on insurgents at their own game. While states cannot use POTD, they can form small, specialised units to counter corresponding insurgent cells. If the campaign is kinetic, the use of Special Forces for targeted killing is an effective, relatively cost-effective military strategy that...enjoys a proven record of success.33 Interdicting supply networks (e.g. arms caches, bomb-factories) is another nonrepressive strategy which is absolutely crucial for taking the momentum out of an insurgent campaign. In the case of a non-kinetic campaign, such as a sustained cyber-insurgency, where the use of violence would clearly be unacceptable, the same principles still apply except in a criminaljustice framework, for example the raids directed against the hacktivist group Anonymous by the FBI in July 2011.34 However, by phase three radical shifts in political and economic policy are usually required to ease underlying causes before the insurgency will truly wane. Even if the state implements a successful kinetic campaign and the insurgents coercive power collapses, the counter-insurgent cannot relax as steps will need to be taken to ensure the problem does not reassert itself. An open stream of dialogue with the insurgency is preferable in order to understand the insurgencies objectives and to identify any space that may exist for negotiations. After all, insurgency is a political problem and thus requires political solutions. This essay has argued that the current array of contested terms that claim to define post-Maoist insurgency may shed some light on its character but are unhelpful as a guide for executing a counter strategy. This is primarily because current academic definitions are exceptionally broad, which dilutes their usefulness. It is therefore recommended that there should be a phased model comparable to Gualalas widely respected counter-Maoist theory. This approach divides up a complicated phenomenon, making it easier to prescribe and apply policy, according to what stage the post-Maoist insurgency has reached in its life-cycle. Further, this essay acknowledges that insurgency will not stop here. Insurgencies are clearly continuing to evolve as the irregularities of the Arab Spring and ensuing debate demonstrate. While some may be tempted to try and de-lineate insurgency, revolt, protest and such this is unhelpful in the long run. It must be remembered that

33 34

Danny Steed: Is There a Future For Targeted Killing? In Infinity Journal 2:1, (Winter 2011) p.19 Kevin Poulsen: In Anonymous Raids, Feds Work From List of Top 1000 Protestors, (Wired, 26/7/11)

insurgency is a full spectrum of political conflict (see Fig.2) and thus it is more sensible to husband our existing knowledge, to build on it and be more alive to the notion that insurgent energy [can] take on many forms and arise in any society.35 It is argued that the phased life-cycle approach provides a useful conceptual starting point for implementing the specific counterinsurgent framework recommended in the relevant doctrine. Ongoing and future research along these lines, such as that currently being undertaken at the Johns Hopkins University may enable accurate forecasting of insurgent evolution in the future: By looking for possible trends, we intend to accomplish two things. First, we hope to be able to quickly recognise changing conditions that indicate the movement might be headed down a particular path...Second, by forecasting particular future paths of organisation, recruitment methods, technology, TTPs, [Tactics, Techniques, Procedures] etc., we can assess whether the analytical methods we are currently pursuing will be relevant, or can be tailored, to those new conditions. We wish to know whether our analytical toolkit can pace the movements evolution.36

Figure 2 - The Spectrum of Post-Maoist Insurgency

Post-Maoist Insurgency Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4 Phase 5

Political Pressure Group Protest Terrorism (POTD) Order (state)-collapse/reform Social movement Religious Cult Unrest Proto-insurgency Guerrilla Strikes Civil-War Coup dtat Other Social Movement Civil-Disobedience Uprising/Revolt Mutiny Revolution Government Political Party

35 36

John Mackinlay: op. cit. p.3 Chuck Crossett & Ronald Buikema: Analysis of Social Movements in Warfare in Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 30:1 (2011) p.11

Bibliography Books: John Mackinlay: The Insurgent Archipelago, (Hurst & Co. 2009) Mao Tse-tung: On Protracted War, in Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, Vol. II (Foreign Languages Press, 1967) David Galula: Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (Praeger Security International, 2006) Athina Karatzogianni & Andrew Robinson: Power, Resistance and Conflict in the Contemporary World: Social movements, networks and hierarchies, (Routledge, 2010) Neville Bolt: The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda and the New Revolutionaries, (Hurst & Co. 2012) Marc Sageman: Understanding Terror Networks, (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004) Frank Kitson: Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-keeping, (Faber and Faber, 1971)

Journal Articles, Research Papers & Government Documents: US Army & Marine Corps: Counterinsurgency Field Manual, (University of Chicago Press, 2007) Daniel Byman: Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, (RAND, 2007) Steve Mansfield-Devine: Hacktivism: assessing the damage, in Network Security, (August 2011) Aviram Jenik: Cyberwar in Estonia and the Middle East, in Network Security, (April 2009) Bruce Hoffman & Jennifer Taw: The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to US Army Operations, (RAND, 1994) Neville Bolt, David Betz & Jaz Azari: Propaganda of the Deed 2008: Understanding the Phenomenon, (RUSI, 2008) Lauren OBrien: The Evolution of Terrorism Since 9/11, in FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (Sept. 2011) Jerome Bjelopera: American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, (Congressional Research Service, 2011) Habibul Haque Khondker: Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring, in Globalizations, 8:5 (Routledge, 2011) Daniel Kimmage & Kathleen Ridolfo: Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War of Images and Ideas, (RFE/RL, 2007) Patrick Meehan & Jackie Speier: Boko Haram: Emerging Threat to the US Homeland, (US Gov, 2011) HM Government: Prevent Strategy, (TSO, 2011) Danny Steed: Is There a Future For Targeted Killing? In Infinity Journal 2:1, (Winter 2011) Chuck Crossett & Ronald Buikema: Analysis of Social Movements in Warfare in Johns Hopkins APL Technical Digest 30:1 (2011)

Web Resources: Cahal Milmo & Kim Sengupta: Rebels claim the victory but did the Brits win it? (The Independent, 23/8/11) available online: http://ind.pn/qthvWH Kevin Poulsen: In Anonymous Raids, Feds Work From List of Top 1000 Protestors, (Wired, 26/7/11) available online: http://bit.ly/qZLykX