STATE OF MICHIGAN BEFORE THE JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION COMPLAINT AGAINST: HON. SYLVIA A.

JAMES Judge, 22nd District Court 27331 S. River Park Drive Inkster, MI 48141 _______________________/ Formal Complaint No. 88

DECISION AND RECOMMENDATION FOR DISCIPLINE

At a session of the Michigan Judicial Tenure Commission held on June 11, 2012, in the City of Detroit PRESENT: Thomas J. Ryan, Esq., Chairperson Hon. Nanci J. Grant, Vice-Chairperson Hon. David H. Sawyer, Secretary Hon. Jeanne Stempien Hon. John D. Hamilton Hon. Pablo Cortes Brenda L. Lawrence David T. Fischer I. Introduction The Judicial Tenure Commission of the State of Michigan (Commission) files this recommendation for discipline against Hon. Sylvia A. James (Respondent), who at all material times was a judge of the 22nd District Court (the Court) in the City of Inkster, State of Michigan. This action is taken pursuant to the authority of the Commission under Article 6, 30 of the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, and MCR 9.203.
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On April 23, 2012, the Commission received findings of fact and conclusions of law from the Master appointed by the Supreme Court to hear evidence in this matter. Having reviewed relevant portions of the hearing transcript, the exhibits and the Masters report, and having considered the oral arguments of counsel, the Commission concludes, as did the Master, that the Examiner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent misappropriated funds in the Courts Community Service Program account, engaged the Court in improper banking and revenue practices, employed her niece in violation of an anti-nepotism policy, employed a magistrate with knowledge that he was unqualified for the position, made intentional misrepresentations in the course of her judicial duties, and made misleading statements to the Commission and the Master. For the reasons set forth herein, the Commission recommends that the Supreme Court remove Respondent from the office of judge of the 22nd District Court. Additionally, the Commission recommends that the Supreme Court order Respondent to pay costs, fees, and expenses in the amount of $81,181.88, pursuant to MCR 9.205(B), based on Respondents misleading statements made to the Commission and the Master.

II. Procedural Background Requests for investigation into possible judicial misconduct by Respondent were filed on February 18, 2011, April 14, 2011, and June 16, 2011. On April 13, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court placed Respondent on paid administrative leave. On October 26, 2011, the Commission filed Formal Complaint No. 88 against Respondent, a Petition for Interim Suspension, and a Request for Appointment of Master. On November 9, 2011, Respondent filed an Answer to the Formal Complaint and moved to disqualify the Michigan Supreme Court Justices from hearing the matter. On November 30, 2011, all seven Michigan Supreme Court Justices declined to disqualify themselves. On December 15, 2011, the Michigan Supreme Court appointed Hon. Ann Matson to hear the Complaint and granted the petition for interim suspension, ordering that Respondent be suspended with pay pending further order of the Court. A 27-day hearing on the Formal Complaint was held on various dates between January 23, 2012 and March 1, 2012. After the hearing, the Examiner filed an Amended Complaint alleging (1) financial improprieties, (2) employment improprieties, (3) administrative improprieties, and (4) misrepresentations. On April 23, 2012, the Master issued her findings of fact and conclusions of law. On May 7, 2012, the Examiner filed a petition asking the Commission to adopt the Masters findings of fact and conclusions of law. On the same day, Respondent

filed written objections to the Masters report. The Commission heard oral argument on the matter on May 14, 2012. III. Standard of Proof The standard of proof applicable in judicial disciplinary matters is the preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Ferrara, 458 Mich 350, 360; 582 NW2d 817 (1998). The Examiner bears the burden of proving the allegations in the Complaint. MCR 9.211(A). The Commission reviews the Masters findings de novo. In re Chrzanowski, 465 Mich 468, 480-481; 636 NW2d 758 (2001). Although the Commission is not required to accept to the Masters findings of fact, it may appropriately recognize and defer to the Masters superior ability to observe the witnesses demeanor and comment on their credibility. Cf. In re Lloyd, 424 Mich 514, 535; 384 NW2d 9 (1986). IV. Findings of Fact The Commission concludes, as did the Master, that the Examiner has established by a preponderance of the evidence a factual basis for the allegations set forth in Count I A, B, and C, Count II A and C, Count III C, and Count IV of the Amended Complaint. Although we adopt the Masters findings in their entiretywith the exception of the Masters finding that Respondent misrepresented whether any food purchased with CSP funds was ever taken to her

homewe highlight the following findings, which provide the basis for our conclusion regarding the appropriate sanction. A. Respondent misappropriated funds from the Courts Community Service Program account 1. Respondent improperly authorized checks from the Community Service Program account to charitable, educational and fraternal organizations for the purpose of self-promotion.

In 1989 or 1990, the Court implemented a Community Service Program (CSP) as an alternative to incarceration for non-violent offenders. Offenders

accepted into the program performed community service throughout the City of Inkster. The CSP was funded by oversight fees paid to the Court by the offenders accepted into the program in addition to any other fines, fees, and costs imposed on them. Before 2006, the City of Inkster maintained the CSP account and issued checks from the account requested by the Court. Beginning in 2006, after a dispute with the City during which the City refused to issue certain checks requested by Respondent on the ground that the expenditures were an improper use of public funds, the Court took over the CSP account and began issuing its own checks from the account. There was evidence that the only proper use of the CSP oversight fees was to pay the operational costs of the CSP, such as equipment, transportation, and supervision costs. There was other evidence that payments from the account to non-profit organizations were not allowed unless they were
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approved by the funding unit in advance and furthered a specific public purpose that could be measured, with the results being reported back to the funding unit. Since the Court took over management of the CSP account, Respondent improperly authorized the issuance of 25 checks from the CSP account, totaling more than $14,000.00, to local charitable, educational, and fraternal organizations chosen by Respondent. The evidence showed instances in which Respondent personally was solicited for a charitable contribution, and responded with a check from the CSP account, rather than her own personal funds. Specifically, the Master found that [t]he facts show that Respondent received many requests for charitable contributions and that rather than responding with checks from her personal accounts, she authorized checks from the CSP account which was in effect her own publicly funded private foundation. These checks were not used for CSP operational expenses and the organizations that received the funds had no direct relationship to the CSP. The expenditures were not approved by the funding unit in advance and there was no attempt to measure any benefit received by the public from the expenditures. Most of the checks were used to purchase advertisements in charitable event program booklets. The advertisements prominently featured Respondents name,

photograph, and title, made only a brief reference to the CSP, and appeared to be political advertisements. Other checks from the CSP account were used to
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purchase high school cheerleader uniforms, to purchase police auxiliary equipment, and to fund a picnic.1 None of these expenses was related to the operation of the CSP. 2. Respondent improperly authorized checks from the CSP account to pay for travel to two National Association of Drug Court conferences.

The City of Inkster allocated money in its budget for judicial seminar and conference expenses. Rather than requesting funds from the City, Respondent improperly authorized the issuance of checks from the CSP account to pay for her and other court employees to travel to the 2009 NADCP conference in Anaheim, California, and to the 2010 NADCP conference in Boston, Massachusetts. The travel expenses were not operational expenses of the CSP. Furthermore, the

checks were issued to the conference attendees in advance of the trips, in the amount of travel expenses estimated by Respondent before the trips, rather than

The Master found, and we agree, that Respondent also misappropriated funds from the CSP account to fund the Courts annual Law Day event for local students. While the Law Day expenses, which totaled $3,353.78, may have been appropriate court expenditures, the Law Day event was unrelated to the CSP and expenses for the event should not have been taken from the CSP account, but should have been part of the Courts approved general fund budget. The Master further found that Respondent improperly authorized the use of funds from the CSP account to purchase copy paper for a court newsletter where only a small portion of the last page of the newsletter mentioned the CSP, and to purchase flowers for the funeral of a court employees relative.

actual expenses. Respondent did not require the court employees to maintain records of actual travel expenses, and she did not maintain such records herself. Respondent did not require the employees to reimburse the CSP account if their actual expenses were less than the expenses estimated before the trips. Although Respondent testified that she would have reimbursed the CSP account if her actual travel expenses ever were less than those advanced to her before a trip, the evidence showed that Respondent accepted a $349.40 check from the CSP account for an airline ticket to the Boston NADCP conference, which she chose to purchase with frequent flier miles and for which she only paid $7.50 out-of-pocket. Respondent did not reimburse the CSP account the difference between the $349.40 advancement of funds and her actual $7.50 expense. 3. Respondent failed to allocate fees received by the Court from CSP participants as required by statute.

The Master found, and we agree, that the oversight fees paid to the Court by the CSP participants were public funds subject to MCL 775.22 and MCL 780.766a, which set forth the manner in which money collected by a court from criminal defendants for fines, fees, and costs is to be allocated by the court receiving the payments.2 For example, if a person is subject to any combination of fines, costs, restitution, fees, or other payments arising out of the same criminal proceeding,

Respondent admitted at the formal hearing, and Respondents attorney agreed at oral argument on May 14, 2012, that the funds in the CSP account were public funds.
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50% of any money collected by the court from that person must first be applied to victim payments. In a case involving a violation of state law, the balance of the payment must then be applied first to minimum state costs, other costs, fines, parole or probation supervision fees, and then to assessments and other payments. See MCL 775.22 and MCL 780.766a. The Courts Judicial Information System (JIS) is programmed to apply payments in the correct priority automatically. Judge Valdemar Washington, who was appointed as the interim judge of the 22nd District Court when Respondent was placed on administrative leave, testified that payments were not being allocated according to statute when he arrived at the Court. The evidence showed that Respondent directed Court staff to force the JIS to allocate payments received from CSP defendants to the CSP oversight fees first, rather than to allow the JIS to allocate the payments as required by statute. This practice resulted in an inflated balance in the CSP account, which was then used to fund the improper expenditures referenced above. B. Respondent engaged in improper banking and revenue practices

Respondent violated statutes and SCAO policy by withholding from the City of Inkster money collected by the Court for fines, fees, and costs. A court is merely a pass-through for the money it collects from the public in the form of fines, fees, and costs. The court revenue disbursement process is governed by
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statute. MCL 600.4803, MCL 600.8379, and MCL 600.8381. In addition, the Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Reference Guide requires that [c]ollections should be transmitted to the local funding unit within 10 business days following the end of the month, unless some other agreement has been made between the local funding unit and the court. Respondent failed to comply with the relevant statutes and the Supreme Court Administrative Reference Guide by failing to transmit money collected by the Court to the funding unit in a timely manner from August, 2010 through January, 2011. Although Respondent claimed that the Court retained the money because the Court intended to begin paying its own bills, the Master found that the Court never took any steps to establish its own bill-paying system. The Courts failure to timely transmit Courts revenue to the City violated MCL 600.4803, MCL 600.8379 and MCL 600.8381. In addition, Respondent improperly withheld from the City of Inkster money received by the Court for fees, fines, and/or costs to fund a petty cash account at the Court. The Court used the account for incidental expenses such as stamps and juror refreshments. The Court funded the petty cash account with money paid to the Court by the public for fines, fees, and/or costs.3 Funds collected by a court for

Former Court Administrator Pamela Anderson explained how the petty cash account was funded. She testified that, if a person paid a fine with a check, and the check was returned for non-sufficient funds, the court clerk would deduct the amount of the check from the Courts receipts. When the person returned to the
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fees, fines, and/or costs were required to be allocated according to statute. Furthermore, the Court did not have an agreement with the City permitting the withholding of the funds. Again, the Courts withholding of revenue from the City violated MCL 600.4803, MCL 600.8379, and MCL 600.8381. C. Respondent engaged in employment improprieties
1.

Respondent employed her niece Administrative Order 1996-11.

in

violation

of

Respondents niece began working for the Court in July, 1989, as a probation clerk/deputy clerk. In December, 1996, the Michigan Supreme Court implemented Administrative Order 1996-11, an anti-nepotism policy for all Michigan courts. The policy provided that [r]elatives of justices, judges or court administrators shall not be employed within the same court or judicial entity. The policy did not apply to those already working for the courts. In October, 2008, Respondents niece resigned from the Court and moved to another state. Six months later, in April, 2010, Respondents niece returned to Michigan and Respondent rehired her as a criminal clerk and community service coordinator. Respondent violated AO 1996-11 by rehiring her niece as a Court employee in April, 2009.

Court to pay the fine in cash, the cash was placed in the petty cash account, rather than transmitted to the City.

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2.

Respondent improperly employed Jeffrey Bowdich as a magistrate.

MCL 600.8501 requires that a person shall not be appointed magistrate unless that person is a registered elector in the district for which the person was appointed. In December, 2002, Respondent submitted a local administrative order (LAO) appointing Jeffrey Bowdich as magistrate. Jeffrey Bowdich was never a qualified elector in the City of Inkster and was therefore unqualified for the position. At the formal hearing, Respondent testified that she believed Jeffrey Bowdich was a registered elector in the City of Inkster when she submitted the LAO because he had given her a letter indicating that he was a registered elector. Jeffrey Bowdich denied ever giving Respondent such a letter and testified that he was never a registered elector in the City of Inkster. The Master specifically found that Jeffrey Bowdichs testimony regarding this issue was credible and that Respondents testimony was not. We defer to the Masters superior ability to observe the witnesses demeanors and to determine their credibility, In re Lloyd, 424 Mich 514, 535; 384 NW2d 9 (1986), and therefore accept the Masters finding that Respondent committed an employment impropriety by employing Jeffrey Bowdich as magistrate in violation of MCL 600.8501. Respondent committed a further employment impropriety by directing Jeffrey Bowdich to sign bench warrants as part of his duties as magistrate. While MCL 600.8511 authorizes a magistrate to sign arrest warrants, a magistrate is not
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authorized to sign bench warrants. As a result of the unauthorized signatures, approximately15,000 bench warrants had to be reissued when Jeffrey Bowdich was terminated in April, 2011. D. Respondent made misleading statements to the Commission and the Master, and made other intentional misrepresentations.

The Master found that Respondent made a number of misrepresentations to the Commission and to the Master, as well as other intentional misrepresentations. We agree with the Masters findings regarding the following misrepresentations: Respondent falsely stated in her Answer to the Commission dated August 1, 2011, that she derived no benefit and/or no direct benefit from the issuance of the checks from the CSP account to charitable, fraternal, and educational organizations. Where Respondents name, photograph, and title were prominently displayed in the advertisements purchased with some of the funds, it cannot be disputed that Respondent benefitted from the advertisements in terms of name recognition and/or goodwill. Respondent similarly benefitted from the other

payments made to charitable, educational, and fraternal organizations. Respondent falsely testified at the formal hearing that an airline ticket between Detroit and San Francisco purchased with court funds became worthless after she was forced to make three changes to the ticket and to pay penalties for the changes. A Delta Airlines representative, Ines Nagy, who reviewed the flight records relating to the ticket, testified that the ticket from Detroit to San Francisco
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was exchanged for a round-trip ticket between Detroit and Atlanta, which was used by Respondent on May 8, 2011, and July 7, 2011. Ms. Nagy testified that the original ticket from Detroit to San Francisco had a price of $350.10, that a $150.00 change penalty was deducted from the ticket, and that the remaining $200.00 value of the ticket was applied to the round-trip Detroit-Atlanta ticket, reducing the $249.40 price of the Detroit-Atlanta ticket to approximately $49.00. Respondent submitted a conference request form indicating that the cost of her airline ticket to the 2010 NADCP conference in Boston was $349.40. The evidence showed that Respondent paid only $7.50 for the ticket because she chose to use frequent flier miles to purchase the ticket. Respondent accepted a check from the CSP account in the amount of $349.40 and did not reimburse the account for the difference between the actual cost of the ticket and the amount she received from the CSP account. Respondent misrepresented the actual cost of the ticket on the conference request form. Respondent falsely stated in her Answer to the Formal Complaint that she was not put on notice that the Court was required to prepare a budget for the CSP account. Respondent testified that she was aware of a 2007 audit report prepared by Darnell & Meyering, and that she had read the report. The Darnell & Meyering report stated that the state budgeting act required a budget for all general and special revenue funds. Respondent testified that she was aware of the audit
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report and that she had read it. Respondent, therefore, was put on notice that a budget was required for the CSP account. Respondent falsely testified that if her court-related travel expenses were ever less than the estimated travel expenses advanced to her, she would have taken appropriate action. It was undisputed, however, that Respondent accepted a check from the CSP account in the amount of $349.40 for an airline ticket for which she actually paid only $7.50, and that Respondent did not reimburse the CSP account for the difference between the estimated airfare and her actual out-of-pocket expense. Respondent represented in LAO 2002-5 that Jeffrey Bowdich was a registered elector in the City of Inkster and, therefore, qualified for a magistrate position. Respondent testified at the formal hearing that this representation was made on the basis of a letter Mr. Bowdich gave her in 2002, in which he stated that he was a registered elector. Mr. Bowdich testified that he never gave Respondent such a letter, that he did not know that he was required to be a registered elector to qualify for the magistrate position, and that he never was a registered elector. The Master specifically found that Jeffrey Bowdichs testimony regarding this issue was credible and that Respondents testimony was not.

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V. Conclusions of Law A. The Legal Basis for the Imposition of Discipline

With respect to Count I A, B, and C, Count II A and C, Count III C, and Count IV of the Amended Complaint, the Commission adopts and incorporates the conclusions of law set forth in the Masters report. The facts asserted in the Amended Complaint, and established at the public hearing in this matter, show by a preponderance of the evidence that Respondent breached the standards of judicial conduct and is responsible for all of the following: Conduct clearly prejudicial to the administration of justice, as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended, Article VI, 30 and in violation of MCR 9.205 (as to Counts I and II);

Conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, in violation of MCR 9.104(1) (as to Counts II and III). Failure to establish, maintain, enforce and personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved, contrary to the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct (MCJC), Canon 1 (as to Count I); Irresponsible or improper conduct which erodes public confidence in the judiciary, in violation of MCJC, Canon 2A (as to Count I); Conduct involving impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, which erodes public confidence in the judiciary, in violation of MCJC, Canon 2A (as to Counts I and II); Failure to respect and observe the law and to conduct herself at all times in a manner which would enhance the publics confidence in

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the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary contrary to MCJC, Canon 2B (as to Counts I and II); Conduct in violation of MCJC, Canon 2C that a judge should not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (as to Count I); Using the prestige of office to advance personal business interests or those of others contrary to MCJC, Canon 2C (as to Counts I and II); Failure to be faithful to the law, contrary to MCJC, Canon 3A(1) (as to Count I);

Enforcing an overly restrictive dress attire policy in violation of Canon 3A(2) (as to Count III). Failure to diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, contrary to Canon 3B(1) (as to Counts I, II and III). Violating MCL 600.4803 (disposition of late penalty paid to court) and MCL 600.8379 (disposition of fines and costs assessed in district court) (as to Count I). Violating MCL 750.174 (embezzlement by agent) and MCL 750.175 (embezzlement by public officer) (as to Count I).

Violating MCL 750.218 (false pretenses) (as to Count I). Violating MCL 775.22 (allocation of money collected by court) and MCL 780.766a (allocation of money collected by court) (as to Count I). Failure to limit expense reimbursement to the actual cost of travel, contrary to Canon 6B (as to Count I). Conduct that exposes the legal profession or courts to obloquy, contempt, censure or reproach, in violation of MCR 9.104(A)(2) (as to Count I );

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Lack of personal responsibility for her own behavior and for the proper conduct in the administration of justice which she presides contrary to MCR 9.205(A) (as to Counts I and II);

Violating MCL 600.8501 and MCL 600.8507 (magistrate qualifications) (as to Count II). Violating MCL 750.249 (uttering and publishing a public record) (as to Count II). Violating Administrative Order 1996-11 (as to Count II). Failure to cooperate with a reasonable request made by the Commission in its investigation of a judge, in violation of MCR 9.205(B)(1) (as to Count IV). Failure to comply with a reasonable request made by the Commission in its investigation (as to Count IV). For all of these reasons, we find that Respondent committed misconduct in office as defined by the Michigan Constitution of 1963, as amended Article VI, 30 and MCR 9.205. VI. Disciplinary Analysis A. The Brown Factors

The Michigan Supreme Court set forth the criteria for assessing proposed sanctions in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291, 1292-1293; 625 NW2d 744 (1999). A discussion of the relevant factors follows. (1) Misconduct that is part of a pattern or practice is more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct.

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Respondents conduct was part of a pervasive pattern of numerous breaches of the canons of judicial conduct. Respondents pattern of misappropriating public funds extended over years, even after Respondent was put on notice that she was authorizing improper expenditures. Respondent engaged in improper hiring

practices, withheld money from the City, and made intentional misrepresentations to achieve her ends. The evidence showed a pattern of willfully and blatantly disregarding the law in the administration of the Courts affairs. This pattern of misconduct is much more serious than an isolated instance of misconduct. This factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a more severe sanction. (2) Misconduct on the bench is usually more serious than the same misconduct off the bench.

The evidence did not show that Respondent engaged in misconduct on the bench. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of a more severe sanction. (3) Misconduct that is prejudicial to the actual administration of justice is more serious than misconduct that is prejudicial only to the appearance of propriety.

The CSP was an alternative to incarceration and, therefore, was part of the administration of justice. The evidence showed that Respondents

misappropriation of funds from the CSP account deprived the CSP of money intended to fund the program itself. Furthermore, Respondents overriding of the JIS was prejudicial to the administration of justice because it resulted in the

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misapplication of funds intended for crime victims and other city and state priorities. This factor therefore weighs in favor of a more serious sanction.

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(4)

Misconduct that does not implicate the actual administration of justice, or its appearance of impropriety, is less serious than misconduct that does.

The evidence clearly showed misconduct that implicated the appearance of impropriety. Respondents own lack of respect for the law and willingness to misrepresent facts to achieve her own ends erodes the publics confidence in her and in the judiciary as a whole. Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of a more severe sanction. (5) Misconduct that occurs spontaneously is less serious than misconduct that is premeditated or deliberated.

Respondents misconduct was pervasive and repeated, and in some cases resulted in a direct benefit to herself. Therefore, it cannot be described as spontaneous. The evidence showed that Respondent continued to authorize improper expenditures from the CSP account even after having been put on notice that such expenditures were improper uses of public funds. Respondent made a deliberate choice to violate the law in many instances. Further, she intentionally misrepresented facts, both before and after these proceedings commenced, for her own purposes. Accordingly, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the imposition of a more severe sanction.

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(6)

Misconduct that undermines the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case, is more serious than misconduct that merely delays such discovery.

The evidence did not show that Respondent engaged in misconduct that undermined the ability of the justice system to discover the truth of what occurred in a legal controversy, or to reach the most just result in such a case. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of the imposition of a more severe sanction. (7) Misconduct that involves the unequal application of justice on the basis of such considerations as race, color, ethnic background, gender, or religion are more serious than breaches of justice that do not disparage the integrity of the system on the basis of a class of citizenship.

The evidence does not show that Respondents actions caused the unequal application of justice on the basis of a class of citizenship. Accordingly, this factor, alone, does not weigh in favor of a more severe sanction. In sum, our consideration of the totality of all seven Brown factors weighs in support of the imposition of a more severe sanction. B. The Basis for the Level of Discipline and Proportionality

In determining an appropriate sanction in this matter, the Commission is mindful of the Michigan Supreme Courts call for proportionality based on comparable conduct. Based on the facts, the Commission believes that removal

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from office is an appropriate and proportional sanction for Respondents misconduct. The primary concern in determining an appropriate sanction is to restore and maintain the dignity and impartiality of the judiciary and protect the public. In re Ferrara, supra at 372. Respondents disregard of, and disrespect for, the law is incompatible with a judges duty to uphold the law. In re Justin, 490 Mich 394, 424-425; 809 NW2d 126 (2012). The fact that certain charitable groups chosen by Respondent may have benefitted from Respondents misconduct does nothing to erase the damage her misconduct caused to the judiciary and to the public as a whole. Respondents prolonged and repeated pattern of misconduct in

purposefully violating statutes, misappropriating public funds, and making intentional misrepresentations both before and after these proceedings commenced render her unfit to sit as a judge. VIII. Assessment of Costs, Fees, and Expenses As noted, the Commission finds that Respondent made intentional misrepresentations as well as misleading statements to the Commission and the Master. Accordingly, the Commission requests that Respondent be ordered to pay the costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the Commission in prosecuting the complaint. See MCR 9.205(B). The Examiner has submitted an affidavit showing costs, fees, and expenses incurred by the Commission in the amount of $81,181.88.
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Therefore, the Commission requests an assessment of costs, fees, and expenses in the total amount of $81,181.88. IX. Conclusion and Recommendation The Commission concludes that Respondent committed judicial misconduct. Based on the nature and pervasiveness of the misconduct, the Commission recommends that Respondent be removed from office and that Respondent be ordered to pay an assessment of costs, fees, and expenses in the total amount of $81,181.88.

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JUDICIAL TENURE COMMISSION

___________________________ THOMAS J. RYAN, ESQ. Chairperson

___________________________ HON. NANCI J. GRANT Vice-Chairperson

___________________________ HON. DAVID H. SAWYER Secretary

___________________________ HON. JEANNE STEMPIEN

___________________________ HON. JOHN D. HAMILTON

___________________________ HON. PABLO CORTES

___________________________ BRENDA L. LAWRENCE

___________________________ DAVID T. FISCHER

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