Jiabs 33-1,2 2010

JIABS
Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)
The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies (ISSN 0193-600XX) is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. As a peer-reviewed journal, it welcomes scholarly contributions pertaining to all facets of Buddhist Studies. JIABS is published twice yearly. As announced at the XVIth IABS Congress in Taiwan, the JIABS is now available online in open access at http://archiv. ub.uni-heidelberg.de/ojs/index.php/jiabs/ index. Articles become available online for free 60 months after their appearance in print. Current articles are not accessible online. Subscribers can choose between receiving new issues in print or as PDF. We are kindly requesting all authors that could be opposed to this decision to inform the Editors by June 2012. Manuscripts should preferably be submitted as e-mail attachments to: editors@iabsinfo.net as one single file, complete with footnotes and references, in two different formats: in PDF-format, and in Rich-Text-Format (RTF) or OpenDocument-Format (created e.g. by Open Office). Address books for review to: JIABS Editors, Institut fr Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens, Apostelgasse 23, A-1030 Wien, AUSTRIA Address subscription orders and dues, changes of address, and business correspondence (including advertising orders) to: Dr Jrme Ducor, IABS Treasurer Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures Anthropole University of Lausanne CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland email: iabs.treasurer@unil.ch Web: http://www.iabsinfo.net Fax: +41 21 692 29 35 Subscriptions to JIABS are USD 55 per year for individuals and USD 90 per year for libraries and other institutions. For informations on membership in IABS, see back cover.
EDITORIAL BOARD
KELLNER Birgit KRASSER Helmut Joint Editors BUSWELL Robert CHEN Jinhua COLLINS Steven COX Collet GMEZ Luis O. HARRISON Paul VON HINBER Oskar JACKSON Roger JAINI Padmanabh S. KATSURA Shry KUO Li-ying LOPEZ, Jr. Donald S. MACDONALD Alexander SCHERRER-SCHAUB Cristina SEYFORT RUEGG David SHARF Robert STEINKELLNER Ernst TILLEMANS Tom
Cover: Cristina Scherrer-Schaub Font: Gandhari Unicode designed by Andrew Glass (http:// andrewglass.org/fonts.php) Copyright 2011 by the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc. Print: Ferdinand Berger & Shne GesmbH, A-3580 Horn
JIABS
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies
Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)
Articles William Chu The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (13681643) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vincent EltsChingEr Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part II
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5 27
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Richard F. nanCE Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth On the privileged lie in Indian Buddhist literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexander WynnE The tman and its negation A conceptual and chronologi cal analysis of early Buddhist thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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75
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103
Contents
Indian Buddhist metaethics

Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 2328 June 2008
Guest editor: Martin T. Adam
Peter harvEy An analysis of factors related to the kusala/akusala quality of actions in the Pli tradition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Abraham vlEz dE CEa Value pluralism in early Buddhist ethics .
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175 211
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Martin T. adam No self, no free will, no problem Implications of the Anatta lakkhaa Sutta for a perennial philosophical issue . . . . . . . . Bronwyn Finnigan Buddhist metaethics .
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239 267 299
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Stephen JEnkins On the auspiciousness of compassionate violence
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Jay L. garFiEld What is it like to be a bodhisattva? Moral phenomenology in ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tom J. F. tillEmans Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics
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333 359
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Contents
Miracles and superhuman powers in South and Southeast Asian Buddhist traditions
Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Atlanta, 2328 June 2008
Guest editor: David V. Fiordalis
David V. Fiordalis Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine
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381 409
Bradley S. Clough The higher knowledges in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya.
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Kristin sChEiblE Priming the lamp of dhamma The Buddhas miracles in the Pli Mahvasa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Patrick PrankE On saints and wizards Ideals of human perfection and power in contemporary Burmese Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . Rachelle M. sCott Buddhism, miraculous powers, and gender Rethinking the stories of Theravda nuns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Luis O. gmEz On Buddhist wonders and wonder-working . Notes on the contributors
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489 513
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The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643)

William Chu
Before proceeding to the main thesis of my paper, I need to review some well known facts about Buddhist-Confucian dynamics in the late imperial era. The rationalist Song Neo-Confucians known traditionally as the Cheng-Zhu school (; after the Cheng brothers Cheng Hao 10321085 and Cheng Yi 10331107, and Zhu Xi 11301200) had asserted the exclusive orthodoxy of their tradition. They repudiated all Confucians who professed syncretistic interest or sympathies toward Buddhism and Daoism, and highlighted the doctrinal incompatibilities between Confucianism and other heretical religions (yiduan ). To Zhu Xi in particular, Buddhism was irredeemably at odds with the Confucian sagely lineage. Zhus staunchly purist stance was targeted at those Confucians who heartily professed dual allegiances to both religions. Another group of Confucians, in contrast, headed by Lu Jiuyuan (11391193), that eventually rose to become Zhus major rival for Confucian orthodoxy, also harbored deep reservations about Buddhism and reiterated the need to vigilantly fend off the latters spiritual allure. But despite Lu Jiuyuans self-proclaimed loyalty to Confucianism, followers of Zhus school often branded Lu an apostate, one who was secretly a sympathizer of Buddhism and, in fact, cherished a much buddhicized interpretation of Confucianism. In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yangming (14721529) relented on Confucian exclusivism. Although still upholding the supreme status of Confucianism, Wang saw that the Buddhist training was not diametrical to Confucian enlightenment and could in fact serve as a stepping stone. His unapologetic use of Buddhist
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jargons earned him infamy among his Confucian colleagues, who jeeringly referred to him as the de facto successor to the Chan of the Five dynasties, and as one who reverently upheld the teachings of Bodhidharma and Huineng.1 Such accusations were not completely baseless, for Wangs teachings were often direct paraphrase of the words of legendary Buddhist Chan patriarchs, as the following demonstrates:2
The innate conscience knows right from wrong; the innate conscience is also neither of right or wrong. Knowing right from wrong is what constitutes propriety, while being oblivious to (unbounded by) right and wrong and thereby realizing the marvelous, is [what defines] the so-called enlightenment. , . , . , .3
In this case, Wang Yangming summarized his understanding of Confucian morality in verses that were unmistakably appropriated from the Buddhist Platform stra. Compare what Wang said with what Hanshan Deqing (15461623 C.E.) the most prolific Buddhist writer in the Ming wrote, their similarity becomes apparent:
[People] do not know that the two opposite polarities of good and evil are in fact dualistic dharmas coming from the outside [of ones innate nature], and have nothing to do with the original essence of our selfnature. That is why those who do evil in the world could at times mend their ways and become good, and good people can also be converted to evils way. This is sufficient to prove that [worldly] virtues could not be stable or reliable. For that if one did not cultivate goodness all the way [to eventually consummate in enlightenment], what is apparently moral is really not ultimately moral. As for the presently expounded highest good, it constitutes enlightening and illuminating the veriCited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 181. Although Robert Sharf has argued that that the shared terminology of Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism might not have been due to deliberate borrowing (see Sharf 2001), in the case of Wang the assimilation of Buddhist ideas and terms was quite deliberate and self-consciously done, as would be made clear in this study. 3 Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 384.
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Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty
table essence of the self-nature, which is originally devoid of either good or evil. , , . , , . , , .4
We may recall, however, that Zhu Xi found precisely such Chan teaching of there is neither right nor wrong (wushi wufei ) to be logically and morally reprehensible. Zhu interpreted what might be explained by Buddhists as transcendence from right and wrong as reckless antinomianism, a disregard for conventional morality. He said:
The difference between we the Confucians and the Buddhists lies in that, we Confucians have reasonable rules and principled guidelines. For the Buddhists, they have none of these. , . .5
Antinomianism and moral laxity were some of the most denigrating and inveterate polemics the Confucians had historically maintained about Buddhism, Wang was conscious of the danger of becoming labeled as an antinomian or moral nihilist. The strategy he employed to differentiate his own position from that of the allegedly amoral Buddhism was, ironically, also the same one many Buddhists resorted to in vindicating Buddhism of this same charge. Wang Yangming posited a bipartite approach where he would put forth both the need to maintain moral rigorousness and the transcendence from inflexible dogmatism. Wang Yangming described his understanding of the innate knowledge of the good (liangzhi ) very much in terms of the language of Buddha-nature. He posited the Mind or the innate knowledge as an all-encompassing, ontological basis for both good and evil. Yet the Mind is only functionally actualized when good is cultivated. In the same way, Chan followers had always described the Buddha-nature as having both an ontological aspect and a functional aspect. Example: For
4 5
Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, p. 2380. Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 379.
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Zongmi (780841), the Chan patriarch in the Tang dynasty, the essence aspect of the mind has to be emphasized along with the responsive functioning6 aspect with the same vigor, if both the transcendent and the responsive nature of the Mind are to be maintained.7 And ever since Neo-Confucians attack on the alleged Buddhist amoralism, Buddhists had become especially cautious and vocal when articulating their moral stance, arguing that morality without transcendence is ritualism or mundane Dharma, and that transcendence without morality is false enlightenment. Yunqi Zhuhong (15351615) was reiterating this dominant Buddhist doctrinal ethos in the Ming dynasty when he made the same point:
Although the mind is originally luminous, yet as one does good or evil deeds, their traces will make the mind soar high or sink to the groundHow can one say that evil deeds do not matter simply because the mind in its essence cannot be designated as good or evil? If one is addicted to the biased view of emptiness, he will deviate from perfect understanding. Once you realize that both good and evil are nonexistent, [it is all the more compelling that] you should stop evil and do good.8
Using unmistakably Chan language, Wang Yangming also explained that at the ontological aspect, the innate knowledge transcends the absolutism and dualism of mundane values; but at the functional level, it is ever discerning about good and evil, and actively pursues good and avoids evil. This two-tiered scheme that validates transmundane wisdom without sacrificing the practical need to defer to conventional virtues9 was a common Buddhist motif that could be traced back not only to the Platform stra, but
Peter Gregorys analysis of the historical conditions and mentality that gave rise to this comparable bipartite moral scheme (Gregory 2002: 237 244) contains many interesting parallels to the Ming scenario. 7 Araki Keng (1975: 45) suggested that the solid wall of principle erected by Zhu runs the danger of curbing the vitality of the Mind. 8 Cited in Greenblatt 1975: 109. 9 David Kalupahana (1992: 6067) had explained the sustained Buddhist attempts at avoiding absolutism.
also to such early texts like the Dhammapada.10 Although Wang Yangming might be subverting Zhus moral absolutism in substantive ways, by bringing such a blatantly Buddhist interpretation into Confucianism, Wang still maintained Zhus polemic that [Chan] Buddhism is morally degenerate. In other words, even as Wang simultaneously relegated Buddhism and Zhu Xis intellectual legacy by charging that Buddhism was hopelessly oblivious to and delinquent of secular moral duties, and that Zhu was trapped in inflexible dualistic thinking Wangs philosophical views overlapped with important Buddhist ideas popular in the Ming dynasty. His position was much closer to Chan Buddhist ideology than he allowed himself to admit.11 Wang Yangming was responsible for still another Confucian transformation that was to prove conducive to the upsurge of Mingdynasty syncretism. One of the most powerful appeals Buddhism had in distracting, if not converting, some of the best minds from the Confucian establishment was its systematic outline of a spiritual mrga the cultivational and soteric technology and its promise of ultimate transformations through the application of its prescribed techniques. In the face of Buddhisms systematic, graduated program of moral and meditative training, many Confucians could not but concede to Buddhist superiority in soteric sophistication. The intricate and elaborate ways in which Buddhists conceived of their spiritual path was the result of the traditional emphasis Buddhists placed on its careful formulation. Robert Buswell and Robert Gimello had explained this emphasis in the following way:
[T]he concept of the path has been given in Buddhism an explication more sustained, comprehensive, critical, and sophisticated than that provided by any other single religious traditionThroughout the
10 The Platform stra contained the following passage that illustrates such a two-tiered scheme for morality: , , . . Similarly, the Dhammapada urged the practice of good yet posited that only by being unattached to even what is the good can one truly be called a spiritual aspirant (Brahmin). Compare verse 183 and 412 in Dhammapada, Kaviratna trans. pp. 73 & 159. 11 See some examples of Wangs critical remarks in Chen (Rongjie) 1984: 7780.
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two-and-a-half millennia of its pan-Asian career, Buddhism has been consistently explicit in declaring itself to be, above all else, a soteriology, a method of salvation, rather than, say, a creed. Its unflagging concentration on the path, whether for the purpose of advocating and charting that path or for the purpose of qualifying and criticizing it, has not only led to the careful and detailed delineation of numerous curricula of religious practice and to the privileging of such delineation over other modes of Buddhist discourse.12
In order to compete, the re-systematization endeavor of the Song Neo-Confucians was to delineate a comparably enticing system of personal cultivation (gongfu lun ) that could outstrip the near dominance Buddhists had always held in this domain. One of the key leitmotifs Confucians had toiled for centuries to configure in its soteriological system concerned a practice known as the extension of knowledge (zhizhi ).13 It was one phase of training in a series of graduated steps leading to ever higher spiritual and ethical goals as prescribed in the Confucian classic the Great Learning (Daxue ). Though vague and abstruse in its language, the text provided a rare indigenous outline of soteric path for the Neo-Confucians, who were in a desperate need to discover something from their own textual tradition rather than appropriating from Buddhism what they supposedly ostensibly lacked. Zhu Xis canonization and propagation of the so-called Four Classics (which included the Great Learning) very likely have been propelled by such a mentality. Through this act of canonization, he had undoubtedly changed the character of Confucianism in posterity. The fact that the Four Classics were readily and heartily received by fellow Confucians as the sine qua non primers for the tradition very likely had something to do with their usefulness to buttress Confucianism in those most glaringly deficient areas. With the exception of the Analects, all the Four Classics (the Analects,
Buswell and Gimello 1992: 23. It should be noted that Lu Jiuyuan was one of the first to bring about this transformation in the Song. In many ways Wang Yangming simply rediscovered and fine-tuned Lus system rather than having single-handedly invented the many implications of an idealist philosophy. See Chan 1963: 572573; Liu 1964: 165166; and Qian 1962: 137.
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the Mengzi, the Great Learning, and the Doctrine of the Mean) in fact were only elevated to their revered prominence from relative obscurity after Zhu Xis unreserved commendation of them.14 Each of the three newly promoted Confucian texts served an important soteric purpose. The Mencius (Mengzi ) discusses the Confucian ideal of sagehood and the actualization of the heavenly virtues. The idea of attaining sagehood as outlined in the Mencius served as a worthy competing ideal to the Buddhist notions of Buddhahood and enlightenment. The Great Learning spelled out the specific praxis involved for that actualization: one sets out to realize the Confucian goal of bringing harmony to the world through a stepby-step self-transformation. The Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong ) served to explicate the mechanism and principles underlying those Confucian systems of spiritual cultivation: the principle of emotional and practical moderation was advised in this text as the connecting theme for Confucian practice. It also provided much of the philosophical expressions with which Zhu built his metaphysical theories such as that of the heavenly nature and the universal principle15 metaphysical theories that were in one capacity intended to compete with the elaborately constructed Buddhist cosmology. In the Great Learning, there is a passage on the sequence of stages to be accomplished by those cultivators intent on illuminating the luminescent virtue and bringing harmony to the world. The first two of the stages are the investigation of things (gewu ) and, as we have previously discussed, the extension of knowledge. As many scholars have noted already, Zhus understanding of this process was that it is an inductive one. He believed that only through wide learning and unceasing exploration of the naMencius was beatified by Zhu himself to become the greatest Confucian sage second only to Confucius (yasheng ). Both the Great Learning and the Doctrine of Mean were excerpts from the Book of Rites by the Younger Zai (Xiaozai liji ) singled out by Zhu for their pertinence to his vision of a new Confucianism. 15 See Zhu Xis exegesis on this part of the Book in Chen (Rong) 1984: 2223.
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ture of external things would the seeker arrive at a universal principle which pervades them all.16 He considered Buddhisms introspective and subitist quest undertaken in the mind ground to be too introverted and perfunctory to generate any concrete, reliable, generalizable knowledge. By collapsing what should otherwise be a thorough investigation of the myriad phenomena into a single, idealist principle, Buddhism appeared to Zhu to be oversimplifying a serious learning process and too complacently engrossed in the self. One of Zhus supporters in the Ming expressed this distaste toward Buddhisms allegedly reductionist approach to investigating things:
Some practitioners had only heeded to the aspect of the oneness of principle while overlooking the aspect of its divergent ramifications. In the case of Buddhism, even its professed oneness of principle [that it so favored] differed from the one principle that was advocated by the [Confucian] sages. , . , , 17 .
This was where Wang Yangming introduced yet another important revolutionary modification of Zhus epistemic approach. While Zhu Xi claimed to have applied his mind in search of the principle amidst the various phenomena and things ,18 Wang braved the antithetical position. Wang sug-
16 Zhu Xis logic was that, The so-called nature is the myriad principles scattered in various places. This is what makes it the nature [of all things] . Cited in Qian 1962: 117. Therefore only by a tireless investigation into various things would the principle be revealed. Zhus conclusion was that, As for our attempt to extend our knowledge, [the key] lies in searching to the limit of things and thereby fully reveal their principle This is the reason that the beginning-leveled teaching of the Great Learning always required the apprentice to pursue the investigation of all things without exceptions under Heaven, basing on principles that one had already comprehended, in order to extend it to its utmost limit. , , , , . Ibid., p. 120. 17 Cited in Araki (Rushi) 1978: 389. 18 Cited in Sun, Liu and Hu 1995: 280.
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gested that the Way of the sages is already endowed in my nature. Those who directed their search for the principle in objects and phenomena are misled , , .19 Wang thought that a deductive and introspective extension of knowledge could avoid the pitfalls of becoming inevitably fragmentary and aimless as was the case in Zhus externally-directed system. Instead of looking outward, Wang felt that nothing other than the mind provides a more direct access to the universal principle, and that understanding the mind itself would suffice to meet the qualification of investigating things and extending knowledge as stipulated in the Great Learning.20 Very few Confucians dared to suggest a rearrangement or bypassing of steps on this prescribed sequence, yet Wang Yangming was ready not only to place the process of rectifying the mind before the investigation of things, thereby reversing its traditional order, he altogether relegated the whole idea of graduated, step-by-step practices as an inferior approach to the recovery of the original mind. In such a manner, Wang also seemed to evince the same loathing to externally-directed investigation and entertained the possibility of a direct, sudden realization of this process in very much the same way the mature Chan school would. Wangs antithetical position to Zhu in this regard was a paradigmatic case for those who are studying the sudden versus gradual polarity in religious studies.21 It was fashionable for Buddhist exegetes to brandish their knowledge of literati culture by writing commentaries for the Confucian Classics. The interesting point was that, Wangs interpretation of the cultivational outline in the Great Learning as a subitist and introspective path was strikingly similar to the way Buddhists had interpreted the Confucian text. This is not to downplay the important, though at times subtle, differences between Wangs understanding of the Mind and that of the mainstream, Ming-dynasty Buddhist; but for our purpose, their similarities are the focus.
Cited in Wu 1994: 171. For example, Wang emphasized that the entirety of the investigation should be performed on just this body and mind , . Cited in Sun, Liu and Hu 1995: 280. 21 Gregory 1997: 8.
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When the Buddhist monk Deqing commented on another two of the cultivational stages in the Great Learning the rectifying of the mind (zhengxin ) and the making sincere of the intention (chengyi ) Deqing, too, saw those stages as perfectible in a single enlightened instant:
The mind is originally luminous. Only because it was clouded by desires that it becomes dullAs soon as the Single Reality had been recovered, all delusions would no longer ariseOnce enlightened, there would be no further delusions; [In fact,] the extinction of delusions is itself the equivalent [of the realization] of the Single Reality. , , , .22
Most of the commentaries written by the Ming Buddhists on the Confucian Classics had in similar fashion attempted to reinterpret the Confucian cultivational stages within the rubric of Buddhist subitist soteriology. Although within the Buddhist tradition itself, there were proponents for both the gradual and the sudden paradigms, the subitist school had decidedly won the ideological battle since the eighth or ninth century. The influential Buddhist systematizer Zongmi categorized the Chan tradition into three major strands, and the one deemed the most advanced on his list of hermeneutical taxonomy was the School of Directly Revealing the Mind and the Nature (zhixian xinxing zong ) not surprisingly, that was the most subitist strand of the three.23 Deqing also echoed this unanimous Buddhist predilection for the subitist and idealist doctrine throughout the Ming dynasty,
The marvel of the great Dao lies in that it could be better accessed through intuitive realization. Even when it comes to mundane knowledge such as the art of elocution, governance of the world, linguistic convention, and various means of livelihood, one could not fail to come to grasp that which is marvelous by simply penetrating into any of these secular enterprises.
Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iii, p. 1959. Zongmis panjiao schemes were recorded in the Chanyuan zhuquan jiduxu. T. 48.2015.
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. , .24
Another Buddhist monk in roughly the same period, Ouyi Zhixu (15911655), in this respect even praised Wang for having reversed Zhu Xis claim to Confucian orthodoxy. The Buddhist monk esteemed Wang for having superseded the spiritual accomplishments of all previous Confucians and for that Wangs enlightenment might not be qualitatively different from Buddhist enlightenment:
Wang Yangming had gone beyond what the Confucians in the Han and the Song had accomplished, and had directly succeeded to the [true legacy] of the Mind School as taught by Confucius and Yan [Hui]. The teaching [Wang] had instructed people with throughout his life [could be summed up] in the words of attaining to ones innate knowledge of the good. It corresponds to and perfectly illumines the Self-NatureIt does not direct people to search outside, because the entirety of its practice is rooted in the Self Nature. , . , , .25
Most of the points outlined so far are not new in the Buddhist scholarship. But I will now direct the discussion to how these points shed lights on Ming Yogcra. In all the aforementioned ways Wang brought about the key catalysts for a syncretistic culture some highly buddhicized recast of Confucian ideas. The Buddhists capitalized on these buddhicized elements to advance their own polemical agenda, by demonstrating how these elements could best be qualified, harmonized, and criticized in Buddhist hermeneutics. It was against this background of a brooding Confucian intellectual revolution and the resultant change in the inter-religious dynamic, that the return of the Buddhist Yogcra thought to scholastic spotlight in the high culture of the Ming dynasty becomes more understandable. To the Buddhist syncretists, it must have been apparent that Wang Yangmings brand of idealism could best be received and countered by Buddhisms own counterpart of idealism in the
24 25
Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, p. 2405. Ouyi dashi wenxuan, p. 178.
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Yogcra tradition. One of the most visible common denominators between the two traditions had been their evolved convergence in the discourse on the mind. The newly resurrected Yogcra tradition assumed a peculiar form in which the traditional category consciousness was treated interchangeably with the notion of the Mind in the Tathgatagarbha thought. The so-called Eminent Monks of the Wanli Era (Wanli si ga oseng ), Hanshan Deqing (15461623),26 Daguan Zhenke (15431603), Yunqi Zhuhong (15351615),27 and Ouyi Zhixu (15991655) were interesting subjects of study not simply because of their reputable literary and spiritual accomplishments, but also in the unanimity of their fascination with syncretism, Yogcra, and Tathgata-garbha. This striking unanimity probably reflected powerful intellectual and cultural trends of their times. The convergence of these seemingly discrete and unconnected subjects of their fascination (again, syncretism, Yogcra, and Tathgatagarbha) was in fact the logical conclusion of development within Buddhism and Confucianism as well as their re-engagement in the Ming. I do not wish to unduly downplay the Eminent Monks undeniable individual differences, but it is in their striking resemblance not fully attributable to their mutual influence that reflected those compelling cultural forces that are in turn the focus of this paper. Though Wang Yangming and his followers had always perceived themselves to be continuing the idealist legacy initiated by none other than Mencius himself, Wangs originality stood out in his spilling forth the creative, ontological implications in explicit terms:
The innate knowledge of good is the numinous Spirit of creation our numinous Spirit has created the heaven and the earth, as well as the myriad things therein. All things in the universe, however, ultimately return to nothingness. [The Spirit] carries out the creating
For more on Hanshans life and syncretistic efforts, see Hsu 1979. Zhuhongs life and contribution to Buddhist revival movement in Ming is covered in detail in Y 1981.
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process in all moments, and constantly transforms [all things], never pausing for even a breath-long instant. , , , , . , , .28
Compare this notion to Buddhisms own Lakvatrastra narrative on the creative Embryo of the Tathgata, and we can easily discern the likeness between Wangs idealism and the Buddhist one that was encapsulated in the Yogcra-Tathgatagarbha hybrid thought:
The Tathgatagarbha is the causative force behind both the wholesome and unwholesome [deeds]. It can function everywhere in creating the different realms of rebirth. Just like a conjuring illusionist, it could magically manifest [the appearances of] the various realms of rebirth. , , , .29
The synthesis of Tathgatagarbha and layavijna (the StoreHouse Consciousness described by the Yogcra school) was well underway when the first Chinese encountered these disparate Buddhist teachings on the nature of consciousness and mind. The ubiquitous influence of Tathgatagarbha thought in Chinese Buddhism since the eighth century, as Chinese Buddhist scholars have frequently noted, swept through practically all Chinese Buddhist schools. The result was a reinterpretation of all Buddhist ideas within Tathgatagarbha light, including the notion of layavijna. Although Tathgatagarbha and layavijna are definitely distinct concepts with very different doctrinal implications, by the Ming they were by and large harmonized and largely read as interchangeable. The Four Eminent Monks close alignment with the Tathgatagarbha thought was not confined to only their understanding of Yogcra, but was evident in their Huayan, Tiantai, Chan, and Pure Land scholarship as well, where traditionally disparate teachings were collapsed into variants of an all-unifying Tathgatagarbha
28 29
Cited in Araki (Yang) 1978: 372373. Dasheng ru lengqie jing, T. 16.619620.
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idealism. The Eminent Monks sweeping reduction of all Buddhist teachings into a uniform doctrine was not without precedent in Chinese Buddhism. In fact the sectarian traditions of almost all surviving Buddhist schools each had its histories of eventually coming to terms with and assimilating the doctrines of an ontological Buddha-hood characteristic of the Tathgatagarbha thought. For the Yogcra system to be amenably conforming to the then Tathgatagarbha-permeated Buddhist culture, all the Four Eminent Monks saw the synthesis of Tathgatagarbha and layavijna under the rubric of the One Mind to be the most convenient and least problematic formulation to that end. Zhenke wrote,
The four divisions of the Eighth Consciousness were initially not distinct entities [from the Eighth Consciousness itself]. It was because that the True Suchness [has the tendency to] responsively adapt to conditions, that it as a result permutated into various [manifestations like the four divisions]. The meaning of True Suchness responsively adapt to conditions is a most difficult doctrine to be clearly elucidated. For if the True Suchness was at the beginning unadulterated and free from being perfumed [by contaminating influences], what determined its initial activation to responsively adapt to conditions? If one unceasingly investigate this [problem of theodicy], one might suddenly become enlightened to itAt that point one could clearly understand [all] the books written on the subject of the Mind-Only teachingTherefore, for those who aspire to transcending the world and shouldering the responsibility of propagating the Path, could they afford not to wholeheartedly direct their attention to the study of the school concerning the Dharma-nature,30 the school of Dharmacharacterization,31 and the school of Chan?
30 Traditionally both the Madhyamaka and the Tathgatagarbha teachings had been understood by many Chinese to be pointing to a substrative reality, therefore the Chinese often indiscriminately lodged the former with the latter under the category of the Xing School, or Dharma-nature School. After the Tathgatagarbha tradition became the undisputed dominant doctrinal tradition in China, however, the Dharma-nature School was increasingly being used to refer specifically to only Tathgatagarbha-oriented teachings. Many scholars are wrong in assuming that, throughout Chinese history, the designation Xingzong was reserved only for the latter group. One example where such an error was made was in Ran 1995: 11. 31 Xiangzong was a rather pejorative descriptive term for the
19
, , , . , , , , ? , , , , ?32
Zhenkes Yogcra disputations were clearly tailored to the doctrinal assumptions of the Awakening of the Faith, an indigenous Tathgatagarbha text traditionally received by Chinese Buddhists with paramount esteem. The text, though rather succinct, devised deft solutions to reconcile many apparently contradictory doctrines between the Yogcra and Tathgatagarbha schools by positing the so-called nature-origination (xingqi ) formal causal theory. The Awakening of the Faith proved most useful a scriptural authority to call upon whenever someone attempted to equate Yogcra conception of the consciousness with the Tathgatagarbha Mind. The text provided (what appeared to be) canonically sanctioned precedent of submitting major Buddhist tenets to the all-subsuming Tathgatagarbha teaching and was especially useful for the Ming Yogcras purpose. Most of the Eminent Monks Yogcra interpretative frame rested so much on the cardinal themes of the Awakening of the Faith (with some of them expressly acknowledging to have done so), that one could not help but to come to the impression that the Yogcra tradition in the late Ming was only studied to be rendered compliant to the school of Dharma-nature (another common name for the Chinese Tathgatagarbha tradition). Zhixu was one such person who self-professedly took the apocryphal text to legitimize Yogcra-Tathgatagarbha synthesis:
What the Consciousness-Only School described as [From the perspective of] the Real, [dharma] characteristics are undifferentiated, it is exactly what the Awakening of Faith explained under the Gate of the True-Suchness aspect of the One Mind. As for what the
Yogcra system coined by its rival traditions. Since the Yogcra school was perceived by people like Fazang of the Huayan tradition as merely delving into the feature/phenomenal aspect of reality rather than penetrating into the deeper substrative level, they labeled it a Faxiang zong, or a Dharmafeature/Dharma-phenomena School in contrast with the Faxing zong, or a Dharma-nature School. 32 Man[ji] Zokuzky 98, pp. 580581.
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Consciousness-Only School described as [From the perspective of] the mundane, [dharma] characteristics are differentiated, it is just pertaining to the Gate of the arising-and-perishing aspect of the One Mind as explained in the Awakening of Faith. , , ; , , .33
Attempting at harmonizing the Dharma characteristic tradition (a common name for the Chinese Yogcra tradition) with the Dharma-nature tradition, Deqing cited the same text and conflated the defiled Store-House Consciousness and the unadulterated Tathgatagarbha as different aspects of the same One Mind. As a result he amalgamated what was traditionally perceived as diametrical strands of Buddhist theories of the mind:
[Avaghoa] authored the Awakening of Faith in order to extirpate [peoples] unwholesome attachmentsand [he] synthesized the doctrinal strands of Dharma-nature and Dharma-characteristics, so that they could be consolidated in [their common] source [in the One Mind]. [].34
These developments within Buddhism, and the rise of Confucian idealism through the work of Wang Yangming, gave Ming Buddhists and Confucians compelling reasons to argue for their syncretistic cause now that they had found a highly homogenous, mutually inspired discourse on the Mind that served as the perfect medium for their syncretistic dialogue. The catalyzing effect of Wang Yangmings system not only could explain the philosophical outlook of the Ming Yogcra scholarship (one that was conflated and reconfigured in such a way it was uncannily consonant with Confucian idealism), it could also account for Yogcra scholarships precise timing of reappearance. In other words, the timing of Yogcras revitalization in the Ming coincided perfectly with the rise of Wang Yangmings thought. Zhenkes disciple Wang
33 Ibid., p. 232. I had to redo the punctuation of the Chinese passage in order to make it intelligible. 34 Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. ii, p. 1024.
21
Kentang (?1613?) had recounted a semi-mythical story about the origin of the Yogcra learning in the Ming. This was a little-known story in and since Wangs time as far as I could tell, but which nonetheless spoke volumes on the timing of Yogcra resurgence. Upon closer scrutiny, the story could provide us some inkling regarding how the Ming Buddhists themselves explained the sudden resuscitation of the school after such long dormancy:
I have heard the Great Master Zibo (Zhenke) said that, the transmission of the [Fa]xiang school (the Chinese Yogcra) had discontinued for long. The Dharma Master Luan [Pu]tai,35 while on one of his learning journeys, had stopped underneath the eaves of a household to shelter himself from the falling rain. He heard the sound of someone giving a Dharma talk inside [the house], and upon listening more closely, it turned out to be about the Faxiang (again, the Chinese Yogcra) teaching. He immediately entered the house to greet the people inside, and saw that it was an old man explaining [the teaching] to an old woman. Master Tai then bowed and asked to be instructed [in the teaching]. He consequently stayed at the place for more than a month, until [the old man] had completed instructing [Tai] of his learning. [Tai] suspected that the old man and the old woman were no ordinary mortals, they should in fact be the magical incarnation of [enlightened] sages. , . 36, , , . , . , , . , .37
The semi-mythical nature of the story is reminiscent of other Buddhist tales that attempt to relate the emergence of a new teaching. One such example involves Ngrjunas journey into the Dragon Kings Palace where he received Mahynastras and brought the new teaching to the world. Another story of similar nature: Asagas ascension into the Tuita heaven where he was said to have received instructions from the Bodhisattva Maitreya
Luan Putai (?1511?) was an otherwise unknown figure save through his two surviving works on Yogcra currently included in Man[ji] Zokuzky 98, p. 513. 36 This character is sometimes written with the radical. 37 Cited in Shi 1987: 201.
35
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on the intricacies of Yogcrabhmi.38 Such Buddhist tales were likely an admixture of partial historical truths, dramatized fiction, and other projections of culturally specific symbols used to account for the obscure and sometimes questionable background of new teachings.39 It would be hard to separate facts from fictions in stories like these. But the semiotics and circumstantial information contained therein were often predicated on more concrete historical backgrounds. As the provenance of Ngrjunas Mahynastras and the authorship of the Yogcrabhmi were concealed by their great antiquity and the hazy memories that reported them, these stories provided assurances of legitimate origins of otherwise questionable teachings. By the same token, as the beginning (if there was such a thing in the singular form and implying a complete prior discontinuance) of the Yogcra revival in the Ming was shrouded in mystery even to its contemporaries, there must had existed an almost subliminal compulsion to attribute its origin to legitimate and comprehensible sources, even if that attribution could only find expression in symbolic dramatization. Just like Asaga purportedly started his Yogcra career after having received Bodhisattva Maitreyas personal tutelage on the matter, thereby locating his source of inspiration in an acknowledged authority, the protagonist of our story at hand Luan Putai also was said to have rekindled the moribund Chinese Yogcra school after receiving the divine revelation of the teaching through otherworldly intermediaries. Moreover, Luan Putai published the [only known] Yogcra works in 1511 (In the Xinwei year of the
38 Interestingly enough, Deqing also had the experience of dreaming about ascending into the presence of the same Bodhisattva. According to his own relating of the story, this dream was the occasion after which he came to grasp the true meanings of Yogcra teachings. See the section on age 33, Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, vol. iv, pp. 29022905. It is puzzling how Western studies of Deqings life consistently leave out this richly symbolic event in his life. 39 See, for example, Robert Buswells discussion on the symbolism and social-religious factors that were embodied in the dragon king motif in Buddhist mythological lore (Buswell 1989: 5160).
23
Zhengde reign era of Emperor Wu of the Ming dynasty ), that is, almost immediately after Wang Yangming had put forth and promulgated his idealism. Since it would only be natural that we place Luan Putais reported divine encounter before the publication date of his Yogcra book that is, before Luan Putai became so proficient in Yogcra as to have been able to write about it the divine source of inspiration that was said to have sparked off a renaissance uncannily coincided with the most opportune time period when important conditions conducive to that renaissance were just becoming ripe. Whether the story originator(s) recounted the story conscious or unconscious of this coincidence, the conclusions we can draw from the story nonetheless corroborate our theory concerning the significant role played by Wang Yangmings thought in the Ming-dynasty Yogcra tradition.
Abbreviations and bibliography Abbreviations

T. Takakusu, J. and K. Watanabe, eds. 19241932. Taish shinsh daizky. Tokyo: Taish issaiky kankkai.
Primary sources
Chanyuan zhuquan jiduxu . T. 48.2015. Dasheng ru lengqie jing . T. 16.619620. Hanshan dashi mengyou ji, 4 volumes. (). 1989. Reprinted in Hong Kong: Puhui Lianshe (reprint). Liuzu dashi fabao tanjing . T 48.2008 Ouyi dashi wenxuan . Compiled by Zhongjing . 1976. Reprinted in Taipei: Fojiao chuban she. Is the 1976 edition used here the reprint? In this case, change Reprinted in Taipei: Fojiao chuban she to Taipei: Fojiao chuban she (reprint)
Secondary sources
Araki, Keng. 1975. Confucianism and Buddhism. In The Unfolding of NeoConfucianism, 3966, eds. William de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Thought. New York and London: Columbia University Press.
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Araki Keng . Trans. with Rushi . 1978. Yangming xue yu mingdai foxue . In Zhongguo jinshi fojiaoshi yanjiu , ed. Lan Jifu . Taipei: Dasheng Wenhua. Araki Keng T . Trans. with Yang Baiyi . 1978. Yijing yu lengyan jing . In Zhongguo jinshi fojiaoshi yanjiu , ed. Lan Jifu . Taipei: Dasheng Wenhua. Buswell, Robert. 1989. The Formation of Chan Ideology in China and Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Buswell, Robert, and Robert Gimello. 1992. Introduction. In Paths to Liberation: The Mrga and its Transformations in Buddhist Thought, 136, eds. Robert E. Buswell, Jr. and Robert M. Gimello. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Chan, Wing-tsit. 1963. A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chen Rong . 1984. Sishu Jijie . Tainan: Zhengyan. Chen Rongjie (Wing-tsit) . 1984. Wang Yangming yu chan . Taipei: Taiwan Xuesheng. Greenblatt, Kristin. 1975. Chu-hung and Lay Buddhism in the Late Ming. In The Unfolding of NeoConfucianism, 93140, eds. William de Bary and the Conference on Seventeenth-Century Chinese Thought. New York and London: Columbia University Press. Gregory, Peter. 1987. Introduction. In Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought, 19, ed. Peter Gregory. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. _____ 2002. Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Hsu, Sung-pen. 1979. A Buddhist Leader in Ming China: The Life and Thought of Han-Shan Te-Ching. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Kalupahana, David. 1992. A History of Buddhist Philosophy. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kaviratna, Harischandra, trans. 1980. Dhammapada: Wisdom of the Buddha. Pasadena, CA.: Theosophical University Press. Liu, Wu-chi. 1964. A Short History of Confucian Philosophy. New York: Dell Publishing. Qian Mu . 1962. Songming lixue gailun, vol. i (). Taipei: Zhonghua Wenhua. Ran Yunhua . 1995. Cong Yindu fojiao dao Zhongguo fojiao . Taipei: Dongda. Sharf, Robert H. 2001. Coming to Terms with Chinese Buddhism: A Reading of the Treasure Store Treatise. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
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Shi Shengyan . 1987. Mingmo fojiao yanjiu . Taipei: Dongchu. Sun Kaitai , Liu Wenyu and Hu Weixi . 1995. Zhongguo zhexueshi . Taipei: Wenjun. Wu Guang . 1994. Rudao lunshu . Taipei: Dongda. Y, Chn-fang. 1981. The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-hung and the Late Ming Synthesis. New York: Columbia University Press.
Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology1 Part II

Vincent Eltschinger
For Jacques May
The first part of this essay (Eltschinger 2009) concentrated on the basic features and likely sources of Dharmakrtis understanding of ignorance (avidy). Against the Vaibhikas, but with Vasubandhu the Koakra, Dharmakrti defines ignorance as a counter- or anti-knowledge, i.e., as a cognition that counteracts true (perceptual) knowledge (vidy) by displaying contrary/erroneous objectsupports and aspects (vipartlambankra). According to him, ignorance amounts to pseudo-perception (pratyakbhsa), hence conceptual construction (vikalpa), superimposition (samropa) and concealment (savti). The core of Dharmakrtis philosophy, the so-called apoha theory, provides an exhaustive picture of both ignorance as conceptuality and inference as a corrective (though conceptual) principle. This conception of ignorance, however, fails to account for the most dramatic form of the Buddhist ignorance, viz. its being responsible for defilements, rebirth and suffering. In
This study has been made possible by the generous financial support of the Austrian Science Fund (FWF-Projekt P19862 Philosophische und religise Literatur des Buddhismus). Most sincere thanks are due to Isabelle Rati, Birgit Kellner, Helmut Krasser and Ernst Steinkellner. Lambert Schmithausen also deserves my wholehearted gratitude for having gone through this essay with incomparably great care and erudition. My most sincere thanks are due to Cynthia Peck, who kindly corrected my English. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 2774
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order to account for this eschatologically valued form of ignorance, Dharmakrti equates avidy with the personalistic false view (satkyadi). Consistently enough, ignorance as satkyadi is but a specialization or instantiation of ignorance as conceptuality insofar as the satkyadi exhausts itself in ones superimposing such conceptual constructs as self/I (tman, aham) and ones own/mine (tmya, mama) on reality. Both Dharmakrti and his commentators evolved exegetical strategies in order to argue for the orthodoxy of this equation of ignorance with a false view (di), which Vasubandhu clearly refuses in the Abhidharmakoa (but not in his commentary on the Prattyasamutpdastra). As for the sources of Dharmakrtis conception, they are very likely to consist of the Prattyasamutpdastra and its numerous idealistic interpretations (Yogcrabhmi, Vasubandhus Vykhy). In the second part of this essay, I shall first inquire into Dharmakrtis account of dependent origination (prattyasamutpda), viz. his interpretation of ignorance as the origin of defilements (craving, etc.), clinging and rebirth. I shall then turn to the philosophical core of this study by attempting to show how Dharmakrtis views on ignorance and the two truths/realities provide the basic framework of his epistemological theory. This is tantamount to claiming that Dharmakrtis epistemology, in locating ignorance and defining the cognitive means of opposing it and entering the path toward salvation, is Buddhistic in both its inspiration and its finality. As a consequence, his philosophy should cease to be regarded as a dry academic endeavour deviating from the spirit of Buddhism as a salvation system.
2.1. Dependent origination

2.1.1. In his account of the future Buddhas philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakrti presents the cause of suffering (dukhahetu) in the following way: The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in self and ones own.2
PV 2.135ac1: tmtmyagrahakta sneha saskragocara / hetu sneha = t according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PV D117b34/P143b7;
2
Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)
29
According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from ones adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from self and ones own, under the aspects of self and ones own.3 This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on dharmas, specifically on the five constituents one clings to, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from ones superimposing aspects such as permanent, pleasurable, self and ones own on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents.4 One may adduce here a huge number of passages presenting one and the same idea: The personalistic belief is responsible for ones superimposing contrary aspects such as self and ones own on the selfless and empty constituents.5 As Dharmakrti himself has it, desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature on something (dharma) that does not have this nature.6 PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakrtis most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been as-
kyabuddhi (PV D117b4/P143b78) unambiguously explains gocara as viaya. 3 PVP D56b1/P64a56: sdug bsal du gyur pai dus byas bdag da bdag gi da bral ba la bdag da bdag gii rnam par mon par en pas jug pa es bya bai don to //. 4 PVP D60b23/P69a45: mi rtag pa da sdug bsal ba da sto pa da bdag med pai phu po rnams la rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gir sgro btags nas jug pa dod chags la sogs pa de dag 5 E.g., PVP D88a45/P101b4: e bar len pai phu po la la ga rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gi rnam pa yod pa ma yin no //. PVP D88a6/ P101b56: e bar len pai phu po la la rtag pa la sogs pai rnam par dzin pai es pa ya rnam pa med pa dzin pa can yin no //. 6 PV 2.196ab: tmntarasamropd rgo dharme tadtmake /. Devendrabuddhi explains (PVP D84a7b1/P97a12): dod chags la sogs pai ra bin du ya gyur ba ma yin te / di ltar de bdag med can te / rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gi da bral bai yul du gyur pao // chos la ste phu po la sogs pai ra gi o bo lao // bdag gan sgro btags phyir te rtag pa da bde ba da bdag da bdag gii ra bin gan du sgro btags pai rgyui phyir mon par en pai mtshan id kyi chags pa skye bar gyur ro //.
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cribed to reality: Having[, due to ignorance,]7 superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. lasting, pleasant, mine, I, etc., on the four [Nobles] Truths,8 one experiences craving [for superimposed objects such as delight, etc.].9 According to Devendrabuddhi and
PVP D116a1/P134b2: sgro btags nas ni mi es pai phyir At least according to the Vaibhikas, each of the four Nobles Truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the Truth of suffering under the aspects impermanent, painful, empty and selfless; the Truth of origin under the aspects of (distant/material) cause (as a seed), arising, (serial) causation and (joint) condition; the Truth of extinction, under the aspects of extinction, calm, excellent and salvation; the Truth of the path under the aspects of path, fitness, access and conducive to release (AKBh 343,1619 on AK 6.17c1: dukha caturbhir krai payaty anityato dukhata nyato ntmata ca / samudaya caturbhir hetuta samudayata prabhavata pratyayata ca / nirodha caturbhir nirodhata ntata pratato nisaraata ca / mrga caturbhir mrgato nyyata pratipattito nairyikata ca /. The sixteen aspects are listed at PVP D62a37/P71a16). The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh 400,1401,17 on AK 7.13a, Koa 7.3039, Pruden 19881990: IV.11101116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (pratipaka) a particular false view (di): The aspects anitya, dukha, nya and antman counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurableness, ones own, and self; the aspects of hetu, samu daya, prabhava and pratyaya contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,3031), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects nirodha, nta, prata and nisaraa oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of dhynas is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects mrga, nyya, pratipad and nair yika, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression; see AKBh 401,1117, Koa 7.3839, Pruden 19881990: IV.11151116. The explanations provided by Dharmakrtis commentators are too few to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and kyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three Truths (see PVP D115b67/P134a8b2 and PV D147b35/P182a8b2). On the sixteen aspects, see Wayman 1980. 9 PV 2.270: sthira sukha mamha cetydi satyacatuaye / abhtn oakrn ropya parityati //. Note PV D147b57/P182b24: sgro
8 7
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kyabuddhi, ignorance,10 i.e., the false view of self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., superimpose an I on what is selfless and a mine on what is empty. But ignorance is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (sthira) or even unchangeably permanent (kasthanitya),11 or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers (ssrava) or dependent on causes (hetuparatantra) in each of their successive phases (pratikaam).12 2.1.2. According to Dharmakrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (nidna), the origin(yoni,
btags nas ni yos su sred ces bya bai tshig gis log par sgro dogs pa son du so ba can gyi sred pa id gsal bar bstan pa yin no // sgro dogs pai yul la jug pai sred pa de ya sgro dogs pai rnam pa id yin la / sgro dogs pai rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi on mos pa da e bai on mos pa thams cad id ma rig pa id yin pa And with the pda (= PV 2.270d) ropya parityati, [Dharmakrti] clearly indicates craving, which presupposes erroneous superimposition. As for this craving, directed [as it is] to an object of superimposition, it also has the aspect of superimposition, and all the kleas and upakleas, which bear on an aspect of superimposition, are [nothing] but ignorance 10 PVP D115b34/P134a4: ma rig pa des kya sdug bsal la rtag pa es bya bai rnam par dzin par byed do //. PVP D115b6/P134a78: re ig de ltar sdug bsal gyi bden pa la mi es pa mi rtag pa la sogs pai rnam pa las phyin ci log tu sgro dogs pa yin no //. See also PV D147a12/P181b35. 11 According to Devendrabuddhi, all that is produced and lasts more than one moment is permanent (PVP D115b4/P134a56: skad cig ma las dus phyis gnas pai a tshul can du skyes pa thams cad rtag pa id do //. To be compared with Vibh. 102 n. 1: nityam iti vcye kat para sthy sarvo nitya ity artha /). According to kyabuddhi, all that is either unchangeably permanent or lasts for at least a second moment is permanent (PV D147a67/P182a23: ther zug tu gnas pai rtag pa ga yin pa da skad cig ma gis pa la sogs par gnas pai a tshul can dus gan du gnas pa can ga yin pa de thams cad ni dir rtag par dod pa yin gyi ther zug tu gnas pa id ni ma yin no es de bstan par gyur ro //). 12 According to PVP D115b5/P134a6: bde ba es bya bai zag pa da bcas pa ma yin paam skad cig ma re re la rgyui gan gyi dba la[s] phyin ci log tu btags pao //. dukha(bhta) is regularly explained as ssrava in PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5.
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prabhava), or the root (mla)13 of all (kinds of) moral faults (doa), defilements (klea, upaklea) or moral impurities (mala).14 Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of self, one also meets with cause (kraa, alone or with preceding utpatti, pradhna; hetu),15 arising (jti, utpatti)16 and suffixal elements such as pr vaka, maya,17 hetuka, ja, mla, or kta. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (satkyadaranaja, jig tshogs su lta bai ra bin), are (causally) preceded/accompanied by the false view of self or by the adherence to self and ones own (bdag tu lta ba son du so ba can, tmtmybhiniveaprvaka), arise from the false view of self (bdag tu lta ba las byu ba), or have ignorance for their cause (avidyhetuka).18 They are all based on the beliefs in I and mine (ar dzin pa da a yir dzin pa dag la gnas pa) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of self and ones own (bdag da bdag gir lta bai rjes su brel bai sems la ltos nas gyur ba).19 2.1.3. As we have seen, the belief in self and ones own is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, ignorance is the cause of craving (t), which
13 Respectively PV 1.223ab (nidna gl. pradhnakraa PVSV 402,23 24), PV 2.211a, PVSV 111,11, PV 2.197ab1 (mla gl. da poi rten PVP D84b2/ P97a4), PV 2.212c. 14 E.g., PV 2.197a (doa), PV 1.222a (sarvs doajtnm), PV 2.214d1 (sarvadoa), PVSV 401,2425 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 ([sarva]klea), PVP D60a23/P68b4 (on mos pa da e bai on mos), PV 2.212c (mal sarve). On upaklea, see also PV D133a45/P164a4. 15 E.g., PVSV 50,28 (kraa), PVSV 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (utpattikraa), PVSV 402,2324 (pradhnakraa), PVSV 401,21 (hetu). 16 E.g., PV 1.222b (jti), PVSV 401,22 and 26 (utpatti). 17 Rendered in Tib. as ra bin (can). But note PV D137b3/P916b6: ra bin ni o bo id dam rgyu yin no //. 18 Respectively PVSV 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on ra bin, see above, n. 17), PVP D60a23/P68b23, PVSV 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSV 401,24 and 25. 19 Respectively PVP D93b12/P108a12 and PVP D67b4/P77a67.
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is nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both function as the cause of suffering: As defilements, they give rise both to other defilements (e.g., t updna) and to act(ion)s (kriy, e.g., avidy saskra, or updna bhava), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (vastu) of existence (e.g., saskra vijna, or bhava jti).20 Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, ignorance and craving21 are the two causes of (re)birth ([punar] janman) and transmigration (sasra),22 which are the hallmarks of suffering.23 Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines suffering
See AK 3.27 and AKBh 134,26135,3, Koa 3.69, Pruden 19881990: II.407. 21 PVP D56a6/P64a3: skye bai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D57b3/P65b4: bdag da bdag gi la chags pai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D115b6/P134a8: sred pai mtshan id can sdug bsal gyi rgyu; PVP D116a1/P134b3: sred pa sdug bsal gyi rgyur gyur pa; PVP D115b2/P134a23: sdug bsal gyi rgyu ni sred pa yin no es bstan zin to // de ya ma rig pa las byu ba According to kyabuddhi, craving is kun nas chi bai rgyu, the cause of bondage, and according to PVP D58b1/P66b4, attachment leads to kleas, punarbhava and janmaparigraha. 22 Dharmakrtis commentators provide us with various definitions of sasra. (1) PVP D62b34/P71b23: khor bar khor bas na khor ba ste / skye ba da chi bai rgyun no //, to be compared with PVV 62,1112: janmamaraaprabandha sasra /. (2) PVP D95b6/P110b3: (bdag gir yos su dzin pa) rtsom pa la sogs pai mtshan id can gyi khor ba , which kyabuddhi (PV D138b67/P171a78) comments as follows: bdag gir yos su dzin pa la sogs pa rtsom pa la sogs pai mtshan id can gyi khor ba es bya ba la bdag gi id du gzu bai srid pai los spyod kyi mtshan id can gyi dos po la mon par chags pa son du so ba can gyi dzin pa ni yos su (P om. su) dzin pao // rtsom pa ni mon par bsgrub pao //. Tib. mon par bsgrub pa may translate either abhinirhra (BHSD s.v., 52b53a) or (more surely) abhisaskra (BHSD s.v., 57b): Defining [re]existence (bhava) in the context of dependent origination, Vasubandhu (Vaibhika definition, AKBh 132,2021) says: sa paunarbhavika karmopacinoti , he accumulates action(s) that is/are conducive to rebirth. Note also TSP 230,89/K184,21 22 (unidentified quotation): cittam eva hi sasro rgdikleavsitam /. 23 PV D148a1/P182b6: ma rig pa da sred pa ni sdug bsal gyi rgyu id yin te / phyin ci log pai ra bin can es bya bai don to //. Suffering is also defined in terms of dukhattraya. PVP D62b4/P71b34: sdug bsal rnam pa gsum gyis dos sam brgyud pas sdug bsal ba yin no //, which kyabuddhi, having named the three painfulnesses (PV D120b5/
20
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as (re)birth (skye bai mtshan id can gyi sdug bsal), Dharmakrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (dukha sasria skandh).24 It comes as no surprise, then, that Dharmakrti declares that as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in sasra.25 According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (pratisandhi) to a new existence (punarbhava),26 the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of self has the notion of pleasure (sukhasaj) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence.27 The link between the false view of self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows: Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of [moral] faults such as attachment to ones own arise, and the attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (sthna).28 2.1.4. Let us consider now the genealogy29 of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakrti provides a
P147b5), comments as follows (PV D120b67/P147b57): (1) dukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as dukhadukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (2) sukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as parimadukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way); (3) asukhdukh vedan is suffering in a direct way as saskradukhat (its causes and conditions being suffering in an indirect way). On dukhattraya, see Schmithausen 1977. 24 Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c. 25 PV 2.218cd (leaving tena untranslated): tentmbhiniveo yvat tvat sa sasre //. 26 PVP D85a67/P98a34: jig tshogs lta ba ya srid par i mtshams sbyor bai rgyur gyur pa Note also, referring to the sahaja satkyadaranam (PV 2.200d), PVP D85b5/P98b23: de ya srid pai rgyu yin no //. 27 PVP D85a6/P98a3: ga la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsal la bde bai du es can yin te / ya srid par mtshams sbyor bar gyur ro //. 28 PVP D58a7b1/P66b34: de ltar na bdag tu mon par en pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pai skyon gyi tshogs jug par gyur i / bdag tu chags pas kya gnas yos su len par byed do //. 29 Genealogy as a free rendering of Karakagomins krama (lit. sequence, succession; PVSV 401,2526: kena puna kramea do satkyadarand utpatti /).
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coherent picture of the sequence avidy(ayatanaspara vedan)tupdnabhavajti, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelvemembered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakrtis opinion, the false view of self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in ones own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakrti points out that once [the notion of] a self exists, the notion of the other (parasaj) [arises, and] from this distinction between self and other [is born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the moral faults arise.30 For reasons that I shall explain below, I am inclined not to follow the traditional explanation that links grasping/attachment to (the notion of) the self and aversion to the notion of the other.31 For the time being, let us leave this problem out of consideration and focus on the genealogy of otherness: As long as the mind adheres to a self (tmeti), [it has] the notion of a self (tmasaj), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the mind] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.32 In
PV 2.219 (ry metre): tmani sati parasaj svaparavibhgt parigrahadveau / anayo sampratibaddh sarve do prajyante //. Delusion (moha), covetousness (lobha) and hatred/aversion (dvea) are traditionally held to be the three root-defilements (mlaklea) or roots of evil (akualamla); see AK 5.20c and AKBh 291,8. Note, e.g., AK 5.48a2b: rgotth hrkyauddhatyamatsar. From out of lust there proceeds disrespect, dissipation, and avarice (Pruden 19881990: III.843, Koa 5.91). For definitions of hrkya, auddhatya and matsara, see AKBh 59,1920 (Pruden 19881990: I.200, Koa 2.170), AKBh 312,17 (Pruden 19881990: I.194, Koa 2.161) and AKBh 312,1617 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa 5.90). AK 5.48a2b: krodherye pratighnvaye. From out of hatred there proceeds envy and anger (Pruden 19881990: III.843, Koa 5.91). For definitions of krodha and ry, see AKBh 312,16 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa 5.90) and AKBh 312,19 (Pruden 19881990: III.842, Koa V.90). 31 PVP D95b1/P110b56: bdag id du bzu ba la yos su dzin pa ni mon par chags pao // gan id du rnam par phye ba la sda ba yin te / yos su dor bao //. PVV 87,1516: svaparavibhgc ca krat svaparayor yathkrama parigraho bhivago dvea paritygas tau bhavata /. 32 PVP D95a7/P110b45: ji srid du blo bdag ces mon par en pa de srid du bdag tu du es pa da de yod na de ltar mi dzin pa ga yin pa de thams cad gan yin no //.
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another statement, Dharmakrti declares that the false view of self generates the belief in ones own (tmyagraha).33 Persons deluded by the false view of self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed desire (rga), craving (t), grasping (pari graha) or attachment/love (sneha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, I am inclined not to consider these terms as (always) synonymous, and to believe that Dharmakrti introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If I am correct, from the false view of self arises first attachment or love for the self and ones own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza: The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self, thinking of it as] I. Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves for the delights [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the drawbacks [of the things he deems conducive to these delights].34 Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret love as love for the self.35 Whereas attachment is directed to the self (but bears upon the conditioned factors), craving is directed to the delights (sukha) of the self,36 i.e., to the things that are deemed conducive to these delights,37 or to impure (ssrava) things that are (deemed) favourable (anugrhaka) in that they are conducive to the delights (of the self).38 Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions such
PVSV 111,18: tmadaranam tmyagraha praste /. PV 2.217: ya payaty tmna tatrsyham iti vata sneha / sne ht sukheu tyati t dos tiraskurute //. Note that kyabuddhi interprets doa as jtijarmaraa (PV D138b1/P170b8). 35 PVP D95a6/P111a2, PVV 87,3. 36 PVP D95a6/P111a2: bdag gi bde la sred gyur 37 PVV 87,34: sukhasdhanatvendhyavasitn vastnm 38 PVP D95b1/P111a45: bde ba sgrub par byed pa id du e bar gro ba zag pa da bcas pai dos po On anugrhaka, see also PVSV 402,8:
34 33
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as tmasneha,39 tmtmyasneha40 or even satkyasneha,41 we also find Devendrabuddhis definition of sneha: [We call] love an inclination for self and ones own which presupposes the [aforementioned delusion]. 42 According to Dharmakrti, self-love and attachment for what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of aversion (pratigha) and hatred (dvea): Indeed, the one who, without grasping (parigraha), sees that there is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unattached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for that which does not hinder the self or ones own, nor for that which opposes the [said] hindrance. 43 One can show aversion or hatred only for that which hinders (< uparodha) or harms (< p) what has been taken as self and ones own:44 Hatred [arises] with regard to
tmtmyatvena tadanugrhakatvena parikalpya 39 E.g., PVP D58a12/P66a3. 40 PVP D57b3/P65b4. Love for self and ones own is said to be directed to the object that is clung to as self and ones own (tmtmyatvbhinivie viaye tmtmyasneha, PVSV 401,2627). 41 E.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7: jig tshogs la chags pa. 42 PVP D60a2/P68b2 3: de son du so ba can gyi bdag da bdag gir en pa ni chags pao //. Note also PVP D94b7/P109b45: chags pa ni bdag tu mon par chags pao // (maybe: sneha tmany abhivaga). 43 PVSV 111,1517: na hi nha na mameti payata parigraham antarea kvacit sneha / na cnanurgia kvacid dvea / tmtmynuparodhiny uparodhapratightini ca tadabhvt /. 44 According to PVSV 402,12: tmtmyatvena ghtasya ya uparodha p /. Note also Devendrabuddhis definition of dvea at PVP D60a2/P68b3: de (= chags pa) son du so ba can rjes su chags pai yul la gnod par byed pa la mnar sems pa ni e sda o //. Hatred is maliciousness with regard to that which injures the object of attachment[, a maliciousness] that presupposes the [afore-mentioned love]. The Sanskrit original for Tib. mnar sems pa is unclear. I would conjecture vypannacitta, although, to the best of my knowledge, mnar (ba) is not attested as a translation of vypanna(/vypda): vypannacitta = gnod sems at AKBh 251,10 and 12 on AK 4.81ac1 (de pense mchante in Koa 4.178) as well as in the Sacetan yastra quoted in AKVy 400,915 on AKBh 237,18. Jaini 2001:221: The kleas are like roots which produce as well as sustain an evil volition. Abhidhy, vypda, and mithydi are not called roots, but are recognized as intensive states of the three roots of evil (akualamla), viz. lobha, dvea, and moha respectively.
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that alone which offers opposition (pratiklavartin) by its hostility to that which love for the self and ones own bears upon (viayabhta). Therefore, there is no hatred without love for the self and ones own. 45 Dharmakrtis unambiguous derivation of aversion from love is the reason why I cannot agree with Devendrabuddhis and Manorathanandins interpretation of PV 2.219b (svapara vibhgt parigrahadveau), which presupposes that what is other than the self can only arouse hatred. In Dharmakrtis eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the delights of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies ones running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (updna),46 and what Dharmakrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab: Seeing [but] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] mine, and appropriates (upd) the means [that are conducive] to them. 47 But Dharmakrti also holds love for the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (paunarbhavika): craving for (future) existence (bhavat), craving for sensual pleasures (kmat), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (vibhavat).48 According
All evil volitions are essentially rooted in and spring from one or another of these three basic passions (mlaklea). 45 PVSV 402,1315: tmtmyasnehaviayabhtavirodhena ya sthita pratiklavart tatraiva dvea / tasmn ntmtmyasneham antarea dvea iti /. 46 AK 3.23cd: updna tu bhogn prptaye paridhvata /. 47 PV 2.218ab (ry metre): guadar parityan mameti tatsdhanny updatte /. 48 PVP D79b34/P91a78: de la sdug bsal kun byu phags pai bden pa ga e na / ga sred pa di ni ya srid par byu ba can dga bai dod chags da bcas pa de da de la mon par dga bai a tshul can / di lta ste dod pai sred pa da srid pai sred pa da jig pai sred pa yin no es gsus so //. PVA 134,33135,2: ukta hi bhagavat tatra katamat samudaya ryasatyam / yeya t paunarbhavik nandrgasahagat tatratatrbhinandin / yad
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to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (pravtti) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (sukhpti), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (dukhnpti). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. bhava (literally existence), which is to be understood as the act(ion) that results in future existence (bhaviyadbhavaphala karma): bhava refers to the act(ion)s resulting in rebirth (paunarbhavika) that are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst.49 In these stanzas, Dharmakrti brings together both meanings of bhava, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self, and the (future) existence that they inevitably lead to: The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire of obtaining pleasure and avoiding suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since love for the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unpleasurable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].50
uta k[m]at bhavat vibhavat ceti PVV 74,1011: nankta bhagavat tatra katama samudaya ryasatya paunarbhavik nandrgasahagat tatratatrbhinandin yad uta kmat bhavat vibhavat ceti For the Pli text, see Vetter 1990: 87, n. 1. 49 AKBh 132,1921 (together with AK 3.24ab): sa bhaviyadbhavaphala kurute karma tad bhava / sa viay prptiheto paridhvan paunarbhavika karmopacinoti so sya bhava /. 50 PV 2.183a2185: hetur bhavavch parigraha / yasmd deavieasya tatprptykto nm // s bhavecch ptyanptccho pravtti sukhadukhayo / yato pi prina kmavibhavecche ca te mate // sar vatra ctmasnehasya hetutvt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasajasya tasmt t bhavraya //.
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2.1.5. Although the standard formulation of dependent origination is traditionally held to range over three (Vaibhika) or two (Yogcra, Sautrntika) lifetimes,51 at least some of its members can also be seen at work on the much shorter sequence of a few interdependent psychological events. According to Vasubandhu, desire follows (anuete, or: is connected to, samprayukta) a pleasant sensation (sukh vedan), whereas aversion follows (or: is connected to) an unpleasant sensation (dukh vedan).52 Dharmakrti agrees with this commonsense statement.53 Depending on whether a given tangible object (spraavya) is considered favourable (anugrhaka) or unfavourable to the self, the pleasant or unpleasant sensations born from the contact between this object and the sense faculties are conducive to the rise of defilements such as desire or hatred.54 This obviously conforms to the prattyasamutpda sequence linking a sensory basis (yatana), contact (spara) between the former and an object, sensation, and craving. But as we have seen, to deem a given object favourable or unfavourable to the self belongs to the personalistic false view. Note should be made here that the erroneous aspects which the personalistic false view consists of overlap in part with those traditionally called wrong notions or misconceptions (viparysa), which amount to four55 and
For a useful overview, see Kritzer 1999: 6772. AKBh 312,12: trivedanvat tri bandhanni / sukhy hi vedany rgo nuete lambanasamprayogbhym / dukhy dvea /. AK 5.55ab + AKBh 316,6 and 8: sukhbhy samprayukto hi rga / sukhasaumanasybhy rga samprayukta / dveo viparyayt / dukhbhym ity artha / dukhena daurmanasyena ca /. 53 See PV 2.151c2d: rgder vikro pi sukhdija /, and the discussion below. 54 According to PVP D66a56/P75b56: reg byai khyad par gyi don phan dogs par byed pa da de las gan pai rjes su byed pas bde baam sdug bsal lam (sic) dod chags la sogs pa skye ba da rjes su mthun pa yin pa 55 To take the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasant, the impure as pure, and the selfless as a self (AKBh 283,57: catvro viparys / anitye nityam iti / dukhe sukham iti / aucau ucti / antmany tmeti /). With the exception of the (im)pure, they correspond to the erroneous aspects one superimposes on the Truth of suffering (see above, n. 8).
52
51
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are regularly held to be caused by imagination (sakalpa).56 ntarakita and Kamalala provide interesting materials regarding the rise of defilements from wrong notions. According to ntarakita, defilements such as desire arise once [erroneous aspects] such as beautiful, ones own, lasting [or pleasant] have been superimposed on a woman, etc.57 A little later, he says: [A sensation] such as a pleasant or unpleasant [one] arises in the presence of a [sensory] object[, say a woman]. For those who despise [suspending] wisdom (pratisakhyna) [and] are subject to improper reflection, this [sensation] gives rise to defilements such as desire or hatred, which are [themselves] born from the ripening of a homologous latent tendency.58 What does this amount to? The contact between an obOn sakalpa, see May 1959: 181n. 586, PrP 451,9 ff., and the following excerpts: PVP D68a45/P77b878a1: ci ste di la ya kun tu rtog pa ya yan lag id du rtog par gyur ba dei tshe kun tu rtog pa ya bdag da bdag gi da gtsa ba da bde ba la sogs pai mi can gyi mtshan id kyi sa bon yin no //. PVP D67a34/P76b56: ga gis bud med ga ig gi gzugs la sogs pa la kun tu rtog par byed ci dod chags kyis gdus pa de ni TSP 666,25667,9/ K547,89: attngate pi viaye sakalpavad abhivddhasukhdiviparysasya pusa pratisakhynanivttau te rgdn prabalatva dyate /. MMK 23.1: sakalpaprabhavo rgo dveo moha ca kathyate / ubhubhaviparysn sambhavanti prattya hi //. PrP 452,45: tatra hi ubham kra prattya rga utpadyate / aubha prattya dvea / viparysn prattya moha utpadyate / sakalpas tv e traym api sdhraakraam utpattau /. PVSV 166,29167,2 gl. sakalpita (PV 1.70d) as ropita. To sum up, sakalpa is the bja of the wrong notions or, equivalently, of the erroneous aspects, which in turn form the bases (raya < ritya) or conditions (pratyaya < prattya) of the defilements; to put it as shortly as Candrakrti, sakalpa is the common cause (sdhraakraa) for the rise of the defilements. On sakalpa, see also below, nn. 68 and 69. 57 TS 1951ac/K1952ac: ubhtmyasthird ca samropygandiu / rgdaya pravartante Pleasant according to TSP 667,1314/ K547,1214 thereon: tm*tmyanityasukhdykrn abhtn evropayanto gandiu pravartante, na ca ubhdirp viay /. *TSPK with no equivalent of tm. 58 TS 19531954d1/K19541955d1 (leaving tu untranslated): viayopanipte tu sukhadukhdisambhav / tasmt samnajtyavsanparipkaj // rgadvedaya kle pratisakhynavidvim / ayoniomanaskravidheynm Note also PV 2.157ac: sajtivsanbhedapratibaddhapravttaya / rgdaya PVV 66,810: sajtivsan
56
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ject and a sense faculty generates an affective sensation (pleasant, unpleasant, or neutral). People who do not devote themselves to meditative practices such as the contemplation of the loathsome (aubhabhvan),59 and are therefore under the sway of improper reflection, superimpose erroneous aspects on the object: that it is a women, of course, but also that she is attractive, desirable, (at least virtually) ones own, etc. Affective sensation as well as the superimposed aspects is in turn responsible for the actualization of the latent tendency of desire.60 Commenting on his masters two stanzas, Kamalala provides us with a more systematic account of the sequence at stake: For such is the sequence [of events]: When an object is present, a pleasure born of the sense faculty arises. And for those who, in the absence of any [suspending] wisdom, abide in the improper reflection consisting of wrong notions such as self, this pleasure brings to maturity (vipka) the latent tendency imprinted by previous desire, etc. From this [coming to] maturity, defilements such as desire arise. Therefore, the objects [themselves] are not directly the cause [of defilements].61 How should we untmtm yagrahamlasya sajte (Vibh. 66 n. 1: satkyadaranasya) prvapr vbhyastasya rgder vsan parparargdijanik aktayas ts bheda parasparatas tatra pratibaddh pravttir janma ye te tath Here, sajtivsan is analysed as a genitive tatpurua: latent tendencies of the homologous [defilements which are rooted in the belief in self and ones own]. But according to Devendrabuddhi and kyabuddhi, the compound is to be analysed as a dvandva (PV D123a23/P150b7): sajti refers to the satkyadi (tmtm yadi in PVP D68a68/P78a3 5) whereas the vsan(bheda) consists in the prvargdyhitabja. 59 TSP 666,2223/K547,6: aubhdipratisakhyna. According to PVP D67a67/P77a12, rgdi do not occur in those who have the aubhdisaj. Note also Kamalalas definition at TSP 666,23/K547,67: aubhdylamban rgdipratipakabht praj pratisakhynam /, which may be compared with AKVy 389,13 on AKBh 226,1314: pratisakhynasya tatpratipakabhvanlakaasya, where tat = klea (context: nirva). Note also AKBh 4,1 on AK 1.6ab1: dukhdnm ryasatyn pratisakhyna pratisakhy prajviea (see also Koa 1.8, and AKVy 16,47). 60 On latent tendencies and their actualization, see Eltschinger 2009: 57 58, nn. 5355. 61 TSP 667,1922/K547,26548,2: ea hi krama viayopanipte satndriyaja sukham utpadyate, tasmc ca sukht pratisakhynavaikalye
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derstand this strong insistence on the responsibility of improper reflection in the rise of defilements? 2.1.6. That improper reflection62 is closely connected with ignorance/personalistic belief and is part of the process leading to the rise of defilements can be easily substantiated.63 The problem raised by the source materials is rather that they testify to contradictory views regarding the relationship between improper reflection and ignorance/personalistic belief. Some sources (mainly Yogcra) introduce improper reflection in the definition of the personalistic belief, which is held to be the manner deluded people improperly consider the five constituents of being as self and
saty tmdiviparysalakayoniomanaskre sthitn prvargdyhitavsanparipko bhavati, tato rgdaya kle pravartanta iti na skd viay kraam /. Note also Prajkaraguptas remarks while commenting on Dharmakrtis polemics against a Materialist upholding medical ideas (PVA 122,2223): sukhdijo hi rgdir na kaph[]dibhv / sukha ca kasyacit kathacid upalabdham ntaravsanprabodht / tato na rgdayo doebhya iti yuktam /. Though ntarakita and Kamalala cannot be suspected of allegiance toward Vaibhika thought, their views are reminiscent of an interesting passage in the AK(Bh), according to which a defilement arises out of three factors: first, its propensity (anuaya) has not been eliminated; second, an object (viaya, dharma) that is conducive to the actualization of desire for sensual pleasures (kmargaparyavasthnya) is present and perceived (bhsagata); thirdly, an improper reflection occurs with regard to the said object. AK 5.34, together with AKBh 305,1920: aprahd anuayd viayt pratyupasthitt / ayoniomanaskrt klea tad yath rgnuayo praho bhavaty aparijta kmargaparyavasthny ca dharm bhsagat bhavanti tatra cyoniomanaskra eva kmarga utpadyate /. 62 AKBh 54,23: manaskra cetasa bhoga /. AKVy 127,33128,2 thereon: manaskra cetasa bhoga iti / lambane cetasa varjanam / avadhraam ity artha / manasa kro manaskra / mano v karoty varjayatti manaskra /. PVSV 50,2951,12: ayonia itydy asyaiva samarthanam / yoni padrthnm anityadukhntmdi / samyagdaranapras[]tihetu tvt / ta asaty lambata iti yonia / yoni yoni manaskarotti sakhyaikavacand vpsym (P 5.4.43) iti aspratyayo v / tathbhta csau manaskra ceti yoniomanaskro nairtmyajnam /. 63 On ayoniomanaskra and avidy, see La Valle Poussin 1913: 89, and especially Mejor 2001. On the improper reflections conditioning and reinforcing dis, see the passage of AN I.31 alluded to by Mejor (2001: 50 + n. 5); see also AKBh 5.3233 in Mejor 2001: 51.
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ones own.64 Some materials regard improper reflection as caused by ignorance: this is the case of the Stra quoted in the AKBh, according to which, depending on the eye and visible [objects,] an incorrect (vila) reflection born of delusion (mohaja) arises.65 Much more common seem to be sources viewing improper reflection as the cause of ignorance/personalistic belief: this is the case in a Sutta of the MN and two Suttas from the AN,66 in the MS,67 in the Sat yadvayanirdea(stra) as it is quoted by Kamalala in BhK 1,68 and in the Sahetusapratyayanidnastra as it is quoted in AKVy 288,2629 and used by Bhadanta rlta to demonstrate that ignorance (as the first link of dependent origination) has indeed a cause.69 Having quoted and commented on various excerpts
See Eltschinger 2009: 6869, nn. 92 and 110. AKBh 135,1314 and AKVy 288,3031: caku prattya rpi cot padyate vilo manaskro mohaja iti /. Note also AKBh 135,7 (in a quotation): avidyhetuka cyoniomanaskra /. 66 MN I.6 ff. (no. 2, Sabbsavasutta). Here, the ayoniso manasikra is held to be responsible for the rise (uppajjhanti) and the increase (pavahanti) of the three cankers (kmsava, bhavsava and avijjsava), which are in turn responsible for the rise of false views (dihi) concerning personal identity in the past (atta addhnam), in the future (angata addhnam) and in the present (paccuppanna addhnam), such as atthi me att ti and natthi me att ti. On this passage, see Collins 1982: 118119; for similar expressions of the satkyadi/sakkyadihi, see Eltschinger 2009: 7375. AN V.113 ff. (no. 61, Avijjsutta) and V.116 ff. (no. 62 Tahsutta). According to the Avijjsutta, ayonisomanasikra belongs to the eight aliments (hra) of avijj; see Mejor 2001: 5255. 67 MS 2.20.9 (Lamotte 1973: I.34): mon par en pai rnam par rtog pa ni di lta ste / tshul bin ma yin pai yid la byed pa las byu bai jig tshogs la lta bai rtsa ba las byu ba lta bar so ba drug cu rtsa gis da mtshus par ldan pai rnam par rtog pa ga yin pao //. See also Lamotte 1973: II.115. 68 BhK 1.215[/525],714: katha majur kle vinaya gacchanti / katha kle parijt bhavanti / majurr ha / paramrthato tyantjtnutpannbhveu (sic, <Tib, but nabh ms) sarvadharmeu savtysadviparysa / tasmd asadviparyst sakalpavikalpa / tasmt sakalpavikalpd ayoniomanasikra / tasmd ayoniomanasikrd tmasamropa / tasmd tmasamropd diparyutthnam / tasmd diparyutthnt kle pravartante /. 69 anya in AKBh 135,12, Bhadanta rlta according to AKVy 289,23; AKBh 135,1217: anya punar ha / ayonio manaskro hetur avidyy ukta
65 64
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of the Stra, Yaomitra comes to the conclusion of a circularity (cakraka), i.e., that improper reflection and ignorance condition each other.70 This is indeed the position most clearly exhibited by the Paramrthagths.71 To the best of my knowledge, Dharmakrti alludes only twice to improper reflection in the context of the rise of defilements. Unfortunately, both statements are far from unambiguous. In PVSV 8,2021, Dharmakrti says that [moral faults] such as desire presuppose [ones] adherence to self and ones own, for the rise of
strntare / sa cpi sparakle nirdia / caku prattya rpi cotpadyate vilo manaskro mohaja iti / vedankle cvayam avidyay bhavitavayam / avidysasparaja vedita prattyotpann teti strntart / ata sparakle bhavann ayoniomanaskro vedansahavartiny avidyy pratyayabhvena siddha iti nsty ahetukatvam avidyy See Koa 3.71n. 4. The whole discussion starts with the Sthavira Vasubandhus (AKVy 289,6: sthaviro vasubandhur cryamanorathopdhyya evam ha) claim that ignorance is not causeless on the basis of a Stra (the Sahetu sapratyayasanidnastra according to AKVy 288,2526; AKBh 135,7: ayoniomanaskrahetuk vidyokt strntare /). As quoted by Yaomitra (AKVy 288,2629), this Stra runs as follows: avidy bhikava sahetuk sapratyay sanidn / ka ca bhikavo vidyy hetu ka pratyaya ki nidnam / avidyy bhikavo yoniomanaskro hetur ayoniomanaskra pratyayo yoniomanaskro nidnam iti stre vacant /. This passage is also quoted in PrP 452,79 (avidypi bhikava sahetuk sapratyay sanidn / ka ca bhikavo vidyy hetu / ayonio bhikavo manaskro vidyy hetu / vilo mohajo manaskro bhikavo vidyy hetur iti), but as coming from the Prattyasamutpdastra (PrP 452,6 [but see n. 3 thereon], Koa 3.70n. 3). Immediately after the quotation, Candrakrti remarks (PrP 452,9): ato vidy sakalpaprabhav bhavati /. Note also Yaomitras (AKVy 289,1) reference to the Prattyasamutpdastra. Mejor (2001: 6165) has translated Vasubandhus polemics against rlta (AKBh 134,2025 and 135,727). 70 AKVy 290,57: tad etac cakrakam ukta bhavati / ayoniomanaskrd avidy / avidyy cyoniomanaskra iti /. This is, indeed, the position of the Sahetusapratyayasanidnastra (1. [moha] vilo manasikra ayoniomanaskra avidy t karman cakus [but also ear, nose, tongue, body and mind]; 2. cakus karman t avidy ayoniomanaskra); see above, n. 69, and Mejor 2001: 58 and 6569 (Mejors translation of the Stra from Tibetan and Chinese sources). 71 Paramrthagth 20 (Wayman 1961: 170): ayoniomanaskrt samoho jyate sa ca / ayoniomanaskro nsamhasya jyate //.
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all moral faults presupposes improper reflection.72 A little later, he refers to a specific condition for the rise of desire, viz. improper reflection that consists in the false view of self/viz. the false view of self and improper reflection.73 Commenting on the first passage, kyabuddhi and Karakagomin clearly equate the personalistic belief with improper reflection.74 But commenting on the second passage, they allow both a dvandva and a karmadhraya analysis of the compound tmadaranyoniomanaskra.75 Though I am inclined to interpret these two passages as involving an equivalence between the false view of self and improper reflection, I would like to refrain from any conjecture regarding Dharmakrtis position on this issue.76 In the same way, I would like to postpone any attempt at organizing the above-mentioned (2.1.56) psychological events into a sequence of phases exhibiting their mutual relationships. At
PVSV 8,2021: tmtmybhiniveaprvak hi rgdayo yoniomanaskraprvakatvt sarvadootpatte /. 73 PVSV 10,11: rgotpattipratyayavieetmadaranyoniomanaskrea yogt /. 74 PV Je D23b12/P28a12 = PVSV 51,1213: tmdijnam ayoniomanaskras tatprvakatvt sar vargdidootpatte /. 75 PV Je D27a23/P32a57 = PVSV 55,2956,12: tmadarana satkyadi / nityasukhdiviparyso yoniomanaskra / dvandvasamsa cyam / tmadaranam evyoniomanaskra iti vieaasamso v /. Interestingly enough, kyabuddhi and Karakagomin explain improper reflection as a wrong notion such as permanent or pleasant, which matches perfectly Kamalalas definition of improper reflection as wrong notion such as self. According to these authors, then, improper reflection and wrong notions are conceptually equivalent. See above, n. 61. 76 Lambert Schmithausen (personal communication) has drawn my attention to the possibility that in the first passage (PVSV 8,2021), Dharmakrti may not be providing a logical justification, but rather a legitimation of his position by resorting to a more traditional phraseology involving a co-extensivity of the two concepts: d.h. weil sie [bekanntermaen] ayoniomanaskra voraussetzen(, und dieser in nichts anderem besteht als eben dem tmtmybhinivea). By interpreting the compound in the second passage (PVSV 10,11) as a karmadhraya, one may, then, read the two passages as exhibiting a homogeneous perspective.
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the present state of research, such an attempt would only be idle speculation.77 2.1.7. Both wrong notions and the personalistic false view consist in the superimposition of erroneous aspects. Both are born of the actualization of a homogeneous latent tendency, which is the hallmark of conceptual construction. In other words, they are but conceptual constructs distorting both internal (the updnaskandhas) and external reality. Dharmakrtis understanding of the personalistic belief harmonizes perfectly well with his overall conception of ignorance as the concealing conceptuality. As for his commentators, they seem to be justified in holding the satkyadi to be a part, a branch or a specific case of ignorance as a whole. That all conceptual constructs misrepresent reality, and sometimes are even deceiving from a practical point of view, does in no way mean that they are morally and (hence) eschatologically harmful. The su-
77 To the best of my knowledge, no study has ever been dedicated to the issue of the Buddhist epistemologists way(s) of dealing with the Abhidharmic cittasamprayuktasaskras. Their assent to Vasubandhus treatment of them cannot be taken for granted. To adduce but one example: saj is classified as a mahbhmika, and as such, should occur together with vijna/citta/ manas; but nicaya(jna), the Buddhist epistemologists equivalent of saj, takes place after the sensory awareness (the latter giving rise to the vsanprabodha of the conceptual construct). In the present context, I think we should refrain from modelling the epistemologists conception of ignorance and improper reflection on Bhadanta rltas above-mentioned (see n. 69) elaborations on this topic. According to him, the improper reflection that is present at the moment of contact (sparakle) is the condition (pratyaya) for the ignorance that coexists with sensation (vedansahavartiny avidy) and in turn gives rise to craving. On the contrary, an Arhats unbiased (aviparta) contact does not give rise to a defiled sensation (kli vedan), which in turn does not provide a condition for craving. As both rlta (at least Vasubandhus rlta) and Yaomitra describe it, Arhats do have sensations, but these do not generate craving, for only sensations that are accompanied by ignorance (svidya) give rise to craving (AKVy 290,1315: arhatm asti vedan / na ca s ty pratyaybhavatti / svidyaiva vedan tpratyaya iti gamyate /.) rlta adduces a reasoning (yukti) in order to make his point (AKBh 135,2022): kay yukty / na hi niravady vedan ty pratyaybhavaty arhat na cviparta spara kliy vedany / na ca punar niravadyasyrhata sparo viparta ity anay yukty /).
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perimposition of ego-related aspects alone results in the rise of defilements and reinforces ones entanglement in sasra. Dharmakrti singles out this kind of harmful conceptual distortion as the personalistic belief.78
2.2. Ignorance, inference, and the path toward salvation

2.2.1. Like most Indian systems of salvation, Buddhism traces human beings unsatisfactory condition back to ignorance, and presents itself as a cleansing and illuminative therapy aimed at uprooting ignorance and the evils it is responsible for. Though the Buddhist epistemologists do not (even pretend to) bring any doctrinal or practical innovation into traditional Buddhist soteriologies, they lay strong emphasis on the means of valid cognition (prama) as being instrumental in salvation. As is well known, Dignga reduced the number of genuine pramas from three (perception, inference, and scriptures [gama]) to two (perception and inference). At the present state of our knowledge about Dignga, however, it is difficult to estimate the extent to which non-epistemological, i.e., religious (lato sensu) considerations played a role in this epistemological reduction. If one cannot question Dharmakrtis endorsement and consolidation of Digngas two-headed system as far as the epistemology is concerned, one might still argue that Dharmakrtis religious ideas, as they are known to us, provided, if not the basic framework, at least a strong additional motivation for sticking to this epistemology. This two-headed system could, after all, lay no claim to traditionally sanctioned authority before Dignga.79 In my opinion, Dharmakrti was deeply convinced that
PVSV 110,2021: te [= do] vikalpaprabhav /. PVSV 398,2325 thereon: vikalpd ayoniomanasikravikalpt prabhava utpda em iti vigraha / tath hy ayoniomanaskram antarea saty api bhye rthe notpadyante rgdaya 79 According to Frauwallner (1959), Vasubandhu had already restricted the number of pramas from three to two in his Vdavidhi. But this might well be another case of Frauwallners use of the argumentum ex/a silentio: the fact that no fragment dealing with (pt)gama is available to us does not mean that the original Vdavidhi did not address scripture as a third genuine means of valid cognition. At any rate, Vasubandhu seems to acknowledge
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perception and inference are enough both to shape and bring about the path to salvation and to provide the basic gnoseological features of the liberated yogin. To put it in a nutshell: Although it is conceptual in nature and thus belongs to ignorance, inference is the means through which perception, which is nothing but knowledge, can be brought to function in its most genuine manner. Dharmakrtis system is in a way analogous to Tathgatagarbha patterns of thought: though polluted by (ultimately adventitious) false views and defilements, the condition of the liberated mind is already here at hand. To be more precise, perception is basically the same with regard to its operation and objects before and after the revolution of the basis (rayaparivtti). The only (but admittedly crucial) difference is that, at the completion of the path, it is no longer adulterated and contradicted by the counteracting cognitive factor called ignorance. Correcting erroneous superimpositions of all kinds and substituting them with true/validated intellectual contents is the basic task of inference. Far from being a means of investigating the world and improving knowledge, inference aims first and fore-
three means of valid cognition in his AKBh (76,2425: pram bhvt / na hi pramam asti pratyakam anumnam ptgamo v ) as well as in VY 173,1617: mdor na rigs pa ni dir tshad ma rnam pa gsum po mon sum da rjes su dpag pa da yid ches pai gsu o //). Buddhist eristic-dialectical treatises are at great variance concerning the number (and definitions) of the pramas: four (or five) in the Hetuvidy Section of the YBh (see, e.g., HV [3.2] 4*,1516, where the last five items of the list defining sdhana must be considered as pramas because of their functional similarity (providing evidence [yuktivda] for the hetu, see HV [3.22] 5*,35): srpya vairpya pratyakam anumnam ptgama ca; to the best of my knowledge, the HV only uses the term prama with regard to pratyaka; therefore, the number of the pramas here is either five [or four if we consider that srpya and vairpya occur once in a singular dvandva compound] or only one), four in the *Upyahdaya/*Prayogasra (*pratyakam anumnam upamnam gama ca; see *UH 6,1011 and 13,5 ff.), three in Asagas Abhidharmasamuccaya (which, maybe on the basis of the BoBh and the Madhyntavibhga, sets the standard number for all subsequent Yogcra treatises), i.e., pratyaka, anumna and ptgama (see ASBh 152,27, 153,1 and 153,5).
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most at discarding the erroneous superimpositions that ignorance is ultimately responsible for.80 2.2.2. As we have seen, ignorance basically amounts to superimposition, concealment/covering, conceptual construct and pseudoperception. As such, ignorance is of a cognitional character and consists in an anti-knowledge, in a mental event counteracting, contradicting or conflicting with knowledge. What does, then, knowledge consist in? As we have seen, Dharmakrtis commentators define it as the vision/perception of a real object (bhtrtha/sadarthadarana), or the grasping of a real object (bhtrthagrahaa).81 In these expressions, darana and grahaa hint at perception and direct cognition (vijna), two terms denoting immediate sensory awareness of an object.82 According to Dharmakrti, the nature of an object is undivided and amenable to sense perception.83 This is tantamount to claiming that a single act of perception is enough to grasp this nature, and that it grasps it in its entirety (sarvtman), in all its aspects (sarvkrea), so that no other means of valid cognition is needed for cognizing this nature in a positive way (vidhin): Perception leaves no part of this undivided nature unknown, so that, say, inference or verbal knowledge might be needed in order to gain access to it.84 In other words, a single perception grasps an object as selfless and momentary, or, to be more precise, grasps a selfless and momentary thing.85 This can,
On the corrective function of inference, see Kellner 2004: 49. See Eltschinger 2009: 4142, n. 6. 82 AK 1.16a: vijna prativijapti; AKBh 11,7: viaya viaya prati vijaptir upalabdhir vijnaskandha ity ucyate /. AKVy 38,24: upalabdhir vastumtragrahaam /. 83 PV 1.43: ekasyrthasvabhvasya pratyakasya sata svayam /; PVSV 26,4: eko hy arthtm / sa pratyaka 84 PV 1.45: dasya bhvasya da evkhilo gua /; PVSV 26,56: tasya pratyakeaiva siddhe sarvkrasiddhe / tadanyasysiddhasybhvt /; PVSV 26,911: tasmt pratyake dharmii tatsvabhvaskalyaparicchedt tatrnavak pramntaravtti syt /; PVSV 121,1718: pratyakadt svabhvt ko nya /. Through perception, bare particulars are grasped in their entire true nature (dasarvatattva PVSV 26,14). 85 PVSV 43,811: npi svalakaasynityatvdyabhva / yasmn n81 80
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of course, be traced back to Dharmakrtis Sautrntika assumption that a perceptual awareness results directly from a real things causal efficiency. According to a well-known statement, experts in reason(ing) hold that [for a given thing] to be a graspable [object] consists in being a cause capable of casting (arpaa) [its own] aspect into cognition.86 That real things cast their own aspect into the consciousness, thus giving rise to perceptual awareness, is the basic meaning of the description of this awareness as arising by the force of something real (vastubalapravtta). Dharmakrti makes it especially clear in the following statement: The property of a [perceptual] cognition is to grasp an object; [as for] this [object, it] is grasped as it is, and it generates this [cognition of itself] through [its truly] existing nature. Such is the nature [of the cognition and of the object].87 Devendrabuddhi (as well as kyabuddhi and Kamalala) exhibits the rationale behind Dharmakrtis (provisionityatva nma kicid anyac cald vastuna / kaapratyupasthnadharmatay tasya tathbhtasya grahad etad eva bhavaty anityo yam anityatvam asyeti v /. Neither does the bare particular lack impermanence, etc., for what we call impermanence is nothing other than the transient entity [itself. But] this is so because [those who see the last phase* of a continuum] grasp such an [entity] as having the property of being present [during only one] phase, [and thus say, ascribing properties]: This is impermanent, or: This has impermanence. *The last phase (antyakaa) is defined in the following way by kyabuddhi and Karakagomin (PV Je D48a7/P56b8 = PVSV 95,30): sadakantarpratisandhy kao ntyakaa The last phase [of an entity] is the phase which is not connected with a new (antara) similar phase. According to PVSV 184,56, PVSV 43,811 answers the objection formulated in PVSV 42,1112: svalakae cnityatvdyapratter atdrpyam / te cvastudharmat /. And since one does not cognize impermanence, etc., in the bare particular, [the bare particular] does not have this nature[, viz. impermanence, etc.], and [hence imper manence, etc.] are not properties of [real] entities. Note also PVSV 21,46: sa eva hi bhva kaasthitidharm nityat vacanabhede pi dharmidharmatay nimitta vakyma /. 86 PV 3.247b2d: grhyat vidu / hetutvam eva yuktij jnkrrpaakamam //. See Hattori 1968: 53. 87 PV 2.206207a1: viayagrahaa dharmo vijnasya yathsti sa / ghyate so sya janako vidyamntmaneti ca // e prakti See also below, 2.2.6 and n. 136.
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nal) position as follows:88 When he is asked about the property of a cognition, the one who accepts that a cognition really grasps an object must answer that the property of a [perceptual] cognition is to grasp an object (= PV 2.206ab1). [And] if the property of all the cognitions possessing an object is to grasp an object, then they grasp [their] objects as they [really] are, () under an aspect such as impermanence, not under an unreal aspect. For in this way, if it is rationally established that a cognition cognizes (viaykaroti) an object as it [really] is, that which is not cognized in this way is due to an external89 or internal90 adventitious cause of error, just as the [erroneous] cognition of a snake in the case of a rope in a dark place abundant in/suitable for snakes. Therefore, to grasp the real aspect of an object is the nature of a cognition. If on the contrary (atha ca) [its] nature were to grasp [an object] erroneously, then it would not have the property of grasping any object [at all]. Because in this way the object would not be as the cognition cognizes [it], and because [the cognition] would not cognize the object as it [really] is, cognitions would be devoid of object, () [and] hence all entities would be unestablished () Therefore, the one who accepts a relationship between object and object-possessor has to hold that the property of a cognition is to grasp an object, [and] thus the nature of this [cognition] is to grasp the real aspect of an object. That which is other than this [i.e., unreal,] is produced by a [purely] adventitious condition.91 This argument draws a sharp delineation
In an introductory statement, kyabuddhi reminds his audience that the following argument does not match Dharmakrtis final, Yogcra position in epistemological matters. PV D133b23/P164b35: don dam par rnam par es pa ni don dzin par dod pas es bya ba la / don dam par rnam par es pa don dzin pa id ni ma yin te / gzu ba ma grub pai phyir ro // on kya re ig phyi rol gyi don yod par dod pa ga yin pa des di ltar dod par byao es bstan pai phyir de skad du brjod pa yin no //. 89 PV D133b34/P164b5: phyi rol lam es bya ba ni dra ba gan da gan byu ba la sogs pai khrul par byed pai rnam pao //. See below, nn. 116 and 139. 90 Tib. cig os = Skt. itara, lit. other [than external]. 91 PVP D87b588a4/P101a2b3: rnam par es pai chos kya ga e na / es dris pa na don dam par rnam par es pa ni don dzin par dod pas rnam es yul dzin pai chos es brjod par byao // ga gi tshe rnam par es pa yul
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between non-erroneous cognitions, which result directly from their objects causal efficiency, and erroneous cognitions, which result from a cause of error (bhrntinimitta, pratyaya). Whereas the former are termed vastubalapravtta, true (bhtrtha), and (being the minds) nature, the latter, which arise, among other factors, from the latent tendencies of erroneous conceptual constructs,92 are decan du gyur pa thams cad kyi chos yul dzin pa yin pa dei tshe / mi rtag (D rtag: P rtag rtag) pa la sogs pai rnam pa ga gis yul yod pa de bin du dzin gyur gyi med pai rnam pas ni ma yin no // de de ltar na es pa don ji lta ba bin du yul du byed par rigs pas thob pa na / de ltar na (D na: P om. na) rtogs pa ma yin pa ga yin pa de ni phyi rol lam cig os glo bur bai khrul pai rgyu mtshan gyis yin te / dper na sbrul du dris pai phyogs mi gsal bar thag pa la sbrul gyi (D gyi: P mi) es pa lta buo* // de bas na yul gyi rnam pa yod pa dzin pa ga yin pa de ni sems kyi ra bin no // ci ste ya log par dzin pa id ra bin yin pa dei tshe yul dzin pai chos ma yin no // de ltar na ji ltar es pas yul du byed pa de ltar don de ma yin i ji ltar don de yin pa de ltar yul du byed pa ma yin pai phyir / es pa dag yul med pa can du gyur bas de ltar na dos po thams cad ma grub pa yin te de bas na yul da yul can gyi dos po dod pa id kyis rnam par es pai chos yul dzin pa yin par brjod par byao // de ltar na dii ra bin ni ya dag pai yul gyi rnam pa dzin pa yin no // de rnam pa gan du gyur ba ga yin pa de ni glo bur gyi rkyen gyis byas pa id yin no //. * Vibh. 82 n. 4: mandamandaprake sarpopacite pradee /. Note also TSP 1056,211057,5/K872,27873,7: tath hi viayaviayibhvam icchat citta viayagrahaasvabhvam abhyupeyam, anyath viayajnayor na viayaviayibhva / arthagrahaasvabhvatvengkriyame yas tasya svabhvas tenaivtmano o rthas tena ghyata iti vaktavyam / anyath katham asau ghta syt / yady asatkrea ghyeta tata ca viayaviayibhvo na syt / tath hi yath jna viaykaroty artha na tath so rtha, yath so rtho na tath ta viaykarotti nirviayy eva jnni syu / tata ca sarvapadrthsiddhiprasaga / tas md bhtaviaykragrhit sya svabhvo nija iti sthitam / bhta ca svabhvo viayasya kaikntmdirpa iti pratipditam etat / tena nair tmyagrahaasvabhvam eva citta* ntmagrahaasvabhvam /. * TSPK reads eveti tan against TSP and TSPTib eva citta; both the Jaisalmer ms and the Pan ms read eve ! citta. On this passage of the TSP, see McClintock 2010: 213214. 92 PV D133b4/P164b56: cig os es bya ba ni na gi bdag id can gyi phyin ci log gi rnam par rtog pai bag chags es bya bas bslad pao //. In an etymologizing vein, Devendrabuddhi explains gantuka as follows (PVP D89a5/P103a2): rkyen gan gyi rgyu mtshan las os pa id yin pai phyir
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scribed as avastubalapravtta, as not agreeing with (means of) valid cognition (pramsavdin) and as adventitious (gantu[ka]). According to Dharmakrtis followers, this delineation only holds good provided perceptual cognitions cognize their objects in their real aspects. Claiming that a perceptual cognition grasps the real aspect of an object93 is tantamount to saying that it grasps aspects such as impermanence or selflessness.94 As Kamalala nicely puts it, it is firmly established that the intrinsic nature of the [mind] is to grasp the real aspect of an object; but it has been explained [earlier] that the real nature of an object consists of [its being] momentary, selfless, etc.; therefore, the mind has the grasping of selflessness for its nature.95 In other words, the nature of the mind is to perceive reality/the true nature (tattvadarana) of things.96 And granted that selflessness is the true nature of things, the mind turns out to be nothing other than discernment (vipayan) itself,97 which kyabuddhi defines as wisdom (praj) bearing upon selfless(*pratyayntaranimittd gatatvt). Erroneous cognitions and defilements are due to ra da rigs mthun pai e bar len pai rgyu (PVP D89a5 6/P103a23; *svasamnajtyopdnakraa; note PV Je D251b6/P299a45 = PVSV 400,30431,9: updnabalabhvti vitathavikalpavsanbalabhvi). 93 PVP D87b7/P101a6: yul gyi rnam pa yod pa ; PVP D88a3/P101b2 = PVP 89a1/P102b3: ya dag pai yul gyi rnam pa 94 PVP D88b34/P102a34: mi rtag pa la sogs pai rnam pa yod pai yul ; PVP D87b6/P101a4 = PVP D90a4/P104a4: mi rtag pa la sogs pai rnam pa ; PVP D89a6/P103a3: bdag med pa ; PVP D89b3/P103a8: bdag med pa id 95 TSP 1057,25/K873,57: bhtaviaykragrhit sya svabhvo nija iti sthitam / bhta ca svabhvo viayasya kaikntmdirpa iti pratipditam etat / tena nairtmyagrahaasvabhvam eva cittam For the context of this statement, see above, n. 91. 96 PVP D87a7/P100b3: sems kyi ra bin ni de kho na id mtho bai bdag id can yin (PV D133a34/P164a23: de kho na id mtho bai bdag id can yin gyi es bya ba ni dos po ji lta ba bin du gnas pai dzin pai* bdag id can es bya bai don to) *Cf. PVV 82,14: yathvasthitavastugrahaam; PVP D89b1/P103a6: sems ni o bo id kyis de kho na id mtho bai bdag id can yin 97 PVP D90a1/P103b8: ra bin ya lhag mtho yin
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ness.98 This Sautrntika epistemology forms the background of Dharmakrtis well-known allusion to the canonical topos of the minds being radiant (prabhsvara) by its very nature (prakty). Radiant is to be understood as having the nature of grasping [entities] as they really are (yathbhtagrahaasvabhva), or consisting in the perception of reality/the true nature [of things] (tattvadaranastmaka).99 Knowledge is nothing but direct perceptual awareness, i.e., the mirror-like mind grasping the true nature of real entities.100 What can be regained from Dharmakrtis understanding of knowledge seems to mirror a significant shift from the ideas held by his Yogcra predecessors. Defining a threefold ignorance, the YBh declares its antidotes (vipaka) to be the insights born of audition, reflection and (mental) cultivation.101 In his PrSVy, Vasubandhu defines knowledge as the insight born of reflection and (mental) cultivation.102 Dharmakrti assents, of course, to the fact that ignorance can only be eliminated by the practice of the path and its three (or at least two) successive types of insight. But according to him, soteric practice does not aim at developing entirely new cognitive modalities, but rather, at freeing from all counteracting factors a type of cognition that has already been here at hand.
98 PV D134b3/P166a1: lhag mtho ba yin la es bya ba bdag med pa la (D la: P la bya ba) dmigs pai es rab bo. Discernment is described in BhK 1.219,23220,4 as sarvadharmanisvabhvatlambana, and defined in BhK 3.5,1720 as follows: bhtapratyaveka ca vipayanocyate / bhta puna pudgaladharmanairtmyam / tatra pudgalanairtmya y skandhnm tmtmyarahitat / dharmanairtmya y tem eva myopamat /. For a French translation, see Lamotte 1987: 340. On vipayan/praj, see Eltschinger 2009: 5758 (1.2.5) and nn. 2627. 99 PVP D89a5/P103a1: od gsal te / ya dag pa ji lta ba bin du dzin pai ra bin yin no //; TS 3434ac1/K3435ac1: prabhsvaram ida citta tattvadaranastmakam / praktyaiva sthitam 100 On this point, see Eltschinger 2005: 190192. 101 YBh 206,67: rutamayy cintmayy bhvanmayy ca prajy vipakea traya paryy yathkrama yojyante /. 102 PrSVy 9a1: bsams pa da bsgoms pa las byu bai es rab ni rig pa es byao //.
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2.2.3. Contrary to knowledge, which, qua perception, is a cognition that is free of conceptual construction (kalpanpoha) and non-erroneous (abhrnta),103 the realm of ignorance is coextensive with conceptuality and error. Error, however, is not necessarily synonymous with unreliability (visavda, visavditva): Whereas erroneous is to be said of any cognition that does not arise from and hence display a bare particular, unreliable denotes those cognitions that are not conducive to a successful practical interaction with the particulars (or, as Dharmottara will say, that do not allow one to reach/obtain [prap] the concrete particular).104 All conceptual constructs are erroneous by their very nature and origin, but some of them are reliable (and hence valid cognitions, prama),105 whereas others are not. kyabuddhi and Karakagomin have an opponent ask the following question: [But] if every conceptual construct is simply erroneous, why [do you hold] conceptual constructs such as [being] impermanent or selfless [to be] valid cognitions, but not conceptual constructs such as [being]
PVin 1.4ab1 NB 1.4: pratyaka kalpanpoham abhrntam On kalpanpoha, see Funayama 1992; on abhrnta, see Funayama 1999. 104 See Krasser 1995. Note also TSP 479,2324/K392,7: avisavditva cbhimatrthakriysamarthrthaprpaaakti /. Being non-deceptive means the efficacy to realize the attainment of the object which is appropriate for the fulfilment of a desired purpose. Translation Funayama 1999: 79. On the differences between Dharmottaras and Kamalalas interpretations of abhrnta, see Funayama 1999: 8081. 105 PV 2.5a: vyavahrea prmyam Epistemic validity [is known] through practical activity. Most important in this connection is the case of inference. PVin 2 46,58 (including PVin 2.1cd): tad etad atasmis tadgrahd bhrntir api sambandhata pram // svapratibhse narthe rthdhyavasyena pravartand bhrntir apy arthasambandhena tadavyabhicrt pramam /. Die (Schlufolgerungserkenntnis) ist wegen der Verbindung [mit dem Gegenstand] eine gltige Erkenntnis (pram), obgleich sie wegen des Erfassens von etwas als etwas, was es nicht ist, Irrtum ist. (Das heit:) Obwohl sie Irrtum ist, weil sie in der Weise auftritt, da sie ihr eigenes Erkenntnisbild, das nicht der (wirkliche) Gegenstand ist, als [diesen Gegenstand] bestimmt, ist sie als mit dem Gegenstand verbundene (dennoch) gltige Erkenntnis. Translation Steinkellner 1979: 2627. See also PV 3.5563.
103
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permanent?106 Dharmakrtis answer is as follows: And since all this is an error due to the latent tendencies imprinted by [previous] perceptions of the particulars themselves, [those] conceptual constructs whose arising is [indirectly] bound to these [particulars] are reliable with regard to the thing [itself] although they do not display it, just like the error [consisting] of [cognizing] a gem [is reliable] with regard to the radiance of that gem. [But] others [such as permanence] are not [reliable with regard to the thing itself] because, () disregarding (parityajya) the conformity107 with the specific [property] as it has been perceived, they superimpose another[, erroneous] specific [property] by [arbitrarily] grasping any sort of universal (kicitsmnya). [These conceptual constructs are as unreliable with regard to the thing itself] as the notion of a gem [is unreliable] with regard to the radiance of a lamp.108 Inasmuch as they do not display bare particulars and owe their existence to latent tendencies, all conceptual constructs are error. Some of them, however, are valid cognitions: Because the aspect they ascribe to the thing exists in it,109 and because they are indirectly related (pratibaddha) to the bare particular, they are reliable with regard to the thing itself, i.e., allow a successful practical interaction with it.110 Other conceptual constructs are not valid cognitions: because
PV Je D95b34/P112a8b1 PVSV 183,910: yadi mithyrtha eva sarvo vikalpa kasmt anityntmdivikalp prama nity[di] vikalps tu neti 107 PV Je D96a3/P113a1 = PVSV 183,2324: anusaraa nicaya pa rityajya 108 PVSV 43,27: sarva cya svalakanm eva daranhitavsankto viplava iti tatpratibaddhajanman vikalpnm atatpratibhsitve pi vastuny avisavdo maiprabhym iva maibhrnte / nnyem / yathdavienusaraa parityajya kicitsmnyagrahaena vientarasamropd d paprabhym iva maibuddhe /. On maibhrnti, see Krasser 1991: 6566n. 121. 109 PV Je D95b67/P112b45 PVSV 183,1617: anitydirpasya vastuni vidyamnatvt 110 PVin 2 48,15 (together with PVin 2.7a): ata eva prmya vastuviaya dvayo pratyaknumnayo, arthakriyyogyaviayatvd vicrasya / sukhadukhasdhane jtv yathrha pratipitsavo hi kicit parkante prekprvakria, na vyasanitay /. Eben daher bezieht sich
106
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they superimpose an aspect that is not found in the thing itself,111 and because what they ascribe to it is not even indirectly related to it,112 they are unreliable with regard to the thing itself, i.e., are deceiving in practice. 2.2.4. In our philosophers linguistic usage, however, error (bhrnti) quite often occurs as a shorter term for unreliable cognition, and is equated with wrong notion or misconception (viparysa). A similar semantic shift can be observed in connection with superimposition ([sam]ropa), no longer used in the general sense of conceptuality and concealment, but in the sense of a mistaken identification barring determinate cognition (nicaya). In the present context, error, superimposition (both in this specialized meaning), wrong notion, and lack of determinate cognition can be considered to be equivalent. Two kinds of situation are responsible for the rise of error: the presence of a cause of error (bhrntinimitta)113 and the lack of the causal conditions needed for determinate cognition (nicayapratyayavaikalya).114 Together with kyabuddhi, we may consider the cause of error as twofold: The internal cause of error consists in the latent tendency of a contrary conceptual construct (vipartavikalpavsan);115 as for the external cause of error, it is most often exemplified as the arising of ever new similar phases (sadparparotpatti) in a continuum,116
die Gltigkeit der beiden, Wahrnehmung und Schlufolgerung, auf das Wirkliche, denn eine prfende Erkenntnis hat ein Objekt, das fhig ist einen Zweck zu erfllen. Vernnftig handelnde Leute, die (auch nur) ein wenig abwgen, (tun dies), wenn sie die Mittel fr Lust und Leid (einmal) erkannt haben, aus der Absicht, [diese] nach Vermgen zu erreichen, aber nicht aus [bloer] Neigung. Translation Steinkellner 1979: 29 (slightly modified). 111 PV Je D96a1/P112b7 PVSV 183,2021: te [= nitydivikalpnm] vastuny avidyamnasyaivkrasya samropt /. 112 PV Je D96a4/P113a2 PVSV 183,2627: pramparyepi apratibaddhatvt /. 113 PV 1.44a, PVSV 26,15, and passim. 114 PVSV 26,19. 115 See above, n. 92. 116 PVSV 26,2021; sadparotpatti at PV Je D61a3/P72a2 = PVSV 122,1011, PV Je D61a5/P72a5 = PVSV 123,89; note also PV Je
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D61b4/P72b5 = PVSV 123,2728: sadasya dvityasya kaasyotpatty bhrntinimittena See also above, n. 89. Locus classicus for sadparotpatti is PVSV 21,69: t punar asya kaasthitidharmat svabhva svahetor eva tathotpatte payann api mandabuddhi sattopalambhena sarvad tathbhvaakvipralabdho na vyavasyati sadparotpattivipralabdho v /. Translated according to kyabuddhis explanation (PV Je D46b2 47a1/P54b655a6): However, although (s)he experiences this property of lasting [only] one phase[, a property which is] the nature of the [entity] since [this entity] is produced such [i.e., momentary,] by its own cause, a [person] of weak intellect fails to determine [it in the same way as (s)he has just experienced it; this failure occurs] either [because this person,] due to having perceived the existence [of this entity at one phase, is] mistaken by the supposition that it permanently (sarvad) exists in this [very] way, or [because this person is] mistaken by the rise of a new (apara) phase similar [to the former one]. According to kyabuddhis interpretation (PV Je D47b648b1/ P56a657a1), the first cause of error (*vipralambhanimitta) is proper to the outsiders (trthika) professing the doctrine of non-momentariness (akaikavda), and points to their inter nal *kudyabhiniveavsanbja (or else: *andikudyabhiniveabja), which is reinforced by the false views propagated by wrong treatises (*kustradi). As for the second cause of error, it is aimed at explaining why the Buddhists, who follow sound reasoning and scripture (yuktygama) professing momentariness, still do not ascertain momentariness upon perceiving the real entity. Karakagomins explanation (PVSV 91,23) of mandabuddhi is worth noticing: andisasrbhyastay nitydirpvidyvsanay mand buddhir yasya Whose intellect is [made] weak by the latent tendency, repeated [and reinforced] in the beginningless sasra, of ignorance in the form of [mistaken aspects] such as permanent. This ignorance (or rather, its latent tendency) being the internal cause of error, the two causes mentioned by Dharmakrti point to external causes of error (bhyam api bhrntibjam, PVSV 91,27). Note also PVSV 100,47 = PVin 2 82,79: tam asya mand svabhvam rdhva vyavasyanti / na prk / darane pi pavbhvd iti tadvaena pacd vyavasthpyate / vikradaraneneva viam ajai /. Weak[-minded people] identify this [transient] nature of the [entity only] later [i.e., at the time of the interruption of the continuum, but] not before [i.e., at the time of the existence of the entity], because even though they [directly] experience [this nature], they lack [intellectual] sharpness. Therefore, [this transient nature] is ascertained [only] later on account of this [determination], just as ignorant [persons identify a poisonous substance that they have seen only] by experiencing a [morbid] affection [such as over-salivation]. See also Steinkellner 1979: 98. Note Karakagomins explanation of mand in PVSV 366,27: sasram avidynubandhn mand This explanation is borrowed from Dharmottaras PVin Dze D249b5/P301b34: khor ba ji srid par ma rig
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which leads to the superimposition of aspects such as permanent (nitya), enduring (sthira), and non-momentary (akaika).117 Be it internal or external, this cause of error impedes determinate cognition (nicayapratirodhin, vibandhaka).118 The lack of (conceptual) habitus (abhysa) is most often quoted as being among the conditions that, when lacking, prevent determinate cognition from arising.119 Just as determinate cognition bears upon one specificity (bheda) or aspect (kra) of a previously cognized particular, wrong notion superimposes one partial erroneous/contrary aspect (aasamropa)120 and associates (< samyojyeta, PV 1.44b) another, i.e., a false quality (gua; glossed as rpa, dharma),121 to the thing. As Dharmakrti himself has it, though it has been perceived as distinct from all [other entities], an entity is not [necessarily] recognized in this way [i.e., in all its aspects], because an obstruction (vyavadhna) to [the recognition of] a certain specificity [such as momentariness] may occur.122 Determinate cognition (nicaya, jna, manas) and superimposition (samropa, jna; ropamanas) are mutually exclusive and stand in a relationship of mupa da rjes su brel pa an pa Note also the various inter pretations of the fact that the determinate cognition arises only at the time of pravhaviccheda: (1) PV Je D227a34/P263b78: mtho bai dus su es pa yod pa ma yin te / ma rig pai mun pa id kyi phyir da gan rgyun dra ba skye bai phyir ro // mtho ba gsal ba med pai phyir ro //. (2) PVSV 366,2829: na daranakle dhyavasyo sti / avidy(sma)rthyt sadparotpatty ca daranapavasybhvt /. (3) PVin Dze D249b67/P301b5: ma rig pa da ldan pai an pa rnams la mtho ba gsal ba med pai phyir ro //. Here again, both kyabuddhi and Karakagomin suggest that the absence of nicaya proceeds from an internal (ignorance) and an external (the rise of a new similar phase) cause. 117 See also above, 2.1.1. and n. 11. 118 PVSV 26,14, PV Je D61a5/P72a5 = PVSV 123,8. 119 PV Je D61b23/P72b3 = PVSV 123,21. On nicayapratyayas, see Kellner 2004: 1932. 120 PV 1.50a; PVSV 27,2228,1: krasamropa; PV Je D62b3/P73b6 = PVSV 125,2829: tadvipartkrasamrop viparysa. 121 PV 1.44b, PV Je D64b7/P76a8b1 = PVSV 131,11, PVV 306,6. 122 PVSV 28,1314 (leaving hi untranslated): na hi sarvato bhinno do pi bhvas tathaiva pratyabhijyate / kvacid bhede vyavadhnasambhavt /.
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tual annulment (bdhyabdhakabhva):123 When aspects such as lasting, endowed with a self (stmaka), or unconditioned (aktaka) are superimposed, (real) contrary aspects such as impermanent/ momentary, selfless (nirtmaka), or conditioned (ktaka) are not made the objects of determinate cognitions.124 2.2.5. According to Dharmakrti, the function (vypra) and aim (phala, artha) of inference125 (anumna, liga, sdhana) as a means of valid cognition is not to cognize something in a positive way (vidhin) or to determine the nature of an entity (vastusvabhvanicaya),126 but to rule out, negate, or exclude (vyavaccheda, niedha, pratiedha, nivtti, apoha) unreliable superimpositions and wrong
123 PV 1.49ab: nicayropamanasor bdhyabdhakabhvata /; PVSV 28,1617: samropanicayayor bdhyabdhakabhvt /. 124 nicitkras: ktakatva (PVSV 124,26 and 125,2324), anityatva (PVSV 26,5), kaikatvdi (PVSV 130,28), kaikatvntmdi (PVSV 124,12), asthira (PVSV 129,28), nirtmaka (PVSV 129,28); samropitkras: sthira (PVSV 28,11, PVSV 122,12), stmaka (PVSV 28,11), sthiti (PVSV 26,21), aktaka (PVSV 125,2324), nitydi (PVSV 124,13 and 125,24). 125 Note should be made that inference is itself strictly of a conceptual nature, and as such is basically on the side of error and ignorance. An inference indeed mobilizes two properties (dharma, a probans [sdhanadharma, hetu, liga] and a probandum [sdhyadharma]) that are thought to belong to a single property possessor (dharmin, or subject). Both of these two properties are universals (smnya) unduly ascribing a single unitary aspect to the many. At the same time, these two different properties are tied to one and the same subject, thus unduly dividing the indivisible. To unify the many (the seed of the use of universals*) and divide the undivided (the seed of co-reference [smndhikaraya]**) are indeed the two main psychological operations giving rise to conceptual constructs. *According to PV Je D101a6/P119a4 and D101a7/P119a5: spyii tha sad kyi sa bon (smnyavyavahrabja); the psychological genesis of universals is presented in a nutshell in PV 1.82. **According to PV Je D101b4/P119b3: gi mthun pa id [kyi] sa bon (smndhikarayabja); the psychological genesis of co-reference is presented in a nutshell in PV 1.83. See also Eltschinger 2009: 5962 (1.2.10). 126 Resp. PVSV 27,10 and PVSV 28,20.
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notions:127 Superimpositions endowed each with its own cause are as many as the alien natures (parabhva) [wrongly ascribed] to the [entity]. In that they exclude these [superimpositions], the means of valid cognition [named inferences] can therefore be useful. But these [inferences,] aiming (phala) [as they do] at the exclusion [of superimpositions,] are not employed in order to cognize a [supposedly still] uncognized part of the entity, because this [part has already been] perceived, and because an indivisible [entity] cannot be perceived in a partial way (ekadeena).128 Dharmakrti spells out the same argument in the following three stanzas: [If] the undivided (eka) nature of an object is in itself perceptible, which other unperceived part [of it] would there be left for [further positive] investigation by the [other] means of valid cognition [i.e., by inference]? [There would be none,] if another [unreal] quality were not associated [with this nature] due to [some] cause of error, just like the aspect of silver [is associated] with a conch-shell due to ones observing a similarity of colour [between them]. Therefore, all the qualities of the perceived entity are perceived, [but] due to some error, they are not determined. Thus one undertakes an [inferential] proof [in order to determine what the error has left undetermined].129 To be more precise, inferences, like conceptual constructs and words, perform both a direct, positive (< vidhin, vidhirpea)
vyavacchedaphala (PVSV 26,24); samropavyavaccheda (PVSV 27,13; 27,14); vyavacchedakt (PVSV 27,10); anyavyavaccheda (PVSV 27,14); vyavacchedaviaya (PVSV 28,9; PV 1.56a); anyavyavacchedaviaya (PVSV 127,10); anyasamropavyavacchedaphala (PVSV 31,1213); samropapratiedhaphala (PVSV 124,16); bhrntinivttyartham (PVSV 31,12); apohagocara (PV 1.48d; PVSV 28,19); apohaviaya (PV 1.47a); an ypohaviaya (PVSV 31,13). See Kellner 2004: 49. 128 PVSV 26,2227,2: yvanto sya parabhvs tvanta eva yathsva nimittabhvina samrop iti tadvyavacchedakni bhavanti pramni saphalni syu / te tu vyavacchedaphaln nprattavastvaapratyyane pravttis tasya datvt / anaasya caikadeena daranyogt /. 129 PV 1.4345: ekasyrthasvabhvasya pratyakasya sata svayam / ko nyo na do bhga syd ya pramai parkyate // no ced bhrntinimittena sayojyeta guntaram / uktau v rajatkro rpasdharmyadarant // tasmd dasya bhvasya da evkhilo gua / bhrnter nicyate neti sdhana sampravartate //.
127
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and an indirect (< artht), negative function.130 In its positive function, inference aims at the conceptual determination of those aspects of the perceived particular that have escaped determination (anicitanicaya).131 But inference ipso facto negates the conceptual constructs wrongly ascribed to the perceived entity, and such is its indirect function. In this respect, inference does not differ from words and concepts, which refer simultaneously to positive intellectual constructs and indirectly exclude other, unfitting constructs. It is hardly surprising, then, that Dharmakrti repeatedly describes inference, too, as the exclusion of another (anypoha): Inference aims at determination, but to determine amounts to holding off superimposition (samropaviveka), i.e., to excluding another, superimposed aspect. That inference always presupposes a wrong notion is the point at stake in the following discussion: [Objection:] The [inferential] determination of [something previously] uncognized does not necessarily presuppose a wrong notion, as [in the case of one] suddenly (akasmt) knowing from [the presence of] smoke [that there is] fire [in a certain place], for in this case, the [previous] superimposition of the absence of fire (an agni) [in this place] is not possible. Therefore, [inference] does not always (sarvatra) exclude [a previous superimposition]. [Answer:] () In this case too, the [person] who sees this [spot] lacks a determinate cognition of its nature [i.e., of this spots indeed possess-
This is made especially clear by Karakagomin, who regularly (e.g., PVSV 124,14, 124,22, 124,24, 125,14, 125,15, 125,21, 126,9) adds vidhin/ vidhirpea after words denoting nicaya or adhyavasya, and artht after words denoting vyavaccheda, etc. Interestingly enough, close comparison with the PV reveals that this is never done by kyabuddhi. Commenting on PV 1.45d (sdhana sampravartate), Karakagomin (PVSV 124,21 22) says: tannicayrtha sdhanam anumna vidhirpeaiva pravartate , whereas kyabuddhi (PV Je D62a2/P73a4) has: sgrub pa es bya ba khrul pa sel bar byed pai rjes su dpag pa rab tu jug pa yin /. For a similar observation, see Kellner 2004: 5n. 3. 131 Note, e.g., PVSV 184,811 (with no equivalent in PV): tena pratyakea svalakae ghyame nityatva ghtam eva kevala bhrntinimittasadbhvd anicitam / atas tannicayamtre numnavypras / tena tannicaya eva svalakae nityatvaprattir iti siddham /.
130
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ing fire. And] why [does he lack it]? Because of a wrong notion!132 And [insofar as] this [person] determines this place as free of [fire] (tadviviktena rpea) through a cognition that does not presume [by any means] that fire exists [there], how can it be said [that this person is] not mistaken (avipar yasta)? And a [person] who would neither superimpose this aspect nor doubt [the existence of fire] would [certainly] not resort to an inference (liga) in order to know that [there is fire in this place].133 2.2.6. We are now in a position to grasp one of the fundamental trends of Dharmakrtis philosophy. Perception provides an unmediated and unbiased access to reality, especially to the so-called vastudharmas (impermanence, selflessness, painfulness, emptiness), those ultimately real aspects that entities themselves cast into the consciousness. But ignorance (qua conceptuality and concealment) first has us ascribe erroneous intellectual constructs to reality, both by unifying the many and by dividing the indivisible. Second, ignorance (especially as the personalistic false view) has us fail to identify, recognize, or determine the entities real aspects by superimposing contrary qualities. Now, aspects such as self, pleasure, or ones own are the root causes of craving, appropriating, acting and finally being reborn, i.e., suffering. From this perspective, the value of inference as a correcting, error-eliminating principle cannot be overestimated. In a very interesting passage in PV 3, Dharmakrti clearly connects error, its elimination by inference, and the (yogic, i.e., Buddhist) strengthening of an (inferentially based) conceptual habitus: Because of the error that is due to the [immediate] occur132 I.e., because this person grasps this place as identical with a spot without fire. 133 PVSV 27,1528,1: nanu nvaya viparysaprvaka evprattanicayo bhavati / yath kasmd dhmd agnipratipatti / na hi tatrnagnisamropa sambhvyate / tan na sarvatra vyavaccheda kriyate / tatrpi taddarinas tatsvabhvnicaya / kuta / viparyst / sa ca ta pradea tadviviktena rpea nicinvann agnisattbhvan*vimuktay buddhy katham aviparyasto nma / tadkrasamropasaayarahita ca tatpratipattau na ligam anusaret /. *On bhvan, see Gnoli 1960 (= PVSV): 2728n. 22. This passage has also been translated and discussed by Kellner (2004: 1019).
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rence of a new (apara) similar [phase, someone] fails to see [i.e., determine] the difference [between two phases as long as the continuum is not interrupted; this person thus] lacks the [determinate] knowledge of a certain [aspect like impermanence, although (s)he has grasped it perceptually () But if the continuum is interrupted by an interval of non-existence,] it is indeed without [resorting to any] inference that down to a child, [any] person determines, upon seeing the rise of a new (uttara) [phase of light] disconnected [from the preceding one], that the light [of a lamp], etc., is perishable. [Or,] failing to see the effect [of an entity] because of the interval [implied by the causal process], an ascertainer [can also], due to dullness (apava), be mistaken with regard to [this entitys very] capacity [to bring about its effect,] although it is inherent to the entity [itself]. It is in order to remove just this [kind of error] that inference is [so] minutely described. [As for] those of great understanding, they determine all aspects [of an entity] by [just] seeing [it].134 The intimate connection between inference and the search for the structure of ultimate reality and hence soteriology is emphasized in the following statement by Dharmakrti: The differentiation between the probandum and the probans is used by/ allows wise people to penetrate ultimate reality.135 In determining
PV 3.104ac and 105107: kvacit tad aparijna sadparasambhavt / bhrnter apayato bhedam // tath hy aligam blam asaliottarodayam / payan paricchinatty eva dpdi nina jana // bhvasvabhvabhtym api aktau phale da / anntaryato moho vinicetur apavt // tasyaiva vinivttyartham anumnopavaranam / vyavasyantkad eva sarvkrn mahdhiya //. See PVP D162b6163b5/ P189a7190b1 and PVV 148,19149,17. Note that both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin analyze the compound asaliottarodayam as a bahu vrhi. Whereas Devendrabuddhi does not elaborate on mahdhiya, kyabuddhi (PV D178a6/P219b7) explains: blo gros chen pos es bya ba ni dba po las das pai don mtho bao (*mahdhiya ity atndriyrthadarina), and Manorathanandin (PVV 149,16), more convincingly: mahdhiyo vipartavyavasynkrntapratyak yogina. 135 PV 1.86bd: sdhyasdhanasasthiti / paramrthvatrya vidvadbhir avakalpyate //. Skt. sasthiti is not entirely clear, but must be semantically near vyavasthna (PV 1.85). Manorathanandin explains sasthiti (PV 3.214, 3.315, 3.319, 4.15, 4.64) as vyavasth (PVV 182,25, 213,1415, 214,22, 419,1112, 437,3), settlement, establishment; statute; fixed rule. On
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what had remained unidentified and hereby excluding wrong notions, inference indeed restores, still on a purely conceptual level, the most fundamental features of reality. The sequence linking the obliteration of perception and an inferences corrective function is outlined by Dharmakrti in a highly suggestive statement of PV 2: The property of [all] cognition is to grasp an object; this [object] is grasped as it [really] is [i.e., as impermanent, etc.], and it generates this [cognition of itself] by [its] real nature. And such is [the objects and the cognitions original] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as it really is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object. But] on account of another cause [i.e., on account of a cause of error], the [mind] shifts (skhalat) from this [inherently veracious nature, superimposing such erroneous aspects as permanence on the object,] and becomes uncertain, requiring a [cognitive] condition for the removal [of this state], like the cognition of a piece of rope [as a snake].136 There is little doubt that the condition alluded to here, explained by Devendrabuddhi as a means of valid cognition annulling error,137 is none other than inference. And given the soteriological context (description of the final revolution of the basis, rayaparivtti) in which this statement occurs, it is no less obvious that Dharmakrti holds that this condition provides the first impetus toward establishing the mind (vijna, i.e., perception), at the completion of the path, in its genuine radiant condition. Taking Dharmakrtis epistemological interpretation of the minds natural radiance seriously, but also his insistence on perceptions non-erroneousness and its giving access to the ultimate structure of reality, we are left with no other possibility than to hold perception before and after the rayaparivtti to be one and the same with regard to its content and operation. As we have seen, ignorance as anti-knowledge
avatra, see BHSD s.v., 71a. 136 PV 2.206207: viayagrahaa dharmo vijnasya yathsti sa / ghyate so sya janako vidyamntmaneti ca // e praktir asys tan nimittntarata skhalat / vyvttau pratyaypekam adha sarpabuddhivat //. See above, 2.2.2 and n. 87. 137 PVP D89a23/P102b56: rkyen la ltos pa yin te / de ltar khrul pa gnod pa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa da bcas pa yin no //.
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neither impedes nor obliterates perception itself, but is responsible for subsequent errors and superimpositions. The main difference between cognition before and after the rayaparivtti, i.e., between cognition-cum-ignorance and cognition-sine-ignorance, does not pertain to perception itself, or, as Dharmakrti himself would have it, to the nature of the mind, but to the subsequent treatment of perceptual data. Inference is responsible for bringing out the intellectual contents that correct erroneous superimpositions; it makes determinate cognition possible, and further, endows the yogin with true conceptual counterparts of the entities real aspects. In other words, inference sets the path in motion138 that will first enable the yogin to determine the real aspects of entities upon perceiving them,139 and then free his mind from all those adventitious factors that counteracted perception. To the best of my underNote PV Je D252a12/P299a8b1 = PVSV 401,1213: pramny anitydibhtkragrh i pratipakamrgam vahanti /. 139 Note, e.g., PV Je D70b45/P83a45 = PVSV 142,15: yath yogin buddhipavd daranamtrea kaikatvdinicaya /. That perception as such does not differ between ordinary people (pthagjana) and yogins is also Karakagomins opinion in two interesting statements. (1) PVSV 91,2425: yogin saty api sadadarane mandabuddhitvbhvt kaikatvanicayo bhavati The yogins do determine momentariness because, though [their perceptual] experience is the same [as that of ordinary persons], they lack [this] being of weak intellect. (2) PVSV 92,1921: mandabuddhir (PVSV 21,7) iti / tena bhydhytmikavipralambhanimittasadbhvt pthagjann [na] nicaya / yogin tu saty api sadadarane paubuddhitvn nicayo bhavaty eva /. By of weak intellect, [Dharmakrti means the following:] Because of the presence of both external [i.e., the rise of a new similar phase, etc.,] and internal [i.e., ignorance,] causes of error, ordinary persons fail to determine [momentariness in the same way as they have experienced it], but the yogins, though [their perceptual] experience is the same [as that of ordinary persons], do indeed determine [momentariness] because they are of sharp intellect. According to Karakagomin, then, perception itself does not differ between those who have reached the daranamrga and those who have not; what indeed differs is the degree of their intellectual sharpness, the increase of which can only be due to the habitus (abhysa) or cultivation (bhvan) that comes along the path. On the context of these statements and the issue of internal as well as external causes of error, see above, n. 116; on abhysa as a condition for determinate cognitions to arise, see Kellner 2004: 1932.
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standing, the perception of the liberated saint is to be equated with the paramrthikaprama that Dharmakrti touches upon at the end of PVin 1.140 I do not intend to claim, in contrast to most scholars and the textual evidence, that Dharmakrtis inference has only soteriological meaning and relevance. By pointing out Dharmakrtis insistence upon the vastudharmas in his treatment of both perception and inference, and by putting to the fore the corrective function of inference, I would like to emphasize the fact that Dharmakrti never lost sight of soteriology in his elaborations on epistemology. According to him, there is at least one set of cases (the most important ones indeed) in which the use of inference coincides with, or impinges upon, the precincts of the wisdom born of rational reflection (yukticintmay praj).141 The wisdom born of rational reflection traditionally consists (at least in connection with the socalled upapattisdhanayukti) in an analysis carried out on the basis of the means of valid cognition. This holds true of the Buddhist epistemologists, according to whom rational reflection basically aims at bringing out intellectual contents that have been thoroughly examined and made immaculate by means of valid cognition (pramaparidrtha, pramapariuddhrtha), i.e., by inference.142 Though still strictly conceptual in nature, these contents (the vastudharmas again) co-function as the antidote (pratipaka = nairtmyadarana, etc.) to the cause of suffering, i.e., ignorance in the form of personalistic belief. Most ordinary people may
PVin 1 44,45: cintmaym eva tu prajm anulayanto vibhramavivekanirmalam anapyi pramrthikapramam abhimukhkurvanti /. On this passage, see Krasser 2004: 142144 and Eltschinger 2005: 155158. That liberated perception comes about through the yogins initially resorting to inferences is clear. How it can be equated with omniscience remains, however, obscure. But does not Dharmakrti himself term unfathomable (acintya) the cognition of (liberated) yogins and the Buddhas omniscience? PV 3.532d: acinty yogin gati //; SAS 94: bcom ldan das kyis don thams cad thugs su chud pa ni bsam gyis mi khyab ste / rnam pa thams cad du es pa da brjod pai yul las das pai phyir ro //. 141 PVin 1 27,9. 142 On the cintmay praj in the Buddhist epistemologists, see Eltschinger 2010.
140
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well show no interest at all for evolving determinate cognitions of momentariness and selflessness. But to the Buddhist yogin still in the stage of being an ordinary person, investigating the most intimate structure of reality by means of inferences is the first significant step towards the path of vision and liberation.
References Abbreviations
BHSD Franklin Edgerton: Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Volume II: Dictionary. Delhi 1970: Motilal Banarsidass. Jikido Takasaki/Zuiho Yamaguchi/Noriaki Hakamaya: sDe dge Tibetan Tripiaka bsTan gyur preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo. Tokyo 19771981. Manuscript Daisetz T. Suzuki: The Tibetan Tripitaka, Peking Edition, Kept in the Library of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tky/Kyto 1957: Tibetan Tripitaka Research Institute. sub voce Tibetan
ms P
s.v. Tib
Primary sources
AK(Bh) Prahlad Pradhan: Abhidharmakoabhyam of Vasubandhu. Patna 1975: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 8). AKVy Unrai Wogihara: Sphurth Abhidharmakoavykhy, the Work of Yaomitra. Tokyo 1989: Sankibo Buddhist Book Store (The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakoavykhy). AN R. Morris/E. Hardy/M. Hunt/C.A.F Rhys Davids: Aguttara Nikya. 6 volumes. London 18851910: The Pali Text Society. ASBh Nathmal Tatia: Abhidharmasamuccayabhyam. Patna 1976: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute (Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series 17). BhK 1 First Bhvankrama (Kamalala). Pp. 497/187539/229 in Giuseppe Tucci: Minor Buddhist Texts. Delhi 1986: Motilal Banarsidass.
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BhK 3 Giuseppe Tucci: Minor Buddhist Texts, Part III: Third Bhvankrama. Roma 1971: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 43). HV Hetuvidy Section of the Yogcrabhmi. Hideomi Yaita: Three Sanskrit Texts from the Buddhist Prama-Tradition: The Hetuvidy Section of the Yogcrabhmi, the Dharmottaraippanaka, and the Tarkarahasya. Narita 2005: Naritsan Shinshoji (Monograph Series of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist Studies 4). The Sanskrit text of the HV can be found on pp. 98/1*124/27*. MMK See PrP. MN I V. Trenckner: The Majjhima-Nikya. Vol. 1. London 1935: Pali Text Society. MS See Lamotte 1973: I. NB() Th. I. erbatskoj: Nyyabindu. Buddijskij uebnik logiki soinenie Dharmakirti I tolkovanie na nego Nyyabinduk soinenie Darmottary. Osnabrck 1970: Biblio Verlag. P Pini (Adhyy). PrP Louis de La Valle Poussin: Madhyamakavtti: Mlamadhyamakakriks (Mdhyamikastras) de Ngrjuna avec la Prasannapad Commentaire de Candrakrti. Delhi 1992: Motilal Banarsidass. PrSVy Prattyasamutpdavykhy (Vasubandhu). D no. 3995, Chi 1b 61a, P no. 5496, Chi 171a. PV 14 Ysho Miyasaka: Pramavrttika-krik (Sanskrit and Tibetan). Acta Indologica 2 (19711972), pp. 1206. See also PVV; for PV 23, see also PVA; for PV 1, see also PVSV; for PV 2.131cd285, see also Vetter 1990. My numbering of the verses in PV 2 follows that of Vetter. PVA Rhula Sktyyana: Pramavrttikabhyam or Vrtiklakra of Prajkaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakrtis Pramavrtikam). Patna 1953: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute. PVin 12 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakrtis Pramavinicaya, Chapters 1 and 2. Beijing/Vienna 2007: China Tibetology Publishing House/Austrian Academy of Sciences Press (Sanskrit Texts from the Tibetan Autonomous Region 2). PVin Pramavinicayak (Dharmottara). D no. 4229, Dze 1b1Tshe 178a3/P no. 5727, Dze 1b1We 209b8. PVP Pramavrttikapajik (Devendrabuddhi). D no. 4217, Che 1326b4/P no. 5717, Che 1390a8. PVSV Raniero Gnoli: The Pramavrttikam of Dharmakrti. The First Chapter with the Auto-Commentary. Roma 1960: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente (Serie Orientale Roma 23).
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PVSV Rhula Sktyyana: Karakagomins Commentary on the Pram avrttikavtti of Dharmakrti. Kyto 1982: Rinsen Books Co. PV Pramavrttikak (kyabuddhi). D no. 4220, Je 1b1e 282a7/P no. 5718, Je 1b1e 348a8. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the PV belong to e. PVV Rhula Sktyyana: Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika with Commentary by Manorathanandin. Published as an appendix to the Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society 2426 (19381940). SAS F.I. erbatskoj: Tibetskij perevo soinenij Satnntarasiddhi Dharmakrti i Satnntarasiddhik Vintadeva. Delhi 1992: Motilal Banarsidass. TS(P) K = Embar Krishnamacharya: Tattvasagraha of ntarakita With the Commentary of Kamalala. 2 vols. Baroda 1984: Oriental Institute. *UH *Upyahdaya/*Prayogasra. Giuseppe Tucci: Pre-Dignga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources. Baroda 1929: Oriental Institute (Gaekwad Oriental Series 49). Vibh. Vibhticandras notes to PVV. See PVV. VY Jong Cheol Lee: The Tibetan Text of the Vykhyyukti of Vasubandhu. Tky 2001: The Sankibo Press (Bibliotheca Indologica et Buddhologica 8). YBh Yogcrabhmi, or, followed by page/line numbers: V. Bhattacharya: The Yogcrabhmi of crya Asaga. Calcutta 1957: University of Calcutta.
Secondary sources
Collins 1982 Steven Collins: Selfless Persons. Imagery and thought in Theravda Buddhism. Cambridge/New York 1982: Cambridge University Press. Eltschinger 2005 Vincent Eltschinger: tudes sur la philosophie religieuse de Dharmakrti: 2. Lrayaparivtti. Journal Asiatique 293/1 (2005), pp. 151211. Eltschinger 2009 Vincent Eltschinger: Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part I. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32/12 (2009 [2010]), pp. 3983. Eltschinger 2010 Vincent Eltschinger: Studies in Dharmakrtis Religious Philosophy: 4. The Cintmay Praj. Pp. 553591 in Piotr Balcerowicz (ed.): Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy. Delhi 2010: Motilal Banarsidass.
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Frauwallner 1959 Erich Frauwallner: Dignga, sein Werk und seine Entwicklung. Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sd- und Ostasiens 3 (1959), pp. 83164. Funayama 1992 Toru Funayama: A Study of kalpanpoha. A Trans lation of the Tattvasagraha vv. 12121263 by ntarakita and the Tattvasagrahapajik by Kamalala on the Definition of Direct Perception. Kyoto 1992: Zinbun Kagaku Kenkysho, Kyto University. Funayama 1999 Toru Funayama: Kamalalas Interpretation of Non-Erroneous in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems. Pp. 7399 in Shoryu Katsura (ed.): Dharmakrtis Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy. Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakrti Conference (Hiroshima, November 4 6, 1997). Vienna 1999: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Philologisch-historische Klasse, Denkschriften, 281). Jaini 2001 Padmanabh S. Jaini: On the Ignorance of the Arhat. Pp. 167179 (= Chapter 9) in Padmanabh S. Jaini: Collected Papers on Buddhist Studies. Delhi 2001: Motilal Banarsidass. Kellner 2004 Birgit Kellner: Why Infer and not just Look? Dharmakrti on the Psychology of Inferential Processes. Pp. 151 in: Shoryu Katsura/Ernst Steinkellner (eds.): The Role of the Example (dnta) in Classical Indian Logic. Vienna 2004: Arbeitskreis fr tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitt Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 58). Koa Louis de La Valle Poussin: LAbhidharmakoa de Vasubandhu. 6 vols. Bruxelles 1980: Institut Belge des Hautes tudes Chinoises (Mlanges Chinois et Bouddhiques 16). Krasser 1991 Helmut Krasser: Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gltigkeit einer Erkenntnis Laghuprmyapark. Teil 2: bersetzung. Vienna 1991: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Beitrge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens 7). Krasser 1995 Helmut Krasser: Dharmottaras Theory of Knowledge in his Laghuprmyapark. Journal of Indian Philosophy 23 (1995), pp. 247271. Krasser 2004 Helmut Krasser: Are Buddhist Pramavdins non-Buddhistic? Dignga and Dharmakrti on the impact of logic and epistemology on emancipation. Hrin: Vergleichende Studien zur japani schen Kultur 11 (2004), pp. 129146. Kritzer 1999 Robert Kritzer: Rebirth and Causation in the Yogcra Abhidharma. Vienna 1999: Arbeitskreis fr tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitt Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 44).
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La Valle Poussin 1913 Louis de La Valle Poussin: Bouddhisme, tudes et matriaux. Thorie des douze causes. Gand 1913: Librairie scientifique E. van Goethem (Universit de Gand, Recueil de travaux publis par la Facult de philosophie et des lettres 40). Lamotte 1973 tienne Lamotte: La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga (Mahynasagraha). 2 vols. Louvain-la-Neuve, 1973: Universit de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste (Publications de lIOL 8). Lamotte 1987 tienne Lamotte: Le troisime Bhvan-krama de Kamalala. Traduction de la version tibtaine. Pp. 336353 in Paul Demiville: Le Concile de Lhasa, une controverse sur le quitisme entre bouddhistes de lInde et de la Chine au VIIIe sicle de lre chrtienne. Paris 1987: Collge de France, Institut des Hautes tudes Chinoises (Publication de lInstitut des Hautes tudes Chinoises 7). May 1959 Jacques May: Candrakrti: Prasannapad Madhyamakavtti. Douze chapitres traduits du sanscrit et du tibtain, accompagns dune introduction, de notes et dune dition critique de la version tibtaine. Paris 1959: Adrien Maisonneuve (Collection Jean Przyluski 2). McClintock 2010 Sara L. McClintock: Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason. ntarakita and Kamalala on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority. Boston 2010: Wisdom Publications (Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism). Mejor 2001 Marek Mejor: Controversy on the mutual conditioning of avidy and ayoniomanas(i)kra in Vasubandhus Abhidharmakoa. Journal of the International College for Advanced Buddhist Studies 4 (2001), pp. 49[/292]78[/263]. Pruden 19881990 Leo M. Pruden: Abhidharmakoabhyam by Louis de La Valle Poussin. English Translation by Leo M. Pruden. 4 vols. Berkeley 19881990: Asian Humanities Press. = Swami Dwarikadas Shastri: Tattvasagraha of crya Shntarakita with the Commentary Pajik of Shri Kamalshla. 2 vols. Varanasi 1981: Bauddha Bharati (Bauddha Bharati Series 1). Schmithausen 1977 Lambert Schmithausen: Zur buddhistischen Lehre von der dreifachen Leidhaftigkeit. Pp. 918931 in Wolfgang Voigt (ed.): Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlndischen Gesellschaft, Supplement III,2 (XIX. Deutscher Orientalistentag). Wiesbaden 1977: Franz Steiner Verlag. Steinkellner 1979 Ernst Steinkellner: Dharmakrtis Pramavinicaya. Zweites Kapitel: Svrthnumnam. Teil II: bersetzung und Anmerkungen. Vienna 1979: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Verffentlichungen der Kommission fr Sprachen und Kulturen Sdasiens 15).
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Vetter 1990 Tilmann Vetter: Der Buddha und seine Lehre in Dharma krtis Pramavrttika. Der Abschnitt ber den Buddha und die vier edlen Wahrheiten im Pramasiddhi-Kapitel. Vienna 1990: Arbeitskreis fr tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitt Wien (Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde 12). Wayman 1961 Alex Wayman: Analysis of the rvakabhmi Manuscript. Berkeley/Los Angeles 1961: University of California Press. Wayman 1980 Alex Wayman: The Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths and Their Opposites. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 3/2 (1980), pp. 6776.
Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth On the privileged lie in Indian Buddhist literature
Richard F. Nance
1. Introduction
A standard-issue Buddhist view on the practice of lying is that it is harmful. Lies are not told by buddhas and they should not be told by properly observant Buddhists. Those who do tell them are said to suffer various horrid consequences: bad breath, being born without a tongue, and rebirth in hell realms.1 Together with slander,
The view is affirmed even in texts acknowledging that the harmful effects of lying may not be immediately apparent. A passage from the Gmaisayutta (SN iv.47) suggests that while the long-term effects of lying are invariably negative, its short-term consequences may, in fact, appear to favor the liar: Then, headman, someone here is seen garlanded and adorned, freshly bathed and groomed, with hair and beard trimmed, enjoying sensual pleasures with women as if he were a king. They ask someone about him: Sir, what has this man done? They answer: Sir, this man amused the king with false speech. The king was pleased with him and bestowed a reward upon him. That is why the man is garlanded and adorned enjoying sensual pleasures with women as if he were a king. (trans. Bodhi 2000: 1364) This scenario is immediately followed by one in which a speaker is severely punished for speaking falsely: having brought to ruin a householder or householders son by lying, the liars arms are bound behind him with strong rope, his head is shaved, and he is led through the streets to the outskirts of the city, where he is beheaded. So, the text concludes, one should not place confidence in those ascetics and brahmins who say Anyone at all who speaks falsely experiences pain and grief here and now. This is a false view Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 75101
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harsh speech, and idle chatter, lying is traditionally understood to be a form of unwholesome speech and to engage in unwholesome speech is to bring pain upon oneself. A person is born, we are told, with an axe in his mouth. One whose speech is unwholesome cuts himself with the axe.2 Of the various forms of unwholesome speech, lying is sometimes singled out as particularly egregious. One who lies is the banner of all vices, the producer of all evils: a singular source of darkness.3 From the Pli Dhammapada, we learn that there is no evil that might not be done by a person who tells a lie.4 The consequences of lying are sufficiently grave that in the Ratnval, Ngrjuna admonishes his royal addressee to stand fast against duplicity, even if doing so should cost him his life and kingdom: For your own sake, always (rtag, *nitya) tell the truth even if it should cause your death or ruin your governance. Do not speak otherwise.5 In the Abhidharmakoabhya, Vasubandhu counsels his audience that although they may have heard that some forms of lying are harmless that a jesting untruth does no harm nor
but rejecting such a view does not entail that one thereby rejects the notion that lies are harmful. 2 Sn 657: purisassa hi jtassa kuhri jyate mukhe, yya chindati attna blo dubbhsita bhaa. This image recurs elsewhere inside and outside the Pli canon (cf. SN i.149; AN v.174); Udnavarga viii.2 (Bernhard 1965, Vol. I: 161); Dharmasamuccaya 12.6 (Lin 1969: 372). 3 Dharmasamuccaya 12.7 (Lin 1969: 373): sarvkryapatk s sarvappaprastik/ tamas yonir ek sa yo vca bhate m// 4 Cf. Dhammapada, verse 176 (= Iti 1.3.5): eka dhamma attassa musvdissa jantuno / vitiaparalokassa natthi ppa akriya; and 306ab: abhtavd niraya upeti yo cpi katv na karomti cha. The former passage is partially paralleled by Dharmasamuccaya 12.3 (Lin 1969: 371); the latter, by Udnavarga viii.1 (Bernhard 1965, Vol. I: 161). While the former passage is missing from the Gndhr Dharmapada, the latter has been preserved (Brough 1962: 161, verse 269). 5 Translation modified from Hopkins 1998: 129. The Sanskrit for this verse (#274) of the Ratnval is lost. The Tibetan of Hopkinss edition reads: bden pa gang gis rang don la/ chi am yang na rgyal poi srid/ nyams gyur de ni rtag brjod cing/ de las gzhan du brjod mi bgyi. Cf. Hahn 1982: 86: bden pa gang gis rang [don la]/ rgyal srid nyams par gyur naang de/ rang gi don la rtag brjod cing/ de las gzhan smra mi bgyio//
Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth
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does one concerning women, one made at the time of marriage, or one made when ones life or all ones property is in danger such a view is both confused and false.6 The impression that one can get from such passages (and they could be multiplied) is that the Buddhist proscription against lying is absolute: that the tradition does not hold any lie to be privileged (i.e., excusable). This view has recently been voiced by the Indologist, comparativist, and legal scholar J. D. M. Derrett, who notes in a 2006 article in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics that for Buddhists, lies are so injurious that no convenience can excuse lying, and hence that privileged lies [are] totally missing from Buddhism.7 Yet, pace Derrett, Buddhist views on the subject of lying are far more complex than the sweeping remark above suggests. In what follows, some of these views and their complexities will be surveyed. It may be useful to begin by getting clear on the terms at stake in the relevant Indic languages. The compound musvda (Sanskrit mvda) is sometimes translated into English as false speech, sometimes as lie. At first blush, these notions may appear to be interchangeable, but they are not. To say that someone has spoken falsely need not imply that she has lied. A person might wrongly presume things to be a certain way, and then go on to describe her erroneous impression accurately. In doing so, she will have spoken falsely but she will not have lied.8 Moreover, to say that someone
6 Abhidharmakoabhya on Abhidharmakoa iv.68 (Vol. 2: 538). The verse quoted by Vasubandhu here is also preserved in the Mahbhrata (1.77.16 of the BORI edition, Sukthankar 1933, Vol. 1, Part 1: 349): na narmayuktam anta (Sukthankar, though acknowledging this variant, here reads vacana) hinasti na stru rjan na vivhakle / prtyaye sarvadhanpahre pacntny hur aptaknti. Cf. Mller 1883: 273. 7 Derrett 2006: 1. 8 This is not a possibility open to buddhas, since buddhas do not make such mistakes. The distinction between lying and speaking falsely can only be made if a certain kind of mistake is possible: one in which we (unknowingly) fail to grasp how things in fact are, and yet accurately report this mistaken understanding. Given that a buddha unfailingly grasps how things in fact are, the question of whether a buddha is capable of speaking falsely collapses into the question of whether a buddha is capable of lying.
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has lied need not imply that she has spoken falsely. When a person lies, she misrepresents how she takes things to be but the falsity of an utterance is typically a matter that has to do not with how a speaker takes things to be, but with how things in fact are. Yet to say that lies involve no more than the misrepresentation of how one takes things to be is still insufficient, since a person can misrepresent how she takes things to be without lying. Such misrepresentations occur regularly for those just beginning the study of an unfamiliar language. Given an exercise in which we are asked to describe our immediate surroundings, we may falter: our descriptions may well misrepresent how we take things to be. These misrepresentations are hardly lies; if anything, they are simple mistakes. For these misrepresentations to become lies, what is required in addition is an element of deliberateness: we lie if, and only if, we deliberately misrepresent how we take things to be. Similar concerns regarding deliberate misrepresentation are broached in Buddhist disciplinary (vinaya) texts, which stipulate a number of conditions that must obtain in order for a particular act of speaking to be judged in violation of proscriptions against m-(mus-)vda. These conditions clarify that what is at issue in such proscriptions is indeed the deliberate misrepresentation of how one takes things to be. At times, this element of deliberateness is made explicit. Far more often, however, such explicit signaling is absent yet the context makes it clear that an element of deliberateness is being presupposed.9 What is typically at stake in discussion of m-(mus-)vda is, then, not simply false speech, but lying.10
9 One occasionally finds the compound m-(mus-)vda augmented by the term samp(r)ajna to clarify that what is at issue is the knowing propagation of falsehoods. See, for example, MN 86 (Agulimlasutta), ii.103 (trans. amoli and Bodhi 1995: 714), and the pcittiya proscription against lying (sampajnamusvde pcittiya). Yet, as noted below, when the term samp(r)ajna is absent, an element of deliberateness is sometimes presumed to be signaled by m/ mus itself: Buddhaghosa, for example, glosses the term mus- as intentionally misleading (visavdandhippya) (Sumagalavilsin i.9). 10 This is not, however, the only way in which the term m- (or the Tibetan [b]rdzun pa, which is stipulated as a suitable translation in the Mahvyutpatti [#7313]) can be used. At times, the terms signal forms of deceptive-
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We can thus rephrase Derretts sweeping claim as follows: Buddhist doctrinal texts prohibit the practice of deliberately misrepresenting how one takes things to be, and they do so in absolute terms: there is no case in which such deliberate misrepresentation is held to be permissible. All lies, then, are held to be equally deserving of censure. To say this does not, of course, entail that all lies are held to deserve equal censure and Buddhist texts do indeed treat lies as falling into various categories, not all of which are judged equally blameworthy. Some lies constitute prjika offenses, punishable by expulsion from the monastic community. These involve intentionally and falsely representing oneself as one who has seen or known things which are seeable and knowable only by persons of consummate attainment (uttaramanuya).11 Most lies are not, however, punished so harshly. Lies that are not counted as prjika offenses are most often counted as pcittiya (Skt. pyantika) offenses.12 These are much less onerous; a Buddhist monastic who commits a pcittiya/ pyantika offense may be absolved of fault after the offense is formally confessed. In the Milindapaha, the Buddhist monk Ngasena is asked about this distinction between forms of lying, and he offers a few clarificatory comments.13 According to Ngasena, lies can be light (lahuka) or heavy (garuka); the gravity of a particular lie depends on its subject matter (vatthu). In this respect, Ngasena insists, lyness that are not intentional in the sense taken up here. So, for example, in the Lives of the Eighty-Four Siddhas (Caturatisiddhapravtti), attributed to Abhayadattar, the siddha Thaganapa, unable to refrain from lying (rdzun smra), is counseled by a monk who tells him you should contemplate everything as a single deception (khyod kyis thams cad rdzun gcig por sgoms shig). There is no indication, however, that this practice of contemplation requires Thaganapa to posit a being that deliberately sets out to deceive. Cf. also Ratnagotravibhga 1.86 (Prasad 1997: 55). 11 Cf. the treatment of prjika 4 in Pachow 2000. For the relevant Sanskrit, see Bannerjee 1977: 15. 12 False claims made against fellow monastics for the purpose of bringing about their expulsion are, however, categorized as saghdisesa (Skt. saghvaea) offenses. 13 See Milindapaha 1923 (trans. Horner 1969, Vol. 1: 2757).
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ing does not differ from striking another person. Just as the punishment meted out to one who strikes a man on the street differs from the punishment meted out to one who strikes a king, so too are there different kinds of lies, meriting different kinds of punishment.14 Of course, simply knowing that lies are to be distinguished based on their subject matter does not help us to assess the gravity of any particular lie. How does one distinguish between lies that are light and lies that are heavy? The great Buddhist commentator Buddhaghosa offers something like a formal criterion: when the welfare (attha) that it [i.e., a lie] destroys is slight, it is less blameworthy; when the welfare is great, it is more blameworthy.15 For Buddhaghosa, assessing the gravity of a lie is not or at least not simply a matter of assessing what the lie is about; one must consider the lies impact on the welfare of others. And, as Buddhaghosa acknowledges, this impact may depend not only on the subject matter of the lie, but also on the context in which the lie is told. This context encompasses not only the aims or intentions of the liar what he or she means to accomplish in telling the lie but also the social situation in which the lie is uttered: Buddhaghosa notes that a lie told during a formal disciplinary proceeding will have a greater impact on the welfare of others than a lie told in jest.16
It is important not to misread the terms of the analogy here: Ngasena is not implying that lies told to common people are less egregious than lies told to kings. The distinction marked does not derive from the social identity (or political clout) of those to whom a particular lie is told, but from the subject matter of the lie. 15 Trans. Bodhi 1978: 118. Cf. Sumagalavilsin 1.9: so yam attha bha jati tassa appatya appasvajjo mahantatya mahsvajjo. 16 Ibid., When a householder, reluctant to part with a certain possession, denies that he owns it, it is of little blame; but when he is caused to witness and lies for the sake of destroying anothers welfare, then the blame is heavy. For monks the blame is light when they speak in jestful exaggeration, e.g. if after getting a little oil or ghee they say, Oil flows like a river in the village today. But the blame is heavy when they claim to have seen something they did not see. (gahahna attano santaka adtukmatya natthtidinayappavatto appasvajjo, sakkhin hutv atthabhajanattha vutto mahsvajjo, pabbajitna appakampi tela v sappi v labhitv
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2. Exceptions to the general rule

The claim that has so far served as a stalking horse Derretts claim that privileged lies are totally missing from Buddhism does not preclude the notion that Buddhist normative texts present certain lies as somewhat less blameworthy than others. The issue is not whether some lies are presented as less blameworthy, but whether any lie is presented as altogether blameless. The answer to this question would appear to be yes. Consider the following, drawn from the lapaala section of the Bodhisattvabhmi:
Although a bodhisattva would not tell a deliberate lie even to save his own life, he speaks that which aims at saving the lives of many sentient beings, at freeing them from bonds, at protecting them from having their hands, feet, noses, or ears cut off, or their eyes gouged out and [he does so] having individually reckoned the benefit to sentient beings. So, in brief, via this or that [means], a bodhisattva sees precisely [what is of] benefit to sentient beings; he does not see [what is] not [of] benefit to them. His mind is unconcerned with his own gain. And focusing on an idea that is prompted only by the desire to benefit sentient beings, he deliberately speaks in another way. In this way, he does not incur fault, and spreads much merit.17
It is difficult to see this passage as one that does not present certain lies as privileged viz., lies told by bodhisattvas who, having judiciously appraised the circumstances at hand, are unconcerned with their own benefit, and solely intent on securing the
hasdhippyena ajja gme tela nad mae sandatti praakathnayena pavatto appasvajjo adihay eva pana dihantidin nayena vadantna mahsvajjo.) 17 Emphasis added. Bodhisattvabhmi pp. 114115: yathpi tad bodhisat tvo bahn sattvn jvitavipramokrtha bandhanavipramokrtha hastapdanskaracchedacakurvikalbhvaparitrrtha y bodhisattva svajvitahetor api samprajnan [sic] mvca na bheta / t te sattvnm arthya pratisakhyya bhate/ iti samsato yena yena bodhisattva sattvnm artham eva payati/ nnartha payati/ svaya ca nirmiacitto bhavati / kevalasattvahitakmatnidna ca vinidhya saj samprajnan [sic] anyathvca bhate/ bhama anpattiko bhavati/ bahu ca puya prasyate.
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benefit of others. In telling such a lie, a bodhisattva not only incurs no fault (he is anpattika); but he also spreads much merit (bahu ca puya prasyate). Analogous claims are advocated in other Buddhist stric texts as well.18 ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra famously notes that even what is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will be of benefit.19 The point is elaborated and clarified by Prajkaramati, in his commentary on ntidevas text:
If someone should object, How can he avoid committing an offense (patti) while engaged in what is forbidden? [The reply is that] the Lord has taught that what is forbidden may be performed by one who perceives with the eye of knowledge a special benefit for beings therein but the foregoing [exemption] does not apply to everyone: only to [cases of] the exercise of compassion in its highest degree by one who is of a compassionate nature, without a selfish motive, solely concerned with the interests of others and totally dedicated to this [ideal].20
Prajkaramati goes on to connect the violation of generally applicable ethical principles to the exercise of skilful means, tactical skill, or ingenuity (upya or upyakaualya) a concept that Damien Keown has associated with later forms of what he terms Mahyna ethics:
The Mahyna allowed monks a limited degree of flexibility subject to the twofold stipulation that (a) the act should benefit others; and (b) it should be performed from an irreproachable (niravadya) motive. Care is taken specifically to exclude from this provision acts of a grave
18 These claims may have informed the favorable stance taken by Jnarmitra (10th century) to certain philosophical claims made by Dharmakrti claims that Jnarmitra reads as only partially true, but nevertheless pedagogically useful (Patil 2007). 19 Bodhicaryvatra 5.84cd: niiddham apy anujta kplor arthadarina. Translation from Crosby and Skilton 1995: 41. 20 Trans. Keown 1992: 14950. Bodhicaryvatrapajik p. 84: prati iddhrthe pravttau katha na spattika iti cet/ na/ kvacin niiddham api sattvrthaviea prajcaku payata karayataynujta bhaga vat / / tac cpi na sarvasypi tu kplo karuprakarapravttitay tatparatantrasya parrthaikarasasya svaprayojanavimukhasya/
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or serious nature, and there is no suggestion that a breach of the fundamental moral precepts would be countenanced. The further development of the principle enunciated here is to be found in the notion of Skilful Means, which can, perhaps, be regarded as the outcome of an attempt to extend the exemption granted in respect of minor offences to serious offences.21
The picture Keown presents is one of change over time: Beginning with an initial reluctance to admit that certain moral precepts those proscribing great offenses should ever be suspended or violated, the adherents of Mahyna gradually shifted to a view according to which actions previously classed as great offenses may, under certain circumstances, be performed without their performer thereby incurring serious karmic debt. Keown associates the trope of skilful means with this putatively latter stage of Mahyna ethical reflection; upya, used in this specific sense, thus appears on the scene as a consequence of a peculiarly Mahyna attempt to reassess the moral dimension of certain actions proscribed in Buddhist Vinaya literature.22 Keowns description of the way in which the concept of upya is deployed is surely correct for at least some passages in which the term appears. Upya does, in certain texts, appear to constitute something like a license to commit actions that would otherwise be impermissible.23 Yet closer examination of the source texts reveals that the notion of skilful means is itself somewhat fluid: Mahyna texts differ in their assessment of what practices the notion of skilful means can accommodate. Indeed, when one goes back to look at a story that has become something of a locus classicus for the presupposition that skilful means affords a bodhisattva permission to lie the Lotus Stras Parable of the Burning House one finds something like the opposite view expressed. According to the
Keown 1992: 14950. The term upya is used in many different ways in Mahyna texts, as Nattier (2003: 1546), among others, has pointed out. Cf. Harvey 2000: 135; Keown 1992: 15860; Pye 1978: 117. 23 On the use of upya in the sense above, see, for example, certain illustrative stories recounted in the Upyakaualyastra (trans. Tatz 1994: 345; 735; cf. Chang 1983: 4334; 4567).
22 21
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analysis presented in the stra, one cannot simultaneously lie and engage in skilful means.24
3. Returning to a house on fire

The Parable of the Burning House is quite well known, and for this reason I will sketch it only very schematically here.25 It is a parable placed into the mouth of kyamuni himself. He tells us of a father who lures his three children out of a burning house to safety by promising to give each of them different gifts once they emerge. All the children, in the end, do receive a gift but they all receive the same thing: a gift that had previously been promised to one child, but not to the others. Thus, though all the children do receive gifts, two fail to receive what they were told they would receive and so might well be read to have been lured from the house under false pretenses. Such an interpretation is floated in the stra, and quickly dismissed. Having finished his parable, kyamuni asks his audience riputra whether the father in the parable should not be understood to have told a lie (m haiva tasya puruasya mvda syt). riputra answers immediately and negatively: such a man would not be a liar (sa puruo na mvd bhavet); instead, we should understand the man to have saved his children via skilful means. Note, then, that riputra is not advocating the notion that lying is one form that skilful means can take. On the contrary, he is presenting the two as alternatives: one either lies, or one engages in skilful means.
24 The story is told twice, in prose and in verse, and there are interesting divergences between these two tellings, though these divergences are of little consequence to my concerns in this paper. It is, of course, true that the parable clearly serves more than one function in the stra. The stra itself encourages us to understand the parable as an allegory for the claim that apparently disparate Buddhist paths are unitary: while the Tathgata may appear to teach many paths to liberation, he in fact teaches only one. However, this aspect of the story is not directly relevant to the points I am working to make here, and so may safely be left aside. 25 For the Sanskrit, see Vaidya 1960: 51ff. (cf. Kern and Nanjio 190812: 72ff.; Wogihara and Tsuchida 1934: 69ff.; Dutt 1953: 54ff.)
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Why, then, should we think of the fathers action toward his children as an instance of skilful means rather than lying? riputras account of his reasoning on this issue is sketchy at best, but he works to justify his view by presenting two separable arguments. The first builds on the traditional assumption that lying involves the deliberate misrepresentation of a speakers intention. riputra notes that the fathers intention in speaking was precisely to save his children from suffering by the use of some skilful means. The father succeeds in his aim and thus should not be thought to have told a lie.26 This argument is supplemented by a second: riputra tells us that the father should not be considered a liar, since his actions serve to benefit his children. The reason offered here would seem to be irrelevant to the question of whether the father lies, unless riputra also presumes that lying is incompatible with benefit.27 If he does presume this, then we can fill in the contours of his argument quite easily: given the premises that an utterance cannot be both a lie and a source of benefit, and that a particular utterance is a source of benefit, the conclusion naturally follows that the utterance is not a lie. This argument is valid, but it is likely to strike most of us today as less than sound. It would seem that riputras response collapses two separable issues. One has to do with what we might call the moral status of the fathers behavior: whether the father is doing the right thing in speaking the way he does to his sons. riputra would, I think, answer this question positively: the father is doing the right
This argument is obviously specious, eliding as it does a distinction between what an utterance is about and the work that it is intended to do a distinction that informs discussions of abhidheya and prayojana in Buddhist stric literature. 27 See below, section 4, and cf. Kambala, lokaml, verse 37: Even if a statement which leads to injury were to be accurate (bhta), it would be false (m). What is the sense of [categorizing statements] as true or untrue? That [statement] which brings benefit to others is true! (bhtam apy upaghtya yad ukta syn maiva tat / satysatyena ko rthrthas tat satya yat parrthakt//)
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thing, because his actions benefit his sons.28 So the fathers actions ought to be affirmed. The other issue has to do with descriptive adequacy: how best to capture what sort of right thing the father is doing. To describe the fathers speech as an instance of mvda is to commit oneself to the view that certain instances of mvda ought to be affirmed. But to affix the label of mvda onto an utterance is already to impugn it and thus render such affirmation impossible. It may seem that what we are faced with here is simply an instance of the privileged lie under another name. And perhaps we are but the attempt at redescription is itself revealing. It suggests that those responsible for the composition of the Lotus Stra felt a degree of discomfort with the notion that upya is finally compatible with mvda: that skilful means can, in fact, be reconciled with the practice of lying. This looks to be a rather different view from the one expressed in the Bodhisattvabhmi passage cited above a passage that appears rather more relaxed about claiming that lies can and should, in certain circumstances, be told.29 Both of these views may be mingled in a single text. Consider, for example, the following passage, drawn from the Mahyna Mahparinirvastra:
O good man! It is because of all beings that although the Tathgata knows all things, he says he does not know; although he sees all things, he says he does not see. Why? Because the Tathgata clearly sees the capacities of individual beings. O good man! Although the Tathgata speaks in this way, he does not lie. Why not? Because lies involve faults (skyon, *doa). How could the Tathgata lie, being completely free of all blameworthy faults? Although the Tathgata does not lie, yet in certain cases he may lie for the purpose of benefiting sentient
28 Whether riputras view ought to be branded a species of consequentialism is an issue that I will leave to others to debate. 29 Note, however, that the terms used shift over the course of the paragraph, so that explicit reference to the practice of lying drops out. Bodhisattvas do not deliberately tell lies, but a bodhisattva may focus on an idea and deliberately speak in another way (anyathvca bhate) in order to bring benefit to others.
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beings by means of the dharma: he teaches and speaks to them with skilful means, as appropriate.30
Two prima facie incompatible assumptions are voiced here. According to the first, lying constitutively involves fault. Hence, the Tathgata cannot lie, since to admit that he could lie would be to admit that he possesses a trace of fault. According to the second, lying does not constitutively involve fault. Hence, the Tathgata may lie; in doing so, he practices skilful means. The passage thus immediately juxtaposes both of the standpoints toward lying discussed above; having done so, it appears in the end to accept the notion that the idea of skilful means can accommodate mvda. Against riputras assessment in the Lotus Stra, this passage strongly suggests that lying is one form that skilful means can take. 31 Mahyna stra texts would thus appear to differ on the question of whether upya and mvda can be reconciled. For this reason (among others), we should be cautious about presuming there to be a single Mahyna attitude to lying and, by extension, a single
rigs kyi bu de bzhin gshegs pa ni sems can thams cad kyi phyir chos thams cad mkhyen kyang mi mkhyen ces gsung ngo/ chos thams cad gzigs kyang gzigs pa med do zhes gsung/ / de ci phyir zhe na/ de bzhin gshegs pas ni sems can so soi dbang po gsal bar gzigs pai phyir ro/ rigs kyi bu de bzhin gshegs pa ni de skad gsung yang brdzun ma yin no/ de ci phyir zhe na/ brdzun du smra ba ni skyon dang bcas pa yin te/ de bzhin gshegs pa ni nyes pai skyon thams cad yongs su bral ba yin na brdzun du smra ba ga la zhig yod/ rigs kyi bu de bzhin gshegs pa la brdzun du gsung ba med mod kyi/ ji ste sems can dag la brdzun du smra bai rkyen gyi/ chos kyis phan pai don du gyur na/ ci rigs pai thabs kyis de la ston cing gsung ngo// 31 Interestingly, the parable of the burning house is also invoked in the Mahyna Mahparinirvastra, though in a highly abbreviated and rather different form one in which the topic of skilful means is not broached: For example: a fire rages in the house of a householder, and he emerges from the house. Yet his sons do not escape, remaining inside the house. Then the householder, though unquestionably aware of the conflagration, enters into the house in order to extract his children. It is the same with the BodhisattvaMahsattva. (dper na khyim bdag cig khyim du me shor na khyim de nas phyir rol tu byung ngo/ ji ste khyim bdag dei bu rnams khyim gyi nang du lus te me las ma thar na/ khyim bdag de dei tshe na gdon mi za bar mes tshig par gyur bar shes kyang bu rnams gdon pai phyir khyim dei nang du jug go/ byang chub sems dpa sems dpa chen po yang de dang dra ste/)
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Mahyna ethics (or single later Mahyna ethics).32 In fact, the Indian Buddhist textual corpus presents a range of views regarding the permissibility of lies. The view expressed in a particular text is not inferable from the knowledge that the text is classed as Mahyna. And, importantly, the same point holds true for nonMahyna texts as well. In the texts of the Pli canon, for example, divergent views on the subject of the privileged lie do occasionally surface, though such views are sometimes implied rather than stated outright.
4. Buddhas as perfected speakers: on truth and benefit in Pli texts

As is well known, texts of the Pli canon repeatedly affirm the Buddhas truthfulness. Yet it is also suggested in various places that to speak truthfully does not entail that one has thereby spoken wholesomely. In a passage preserved in the Aguttara Nikya, Gotama advises that a person should not speak of what he or she has seen, heard, sensed or understood, if doing so should cause unwholesome (akusala) states to increase and wholesome (kusala) states to decrease. Apparently, the truth can hurt and hurt in ways that impede the practice of the path. In such circumstances, one is better off saying nothing.33 On a first reading, this sentiment might appear to be similar to one expressed in Manusmti 4.138 a verse that stipulates what it calls an eternal dharma (santano dharma) concerning appropriate brahmanical speech. A brahmin, the text tells us,
Shall say what is true (satya); and he shall say what is agreeable (pri ya). He shall not say what is true, but disagreeable; nor shall he say what is agreeable, but wrong. This dharma is eternal.34
Cf. Silk 2002. AN ii.1723 (Vassakrasutta). 34 Jha 1999, Vol. 1: 378: satya bryt priya bryn na bryt satyam apriyam/ priya ca nnta bryd ea dharma santana.
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However, the prima facie similarity here is, I think, misleading. What is at stake in the passage from the Aguttara Nikya is not the agreeability of an utterance, but the wholesome effects it brings in its wake: the benefit it confers.35 And these two things are not the same, as the tradition acknowledges in the following rather complex passage of the Abhayarjakumrasutta.
Now on that occasion a young tender infant was lying prone on Prince Abhayas lap. Then the Blessed One said to Prince Abhaya: What do you think, prince? If, while you or your nurse were not attending to him, this child were to put a stick or a pebble in his mouth, what would you do to him? Venerable sir, I would take it out. If I could not take it out at once, I would take his head in my left hand, and crooking a finger of my right hand, I would take it out even if it meant drawing blood. Why is that? Because I have compassion for the child. So, too, prince, such speech as the Tathgata knows to be untrue (abhta) incorrect (ataccha), and unbeneficial (anatthasahita), and which is also disagreeable (appiya) and unwelcome (amanpa) to others: such speech the Tathgata does not utter. Such speech as the Tathgata knows to be true and correct but unbeneficial, and which is also disagreeable and unwelcome to others: such speech the Tathgata does not utter. Such speech as the Tathgata knows to be true, correct, and beneficial, but which is also disagreeable and unwelcome to others: the Tathgata knows the time to use such speech. Such speech as the Tathgata knows to be untrue, incorrect, and unbeneficial, but which is agreeable and welcome to others: such speech the Tathgata does not utter. Such speech as the Tathgata knows to be true and correct but unbeneficial, and which is agreeable and welcome to others: such speech the Tathgata does not utter. Such speech as the Tathgata knows to be true, correct, and beneficial, and which is agreeable and welcome to others: the Tathgata knows the time to use such speech. Why is that? Because the Tathgata has compassion for beings.36
Cf. the discussion of truth (bhta/ taccha) and benefit (atthasahita) pertaining to covert speech (rahovda) at MN 139 (Araavibhagasutta), iii.234 (amoli and Bodhi 1995: 10834). 36 Translation modified from amoli. MN 58, i.394395: Tena kho pana samayena daharo kumro mando uttnaseyyako abhayassa rjakumrassa ake nisinno hoti. Atha kho bhagav abhaya rjakumra etadavoca:
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In this passage, benefit is explicitly distinguished from both agreeability and truth. An utterances agreeability (or lack thereof) is presented as irrelevant to the question of whether the utterance is appropriate for a buddha. The salient issue is rather one of benefit: if an utterance is beneficial, a buddha will utter it, whether or not it is also agreeable (and it may not be). Agreeability and benefit are thus presented here as wholly autonomous notions (i.e., the presence of either one implies nothing about the presence of the other). The same autonomy is presented as characterizing agreeability and truth as well. Yet the texts stance on the conceptual relation between benefit and truth is left somewhat murky. There are four possibilities: An utterance might be untrue and unbeneficial (in which case, a buddha will not utter it); alternatively, an utterance might be true and unbeneficial (in which case, again, a buddha will not utter it); an utterance might be true and beneficial (in which case, a buddha will utter it). Finally, an utterance might be untrue and beneficial. The latter would seem, at least, to be a logical possibility but it is a possibility that is conspicuously absent from the text; Gotama does not so much as consider it.
ta kimmaasi rjakumra, sacya kumro tuyha v pamdamanvya dhtiy v pamdamanvya kaha v kahala v mukhe hareyya, kinti na kareyysti hareyy assha bhante. Sace aha bhante na sakkueyya diken eva hattu vmena hatthena ssa pariggahetv dakkhiena hatthena vakaguli karitv salohitampi hareyya. Ta kissa hetu: atthi me bhante kumre anukamp ti. Evameva kho rjakumra, ya tathgato vca jnti abhta ataccha anatthasahita, s ca paresa appiy amanp, na ta tathgato vca bhsati. Yampi tathgato vca jnti bhta taccha anatthasahita. S ca paresa appiy amanp, tampi tathgato vca na bhsati. Yaca kho tathgato vca jnti bhta taccha atthasahita s ca paresa appiy amanp, tatra kla tathgato hoti tass vcya veyykaraya. Yam tathgato vca jnti abhta ataacha anatthasahita s ca paresa piy manp, na ta tathgato vca bhsati. Yampi tathgato vca jnti bhta taccha anatthasahita. S ca paresa piy manp, tampi tathgato vca na bhsati. Yaca kho tathgato vca jnti bhta taccha atthasahita. S ca paresa piy manp, tatra kla tathgato hoti tass vcya veyykaraya. Ta kissa hetu: atthi rjakumra tathgatassa sattesu anukamp ti.
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Why is this possibility ignored? It is hazardous to engage in speculation here, but the passage from the Manusmti quoted above suggests one possible rationale. In the Manusmti passage, there are likewise four possibilities, only three of which are considered explicitly. (It can, it would seem, go without saying that a brahmin should not utter speech that is both disagreeable and untrue). Is something like the same thing happening in the Abhayarjakumrasutta? Is the notion of a beneficial untruth, or of a buddhas uttering beneficial untruths, so obviously untenable that it can safely be passed over in silence? If so, then the sutta would appear to present a view of benefit and truth that sees them as distinct but not wholly autonomous notions. In keeping with the view advocated in the Aguttara Nikya passage discussed earlier, truth does not imply benefit but benefit does imply truth.37 When considering whether an utterance is appropriate for a buddha, all one needs to ask is whether the utterance benefits others; if so, it is ipso facto true.
Cf. the following passage from the Mahyna Mahparinirvastra: All the world loves right speech. I never utter words that are untimely, contrary to the dharma, unbeneficial and non-virtuous. O good man! Certain words are also fundamentally harsh and false, in addition to being untimely, contrary to the dharma, disagreeable to one who hears them, unbeneficial and non-virtuous. I never speak such words either. O good man! Certain words, even though they may be fundamentally harsh, are true and not false; they are timely, concordant with the dharma and bring benefit and virtue to all sentient beings, even though they are disagreeable to one who hears them. I speak such words. And why is that? Because the Buddha, the Blessed One, possesses knowledge: because he knows skilful means. (yang dag par smra ba la ni jig rten pa thams cad dod do/ dus ma yin pa dang chos ma yin pa dang/ phan pa dang bde bar mi gyur bai tshig ni nam du yang mi gsung ngo/ rigs kyi bu tshig kha cig ni shin tu brlang zhing rtsa ba la brdzun pa yang yin te/ dus ma yin pa dang/ chos ma yin pa dang/ gang gis thos kyang mi dod pa dang/ phan pa dang/ bde bar mi gyur ba ni ngas nam du yang ma gsungs so/ rigs kyi bu tshig tu gsung ba kha cig ni brlang zhing rtsa ba kyang yang dag pa mi brdzun pa ste/ dus dang ldan pa/ chos dang ldan pa/ sems can thams cad la phan pa dang bde ba ste/ thos pas mi dga bar gyur ba yang nges par gsung ngo/ de ci phyir zhe na/ sangs rgyas bcom ldan das ni mkyhen pa dang ldan pa ste/ shin tu thabs mkhas pa dang ldan pai phyir ro//).
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Perhaps something like this assumption underlies riputras peculiar response to kyamunis question regarding the protagonist of the Parable of the Burning House. Did the father lie? No: given that he benefited his sons, he could not have lied; the very fact that he benefited his sons entails that he told the truth. In distinguishing between benefit and truth and emphasizing the salience of the former in deciding on what is and is not appropriate speech for buddhas, the Abhayarjakumrasutta arguably makes room for a certain ambivalence toward truth per se.38 This ambivalence is also arguably present in the Pli jtaka literature, to which we now turn.
5. Deception in the Pli jtaka literature

In Richard Robinsons well-known and widely used introduction to Buddhism The Buddhist Religion, originally authored in 1972 and now in its fifth edition (having been substantially revised and re-titled as Buddhist Religions), one finds the claim made and made repeatedly (Robinson et al. 2005: 69, 113) that although the Pli jtaka tales present occasions in which the bodhisattva is shown violating various precepts, he is never portrayed as violating the precept against lying.39 If this claim were true, then the jtakas would appear to be the wrong place to look for privileged lies. But the claim is misleading at best, as becomes apparent upon close investigation of the relevant literature a corpus of texts that comprises not only the skeletal canonical jtaka verses themselves, but the paracanonical Jtakahakath commentary that elaborates the stories traditionally assumed to surround them.
38 Cf. Bhvivekas insistence, in the Tarkajvl, that [t]he Blessed One seeks the welfare of the world, so he does not always favor reality, transl. Eckel (2008: 199). The corresponding Tibetan (Eckel 2008: 376) reads: bcom ldan das kyi rtsom pa ni jig rten la phan pa yin pai phyir yin pas de kho na nyid mchog tu dzin par mi mdzad. 39 This claim should probably not be attributed to Robinson himself, as it is not present in the first edition of Robinsons text, but appears to have been introduced in a subsequent edition.
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Here, I want to consider two of these stories. One the Dumme dhajtaka has been largely ignored by modern scholarship, despite the fact that a story quite similar to it is among those anthologized in the well-known Jtakaml of ryara.40 The other the Vessantarajtaka needs no introduction to scholars of Buddhism; it is perhaps the most widely known and beloved jtaka tale throughout the Buddhist world.41 In the Dummedhajtaka, the bodhisatta is born as a prince named Brahmadatta. As the story opens, he is 16 years of age. Educated at Takkasil, he is properly versed in the various branches of brahmanical learning, and is well aware of the protocols for Vedic sacrifice. He is also disturbed by these protocols, insofar as they demand the killing of animals. So he makes a vow: when he comes to power, he will, without harming a single being, cause this killing to stop by means of a stratagem (or a trick: upyena).42 One day, Brahmadatta is outside the city on his chariot when he notices a crowd of people gathered around a tree, making offerings to the devat dwelling there. Brahmadatta descends from his chariot and does the same. As time passes, he continues to return to the tree and engages in pj like a worshipper.43 When he finally attains sovereignty, he calls together the brahmins and householders of the region to remind them of his practice of worshipping the tree-devat. He then tells them that he has vowed to offer a sacrifice to the tree on the occasion of his becoming king, and that he will need their assistance in preparing the sacrifice. The sacrifice is to consist in the flesh and blood of one thousand people specifiOn the version of the story preserved in the Jtakaml, see below, note 44. The title Dummedhajtaka is given to two distinct stories preserved in the Pli jtaka corpus; the story under consideration here may be found in Jtaka, Vol. 1: 2596; trans. Cowell et al. 18951907, Vol. 1: 1288. 41 On the popularity of the Vessantarajtaka, see Cone and Gombrich 1977: xv; Collins 1998: 4978. 42 Jtaka, Vol. 1: 259: aha pitu accayena rajja labhitv ekam pi akilametv upyen eva pavadha ktu na dassmti. Interestingly, in the version of the tale presented in ryaras Jtakaml, no reference is made to upya. 43 Ibid.: 25960: devatmagaliko viya pja karoti.
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cally, those who engage in the five or ten immoral actions. He orders the assembled brahmins and householders to make known that anyone who behaves immorally will be killed and offered to the devat. They do so, striking fear into everyone. Duly cowed, the community halts the practice of harming living beings and committing any other infraction. Thus, the bodhisatta fulfills the terms of his original vow. This story offers a rather disturbing portrait of righteous kingship. Brahmadatta does succeed in halting the killing of animals, but he does so by enacting a reign of terror. The bodhisattas strategem his upya appears to involve protracted play-acting at pj, in order to set up the conditions under which his subjects will take seriously the issuance of what amounts to a zero-tolerance policy against ethical infraction, punishable by death. While we, as readers, know that Brahmadatta does not approve of the killing of animals or the harming of human beings, Brahmadattas subjects do not. In order for the stratagem to be effective, they need to believe that they will be killed if they behave immorally even if, given the objections to violence Brahmadatta raises in his vow, no killing will in fact occur. Brahmadatta is thus plausibly read as lying to his subjects. The lie is portrayed as facilitating an end that the tradition affirms but it is no less a lie for that.44
44 In ryaras version of the tale preserved under the title Yajajtaka (Kern 1891: 6773 = Vaidya ed.: 706; trans. Speyer 1895: 93104; Khoroche 1989: 7480) the bodhisattva, born as a king, faces the problem of drought, and seeks advice on what to do from senior brahmins. Not surprisingly, they tell him that he needs to prepare a sacrifice such as those described in the Veda a sacrifice in which many animals will need to be slaughtered. On hearing this answer, the king is appalled; his advisors appear to him pathetically weak-minded and gullible, unquestioning in their faith and blindly devoted to tradition (Khoroche 1989: 75). Yet, feigning eagerness to undertake the sacrifice (yajrambhasamutsuka iva nma), he agrees to the proposal with one modification: instead of an animal sacrifice, he will sponsor a human sacrifice (puruamedha) in which one thousand victims will be killed. He then calls together the populace of his kingdom and tells them that they should watch what they do, since he will be watching them: he plans to circulate spies around the kingdom who are sharp-eyed, tireless, and alert. Persons whom these spies observe behaving unethically will be arrested and added to the pool of sacrificial victims.
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Turning to the Vessantarajtaka, one finds an apparent lie portrayed as facilitating the bodhisattas perfected virtue of selfless generosity. The passage in question occurs just after Vessantaras wife Madd awakens from a harrowing dream, and approaches Vessantara to relate it and ask him what it means. Cone and Gombrich translate the passage as follows:
She went to the leaf hut of the Great Being and knocked at the door when she had told him [the dream], just as she had experienced it, the Great Being understood the dream, and knew that he would fulfill the Perfection of giving, and that a suppliant would on the next day come and beg his children from him. He decided to console Madd and sent her away. Your mind must have been agitated because you were lying uncomfortably, or because of something you had eaten, Madd. Do not be frightened. So he deceivingly consoled her (mohetv asssetv), and sent her away.45
We do not find the compound musvda invoked in this passage and its absence prompts questions. Vessantara has certainly misled Madd but has he lied to her? Perhaps not: Madds dream could
Agents are dispatched to monitor the public, and repeated announcements of the impeding sacrifice are made: the population knows that it is being watched very carefully, that a zero-tolerance policy is in effect, and that the consequence of immoral behavior is death. As a result, the text tells us, all inclination to misbehave left them, and instead they were all eager to vow themselves to a life of virtue. In their readiness to love and respect one another, they turned their backs on petty feuds. Quarrels and disputes ceased, and they abided by their elders decisions. Sharing became commonplace, and hospitality too. They took pride in behaving with politeness and modest reserve. It was as though they were living in the Golden Age no one lapsed at all (Khoroche 1989: 778). The drought is thus brought to an end, the crops are restored, and everyone lives happily ever after. Because he has so successfully modified his subjects behavior, the king never has to hold the human sacrifice: he has accomplished a sacrifice without bloodshed a sacrifice according to the law (dharmayaja). 45 Cone and Gombrich 1977: 54. Cf. Jtaka, Vol. 6, p. 541: paasla gantv Mahsattassa paasladvra koesi s attan dihaniymen eva kathesi, M. supinam parigahitv mahya dnapram prissati, sve mahya ycako gantv putte yccissatti, Maddi asssetv uyyojessmti cintetv Maddi tava dussayanadubbhojanehi citta luita bhavissati, m bhyti mohetv asssetv uyyojesi.
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conceivably have been caused by one or both of by the very conditions that Vessantara identifies as potentially prompting it. Even if the dream turns out to portend future events (as it does), it could indeed have been caused by an awkward physical posture, or by something she ate and Vessantara might be aware of this. So, in telling Madd not to worry that it was just something she ate Vessantara could conceivably be offering Madd an accurate account of the antecedent material conditions that prompted the occurrence of her dream. This, however, seems a stretch. Given the scenario as presented here, it seems much more natural to take Vessantara as deliberately misrepresenting how he takes things to be. Vessantara has lied. In doing so, he has not engaged in an action that is ever explicitly identified as blameworthy. The deception of Madd is not mentioned again but its effects are important to the narrative: Madd, having been deceitfully consoled, leaves the children alone with Vessantara the next day, and Vessantara gives them away thereby fulfilling the perfection of giving.46
6. Concluding reflections
The above remarks barely scratch the surface of some of the issues raised in Buddhist doctrinal texts and those familiar with such texts will note also certain complexities have been avoided altogether (e.g., the claim, made in the Lakvatrastra, the Mlamadhyamakakrik and elsewhere, that buddhas do not in fact speak at all). But I hope that the material presented here has been sufficient to show that the sweeping claim that has served as the papers stalking horse the claim that Buddhism (or, more precisely, normative Buddhist doctrine) has no notion of the privileged lie needs to be seriously reconsidered. So, too, does the claim that the bodhisattva is never portrayed in the jtaka literature as violating the precept against lying. Both of these claims are false. Buddhist doctrine does not, in fact, advocate a uniform stance on
Interestingly, the versions of the story presented in Kemendras Avadnakalpalat (Vol. I: 1725) and ryaras Jtakaml (5569) omit any reference to Madds dream and her subsequent deception.
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the permissibility of lying nor is a uniform stance on lying implied by the actions of the bodhisatta in the jtakas. One finds, instead, different views stated and implied in the literature and, as we have seen, such differences emerge even when one confines oneself to the canonical texts of a single Buddhist tradition. Lies, though generally discouraged by the tradition, do appear to be presented as blameless in certain circumstances. Despite the prima facie absolutism of certain Vinaya precepts, Buddhist texts suggest that the moral status of lying can be read as varying from case to case. This is a substantive point but there is also a methodological point at stake here that, although it has been raised before, is worth raising again. Over the past decade, the field of Buddhist studies has seen an explosive growth in searchable e-texts. With the click of a mouse, I can know that the term mus- occurs 653 times in the Pli canon. This is a salutary development for research in the field but in addition to the rewards it brings, it also carries with it certain risks. As noted above, certain canonical and paracanonical Pli texts portray the bodhisatta as engaging in intentional deception (verbal and otherwise). None of these instances is signaled by the term mus-; each would be missed in even the most comprehensive e-text survey of the term and its cognates. For all of the benefits provided by e-texts and they are considerable they cannot substitute for the hard work of reading through, and thinking with, these texts. This is especially true if one is interested in detecting conceptual undercurrents: ideas that are not explicitly acknowledged topoi for the tradition. The privileged lie would appear to be one such idea; there is no Sanskrit or Pli term for it, and this fact has perhaps contributed to the elusiveness of the idea under the philological gaze. Without downplaying the importance of rigorous philological work (we could get nowhere without it), we should, I think, heed the recommendation of the texts themselves, and continually remember to attend not only to their phrasing (vyajana), but also to their meaning (artha).
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Abbreviations and bibliography General abbreviations

D The sde dge mtshal par bka-gyur and bstan-gyur. Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Chodhey Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang. Consulted in digital format via the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center: (http://www.tbrc. org/#library_work_Object-W22084, last visited 07-09-2011) and (http:// www.tbrc.org/#library_work_Object-W23703, last visited 07-09-2011). G Bstan gyur gser gyi lag bris ma. Tianjing. Consulted in digital format via the Tibetan Buddhist Resource Center: (http://www.tbrc.org/#library_ work_Object-W23702, last visited 07-09-2011). Mahvyutpatti Sakaki, R. 1916. The Mahvyutpatti, a Buddhist Dictionary Originally Translated into Sanskrit and Tibetan, Later into Chinese and Japanese. Kyto: Shingonsh Kyto Daigaku. Consulted in digital format, in an edition prepared by Mitsuhara, H. et al., eds. 2002. Mahvyutpatti (http://texa.human.is.tohoku.ac.jp/aiba/archive/mvyut/open/, last visited 07-09-2011).
Primary sources in Pli

AN Aguttara-Nikya. Morris, R. (Vols. 12) and E. Hardy (Vols. 35), eds. 196181 [18851900]. The Aguttara Nikya. 5 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Dhammapada Von Hinber, O. and K. R. Norman, eds. 19945. Dhammapada. London: Pali Text Society. Iti Windisch, E., ed. 1975 [1889]. Itivuttaka. London: Pali Text Society. Jtaka/ Jtakahakath Fausbll, V., ed. 19901 [187796]. The Jtaka Together with its Commentary, Being Tales of the Anterior Births of Gotama Buddha. 6 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. MN Majjhima-Nikya. Trenckner, V. et al., eds. 199194 [18881902]. The Majjhima Nikya. 4 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Milindapaha Trenckner, V., ed. 1986 [1880]. Milindapaha. London: Pali Text Society. SN Samyutta-Nikya. Feer, M. L., ed. 197380 [18841904]. The Samyutta Nikya of the Sutta-piaka. 6 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Sumagalavilsin Rhys Davids et al., eds. 196871 [192932]. Dghanikya Commentary: Sumagalavilsin. 3 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Sn Suttanipta. Andersen, D. and H. Smith, eds. 1990 [1913]. The Suttanipata. London: Pali Text Society.
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Primary sources in Sanskrit

Abhidharmakoa and -bhya (Vasubandhu) Dwrikds str, S. ed. 1998. Abhidharmakoabhya. 2 Vols. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati Series 58. Avadnakalpalat (Kemendra) Vaidya, P. L., ed. 1959. AvadnaKalpalat. 2 Vols. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. lokaml (Kambala) Lindtner, C., ed. and trans. 2003. A Garland of Light: Kambalas lokaml. Fremont: Asian Humanities Press. Bodhicaryvatra (ntideva) Dwrikds str, S., ed. 2001. Bodhi caryvatra. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati Series 21. Bodhicaryvatrapajik (Prajkaramati) Vaidya, P. L., ed. 1960. Bodhi caryvatra of ntideva with the commentary Pajik of Prajkaramati. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. Bodhisattvabhmi (attributed to Asaga) Dutt, N., ed. 1966. Bodhisattva bhmi: Being the XVth Section of Asagapadas Yogacarabhumi [sic]. Patna: Jayaswal Reseach Institute. Caturatisiddhapravtti (Abhayadattar) Sanskrit lost. Tibetan: not incorporated in D; G 3090 rgyud grel lu 1b1102a6. Dharmapada Brough, J., ed. and trans. 1962. The Gndhr Dharmapada. London: Oxford University Press. Dharmasamuccaya (Avalokitasiha) Ch. 12 Lin, Li-Kouang et al., ed. and trans. 1969. Dharmasamuccaya: Compendium de la Loi. Recueil de Stances Extraites de Saddharmasmtyupasthna-stra par Avalokitasiha, Vol. 2 (Annales du Muse Guimet 68). Paris. Jtakaml (attributed to ryara) Vaidya, P. L., ed. 1959. Jtakaml. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. Mahbhrata (diparvan) Sukthankar, V. S. et. al., eds. 1933. The Mahbhrata; for the first time critically edited. Vol. 1: diparvan. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Mahparinirvastra Sanskrit fragments in Yuyama, A., ed. 1981. Sanskrit Fragments of the Mahyna Mahparinirvnastra 1: Koyasan Manuscript. Studia Philologica Buddhica, Occasional Paper Series, IV. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library; Bongard-Levin, G. M., ed. 1986. New Sanskrit Fragments of the Mahyna Mahparinirvastra (Central Asian Manuscript Collection at Leningrad). Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. Tibetan: D 119 mdo sde nya 1b1ta 339a7. Prtimokastra Bannerjee, A., ed. 1977. Two Buddhist Vinaya Texts in Sanskrit: Prtimoka Stra and Bhikukarmavkya. Calcutta: World Press Private Limited.
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Ratnagotravibhga (attributed to Asaga/Maitreya) Prasad, H. S., ed. 1997 [1991]. The Uttaratantra of Maitreya. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications. Saddharmapuarkastra Vaidya, P. L., ed. 1960. Saddharmapuarkastra. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning; Kern, H. and B. Nanjio, eds. 1908 12. Saddharmapudarka. Bibliotheca Buddhica 10. St. Petersburg; Wogihara, U. and C. Tsuchida, eds. 19345. Saddharmapuarkastram = Kaitei Bonbun Hokeky (3 Vols). Tokyo: Seigo-Kenkykai; Dutt, N., ed. 1953. Saddharmapuarkastram, with N. D. Mironovs readings from Central Asian MSS. Calcutta: Asiatic Society. Tarkajvl (Bhviveka) Sanskrit lost. Critical edition of Chapters 4 and 5 in Tibetan translation in Eckel, M. D., ed. 2008. Bhviveka and His Buddhist Opponents (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 70). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Udnavarga Bernhard, F., ed. 1965. Udnavarga. 2 vols. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. Upyakaualyastra Sanskrit lost. Tibetan: D 261 mdo sde za 283b2 310a7, D 82 dkon brtsegs cha 30a170b7.
Secondary sources
Bodhi, B., trans. 1978. The Discourse on the AllEmbracing Net of Views: The Brahmajlasutta and its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Bodhi, B., trans. 2000. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Samyutta Nikya. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. Chang, G., et al., trans. 1983. A Treasury of Mahyna Stras: Selections from the Mahratnaktastra. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. Collins, S. 1998. Nirva and Other Buddhist Felicities: Utopias of the Pali Imaginaire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cone, M. and R. Gombrich, trans. 1977. The Perfect Generosity of Prince Vessantara. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Cowell, E. B. et al., eds. and trans. 18951907. The Jtaka: or, Stories of the Buddhas Former Births. 6 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Crosby, K. and A. Skilton, trans. 1995. The Bodhicaryvatra (Oxford World Classics). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Derrett, J. D. M. 2006. Musvda-virati and privileged lies. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 13: (http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/ files/ 2010/ 04/derrett-article.pdf, last visited 07-09-2011). Hahn, M., ed. 1982. Ngrjunas Ratnval, Volume 1: The Basic Texts
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(Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese). Bonn: India et Tibetica Verlag. Harvey, P. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hopkins, J., ed. and trans. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Ngrjunas Precious Garland. Ithaca: Snow Lion. Horner, I. B., trans. 1969 [19634]. Milindas Questions. 2 Vols. London: Pali Text Society. Jha, G., trans. 1999. Manusmti with the Mahubhya of Medhtithi. 10 Vols. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Keown, D. 1992. The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. Houndmills: Macmillan. Kern, H. 1891. The Jtaka-ml: Stories of Buddhas Former Incarnations, Otherwise Entitled Bodhisattva-avadna-ml, by rya-ra (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 1). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Khoroche, P. 1989. Once the Buddha Was a Monkey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mller, F. 1883. India: What Can it Teach Us? London: Longmans, Green, and Company. amoli, B. and B. Bodhi, trans. 1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation of the Majjhima Nikya. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Nattier, J. 2003. A Few Good Men. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Pachow, W. 2000. A Comparative Study of the Prtimoka on the Basis of Its Chinese, Tibetan, Sanskrit, and Pli Versions. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Patil, P. 2007. Dharmakrtis White Lie Philosophy, Pedagogy, and Truth in Late Indian Buddhism In Kellner, B. et al. 2007. Pramakrti: Papers Dedicated to Ernst Steinkellner on the Occasion of his 70 th Birthday. 2 Vols. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fr Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien. Vol. 2, pp. 597619. Pye, M. 1978. Skilful Means: A Concept in Mahyna Buddhism. London: Duckworth. Robinson, R. 1972. The Buddhist Religion: An Historical Introduction. Belmont, CA: Dickinson Publishing. Robinson, R. et al. 2005. Buddhist Religions: A Historical Introduction (Fifth Edition). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Silk, J. 2002. What, if Anything, is Mahyna Buddhism? Problems of Definitions and Classifications Numen 49, pp. 355405. Speyer, J. S., trans. 1982 [1885]. The Jtakaml, or Garland of BirthStories of ryara. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Tatz, M. 1994. The Skill in Means (Upyakaualya) Stra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
The tman and its negation A conceptual and chronological analysis of early Buddhist thought
Alexander Wynne
The denial that a human being possesses a self or soul is probably the most famous Buddhist teaching. It is certainly its most distinct, as has been pointed out by G. P. Malalasekera: In its denial of any real permanent Soul or Self, Buddhism stands alone.1 A similar modern Sinhalese perspective has been expressed by Walpola Rahula: Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self or tman.2 The No Self or no soul doctrine (Sanskrit: antman; Pli: anattan) is particularly notable for its widespread acceptance and historical endurance. It was a standard belief of virtually all the ancient schools of Indian Buddhism (the notable exception being the Pudgalavdins),3 and has persisted without change into the modern era. Thus the classical Theravdin view of Buddhaghosa that there is only suffering, but nobody who suffers4 is identical to the view of ntideva, the famous Indian Mahynist, that the person who experiences suffering does not exist,5 and both views are mirrored by the modern Theravdin perspective of Mahasi Sayadaw
Malalasekera 1957: 33. Rahula 1959: 51. 3 On the Pudgalavdins see Chu 1999 and Williams and Tribe 2000: 12428. 4 Vism XVI.90 (Warren and Kosambi 1989: 436): dukkham eva hi, na koci dukkhito. 5 BCA VIII.101 (Tripathi 1988: 164): yasya dukha sa nsti.
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that there is no person or soul6 and the modern Mahyna view of the fourteenth Dalai Lama that [t]he Buddha taught that our belief in an independent self is the root cause of all suffering.7 This traditional understanding has been accepted by Buddhist scholars past and present. According to La Valle Poussin, the Buddha did not accept the existence of a Self (tman), a permanent individual; he teaches that the so-called Self is a compound of material and spiritual data called skandhas.8 In a similar vein Norman has stated that the Buddha denied the existence of the permanent individual self,9 Collins has spoken of the Buddhist denial of self,10 and De Jong has noted that in early Buddhism impermanence and suffering imply the non-existence of the self as a permanent entity.11 There is early canonical support for all these statements. In the Vajir Sutta of the Sayutta-Nikya, where the bhikkhun Vajir reports the doctrine to Mra as follows:
Why do you believe in a living being? Is not this your view, Mra? This is nothing but a heap of formations: No being is found here. (553) When there is a collection of parts the word chariot is used; In the same way, when the aggregates exist (khandhesu santesu) the conventional term being (satto) [is applied to them]. (554) Only suffering (dukkham eva) comes into existence, and only suffering endures. Nothing apart from suffering comes into existence, and nothing apart from suffering ceases to exist. (555)12
Kornfield 1996: 45. Dalai Lama 1994: 111. 8 La Valle Poussin 1917: 34. 9 Norman 1981: 87ff. 10 Collins 1982: 95. 11 De Jong 2000: 177. 12 SN I.296 (v. 55355): kin nu satto ti paccesi Mra dihigatan nu te, suddhasakhrapujo ya na yidha sattpalabbhati. (553) yath hi agasambhr hoti saddo ratho iti, eva khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti. (554) dukkham eva hi sambhoti dukkha tihati veti ca, natra
7 6
The tman and its negation
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The statement that only suffering comes into existence, and only suffering endures is akin to Buddhaghosas statement that there is only suffering, but nobody who suffers, and ntidevas statement that the person who experiences suffering does not exist: all assume that there is no ghost in the machine. Such an understanding has been summed up by T. W. Rhys Davids as follows: Man is never the same for two consecutive moments, and there is within him no abiding principle whatever.13 According to this definition, and depending on ones perspective, the doctrine could be taken to mean either that a person has no soul (in the sense of a spiritual part of man in contrast to the purely physical), or that a person lacks an inherent identity, that which could be termed self (in its simple philosophical sense of that which a person is really and intrisically he (in contradistinction to what is adventitious). For these definitions see the OED). Given the close correspondence between the Vajir Sutta, Buddhaghosa, ntideva and the more recent Buddhist authorities cited above, this understanding would seem to have been the norm in Buddhist circles for over two thousand years. Indeed the attestation of this idea in a canonical text means that it can most probably be taken back to the pre-Aokan period, i.e. within roughly 150 years of the Buddhas death.14
1. The historical problem

Despite its importance and historical endurance, it is odd that the No Self doctrine is hardly attested in the early Buddhist literature, the Vajir Sutta being perhaps the only Pli discourse to state the idea explicitly.15 Indeed it is very easy to read a substantial amount
dukkh sambhoti natr dukkh nirujjhati. (555) Buddhaghosa cites some of these verses in his Visuddhimagga (XVIII.25, 27; Warren and Kosambi 1989: 508. 13 Rhys Davids 1877: 94. 14 Assuming that the Buddhas teaching career began at around 450 BCE, and that the Buddha died in about 404 BCE, i.e. about 136 years before Aokas inauguration (Gombrich 1992: 246). On the pre-Aokan date of canonical Pli Suttas, see Wynne 2005. 15 Although see section 7 below on the possibility that the doctrine is as-
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of the early literature such as virtually all of the important DghaNikya without encountering anything remotely like it. There are only two plausible explanations for this historical peculiarity. The first is that the doctrine is implicit in the early texts, but for some reason was only explicated in the Vajir Sutta (and perhaps a few other discourses). The second is that the doctrine was generally unknown to the composers of the canonical texts either because it emerged at a later date or because it was initially a fringe idea who therefore failed to record it. Both explanations imply that Buddhist thought changed over time: from implicit to explicit formulations of the doctrine, or so that a later development or minority concern eventually came to dominate the philosophical mainstream of the early sagha. In other words, there must have been either a terminological or philosophical change in early Buddhist thinking about the human being. To establish the more likely eventuality, the early Buddhist teachings on personal identity must be reconsidered. This will involve going over much old ground, but since a general consensus has not been reached this is unavoidable.16 Such a study is further necessitated by the fact that a number of important text-critical problems have been ignored: the historical problem noted above has not been properly recognised, little thought has been given to the form of the important Not-Self teaching, the basic vocabulary of the teachings on personal identity has been misunderstood, nonBuddhist parallels to important teachings have been missed, and little attempt has been made to relate the teachings on personal identity to the wider doctrinal concerns of the early texts. In short, there is much scope for a more detailed exploration of this aspect of early Buddhist thought.
sumed by the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta. 16 A minority but not insignificant view is that of Prez-Remn (1980), who has argued that since the early texts do not deny the self they must in fact presuppose it; for more scholars who believe that the early Buddhist teachings presuppose a self, see Collins 1982: 310. Against this view, Vetter (1988: 41, n.10) has argued that although the early texts do not deny the existence of the self, they do not presuppose it. Oetkes detailed study (1988) also argues that the early texts neither deny nor affirm the existence of the self.
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Such a study must begin with a very old and much discussed point: the Upaniadic background to early Buddhism. For as we will see, early Upaniadic speculation on the tman was wellknown in early Buddhist circles, and determines the form and content of some important early Buddhist teachings. Of the various senses in which the term tman is used in the early Upaniads, the most important is the spiritual self or the inmost core of a human being.17 According to the Yjavalkyaka of the Bhadrayaka Upaniad, the tman in this sense is a non-physical substance,18 a principle of life on which a persons cognitive functions (pra) depend,19 and also the inner subject of perception, i.e. an unseen seer20 that consists of nothing but
According to Olivelle (1998: 22) the term is used in two other senses, i.e. as a simple reflexive pronoun and in denoting a living, breathing body. The three usages are also well attested throughout Sanskrit literature. According to Monier Williams, in its simplest sense the term tman refers to the bodily person: the person or whole body considered as one and opposed to the separate members of the body (MMW s.v.). In a similar fashion, the term tman is often used as a reflexive pronoun: tman in the sg. is used as reflexive pronoun for all three persons and all three genders, e.g. tmna s hanti she strikes herself (MMW s.v.). Monier Williams also cites the expressions tman (Ved. loc.) dhatte/karoti: he places in himself, makes his own, and atman akarot: he did it himself; he also suggests that something like essence is the oldest and most basic definition of the term tman as the breath, the soul, principle of life and sensation (RV, AV). 18 That the tman is a spiritual principle is made clear in the numerous references to its immortality, e.g. BU IV.3.12, BU IV.4.16, BU IV.4.17, BU IV.4.25. That it is a spiritual principle distinct from the body is made clear in those passages which describe its reincarnation, e.g. BU IV.3.8 and especially the detailed account of BU IV.4.3: ayam tmeda arra nihatyvidy gamayitvnyam kramam kramytmnam upasaharati: Once this tman has struck the body down and rendered it unconsciousness, it approaches another station and draws itself towards it. See also BU IV.4.7: tadyath ahinirvlayan valmke mt prayast ayta, evam eveda arra ete. athya aarro mta pro brahmaiva teja eva. 19 BU IV.4.2: tam utkrmanta pro ntkrmati, pram utkrmanta sarve pr antkrmanti. 20 E.g. BU III.7.23: ado drarruta rotmato mantvijto vijt (see also BU III.8.11); see also BU IV.5.15 which makes it clear that the tman, as the perceiver, cannot be perceived (vijtram are kena vijnyd:
17
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consciousness.21 The tman of Yjavalkya, and henceforth of Vedntic philosophy in general, is both a spiritual substance and an unchanging inner subject of phenomena. This understanding is not entirely different from the Cartesian mind-soul, which is also a spiritual substance as well as the true subject of experience.22 Despite this similarity, however, the tman of Yjavalkya is also said to be a nondual consciousness identical to the underlying essence of the cosmos (brahman), the realisation of which is a state of pure bliss.23 This equation of microcosm (tman) and macrocosm (brahman) is of course philosophically problematic, since it involves the identification of the individual subject of perception with an impersonal essence. In the early Upaniads, however, this problem is resolved mystically rather than philosophically: as the Bhadrayaka Upaniad states, by meditating on the tman (when it is seen, heard, contemplated and cognised ), its true nature as a macrocosmic essence will be revealed ( the whole world is known).24 Such an understanding belongs more to the realm of religious experience than that of rational enquiry. The peculiar identity of microcosm and macrocosm was not initially problemBy what means might one perceive the perceiver?). 21 BU IV.3.7: yo ya vijnamaya preu; BU IV.4.22: sa v ea mahn aja tm vijnamaya preu. 22 Although Williams states that very little of his discussion about Western concepts of the soul is relevant to the Buddha, (Williams and Tribe 2000: 56), his definition of the Cartesian position shows striking similarities with Yjavalkyas understanding of the tman (ibid.): As is well known, Descartes identified that which gives life to the body, and survives death, with the mind, and he also identified this mind-soul as the true self, of an intrinsically different stuff from the body. The mind-soul is the factor in which lies the identity of the person over time and change. 23 BU IV.3.32 states that the tman is the highest bliss (parama nanda), BU IV.5.22 states that the tman is nondual consciousness (vijnaghana), BU IV.5.11 states that it is macrocosmic (mahbhta), and BU IV.5.12 likens the person who unites with the tman in deep sleep to a single ocean (salila eka), a state equated with the world of brahma (brahmaloka). 24 BU IV.5.6: tmani khalv are de rute mate vijta ida sarva vidita: When the tman is seen, heard, contemplated and cognised, the whole world is known. For a parallel teaching see BU II.4.5: tmano v are daranena ravaena maty vijneneda sarva viditam.
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atic, therefore, but only became so for later generations of Vedntic thinkers who puzzled it over to varying degrees of success. It is against this conceptual background that the early Buddhist teachings on personal identity must be understood. As will become clear, these teachings refer to the Upaniadic tman in both its microcosmic and macrocosmic apsects (as the inner perceiver and nondual essence respectively). Understanding exactly how this is the case will help resolve the problem of whether the No Self teaching of the Vajir Sutta was implicit in other early teachings, or whether it was a philosophical development from an earlier period dominated by different concerns.
2. The Not-Self teaching

Perhaps the most important source for the early Buddhist critiques of the tman are the various sectarian accounts of the Buddhas Second Sermon. The first teachings of this sermon states that the five aggregates (form, feeling, apperception, volitions and consciousness) are not tman/attan (antman/anattan) since they are beyond a persons control.25 The precise meaning of this teaching is unclear: quite what the word tman/attan means, and why the ability to control each of the five aggregates would mean that they constitute an tman/attan, is difficult to make out.26 The peVin I.13.18: rpa bhikkhave anatt. rpa ca h ida bhikkhave att abhavissa, na yida rpa bdhya savatteyya, labbhetha ca rpe: eva me rpa hotu, eva me rpa m ahos ti. yasm ca kho bhikkhave rpa anatt, tasm rpa bdhya savattati, na ca labbhati rpe: eva me rpa hotu, eva me rpa m ahos ti. vedan anatt, vedan ca h ida bhikkhave att abhavissa For this teaching in Buddhist Sanskrit texts, see Mvu III.335.12, SbhV I.138.10 and CPS 15.2 (Waldschmidt 1952: 162). 26 Collins 1982: 97 has suggested that this teaching is directed against the Brahminic notion of the tman as the microcosmic reflection of the macrocosmic force of the universe (brahman). But the teaching does not presuppose that the tman should be an inner controller, and if so it would not appear to be a microcosmic reflection of a world-controlling force. The teaching instead states that if the five aggregates were tman/attan, a person should be able to change them as he wants. The argument is thus directed against the notion that the five aggregates constitute the tman/attan, and not
25
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culiar content of this teaching is matched by the fact that it is mentioned in only one Pli discourse (the Casaccaka Sutta) besides the two Pli texts that record the Second Sermon.27 This peculiarity suggests that the teaching was of little importance in the early Buddhist period. Much more important is the second teaching of the Second Sermon. As Collins has pointed out, a very high proportion of the discussions of Not-Self in the Suttas consist in various versions of this argument.28 This teaching is in fact the most important early Buddhist negation of the tman, and one that has distinct Upaniadic undertones:
What do you think, bhikkhus: is form permanent (nicca) or impermanent (anicca)? Impermanent, master. Is that which is impermanent unsatisfactory (dukkha) or satisfactory (sukha)? Unsatisfactory, master. And is it suitable to regard that which is impermanent, unsatisfactory and subject to change (viparimadhamma) as This is mine, I am this, this is my attan?
against the notion that there is tman/attan controlling them from within, as is also assumed by Siderits (2007: 46ff.). For a full study of the conceptual and historical implications of this teaching see Wynne 2009a; especially 8688. 27 Collins 1982: 97 has suggested that this teaching is directed against the Brahminic notion of the tman as the microcosmic reflection of the macrocosmic force of the universe (brahman). But the teaching does not presuppose that the tman should be an inner controller, and if so it would not appear to be a microcosmic reflection of a world-controlling force. The teaching instead states that if the five aggregates were tman/attan, a person should be able to change them as he wants. The argument is thus directed against the notion that the five aggregates constitute the tman/attan, and not against the notion that there is tman/attan controlling them from within, as is also assumed by Siderits (2007: 46ff.). For a full study of the conceptual and historical implications of this teaching see Wynne 2009a; especially 8688. 28 Collins 1982: 98. Similar teachings begin book IV (Sayatanavagga) of the Sayutta-Nikya: it is stated that all sense faculties and their objects are impermanent (anicca), unsatisfactory (dukkha) and so Not-Self (anattan). Derivatives of this teaching, where the five aggregates are also stated to be anattan, can be found at SN III.2021, 2324 and 179.
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No, master.29
Since the list of five aggregates denotes the different aspects of phenomenal being,30 this teaching therefore states that an tman/ attan cannot be found in conditioned experience. Although it is not immediately clear how the term tman/attan is to be taken here, Norman has argued that it is to be understood as the blissful and unchangeable tman of the early Upaniads. This is shown by the fact that the response to the Buddhas final question can only be given
by those who know, in advance, that the term att is by definition nicca and sukha, and therefore anything which is anicca and dukkha cannot be att. This gives us a clear indication of the type of att which is being discussed. It is the Upaniadic idea of an tman which is nitya and sukha 31
If this teaching negates the Upaniadic tman in the sense of an unchanging, blissful essence, it would seem to be concerned with the tman in its macrocosmic aspect (as brahman), for this is how
29
Vin I.14: ta ki maatha bhikkhave: rpa nicca v anicca v ti? anicca bhante. ya pannicca dukkha v ta sukha v ti? dukkha bhante. ya pannicca dukkha viparimadhamma, kallan nu ta samanupassitu: eta mama, eso ha asmi, eso me att ti? no h eta bhante. For the various Sanskrit versions of this teaching, see Mvu III.337.11, SbhV I.138.21 and CPS 15.6 (Waldschmidt 1952: 164). 30 Gethin 1986: 49: the five khandhas, as treated in the Nikyas and early Abhidhamma, do not exactly take on the character of a formal theory of the nature of man. The concern is not so much the presentation of an analysis of man as object, but rather the understanding of the nature of conditioned existence from the point of view of the experiencing subject. Thus at the most general level rpa, vedan, sa, sakhr and via are presented as five aspects of an individual beings experience of the world Hamilton (2000: 27) has similarly written that the five aggregates are not a comprehensive analysis of what a human being is comprised of Rather they are factors of human experience. 31 Norman 1981: 22. To this we might add that by equating impermanence (anicca) with being subject to change (viparimadhamma), the Buddha recalls a key feature of the self according to the Yjavalkyaka (e.g. BU IV.5.15), i.e. that it is unchangeable. Bronkhorst (2007: 233) has noted that BU IV.5.15 introduces the notion of the immutability of the self.
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the blissful tman is considered in the early Upaniads.32 It does not make any sense, however, to read this teaching as a negation of a macrocosmic essence. While it might make sense to ask whether consciousness has the characteristics of the macrocosmic tman (since a number of important early Upaniadic passages state that the tman in its macrocosmic aspect is a nondual consciousness),33 it makes little sense to ask if form, sensation, apperception and volitions have the characteristics of an essence that transcends all phenomena. That the teaching is not a straightforward denial of the macrocosmic tman is also suggested by the use of the terms sukha and nicca. The primary sense of these terms seems not to be permanent and blissful, as would be the case in a straightforward negation of Upaniadic thought. The term sukha is rather an antonym of the term dukkha, which here has the weak sense of unsatisfactory, this being the only way in which the impermanence (anicca) of the five aggregates can be taken: the point is not that the general experiential condition of a person is suffering, but rather that it is ultimately unsatisfactory on the basis that something enduring cannot be found. The teaching therefore appears more like an enquiry into phenomenal identity rather than a direct negation of the Upaniadic tman: it seeks to establish that form and so on are affected by causes and conditions (i.e. that they are adventitious: viparimadhamma) and so cannot constitute what a person really and intrinsically is. If so, it would appear that the teaching is a philosophical enquiry into intrinsic identity or self.34
See BU II.1.1920, BU III.9.28, BU IV.3.3233, TU II.59, TU III.6. E.g. BU II.4.12: ida mahad bhtam anantam apra vijnaghana eva; BU IV.5.13: ayam tmnantaro bhya ktsna prajnaghana eva. 34 Opposition to the notion that this teaching denies soul has been made by Gombrich (1996: 15): In Western languages, the Buddha is presented as having taught the doctrine (vda) of no soul (antman). What is being denied what is a soul? Western theologians are at home in the Christian cultural tradition. Christian theologians have differed vastly over what the soul is. For Aristotle, and thus for Aquinas, it is the form of the body, what makes a given individual person a whole rather than a mere assemblage of parts. However, most Christians conceive of the soul, however vaguely, in a completely different way, which goes back to Plato: that the soul is other than the
33 32
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This impression is strengthened by the fact that the term tman/ attan must here be taken in the philosophical sense of self. For it makes no sense to ask whether form (i.e. the physical body), sensation, apperception and volitions constitute a soul, no matter how the latter is conceived. These are sensible questions in an enquiry into personal identity, however: since a person ordinarily identifies with form and so on as oneself, it makes sense to ask if they really can be considered as an intrinsic identity. On this point it is important to note that the Not-Self teaching is often placed directly after the statement that an ordinary person identifies with the five aggregates in the form This is mine, I am this, this is my self (tman/attan).35 Such texts play on the flexibility in the term tman/ attan, using it first in the sense derived from the reflexive pronoun (where it denotes a persons phenomenal identity), and second in the more philosophical sense of intrinsic identity. In this way the teaching points out that although a person takes the five aggregates as his individual self (tman/attan), this is unsatisfactory since no intrinsic identity (tman/attan) can be found therein. It would seem, then, that the teaching addresses the problem of personal identity by questioning the identification with phenomenal being. To this end the Upaniadic notion of an tman that is blissful and permanent/unchanging is certainly invoked, of course, but this would seem to be only for the sake of communicating a new idea in a particular intellectual context. This is far from a statement of the No Self doctrine as described by the Vajir Sutta, Buddhaghosa and ntideva: there is no denial of the self per se, but only a subtle argument that the concept of a self does not make sense of conditioned experience. Since the underlying metaphysic of the teaching is not made clear, it is possible that it presupposes a self beyond conditioned experience or the
body, as in the expression body and soul, and is some kind of disembodied mental, and above all, moral, agent, which survives the body after death. But none of this has anything to do with the Buddhas position. He was opposing the Upaniadic theory of soul. A similar point has been made by Williams (Williams and Tribe 2000: 56). 35 This is how the teaching is presented in its most important occurrence in the Pli discourses, the Alagaddpama Sutta (MN I.135.27ff.).
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exact opposite. If so, the difference between this teaching and the No Self doctrine of the Vajir Sutta remains to be determined. A better understanding of the problem requires an investigation of other early Buddhist teachings on personal identity.
3. Self-consciousness in the early Buddhist texts

The Not-Self teaching considers a persons identification with the five aggregates in terms of the notion This is mine, I am this, this is my self. As such, it is closely connected to other early Buddhist teachings concerned with the notion I (ahan ti), the notion I am (asm ti), the conceit I am (asmimna), and the underlying tendency towards conceit with regard to the notions I and mine (ahakramamakra-mnnusaya). All of the teachings containing these formulations tackle the subject of personal identity by examining what we might call self-consciousness, i.e. a persons awareness of his own identity, acts and thoughts.36 Rather than enquire into whether an intrinsic identity can be found in self-consciousness, as the Not-Self teaching does, such teachings explore the affective and cognitive aspects of reflexive awareness. Its affective nature is most apparent in these texts, this being indicated by the compounds the underlying tendency towards conceit with regard to the notions I and mine (ahakra/mamakramnnusaya) and the conceit I am (asmimna). Both formulations indicate that for the unenlightened man, all experience and action must necessarily appear phenomenologically as happening to or originating from an I.37 This means, in other words, that self-consciousness is a basic sort of existential conceit, a grasping at individual existence and identity that underpins all conditioned experience. Other texts affirm this affective understanding of self-consciousness, e.g. the Tah Sutta, where eighteen thoughts caused by thirst (tahvicarita) are listed with reference to both oneself (ajjhatikassa updya) and that which is external to oneself
36 37
I follow the definition of the OED. Collins 1982: 94.
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(bhirassa updya) respectively.38 Thus the notion I am (asm ti) is the most basic thought caused by thirst that paves the way for seventeen further forms of self-consciousness with reference to oneself (e.g. evasm ti: I am thus); and the notion I am in respect of this (iminsm ti) is the most basic thought caused by thirst that paves the way for seventeen further forms of self-consciousness with reference to that which is external to oneself (e.g. imin evasm ti: I am thus in respect of this).39 In contrast to this analysis of the affective aspect of self-consciousness, other texts suggest that self-consciousness is a sort of ignorance. A good example is the Sammdihi Sutta, which equates the destruction of the underlying tendency towards conceit with regard to the view I am (asm ti dihimnnusaya samhanitv) with the abandonment of ignorance (avijja pahya) and the attainment of knowledge (vijja uppdetv).40 Other texts combine the affective and cognitive aspects of self-consciousness. Thus the Dutiyanntitthiya Sutta concludes with the following inspired utterance (udna) of the Buddha:
This generation is obsessed with the notion I (ahakra) and attached to the notion another (parakra). They have not understood this matter, and have not seen that it is a barb. For the person with vision who has removed this barb,
38 It is perhaps possible that the compound tahvicarita is to be read as a dependent determinative (tatpurua) in the dative case, i.e. movements towards thirst. But the compound tahvicarita is more likely to be read as a dependent determinative in the instrumental case: a past participle preceded by a substantive suggests some sort of conceptual activity (vicarita) prompted by a cause (tah). If so, self-consciousness would seem to be caused by an underlying affective state termed thirst. 39 AN II.212.13: katamni ahrasa tahvicaritni ajjhattikassa updya? asm ti bhikkhave sati 40 MN I.47.21: yato kho vuso ariyasvako eva akusala pajnti, eva akusalamla pajnti, eva kusala pajnti, eva kusalamla pajnti, so sabbaso rgnusaya pahya, paighnusaya paivinodetv, asm ti dihimnnusaya samhanitv avijja pahya vijja uppdetv, diheva dhamme dukkhass antakaro hoti. ettvat pi kho vuso ariyasvako sammdihi hoti
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the notions I am acting and Another is acting do not occur. This generation is mired, bound and trapped by conceit (mna); it exerts itself over views, and so does not escape transmigration.41
The notions of I (ahakra) and another (parakra) are here related to conceit (mna) and the holding of speculative views (dihi). Self-consciousness, therefore, is deeply involved in the affective and cognitive causes of a persons suffering. Given that it is said to be an underlying tendency (anusaya), it would seem to be an ever-present factor of conditioned experience, and its transcendence would no doubt effect a substantial personal transformation. Although the early texts generally have little to say about the state achieved through eradicating self-consciousness, there are a couple of illuminating exceptions. A series of Suttas in the SayuttaNikya describe how Sriputta attained all nine gradual abidings (anupubbavihra) from the first jhna to the cessation of apperception and feeling (savedayitanirodha) despite lacking self-consciousness. These texts begin with a question from nanda about the reason for the unusually calm countenance of Sriputta. The latter explains that this is due to the meditative states he attains without any prior intention, a state of affairs that nanda attributes to his lack of self-consciousness:
Herein, venerable sir, I pass my time having attained the first jhna, that state of joy and bliss born of seclusion which is devoid of desire and bad thoughts, but which includes deliberation (vitakka) and reflection (vicra). It does not occur to me, venerable sir, that I am attaining the first jhna, or have attained the first jhna, or have emerged from the first jhna. It is so for the venerable Sriputta because the underlying tendency towards conceit in the notions I and mine has for a long time been
Ud VI.6 (v. 70.23): atha kho Bhagav etam attha viditv tya velya ima udna udnesi: ahakrapasut aya paj parakrpasahit, etad eke nbbhaasu, na na sallan ti addasu. eta ca salla paigacca passato, aha karom ti na tassa hoti, paro karot ti na tassa hoti. mnupet aya paj mnaganth mnavinibaddh, dihsu byrambhakat, sasra ntivattat ti.
41
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destroyed. Therefore it does not occur to the venerable Sriputta that he is attaining the first jhna, or has attained the first jhna, or has emerged from the first jhna.42
Apart from another text in which nanda states that Sriputtas underlying tendency towards conceit in the notions I and mine has for a long time been destroyed,43 the only other discourse on the unusual psychology of a person devoid of self-consciousness is the Upasena-svisa Sutta. In this peculiar text, the venerable Upasena is said to have been bitten by a poisonous snake while both he and Sriputta dwelt in the Sappasoika mountain cave.44 When he subsequently asks to be taken outside on a couch, before his body falls apart right here, just like a fistful of chaff,45 Sriputta exclaims that he sees no change in his body or decline in his faculties.46 To this Upasena states that his unusual countenance is due to the fact that he lacks self-consciousness with regard to his sense faculties:
SN III.235.22: idhha vuso vivicc eva kmehi vivicca akusalehi dhammehi savitakka savicra vivekaja ptisukha pahamajjhna upasampajja viharmi. tassa mayha vuso na eva hoti: aha pahamajjhna sampajjm ti v, aha pahamajjhna sampanno ti v, aha pahamajjhn vuhito ti v ti. tath hi panyasmato Sriputtassa dgharatta ahakramamakramnnusay susamhat, tasm yasmato Sriputtassa na eva hoti: aha pahamajjhna sampajjm ti v aha pahamajjhna sampanno ti v aha pahamajjhn vuhito ti v ti. The PTS reading pahatmajjhn at the end instead of pahamajjhn is clearly an error. 43 SN II.275.1: tath hi panyasmato Sriputtassa dgharatta ahakramamakramnnusay susamhat. 44 SN IV.40.16: etha me vuso ima kya macaka ropetv bahiddh nharatha. purya kyo idh eva vikirati, seyyath pi bhsamuh ti. 45 SN IV.40.16: etha me vuso ima kya macaka ropetv bahiddh nharatha. purya kyo idh eva vikirati, seyyath pi bhsamuh ti. 46 SN IV.40.20: eva vutte yasm Sriputto yasmanta Upasena etad avoca: na kho pana maya passma yasmato Upasenassa kyassa v aathatta indriyna v viparima. atha ca panyasm Upaseno evam ha: etha me vuso ima kya macaka ropetv bahiddh nharatha; purya kyo idh eva vikirati, seyyath pi bhsamuh ti.
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Venerable Sriputta, the person who might think that he is the eye or possesses it that he is the tongue or possesses it that he is the mind or possesses it, for him there might be a change in his body or a decline in his faculties. But it is does not occur to me, venerable Sriputta, that I am the eye or possess it that I am the tongue or possess it that I am the mind or possess it. So how could there be a change in my body or decline in my faculties?47
Sriputta thus concludes that the venerable Upasenas underlying tendency to feel conceit in the notions I and mine has for a long time been destroyed,48 and the story concludes with the account of how Upasenas body fell apart like a fistful of chaff after he had been taken outside on a couch.49 This text thus claims that Upasena achieved a completely impersonal state, one in which the automatic tendency to identify with conditioned experience had ceased to function. Various texts describe the means of attaining this state, e.g. following the path that leads through the four jhnas and culminates in the three knowledges,50 or concentrating on the thought this is calm, this is supreme, namely the calming of all mental formations, the relinquishment of all attachment (upadhi), the destruction of thirst, dispassion, cessation, Nirvana, which is said to lead to the attainment of the release of mind, a release through understanding.51 For the purpose of the present enquiry, however,
AN IV.40.29: yassa nna vuso Sriputta evam assa: aha cakk hun ti mama cakkhun ti v la aha jivh ti v, mama jivh ti v aha mano ti v mama mano ti v. tassa vuso Sriputta siy kyassa v aathatta indriyna v viparimo. mayha ca kho vuso Sriputta na eva hoti: aha cakkhun ti v, mama cakkhun ti v la aha jivh ti v mama jivh ti v aha mano ti v mama mano ti v. tassa mayha ca kho vuso Sriputta ki kyassa v aathatta bhavissati indriyna v viparimo ti? 48 SN IV.41.6: tath hi panyasmato Upasenassa dgharattam ahakramamakramnnusay susamhat. 49 SN IV.41.11: atha kho te bhikkh yasmato Upasenassa kya macaka ropetv bahiddh nharisu. atha kho yasmato Upasenassa kyo tatth eva vikiri, seyyath pi bhsamuh ti. 50 MN III.32.32ff. 51 AN I.133.1: idh nanda bhikkhuno eva hoti: eta santa eta
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more important are other texts which relate the transcendence of self-consciousness to the understanding of the five aggregates and the Not-Self teaching. The Dutiyasa Sutta of the AguttaraNikya, for example, states that the problem of self-consciousness (ahakra/mamakra) is resolved by regarding that which is unsatisfactory (dukkha) as Not-Self (anattan).52 A similar contemplation is outlined in the Mahpua Sutta, which states that seeing the five aggregates as Not-Self (attan) leads to the cessation of selfconsciousness as follows:
O bhikkhus, one should regard whatever form is past, present or future, internal or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, near or far all form as This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self (attan) For the person who knows and sees it thus, bhikkhus, the tendency towards conceit in the notion I with regards to the body and its consciousness, and towards conceit in the notion mine with regards to external objects, does not arise.53
This passage does not state how contemplating the insubstantiality of conditioned experience (the five aggrgegates) aids the transcendence of self-consciousness, but the point is investigated in more
pata yadida sabbasakhrasamatho sabbpadhipainissaggo tahkkhayo virgo nirodho nibbnan ti. eva kho nanda siy bhikkhuno tathrpo samdhipailbho yath imasmi ca saviake kye ahakramamakramnnusay nssu bahiddh ca sabbanimittesu ahakramamakramnnusay nssu, ya ca cetovimutti pavimutti upasampajja viharato ahakramamakramnnusay na honti, ta ca cetovimutti pavimutti upasampajja vihareyy ti. 52 AN IV.53.7: dukkhe anattasaparicitena bhikkhave bhikkhuno cetas bahula viharato imasmi ca saviake kye bahiddh ca sabbanimitte su ahakramamakramnpagata mnasa hoti vidhsamatikkanta santa suvimutta. 53 MN III.18.32: ya kici bhikkhu rpa attngatapaccuppanna, ajjhatta v bahiddh v, orika v sukhuma v, hna v pata v, ya dre santike v sabba rpa: n eta mama, n eso ham asmi, na m eso att ti, evam eta yathbhta sammappaya passati MN III.19.7: eva kho bhikkhu jnato eva passato imasmi ca saviake kye bahiddh ca sabbanimittesu ahakramamakramnnusay na hont ti. For the same teaching see SN II.252.16, 253.11; SN III.80.7, 81.1, 103.12, 136.4, 136.24, 169.12, 170.7.
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detail in the Khemaka Sutta, where the bhikkhu Khemaka addresses the elders of Kosamb as follows:
Venerable sirs, the Blessed one has spoken of five aggregates of attachment,54 namely: the aggregate of attachment that is form feeling apperception volitions [and] consciousness. I have no view that any sort of self (attan) or its property (attaniya) is found in these five aggregates of attachment, venerable sirs, and yet I am not an arahant devoid of corruptions. For I still have the notion I am (asm ti) with regard to these five aggregates of attachment, venerable sirs, despite the fact that I do not have the view I am this (ayam asm ti na ca samanupassmi).55
The logic of this statement is relatively simple. Khemaka knows that he should be detached from the conditioned experience of the five aggregates, this being inherently unsatisfactory since it lacks intrinsic identity (attan). But he is unable to do so because of his automatic tendency to identify with conditioned experience in the form of the notion I am. Although Khemaka knows what he should know, according to Buddhist doctrine, and so does not intentionally identify with the the five aggregates, his identification with them runs deeper in the form of a sense of subjectivity (asm ti) that takes them as its locus. What is required to achieve detachment from the five aggregates, according to Khemaka, is the following contemplation:
Although a noble disciple might have abandoned the five lower fetters, it might occur to him that the conceit (mno), intention (chando) and underlying tendency (anusayo) I am (asm ti) with regard to the five aggregates of attachment has not been destroyed. At another time, he immerses himself in observing the rise and fall of the five aggregates
I give the standard translation of the compound updnakkhandha, but for a more detailed historical explanation see Gombrich 1996: 67 and Wynne 2007: 84. 55 SN III.128.29: pac ime vuso updnakkhandh vutt Bhagavat, seyyathda: rpupdnakkhandho pe viupdnakkhandho. imesu khv ha vuso pacasu updnakkhandhesu na kici attna v attaniya v samanupassmi, na c amhi araha khsavo. api ca me vuso pacasu updnakkhandhesu asm ti adhigata, ayam aham asm ti na ca samanupassm ti.
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of attachment: form feeling apperception volitions consciousness is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus. In doing this the conceit, intention and underlying tendency I am with regard to the five aggregates of attachment that had not been destroyed is destroyed.56
The practice mentioned here the contemplation of conditioned experience (the five aggregates) as a process seems to be an attempt to see the truth of the Not-Self teaching at a deeper level: the bhikkhu does not simply think about the insubstantiality of the five aggregates, but attempts to see this truth experientially. According to the Khemaka Sutta, such a contemplation is a more powerful means of overcoming the subtle sense of identification with conditioned experience, but the aim of both contemplations is, however, the same, i.e. detachment from the five aggregates leading to the cessation of identification with them. All of the above passages on self-consciousness elaborate the typically Buddhist understanding that desire and ignorance cause suffering. That self-consciousness is a problem of an affective nature is easy to understand, of course, for self-consciousness implies self-centredness which in turn implies psychological states selfishness, desire etc. which are, according to the Buddhist analysis, ethically and spiritually harmful. But if the fundamental problem of desire the sole cause of suffering according to the Second Noble Truth can be controlled and suppressed via various religious practices, should it matter that the person who suppresses it is still self-conscious? According to the Khemaka Sutta it does, for the locus of the notion I am is the five aggregates. This means that the self-conscious person is inevitably attached to conditioned
SN III.130.28: kicpi vuso ariyasvakassa pacorambhgiyni saojanni pahnni bhavanti atha khv assa hoti: y eva pacasu updnakkhandhesu anusahagato asm ti mno asm ti chando asm ti anusayo asamhato. so aparena samayena pacasu updnakkhandhesu udayabbaynupass viharati: iti rpa, iti rpassa samudayo, iti rpassa atthagamo; iti vedan iti sa iti sakhr iti via, iti vi assa samu dayo, iti viassa atthagamo ti. tass imesu pacasu up dnakkhandhesu udayabbaynupassino viharato, yo pi ssa hoti pacasu updnakkhandhesu anusahagato asm ti mno asm ti chando asm ti anusayo asamhato, so pi samugghta gacchati.
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experience, and if so it is not enough to conquer ones desires and abide in a state of altruism, for self-consciousness is by its very nature a subtle form of clinging to conditioned experience: as we have seen, self-consciousness is a subtle, underlying form of grasping after individual experience and identity, a basic existential conceit (p. 114). Being self-conscious, in other words, means to be both ignorant and attached, and so subject to suffering. These teachings on personal identity seem to have the same pragmatic point as the Not-Self teaching, i.e. the comprehension and abandonment of the underlying affective and cognitive cause of suffering: self-consciousness. And just like the Not-Self teaching, these teachings seem to have no obvious metaphysical significance: it is not clear if detachment from the five aggregates and transcendence of self-consciousness means that a person transcends intrinsic identity per se or whether he has some other sort of transcendent identity. This is true even of the texts that describe how Sriputta attained certain meditative states without being aware of it, apparently because he lacked self-consciousness: the focus of these texts is the psychology of Sriputta rather than more abstract concerns, such as the ontological nature of the state attained by him. Attempts to read a particular metaphysic into such texts are far from persuasive. Prez-Rmon, for example, has argued that two kinds of personal identity can be indentified in the series of texts on Sriputtas meditative attainments. On the one hand there is the socalled asmimanic self which is contained in expressions such as I am attaining the first jhna, I have attained the first jhna, I have emerged from the first jhna 57 On the other hand, PrezRmon believes that forms of the first personal pronoun in statements such as I dwell having attained the first state of meditation (idhha pathama jhna upasampajja viharmi) and it [did not occur] to me thus, venerable sir (tassa mayha, vuso, na eva hoti) is incompatible with the asmimanic I contained in the expressions that follow. He therefore argues that
Sriputta is able to say I dwell having attained the cessation of awareness and feeling. If the I of this sentence cannot stand either for the
57
Prez-Rmon 1980: 236.
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the asmimanic self or for the genuine empirical moral agent, what kind of self does it stand for? Nothing is left but to say that it stands for the true self who, in that condition attains to a complete aloofness from the empirical factors in the isolation that is his very being.58
This argument is not very convincing. Prez-Rmon supposes that there is a metaphysical difference between the subject of the verb in expressions such as pahamajjhna upasampajja viharmi, which apparently indicates the true self, and expression such as aha pahamajjhna sampajjm ti, which apparently indicates the asmimanic or phenomenal self. Such a distinction is entirely arbritary, and does not convince that an intrinsic identity is presupposed by the early Buddhist teachings. Indeed key phrases, such as tassa mayha vuso na eva hoti: aha pahamajjhna sampajjm ti, seem to cancel out the positive language that they follow, such as pahamajjhna upasampajja viharmi. This would seem to incline towards the position that there is no true subject of experience. A better argument, then, would in fact be that since Sriputta is unaware of what he experiences, these passages imply the No Self doctrine. Although the Sayutta-Nikya texts on Sriputtas meditative attainments perhaps incline towards the No Self doctrine, another argument for intrinsic identity in early Buddhism can be made. This is that since the Not-Self teaching considers only the experiential aspects of the human being (the five aggregates), it might leave room for a non-phenomenal or transcendental self. Indeed the five aggregates are presented as objects of identification or appropriation for the perceiving subject, who is denoted by the term I in the expression I am not this. It is possible that such an I could stand for a transcendent subject of experience. This being the case, the arguments for or against a self would seem to be well-balanced. There are further passages to consider, however, and these are more useful in determining the metaphysical presuppositions of the early Buddhist texts on personal identity.
58
Prez-Rmon 1980: 237, on which see Oetke 1988: 107109.
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4. Dependent origination and self-consciousness

We have seen that the Khemaka Sutta advises a contemplation of the rise and fall of the five aggregates as a means of achieving the cessation of the notion I am with regard to them. In this context, the I that ceases would seem to be a persons notion of an individual identity comprised of form, sensation, apperception and so on, for it is this that is undermined by seeing that the five aggregates are impermanent. If so, the text would not seem to deny that subjectivity remains intact in the liberating experience, and the possibility remains that it presupposes a subjectivity abstracted from the five aggregates as a persons real self, i.e. a sort of transcendent I that experiences detachment from the five aggregates. The same could be said for the Not-Self teaching: the statement I am not this might presuppose a transcendent I beyond the five aggregates. In another respect, however, this point is not so clear. For the Khemaka Sutta goes on to compare the notion I am to the subtle persistence of a flowers scent, a simile in which the I seems to indicate simple subjectivity:
It is just like the scent of a blue lotus, a red lotus or a white lotus. Would a person be describing it correctly if he were to say that the scent belongs to its leaves, its colour or filaments? It is not so, venerable sir. How, then, would one describe if correctly? If one were to describe it correctly, one would say that the scent belongs to the flower. In just the same way, venerable sirs, I do not declare I am with regard to or apart from form feeling apperception and consciousness. And yet I still have the notion of I am (asm ti) with regard to these five aggregates of attachment, venerable sirs, despite the fact that I do not think I am this.59
SN III.130.13: seyyath pi vuso uppalassa v padumassa v puarkassa v gandho. yo nu kho eva vadeyya: pattassa gandho ti v, vaassa gandho ti v, kijakkhassa gandho ti v, samm nu kho so vadamno vadeyy ti? no h eta vuso. yathkatha panvuso sammvykaramno vykareyy ti? pupphassa gandho ti kho vuso sammvykaramno vykareyy ti. evam eva khv ha vuso na rpa asm ti vadmi, na pi a atra rp asm ti vadmi, na vedanam na saam na sakhre na viam asm ti vadmi, na pi aatra vi asm ti vadmi. api ca me
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Khemakas primary point is that the locus of the notion I am is the five aggregates as a whole, in a manner comparable to how a scent lingers around the whole flower. But the simile also points out that just as scent emerges from the whole flower, so too does the notion I am arise from conditioned experience as a whole. This might indicate the understanding that the notion I am is an emergent state of consciousness, one in which the I is felt to stand apart from its objective locus as a quasi-independent subject of experience. The text is therefore ambiguous: it is not entirely clear if the term I refers to a persons sense of being a composite entity made up of different phenomenal aspects, or whether it refers to a persons sense of being a quasi-independent subject of consciousness that observes the different aspects of conditioned experience. Forming a correct understanding of this ambiguity is vitally important. For if the early Buddhist texts understand the I in expressions such as asmimna, ahakra, asmti and so on in the sense of a quasi-independent subject of consciousness, they would imply that liberation involves the cessation of subjectivity per se, in which case there would be little possibility that a person has a self. Just as ambiguous as the Khemaka Sutta is the nanda Sutta, in which the bhikkhu Pua teaches that the notion I am occurs only in relation to (updya) the five aggregates, rather than independently (anupdya).60 This could indicate the understanding that the I is a quasi-independent observer of the five aggregates, rather than a persons sense of being an I made up of the five aggregates. On the other hand, however, this text also includes the Not-Self teaching.61 Since this teaching deconstructs a persons
vuso pacasu updnakkhandhesu asm ti adhigata, ayam aham asm ti na ca samanupassmi. In the second sentence reading pattassa gandho ti v, vaassa gandho ti v, kijakkhassa gandho ti v with CSCD instead of the PTS pattassa gandho ti, vaassa gandho pi, kijakkhassa gandho ti v. 60 SN III.105.10: Puo nma vuso yasm Mantniputto amhka navakna sata bahpakro hoti. so amhe imin ovdena ovadati: updya vuso nanda asm ti hoti, no anupdya. ki ca updya asm ti hoti, no anupdya? rpa updya asm ti hoti, no anupdya. vedana saa sakhre via updya asm ti hoti, no anupdya. 61 SN III.105.25.
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identification with the five aggregates, and since it is here presented as a means of overcoming the notion I am, the term I would here seem to denote the phenomenal person as a whole, i.e. the individual I understood as an aggregate of five experiential parts. On balance, the presence of the Not-Self teaching in the nanda Sutta, probably indicates the latter possibility, i.e. that the term I refers to a persons sense of individuality comprised of different phenomenal aspects. Furthermore, since the Khemaka Suttas contemplation of the five aggregates is simply an expansion of the NotSelf teaching, the same conclusion probably applies to it. Other texts definitely do not share this understanding, however, but seem to veer more towards taking the term I as a persons sense of being a quasi-independent subject of experience. They therefore suggest a relationship of dependence or emergence rather than identification between the I and the five aggregates. One such text is the Vopama Sutta, which uses the simile of the lute (v) and its sound to describe the relationship between the subjective aspect of self-consciousness and the five aggregates:
This thing called a lute, venerable sir, consists of many different components so that when played it makes a sound by means of them: dependent on the parchment sounding board, the belly, the arm, the head, the strings, the plectrum and the appropriate effort of the musician, this lute, venerable sir, which consists of many various components, is played and makes a sound by means of them.62
In this simile the different parts of the lute denote the different aspects of a persons phenomenal being, whereas the sound that emerges from them denotes the notion I am, i.e. a persons sense of subjectivity. The simile of the lute thus suggests that the sense of being an inner perceiver emerges from the different aspects of conditioned experience functioning as a whole, so that an apparSN IV.197.11: aya kho bhante v nma anekasambhr mahsambhr anekehi sambhrehi samraddh vadati, seyyathida: doi ca paicca, camma ca paicca, daa ca paicca, upavea ca paicca, tantiyo ca paicca, koa ca paicca, purisassa ca tajja vymam paicca evya bhante v nma anekasambhr mahsambhr anekehi sambhrehi samraddh vadat ti. Following the translation of Bodhi (2000: 1254). On this simile see Collins 1982: 101.
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ently independent subject of experience is constructed out of an insubstantial process. This implies that the subjective aspect of selfconsciousness does not exist apart from the five aggregates, despite the cognitive separation of functions (subject vs. object) that might give this impression. In the language of Buddhist philosophy, this means that the I is dependently originated and so not ultimately real. If so, a contemplation of the five aggregates could be used to emphasise the fact that the inner subject is dependent on an insubstantial process, and in this way lead to the cessation of a persons sense of being a quasi-independent subject of experience. Such a contemplation is suggested in the Vopama Sutta, which states that the notions I (ahan ti), mine (maman ti) and I am (asm ti) can be transcended by investigating the limits of conditioned experience as follows:
In just this way, bhikkhus, the bhikkhu investigates form to its full extent, he investigates feeling apperception volitions ... [and] consciousness to its full extent. When he does this, the notions I, mine and I am are found in him no longer.63
This passage suggests that by contemplating the limitations of conditioned experience, the subjective aspect of self-consciousness the I that perceives the five aggregates ceases to function. This contemplation is similar to the contemplation of the rise and fall of the five aggregates outlined in the Khemaka Sutta. But the purpose here seems to be that of emphasising the limitations of that on which the notion I is founded. This seems to show that the I is limited to the impermanent processes of conditioned experience, and so cannot be separated from them. Dependence on the five aggregates, then, would here seem to indicate that the subjective aspect of self-consciousness is not independent or ultimately real.
SN IV.197.25: evam eva kho bhikkhave bhikkhu rpa samanvesati yvat rpassa gati, vedana samanvesati pe saa sakhre vi a samanvesati yvat viassa gati. tassa rpa samanvesato pe saa sakhre via samanvesato yvat viassa gati, yam pi ssa ta hoti ahan ti v maman ti v asm ti v, tam pi tassa na hot ti. Reading samanvesati and samanvesato with CSCD for PTS samane sati and samanesato respectively.
63
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Suggestive as they are, the similes of the lute and flower do not explicitly state that the term I is to be understood as a quasi-independent subject of experience. There is still some room to doubt, then, that these texts deny the notion of an independent subject of experience per se. Other texts certainly do focus on this understanding, however. We have seen, for example, that the Sriputta Sutta describes the destruction of the underlying tendency towards conceit in the notions I and mine (asmimna/mamakraanusaya), so that Sriputta attains each of the nine states of meditation (anupubbavihra) without an awareness of the fact that he attains, abides in or emerges from them.64 Such a description seems to imply the complete cessation of the subjective aspect of selfconsciousness, as if Sriputta is in a totally impersonal and selfless state in which there is no sense of being an inner perceiver or I that observes and comprehends what is happening. In such texts there seems to be little room for a subjective aspect of consciousness that could be taken as the true self in opposition to the phenomenal self (consisting of the five aggregates). A similar understanding is suggested in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta. Like the Khemaka Sutta it advocates the practice of contemplating the rise and fall of the five aggregates, although the end result is expressed slightly differently. The key passage occurs when the Buddha responds to Vacchagottas question as to whether he has any views (dihigata):
Does the venerable Gotama have any view (dihigata)? The very notion of view has been dispelled by the Tathgata, O Vaccha, for the Tathgata has seen this: Form is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; sensation is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; apperception is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus; volitions are thus, their arising is thus, their fading away is thus; consciousness is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus. Therefore I say that the Tathgata is released through the destruction, fading away, cessation, abandonment and relinquishment of all thoughts (maita), agitations (mathita), and every under-
64
See n. 42 above.
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lying tendency towards conceit (mna) with regard to the notions I (ahikra) and mine (mamikra).65
Understanding the five aggregates as a process is here not said to eradicate a persons identification with conditioned experience (the notion I am with regard to the five aggregates), but rather to eradicate the notions I and mine. While the understanding of the term I is not made clear, this emphatic description of the Buddhas liberated state seems to indicate a complete transcendence of phenomena: the cessation of all conceptuality (maita) implies the cessation of the entire contents of consciousness, including the sense of being a quasi-independent subject of experience. If so, the text indicates that in the Buddhas awakened state the sense of subjectivity per se has been transcended. In support of this interpretation are a number of texts that focus on the dependent origination of the notion I am. One such text is the Vepacitti Sutta, which relates the myth of the defeat of the demons (asura) by the gods (deva), and the shackling of their leader Vepacitti. The doctrinal point of this myth is that the bonds of Vepacitti operate as a function of his thoughts:
O bhikkhus, when Vepacitti the leader of the demons thought The gods are righteous, but the demons are not, and so I will go, right here and now, to the citadel of the gods, he saw that he was released from the five bonds wrapped round his neck, and being presented and endowed with the five sorts of heavenly sensual pleasure he enjoyed himself. But when, O bhikkhus, Vepacitti the leader of the demons thought The demons are righteous, but the gods are not, and so I will go there right now, to the citadel of the demons, he saw that he was shackled by the five bonds wrapped round his neck, and so was deprived of the five sorts of heavenly sensual pleasure. That is how
65 MN I.486.10: atthi pana bhoto Gotamassa kici dihigatan ti? dihigatan ti kho Vaccha apantam eta tathgatassa, diha h eta Vaccha tathgatena: iti rpa, iti rpassa samudayo, iti rpassa atthagamo; iti vedan, iti vedanya samudayo, iti vedanya atthagamo; iti sa, iti saya samudayo, iti saya atthagamo; iti sakhr, iti sakhrna samudayo, iti sakhrna atthagamo; iti via, iti viassa samu dayo, iti viassa atthagamo ti. tasm tathgato sabbamaitna sabbamathitna sabba-ahikramamikramnnusayna khay virg nirodh cg painissagg anupd vimutto ti vadm ti.
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subtle the bonds of Vepacitti are, O bhikkhus, but even subtler is the bond of Mra. The person who thinks, O bhikkhus, is shackled by Mra but by not thinking he is released from the Evil One.66
There is perhaps no clearer Buddhist text on the notion that thinking or conceptualisation (maita) causes bondage. The text goes on to state that the foundation of this conceptual bondage is the subjective aspect of self-consciousness:
I am, O bhikkhus, is a thought (maita); I am this, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will be, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will not be, O bhik khus, is a thought; I will possess form, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will not possess form, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will be conscious, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will be unconscious, O bhikkhus, is a thought; I will be neither conscious nor unconscious, O bhikkhus, is a thought. Thought, O bhikkhus, is an illness, a boil and a barb. Therefore, O bhikkhus, you should train yourselves with the thought I will pass my time with a mind free from thinking.67
A similar analysis is found in the Dhtuvibhaga Sutta, which adds to this the point that thinking itself (maita), especially in terms of the notion I am (asm ti), is fundamentally problem66 SN IV.202.6: yad ca kho bhikkhave Vepacittissa asurindassa eva hoti: dhammik kho dev, adhammik asur, idh eva dnha devapura gacchm ti, atha kahe pacamehi bandhanehi muttam attna samanupassati, dibbehi ca pacahi kmaguehi samappito samagbhto paricreti. yad ca kho bhikkhave Vepacittissa asurindassa eva hoti: dhammik kho asur, adhammik dev, tatth eva dnha asurapura gamissm ti, atha kahe pacamehi bandhanehi baddham attna samanupassati, dibbehi ca pacahi kmaguehi parihyati. eva sukhuma kho bhikkhave Vepacittibandhana, tato sukhumatara Mrabandhana. maamno kho bhikkhave baddho Mrassa, amaamno mutto ppimato. 67 SN IV.202.20: asm ti bhikkhave maitam eta, ayam aham asm ti maitam eta, bhavissan ti maitam eta, na bhavissan ti maitam eta, rp bhavissan ti maitam eta, arp bhavissan ti maitam eta, sa bhavissan ti maitam eta, asa bhavissan ti maitam eta, nevasa nsa bhavissan ti maitam eta. aita bhikkhave rogo, maita gao, maita salla. tasmt iha bhikkhave amaamnena cetas viharissm ti, eva hi vo bhikkhave sikkhitabba. Reading sa bhavissan ti maitam eta with CSCD instead of PTS sa bhavissan ti; rogo with CSCD instead PTS rgo; and amaamnena with CSCD instead of PTS amaitmnena.
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atic an illness, a boil and a barb that ought to be transcended (samatikkama).68 The reason for this critique is made clear in the Vepacitti Sutta, which explains that each of the notions beginning with I am is an impulse (ijita), a palpitation (phan dita), a conceptual proliferation (papacita) and a conceit (mnagata).69 All these terms indicate that the various manifestations of the subjective aspects of self-consciousness the I as a quasi-independent observer of phenomena arise in dependence on the conceptual activity of the mind. This is especially true of the term papacita. In contrast to the Brahminic notion of prapaca as the manifoldness or diversity of the external world,70 the term in early Buddhist texts refers to the tendency of the mind towards conceptual diffuseness or proliferation.71 If so, it would seem that the subjective aspect of self-consciousness is conceptually constructed in the processes of the dependent origination of consciousness, and thus has no independent reality. The clearest explanation of the dependent origination of conceptual proliferation (papaca) is found in the Madhupiaka Sutta:
Visual consciousness arises dependent on the eye and forms, the coming together of the three is contact, sensation arises from contact, one apperceives (sajnti) what one senses, thinks over (vitakketi) what one apperceives, and conceptually proliferates (papaceti) what
MN III.246.11: asm ti bhikkhu maitam eta, ayam aham asm ti maitam eta, bhavissan ti maitam eta, na bhavissan ti maitam eta, rp bhavissan ti maitam eta, arp bhavissan ti maitam eta, sa bhavissan ti maitam eta, asa bhavissan ti maitam eta, nevasansa bhavissan ti maitam eta. maita bhikkhu rogo, maita gao, maita salla. sabbamaitna tv eva bhikkhu samatikkam muni santo ti vuccati. 69 SN IV.202.28: asm ti bhikkhave ijitam eta, ayam aham asm ti iji tam eta, bhavissan ti ijitam eta, na bhavissan ti ijitam eta, rp bha vissan ti ijitam eta, arp bhavissan ti ijitam eta, sa bhavissan ti ijitam eta, asa bhavissan ti ijitam eta, nevasansa bhavissan ti ijitam eta. The text then repeats this passage but replaces ijitam eta with phanditam eta, papacitam eta and finally mnagatam eta. 70 MMW s.v.: expansion, development, manifestation manifoldness, diversity. See also Gombrich 2009: 205206. 71 The standard study is that of nananda 1971.
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is thought over. From conceptual proliferation comes reckoning, of ones conceptual proliferations and apperceptions, and this afflicts a man with regard to the past, present and future forms cognised by the eye.72
This passage states that the conceptual forms constructed in the cognitive process ultimately cause a persons suffering. Selfconsciousness arises in this way: according to the Vepacitti Sutta its subjective aspect the various forms in which the notion I is expressed is a form of conceptual proliferation or manifoldness (papacita). This implies, then, that the subject of self-consciousness does not exist beyond particular cognitive events. Such an analysis leaves little room for an inherently real self denoted by the term I. Indeed the Vepacitti Suttas comprehensive account of the forms in which this notion occurs seems to indicate that there is no true I behind its appearances in thought. At the least, there is very little ground on which this case could be made. That the notion I am indicates subjectivity per se, and that this is dependently originated, is made explicitly clear in an important section of the Mahnidna Sutta which analyses three notions of intrinsic identity.73 The first is the simplest: a self (attan) identical to sensations (vedan) is dismissed since this would mean that intrinsic identity is changeable, i.e. a contradiction is terms.74 The second and third understandings of the self are more subtle, however. The latter seems to reject the notion that the subjective aspect of self-consciousness is independently real:
MN I.111.35: cakkhu c vuso paicca rpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvi a, tia sagati phasso, phassapaccay vedan, ya vedeti ta sajnti, ya sajnti ta vitakketi, ya vitakketi ta papaceti, ya papaceti tatonidna purisa papacasasakh samudcarati attngatapaccupannesu cakkhuvieyyesu rpesu. It is not clear exactly how the compound papacasasakh is to be taken. amoli and Bodhi (1995: 203) translate it as perceptions and notions [born of] mental proliferation, although this misses the fact that the compound is declined in the singular number. 73 For an analysis of these teachings see Oetke 1988: 130ff. 74 DN II.67.12: anicca sukhadukkhavokia uppdavyayadhamma attna
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Therein, nanda, to the person who claims that his self (attan) is different from sensation (vedan) but not without experience (no pi appaisavedano), it being able to sense (att me vediyati) and having sensations as a property (vedandhammo hi me att), one should say: When sensation has completely and utterly ceased without remainder (vedan va hi vuso sabbena sabba sabbath sabba aparises nirujjheyu), when there is no sensation whatsoever since it has ceased (sabbaso vedanya asati vedannirodh), is it possible in that state to have the notion I am this (ayam aham asm ti)? It is not so, master. Therefore, nanda, it is because of this reason that it is not suitable to think that one has a self different from sensation but not without experience, it being able to sense and having sensations as a property.75
This passage rejects the notion of an independently real subject of perception. The problem with such a notion is that although it is possible to conceive this understanding of individual identity when conditioned experience (sensation: vedan) functions normally, this is not the case in the absence of these conditions. This critique therefore makes the point that the sense of being an inner perceiver only arises under certain conditions, those that pertain in conditioned experience, and thus rejects the notion that a persons sense of being an independent subject of perception is ultimately real. Such an analysis leaves little room for any sort of self, for what identity could a person have apart from the subjectivity denoted by the term I? The only other possibility is perhaps that a person has a transcendent identity beyond conditioned experience. The problem with such a notion is made clear in the second of the Mahnidna Suttas critiques of intrinsic identity. This section of the text points out the impossibility of integrating the concept of individuality (a necessary aspect of any notion of personal identity)
DN II.67.25: tatr nanda yo so evam ha: na h eva kho me vedan att, no pi appaisavedano me att, att me vediyati, vedandhammo hi me att ti, so evam assa vacanyo: vedan va hi vuso sabbena sabba sabbath sabba aparises nirujjheyu, sabbaso vedanya asati vedannirodh, api nu kho tattha ayam aham asm ti siy ti? no h eta bhante. tasmt ih nanda etena p eta na h eva kho na kkhamati me vedan att, no pi appaisavedano me att, att me vediyati, vedandhammo hi me att ti samanupassitu.
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with that of transcendence (which implies a completely impersonal state):

Therein, nanda, to the person who claims my self (me att) is beyond sensation (na ... vedan) and experience (appaisavedano), one should say: Is it possible to have the notion I am (asm ti) when there is no sensation whatsoever (sabbaso vedayita n atthi)? It is not so, master. Therefore, nanda, it is because of this reason that it is not suitable to think that one has a self beyond feeling and experience.76
The problem with the notion of a transcendent self, according to this analysis, is that personal identity is conceived in terms of something completely impersonal. But how could it be claimed that a transcendent self is ones own (me att) when the individualising factor of self-consciousness (asm ti) is absent? The notion that something is ones own depends on a person being self-conscious and so able to conceptually appropriate it. The absence of the conditions necessary for self-consciousness, then, would seem to render identification with a truly transcendent state impossible. A state beyond conditioned experience cannot be conceived in terms of personal identity, therefore, the latter pertaining only within certain, limited, cognitive states. These two critiques consider the same problem from different angles: the third critique points out the problem of hypostasising the inner perceiver into a transcendent entity, whereas the second critique points out the problem of individualising the transcendence of conditioned experience. Since notions of a self within conditioned experience or beyond it are both negated, this dual analysis would seem to leave no room for any sort of intrinsic identity. This suspicion is confirmed by the fact that these critiques respond to similar conceptualisations of intrinsic identity stated in
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DN II.67.17: tatr nanda yo so evam ha: na h eva kho me vedan att, appaisavedano me att ti, so evam assa vacanyo: yattha pan vuso sab baso vedayita n atthi, api nu kho tattha asm ti siy ti? no h eta bhante. tasmt ih nanda etena p eta na kkhamati na h eva kho me vedan att, appaisavedano me att ti samanupassitu. On this teaching see Collins 1982: 99.
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the eighth chapter of the Chndogya Upaniad. In the dialogue between Prajpati and Indra (CU VIII.712), Prajpati presents various ways of understanding the tman to his pupil Indra, each of which is in turn rejected and replaced by a higher and more sophisticated understanding. The final two conceptualisations of the tman match the final two notions of the attan criticised in the Mahnidna Sutta studied above. Prajpati first presents the tman in its transcendent or macrocosmic aspect, i.e. as an intrinsic identity beyond conditioned experience, which Indra rejects as follows (CU VIII.11.1):
In the state in which a person falls into deep sleep, so that he becomes whole, completely tranquil, and does not perceive even a dream, this is the self, said [Prajpati] it is the immortal free from fear, it is brahman. Indra then left, his heart fully satisfied. Before reaching the gods, however, he saw this problem: This person certainly does not know himself nor even these beings here directly in the form I am this (ayam aham asmti); he has become completely annihilated. I see nothing beneficial in this.77
This conceptualisation of the tman, and Indras reasons for rejecting it, correspond closely to the Mahnidna Suttas second critique of intrinsic identity (attan): both address the notion that a persons true identity is to be found beyond self-consciousness, the problem being that there is no means of identification with such a state. A similar correspondence can be seen between the Chndogya Upaniads final description of the tman (CU VIII.12.25) and the Mahnidna Suttas third and final critique of the attan:
(2). The wind has no body; the clouds, lightning and thunder are also bodiless. Just as these, rising up from space and reaching the highest light, emerge into their true form (3) so too does this tranquil one, rising up from this body and reaching the highest light, emerge into his true form. He is the supreme person and wanders about there laugh77 CU VIII.11.1: tad yatraitat supta samasta saprasanna svapna na vijnty ea tmeti hovca, etad amtam abhayam etad brahmeti. sa ha ntahdaya pravavrja. sa hprpyaiva devn etad bhaya dadara. nha khalv ayam eva sapratytmna jnty ayam aham asmti. no evemni bhtni. vinam evpto bhavati. nham atra bhogya paymi.
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ing, playing and enjoying himself with women, carriages and relatives, without being aware of this appendage of the body. Just as a draught animal is harnessed to a cart, so is this lifebreath harnessed to this body. (4). Thus the person whose faculty of vision is fixed on space, he is the subject who sees (ckua purua): the faculty of vision merely enables him to see. Thus the one who thinks let me smell this, he is the self; the olfactory faculty merely enables him to smell. Thus the one who thinks let me utter this, he is the self; the faculty of speech merely enables him to speak. Thus the one who thinks let me hear this, he is the self; the faculty of hearing merely enables him to hear. (5). Thus the one who thinks let me think this, he is the self, and mind is his divine faculty of vision. It is only this one who through his mind, the divine faculty of vision sees the pleasures to be found in the world of Brahma, and enjoys them.78
This passage places the inner perceiver of the Yjavalkyaka within a more developed Brahminic cosmology, so that after its separation from the body such a self is said to exist in the world of Brahma and enjoy its pleasures. Although this cosmology is entirely absent in the Mahnidna Sutta, this Buddhist text reports the same idea, i.e. the notion that the inner perceiver constitutes a persons intrinsic identity. There can be no doubt, then, that ideas have been shared between the two texts. Indeed, the Mahnidna Suttas first critique of the attan also corresponds to the formulation of self that precedes the final two teachings of Chndogya
78 CU VIII.12.35: aarro vyu, abhra vidyut stanayitnur aarry etni. tadyathaitny amud kt samutthya para jyotir upasapadya svena rpebhinipadyante (2). evam evaia saprasdo smc charrt samutthya para jyotir upasapadya svena rpebhinipadyate. sa utta mapurua. sa tatra paryeti jakat kran ramama strbhir v ynair v jtibhir v nopajan smarann ida arram. sa yath prayogya carae yukta evam evyam asmi charre pro yukta (3). atha yatrai tad kam anuviaa caku, sa ckua puruo daranya caku. atha yo vededa jighrti sa tm gandhya ghra. atha yo vededam abhivyharti sa tmbhivyhrya vk. atha yo vededa avnti sa tm ravaya rotram (4). atha yo vededa manvnti sa tm, mano sya daiva caku. sa v ea etena daivena caku manasaitn kmn payan ramate ya ete brahmaloke (5).
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Upaniad VIII. Prajpati here teaches that the tman is the bodily self, a notion that Indra rejects as follows:
Just as this self becomes well-adorned when the body is well-adorned, becomes well-dressed when the body is well-dressed, and decorated when the body is decorated, so too does it become blind when the body is blind, become weary when the body is wearied, and crippled when the body is crippled. It is annihilated in consequence of the bodys annihilation. I see nothing beneficial in this.79
This rejection of a bodily self is akin to the Mahnidna Suttas rejection of a self consisting of sensation, a notion that is rejected because such a self would be changeable and subject to suffering.80 Both critiques thus point out that the notion of identity with a bodily self is unsatisfactory because of its transience. This correspondence confirms that the Buddhist and Brahminic texts are parallel. If so, it would seem that the Buddhist text has drawn from a Brahminic source, for it goes one step further than the Brahminic parallel by criticising the final formulation of personal identity, and as such seems to extend and supplement an already existent teaching. Furthermore, the order of the Buddhist text is peculiar. It would make better sense if the third critique (the notion that the inner perceiver constitutes a persons intrinsic identity) preceded the second critique (the notion of a transcendent self beyond conditioned experience), for this order the denial of a self within conditioned experience followed by the denial of a self beyond it makes better sense of an analysis that begins with the bodily human being. That this order is not followed is odd, but can be easily explained as a response to an Upaniadic teaching in which the order had been determined by the need to claim superiority for the notion of the tman as an inner perceiver. It would seem, then, that an important early Upaniad has been used to communicate the early Buddhist critique of the tman/at
CU VIII. 9.1: yathaiva khalv ayam asmi arre sdhvalakte sdhvalakto bhavati suvasane suvasana parikte parikta, evam evyam asminn andhe andho bhavati srme srmo parivke parivko. asyaiva arrasya nam anv ea nayati. nham atra bhogya paymi. 80 DN II.67.12: anicca sukhadukkhavokia uppdavyayadhamma attna
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tan. This helps clarify the meaning of the Buddhist teachings on personal identity. The final teaching of Chndogya Upaniad VIII understands the self as an inner perceiver, i.e. the unseen seer of the Yjavalkyaka, and so hypostasises a persons sense of subjectivity into an intrinsic identity. Since this idea is firmly rejected, based on the argument that it only pertains in a conditioned state of consciousness, there would seem to be no sense in which early Buddhist thought allows a self in the form of the subjective aspect of self-consciousness: a persons sense of being an independent subject denoted by the term I cannot be hypostasised into a self, according to the Mahnidna Sutta. This indicates that the early Buddhist critiques of the notions I and I am ultimately address the problem of subjectivity per se. In the end, the Buddhist teachings therefore point out that the separation of subjective and objective aspects of self-consciousness has no ultimate ontological basis. If so, there would seem to be no room in the early Buddhist analysis for any sort of self. Indeed the second critique of the Mahnidna Sutta even criticises the notion of a transcendent self, and so suggests the impossibility of there being any such thing as intrinsic identity: such an analysis leaves no room for a self abstracted from causes and conditions. This suggests that the point of the early Buddhist critiques of the tman, as seen in the Not-Self teaching as well as the various other analyses of self-consciousness, is finally that a person has no intrinsic identity and thus is selfless. If so, the difference between the Not-Self teaching and the No-Self teaching of the Vajir Sutta would seem to be only terminological, the implicit point of the former being explicitly articulated in the latter. But before accepting this interpretation, we must first explain why the No Self doctrine was not expressed explicitly in the first place.
5. Cognitive conditioning and personal identity

In the above analysis of early Buddhist texts on self-consciousness, the most crucial evidence is provided by the Mahnidna Sutta. It is this text more than any other that points towards the No Self doctrine, for if intrinsic identity cannot be found in the inner perceiver or beyond it, what sort of self could a person possibly have? The
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apparently obvious implication of this text is that a person has no intrinsic identity. But if so, why does the text not state this explicitly? Why does it instead point out that it is not suitable (na kkhamati) to think that there is neither a self beyond conditioned experience, nor that the inner perceiver is a self? The same feature can be seen in the Not-Self teaching, which similarly asks if it is suitable (kalla nu) to regard the five aggregates as ones self. This is peculiar: if these early critiques really are based on the No Self doctrine, it is odd that they dodge the issue with such evasive formulations. The form of these teachings must be explained before concluding that the No Self doctrine is implicit in them. The only possible reason for the failure to articulate an explicit No Self doctrine is that this abstract philosophical issue is avoided for practical purposes. The pragmatic bent of early Buddhism is well attested in the canonical texts, of course: the simile of the raft and the simile of the arrow make it clear that all unnecessary speculation is better off avoided by the person who wishes to attain Nirvana.81 This pragmatic minimalism is even the reason given for the failure to affirm or deny the selfs existence in one canonical text, where the Buddha explains that he did not answer Vacchagottas direct questions because he did not wish to confuse him.82 This approach, in which the psychological well-being of a spiritual seeker is deemed more important than an abstract point, aptly summarises the early Buddhist approach to philosophical discourse: all that is not directly connected to achieving the cessation of suffering is not a proper subject of early Buddhist thought.83 Such a didactic approach would seem to explain the lack of a direct ontological assertion in both the Not-Self teaching and the Mahnidna Sutta, for the purpose of both is to effect an existential detachment
The simile of the raft is found at MN I.134.30, on which see Gombrich 1996: 2325. The simile of the arrow is found at MN I.429.2ff., on which see Gethin 1998: 6667. 82 SN IV.400401, on which see Gethin 1998: 161. 83 This approach is aptly summarised when the Buddha compares what he has taught to the few leaves in his hand, whereas what he knows is compared to all the leaves in a forest grove (SN V.437438). For a different interpretation of this simile, see p. 167 below.
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that paves the way for liberation.84 If so, there are good reasons for thinking that the general failure of the early texts to assert the non-existence of the self was due to the pragmatic purpose of early Buddhist discourse, despite the fact that the most relevant teachings point towards this conclusion. This explanation is not entirely convincing, however. The problem is that there is no obvious reason why denying the existence of the self should be regarded as an unnecessary ontological speculation. For if there is no self, and if the belief in and attachment to the self is the ultimate cause of suffering, it would seem wise to indicate its non-existence as a means of helping others attain liberation. After all, subsequent generations of Buddhist thinkers in India did not have any problem in admitting this fact, and it is hard to see why this should not also have been the case in earlier times. While it might not have been suitable for the Buddha to state the non-existence of the self when asked outright by Vacchagotta, it is easy to imagine that this truth could have been revealed on other occasions when the Buddhas interlocutors were not so likely to have been confused by the answer. Indeed the Mahnidna Sutta seems eminently suitable as a context in which to reveal this truth. For after the Buddha has presented an opinion about the self and stated an argument against it, it seems natural to follow up this refutation with the conclusion that a person does not possess such a self: if the teaching does indeed presuppose this, there is no reason why the conclusion should not be it is because of this reason that a person cannot have a self beyond feeling and experience rather than it is because of this reason that it is not suitable to think that one has a self beyond feeling and experience. In short, if the early teachings claim that belief in the self is the principle cause of suffering, the question of its existence or non-existence is not a pointless ontological question of the kind met with elsewhere in the early Buddhist literature, e.g. whether the world is finite/eternal or not, or whether the Tathgata exists and so on after death.
See the concluding parts of both teachings at MN I.139.11 and DN II.68.4.
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If the argument from pragmatism is not entirely satisfactory, we must try to find another explanation for the refusal to address the issue of the selfs existence. Why is this rather straightforward matter of ontology avoided in both the Not-Self teaching and the Mahnidna Sutta, two teachings well-suited to make this point? And why is the matter avoided in all the other texts on personal identity studied above? These other texts on personal identity suggest that there is a problem with ontology itself. For we have seen although self-consciousness is sometimes considered in terms of the notion I (ahan ti, ahakra), it is also considered in terms of the conceit I am (asmimna) or more simply the notion I am (asm ti), the latter form being used in the Khemaka Sutta, the V Sutta, the Vepacitti Sutta, the Dhtuvibhaga Sutta and the Mahnidna Sutta. Since the formulation I am consists of a subject (the personal pronoun I) and a verb (-as, to be), it surely implies not just a critique of individual identity but also of the notion of individual existence (I am). The Vepacitti and Dhtuvibhaga Suttas even expand their critique to include the notions I will be (bhavissan ti), I will not be (na bhavissan ti) and various other ways of conceiving individual existence. The emphasis in these texts is as much on individual existence as it is on individual identity. Furthermore, since the notion of existence is inconceivable apart from the existence of individual entities, it would seem that the Buddhist texts on personal identity have a problem with the notion of existence itself. Why is this? The Vepacitti Sutta states that the various forms in which notions of personal existence are expressed are conceptualisations (maita). This indicates that such notions which are forms of conceptual proliferation (papaca) pertain only under certain cognitive conditions, i.e. that they are dependently originated. This suggests the understanding that existence does not pertain independent of human consciousness, but is in fact a reality constructed in the cognitive process, i.e. a conceptual rather than an ultimate truth. While this would seem to provide an extreme solution to the failure to state the non-existence of the self, it at least provides a logical explanation for this peculiarity. For it suggests that the early Buddhist problem with the statement the self does not exist is that although it claims to report an ultimate truth (a state of affairs
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that is true independent of human consciousness), both the notions self and existence have no reality beyond particular cognitive conditions. And if the terms existence and self are conceptual constructions rather than ultimate truths, the statement the self does not exist cannot describe the way things really are, and must therefore be avoided. Radical as this idea may seem, the notion that existence does not pertain beyond human thought fits the Mahnidna Suttas critique of personal identity very well. As we have seen, the second of these critiques denies the notion of intrinsic identity (attan) in a state beyond conditioned experience. Although it would be easy to conclude from this that there is no self beyond conditioned experience, the teaching steers away from drawing an ontological conclusion of this sort. It instead asks if a person can have the thought I am (asm ti) beyond sensation (vedayita), and since this is not so it concludes that a persons identification with a transcendent identity as my self (me att ti) is impossible. The point of this is that the very notion of individual identity (attan) depends on particular cognitive events, i.e. the sensations that, arising in the process of conditioned experience, lay the cognitive foundations for self-consciousness (I am). In other words, in the process of conditioned experience arises the notion of individual existence, and dependent on that arises the notion of intrinsic identity. But both have no reality beyond the conditioning of human consciousness. The ultimate truth, then, is not that the self does not exist, but rather that the very notions of individual existence and intrinsic identity are dependently originated, and thus that any articulation of such concepts cannot be ultimately true; such concepts do not correspond to the way things really are. Exactly this point about the dependent origination of consciousness is made in the Brahmajla Sutta, the first Sutta of the Dgha-Nikya. This discourse presents and criticises an extensive list of views, attributed to various unnamed ascetics and Brahmins, concerning the ultimate nature of the human being (attan) and the world (loka). The large number of views (sixty-two in total) and the complex manner of their presentation can obscure the ultimate point of the critique. Hayes, for example, has focused on the therapeutic as-
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pects of the text and so missed the philosophical point entirely.85 The philosophical point has also been missed by Fuller, who had synthesised the Brahmajla Sutta with the Sammdihi Sutta and concluded that the texts critique of views is concerned only with the knowledge of the cessation of craving.86 Even Collins, who has noted that the focus of the Brahmajla Sutta is the conditioned status of views, believes that this means nothing more than that the views are conditioned by the craving of their proponents. He thus comments that It is here, par excellence, that the argumentum ad hominem, the denigration of others views on the ground of the character of those others, and the argumentum ad verecundiam, the appeal to feelings of reverence and respect (for the Buddha), can be seen in Buddhist thinking.87 Although it is true that the ascetics and Brahmins of the Brahmajla Sutta are criticised for their craving, the focus is more on the cognitive foundations of their views rather than their affective faults. Moreover, the text does not praise the Buddha simply because of his virtuous character, but also because of his understanding and transcendence of views: faith plays no role in this discourse at all. None of these studies of the Brahmajla Sutta, nor even that of Rhys Davids (1899: xxvxxvii), Bhikkhu Bodhi (1978) or the
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Hayes (1988: 48) seems to view the text as some sort of ancient self-help manual: In an era in which various teachers are gathering disciples around them and making claims of supernatural powers and access to cosmic information that is beyond the ken of ordinary mortals, the superior knowledge of the Tathgata consists in no more than a full awareness of his own feelings (vedan) and the realization that tranquility is possible only by giving up being attached to them. For a detailed study of the form of the Not-Self teaching in the Alagaddpama Sutta see Wynne 2010: 210211. 86 Fuller 2005: 115. Although Fuller does not clarify his understanding of the historicity of the early Buddhist literature, his attempt to synthesise the Brahmajla Sutta with the Sammdihi Sutta is based on the presupposition that the teachings in the Pli Nikyas constitute a homogeneous whole; this is also indicated by statements such as the Pli canon teaches (Fuller 2005: 157). This is seriously misconceived, however, for there is much evidence in the Pli Nikyas for divergent views and even debate. For a sample of such views see Wynne 2007: 117ff. and 2009a. 87 Collins 1982: 129.
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recent analysis of Evans (2009), comment on the fact that the views it criticises are analysed in terms of their connection with the past (pubbanta) or future (aparanta). Although it is easy to overlook this presentation of views according to their temporal significance, it is fundamental to the texts analysis. Time is an essential aspect of human experience, it being impossible to conceive the fundamental reality of the human being and the world in which he exists apart from the notion of past, present and future. If so, the presentation of views in temporal terms surely indicates that the point is to criticise any attempt to conceptualise the existential reality of the human being and the world. The following statement, occurring immediately after the presentation of views, makes this quite clear:
Whatever ascetics or Brahmins speculate and form views about the past, future or both, declaring various sorts of opinion (adhivuttipadni) with reference to the past and future, all do so through these sixty-two points or one of them there is no possibility besides this.88
Whether or not one accepts the comprehensiveness of the views presented, the logic of this statement is that any attempt to understand the reality of the human being and the world in terms of the past and future falls within its critique. This means, then, that the text rejects the notion that the ultimate reality of things can be understood in terms of the concept time. For if this were not the case, it would surely be possible to conceive the reality of inner and outer things in terms of some sort of temporal analysis, i.e. another possibility besides this. And if the human being and the world cannot be understood in terms of time, their true reality cannot be conceptualised at all. The presentation of views in terms of the past and future is no accidental or convenient way of ordering ideas, then, but is intended to show that any attempt to conceptualise the ultimate existential reality of the human being and the world is impossible, and that the Buddhas liberated understanding to which the views are eventually contrasted is beyond all notions of
88 DN I.39.14: ye keci bhikkhave sama v brhma v pubbantakappik ca aparantakappik ca pubbantparantakappik ca pubbantparantadihino pubbantparanta rabbha anekavihitni adhivuttipadni abhivadanti, sabbe te imeh eva dvsahiiy vatthhi etesa v aatarena, n atthi ito bahiddh.
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temporal existence. An indication of this is given in the following statement that precedes the presentation of views:
There are, bhikkhus, other matters profound, hard to see and understand, tranquil, supreme, beyond the scope of logic, subtle, to be known by the wise that the Tathgata declares through his own understanding and vision. It is because of these that those who speak correctly would speak the true praise of the Tathgata.89
The account of views is thus intended to elucidate the nature of the Buddhas awakened understanding through a simple contrast: whatever the Buddha understands, it is entirely different from any attempt to conceptualise the way things are in terms of the past and future. In fact the sixty-two views are dominated by attempts to understand the human being and the world in spatio-temporal terms. This is most obvious with regard to the views about the world, all of which concern its spatial or temporal limits: the world is imagined to have a beginning or not (and so be eternal), or to be with or without spatial limits, or else to be a mixture of the two.90 The views about the human being are also concerned with the spatiotemporal reality of individual existence: they either comment on the ultimate temporal existence of a person (e.g. that there is an eternal but transmigratory self,91 or that the self has a beginning since it comes into existence spontaneously,92 or that the human being finds ultimate felicity within the bounds of this life),93 or his spatial existence (e.g. that there is a self consisting of consciousness within the body, this being the essential subject that experiences sensations),94 or else his spatio-temporal existence (e.g. that
DN I.12.18: atthi bhikkhave a eva dhamm gambhr duddas duranubodh sant pat atakkvacar nipu paitavedany, ye Tathgato saya abhi sacchikatv pavedeti, yehi Tathgatassa yathbhucca vaa samm vadamn vadeyyu. 90 DN I.22.17ff. 91 DN I.13.11ff. 92 DN I.28.25ff. 93 DN I.36.23ff. 94 DN I.21.16ff.
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the true self however imagined is realised after death,95 or that the different constituents of individual existence cease at death).96 The text thus contrasts what it imagines are all conceivable ideas about existence in time and space with the Buddhas understanding that is beyond the scope of logic (atakkvacara). The text goes on to explain this awakened understanding as follows:
The Tathgata understands all these [views as follows], bhikkhus: These points of view thus seized and grasped will have such a destiny and such an outcome. The Tathgata understands this, and he understands what is beyond it (uttartara), but he does not grasp at this understanding, and through not grasping he experiences internal quenching. Having comprehended as it really is the rise and fall of sensations, as well as the pleasure and danger in them and the release from them, the Tathgata is released without grasping, bhikkhus.97
Rather than present another view about the spatio-temporal reality of the human being or the world, it seems that the Buddha understands what is beyond such conceptualisations and so is able to say something objective about them. This objective understanding takes two forms: first, the Buddha understands the effects of the various views in the form of the continued existences to which they lead; and second, the Buddha understands the structure of conditioned experience (the rise and fall of sensations), i.e. the cognitive conditions under which views arise. It is the latter aspect of the Buddhas understanding the construction and limits of views that is taken up in the remainder of the text. It is first pointed out that the affective and cognitive state of the various ascetics and Brahmins who hold views renders their understanding of primary experience unreliable:
DN I.31.6ff., DN I.32.10ff., DN I.33.1ff. DN I.34.6ff. 97 DN I.39.20: tayida bhikkhave Tathgato pajnti: ime dihihn evagahit evaparmah evagatik bhavissanti evamabhisampary ti. ta ca Tathgato pajnti tato ca uttartara pajnti, ca pajnana na parmasati, aparmasato c assa paccatta yeva nibbuti vidit. vedanna samudaya ca atthagama ca assda ca dnava ca nissaraa ca yathbhta viditv anupd vimutto, bhikkhave, Tathgato.
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Therein, bhikkhus, whatever ascetics or Brahmins form ideas about the past, future or both, and have views about them, making all sorts of claims by means of these sixty-two statements with reference to the past and future, this is because (tad api) what is sensed (vedayita) by these venerable ascetics and Brahmins, who have no knowledge and vision and are affected by thirst, is subjected to trembling and quivering (paritasitavipphandita).98
Although the grammar of this statement is complex, the terms pari tasita and vipphandita indicate that views depend on the cognitive processing or elaboration of primary experience (vedayita).99 That
98 DN I.41.29: tatra bhikkhave ye te samaabrhma pubbantakappik ca aparantakappik ca pubbantparantakappik ca, pubbantparantnudihino pubbantparanta rabbha anekavihita adhivuttipadni abhivadanti dvsahiy vahhi, tad api tesa bhavata samaabrhmana aj nata apassata vedayita tahgatna paritasitavipphanditam eva. 99 Fuller (2005: 115) translates ajanatam apassatam vedayita tahgatna paritasitavipphanditam eva as only the feeling of those who do not know and do not see []; only the agitation and vacillation of those immersed in craving. More recently Evans (2009: 71) writes that each of the views is merely the feeling [vedayita] of those who do not know and see, the worry and vacillation of those immersed in craving. It is unlikely, however, that the past participles in this construction can be taken in a nominal sense: it is more likely that the placing of the ascetics and Brahmins in the genitive case (samaabrhmana) indicates that they are agents of the verb expressed by the past participles, so that they are what Warder (1963: 57) has called agent-genitives. Collins translation (1982: 128) is closer to this, for he takes the term vedayita as a past participle and understands the correlative clause beginning tad api as follows: something experienced by these ascetics and Brahmins, who neither know nor see, and are subject to craving. This problem with this translation is that it conventiently avoids the final words paritasitavipphanditam eva. Moreover, to say that views are experienced is odd, and does not add anything to the analysis; it is also implausible to translate tad api as something, i.e. as a correlative pronoun with an indefinite sense. The main grammatical problem posed by this sentence is the correlative phrase tad api. The word tad cannot be a correlative pronoun, since such a pronoun would have to be in the plural rather than the singular number, there being a large number of diverse views held by various ascetics and Brahmins. Indeed, the fact that the phrase tad api appears in the subsequent expression tad api phassapaccay (e.g. DN I.42.2 and following) indicates that tad is not to be taken as a neuter pronoun in agreement with vedayita. If, then, the
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this cognitive elaboration is spoken of in terms of trembling and quivering (paritasitavipphandita) suggests, in fact, that a persons conceptual grasp of things is in fact a sort of distortion of primary experience. Indeed we have seen that the term phandita is synonymous with the term papacita in the Vepacitti Sutta, where both define the various forms of the notion I am. The Brahmajla Suttas critique would thus seem to be concerned with the cognitive differentiation or conceptual proliferation of a persons basic experience. Just as the Vepacitti Sutta describes the notion I am as a palpitation or distortion, so the Brahmajla Sutta states that the same is true of all possible views about individual existence in space-time. The text goes on to point out that these statements of view ultimately depend on sense contact (DN I.43.8: tad api phassapaccay), and that experience only comes about under these particular cognitive conditions (DN I.44.30: te vata aatra phass paisavedissant ti n eta hna vijjati). All ideas about the spatio-temporal reality of the human being and the external world are therefore contingent, the implication being that should the cognitive conditions change so too would a persons grasp of reality. This is exactly what the text implies has happened to the Buddha: his cognitive state and subsequent grasp of reality are so utterly different that it is impossible to capture in terms of ideas about existence in time and space. Views about the human being and the world are therefore not absolute: they are ideas that pertain only under particular cognitive conditions, those that come about in the process of conditioned experience. It follows from this that the entire content of human
word tad is not a correlative pronoun that picks up a noun in the preceding clause and agrees with the term vedayita that follows, it is more plausible to take the phrase tad api as an adverbial correlative construction. Such a construction could be used to explain the reason for a preceding state of affairs, i.e. the fact that various ascetics and Brahmins state different views. In other words, it seems to have a meaning close to the adverbial sense noted by noted by Rhys Davids and Stede (ta, s.v. 4c: therefore that is why, now, then); a close translation could be something like in this case too The point is thus that the ascetics and Brahmins are able to state various views because their primary experience (that which they sense: vedayita) is subjected to quivering and trembling.
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consciousness notions of personal identity, existence, non-existence and even space-time itself are real only in so far as the cognitive conditions for them pertain, and have no essential reality beyond this dependently originated state of consciousness.100 In other words, what human beings assume to be objectively true facts about reality are nothing of the sort.101 The Brahmajla Sutta thus articulates a philosophy of epistemological conditioning and its transcendence through the doctrine of the dependent origination of consciousness. This constitutes, in other words, a rejection of philosophical realism, as has been pointed out by Ronkin:
What the Buddha rejects is realism, conceptual and ontological alike: the notion that the encountered world is made up of distinguishable substances, and the linguistic theory that words refer to these substances which they represent; the conviction that our language corresponds to or mirrors a mind-independent reality. He points towards conventionalism in language and undermines the misleading character of nouns as substance-words. Whatever we know is part of the
Hamilton (2000: 169170) has suggested something similar to this: What is more difficult to grasp, or what is even less obvious, is that if the structure of the world of experience is correlated with the cognitive process, then it is not just that we name objects, concrete and abstract, and superimpose secondary characteristics according to the senses as described. It is also that all the structural features of the world of experience are cognitively correlated. In particular, space and time are not external to the structure but are part of it. 101 As Ronkin has pointed out (2005: 244), according to this understanding the boundaries of ones cognitive process are the boundaries of ones world: the latter is the world of ones own experience, dependent on the workings of ones cognitive apparatus. Evans (2009: 80) has made the similar point that by insisting that the 62 positions are vedayita, conditioned by phassa, leading to vedan and so on, the Sutta implies that they are causally conditioned hence lack fully definite truth-value. See also Hamilton 2000: 107108: the Buddha metaphorically relates the different aspects of what we think as the world around us to ones subjective experience. In explaining how the khand has work, he focuses in particular on the fact that we cannot have access to anything else: all of our experience is mediated to us by means of them. And our world is simply that. We cannot have access to an external world because we cannot get outside of out experience. Our experience, then, is our world.
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activity of language, but language, by its very nature, undermines certified knowledge.102
The Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning explains the early Buddhist teachings on personal identity very well: it explains the dependent origination of notions of individual existence (as found, for example, in the Vepacitti Sutta), and indicates why the Mahnidna Sutta and the Not-Self teaching do not deny the selfs existence outright. Furthermore, the position of the Brahmajla Sutta at the beginning of the Dgha-Nikya surely indicates that it is foundational for the early texts. This suggests that the philosophy of epistemological conditioning ought to be generalised to the entire edifice of early Buddhist thought, and since this perspective explains the early teachings on personal identity, there can be little doubt that virtually all these teachings fit into a homogeneous understanding, one that can be ascribed to the same thinker(s) or period of thought. This is also indicated by the fact that the Not-Self teaching and the Mahnidna Sutta both use early Upaniadic thought to elucidate new ideas: the Not-Self teaching alludes to the Upaniadic tman in its transcendent or macrocosmic aspect, whereas the Mahnidna Sutta uses the dialogue between Prajpati and Indra (Chndogya Upaniad VIII) in order to criticise the Upaniadic tman in both its microcosmic and macrocosmic aspects (as an inner perceiver and transcendent essence). Furthermore, the philosophy of epistemological conditioning is complemented by a consistent understanding of religious means and ends. This understanding can be discerned in most of the texts studied above, especially those passages of Brahmajla Sutta that deal with the Buddhas transcendent state and the insight thought to effect it. This doctrine of transcendence is not confined to the texts on personal identity, however, but is assumed by some of the most important early Buddhist teachings.
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Ronkin 2005: 245.
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6. The transcendence of cognitive conditioning

The means of attaining liberation suggested by the Brahmajla Sutta consists of a discipline in which a person directs attention towards the process of conditioned experience (the rise and fall of sensations). A similar means is envisaged by both the Khemaka and Aggivacchagotta Suttas (form is thus, its arising is thus, its fading away is thus etc.), this being a more experiential elaboration of the Not-Self teaching: the goal of both is the correct comprehension of conditioned experience. Such a discipline is, of course, consistent with the Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning. For if a persons experiential condition and the suffering encountered therein is ultimately due to the dependent origination of consciousness, a person must understand how this state of affairs comes about in order to be released from it. The end result of such practices is the attainment of a transcendent state, that which the Aggivacchagotta Sutta states is beyond concepts (mai ta) and self-consciousness (the notions I and mine: ahikra, mamikra). The Brahmajla Sutta similarly understands that this state is beyond views (tato utartara) and the scope of logic (atakkvacar). Although such statements on religious means and ends indicate that the liberated state is beyond conceptualisation, they also imply that it is beyond conditioned experience per se. Indeed the Brahmajla Sutta states that the Tathgata is released not only because he understands as it really is (yathbhta viditv) the rise, fall, pleasure and danger of sensations, but also because he undestands the release from them (nissaraa).103 This point is made explicit towards the end of the text when a bhikkhu is said to be liberated by understanding the rise, fall, pleasure, danger and release from the six spheres of contact.104 Perhaps the meaning of this is that in such a mindfully aware person, there is no distortion of primary experience. The implication of this is that transitive consciousness (via) must be transcended too, since
See n. 97 above. DN I.45.22: yato kho bhikkhave bhikkhu channa phassyatanna samudaya ca atthagama ca assda ca dnava ca nissaraa ca yathbhta pajnti, aya imehi sabbeh eva uttartara pajnti.
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this is an essential aspect of sense-contact (phassa).105 This idea is expressed in the Alagaddpama Sutta certainly the most important canonical discourse on the Not-Self teaching106 when the Buddha describes the transcendent state of the liberated bhikkhu who has understood the Not-Self teaching as follows:
Therefore, bhikkhus, I say that when Indra, Brahma, Prajpati and the gods search for the bhikkhu thus released in mind (eva vimuttacit tam), they cannot establish that the consciousness of the Tathgata is located here. What is the reason for this? As soon as the teaching is realised, bhikkhus, I say that a Tathgata is untraceable.107
This statement would seem to indicate the understanding that the liberated bhikkhu is devoid of transitive consciousness, this being the reason for the failure of the gods to locate him. Such a statement on the inability to find the liberated bhikkhu is akin to the notion that the Tathgata is indefinable, as implied, for example, by the refusal to answer certain questions about his existential state. These questions form the final four of the well-known set of ten unanswered (avykata) questions: the first four concern the eternality (or not) and finitude (or not) of the world,108 the next two ask whether the soul or life principle (jva) is the same as the body (or not), and the final four are concerned with the Tathgatas existential status after death (whether he exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, or neither exists nor does not exist).109 According to
According to the standard explanation of the Madhupiaka Sutta (MN I.111.35ff.), conditioned experience begins as follows: cakkhu c vuso paicca rpe ca uppajjati cakkhuvia, tia sagati phasso, phassa paccay vedan. On this passage see n. 72 above. 106 For the argument that this text is probably the source of the Not-Self teaching, see Wynne 2010. 107 MN I.140.3: evavimuttacitta kho bhikkhave bhikkhu sa-Ind dev sa-Brahmak sa-Pajpatik anvesa ndhigacchanti: ida nissita Tathgatassa via ti. ta kissa hetu? dihe vha bhikkhave dhamme Tathgata ananuvejjo ti vadmi. 108 On the first four questions, and the textual tradition regarding the unanfirst swered questions, see Collins 1982: 131, n. 1. 109 Collins 1982: 131133.
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Collins these questions are not answered since they are linguistically ill-formed, the problem being that they use
personal referring terms, which according to Buddhist thinking have no real referrent; hence, any answer given directly to them would confirm the misleading presupposition that such terms do refer to some real individual.110
In explaining that the problem posed by these questions is that there is no real referrent to terms such as soul and Tathgata, Collins reads the classical No Self doctrine into the Buddhas failure to answer them. On the other hand, however, he indicates that the failure to answer questions about the ontology of the world is based on a different reason, i.e. that they are pragmatically pointless.111 This explanation thus assumes the classical ontology in which the term world refers to a reality independent of consciousness, whereas personal terms have no ultimate referent in this world. This is problematic not only because such an ontology is not made clear in the early texts, but also because a common set of questions is explained differently. A single explanation should be found for all the questions: if there is a linguistic problem with the questions, as maintained by Collins, this should similarly apply to all the points they cover. A single, coherent explanation for the linguistic problem is provided, however, by the Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning. According to this philosophy, all linguistic formulation even basic concepts such as space-time and existence have no reality beyond a persons dependently originated state of consciousness. According to this perspective, the problem with questions about the ontology of the world and the human being is they that assume the mind-independent reality of spacetime and existence, and to answer them would be to subscribe to such notions. But as Hamilton has pointed out, the unanswered questions are based on false premises:
Collins 1982: 133. Collins 1982: 132 describes these questions as a standard type of pointless speculation.
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If, however, space and time are part of the structural characteristics of the experiential world, and that this is cognitively dependent, then one can see that the presupposition of the transcendental reality of time and space is false, and that the fundamental premises on which the questions rest are therefore also false. What this means is that though the questions are meaningful within a conceptual framework which assumes that space and time are transcendentally real, if space and time are not transcendentally real the questions are in effect unanswerable if one wishes to be truthful. Any formulation of a response within the same conceptual framework as the questions would not truthfully reflect a reality which does not conform to that conceptual framework.112
The unanswering of these questions thus indicates the Buddhas transcendence of dependently originated states of consciousness, such that notions of space-time and existence have no ultimate reality to him. It would seem, then, that the philosophy of the Brahmajla Sutta thus provides a coherent explanation for all of the unanswered questions. Indeed this understanding of the unanswered questions is articulated in at least two canonical texts. In the Avykata Vagga of the Aguttara-Nikya (Sattaka Nipta 51), the Buddha explains that each of the final four of these questions is a view endowed with thirst (tahgata), apperception (or ideation: sagata), conceptualisation (maita), conceptual diffuseness (papacita), attachment (updnagata) and regret (vippaisra).113 In other words the unanswered questions are conceptualisations that have no correspondence with reality. A similar explanation is found in the Mahnidna Sutta. After describing the liberation of the bhikkhu who understands its teachings on personal identity (those studied in section four above),114 it states that it is unsuitable (akalla) to consider this bhikkhu thus liberated in mind (eva vimuttacittam) in terms of questions about his existence, non-existence, existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-
112 113 114
Hamilton 2000: 174. AN IV.68.33ff. DN II.68.4ff.
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existence, i.e. the final four of the ten unanswered questions.115 The reason for this is given as follows:
The extent of articulation and its range, of utterance and its range, of designation and its range, of understanding and its scope, of existence and its movement the bhikkhu is released from all this through higher understanding.116
This account of transcendence is in agreement with the Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning outlined above: questions about the ontological state of the liberated bhikkhu cannot be answered because he has transcended the cognitive conditions on which they are founded. In other words, the problem here is with conceptuality per se: the liberated bhikkhu transcends the path of articulation (adhivacanapatha), the path of designation (paattipatha), the scope of understanding (pavacaram) and even the notion of existence (vaa) and its movement (vaa vattati), i.e. time. Indeed, the equating of the two latter concepts (existence and time) with those of articulation, designation and understanding indicates the understanding that space-time is only conceptually real. That the problem with the unanswered questions is as much with the notion of existence as it is with the notion of personal referring terms is similarly suggested in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta. For this text likens the inexplicability of a Tathgatas liberated condition to that of an extinguished flame, the point being that the fuel through which both can be designated the five aggregates for the Tathgata, grass and firewood for the flame has ceased. The Tathgata cannot be conceptualised, therefore, because he has gone beyond the experiential conditions through which an individual is normally understood (the five aggregates). And in this transcendent condition, the notions of arising (or being reborn: upapajjati), non arising, both arising and non-arising, and neither arising nor
DN II.68.11ff. DN II.68.18: yvat nanda adhivacana yvat adhivacanapatho yvat nirutti yvat niruttipatho yvat paatti yvat paattipatho yvat pa yvat pavacara yvat vaa yvat vaa vattati, tad abhi vimutto bhikkhu.
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non-arising have no relevance. This account indicates that the conceptual problem is not simply one of defining the Tathgata, but in conceiving his individual existence. A similar problem with applying the concept of existence to the liberated person can be seen in the Buddhas dialogue with Upasva in the Pryanavagga (Sn 10691076): in response to Upasvas question about whether the liberated sage (muni) exists eternally or does not after death (Sn 1076), the Buddha states that he cannot be measured (na pamam) because the means of speaking about him have ceased.117 In other words the liberated sage has gone beyond the concepts by which the existence of anything can be known (yena na vajju tassa natthi). What all this means is that the apophatic strand strongly evident in early Buddhist thought can be explained by the notion that space-time is a relative truth transcended by a Tathgata, the one whose condition is therefore incomprehensible, i.e. like that.118 The philosophy of epistemological conditioning and its transcendence thus explains some of the more puzzling aspects of early Buddhist thought: critiques of personal identity that do not commit to any ontology, the refusal to comment on the ultimate reality of the world, the avoidance of questions about the existential status of the liberated sage, the simile of the extinguished flame and so on. The Brahmajla Sutta therefore provides a coherent explanation for the early Buddhist teachings on personal identity as well as the apophatic strand in early Buddhist thought, and so underpins a religio-philosophical understanding found consistently and extensively throughout the early Buddhist texts. Although this is not a philosophy of realism since it assumes that the reality of space-time does not extend beyond a persons cognitive conditioning, this does not imply an idealist understanding. For idealism is still an ontology of sorts, and indeed one that can only be imagined under particular cognitive conditions; the authors of the Mahnidna Sutta would no doubt object to this by pointing out that there would be no means of conceiving such an understanding beyond sensation
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On this see Wynne 2007: 90ff. Gombrich 2009: 151.
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and self-consciousness. Indeed idealism is, basically, an hypostasisation of a persons subjective awareness into a mind-independent, ultimate reality, an idea which the Mahnidna Sutta rejects of this system of thought is rather that the way things really are is unspeakable and unthinkable. In other words, the Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning implies that reality is ultimately ineffable, as is the state of the person who realises it by escaping his cognitive conditioning.
7. The development of reductionistic realism: Abhidharma origins

This conceptual clarification allows us to see that the metaphysical assumptions of the Brahmajla Sutta differ considerably from those of the first attempt to systematise the Buddhas teachings, i.e. the reductionistic realism articulated in the various Abhidharmas. This reductionism is based on the No Self doctrine: it assumes that although a person exists in the mind-independent reality of the world, he is made up of impermanent existents or events (dharmas) which lack self. The human being and the world are reduced to their constitutent parts, therefore, these being thought to lack essence but exist transiently in the objectively real domain of space-time. Traces of the change towards a proto-Abhidharma reductionism can be found in the early texts. It is clear, for example, that the Vajir Sutta is both reductionistic as well as realistic, for it speaks of the aggregates existing (khandhesu santesu) and of the failure to find an essential being in them (na yidha sattpalabbhati). This goes beyond the Not-Self teaching and the philosophy of the Brahmajla Sutta by assuming that ultimate truth can be spoken of in terms of the concepts existence and non-existence. If so, it follows that the Not-Self teaching and the Vajir Sutta are separated by an important philosophical change: whereas the former is based on the doctrine of epistemological conditioning and the relative truth of space-time, whereas the latter is based on the realistic assumption that space-time exists independent of human consciousness. This change in thought was probably complex and
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multi-faceted, but in principle can be simply explained. For it requires only that certain Buddhist thinkers focused on the Not-Self teaching (and related ideas) at the expense of the philosophical framework provided by the Brahmajla Sutta. In such a scenario the Not-Self teaching could easily have been taken in a realistic sense, and this would have set the foundations for the emergence of the Abhidharmic reductionism. The beginnings of such a development can perhaps be seen in the Khemaka Sutta. As we have seen, the bhikkhu Khemaka was of the opinion that I see no sort of self (attan) or its property (attani ya) in these five aggregates of attachment, venerable sirs (imesu khv ha vuso pacasu updnakkhandhesu na kici attna v attaniya v samanupassmi). Although this does not indicate any departure from the philosophy of the Brahmajla Sutta, it certainly paves the way for a new sort of enquiry, one in which the contemplative bhikkhu analyses the different aspects of his being in the attempt to find a self. Such an approach leaves Buddhist thought on the verge of an important conceptual change: through this enquiry, factors of experience (the five aggregates) which were thought unsuitable to be regarded as self begin to look like impermanent factors of being which lack self. The change from the teaching that form is not self (this being an unsuitable conceptualisation) to the similar but subtly different idea that no self can be found in form (the latter being something that exists whereas the former does not) is easy to imagine, therefore, on the basis of the Khemaka Sutta. Textual evidence for this change is in fact contained in the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta. This discourse begins with the simile of an elephants footprint but soon turns into an analysis of the first aggregate form in terms of the four material elements (earth, water, fire and wind). The Not-Self teaching is applied to these four material elements in the following manner:
What, venerable sirs, is the earth element? It might be internal or external. And what is the internal earth element? That which is internal and personal, i.e. that which is solid, hard and materially derivative, namely: head-hair, bodily hair, nails, teeth, skin, flesh, sinew, bones, bone-marrow, kidney, heart, liver, membrane, spleen, lungs, bowels, intestinal tract, stomach, faeces, and whatever else is internal and personal, i.e. that which is solid, hard and materially derivative, this,
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venerable sirs, is said to be the internal earth element. This very internal earth element and the external earth element are simply the earth element, which should be seen with correct understanding as it really is: This is not mine, I am not this, this is not my self. Once this has been seen with correct understanding as it really is, one becomes disillusioned with the earth element, one cleanses ones mind of passion for the earth element.119
This teaching does not focus on the process of conditioned experience and its conceptual appropriation, but is rather concerned with a virtually exhaustive analysis of the physical constituents of a human being.120 This is a considerable departure from the Not-Self teaching. The point is no longer that the concept self arises in connection with a dynamic process of experience and is ill-suited to it, but rather that when a human being is broken down into his constituent parts all is found to be lacking in self. The Mahhatthipadopama Sutta thus assumes a realist ontology in which the four elements really exist but the self does not. Furthermore, the ultimate truth of things is here captured in words, and is not something beyond logic and the conceptual construction
MN I.185.14: katam c vuso pahavdhtu? pahavdhtu siy ajjhattik siy bahir. katam c vuso ajjhattik pahavdhtu? ya ajjhatta paccatta kakkhaa kharigata updia, seyyathda: kes lom nakh dant taco masa nahru ah ahimij vakka hadaya yakana kilomaka pihka papphsa anta antagua udariya karsa, ya v pan aam pi kici ajjhatta paccatta kakkhaa kharigata updia, aya vuccat vuso ajjhattik pahavdhtu. y c eva kho pana ajjhattik pahavdhtu, y ca bahir pahavdhtu, pahavdhtur ev esa. ta: n eta mama, n eso ham asmi, na m eso att ti evam eta yathbhta sammapaya dahabba. evam ata yathbhta sammapaya disv pahavdhtuy nibbindati, pahavdhtuy citta virjeti. 120 Hamilton (1996: 10) is correct to point out of that this list of bodily items in the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta is manifestly not comprehensive, but this does not mean that the point is to indicate examples of the characteristics being described in order to emphasise the characteristics and processes which enable the living body of the human being to function. (Hamilton 1996: 1213. The passage is entirely lacking in any words indicating that the contemplative bhikkhus attention should be focused on how the human body functions. The point is rather to go into enough detail so that the bhikkhu gets the reductionistic point that a self is not found in the body, despite the fact that every known part of it is not listed.
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of consciousness, as stated in the Brahmajla Sutta. Concepts thus capture the fact that the human being really exists in the mindindependent reality of space-time, albeit as an aggregate of various elements in which a self cannot be found. The simile of the house, found towards the end of the text, makes this reductionistic realism quite clear:
Venerable sirs, just as an enclosed space is designated house dependent on logs, creepers, grass and clay, so too is an enclosed space designated form dependent on bones, sinew, flesh and skin.121
This is a statement of the ultimate truth that a persons physical being is nothing more than an accumulation of different parts in which, as the text goes on to state, are to be found sensation, apperception, volitions and consciousness.122 The reference to an enclosed space (kso parivrito) shows that the authors of this text regarded the human being as a construction in space-time, albeit one that lacks intrinsic identity, an idea that comes very close to the chariot simile of the Vajir Sutta. The truth to be known is here that the human being exists but is an aggregate lacking essence, a fact that the bhikkhu should come to understand by the following means:
He understands thus: Thus indeed is the coming togther, collection and accumulation of the five aggregates of attachment. But the Blessed One has said this: The one who sees Dependent Origination sees the Dhamma, and the one who sees the Dhamma sees Dependent Origination. These very things are dependently originated, that is to say the five aggregates.123
121 MN I.190.15: seyyath pi vuso kaha ca paicca valli ca paicca tia ca paicca mattika ca paicca, kso parivrito agran t eva sakha gacchati, evam eva kho vuso ahi ca paicca nahru ca paicca masa ca paicca camma ca paicca, kso parivrito rpan t eva sakha gac chati. 122 MN I.190.28ff. 123 MN I.190.35: so eva pajnti: eva kira mesa pacanna updnakkhandhna sagaho sannipto samavyo hot ti. vutta kho pan eta Bhagavat: yo paiccasamuppda passati so dhamma passati, yo dhamma passati so paiccasamuppda passat ti. paiccasamuppanna kho pan ime, yadida paca updnakkhandh.
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In this passage the five aggregates (updna) really are aggregates, i.e. parts out of which a person is made, these being impermanent (dependently originated) and so not intrinsically real. This shows that a realistic reading of the Not-Self teaching did indeed lead to reductionism, i.e. the notion that a person is an accumulation (samavya) of impermanent, causally-connected elements. This understanding is entirely different from that articulated in the Brahmajla Sutta and most of the other texts on personal identity: there is no trace in the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta of the notion that the dynamic processes of conditioned experience is not to be understood in terms of intrinsic identity. The point, rather, is that intrinsic identity cannot be found in the different existential factors of the human being. How is this conceptual divergence to be explained? Whereas the philosophy of epistemological conditioning can be generalised to a great number of early texts, the same cannot be said of the reductionistic realism espoused in the Vajir and Mahhatthipadopama Suttas. This indicates that the ideas of the latter texts were marginal in the early period, which can only be explained in two possible ways: either these ideas circulated among a small sub-section of the early sagha, and so were not recorded in most of the early texts, or they belong to a later stage of speculation than that recorded in most of the early texts. In support of the latter hypothesis, we can note that the Ahakavagga and Pryanavagga, which are certainly among the earliest Buddhist texts, are generally in agreement with the philosophy of epistemological conditioning.124 In the Kalahavivda Sutta, for example, the Buddha states (Sn 870) that existence and non-existence depend upon sense contact:
The pleasant and unpleasant originate in sense-contact, but do not arise when there is no sense-contact. I say to you that the fact of nonexistence and existence also originates in this.125
On the antiquity of these texts see Wynne 2007: 73. Sn 870: phassanidna sta asta, phasse asante na bhavanti h ete. vibhava bhava cpi ya eta attha, eta te pabrmi itonidna.
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Later on in the same dialogue (Sn 874) the Buddha explains that form (rpa) is a conceptual proliferation that depends on conceptualisation (or apperception, sa) and can thus disappear for the religious adept:
Not cognisant of conceptualisation, not cognisant of misconceptualisation, not uncognisant but not cognisant of what is untrue: form disappears for the one who has reached this state, for the discernment of manifoldness (papacasakh) originates in conceptualisation (sanidn).126
According to this enigmatic statement of the Buddha, a persons physical being is not ultimately real, but depends on the tendency to conceptualise reality in terms of a manifold world of diversity. Elsewhere in the Ahakavagga, the seeds of the Buddhas teachings on personal identity can be seen at the beginning of the Tuvaaka Sutta (Sn 915916), when the Buddha responds to a question about the attainment of Nirvana:
I ask you, kinsman of the sun, great sage, about detachment and the state of peace: with what sort of vision is a bhikkhu quenched, so that he grasps at nothing in the world? (915) The Blessed One said: The contemplative (mant) should put a complete stop to the notion I am (asm ti), which is the root cause of discerning manifoldness (mla papacasakhy). He should ward off whatever inner thirst he has, training himself to be ever mindful. (916)127
The notion of individual existence is here said to be the root cause of a persons diverse perceptions (papacasakh), which is simply a more emphatic way of stating the teaching of the Vepacitti Sutta, i.e. that the notion I am is a conceptual proliferation (papaca).
Sn 874: na saasa na visaasa, no pi asa na vibhtasa: evasametassa vibhoti rpa, sanidn hi papacasakh. This statement reminds one of the similar statement in the Aggivacchagotta Sutta that the Buddha has annihilated form (rpa anabhvakata, MN I.487.33). On this passage see n. 134 below and Wynne 2007: 9596. 127 Sn 915916: pucchmi ta diccabandhu, viveka santipada ca Mahesi: katha disv nibbti bhikkhu, anupdiyno lokasmi kici? (915). mla papacasakhy ti Bhagav, mant asm ti sabbam uparund he. y k ci tah ajjhatta, tsa vinay sad sato sikkhe. (916).
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Besides these Ahakavagga teachings on existential matters, in the Purbhada Sutta the Buddha explains (Sn 849) that the liberated sage is released from the very notion of time:
Devoid of thirst even before death, said the Blessed One, not dependent upon the past, immeasurable in the middle, for him nothing is fashioned with regard to the future.128
The statement that the liberated sage is immeasurable in the present is but a poetic way of describing the complete transcendence of time. Indeed in the Ahakavagga the notion of being independent or unnattached (anissita) can refer not just to having no inclination or fondness for something, but also to being completely devoid of the notion of something. When the Paramahaka Sutta states that the bhikkhu should have no dependency on knowledge (Sn 800: e pi so nissaya no karoti), for example, the point is that he should transcend it. Indeed the Kalahavivda Sutta claims that those who have different opinions about liberation are dependent (Sn 877: upanissit), whereas the Buddha is released, the implication being that he is completely beyond such views. It seems, then, that when the Purbheda Sutta states that the sage is not attached (anissito) to the past, it means that he is free from the very notion of it. Indeed this text goes on to state (Sn 851) that the sages freedom from the past and future is connected to his transformed cognitive state and lack of views:
He is without attachment for the future and does not grieve over the past. Perceiving detachment, he is not led into sense-contacts and views.129
All of this evidence is in agreement with the Brahmajla Suttas philosophy of epistemological conditioning: notions of existence, non-existence and time are said to be dependent on a persons cognitive functioning, the release from which implies the cessation of a persons awareness of individual existence in space-time. There are reasons for believing that such teachings go back to
128 Sn 849: vtataho pur bhed ti Bhagav, pubbam antam anissito, vemajjhe npasakheyyo tassa n atthi purekkhatam. 129 Sn 851: nirsatti angate atta nnusocati, vivekadass phassesu dihsu ca na niyyati.
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the Buddha himself, not only because of the Ahakavaggas antiquity and originality,130 but also because related teachings in the Pryanavagga correspond very closely to the few historical facts about the Buddha that can be deduced from the early literature.131 Similar observations suggest that the Not-Self teaching is also to be ascribed to the Buddha, for it is hard to explain this highly original teaching especially its occurrence in Alagaddpama Sutta as an abstract formulation of later Buddhist teachers.132 A similar antiquity cannot be assumed of the Vajir and Mahhatthipadopama Suttas, however. It is surely important that the Buddha does not feature in either text, and that the orator in the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta is Sriputta, the patron saint of the Abhidharma. Furthermore, in its statement that the Blessed One has said this: The one who sees Dependent Origination sees the Dhamma , the Mahhatthipadopama Sutta even seems to speculate on the meaning of the Buddhas teaching of Dependent Origination. This texts highly complex and artificial style of analysis also suggests that it is a proto-Abhidharmic work, a text composed as Buddhist thought progressed towards a fully developed philosophy of reductionistic realism. Further evidence in support of this chronological stratification is found in the various Vinayas accounts of the beginning of the Buddhas ministry. These texts state that the Buddhas teaching to the five disciples concluded with the Not-Self teaching, the understanding of which triggered their instantaneous liberation. But it can be shown that the account as a whole draws upon and adapts the earlier account of the Ariyapariyesana Sutta.133 The doctrinal understanding that underpins this adaptation can be seen at the conclusion of the Second Sermon, when it is stated that the minds of the five disciples of the Buddha were released from the corruptions without grasping (Vin I.14.34: pacavaggiyna
Gmez 1976: 139: When I first read the Mahviyha Sutta of the Suttanipta I was impressed not only by its freshness and directness, but also by its originality. 131 See Wynne 2007: 127 for a summary of the evidence. 132 See Wynne 2010. 133 For this analysis see Wynne 2009a.
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bhikkhna anupdya savehi cittni vimuccisu). Although this formulation of liberating insight occurs throughout the early Buddhist literature, it deviates from the Ariyapariyesana Suttas account of how the five bhikkhus realised Nirvana (MN I.173.7ff.: pacavaggiy bhikkh asakiliha anuttara yogakkhema nibbna ajjhagamasu). The authors of the Second Sermon thus drew upon the Ariyapariyesana Sutta but replaced its apophatic account of the five bhikkhus liberation with an apparently reductionistic one, the subject of liberation being the minds of the bhikkhus rather than the bhikkhus themselves. This deviation from an older, apophatic description, one that sees no problem in speaking of the human being as a whole realising Nirvana, and its replacement with a reductionistic formulation which in Buddhist literature past and present complements the No Self doctrine implies that the authors of the Second Sermon believed in the non-existence of the self. It would even seem that in this case the authors of this Vinaya account read the No Self doctrine into the Not-Self teaching. This is strong evidence for a doctrinal change from a philosophy of ineffability to that of reductionistic realism. Regardless of the strength or weakness of this theory of doctrinal change, a couple of facts can hardly be denied. First, a doctrine of ineffability is certainly contained in the early Buddhist texts, and attempts to deny this are implausible.134 And second, this phiSiderits (2007: 7073) has argued that the Aggivacchagotta Sutta assumes a doctrine of realistic reductionism rather than ineffability. But this understanding cannot be derived from the Pli text. Most importantly, when the Buddha claims that he, the Tathgata, has annihilated the five aggregates (MN I.487.31), and so cannot be defined, instead of reading tathgata Siderits reads the term arhat (2007: 71), and understands that it refers to a dead Buddhist saint. Thus he translates the Pli yena rpena Tathgata papayamno papeyya ta rpa Tathgatassa pahna as follows: all rpa by which one could predicate the existence of the arhat, all that rpa has been abandoned. By shifting the focus from the living Tathgata i.e. the Buddha himself to the dead arhat, the meaning of the passage is substantially changed. For it would now seem to be saying that nothing can truly be said about the dead saint because the five aggregates of which he was formerly constituted no longer exist. Thus Siderits notes that [t]he word arhat is a convenient designator, just like fire. So nothing we say about the arhat can ultimately be true. The only ultimately true statement about the
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losophy is incompatible with the philosophy of reductionistic realism later outlined in the various Abhidharmas, and anticipated in the Vajir and Mahhatthipadopama Suttas. It can hardly be the case that both philosophies were devised by a single thinker or the same group of thinkers. One must have developed from the other, and if the philosophy of epistemological conditioning and its transcendence can be ascribed to the very beginnings of Buddhism and perhaps to the Buddha himself reductionistic realism must belong to a later period. This is in fact the most logical explanation of the evidence. The philosophy of epistemological conditioning radically subverts all our most basic presuppositions about life: it is difficult to believe that space-time is merely conceptual rather than an objective, mind-independent reality. It is not hard to imagine that this challenging philosophy was misunderstood and replaced by a sophisticated but simpler realistic philosophy. Indeed teachings based on the philosophy of epistemological conditioning, such as the Mahnidna Suttas three critiques of personal identity, could easily be misunderstood in a realistic manner unless the underlying philosophy is made clear. But it is hard to see how the philosophy of epistemological conditioning could have emerged from that of reductionistic realism. In conclusion, the evidence studied here suggests that the difference between the Not-Self teaching and the Vajir Sutta is philosophical rather than terminological. It follows from this that although the early Buddhist teachings were not presented in the form of a philosophical system, they are at least philosophically grounded. This is not to say that the Buddha should be regarded
situation will be one that describes the skandhas in a causal series Does this mean that the arhat is annihilated that nirva means the utter extinction of the enlightened person? No. There is no such thing as the arhat, so it lacks meaning to say that the arhat is annihilated. And for exactly the same reason, it lacks meaning to say that the arhat attains an ineffable state after death (2007: 73). But since the passage is concerned with the living Buddha (Tathgata) rather than the dead saint (arhat), it therefore is attempting to describe the state of being alive and yet liberated. Its negations, and the simile of the extinguished flame, indicate a completely apophatic understanding of religious experience that points towards a doctrine of ineffability.
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as a philosopher, however.135 For although the evidence suggests he had worked out a coherent world-view, it also indicates that he applied it as and when he saw fit, i.e. according to the pragmatic demands of the situation.136 Such an interpretation seems to fit with one of the Buddhas most famous statements on his approach to teaching: in the fifth book of the Sayutta-Nikya (Saccasayutta IV: Sisapvanavagga, no. 1), the Buddha states that although his knowledge is as vast as the numbers of leaves in a forest grove, the teachings he had revealed were comparable to just a few leaves.137 According to the texts studied above, this statement would seem to mean that although the Buddha had worked out a coherent philosophy, he did not teach it directly because of his pragmatic interest in helping others attain the cessation of suffering. This explains why the most important teachings studied above, such as the Not-Self teaching and the Mahnidna Suttas critiques of personal identity, are philosophical in their method and argumentation but ultimately avoid a direct statement of philosophical truth. The same is true of the Brahmajla Sutta: it is philosophical without stating a philosophy directly. All this seems to be the work not of a philosopher interested in abstract ideas for their own sake, but rather of a religious teacher keen to apply a philosophical understanding in order to help his followers achieve the best possible spiritual result. Early Buddhist thinkers were less philosophically parsimonious, however. In contemplating the Not-Self teaching, they came to believe in the non-existence of the self against the explicit warnings of the Buddha. For in the Alagaddpama Sutta, perhaps the single most important canonical exploration of the Not-Self teaching, the
For a recent discussion of the philosophical value of early Buddhist thought, see Bronkhorst 2009: 17. 136 Richard Gombrich has recently argued something along these lines (2009: 164): I do not feel that Buddha was interested in presenting a philosophically coherent doctrine: the evidence that his concern was pragmatic, to guide his audiences actions, is overwhelming. On the other hand, I have also concluded that the evidence that he had evolved such a structure of thought and that it underpinned his pragmatic advice is no less compelling. 137 SN V.437ff.
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Buddha describes how others responded to his teachings by weeping, beating their breasts and thinking I will be annihilated!.138 Such people concluded that the Buddha had taught the non-existence of the self, although the Buddha rejected this charge.139 It is ironic that within probably a few generations of his death, the Buddhas followers had drawn exactly the same conclusion, even if they did so with a little more composure and meditative calm.
Abbreviations
All Pli citations are from Pali Text Society editions.
AN AV BCA BU CSCD Aguttara-Nikya Atharva Veda Bodhicaryvatra (see Tripathi) Bhadrayaka Upaniad (see Olivelle) Chaha Sagyana: CD-ROM version of the Burmese Tipiika, Rangoon 1954. Dhammagiri: Vipassana Research Institute, version 3. Catupariatstra (see Waldschmidt) Dgha-Nikya Majjhima-Nikya A Sanskrit-English Dictionary, Monier Monier-Williams. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1899). Mahvastu (see Senart) Oxford English Dictionary, Second Edition, prepared by J. A. Simpson and E. S. C Weiner. Oxford: Clarendon Press (1989). Pali Text Society g Veda Sayutta-Nikya Saghabhedavastu (see Gnoli)
CPS DN MN MMW Mvu OED PTS RV SN SbhV
MN I.137.1ff: tassa eva hoti: ucchijjissmi nmassu, vinassissmi nma ssu, n assu nma bhavissm ti. so socati kilamati paridevati uratti kandati sammoha pajjati. 139 See the section at the beginning of MN I.140, where the Buddha rejects that he is a nihilist (venayika).
138
The tman and its negation Ud Vin Vism Udna Vinaya Visuddhimagga (see Warren and Kosambi)
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References
Bodhi, Bhikkhu. 1978. The All Embracing Net of Views. The Brahmajla Sutta and its Commentaries. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Bodhi, Bhikkhu. 2000. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. A New Translation of the Sayutta Nikya (2 Volumes). Oxford: Pali Text Society. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2007. Greater Magadha. Studies in the Culture of Early India. Leiden, Boston: Brill. Bronkhorst, Johannes. 2009. Buddhist Teaching in India. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Chu, Bhikshu Thch Thin. 1999. The Literature of the Personalists of Early Buddhism. English translation by Sara Boin-Webb. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Collins, Steven. 1982. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravda Buddhism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dalai Lama. 1994. The Way To Freedom: Core Teachings of Tibetan Buddhism. San Fransisco: Harper Collins. De Jong, J. W. 2000. The Buddha and His Teachings. In Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding. The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, pp. 171180. Ed. Jonathan A. Silk. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Evans, Stephen A. 2009. Epistemology of the Brahmajla Sutta. Buddhist Studies Review, Vol. 26(1), pp. 6784. Fuller, Paul. 2005. The Notion of dihi in Theravda Buddhism. The Point of View. London, New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Gethin, Rupert. 1986. The Five khandhas: Their Treatment in the Nikyas and Early Abhidhamma. Journal of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 14(1), pp. 3553. Gnoli, Raniero. 1978. The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saghabhedavastu, Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mlasarvstivdin, Part I. Roma: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Gombrich, Richard F. 1992. Dating the Historical Buddha: A Red Herring Revealed. In The Dating of the Historical Buddha Part 2, pp. 237259. Ed. Heinz Bechert. Gttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
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Gombrich, Richard F. 1996. How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London: Athlone Press. Gombrich, Richard. 2009. What the Buddha Thought. London: Equinox. Gmez, Luis O. 1976. Proto-Mdhyamika in the Pali Canon. Philosophy East and West, Vol. 26, pp. 137165. Hamilton, Sue. 1996. Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism. London: Luzac Oriental. Hamilton, Sue. 2000. Early Buddhism: A New Approach. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press. Hayes, Richard. 1988. Dignga on the Interpretation of Signs. Dordrecht: Publisher. Kornfield, Jack. 1996. Living Dharma. Teachings of Twelve Buddhist Masters. Boston and London: Shambhala. La Valle Poussin, Louis de. 1917. The Way to Nirva: Six Lectures on Ancient Buddhism as a Discipline of Salvation. (The Hibbert Lectures, 1916) Cambridge: The University Press. Malalasekera, G. P. 1957. The Buddha and his Teachings. Colombo: Buddhist Council of Ceylon. amoli, Bhikkhu and Bodhi, Bhikkhu. 1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. A Translation of the Majjhima Nikya. Boston: Wisdom Publications. nananda, Bhikkhu. 1971. Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought: An Essay on Papaca and Papaca-Saa-Sankh. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society. Norman, K. R. 1981. A Note on att in the Alagaddpama Sutta. In Studies in Indian Philosophy (Memorial Volume for Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi), pp. 1929. Eds. Dalsukh Malvania and Nagin J. Shah. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology. Oetke, Claus. 1988. Ich und das Ich. Analytische Untersuchungen zur bud dhistisch-brahmanischen tmankontroverse. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner. Olivelle, Patrick. 1998. The Early Upaniads. Annotated Text and Translation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Prez-Remn, Joaquin. 1980. Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism. The Hague: Mouton Publishers. Rahula, Walpola. 1959. What the Buddha Taught. Bedford: Gordon Fraser. Ronkin, Noa. 2005. Early Buddhist Metaphysics. The Making of a Philosophical Tradition. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon. Rhys Davids, T. W. 1877. Buddhism: Being a Sketch of the Life and Teachings of Gautama, the Buddha. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. Republished, New Delhi (2000): Asian Educational Services.
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Rhys Davids, T. W. 1899. Dialogues of the Buddha Part 1. London: Luzac. Rhys Davids, T. W. and Stede, William. 19211925. Pali-English Dictionary. London: Pali Text Society. Senart, mile. 1897. Le Mahvastu. Texte Sanscrit, Volume III. Paris: Imprimerie Nationale. Siderits, Mark. 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction. UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited. Tripathi, Sridhar. 1988. Bodhicaryvatra of ntideva with the Commentary Pajik of Prajkaramati. (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts No. 12). Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute. Vetter, Tilmann. 1988. The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism. Leiden: E. J. Brill. Waldschmidt, Ernst. 1952. Das Catupariatstra. Teil I: Der Sanskrit Text im Handschriftlichen Befund. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Warder, A. K. 1991. Introduction to Pali (Third Edition). Oxford: Pali Text Society. Warren, Henry Clarke and Kosambi, Dharmananda. 1989. Visuddhimagga of Buddhaghoscariya. (Harvard Oriental Series Vol. 41). New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Williams, Paul and Tribe, Anthony. 2000. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. London and New York: Routledge. Wynne, Alexander. 2005. The Historical Authenticity of Early Buddhist Literature: A Critical Evaluation. Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sdasiens, Band XLIX, pp. 3570. Wynne, Alexander. 2007. The Origin of Buddhist Meditation. London, New York: Routledge. Wynne, Alexander. 2009a. Early Evidence for the no self Doctrine? A Note on the Second antman Teaching of the Second Sermon. Thai International Journal for Buddhist Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 6484. Wynne, Alexander. 2009b. Miraculous Transformation and Personal Identity: A Note on the First antman Teaching of the Second Sermon. Thai International Journal of Buddhist Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 85113. Wynne, Alexander. 2010. The Buddhas Skill in Means and the Genesis of the Five Aggregate Teaching. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Soicety, Series 3, Vol. 20(2), pp. 191216
Indian Buddhist metaethics

Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Atlanta, 2328 June 2008
Guest editor
Martin T. Adam
Dedicated, with deepest gratitude, to the late Dr. Leslie Kawamura, University of Calgary: Profound teacher, trusted guide, friend. Magalam!
An analysis of factors related to the kusala/ akusala quality of actions in the Pli tradition
Peter Harvey
Scattered through the texts of the Pli Canon, and supplemented by some commentarial passages, are a series of discussions of such matters as the nature of action (Pli kamma, Skt. karman), praiseworthy and reprehensible actions, criteria for determining an action as praiseworthy or reprehensible, and reflections on how the intention and knowledge of an agent should affect the moral assessment of an action. In these one can see a set of complementary principles of ethics. These passages are helpful in ascertaining the closest Western analogue to the ethics of early and Theravda Buddhism. Is it Utilitarianism, where actions are judged only by the amount of pain or happiness that they cause people, or sometimes also animals? Is it Kantian ethics, where the good will is central? Is it virtue ethics, as argued by Keown (1992), where actions are judged by the virtues or vices that they express, and their contribution to character traits that produce a certain kind of person? Is it simply a form of moral realism, in which ethical statements are seen to report certain moral facts about the world, particularly that certain specified acts are wrong? Or is it that these theories each correspond to only certain aspects of Buddhist ethics? As we will see, the last of these turns out to be the case.
Kusala and akusala actions and their roots

Kusala and akusala are the terms perhaps most commonly used for praiseworthy and reprehensible actions or states of mind in early
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Buddhist texts. Kusala can be translated as wholesome1 or skilful, and akusala means the opposite of this. For the time being, the translation wholesome will be used. In the Sammdihi Sutta is a passage (MN I.4647), which identifies typical akusala and kusala actions and makes clear what lies at the root of such actions:
When, friends a noble-disciple2 understands the unwholesome (akusala) and the root of the unwholesome (akusalamla-), the wholesome (kusala) and the root of the wholesome (kusalamla-), in that way he is one of right view (sammdihi), whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma and has arrived at this true Dhamma. And what is the unwholesome (akusala)? Killing living beings is the unwholesome; taking what is not given is the unwholesome; misconduct in sensual pleasures is the unwholesome; false speech is the unwholesome; divisive speech is the unwholesome; harsh speech is the unwholesome; frivolous chatter is the unwholesome; covetousness is the unwholesome; ill-will is the unwholesome; wrong view is the unwholesome. This is called the unwholesome. And what is the root of the unwholesome? Greed (lobho) is a root of the unwholesome; hatred (doso) is a root of the unwholesome; delusion (moho) is a root of the unwholesome. This is called the root of the unwholesome. And what is the wholesome? Abstention from killing living beings is the wholesome; abstention from frivolous chatter is the wholesome; uncovetousness is the wholesome; non-ill-will is the wholesome; right view is the wholesome. This is called the wholesome. And what is the root of the wholesome? Non-greed (alobho) is a root of the wholesome; non-hate (adoso) is a root of the wholesome; nondelusion (amoho) is a root of the wholesome. This is called the root of the wholesome.
Here, the roots of wholesome action, literally non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion, are not just the absence of greed, hatred and
1 The sixth edition of the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) defines wholesome as promoting physical or moral health. The idea of kusala actions as nourishing moral health seems appropriate. 2 Ariya-svako: noble disciple or disciple of the noble ones.
Factors related to the kusala/akusala quality of actions
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delusion, but states which oppose them: anti-greed (generosity and renunciation), anti-hatred (loving-kindness and compassion) and anti-delusion (wisdom).3 In this passage, the unwholesome is explained as consisting of actions of body and speech that are widely recognized as harmful to others, plus mental states that are likely to later lead to such harmful actions. The neuter term akusala is used with all these actions, showing it is a noun, not an adjective agreeing with the gender of the respective actions. This seems to indicate that these actions are key ingredients of the unwholesome, rather than things which happen to have the quality of being unwholesome. In this passage, greed, hatred and delusion, as the roots of harmful actions, are not presented as the criteria for labeling something as the unwholesome, but as the inner causes of the unwholesome. However, at AN I.197, greed, hatred and delusion are not just causes of unwholesome action, but their very existence is an unwholesome situation: an arahant understands: Formerly there was greed; that was an unwholesome thing (akusala). Now it does not exist; this is a wholesome thing (kusala) (and the same for hatred and delusion). This is also seen at AN I.201205 which, having identified greed hatred and delusion as each a root of the unwholesome (akusalamla), says:
Whatever, monks, is greed, that is also is an unwholesome thing (Yad api bhikkhave lobho tad api akusala). Whatever the greedy one performs by body, speech or mind, overpowered by greed, his thoughts controlled by it (pariydinnacitto), doing to another by falsely4 causing him pain (asat dukkha upadahati) through punishment, imprisonment, loss of wealth, abuse, banishment, (thinking) I am strong, (I have the) advantage of strength, that is also is an unwholesome thing. Thus these various evil (ppak), unwholesome states born of greed, with greed as cause, greed as origin, greed as condition are assembled together in him.
3 As indicated by the fact that Dhs 3234 treats them as positive presences, with 34 explaining amoha as pa, wisdom. 4 The context indicates that the situation concerns lying about someone, so that they are then subject to punishment.
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The same is then said of behaviour based upon hatred and delusion. The passage continues:
Such a person, overpowered by evil, unwholesome states born of greed, being of uncontrolled mind, in this very life lives in pain, with distress, unrest and fever (dukkha savighta saupysa sapariha), and when the body breaks up after death, a bad destiny is to be expected.
The same is then said of someone overwhelmed by states born of hatred or delusion, all such cases being like the case of a tree destroyed by parasitic creepers. On the other hand, non-greed, nonhatred and non-delusion are each a root of the wholesome, and one who abandons states born of greed, hatred and delusion is released in this very life, like a tree that a person completely frees of parasitic creepers. This holds not only that greed etc. are causes for unwholesome action, but are themselves included in what is unwholesome. They can take over the mind so as to lead a person to act in a way that brings suffering on others. This, though, leads to pain and distress to the agent in this life, and a bad rebirth. Showing this as a causal sequence:
unwholesome roots unwholesome actions that bring pain to others harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent.
AN I.263 sees both greed, hatred and delusion and non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion as causes for the origin of actions (nidnni kammna samudayya). Furthermore:
whatever action is of the nature (pakata) of greed (or hatred, or delusion), born of greed, caused by it, that action is unwholesome, it is with fault/blameable (svajja), it ripens in pain (dukkhavipka).
On the other hand, an action of the nature of non-greed etc., is wholesome, it is faultless/blameless, it ripens in happiness. However, while the first kind of action, that born of greed etc., conduces to the origin of actions (kammasamudayya), not to the cessation of actions, the second, born of non-greed etc., does the opposite. Wholesome actions, then, are actions which bring hap-
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piness in sasra but also go beyond entrapment in action-fuelled sasra.
The nature and relative effect of attachment, hatred and delusion, and the role of attention
What is the nature of the three roots of the unwholesome, and what feeds them? In some passages, lobha, greed, is replaced by rga, attachment or lust. This covers sexual lust, but also lusting after anything, including subtle meditative states. It encompasses the same ground as greed (lobha). At AN I.194, the Buddha calls greed covetousness (abhijjh), calls hatred ill-will (vypdo), and calls delusion ignorance (avijj). This sees the first two of these as the same as the first two of the three unwholesome mental actions though a consciously developed line of thought is more of an action than the initial root that it expands from , but the third as ignorance rather than the mental action of wrong view. Greed and hatred are affective, non-cognitive states and, as directed to certain goals, can be termed motives. While the confusion aspect of delusion can have an affective component, delusion is mainly a cognitive state, not itself a motive, in the sense of an impulse directed at a certain kind of goal, now or in the future. In the Abhidhamma, it is equated with spiritual ignorance (avijj), and both are explained as:
unknowing (aa) as regards dukkha (the painfulness of life), the origin of dukkha, the cessation of dukkha, the way leading to the cessation of dukkha;5 unknowing as regards the past the future the past and future;6 unknowing as regards dependently arisen states from specific conditionality (idapaccayat paiccasamupannesu dhammesu);7 even all that kind of unknowing which is unseeing, non-achievement, non-wakening, non-awakening, non-penetration, non-apprehension, non-comprehension, non-conThe unknowing is not lack of information about these, but lack of direct insight into them. 6 That is, relating to past lives, and to future lives yet to be produced by present and past karma. 7 That is, dependent origination.
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sideration, non-reflection, non-clarification stupidity, folly, lack of clear comprehension,8 delusion, bewilderment, confusion, ignorance, the flood of ignorance, the yoke of ignorance, the latent tendency of ignorance, the besetting of ignorance, the barrier of ignorance, delusion, the root of the unwholesome (Dhs 1061, 1162; cf. Vibh 362).
Delusion, then, is a kind of ingrained misperception, a distorted perspective, even stupidity, a kind of general mental misorientation that gives a view of things blind to dukkha etc., and conditionality in which certain motives, such as greed directed at gaining or holding on to something, or hatred, directed at bringing harm to someone, are seen to make sense. Non-delusion is the clarity and wisdom that sustains wholesome motives. AN I.199201 is another passage that probes the nature of attachment, hatred and delusion, and discusses what causes them and their opposites.
If wanderers of other sects should ask you about the distinction, disparity and difference among these three qualities (dhamm) attachment (rgo), hatred (doso) and delusion (moho) you should answer them thus: Attachment is a small fault (appasvajjo) but its removal is slow (dandhavirg); hatred is a great fault (mahsvajjo) but its removal is quicker (khippavirg); delusion is a great fault and its removal is slow.9 If they ask, Now friends, what is the cause and reason for the arising of unarisen attachment (or hatred or delusion), and for the increase and strengthening of arisen attachment (or hatred or delusion)?, you should reply: For one attending unwisely (ayoniso manasi karoto) to (an objects) attractive aspect (subhanimitta), unarisen attachment will arise and arisen attachment will increase and become strong. For one attending unwisely to (an objects) irritating aspect (paighanimitta) unarisen hatred will arise and arisen hatred will
Clear comprehension is a close complement to mindfulness. While this might refer to the short-term subsidence of these three states, it more likely applies to their long-term eradication. In terms of the ten fetters destroyed by noble persons, while a non-returner destroys ill-will (hatred) and desire for sense-pleasures, other forms of rga still remain for him: for the subtle elemental form and formless levels. These, along with ignorance (delusion) are only destroyed at arahantship.
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increase and become strong. For one attending unwisely,10 unarisen delusion will arise and arisen delusion will increase and become strong. If they ask, Now friends, what is the cause and reason for the nonarising of unarisen attachment (or hatred or delusion), and for abandoning of arisen attachment (or hatred or delusion)?, you should reply: For one attending wisely (yoniso manasikaroto) to (an objects) unattractive aspect (asubhanimitta), unarisen attachment will not arise and arisen attachment will be abandoned. For one attending wisely to the liberation of mind by loving-kindness, unarisen hatred will not arise and arisen hatred will be abandoned. For one attending wisely, unarisen delusion will not arise and arisen delusion will be abandoned.
Here we see that the crucial sustainer of attachment, hatred and delusion is attention that is ayoniso: unwise, unsystematic, inappropriate, not focussing on the fundamental nature of its object. Elsewhere, it is said that ayoniso attention supports lack of both mindfulness (sati) and clear comprehension (sampajaa), which then supports non-guarding of the sense-faculties, and this then supports misconduct of body, speech and mind. Wise attention has the opposite effect (AN V.113116). Wise attention is something that is used in and strengthened by the various forms of Buddhist mind-training or meditation. That wise attention feeds the roots of kusala action is reflected in the fact that kusala, when applied to a person, can mean skilled or expert. This is seen at AN I.112, where the Buddha says that in a past life he had been a wheelwright. A wheel he took nearly six months to make was without faults, and when set rolling on its own, did not fall over when the impetus ran out. One he had only six days to make was crooked and with faults and flaws (savak sados sakasv), so it did fall over after the impetus ran out. Thus he says,
Then, monks, I was one skilled (kusalo) in [understanding] wood that was crooked, the faults and flaws of wood. Now, monks, I am one
Note that no specific object of unwise attention is specified here as respecific specified gards delusion (or, below, wise attention as regards non-delusion).
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skilled in the crooked ways, the faults and flaws of body of speech and mind.11
We can thus extend the causal sequence given above, to:

unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions that bring pain to others harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent.
Why is the moral tone of an action seen to cause certain karmic results? It is said that wrong view leads on to wrong resolve (sakappa), and this to wrong speech and thus wrong action, while right view has the opposite effect (AN V.211212). As wrong actions thus come from the misperception of reality, they can be seen to be out of tune with the real nature of things. As they thus go against the grain of reality though they may be the sort of thing that many people do , they naturally lead to unpleasant results. Thus it is said to be impossible that wrong conduct of body, speech or mind could produce a ripening that was agreeable, pleasant, liked, or for right conduct to produce a ripening that was disagreeable, unpleasant, not liked (MN III.66).
Corrupt actions of unwholesome volition with painful ripening

As is well known, at AN III.41512 it is said, It is volition (cetan), monks, that I call karma. Having willed (cetayitv), one performs an action (kamma karoti) by body, by speech, by mind. Moreover: the ripening (vipka) of action is in this life, in the next life, or subsequently. Here, the identifying feature of human action is specified as the will or volition (cetan) that is expressed in a performed action of body, speech or mind (an active line of thought). This seems to be a recognition of the fact that an unwilled movement of limbs is
11 Cousins (1996: 143144) discusses this and similar passages, linking such passages to the skill required in meditation. 12 Cf. Asl 88.
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not, as such, a human action, and how an action is morally characterised typically depends on the volition that it expresses. Cetan encompasses the general motive for which an action is done, its immediate intention (directed at a specific objective, as part of fulfilling a motive), and the immediate mental impulse which sets it going and sustains it (Keown 1992: 213218). Buddhaghosa explains it thus (Vism 463):
It wills (cetayati), thus it is volition (cetan); it collects (abhisanda hati) is the meaning. Its characteristic is the state of volition (cetan). Its function is to strive (yhana-). It is manifested as co-ordination. It accomplishes its own and others functions, as a senior pupil, a head carpenter etc. do. But it is evident when it occurs in marshalling of associated states in connection with urgent work, remembering and so on.
At AN V.292297, what are elsewhere described as unwholesome actions are seen to express an unwholesome volition:
There are, monks, corrupt and harmful actions (kammantasandosavypatti) of unwholesome volition (akusalasacetanik) with painful consequences (dukkhudray), ripening in pain (dukkhavipk): three of body, four of speech, and three of mind.
These actions are the above three forms of wrong action, four forms of wrong speech, and three forms of wrong thought. In the following delineation of these, both the overt action and inner mind state are described:
There is a person who kills living beings; he is cruel and his hands are blood-stained; he is bent on slaying and murdering, having no compassion for any living being. He takes what is not given to him, appropriates with thievish intent There is one who is a liar he utters deliberate lies He utters divisive speech He is fond of dissension He is given to frivolous chatter There is a person who is covetous; he covets the wealth and property of others, thinking: Oh, that what he owns might belong to me! There is also one who has ill will in his heart. He has corrupt mental resolve (manasakappo): Let these beings be slain! Let them be killed and destroyed! May they perish and cease to exist!
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He has wrong views (micchdihiko) and a perverted way of seeing (vipartadassano): There is no gift, there is no offering, there is no (self-)sacrifice (that is, these have no worth); there is no fruit (phala) or ripening (vipko) of actions well done or ill done (that is, how one behaves does not matter, it has no effect one ones future); there is no this world, no other world (that is, this world is unreal, and one does not go to another world after death); there is no mother or father (that is, there is no point in respecting the people who established one in this world); there are no spontaneously arising beings (that is, beings without parents in some rebirth worlds); in this world, there are no renunciants and brahmins who are faring rightly, practising rightly, who proclaim this world and the world beyond, having realized them by their own super-knowledge (that is, spiritual development is not possible; people cannot come to have direct meditative knowledge of rebirth into a variety of kinds of world).
Such actions lead to rebirth in hell. On the other hand there are beneficial (sampatti) actions of wholesome volition, with happy consequences, ripening in happiness: three of body, four of speech, and three of mind. These are to abstain from the above ten kinds of action and where appropriate do the opposite kind. For example, there is a person who abstains from the destruction of life; with rod and weapon laid aside, he is conscientious and kindly and dwells compassionate towards all living beings. This then leads to a heavenly rebirth. Here the volitions involved in unwholesome actions are themselves unwholesome, and the actions corrupt and harmful, They have painful consequences (dukkhudray), ripening in pain (dukkhavipk). The term for ripening, vipka, is usually used for future karmic results for the agent of an action,13 but the term for consequence, udraya, may refer to the more immediate effects of an action on anyone. The causal sequence now becomes:
An action is often likened to a seed and its karmic result to the fruit (phala) or ripening (vipka) of this.
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unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are cor rupt and bring pain to others harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent.
How intention and perception of relevant facts affects the moral assessment of an action
In certain Vinaya passages, it becomes clear that how a monk perceives the facts of a situation affects whether or not he breaks a relevant monastic rule fully, partially, or not at all and, by implication, whether and by how much the act is unwholesome. Most monastic rules can also only be broken when the act is intentionally done (Harvey 1999: 273280). Vin IV.124125 concerns the rule against intentionally killing a non-human living being, and comes after a story of a monk shooting crows with arrows:
Whatever monk should intentionally (sacicca) deprive a living being of life, there is an offence of expiation. Intentionally means a transgression committed knowingly (jnanato), consciously (sajnanto), deliberately (cecca).
It is then said that there is an offence of expiation when:

a) he thinks that it is a living being when it is a living thing, and deprives it of life.
There is a lesser offence of wrongdoing when:

b) he is in doubt as to whether it is a living being, and deprives it of life. c) he thinks that it is a living being when it is not a living being, and acts to kill it. d) he is in doubt as to whether it is not a living being, and deprives it of life.
There is no offence when:

e) he thinks that it is not a living being when it is a living being,14
14
As when one misperceives a crow as a patch of shade; not as when one,
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f) he thinks that it is not a living being when it is not a living being. g) if it is unintentional; if there is no mindfulness (asatiy) (of what is being done); if he does not know;15 if he is not meaning death; if he is mad, if he is the first wrong-doer (i.e. a monastic rule cannot be broken before there is such a rule).
The causal sequence now becomes:

unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are intentional, corrupt and bring pain to others, in a way that is antici pated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent.
Unwholesome acts as with fault/blameable, criticised by the wise, not to be done

In the Lakkhaa Sutta, it is said that the past karmic cause of the Bodhisatta having smooth skin, to which dust does not stick this being an indication of his great wisdom , was that he used to enquire of renunciants and brahmins:
What is it that is wholesome (kusala), what is it that is unwholesome? What is with fault (svajja), what is not? What course is to be followed (sevitabba), what is not? What, if I do it, will be to my lasting harm (ahitya) and pain (dukkhya), what to my lasting benefit and happiness? (DN III.157).
This sees understanding the distinction between what is wholesome and unwholesome as linked to wisdom, just as the above Sammdihi Sutta associates it with right view. It also sees being with fault as closely linked to unwholesomeness, and clearly sees both as not to be pursued. Cousins (1996: 148) comments that:
for example, recognises a worm as a worm, but does not count it as a living being. 15 That is, does not know that his action might kill a living being.
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In the great majority of cases whatever other terms are associated with kusala, the term which is always present, usually immediately next to kusala, is blameless (anavajja).
There is a small uncertainty in how best to translate svajja and anavajja. Cousins (1996: 139) sees anavajja, as (originally) not reprehensible, blameless; (later) faultless. Margaret Cone (2001: 245) says that avajja means, as an adjective, blameable; low, inferior, as a noun, what is blameable; imperfection, fault, and svajja as an adjective meaning blameable; faulty. Perhaps a word which captures both aspects of the adjectival meaning is wrong, with right for anavajja. While micch and samm are also translated this way, at AN V.242, the micch and samm path factors are respectively called, among other things, svajja and anavajja. It is not surprising, then, that an unwholesome action is also criticised by the discerning or wise (viugarahit).16 Of course blame from those who are not wise may not be appropriate: the eight worldly phenomena that one needs equanimity in the face of are gain and loss, fame and shame, blame and praise (nid, pasas), and pleasure and pain (e.g. DN III.260). As king Pasenadi says in the Bhitika Sutta (MN II.114):
we do not recognise anything of value in the praise and blame (vaa v avaa) of others spoken by foolish and ignorant people who speak without having investigated and evaluated; but we recognise as valuable the praise and blame of others spoken by wise, intelligent and sagacious (pait vyatt medhgvino) persons who speak after having investigated and evaluated.
The relevance of criticism from the wise is seen in the Klma Sutta, the popular name for the Kesaputta Sutta (AN I.188193), which sees greed, hatred and delusion as the states identified:
when you know for yourselves, these states (dhamm) are unwholesome (akusal) and with fault (svajj), they are criticised by the wise (viugarahit); these states, when undertaken and practised, conduce to harm (ahitya) and pain (dukkhya)
There is also reference to virtues dear to the noble ones (ariyakantehi slehi) (SN V.343).
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They should, therefore, be abandoned (AN I.189). This is because a person:

overpowered by greed (hatred or delusion), his thoughts controlled by it, will destroy life, take what is not given, engage in sexual misconduct, and tell lies; he will also prompt others to do likewise.
Hence they conduce to his harm and pain for a long time. States of non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion have the opposite qualities and effects. Indeed, one devoid of covetousness, devoid of illwill, unconfused,17 clearly comprehending, ever mindful, dwells pervading the entire world with a mind imbued with lovingkindness, i.e. he can develop in meditation and be calm and confident. The causal sequence thus becomes:
unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are intentional, corrupt, with fault, and bring pain to others, in a way that is anticipated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation, and which are criticized by the wise, not to be done harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent.
Unwholesome actions as also bringing injury to others, future karmic pain, affliction to self and others, and a bad effect on ones character
A sutta which gives a series of near equivalents of the term akusala, and then for kusala is the Bhitika Sutta (MN II.114115).18 Here nanda explains, in response to questioning by king Pasenadi that:
1. An action of body (or speech or mind) which is censured (oprambho) by wise (vihi) renunciants and brahmins is:
These suggest the overcoming, or at least suspension, of greed, hatred and delusion. Note, though, that such a disciple is only said to be free of enmity and ill will (perhaps temporarily), not delusion. 18 Anlayo (2007) compares this to a Madhyamgama parallel sutta which he also translates from the Chinese.
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2. Any bodily behaviour (kyasamcro) that is unwholesome (akusalo), which in turn is: 3. Any bodily behaviour that is with fault (svajjo), which in turn is: 4. Any bodily behaviour that is injurious (savypajjho), which in turn is: 5. Any bodily behaviour ripening in pain (dukkhavipko), which in turn is: 6. (a) Any bodily behaviour, great king, that leads to ones own affliction (attabybdhya), or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both, and (b) on account of which unwholesome states increase and wholesome states diminish. Such bodily behaviour is censured by wise renunciants and brahmins.19
The passage goes on to say that behaviour uncensured by wise renunciants and brahmins is behaviour that is wholesome. And then, in response to the kings questions, he explains that wholesome actions are faultless ones; these are ones that do not bring harm; these are ones that ripen in pleasure. Furthermore, these are any that:
does not lead to ones own affliction, or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both, and on account of which unwholesome states diminish and wholesome states increase. Such bodily behaviour is uncensured by wise renunciants and brahmins, great king.
Here the faultiness (3) of an action is explained in terms of item 4: it being associated with vypajjha: injury, harm, trouble. Presumably this refers to the injury caused to others by killing, stealing, etc.
19 The Chinese parallel refers in turn to conduct that is: i. (= 1 above) detested by recluses and brahmins, ii. (= 2) unwholesome, iii. (= 3) constitutes an offence, iv. (cf. 1) is detested by the wise, v. (~= 6) harms oneself, harms others, harms both; that destroys wisdom and fosters evil; that does not [lead to] attaining Nibbna, does not lead to knowledge, does not lead to awakening, and does not lead to Nibbna (Analyo 2007: 158159). Here, item i and iv are close in meaning and v specifically refers to hindering the attainment of nibbna, while 4 and 5 of the above are not listed. The passage adds that those who carry out such conduct do not know, according to reality, what should or should not be undertaken, accepted, eliminated or accomplished (Analyo 2007: 159160). Analyo sees v/6. as the basic definition (2007: 168).
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This is implied by the Klama Sutta and by the fact that avypajjha means to be peaceful and friendly. An injurious action is then explained as item 5: an action ripening in pain (dukkhavipko). The term vipka usually refers to future karmic results, so here 5 gives not so much the meaning of 4 as refers to its inevitable consequences for the agent. Item 6a then links 5 back to affliction (bybdha): to self, others, or both. Affliction to others cannot be referring to future karmic results, as the affliction that one persons actions may bring to other people cannot mean karmic results that come to them: such results come to the agent of actions, not those they act on. This also implies that the affliction to self refers to immediate harm to oneself. Indeed at MN I.342349, a person who is a self-tormentor (attantapo), is one who inflicts harsh asceticism on himself,20 an other-tormentor is a butcher, hunter or executioner, while one who torments both is an ascetic king who has large animal sacrifices done by enforced and suffering workers. Nevertheless, 6b brings another reference to the future, not in terms of karmically caused pain for the agent of present actions, but in terms of the affect on their character or virtue: an increased disposition to further unwholesome actions and decrease in wholesome traits. This can also be seen at DN II.279280, which says that any bodily or verbal behaviour, or the pursuit of goals (pariyesana) should be avoided if it leads to the increase of unwholesome dhammas and decrease of wholesome ones, but followed (sevitabba) if it leads to the decrease of unwholesome dhammas and the increase of wholesome ones.21 Here, dhammas most likely refer to mental states. The causal sequence thus becomes:
unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are intentional, corrupt, with fault, bring pain and injury to oneself or
Nevertheless, SN IV.338339 says that a person who (generally) afflicts and torments (tpeti paritpeti) himself may still develop a wholesome state. 21 My thanks to the reviewer of this paper for drawing my attention to this passage.
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to others in a way that is anticipated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation, criticized by the wise, not to be done harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent, and un wholesome character tendencies.
Afflictive, dark action with afflictive, dark ripening

Item 6a above is also a feature of other passages. In the Amba lahikrhulovda Sutta (MN I.415419), the Buddha advises his son Rhula, now a novice, to reflect before an action of body, speech or mind and ask himself:
Would this action that I wish to do with the body lead to my own affliction (-attabybdhya), or to the affliction of others, or to the affliction of both? Is it an unwholesome bodily action with painful consequences (dukkhudraya-), with painful ripening (dukkhavipka-)? (MN I.415).
If the answer is yes, he should not do the action, if no, he can do it. He should likewise break off an action if he realises during its performance that it is leading to these effects and, if after an action he reflects that it has led to such affliction and has painful consequences and ripening, he should confess it and undertake not to repeat it. Along with 6a, factor 5 is mentioned, and painful consequences is probably equivalent to 4. The concern not to bring affliction to self or other is also seen in the Veudvreyy Sutta (SN V.353356), which urges a nobledisciple to reflect using a negative version of the golden rule:
I am one who wishes to live, who does not wish to die; I desire happiness and am averse to suffering. Since this is so, if someone were to take my life, that would not be pleasing and agreeable to me. Now if I were to take the life of another of one who wishes to live, who does not wish to die, who desires happiness and is averse to suffering that would not be pleasing and agreeable to the other either. What is displeasing and disagreeable to me is displeasing and disagreeable to the other too. How can I inflict upon another what is displeasing and disagreeable to me?
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On the basis of this, it is said that a person abstains from the three forms of wrong action and four forms of wrong speech, as well as exhorting others to do so, and praising such abstinence. The context of the passage is that the Buddha is asked by some brahmins for a teaching that will help them live happy lives of many children, beautiful possessions and good rebirths. That is, just as one does not like to be afflicted oneself, do not afflict others and this abstinence will bring one future good fortune. Indeed, whether he is presently in pain or happy, the wise person does not do any of the three forms of wrong action, four forms of wrong speech or three forms of wrong mental action, as these will ripen in pain (dukkhavipka) in the future; rather, he or she does actions that ripen in happiness (MN I.313315). In the Kukkuravatika Sutta, the focus is on not afflicting oneself, as here the Buddha addresses an ascetic who models his behaviour on that of a dog (i.e. he afflicts himself), and explains that this conduct will lead to rebirth as an animal or in hell. He then explains that there are four kinds of action (MN I.389391), the first three of which are:
action that is dark22 and with a dark ripening (kamma kaha kahavipka): one generates an activity (sakhra abhisakharoti) of body speech or mind that is afflictive (sabybajjaha) and hence is reborn in an afflictive world such as hell, with afflictive contacts and afflictive, painful feelings. AN II.234 explains dark actions as breaking the five precepts. action that is bright (sukka) with a bright ripening: generating unafflictive activities, so as to be reborn in an unafflictive world, such as that of the Subhaki heaven (of the elemental form level). AN
22 Cf. DN I.163 refers to those things that are unwholesome, and reckoned as such, with fault (svajj), to be refrained from (asevitabb), unbefitting noble ones (nlamariy), dark (kih, vl. kah) , with the opposite kinds of things as e.g. bright (sukk). At SN V.104, the nutriment for the arising and development of the discrimination of dhammas factor of awakening is giving wise attention to: dhammas which are wholesome and unwholesome, with fault and faultless, inferior and superior (hnapait), dark and bright with their counterparts (kahasukkasappaibhg). These four pairs also occur at SN I.129 and AN III.165; cf. AN IV.363.
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II.234 explains bright actions as keeping the five precepts, and AN II.235 explains them as the ten right actions ending in right view. action that is dark-and-bright with dark-and-bright ripening: generating a mixture of afflictive and non-afflictive activity, so as to be reborn in a world that is both afflictive and non-afflictive, such as the human world.
This passage makes clear that while the nature of an actions karmic ripening corresponds to the nature of the action, it does not determine its nature. For example a dark action is not to be counted as dark because it has a dark karmic result; rather, it has a dark result because it is itself dark: causing affliction here and now.23 Its having dark karmic results is a sign of its dark, afflictive, unwholesome nature, but not the criterion for its being unwholesome in the first place. Nevertheless, the passages we are examining in this article hardly neglect to mention karmic results, in the form of pleasant or unpleasant experiences, perhaps as additional motivating or demotivating factors for the actions , and of course do concern themselves with the immediate (non-karmic) effects of actions on both others and oneself. The causal sequence thus becomes:
unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are intentional, dark, corrupt, with fault, bring pain and injury to oneself or to others in a way that is anticipated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation, criticized by the wise, not to be done dark harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent, and unwholesome character tendencies.
The fourth kind of action at MN I.389391 is:
23 Adam (2005: 68) sees the affliction aspect which makes an action dark as its obscuring the mind and the dark (or bright) aspect as concerning both the moral quality and the epistemic character of the action itself (2005: 69). An epistemic aspect is possible here, but I do not see any direct evidence for it.
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action that is neither dark nor bright with neither-dark-nor-bright ripening, action that leads to the destruction of action: the volition for abandoning (pahnya y cetan) the above three kinds of action.
AN II.236 explains this kind of action as right view through to right concentration, and Asl 89 explains it as both the seven factors of awakening (bojjhagas) and the Noble Eightfold Path. AN III.384385 sees nibbna as neither dark nor bright, in the sense of neither a bad nor good rebirth. As we have seen above, AN I.263 sees actions born of non-greed, non-hatred and nondelusion i.e. wholesome actions, as leading to the cessation of (sasra-fuelling) actions. Adam (2005: 72) tentatively identifies the person who does the fourth kind of action as the noble persons who have not yet attained arahantship.24 While the first of these he mentions is the stream-enterer, we should also probably include the person practising for the fruit that is stream-entry (sotpattiphalasacchikiriyya paipanno), who is close to becoming a stream-enterer.25 Wholesome action is in one aspect bright action that also leads to bright future results in sasra, but at the level of path actions it enables a person to go beyond even the bright aspects of sasra.
However, at AN V.244245: right view through to right liberation is the sukkamagga in contrast to wrong view through to wrong liberation as the kaha-magga. This implies either that bright may sometimes exclude and sometimes include the path, or that only the paths lokuttara form is beyond both dark and bright. On this fourth kind of action, see Harvey (2000: 4346). 25 AN IV.372 sees them as no longer an ordinary person (puthujjana), SN V.23 sees one who is rightly practising (sammpaipanno) as having the eight factors of the magga, and SN V.25 sees the eight factors of the magga as what being a renunciant (smaa), a samaa, entails, whose fruits are the stream-entry-fruit up to the arahantship-fruit. As the magga leads to not only the three higher fruits, but the first one, stream-entry, then those engaged in the magga include the first kind of paipanna person. Such a person is endowed with its eight factors to some degree (Harvey 2011).
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Afflictive action that obstructs wisdom and leads away from nibbna
The Dvedhvitakka Sutta (MN I.115116) echoes the Bhitika Suttas item 6a, but also expands on 6b. Here the Buddha explains that before his awakening, while still a Bodhisatta, he had divided his thoughts (vitakkas) into two groups: those of sensual desire, illwill and cruelty, and those of renunciation, of non-ill-will, and of non-cruelty.26 Whenever one of the first group of thoughts arose, he understood that it:
leads to (savattati) my own affliction (attabybdhya), to others affliction, and to the affliction of both;27 it obstructs wisdom (panirodhiko), causes difficulties (vightapakkhito), and leads away from nibbna (anibbnasavattaniko).
With each of these reflections, such a thought subsided and was then abandoned. The character-forming effect of the nature of ones thoughts is then emphasised: Monks, whatever a monk frequently thinks and ponders on (anuvitakketi anuvicreti), that will become the inclination (nati) of his mind . It is then said that when one of the second group of thoughts arose, he understood:
This does not lead to my own affliction, or to others affliction, or to the affliction of both; it aids wisdom, does not cause difficulties, and leads to nibbna. If I think and ponder upon this thought even for a night, even for a day, even for a night and a day, I see nothing to fear from it. But with excessive thinking and pondering, I might tire my body; and when the body is tired, the mind becomes disturbed, and when the mind is disturbed, it is far from concentration. So I steadied my mind internally, quieted it, brought it to singleness (ekodikaromi), and concentrated it.28 Why is that? So that my mind should not be disturbed.
26 The objects of these last three thoughts are the same as of the three forms of right resolve (sammsakappa), the second factor of the noble eightfold path. 27 At SN IV.339, it is said that attachment, hatred or delusion lead to willing (ceteti) for the affliction of oneself, others or both. 28 That is, he attained a jhna, especially the second of these, in which
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Here the emphasis is on mental action that does not lead to afflicting oneself or others (presumably through harmful verbal or physical actions) and which does not make the mind incline away from wisdom or nibbna. That is, the concern with future results is not in regard to karmically induced pleasures or pains, but on the character trait of wisdom that enables one to go beyond any karmically shaped state. This links with action that is neither dark nor bright, and clearly relates to the right resolve factor of the Eightfold Path, itself counted as part of wisdom (MN I.301). The suspension of thought by meditative concentration, even wholesome thought, indicates the more subtle aspects of wholesome/skilful states. The causal sequence thus becomes:
unwise attention unwholesome roots unwholesome actions, of unwholesome volition, that are intentional, dark, corrupt, with fault, bring pain and injury to oneself or to others in a way that is anticipated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation, criticized by the wise, not to be done dark harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent, and unwholesome character tendencies, obscuring wisdom and moving one away from nibbna.
Further reflections on the terms kusala and akusala

Having surveyed what the suttas have to say on these terms and related ones, what do the commentaries say? The Atthaslin (Asl 3839; cf. Cousins 1996: 141142) gives this explanation of the phrase kusala states (kusal dhamm) at the start of the Dhammasaga:
The word kusala means healthy (rogya), faultless (anavajja), skilled (-cheka), ripening in happiness (sukhavipkesu). In such passages as, Is your reverence well (kusala)? Is your reverence free from ailment? etc., kusala means healthy. In such passages as, Venerable sir, what bodily behaviour is kusala? Great king, it is bodily behavvitakka and vicra, related to thinking and pondering, are absent.
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iour that is faultless (anavajjo) (Bhitika Sutta, above); and again in, Venerable sir, the Blessed Ones way of teaching Dhamma in regard to kusala states is unsurpassed (DN III.102), kusala means faultless. In such passages as, You are kusala at the different parts of a chariot (MN II.94); Graceful women who have been trained are kusala in singing and dancing (Jat VI.25) etc., kusala means skilled. In such passages as, Monks, it is by the building up of kusala states (that this pua increases) (DN III.58), and from being accumulated (upacitatt) from the doing of kusala actions, kusala means ripening in happiness. Now here, in the phrase kusala states, either healthy or faultless or ripening in happiness is applicable. But in regard to word-definitions: kusalas are so called as they cause contemptible evil things (kucchite ppadhamme) to tremble (salayanti), to shake, to be disturbed, to be destroyed
Asl 6263, on a kusala state of mind (citta) that is connected with knowledge, says:
Kusala: kusala in the sense of destroying contemptible states (kucchitna salandhi); or in the sense of healthy (rogyahena), or in the sense of being faultless (anavajjahena), or in the sense of produced by skill (kosallasambhtahena). To illustrate: in How are you? Are you kusala sir?, kusala is used to mean healthy, i.e. not being ill or sick or unwell in body. So in mental states it should be understood in the sense of healthy, i.e. absence of sickness, illness or disease in the form of the defilements (kilesa). Moreover, from the absence of the fault of the defilements (kilesavaj ja-), blemish (dosassa) of the defilements, torment (darathassa) of the defilements, kusala has the sense of faultless. Wisdom (pa) is called skill (kosalla). Kusala has the sense of produced by skill from being produced by skill.
At DN-a 883 (on DN III.102), Buddhaghosa explains the meaning healthy as that used in the Jtaka method of exposition, faultless as that used in the Suttanta method of exposition, and meanings used in the Abhidhamma method as being: produced by skill, freedom from distress (niddharatha) and ripening in happiness. Cousins (1996: 139140) comments that freedom from distress is otherwise neglected, and says on ripening in happiness,
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the commentators do not in fact often explain the word kusala as having this sense. He also points out that the k on this passage explains produced by skill as caused by appropriate bringing to mind (yonisomanasikrahetuka), i.e. by what is referred to above as wise attention. Cousins (1996: 149) comments that this last meaning is not found only in the Abhidhamma, but it is intended to suggest that this is in some way a higher or more profound explanation of kusala, or at least one which is more strictly correct. Here, then, something that is kusala:
a) is morally/spiritually healthy in being unaffected by defilements, i.e. by greed, hatred or delusion. b) is faultless in being free of defilements. c) destroys contemptible states. d) in the case of kusala states connected to knowledge, and perhaps less directly in other cases, is produced by skill, by wisdom. e) more generally, it ripens in happiness.
a)c) support the translation wholesome, d) and the non-delusion-affected aspect of a) support skilful, and e) supports something like beneficial. Cousins (1996) traces the meaning of kusala/kuala in pre-Buddhist and Buddhist sources and summarises thus:
1. An original meaning [applied to a person] of intelligent wise; 2. Expert in magical and sacrificial ritual (in the [pre-Buddhist] Brhmaas); for brahmins, of course, this would precisely constitute wisdom. 3. a) Skilled in meditational/mystic (/ascetic?) practices (in the early Pli sources and, no doubt, in other contemporary traditions), including skilled in the kind of behaviour which supported meditation, etc., i.e. la [keeping moral precepts], etc. b) Skilled in performing dna [giving] and yaa [sacrifice], now interpreted in terms of central Buddhist ethical concerns; and associated with keeping the precepts and so on. 4. Kusala in later Buddhist and Jain sources becomes generalized to refer to something like wholesome or good states. So there is no reason to doubt that by a later period (i.e. in the commentaries and perhaps later canonical sources) kusala in non-techni-
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cal contexts means something which could be translated as good (Cousins 1996: 156).
This emphasises skilful as the earlier meaning, but it is by no means clear from the above survey that, in the suttas, there is stronger evidence for this than wholesome moreover, this latter meaning cannot simply be equated with good, as Cousins implies, as this English term has a rather wide meaning, as Keown argues, though in support of this as the translation for kusala (1992: 119120). Nevertheless, skilful is certainly part of the meaning of the term in the Sutta passages examined here.
Kusala and sla, samdhi, pa

It is notable that both the English term morality and the Pli word sla concern only physical and verbal action: sla is explained as the right speech, right action and right livelihood aspects of the Noble Eightfold Path (MN I.301). All aspects of the path are kusa la, though, so this term covers more than sla or moral conduct: it also covers aspects of the path pertaining to samdhi and wisdom (Cousins 1996: 144146). Accordingly: the first jhna is typically said to be detached from akusala states (DN I.73); the four jhnas and other meditative states are referred to as kusala dhammas (Vin I.104 and Vin III.91); the kusala dhammas that the Buddha teaches about are the seven sets later known as the 37 bodhipakkhiya dhammas (DN III.102); and the four right efforts, which pertain to the samdhi aspect of the path concern the ending of akusala dhammas and development of kusala ones (DN II.312). Moreover, the first two of the three forms of right mental action, non-covetousness and non-ill-will, also pertain to mind training, and the third, right view as either right belief on karma and rebirth etc or noble wisdom (MN III.7172, below) pertains to wisdom. Sla is only part of the path, but the foundation of it all:
So you see, nanda, wholesome virtues (kusalni slni) have freedom from remorse as object and profit; freedom from remorse has gladness; gladness has joy; joy has tranquillity; tranquillity has happiness; happiness has concentration; concentration has seeing things as they really are; seeing things as they really are has turning away
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and non-attachment; turning away and non-attachment have release by knowing and seeing as their object and profit. So you see, nanda, wholesome virtues lead gradually up to the summit (AN V.2).
Sla restrains overt unwholesome actions: those of body and speech (though the mindfulness needed for the more detailed monastic sla also involves mind-training too). Samdhi counteracts mental unwholesome actions that are expressions of greed/attachment and hatred/ill-will, as well as cultivating their opposites, and pa digs out the deep roots of greed and hatred and of delusion/ignorance and related wrong view.
Pua, apua and ppa

Actions of dna, sla and bhvan (meditative cultivation) are also bases for effecting pua (puakiriyavatthu; DN III.218; AN IV.214; It 51) and unwholesome actions are often described as apua. As an adjective, Cousins sees pua as the fortunebringing or auspicious quality of an action (1996: 153), while as a noun it is applied either to an act which brings good fortune or to the happy result in the future of such an act (1996: 155). Thus we see:
Monks, do not be afraid of puas; this, monks, is a designation for happiness, for what is pleasant, charming, dear and delightful, that is to say, puas. I myself know that the ripening of puas done for a long time are experienced for a long time as pleasant, charming, dear and delightful. After developing a heart of loving kindness for seven years, for seven eons of evolution and devolution, I did not come back to this world ... (being reborn in a delightful heaven for that time; It 1415, cf. AN IV.8889).
As an adjective, pua can be seen as auspicious, bringing good fortune, hence karmically fruitful. As a noun it refers to the auspicious, uplifting, purifying power of good actions to produce future happy results, or sometimes to such results themselves. The opposite of pua is apua, which one can see as meaning (an act of) karmic unfruitfulness or karmically unfruitful, i.e. producing no pleasant fruits, but only bitter ones.
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A synonym for apua is ppa, which is often given with pu a as its opposite (e.g. Sn 636). Ppa is often translated as evil, but really means that which is infertile (SN IV.315), barren, harmful (Cousins 1996: 156) or ill-fortuned (Cousins 1996: 148). A good way of rendering these meanings would be to see ppa as an adjective as meaning (karmically) deadening, and as a noun as (karmic) deadness, meaning that what is so described has a deadening effect on the psyche, making it more constricted and lifeless, rather than having an uplifting, fruitful effect. The term ppa is fairly frequently used with akusala. AN I.201205, above, talks of being overpowered by ppa, unwholesome states born of greed and SN V.417 says do not think ppaka, unwholesome thoughts (vitakke); that is sensual thought, thought of ill-will, thought of harming. To have done the kusala is to have not done what is ppa (Vin III.72). The foolish person (bla) who has done misdeeds, whose past ppa deeds envelop him, thinks:
I have not done what is good (kalya),29 I have not done what is wholesome, I have not made myself a shelter from anguish (bhruttaa). I have done what is ppa, I have done what is cruel (ludda), I have done what is wicked (kibbisa)
Thus he contemplates the bad rebirth he is heading for (MN III.165; cf. AN II.174). Dhp 116 says:
Make haste in doing good (kalyne); check your mind from ppa; For the mind of one who is slow in doing the karmically fruitful (pua) delights in ppa.30
Cone sees kalya as meaning what is good, excellent; virtuous action (Cone 2001: 665). At AN II.222223, ppa is to do the ten bad deeds starting with killing. Kalya is to refrain from these. Or these are respectively wrong view to wrong liberation, and right view to right liberation. 30 Note that, just at the English terms evil or bad can refer both to immoral actions and bad things that happen to one, and pua can refer to both bad actions and their fruits, ppa can refer to both actions and things that happen to one: Even a ppa person sees good fortune (bhadra) as long as the ppa does not ripen (paccati); but when ppa ripens, then the ppa person sees ppas (Dhp 119).
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Clearly, the referent of the term pua overlaps to a considerable extent with that of kusala, but it emphasises the aspect of a good action that is its power to bring future happy karmic results. Cousins comments that in Buddhist canonical texts, pua occurs much less frequently than kusala (1996: 154) and suggests that it was almost certainly not a technical term in the thought of the Buddha and his early disciples. It was no doubt a part of the background of beliefs current at the time (p. 155). One can say that in terms of the causal sequence described in this paper, doing an action with an orientation towards its being pua a pua-centric action emphasises its future karmic results: the happiness that the action will in time engender in one. Typically, in the suttas, such action is associated with giving and other aspects of lay religiosity (Cousins 1996: 154). Doing an action with an orientation to its being kusala a kusala-centric action focuses more on the nature of the action itself, and its roots, and its ongoing effect on character, perhaps with wisdom and nibbna in mind. Ironically, though, the greater the concern with pua, the lesser the degree of the good result. It is said that, the mental aspiration of a moral person (slavato) is effective through its purity (suddhatt) (DN III.259), in terms of the rebirth aspired to in giving a gift, but for such an aspiration to truly work, it should not be itself the sole motive of the giving. If a person gives something to a monk with longing (spekkho), with the heart bound (to the gift; paibaddha-citto), intent on a store (of karmic fruitfulness; sannidhipekho), thinking Ill enjoy this after death (ima pecca paribujissmi ti), it is said that he will be reborn for a while in the lowest of all the heavens. A series of what seem to be meant as progressively higher motives is then outlined: giving because one feels it is auspicious (shu) to give!; wishing to continue a family tradition of giving; wishing to support those who do not cook for themselves; because great sages of the past were supported by alms; because giving leads to mental calm, joy and gladness; or because giving enriches the heart and equips it for meditation (AN IV.6063). Giving from the last of these motives is then said to lead to rebirth in the first heaven of the realm of (elemental) form, where the brahms dwell. Thus doing a good action simply because it is seen to have pleasant results is not the highest of motives it is
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better to value goodness in itself, and the peace and wisdom that it facilitates. Accordingly, Buddhaghosa says on sla:
That undertaken just out of desire (-kmatya) for fame is inferior; that undertaken just out of desire for the fruits of karmically fruitful actions (puaphala-) is medium; that undertaken for the sake of the noble state thus, This is to be done is superior (Vism 13).
with all three involving forms of chanda, or desire-to-do. Any akusala action will also be apua, and vice versa. Any pua action will also be a kusala one, i.e. be harmless, and contribute to skilful, wholesome, faultless states. Even to give from desire for the future karmic benefit of this is kusala to a degree desire is not necessarily akusala, as is shown by the fact that chanda can be a kusala state, it being the basis of one of the four bases of spiritual success, the iddhipadas (e.g. DN II.213214). A person may initially focus on generating pua, perhaps by acts of dna, only to contribute to his or her future worldly happiness, but then also to help give a supporting basis for the path to nibbna. That said, there remains a question of whether all kusala actions are also pua ones. The three aspects of the nidna of sakhras are puabhisakhras, apuabhisakhras and nejabhisakhras (DN III.217). The last of these are actions leading to the formless realms (in meditation or rebirth) (Vibh 135), and while such actions will involve kusala states of mind, they lead to a state in which there is only neutral feeling, not happiness: hence they are differentiated from the first, pua, ones. In relation to the noble path, moreover, the actions which are neither dark nor bright will still be kusala, but not pua, as they pertain to going beyond rebirths, and any happiness they may contain. Indeed we see that the Mahcattrsaka Sutta (MN III.7172) differentiates between two kinds of right view:
[T]here is right view that is affected by taints (ssav), partaking of pua (pubhgiy) ripening on the side of attachment (upadhivepakk), and there is right view that is noble, taintless, transcendent, a factor of the path (ariy ansav lokuttara maggag).
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The first kind of right view is to believe in karma and rebirth, and that some renunciants and brahmins know of these directly, whereas the second is:
the wisdom (pa), the faculty of wisdom, the power of wisdom, the investigation-of-states awakening factor, the path factor of right view in one whose mind is noble, whose mind is taintless, who is possessed of the noble path and is developing the noble path
By the time a person has attained stream-entry, and so is destined for arahantship within seven lives at most (AN V.120) their sla is perfected (AN I.231232), though they do not cling to their sla (aparmahehi, SN V.343344) as the whole of the path. Moreover, while their emphasis is no longer on the pua aspect of good actions, their actions still generate much pua as a side-effect of their quest for nibbna: the four factors of streamentry (SN V.343) are also called streams of pua (pubhisand), streams of the wholesome (kusalbhisan), nutriments of happiness (SN V.391), they cannot have any sub-human rebirths, and their future lives may include millions of years in a heavenly realm. The arahant goes wholly beyond pua (Sn 636; Harvey 2000: 4346), as he or she will have no future rebirths. Those who do kusala/pua actions out of concern for the future karmic fruits (though still with regard to not afflicting others) may not be directly aiming for nibbna, but their actions still help to prepare the ground for later efforts to attain this goal. It is in this sense that Velez de Cea (2004: 129) calls them instrumental actions in that they are actions leading to favourable conditions for cultivating nirvanic virtues, in contrast to teleological actions which are actually displaying nirvanic virtues or virtues characteristic of the Buddhist ideal of sainthood, whether or not a person doing such action is consciously aiming for nibbna. Adam (2005: 74) uses similar language but in a different way, saying that actions aimed at nibbna, as they still generate pua as a side-effect, while teleologically nirvic, are also instrumentally karmatic. On the other hand, actions that are focussed on generating good karmic results are teleologically karmic and, as a side-effect, instrumentally nirvic. That said, it is perhaps clearer to here
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replace instrumentally by indirectly and teleologically by directly:

directly nirvic actions directly display virtues that are most fully embodied in the kind of person who has fully experienced nibbna, the arahant, and directly contribute to attaining arahantship whether or not this is the conscious aim of such actions. These are also indirectly karmatic as they have the side-effect of producing good karmic fruits except in the case of the arahant, that is, as he or she generates no more karmic fruits, though inspires others to act in ways that generate good karmic fruits. directly karmatic actions consciously aim at good karmic results, and are indirectly nirvic as they have the side-effect of helping to prepare the ground for directly nirvic actions.
Comparison to Western ethical theories

If we survey the above factors related to an unwholesome/unskilful (akusala) actions, which actions are also misfortune-bringing (apua, ppa) ones, we have:
1. unwise attention, feeding 2. attachment/greed/covetousness, hatred/ill-will, and delusion/ignorance, which are both the unwholesome and are roots that that sustain 3. the unwholesome: specified unwholesome actions of body, speech or mind 4. that are of unwholesome volition, and intentional, 5. that are dark, corrupt, with fault/blameable (by the wise), as they 6. bring pain and injury to oneself or to others 7. in a way that is anticipated by correct perception of the immediate facts of the situation, 8. such that one should not inflict on another what one would not like inflicted on oneself 9. and are criticized by the wise, 10. not to be done 11. and that, as a karmic result, bring dark harm and pain in this and later lives to the agent, as well as 12. unwholesome character tendencies,
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13. obscuring wisdom and moving one away from nibbna.
Wholesome actions have the opposite qualities. Of these factors:

realist ethics focuses simply on the body and speech aspects of 3. utilitarianism focuses on 6, perhaps 7, and the body and speech aspects of 3. Kantian ethics, with its emphasis on the good will, universalisability, and duty, focuses on 4, 8, 10, 3, and perhaps 5. Aristotelian virtue ethics focuses on 12, an analogy to 13, 2 and perhaps 3. A further virtue aspect of Buddhist ethics is that in seeking to do acts rooted in non-greed, non-hatred and non-delusion, one is cultivating virtues that have a strong affinity with the destruction of greed/attachment, hatred and delusion that is the goal of the Buddhist path.
None of these particularly focuses on 1, 9, 11, or the nibbna aspect of 13, all of which except 11 connect to wisdom and skilfulness. Buddhist ethics encompasses all these aspects. A beginner may focus on 11, the particularly pua aspects, but more serious practitioners focus on the rest, especially 1 and 13. Of course with a number of factors being involved, one may ask whether they can conflict, necessitating a choice of one or more factors over others. For example, can an injurious action (6) originate in a well intentioned action of wholesome volition (the opposite of 4)? I would say that, taking into account aspect 7, a genuinely wholesome volition may result in harm to others or oneself if it is based on incorrect factual information or incorrect perception of the situation. Nevertheless, when insufficient care has been taken to ascertain the facts of the situation, this may bring in culpable carelessness, so as to make the action unwholesome to some extent. There may, though, be cases where the agent of a harmful action thinks of the action as wholesome and beneficial, but where delusion, also leading to wrong view, is one of the actions roots, rendering it unwholesome. For example, Hitler may have genuinely thought his actions were right. One might also think that a beneficial result can come from an action of unwholesome volition, for example when a starving person is fed by killing and cooking an animal for him. But here, both benefit and harm are actually the result, and the full
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action involves both wholesome (to feed a hungry person) and unwholesome (to kill) volitions. How a person deals with potential conflicts of moral criteria may depend on where they are on the path, for example a lie (cf. 3) may help prevent harm to another (6), but strengthen an unwholesome tendency (12) and even have some minor bad karmic results (11); yet with wise attention (1), one may see a way to both avoid lying, and preventing harm to the person. Of course the Mahyna is more open to skilful means precept breaking, out of compassion. Moreover, potential conflict between certain factors may be skilfully dealt with by bringing in another factor, for example someones wish to ordain, or an act of great generosity, may bring suffering to some relatives (cf. 6), but help generate good character traits (12) and facilitate a movement towards nibbna (13); moreover the harm may be counteracted by sharing pua with the relative (cf. 11), and the strengthened good character traits, perhaps including wisdom, will also bring benefit to others in the future. While Keown (1992) has argued that a virtue ethic model is the best fit for early Buddhist ethic, this study shows that while there is a virtue-ethics dimension to such ethics, a utilitarian concern for directly caused suffering and happiness, and a Kantian concern for a good will, are also present. There are also plenty of specific ethical rules, which accords with a kind of realist ethics. These aspects are integrated into one system, and as Velez de Cea says, Early Buddhist ethics is sui generis, that is, one of a kind (2004: 138). The key content of akusala actions are specified actions that directly (actions of body and speech) or indirectly (mental actions) bring pain and affliction to others, oneself, or both, and the greed/attachment, hatred and delusion that are the motivating or orientating roots of these. Kusala states are actions which avoid these actions and roots, and are the opposite of them; moreover, they include the meditative states involved in the development of the Eightfold Path, which go further than, but still depend on, ethics per se. Kusala states come from wise skill and contribute to wise skill, and are both morally and spiritually wholesome: morally faultless, nourishing further wholesome states, healthily without greed, hatred or
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delusion, and contributing to the end of these. They bring no harm to anyone, and lead to happiness for the agent of them.
Literature Primary sources

The above translations are the authors own, though they are generally close to those listed below.
AN Asl Dhs Dhp DN DN-a It Jat MN SN Sn Vin Vibh Vism Aguttara-Nikya: 1961, eds. R. Morris and A.K. Warder; 1888, ed. R. Morris; 1897, 1899, 1900, ed. E. Hardy. Atthaslin: 1897, ed. E. Mller. Dhammasaga: 1885, ed. E. Mller. Dhammapada: 1994, eds O. von Hinber and K.R.Norman. Dgha-Nikya: 1890, 1903, ed. T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter; 1911, ed. J.E. Carpenter. Dgha-Nikya-Ahakath = Sumagalavilsin: 1929, eds T.W. Rhys Davids and J.E. Carpenter; 1931, 1932, ed. W. Stede. Itivuttaka: 1889, ed. E. Windisch. Jtaka with Commentary: 187796, ed. E. Fausboll. Majjhima-Nikya: 1888, ed. V. Treckner; 1898, 1899, ed. R. Chalmers. Sayutta-Nikya: 18841898, ed. M.L. Freer. Suttanipta: 1913, eds D. Andersen and H. Smith. Vinaya Piaka: 18791883, ed. H. Oldenberg. Vibhaga: 1904, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids. Visuddhimagga: 1920, 1921, ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids.
Secondary sources
Adam, M. T., 2005, Groundwork for a Metaphysic of Buddhist Morals: a New Analysis of pua and kusala, in the Light of sukka, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 12: 6285; http://www.buddhistethics.org/12/adamarticle.pdf. Last visited 06-07-2011. Anlayo, 2007, What the Buddha Would Not Do, According to the Bhitikasutta and its Madhyama-gama Parallel, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 14: 153179; http://www.buddhistethics.org/14/anaalayo-article.pdf. Last visited 06-07-2011.
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Cone, M., 2001, A Dictionary of Pli, Part I, akh, Oxford, The Pali Text Society. Cousins, L. S., 1996, Good or Skilful? Kusala in Canon and Commentary, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 3: 136164; http://www.buddhistethics. org/3/cousins1.pdf. Harvey, P., 1999, Vinaya Principles for Assigning Degrees of Culpability, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 6: 271291; http://jbe.gold.ac.uk/6/harvey991.pdf. Last visited 06-07-2011. Harvey, P., 2000, An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Issues, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Harvey, P., 2011, The Nature of the Eight-factored Ariya, Lokuttara Magga in the Suttas Compared to the Pali Commentarial Idea of it as Momentary, Religions of South Asia, Vol. 5 forthcoming. Keown, D., 1992, The Nature of Buddhist Ethics, London, Macmillan. Velez de Cea, A., 2004, The Criteria of Goodness in the Pli Nikyas and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, Vol. 11: 123142; http://www.buddhistethics.org/11/vele0401.pdf. Last visited 06-07-2011.
Value pluralism in early Buddhist ethics

Abraham Vlez de Cea
Introduction
Following Susan Wolf, I understand ethical pluralism as the view that there is an irreducible plurality of values or principles that are relevant to moral judgment.1 Wolf distinguishes between two types of ethical pluralism: evaluative and deontic. Evaluative pluralism is concerned with the nature and the lexical order of values or goods. Deontic pluralism on the other hand, discusses principles, not in the sense of specific precepts but rather in the sense of decision procedures and criteria to determine the rightness of actions. I have argued elsewhere that early Buddhist ethics proposes several criteria to determine the rightness of actions.2 In the present essay, I focus on the specific type of value pluralism represented in early Buddhist ethics. The distinction between evaluative and deontic pluralism is important because one can be a pluralist in terms of values and a monist in terms of principles. For instance, contemporary consequentialists tend to be pluralists in terms of values but monists in terms of principles. That is, they accept diverse kinds
Wolf 1992: 785. Vlez de Cea 2004a. I claim that the Pli Nikyas contain several criteria to determine the rightness of actions. I use the term goodness instead of rightness to challenge narrow understandings of the realm of the good in Buddhist ethics. Specifically, I question the abhidharmic tendency to reduce the moral fruitfulness of actions to the wholesomeness of the agents motivation, that is, the tendency to conflate the rightness of actions with the goodness of the agents motivation. In other words, I question interpretations of early Buddhist ethics as agent-based forms of virtue ethics. Instead, I view early Buddhism as presupposing a pluralistic approach to virtue ethics.
2 1
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of goods but the rightness of actions depends exclusively on the net amount of value that an action, rule, or virtue promotes. In the first section of this essay I discuss the principal values that can be inferred from moral exhortations and what early Buddhists considered spiritual and non-spiritual benefits. In the second section, I clarify the nature of early Buddhist values. In order to accomplish this goal, I challenge the application to the Pli Nikyas of diverse categories common in current western ethical discourse. As an alternative, I distinguish between ultimate and penultimate values, and speak about their enabling, favoring and intensifying functions. In the third and final section, I compare the lexical order of values in early Buddhism to Damien Keowns (1995) list of three basic Buddhist goods.
1. Deriving values from exhortations and claims regarding spiritual and other benefits
In this article, I do not deduce early Buddhist values from our natural inclinations or from what make humans good and healthy specimens of their kind. Likewise, I do not derive early Buddhist values from a priori accounts of what constitutes human fulfillment or the highest function of humans. Rather, I infer early Buddhist values from the most common moral exhortations found in the Pli Nikyas, and from what these texts consider beneficial, whether spiritually or non-spiritually. The non-spiritual benefits to which the Pli Nikyas refer reflect the actual values of early Buddhists. These non-spiritual benefits are clearly presented as inferior to spiritual ones. Nonetheless, they are nevertheless presented as valuable and worthy of pursuit. From the early Buddhist perspective, these benefits usually derive from ethical and spiritual practices, but this is not necessarily the case (SN IV.230; AN V.10). Even if it were the case that non-spiritual benefits, such as prosperity, repute, social influence and status, were always the consequence of ethical and spiritual development, this would not render non-spiritual benefits valueless.
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Some scholars of Buddhist ethics tend to reduce the value of non-spiritual benefits to the value of spiritual benefits.3 However, interpreting the value of non-spiritual benefits as mere consequences of spiritual values makes the Pli Nikyas too spiritual. Besides, this romanticized too spiritual interpretation of early Buddhist axiology renders early Buddhism unnecessarily inconsistent with the actual practice of many traditional Buddhists today. Instead of contrasting an ideal abhidharmic Buddhist ethics and a somehow degenerated Buddhist ethics in practice, I interpret the Pli Nikyas and early Buddhism as legitimizing from the beginning diverse types of ethical practice, not always motivated by pure and ideal spiritual concerns. Moral exhortations usually appear in the form of precepts, but sometimes they appear as part of simple prudential advice. Here however, I understand the term moral in a broad sense as including not only ethical precepts but also social and spiritual recommendations, which, from a traditional Buddhist perspective, belong to the ethical realm. Precepts point to morally significant items that require from us diverse kinds of response: protection, cultivation, respect, love. Not only positive action, but failure to respond adequately to these items, constitutes doing something that is ethically relevant, or using Buddhist terminology, performing an act that is karmically fruitful or unfruitful, wholesome or unwholesome. Thus, precepts indicate the existence of items and actions that are worthy, valuable, good. As Damien Keown states: precepts gesture beyond themselves in the direction of certain values which it is their function to preserve. Their formulation as negative recommendations flashes an alert that anyone contemplating such actions as killing or stealing is threatening an assault on certain values or goods.4 The Pli Nikyas contain many sets of moral exhortations. Here, I limit myself to discussing the lists of five and ten precepts, the ten
3 See for instance Damien Keowns account of early Buddhist ethics, where non-spiritual benefits of actions are reduced to non-moral secondary consequences entrained by moral acts (2001: 128). 4 Keown 1995: 41.
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wholesome actions, and the three sections on ethical conduct (la) of the Brahmajla Suttanta. The following analysis is not intended to provide a comprehensive list of early Buddhist values, just a sense of their nature. The five precepts are, as Richard Gombrich states, the most obvious principles through which Buddhist values may be examined.5 Even though the Pli Nikyas do not correlate the five precepts with values and virtues, it seems possible to correlate the first precept abstaining from taking life to the value of life and virtues such as friendliness or loving-kindness and compassion. Similarly, the second precept abstaining from taking what is not given can be related to the values of property and social justice. These values can be protected by virtues such as non-greed, generosity, and honesty. The third precept abstaining from sensual misconduct can be connected to the values of self-control, moderation, and fulfilling role-dependent duties: celibacy in the case of monks and nuns, and faithfulness in the case of lay people. These values can be guarded by several virtues including temperance, contentment, and non-greed. The fourth precept abstaining from telling lies expresses what Peter Harvey calls the value of seeking truth and seeing things as they are,6 which can be cultivated through virtues such as wisdom, mindfulness, and investigation of things (dham mavicaya). The fifth precept abstaining from taking intoxicants reflects the Buddhist concern for mental health, as well as for the value of seeking truth and seeing things as they are. Mindfulness, which in this context includes sobriety, is a fundamental Buddhist virtue because it protects not only the values of mental health and seeing things as they are, but also the values associated with the other precepts. That is, mindfulness is a key Buddhist virtue because it prevents reckless moral conduct and the breaking of precepts in general. The list of ten precepts includes the first five precepts plus five extra precepts. Today, these precepts are usually observed by novices, and nuns who are denied full ordination. On special occasions
5 6
Gombrich 1992: 98. Harvey 2000: 75.
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such as full moon days, lay people may decide to observe some or all of these extra precepts. The sixth precept abstaining from eating at the wrong time like the third precept, seems to be intended to preserve the values of self-control and moderation, which relate to the virtues of temperance and contentment. The seventh precept abstaining from dancing, singing, music, and watching shows is difficult to understand outside its original cultural context. The seventh precept is not so much about dancing, singing, music, and watching shows per se, but rather about the ambiance that may have surrounded such activities in ancient India, an ambience that can still be experienced in rural South Asia. Thus, I prefer to interpret the seventh precept as expressing the value of circumspection, which relate to the virtues of mindfulness and prudence in the sense of ability to avoid situations that may endanger moral conduct. Similarly, the eighth precept abstaining from garlands, perfumes, cosmetics, and adornments does not target concern for beauty as such, or concern for looking good, smelling good, and being clean or elegant. Rather, the precept seems to be intended to undermine attitudes that go against the values of simplicity and humility, for instance, lack of modesty and vanity. Likewise, the ninth precept abstaining from using high seats or beds appears to be intended to preserve the values of simplicity and humility, thus, opposing extravagance and vanity. Finally, the tenth precept abstaining from accepting gold or silver applies to monks and nuns, and protects the value of right livelihood, renunciation and simplicity through virtues such as contentment and detachment from material possessions. The first four of the ten wholesome actions overlap with the first four precepts. The fifth wholesome action abstaining from divisive speech and the sixth abstaining from harsh speech seem to relate to social values such as friendship, peace and harmony. These social values can be protected by virtues such as lovingkindness, truthfulness, compassion, non-violence, and even calmness and patience. The seventh wholesome action abstaining from frivolous speech or idle chatter demonstrates the Buddhist concern for what is practical in the sense of being directly related to ethical and spiritual development. This focus on what is practical can be related to many virtues, primarily wisdom and diligence.
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The eighth wholesome action abstaining from covetous thoughts expresses the values of mental health, simplicity, selfcontrol and moderation, undermining negative mental states such as envy, avarice, greed. The ninth wholesome action abstaining from ill-will connects to the value of mental health, peace, and harmony, protected through virtues such as loving-kindness and compassion. Finally, the tenth wholesome action abstaining from wrong views concerns the values of mental health, seeking truth and seeing things as they are, which can be preserved by the virtues of mindfulness, investigation of things, and wisdom. The moral exhortations that appear in the three sections on ethical conduct of the Brahmajla Suttanta overlap to a great extent with the aforementioned sets of precepts. Here I will discuss briefly the exhortations that differ from those already discussed. For instance, respect for seeds and plants shows concern for the values of life and the environment. Several virtues including love, compassion, and wisdom may help to guard these values. Abstaining from accepting uncooked grain, raw meat, slaves, animals, and fields, like the former precept, applies to monks and nuns, and relate to the values of right livelihood and fulfilling role-dependent duties, both preserved by the virtue of renunciation. Similarly, abstaining from certain activities such as running messages, buying and selling, dealing with false weights, bribery, cheating, predicting the future by different methods, and reciting charms and incantations to benefit or harm others, embodies the value of right livelihood, though in this case it is less clear that the precept is intended exclusively for monks and nuns. Trading with false weights, bribery, and cheating are also prohibited for lay people. Although many early Buddhist values are linked to moral exhortations and precepts, not all of them are. The second strategy to infer early Buddhist values is to analyze what the Pli Nikyas considered benefits, that is something worthy, valuable or good. The number of texts that could be used to infer values from spiritual and non-spiritual benefits is endless. Here, I provide just a few representative examples. Among the texts that connect non-spiritual benefits and virtuous conduct, I will here focus on two: AN IV.197 and DN III.180193.
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In AN IV.197, the Buddha tells queen Mallik that material benefits such as wealth, influence, and beauty result from not displaying anger, hatred, resentment, generosity to holy people, and from not being envious of others achievements, honor, and respect. In the Siglaka Suttanta (DN III.180193), the Buddha explains the dangers of taking intoxicants, haunting the streets at night, attending fairs, gambling, keeping bad company, and idleness. By avoiding this type of conduct, one avoids many negative consequences and achieves many positive ones. Specifically, by not taking intoxicant one avoids present waste of money, increased quarreling, liability to sickness, loss of good name, indecent exposure of ones person, and weakening of the intellect (DN III.182183). From these diverse benefits, we may infer values such as prosperity, peace, health, beauty, repute, and mental health. The Siglaka Suttanta is also useful in that it allows us to identify social values such as friendship, respect for status, and fulfillment of role-dependent duties, i.e. fulfillment of the duties of parents toward children, teachers toward students, husbands toward wives, friends toward friends, employers toward employees, holy people toward followers, and vice versa. Among the texts that connect virtuous conduct to both spiritual and non-spiritual benefits, I discuss two: MN III.202206 and MN I.32ff.. In MN III.202206, the Buddha explains that killing leads to a bad rebirth, or in case a killer is born as a human being, to a short-life. Conversely, abstaining from killing leads to a happy rebirth, or if born as a human being, to a long life. Injuring beings leads to an unhappy rebirth or if one is reborn as human, to being sick frequently. Conversely, respecting life leads to a good rebirth, or to a healthy life if one is born as human. Being angry and irritable, displaying hate and bitterness makes one ugly; doing the opposite makes one beautiful. Envy of others achievements and honors leads to being powerless, doing the opposite makes one influential. Being stingy with holy people leads to poverty and giving to wealth. Obstinance and arrogance and failure to respect those worthy of respect leads to a low-birth; the opposite leads to being high-born. Finally, failure to ask wise and holy people about what is wholesome and unwhole-
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some, about what someone should and should not cultivate, and about the actions conducive to harm and suffering, versus welfare and happiness, leads to stupidity in a next life; the opposite leads to wisdom. The foundation of the lists of benefits found in MN III.202206, appears to be a hierarchy of values: first, biological values such as life and health; second, worldly values such as beauty, influence, prosperity, and social status; third, spiritual values such as wisdom and discernment. This hierarchy of values, demonstrates that spiritual values such as wisdom and discernment are superior to non-spiritual values. However, the fact that biological values appear before worldly values does not seem to suggest that life and health are less important than worldly values. Instead, they seem to come first because they are the preconditions of achieving the other values. That is, without life and health, worldly values cannot be enjoyed. The conclusion of MN III.202206 expresses two central values of early Buddhism: self-reliance and personal responsibility: Beings are owners of their actions, student, heirs of their actions; they originate from their actions, are bound to their actions, have their actions as their refuge. It is action that distinguishes beings as inferior and superior.7 A slightly different hierarchy of Buddhist values can be inferred from MN I.32ff. In this text, the Buddha exhorts his monks to practice the precepts, serenity of mind, meditation, and insight in order to achieve diverse benefits. The first set of benefits is being dear to fellow monks and respected by them, which I interpret as expressing the social values of friendship and respect for spiritual status. Although the Buddha is addressing monks in this text, it can be inferred that the values of friendship and respect for spiritual status are relevant not only for monks and nuns, but also for lay practitioners. The second set of benefits is obtaining the four material requirements of monks and nuns: robes, alms, resting place, and medicine.
kammasakk mava, satt kammadyd kammayoni kammabandhu kammapaisara. kamma satte vibhajati yadida hnappatatyti.
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These benefits presuppose concern for basic material values such as clothing, food, shelter, and health care. Although the text refers to the four requirements of monks and nuns, the values underlying the text might be extrapolated to lay practitioners as well. The third set of benefits is spiritual in nature: achieving great consequences and benefit for those who provide the four material requirements, which reflect to the value of giving and the virtue of generosity. Generosity is generally a virtue to be cultivated by lay people. However, as Gregory Schopen has shown, historically, it has been cultivated by many monks as well. Achieving great consequences and benefits for dead kinsmen and relatives who remember the qualities of holy people, reflect the value of faith, both in monastics and lay people. Conquering the emotional ups and downs, fear and dread, demonstrate the value of self-control and a variety of virtues, primarily temperance. Obtaining the pleasant states of the four jhnas and the four immaterial jhnas, here described as the peaceful liberations that transcend form and are immaterial,8 can be related to the value of calm meditation and virtuous mental factors conducive to concentration (samdhi), including bliss and equanimity. The fourth set of benefits, also spiritual in nature, consists in becoming one of the four particular types of persons: a streamenterer (sotpatti), a once-returner (sakadgm), a non-returner (angm), or an enlightened being or arahant. The enlightened being is described as someone who acquires nirvanic knowledge and powers: the divine ear, the ability to know the minds of others, recollect former lives, perceive with the divine eye the passing away and reappearance of beings, and liberation of the mind through wisdom and the destruction of taints. One becomes a stream-enterer by destroying the three lower fetters (identity views, doubt, and attachment to rules and observances); a once-returner by attenuating lust (rga), hate, and delusion; a non-returner by destroying the five lower fetters (the former three plus sensual desire and ill will); and an enlightened being by eradicating the remaining fetters (desire for fine-material existence, desire for inmaterial existence, conceit,
8
sant vimokkh atikkamma rpe rupp.
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restlessness, and ignorance). All these spiritual benefits point to the values of insight meditation and spiritual powers, yet overall to the value of character cultivation, which is protected and developed by many virtuous mental factors. The fact that the development of values culminates in becoming a certain type of person suggests that the development of character traits characteristic of enlightened beings is the supreme early Buddhist value. The fact that social values appear before material values does not seem to show a particular ranking of non-spiritual values. Both social and material values can be interpreted as favorable conditions for the cultivation of spiritual values.
2. The complex nature of early Buddhist values

In order to better understand the nature of early Buddhist values, we need to apply to the Pli Nikyas the proper set of hermeneutical categories. The objective is not to interpret Buddhist values in terms of non-Buddhist concepts but rather to determine what concepts are most helpful to interpret Buddhist values on their own terms. The most common axiological distinction in western philosophical ethics is that between intrinsic and instrumental values. Intrinsic values are those things valued for their own sake, and instrumental values are those valued for the sake of something else. This distinction although not in cognate terminology appears explicitly in the Pli Nikyas. For instance, in SN III.189, the monk Rdha asks for the purpose or goal (attha) of seeing correctly (sammdassana), and the Buddha replies that it is disenchantment (nibbid). Next, Rdha asks for the purpose of disenchantment, and the Buddha responds that it is dispassion (virgo). Rdha asks for the purpose of dispassion, and the Buddha replies that it is liberation (vimutti), which in this context refers to the meditative absorptions called immaterial jhnas. Once again, Rdha asks for the purpose of liberation, and the Buddha replies that it is nibbna (English nirvana). Finally, when Rdha asks for the purpose of nirvana the Buddha replies You have gone beyond the range of questioning, Rdha. You werent able to grasp the limit of your
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questioning. For, Rdha, the holy life is lived with nirvana as its ground, nirvana as its destination, nirvana as its final goal. Thus, the value of seeing things as they are, the value of spiritual renunciation, and the value of calm meditation would be instrumental, whereas nirvana would be the only intrinsic value. Similarly, in MN I.149150 the simile of the seven relay chariots seems to suggest that different types of purification are instrumental in leading gradually toward nirvana. The seven are the purifications of 1) virtue, 2) mind, 3) view, 4) overcoming doubt, 5) knowledge and vision of what is the path and what is not the path, 6) knowledge and vision of the way, and 7) knowledge and vision, which is said to be for the sake of reaching final nirvana (parinibbna) without clinging. However, while these two texts indicate that nirvana is the only thing valued for its own sake, it would be inaccurate to conclude that what is valuable for the sake of nirvana is simply valued as an instrument or means to attain nirvana. That would be simplistic and inconsistent with the Pli Nikyas. Damien Keown has conclusively demonstrated that ethical practice is not only instrumental but also constitutive of nirvana.9 Ethical practice is valuable for the sake of attaining nirvana as well as for its own sake. Furthermore, mental qualities constitutive of nirvana can be both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable. For instance, wisdom and compassion are intrinsically valuable and at the same time instrumentally valuable in the sense that they contribute to the achievement, spread, or implementation of other values. To claim that something can be at the same time both instrumentally and intrinsically valuable is neither problematic nor at odds with practice in contemporary philosophical ethics. For instance, Thomas Hurka acknowledges that something intrinsically good or evil can also have instrumental qualities.10 Similarly, Christine Korsgaard speaks about things that human beings might choose partly for their own sake under the condition of their
9 10
Keown 2001. Hurka 2001: 21.
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instrumentality.11 Nor is this a new development in the West. Plato speaks of the value of justice as desired for its own sake,12 as well as for the sake of something else, namely, for its consequences in this life and the next.13 Similarly, Aristotle speaks of friendship as instrumentally good,14 as well as a good for its own sake whatever other benefits it may yield.15 The Pli Nikyas refer to goods that are both intrinsically and instrumentally valuable. But in order to understand the full diversity of early Buddhist values, we need something more than the dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental values. Christine Korsgaard has expanded the classical distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values, introducing two new distinctions: intrinsic-extrinsic and instrumental-final. The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction concerns the source of a value: intrinsic goods are those that have value in themselves, that is, in virtue of its intrinsic, nonrelational properties; extrinsic goods derive their value from something else, that is, they have value in virtue of its extrinsic, relational properties. The final-instrumental distinction, on the other hand, concerns not to the source of value, but to the reasons for valuing something: final goods are valued for their own sake as ends, whereas instrumental goods are valued for the sake of something else as means.16 (Other philosophers have further challenged the distinction between final and instrumental values, arguing that collapses, and proposing instead a distinction between two types of final values, final intrinsic and final extrinsic values.)17 These conceptual elaborations are philosophically interesting; however, in my view, they are often misleading when applied to early Buddhist values. The final-instrumental distinction faces the same difficulty as the intrinsic-instrumental distinction. From the
11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Korsgaard 1996: 264. Plato. Republic, Books IIIV. Ibid., Book X. Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics, 1099a31b6. Ibid., 1155a2932, 1159a27. Korsgaard 1996: 111. See also Korsgaard 1982. Rnnow-Rasmussen 2002.
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fact that nirvana is valued as the final good, it does not follow that all other goods must be valued as mere instruments or means to attain the values constitutive of nirvana. Moreover, from the fact that something is instrumentally valued by someone, it does not follow that it cannot be at the same time valued for its own sake by someone else. Likewise, something can be final with respect to X but instrumental with respect to Y. For instance, seeing correctly is instrumental with respect to disenchantment, which is a final good with respect to seeing correctly, yet disenchantment is also instrumentally valuable with respect to dispassion. Furthermore, the application of the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values to the Pli Nikyas is not helpful in understanding early Buddhist values in their own terms. Given the non-substantial, relational ontology of early Buddhism, it would be awkward to say that some things are valuable by virtue of their intrinsic, non-relational properties, as if they were inherently valuable independently of everything else. Even the ethical and spiritual dimension of nirvana, that is, the mental qualities that constitute the state of nirvana, are conditioned in the sense of being dependently originated. Therefore, if all values including the ethical-spiritual qualities of nirvana are dependently originated, does not it follow that, at least to some extent, they all get their value from the multiplicity of factors that condition and contribute to their existence? In other words, strictly speaking, the distinction between what possesses value in virtue of intrinsic, non-relational properties versus what possesses value by virtue of extrinsic, relational properties does not apply to early Buddhist values. It might seem that from a less ontological level of discourse, one may apply the distinction intrinsic-extrinsic to the Pli Nikyas. Thus, at a conventional, common sense level of discourse, one may say that if the value of something does not derive from something else, then it has intrinsic value. On the other hand, if the value of something does derive from the value of something else, then it has extrinsic value. Accordingly, all Buddhist values except nirvanic values would be instances of extrinsic values: their value derives from their contribution to the achievement of nirvana. For instance, friendship would not be intrinsically valuable but rather extrinsi-
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cally valuable, because of its relationship to nirvana, that is, because it contributes to the attainment of nirvana. The problem with this application of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is that the Pli Nikyas do not seem to derive the value of non-nirvanic goods exclusively from their relationship or contribution to nirvana. Some early Buddhist goods appear to be valuable independently of nirvana. For instance, life is valuable regardless of its relationship or contribution to nirvana. The precept abstaining from taking life protects the value of life even in the case of non-human animals, which in early Buddhism are understood as incapable of volitional action (kamma), and therefore, as unable to progress toward nirvana. Similarly, the values of respect for spiritual status and fulfilling role-dependent duties do not appear to be dependent on their relationship or contribution to nirvana. I am not saying that these values cannot contribute to the attainment of nirvana. What I am suggesting is that in early Buddhism the values of life, respect for spiritual status, and fulfilling role-dependent duties do not derive only from their conduciveness to or even from other relationships to nirvana. If it is plausible to claim that at least some non-nirvanic values do not derive all their value from their contribution or relationship to nirvana, then they cannot be considered extrinsically valuable alone. In other words, some non-nirvanic values are intrinsically and extrinsically valuable simultaneously. Since some early Buddhist values can be both intrinsically and extrinsically valuable, we cannot apply to early Buddhism the dichotomy intrinsicextrinsic values. Despite their failure to illuminate the domain of Buddhist ethics fully, these distinctions are useful, in that they help us realize that early Buddhist values are complex, at least complex enough to be irreducible to the dichotomies intrinsic-instrumental, final-instrumental, intrinsic-extrinsic. Even though this might be the wrong set of distinctions to apply to the Pli Nikyas, they do suggest a model for approaching this rich axiological terrain. Following their lead, I propose an alternative distinction, that between ultimate and penultimate values.
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Ultimate values are the highest. Strictly speaking, for the Pli Nikyas only nirvana is ultimate, the end or final destination for the sake of which the entire spiritual path is cultivated (SN III.189; MN I.149150). However, here by ultimate value I do not mean nirvana in its broadest sense but specifically the mental qualities and character traits constitutive of nirvana. For the sake of simplicity, I call these qualities and traits nirvanic values. I break the concept of nirvanic values into two umbrella terms, nirvanic knowledge and nirvanic virtues. Another possibility would be to explain nirvanic values in terms of more traditional Buddhist concepts such as mental factors (ceta sika), perfections (pramit), or requisites for enlightenment (bo dhipakkhiya-dhamma). However, I prefer the terms knowledge and virtue to facilitate the understanding of early Buddhist values by non-Buddhists, as well as comparisons of Buddhists and non-Buddhist values. I qualify the terms knowledge and virtue with the adjective nirvanic because not all types of knowledge and not all possible virtues are necessarily constitutive of or conducive to nirvana.18 All values except nirvanic values are penultimate. By penultimate values, I simply mean values not constitutive of nirvana: nonnirvanic pleasures, non-nirvanic knowledge, non-nirvanic virtues, friendship, fulfillment of role-dependent duties, life, health, repute, prosperity, and so on. Given that not all penultimate values are necessarily means toward nirvanic values, and since many intrinsically valuable virtues have also instrumental value, my distinction between ultimate and penultimate values should not be confused with the classical distinction between intrinsic and instrumental values. For instance, health is a penultimate value, and yet it cannot be reduced to a mere means for the attainment of nirvana. Likewise, the virtue of
The distinction between nirvana and nirvanic values might be seen by some as unnecessary. However, I would like to leave open the question of whether nirvana is something more than mental qualities and character traits. In fact, some texts of the Pli Nikyas seem to justify an interpretation of nirvana as more than just ethical and spiritual flourishing, that is, as the unconditioned dhamma, a transcendent base or sphere of reality (yatana).
18
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love can both contribute and constitute many other ends other than Buddhist flourishing. For instance, love contributes and constitutes a good relationship; however, that does not make love a mere instrument for human relationships either. Whereas final values in Korsgaards sense are valued for their own sake, ultimate values can also be valued for the sake of something else. For instance, nirvanic virtues can be valuable also because they contribute to the well-being of other living beings. Similarly, while Korsgaards instrumental values are valuable for the sake of something else, penultimate values do not need to be always valued for the sake of something else. In fact, many penultimate values such as non-nirvanic knowledge and friendship can also be valued for their own sake. Besides understanding early Buddhist values through the concepts of ultimate and penultimate, I propose a critical appropriation of Jonathan Dancys distinction between favoring, enabling, and intensifying conditions.19 Unlike Dancy, I use the distinction to explain the functions performed by values. Values function as enablers if they make other values possible; as favorers if they increase the chances of achieving or implementing other values; and as intensifiers if they improve or supplement the value of other goods, for instance, by making them more attractive or enticing. I interpret the functions of enabling, favoring, and intensifying as cutting across ultimate and penultimate values. That is, the functions of favoring, enabling and intensifying can be performed by both achievements valued ultimately or penultimately. The three functions cannot be confused with a mere instrumental function, that is, the function of being a means to an end. As I said, the dichotomies intrinsic-instrumental and final-instrumental might be
19 Dancy 2004. Despite the fact that Dancys distinction belongs to his theory of reasons, I think it possible to apply them to the realm of values. In fact, Dancy himself admits the possibility of applying his concept of enabling to his theory of value, though not his concept of favoring. By using the terms enabling, favoring, and intensifying to clarify the lexical order of early Buddhist values, one does not have to share the meaning that Dancy gives to such terms, nor endorse his holistic theory of reasons, nor agree with his moral particularism.
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misleading and unhelpful in appreciating the complexity of some Buddhist values. Accordingly, instead of speaking of instrumental function20 or being a means to an end, I prefer to speak more specifically of enabling, favoring, and intensifying functions, which are not the monopoly of either ultimate or penultimate values. When I assign one of these three functions to something we value a trait or an achievement I do not want to insinuate that it is the only function that such value can perform. For instance, mental health primarily performs an enabling function but it can also perform a favoring function. Similarly, spiritual pleasures primarily performs an intensifying function, but it can also perform a favoring function in that it may encourage further spiritual practice. Moreover, such valuable traits as repute and influence primarily perform an intensifying function, but they can also perform a favoring function, facilitating the practice of certain virtues. For instance, the fame and the spiritual influence of a holy person can facilitate the practice of generosity and compassion among her/his disciples.
20 Although the application of the concept of instrumental value to the Pli Nikyas is problematic, I do advocate a distinction between teleological and instrumental actions, which correlates to some extent to the early Buddhist distinction between kusala and pua, and, in a different way, to W.D. Ross distinction between the goodness and the rightness of actions. Whereas teleological actions are necessarily performed with a wholesome motivation, instrumental actions do not necessarily presuppose a wholesome motivation, though they are nevertheless morally acceptable and karmically fruitful. From a Buddhist perspective, instrumental actions are right actions, stepping stones toward the eventual performance of teleological actions. I do not deny that actions may be simultaneously good and right, teleological and instrumental, at least in ideal types of ethical practice. However, the goodness and rightness of actions do not always overlap, and therefore, we cannot always reduce teleological and instrumental actions to two different aspects of a single action; at least this is not the case in actions where goodness and rightness do not coincide. For instance, in less ideal types of ethical practice it is possible to do the right thing without a wholesome motivation, or to do what is wrong with a wholesome motivation. Thus, I neither conflate nor fracture the rightness and goodness of actions, and accordingly, I neither identify nor totally separate teleological and instrumental actions.
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Life and health primarily perform an enabling function. Values that primarily favor the achievement or implementation of other values can be divided into at least three groups: material, social, and ethical-spiritual. The four requirements of clothing, shelter, food, and medicine or health care, are material values that facilitate other values, for instance, the cultivation of spiritual values. The social values that primarily facilitate other values are right livelihood, friendship, respect for spiritual and social status, and fulfillment of role-dependent duties. Social values may also perform an intensifying function in that they make life in society more enjoyable. Ethical-spiritual values favor the development of material values and enhance the value of social goods. Pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits such as welth, corporeal beauty, influence, honors, and repute primarily perform an intensifying function. In early Buddhism, pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits are valued because they enhance the value of other values. For instance, by saying that generosity leads to future prosperity, one intensifies the value of giving. Similarly, the pleasure of nirvana the highest kind of pleasure (Dhp 203; MN I.508) intensifies the value of mental qualities constitutive of nirvana. Furthermore, the values of wisdom and certain meditative attainments are intensified by the supernatural abilities they may generate. Intensifying values can also perform enabling or favoring functions. For instance, prosperity enables one to create Dharma centers and thus, favors the cultivation of spiritual practice in oneself and others. Similarly, the pleasure of the first jhna is praised because it is the path leading to enlightenment, that is, because it facilitates the attainment of nirvana (MN I.247). Someone might object that pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits are not genuine values but rather side-effects of ultimate values. For instance, health, wealth, beauty and influence are often described as karmic consequences of previous generosity and ethical conduct. Similarly, supernatural powers and spiritual pleasures usually derive from the development of wholesome mental states through meditation practice. Consequently, the objection goes, only ultimate values and not their side-effects should be seen
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as true values. However, the fact that pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits are consequences of ultimate values does not imply that they possess no value at all, even less that their value is reducible to the value of nirvanic virtues and nirvanic knowledge. The fact that the Pli Nikyas use pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits such as health, wealth, beauty, and influence to motivate ethical and spiritual practice indicates that they provide an incentive that ultimate values cannot provide by themselves, at least for certain kind of practitioners. Such an incentive might not be the best possible motivation, but it is nevertheless valuable for attracting some people to the spiritual path, people who otherwise might not be interested in ultimate values by themselves. Another possible objection is that pleasure, supernatural powers, and worldly benefits are valuable only when they are handled well, that is, if they are enjoyed virtuously. For instance, the objection goes, many texts seem to demonstrate that pleasures associated with unwholesome mental states such as craving and grasping, are not valuable at all. Therefore, their value would be reducible to that of spiritual values. This, however, is true of all Buddhist values except nirvana, not simply those that are primarily intensifying; they all lose worth when associated with unwholesome mental states. All values are more valuable when accompanied by wholesome mental states, but that does not mean that they have no value whatsoever without these states. Even the pleasure of sublime spiritual attainments can become counterproductive for spiritual progress if one develops clinging (updna) or ego-conceit (asmimna) towards them (MN II.264265; MN II.237). This does not imply that the pleasure of spiritual attainments lacks any value whatsoever when clinging and ego-conceit are present. In fact, MN II.265 speaks about someone who clings to the best object of clinging, namely the meditative base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. If the value of this pleasant meditative base were dependent exclusively on wholesome mental states, it would make no sense to consider it the best object of clinging (updnaseha). If the objection were plausible, the text should say that the base has no value at all due to the presence of clinging. However, this is not what the text states.
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From the early Buddhist perspective, any pleasures, especially sensual pleasures, can become counterproductive for spiritual progress. This misgiving, however, has nothing to do with their value as such, but rather with what early Buddhists call their danger (dnava). The Pli Nikyas are ambivalent about pleasures since they entail both value and danger. Spiritual pleasures are ranked higher than sensual pleasures, and, overall, they are considered extremely valuable: the pleasure of renunciation, the pleasure of seclusion, the pleasure of peace, the pleasure of enlightenment. I say of this kind of pleasure that it should be pursued, that it should be developed, that it should be cultivated, that it should not be feared (MN I.454).21 Strictly speaking, any value, not just pleasures, may hold danger for the unenlightened mind, but this does not imply that their value is dependent on the presence of wholesome mental states and, therefore, that their value is reducible to nirvanic values. Since the Pli Nikyas do not reduce all these different kinds of values to an overarching super-value or single good, early Buddhist ethics is pluralistic in terms of values. Moreover, since the Pli Nikyas presuppose a hierarchy of values (ultimate and penultimate, nirvanic and non-nirvanic), the evaluative pluralism of early Buddhist ethics is lexically ordered. It is to that lexical ordering that we now turn.
3. The lexical order of early Buddhist values

In order to clarify the lexical order of early Buddhist values, I would like to compare my account to Damien Keowns list of three basic goods. So far, I have contended that in the Pli Nikyas spiritual values surpass non-spiritual values, that non-spiritual values are genuine values irreducible to spiritual ones, and that given the complexity of some early Buddhist values, they cannot be adequately categorized in terms of the dichotomies intrinsic-instrumental, final-instrumental, intrinsic-extrinsic. Instead, I have proposed the distinction between ultimate and penultimate values, and claimed
nekkhammasukha pavivekasukha upasamasukha sambodhasu kha sevitabba bhvetabba bahulktabba. Na bhyitabba etassa sukhassti vadmi.
21
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that values may perform enabling, favoring and intensifying functions, which are not necessarily reducible to just being a means to an end. In Buddhism and Bioethics, Damien Keown speaks about three fundamental values or basic goods. These goods are life, knowledge, and friendship. By knowledge, Keown means wisdom (paa, Skt. praja), which has as its object the truths of Buddhist doctrine.22 By friendship, he does not refer to spiritual friendship (kalyamitta) but rather to a wider complex of ideasthe proper mode of relationship with othersthe complex which in early Buddhism is labeled as Morality (sla), and in the Mahyna as Compassion (karu) or alternatively as Means (upya).23 By life, he does not mean all kinds of life but specifically what he calls karmic life. That is, life that possesses the capacity to attain nirvana.24 Keowns two basic goods of friendship and knowledge overlap to a great extent with what I call ultimate values: nirvanic virtues and nirvanic knowledge. Unlike Keown, I prefer to differentiate clearly between friendship, which in my account is a penultimate value, and friendliness or loving-kindness (mett), which is an ultimate value or nirvanic virtue. Likewise, I would like to keep separated the value non-nirvanic knowledge, which is penultimate, and nirvanic knowledge, which is ultimate. This distinction is grounded in the Pli Nikyas, which distinguish between diverse kinds of knowledge, not all of them equally valuable. Similarly, the Pli Nikyas value friendship but never identify it with a particular nirvanic virtue, let alone with morality in the sense of relationships with others. I do not deny that morality regulates our relationships with others, yet morality does much more than that. At least in the Pli Nikyas, morality also regulates internal behavior (mental states) and actions that do not necessarily relate to others. For instance, taking intoxicants and engaging in
22 23 24
Keown 1995: 50. Ibid., 4344. Ibid., 46.
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sexual misconduct may take place without necessarily involving a relationship with others. According to Keown, the three goods of life, knowledge, and friendship are basic in the sense of being irreducible to each other; they are also incommensurable: it is impossible to quantify these things and trade them off against one another as if they could be related on a common scale. Consequently, for Keown, these goods must be equally valuable: None of these things can stands as greater in relation to another which is lesser.25 I agree with Keowns claim about the irreducible nature of early Buddhist goods and values. I also concur with him when he says that Buddhist values are incommensurable. Nevertheless, from the fact that goods are incommensurable, it does not follow that they must be equally valuable. We must distinguish between commensurability and comparability. Early Buddhist goods are incommensurable but not necessarily incomparable. By saying that values are comparable, I do not mean that they are quantifiable or subject to utilitarian calculations. Rather, the point is that values can be lexically ordered to some extent, and, therefore, they must be somehow comparable. The lexical order of values in the Pli Nikyas is undeniable: ultimate values are superior to penultimate values. This hierarchy of values would not exist if values were not comparable. Yet early Buddhist values are incommensurable. For instance, no amount of prosperity equals any specific number of lives. Similarly, it does not make much sense to state that fostering non-nirvanic knowledge in 300 people equals the development of nirvanic wisdom in one person. This way of thinking is foreign to the Pli Nikyas. Nevertheless, the value of life seems to surpass the value of material benefits, and the value of nirvanic wisdom is higher than the value of non-nirvanic types of knowledge. The lexical order of values found in the Pli Nikyas presupposes not only the comparability of values from different kinds but also of values that belong to the same kind. For instance, the value of spiritual pleasures is superior to the value of sensual pleasures, which are often negatively portrayed (MN I.132ff., MN I.173ff.,
25
Ibid., 5556.
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etc.). Similarly, human life is more valuable than other types of lives, and the life of holy beings is more worthy than the life of ordinary beings; that is why the karmic consequences of killing a buddha are far more negative than killing any other ordinary being. Even among wholesome mental states, it is possible to perceive some lexical order. For instance, wisdom seems to be the most valuable mental state, even more than loving-kindness and compassion, though according to Gombrich the Pli Nikyas are not always consistent in this regard.26 Nonetheless, despite some tensions and minor variations, the Pli Nikyas presuppose a lexical order of values. Even if the ranking among values of the same kind is not beyond dispute, it is clear that ultimate values are more important than penultimate ones, and that spiritual benefits surpass non-spiritual benefits. I do not claim that my discussion of early Buddhist values is comprehensive or that my list of values exhausts all things that early Buddhists considered valuable. Like Keown, I admit that there may be other ways of mapping the most important Buddhist values. It would be unfair to question Keowns list of three basic goods for not being long enough. However, I find some of Keowns ideas problematic from the early Buddhist perspective, specifically his understanding of friendship and life. Keowns view of life as belonging to the same category of values as knowledge and friendship cannot be justified on the basis of any early Buddhist texts. Nowhere in the Pli Nikyas is the value of life considered similar to the spiritual values of nirvanic wisdom and nirvanic virtue. Similarly, the Pli Nikyas do not suggest anywhere that life is constitutive of nirvana beyond death. Keowns claim that life in nirvana will take some form, since Buddhist doctrine condemns as heresy the view that nirvana is annihilation,27 is textually unjustified. I have argued somewhere else that the Pli Nikyas are silent about the tathgata and nirvana beyond death.28
26 27 28
Gombrich 1996: 60ff. Ibid., 49. Vlez de Cea 2004b.
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Keowns suggestion about some form of life in nirvana beyond death is also questionable on philosophical grounds. The Pli Nikyas consider eternalism an extreme doctrinal position; it is as extreme as annihilationism. Consequently, Keowns reasoning to infer the existence of some form of eternal life in nirvana from the rejection of annihilationism is unjustified. One could use exactly the same reasoning to argue that Buddhism is nihilistic because it rejects eternalism. This conclusion, however, would be equally inconsistent with the philosophy of the Pli Nikyas.29 Keown seems to be influenced in his interpretation of life and friendship by contemporary neo-Thomist thinkers such as John Finnis and Germain Grisez. For instance, John Finnis lists life and friendship as basic goods and consider them constitutive of the human good. Like Keown, Finnis considers all basic goods incommensurable and equally valuable. Finnis concept of friendship is strikingly similar to that of Keown in that both convey the idea of relationships with others and concern for their well-being. In fact, Finnis uses the term sociability as a term equivalent to his understanding of friendship.30 Another possible reason for Keowns inclusion of life in his list of basic goods is his application to Buddhism of the classical dichotomy between intrinsic and instrumental values, that is, the distinction between what is valued for its own sake as an end, and what is valued for the sake of something else as a means. For instance, Keown distinguishes between the intrinsically valuable life of humans and animals, and the instrumentally valuable life of tiny organisms, vegetables and plant life.31 Since the classical dichotomy intrinsic-instrumental only allows for two options, and since human life is not a mere means or instrument for something else, it is only natural for Keown to place life at the same level as other intrinsic values. However, I have demonSpecifically, inconsistent with the limits that the Buddha of the Pli Nikyas puts to language and his teachings (Vlez de Cea 2004b). See also Vlez de Cea 2008. 30 Finnis 1980: 8688, 141144. 31 Keown 1995: 4649.
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strated the inappropriateness of applying the dichotomy intrinsicinstrumental to the Pli Nikyas. This distinction fails to capture the diversity of early Buddhist values. Once we shift to the alternative hermeneutical strategy of applying the distinction between ultimate and penultimate values, we gain far greater clarity, and this approache undermines the motivation for Keowns inclusion of life as a basic Buddhist good. In my account, life in the Pli Nikyas is a penultimate value that primarily enables or makes possible other values. In the case of humans, life also favors the cultivation of spiritual values, thus intensifying the value of human rebirth. Keown would probably agree with my account because he says explicitly at one point that life is both a good in itself and a precondition for the fulfillment of other goods.32 This is precisely what I claim only with a different terminology: that the value of life is not reducible to the value of anything else, and that life performs primarily an enabling function. I prefer to avoid the expression in itself because it is usually associated to the concept of intrinsic value, which is ontologically misleading when applied to Buddhism. Keown and I agree that life is not a mere instrument in the restricted sense of the term, that is, as being a mere means without value in itself. Attributing irreducible and enabling value to life, does not render it a simple means whose value depends entirely on the performance of a particular function or on being a condition of possibility of other values. And denying that life is a mere means to an end or a mere instrument for the performance of a function, does not entail that the value of life is supreme, at the same level as nirvanic knowledge and nirvanic virtue. Either claim would be foreign to the Pli Nikyas. Like the value of life, the value of nirvanic knowledge and virtue is irreducible to other values; they are also similar in that they all can perform enabling, favoring, and intensifying functions. However, unlike life, nirvanic values belong to a higher order of values. The profound respect for life found in the Pli Nikyas can
32
Ibid., 44.
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be explained without suggesting, as Keown does, that life is an ultimate value constitutive of nirvana. Perhaps the greatest difference between Keowns account and mine is that unlike his, my account does not view nirvanic values as the only kind of value constitutive of Buddhist flourishing, which I do not identify with enlightenment or human fulfillment from a Buddhist perspective. On the contrary, for Keown: To say that life, knowledge and friendship are good is to say that these are the things which make for a fulfilled life as a human being. They are fundamental aspects of human fulfillment or flourishing in that each makes a unique contribution to the nature of the being one wishes to become (a Buddha).33 Thus, Keown seems to identify human fulfillment with flourishing, and these two concepts with the values of life, knowledge and friendship. My account, however, presupposes a difference between Buddhist flourishing and fulfillment: Buddhist flourishing can take place without being enlightened, and it can be spiritual and/or nonspiritual in nature; on the contrary, Buddhist fulfillment is the state of enlightenment, which is constituted only by nirvanic knowledge and virtues. Nevertheless, like Keown, I view spiritual flourishing and nirvanic qualities as the most important sources of value in Buddhism.
Primary sources
All references to the Pli texts are to the roman-script editions of the Pali Text Society, England. References to the Aguttara-, Dgha-, Majjhima- and Sayutta-Nikya are to the volume and page number.
AN DN Dhp Aguttara-Nikya, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, 5 vols. London 18851900. Dgha-Nikya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter, 3 vols. 18901911. Dhammapada, ed. O. von Hinber, K. R. Norman, 1994.
33
Ibid., 43.
Value pluralism in early Buddhist ethics MN SN
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Majjhima-Nikya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers, 3 vols. London 18881899. Sayutta-Nikya, ed. L. Feer, 5 vols. London 1884-1898.
Secondary sources
Dancy, Jonathan. 2004. Ethics Without Principles. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Finnis, John. 1980. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Gombrich, Richard. 1992. The Ethic of Intention. In Charles Prebish, Buddhist Ethics: A Cross-Cultural Approach. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/ Hunt Publishing Company: 92111. _____. 1996. How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings. London: Athlone. Harvey, Peter. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hurka, Thomas. 2001. Virtue, Vice, and Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keown, Damien. 1995. Buddhism and Bioethics. London: Macmillan. _____. 2001. The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. New York: Palgrave. Korsgaard, Christinine. 1996. The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. _____. 1982. Two Distinctions in Goodness. The Philosophical Review 2: 169195. Rnnow-Rasmussen, Toni. 2002. Instrumental values strong and weak. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5: 2343. Vlez de Cea, Abraham. 2004a. The Early Buddhist Criteria of Goodness and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 11: 123 142. _____. 2004b. The Silence of the Buddha and the Questions about the Tathgata after Death. The Indian International Journal of Buddhist Studies 5: 119141. _____. 2008. Buddha, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www. iep.utm.edu/buddha/, last visited 26-09-2011 [last update 2009]. Wolf, Susan. 1992. Two Levels of Pluralism. Ethics 102 (July): 785798.
No self, no free will, no problem Implications of the Anattalakkhaa Sutta for a perennial philosophical issue
Martin T. Adam
The free will problem

Are we free agents? The free will problem remains one of the great ongoing debates of western philosophy. This paper investigates the Buddhas views on human freedom. It suggests that the Buddhas position is a unique one, implying a negative response to the question of a metaphysically free will but a positive response to the question of moral responsibility and the possibility of human freedom in a spiritual sense. The problem of free will in its most general terms can be formulated as follows. All events are caused. A full understanding of the causes of any particular event and of the laws of nature would allow for the accurate prediction of that event. The actions we perform, including the choices we make, are events. Therefore they are all predictable in principle, if not in fact. Therefore the idea that one can do other than one actually does is false. If one cannot do other than one actually does, one cannot be morally responsible for ones actions. Therefore human beings cannot be justifiably held morally responsible for their actions.1
This is a modified version of the argument presented by Van Inwagen (1982), who frames the issue in terms of knowledge of the state of the physical world and the laws of physics. Here I have generalized the formulation to exclude such ontological considerations. Strictly speaking they are irrelevant to the deterministic thesis, which depends only on the notion that all events have causes, past and present, sufficient to bring them about (irrespective of Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 239265
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A common counterargument to this line of thinking is as follows. While it is true that all events are caused, human actions are a special case in that among their causes is the individuals own will or choice. Because individuals are the causes of their own actions they can be justifiably held morally responsible for them. So free will and determinism are compatible. This is the compatibilist position: within a deterministic universe we are nevertheless free in a sense sufficient to justify holding one another morally to account. We do, in fact, hold one another morally responsible when certain specified conditions of freedom are met; a failure to acknowledge this would be to empty the notion of freedom of all meaning. There must be some instances in which we are free. And these instances, by and large, are precisely those in which we recognize each other as being morally responsible.2 Thus the compatibilist argues from the fact of moral responsibility to the assertion of freedom and the irrelevance of the deterministic thesis. The incompatibilist determinist on the other hand, argues from determinism to a lack of freedom and the irrelevance of conventions of moral accountability. Both positions are persuasive; our intuitions seem torn. Before examining what Buddhist teachings might have to offer in connection with this dilemma, it will be helpful to explicitly set out, in brief, its key terms of reference. In discussing the concept of freedom, one of the most basic distinctions philosophers
whether they are physical, mental, spiritual or otherwise). In recent years the argument has been framed in scientific terms: the notion of an action being predictable in principle is understood in terms of an imagined third-person observer possessing a complete knowledge of the state of the world at a given point in time and a complete knowledge of the laws of nature. The fact that no one possesses such complete knowledge does not affect the argument, for what we are concerned with is predictability in principle. The classical problem of free will was, of course, framed in terms of Gods foreknowledge: if God knows everything that will happen ahead of time, then everything must happen exactly as God knows it will happen. In spite of the presentday replacement of God by an imaginary super-scientific observer, the basic argument is the same. 2 Clear cases would be those in which one is rational, knows what one is doing, has reflected on the alternatives, is not being coerced, and approves of the action without doubt or hesitation.
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have drawn is that between empirical and metaphysical freedom. Empirical freedom can be understood in a number of ways, but in its most general positive conception it refers to the ability of an individual to act as she wants, or to do as she wills. Philosophers have, of course, offered varying accounts of what such a positively conceived freedom actually means once it is spelled out in detail for example politically, in term of specific rights and freedoms (freedoms to do one thing or another). It is, however, beyond the scope of the present study to explore such differences; for our purposes it is enough to note the general concept. We must also observe that the concept of empirical freedom can be formulated negatively, in terms of an absence of constraints or impediments that might potentially obstruct an individuals ability to act as she wants (freedoms from one condition or another). In this case clarity would demand that a particular set or sets of constraints be specified. Here we should note that the notion of a constraint may be conceived of as either external or internal to a person. Philosophers have considered various sets of external and internal constraints in spelling out their own particular understandings of freedom. Political philosophers, for example, have tended to focus on restrictions placed upon the individual by external forces such as other persons, governments, political classes, or even material conditions. Psychologically minded thinkers, on the other hand, have focused on internal constraints such as compulsions, obsessive thoughts, depression, confusion and so forth. But for philosophers working in the area of metaethics, concerned as they are with establishing foundations for our judgments of moral responsibility, it has usually been the idea of metaphysical freedom that has been called upon to do the work. Metaphysical freedom, like empirical freedom, can be conceived negatively as an absence of constraints. But in this case, the constraints are regarded as those of causality itself. Moral responsibility is thought to require some kind of freedom from, or exception to the necessity that characterizes the normal cause and effect operations of nature. Attaching a clear meaning to this idea of freedom is problematic, but in general either one of two basic approaches is taken. On the one hand, to say that a person is metaphysically free is interpreted
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as asserting that at least some of her actions or decisions are un caused.3 On the other hand, to make this statement is taken as asserting that at least some of her actions or decisions are selfcaused. One final distinction needs to be recognized, even though it is not one that is often explicitly drawn. A broad distinction can be drawn among the kinds of object to which the concept of freedom is applied. For our purposes we can enumerate three: actions, wills, and persons (or individuals).4 Freedom of the will is sometimes equated with freedom of action and sometimes with freedom of the person. In fact, authors often slide between these three ways of speaking about freedom, assuming that to talk of one is to talk of the others, and that the predication of freedom in one these categories ipso facto implies a statement of the same truth value in the others. But as we shall see, this assumption is worth questioning. At a minimum it must be ensured that the same set of constraints in terms of which freedom is understood is being applied across categories. Further, each of these categories themselves admit of various conceptions and therefore require careful analyses. In this paper I will argue that the Buddhas teachings do not allow for the possibility of a metaphysical freedom of the will. Nevertheless persons are regarded as morally responsible for their actions. In order to explain this view I will examine the implications of the Anattalakkhaa Sutta, comparing these with an influential account of free will provided by the western philosopher, Harry Frankfurt. The overall discussion is framed with reference to Harvey (2007), which is probably the most comprehensive individual survey of Theravda Buddhist teachings on this topic to
We shall not explore this possibility in great detail in this paper. It has commonly been observed that such indeterminism does not appear to be of much use when it comes to the grounding of moral responsibility. If a decision or action were uncaused, would it not then be random? How can a person be justifiably held responsible for a random decision or act? Such a conception of freedom would actually seem to undermine the foundations of moral responsibility. 4 A fourth possibility can here only be mentioned in passing, namely, freedom of a group or society.
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date. This is where we begin our own exploration of Buddhism and free will.
Buddhism and free will

Harveys review of the primary and secondary sources on this topic is extensive and it cannot be my aim here to provide a detailed critique of the account he provides. The conclusions he derives are complex, but by and large fall into two parts. Initially he concludes that Buddhism accepts a form of compatibilism.5
On the whole, it can be said that the implied position of Theravda Buddhism on the issue of freedom of the will is a middle way between seeing a persons actions as completely rigidly determined, and seeing them as totally and unconditionally free [] It accepts a variable degree of freedom within a complex of interacting mental and physical conditions. This freedom of action is such that present awareness always offers the possibility of not being wholly determined by past patterns of internal or external conditioning [] (Harvey 2007: 86)
Nevertheless he also maintains that there is a second sense in which the Buddhas teachings imply that neither free will nor determinism can be true:
In a different way [] if a person is wrongly seen as an essential, permanent self, it is an undetermined question as to whether a persons acts of will are determined or a persons acts of will are free. If there is no essential person-entity it can not be said to be either determined or free. (Harvey 2007: 86)
Harveys answer is difficult conceptually. In this paper I will mainly take issue with its second part: I will argue that if there is no essential person-entity, the implication is not that the will is neither free
This would also appear to be the view of Thanissaro Bhikkhu who speaks of some room for free will in Buddhism (1996: 13). This author also provides a similar rationale for the attribution of freedom, in terms of the reflective capacity of present awareness or what he calls feedback loops (1996: 4042). This is indeed an important factor in understanding the human capacity for freedom. We will return to it below.
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nor determined, but rather that there is no metaphysical freedom of the will, which is to say no will that is free of ordinary causality.6 At least two general points arise from Harveys conclusions. First, with regard to its first part, it is important to note the qualification that Theravda Buddhism has an implied position on the free will debate. This needs to be emphasized. While I differ with Harvey as to what that implied position is, he is undoubtedly correct in this. The problem of moral responsibility in relation to the deterministic thesis has never been a burning issue in traditional Buddhism.7 This is not to suggest that the issue is not important to Buddhists today, nor is it to say that the question of human freedom was not important in early Buddhism. It is simply to suggest that the problem presented to the foundations of morality by determinism is not a live problem in the Buddhas teachings.8 There are reasons for this, which we shall examine below.9 The second point relates to the first part of Harveys conclusion as well. In what sense are we to understand the notion of a
The impulse to read Buddhism as a form of compatibilism possibly stems from the assumption that moral responsibility must be regarded as contingent upon some kind of metaphysical freedom of the will. (Note, however, that Harvey does not himself make this assumption). In the present paper I argue that this is not the case for the Buddhist tradition at least. 7 We shall see however that there may have been a peripheral awareness of this tension on the part of the compilers of the Pali Canon. 8 While the Buddha was concerned, on occasion, with the refutation of fatalism, this cannot be equated with a rejection of determinism. Oddly Harvey seems to make this equation at one point, in his discussion of the Buddhas response to the jvikas (2007: 40). Fatalism is the view that individuals do not have control over what happens to them, in the sense that certain events will happen to them irrespective of what they decide to do. In some versions of fatalism this is attributed to the design of an outside power or Fate. Determinism is simply the view that every event has causes sufficient to bring it about; our choices are both causes of the events that occur to us as well as caused events themselves. Thus one can consistently deny that there is any external force of destiny, such as the jvikas niyati, and still be a determinist. 9 The explanation, we shall see, lies in the fact that freedom was principally understood as a quality of persons, dependent on their knowledge and mental purity, rather than as a quality of volitions or actions.
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Buddhist middle way in this context? Harvey seems to suggest that Buddhism adheres to a compromise position, i.e. one that lies between strict determinism and complete freedom from causality (or as he puts it between seeing a persons actions as completely rigidly determined, and seeing them as totally and unconditionally free). But how can this be so? Surely, the two positions are mutually exclusive. And what might it mean to say that persons possess a variable degree of freedom? Is freedom the kind of quality that admits of degrees? This needs explanation. It would appear that this middle way solution runs the risk of incoherence (a charge often leveled at compatibilist accounts). It may be that each of Harveys statements is correct, and that in point of fact the Buddhas various teachings do imply these rather different positions at different places in the scriptures. If so, one might be inclined to conclude that the Buddha of the Pali scriptures is simply inconsistent and that his teachings on freedom constitute a colourful, but philosophically unprofitable area of investigation. More charitably, one might wish to suggest that the Buddhist concept of freedom is one of religious or mystical paradox, beyond rational comprehension. Here, however, I will argue that there is a systematic and consistent rationale underlying the Buddhas teachings concerning freedom. The concept of freedom plays a critical role within what is a highly sophisticated soteriological system. The Buddhas implied position on freedom of the will cannot be properly understood outside the confines of this framework.
Free will and the Anattalakkhaa Sutta

To investigate these matters, I will now turn to an examination of one of the most famous of the Buddhas discourses, the Anatta lakkhaa Sutta.10 This is the Buddhas second sermon, delivered to his first five disciples at the Deer Park in Srnth. In this sutta the Buddha systematically argues for the impossibility of identifying a Self with any of the five aggregates that together constitute a person. While the Anattalakkhaa Sutta is not normally considered
For another interpretation of this sutta in relation to the issue of free will, see Federman 2010.
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as addressing the matter of free will, the teachings it contains do have implications that bear on this topic. The Buddha offers two distinct arguments to support the thesis that no aspect of a person is a wholly autonomous, essential, permanent Self; the first of these is directly relevant to our present concerns. In this argument, the Buddha suggests that none among the five aggregates that together constitute a person can be identified with such a Self because none among them is subject to control.11 Beginning with the body or form (rpa) the Buddha makes his case:
Bhikkhus, form is nonself. For if, bhikkhus, form were self, this form would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of form: Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus. But because form is nonself, form leads to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of form: Let my form be thus; let my form not be thus.12 (SN III 66)
A similar line of reasoning is offered for each of the five aggregates. To appreciate the implications of this argument for the question of free will, we need to see that the Buddha is relying on a conceptual connection between the notion of Self and the notion of control. If there were a Self, he asserts, it would be that aspect of the person over which one has control.13 We do not have control over any of
11 The second argument reasons from the impermanence of each of the aggregates to the fact that they are each dukkha. From these two considerations the conclusion is drawn that none among the aggregates are fit to be regarded as Self. 12 Rpam bhikkhave anatt // rpa ca bhikkhave att abhavissa nayida rpa bdhya savatteyya // labbhetha ca rpe Eva me rpa hotu eva me rpa m ahosti // Yasm ca kho bhikkhave rpa anatt tasm rpam bdhya savattati // na ca labbhati rpe Evam me rpa hotu eva me rpa m ahosti // // Translations are those of Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000). 13 In a paper delivered to the annual meeting of the UKABS (2009) Tse-fu Kuan has argued that this way of conceiving the self as what comes under control constitutes a deliberate twisting of the classical Brahmanic concept of the self as inner controller found in in the Upanids. His argument is principally focused on a comparison of Majjhima-Nikya Sutta 35 and two Chinese versions of this text, where the same argument is found. According to the author, an earlier version of the argument, employing the concept of Self as inner controller, can be found in Chinese Ekottarika-gama version.
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the five aggregates. The five aggregates are all that a person is. The implication is clear: there is no self.14 In his notes on this sutta, Bhikkhu Bodhi makes some insightful observations about the basis of this argument. The five aggregates lack of selfhood is demonstrated, he says:
on the ground that they are insusceptible to the exercise of mastery (avassavattit). If anything is to count as our self it must be subject to our volitional control; since, however, we cannot bend the five aggregates to our will, they are all subject to affliction and therefore cannot be our self. (Bodhi 2000: 1066-1067)15
From these comments we can see how the Buddhas argument can be connected to the issue of free will there is a conceptual link
While I cannot evaluate this argument here, the need to establish an explanation for the apparent oddity of conceiving the Self as what comes under control would appear to be eliminated if one recalls that the fourth aggregate, the sakhras, encompasses the function of directing or controlling ones actions (cetan). Thus the phrase what comes under control includes the inner controller. This very function, the only candidate for inner controller that there is, is itself not subject to control. See below. Kuans paper has recently been published (2009). 14 The initial argument structure is Modus Tollens and is formally valid. If there were Self, it would be controllable. None among the five aggregates are controllable. Therefore none among the five aggregates are Self. There is an additional, unstated assumption required to reach the conclusion that there is no Self, viz., that the five aggregates are all that there is. This is a safe enough assumption from the Buddhist perspective. The complete argument also involves one other assumption, viz., if we could control our states we would choose those that are not afflicted by suffering and its causes. This seems a safe enough assumption, for all but the masochist. I bring it up because it reveals an important teleological aspect to the Buddhas thinking, which is not argued for here: we are naturally oriented away from suffering and towards happiness. In point of fact it is this aspect of our constitutions that makes it possible to attain spiritual freedom, the realization of nibbna. The general point that we are naturally predisposed towards wanting to be free from suffering is explicitly taken up in the following sutta, Mahli (SN III 6871). We will return to it below. 15 Elsewhere he writes that [] the aggregates are suffering because they tend to affliction and cannot be made to conform to our desires. (Bodhi 2000: 842)
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between the idea of Self and the idea of volitional control. If there were a Self, whatever else it might be, we would be able to control its states. Thus in the above passage, concerning rpa, the idea is that we would all choose not to suffer and to be well in our bodies if we could; indeed this is our natural wish and predisposition. In spite of this, we remain afflicted and disposed to affliction. Suffering is inherent to rpa. It is not possible to simply wish it away. If rpa were Self we would be able to do this. It is important to notice that the sense in which it is said that we do not have control over rpa seems to be one of direct control over its states, in particular its state of being subject to affliction. In the passage above, there is no denial of the idea that we can do as we wish with respect to the actions we perform with and through our bodies; the denial is of the notion that we can be as we wish with respect to the presence or absence of affliction. The wish that the Buddha describes as impossible to fulfill is Let my form be thus, let my form not be thus, not Let my form do thus, let my form not do thus. If free will is simply understood as the empirical ability of persons to act voluntarily or to do as they want within a specified set of constraints, then the Buddhas position does not here imply any denial of this. All it suggests is that we cannot directly wish away the suffering associated with the first aggregate. In point of fact, the Buddhas teachings are premised on the idea that it is possible to do something about suffering, and indeed to eliminate it. But we cannot simply do away with it directly. Are we then to conclude that the Buddhas doctrine implies a limited or qualified free will, one in which we can do as we will if not actually be as we will with respect to suffering? Is this the end of the story? Actually, the Buddhas position turns out to be considerably more complex than this. This can be seen if we pause to analyze the notion of will a bit more carefully.
Buddhism and the will

What is the will? What do we mean to refer to when we employ this word? From a Theravda Buddhist perspective, if the five aggre-
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gates are all that a person is, we must locate the idea of will within them. The problem of matching concepts is, of course, always a difficult one for those engaged in the enterprise of cross-cultural philosophy. That being said, whatever aspect of the human person we might consider the will to be, in the Buddhist context it will have to correspond to some aspect or aspects of the five aggregates for this is all that a person is considered to be. Among Pali terms, the most obvious candidate for will is cetan. This word is usually translated as intention or volition. Keown (1992: 212221) has also rendered it as choice. These English words each carry very different implications, a few of which can be brought out here. The term volition implies an actual effort, an impulse towards action, perhaps even a trying or exertion; the English word intention does not. It simply indicates a plan or desire to act, but not necessarily one that has been initiated or set in motion. The notion of choice implies the conscious entertaining of alternatives and an actual mental event in which one alternative is favoured over the others. Of these terms, will seems to be the most general, encompassing all of the others in its potential meaning. We will have more to say concerning some of the western variations of the notion of the will in the next section of this paper; but for the moment let us accept the tentative identification of the English language concept will with the Pali concept of cetan.16 However inexact the match may be, the concept of the will must correspond to some aspect or aspects of the five aggregates and this is actually all we need for our argument to proceed. Here it is necessary to observe that cetan is considered part of the fourth aggregate, the sakhras. The latter term has commonly been translated as volitional formations, a heading meant to capture those mental events that direct ones actions physical, mental and
16 From a more Mahyna perspective, the will might be viewed as an abstraction, a reification of diverse events, possessing no inherent nature of its own. There are, of course, many ways to pick out and group these events into a concept of will (e.g. desires we are moved by, desires we identify with, our intentions, etc).
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vocal.17 It would appear, then, that volitional formations, qua voli tional formations, constitute the very aggregate in virtue of which action can be said to be voluntary. Keeping this understanding in mind allows us to raise a deeper question regarding the freedom of the will. For, as mentioned, in the Anattalakkhaa Sutta an analysis identical to that carried out on rpa is carried out on each of the aggregates in turn, including that of the sakhras.
Volitional formations are nonself. For if, bhikkhus, volitional formations were self, they would not lead to affliction, and it would be possible to have it of volitional formations: Let my volitional formations be thus; let my volitional formations not be thus. But because volitional formations are nonself, volitional formations lead to affliction, and it is not possible to have it of volitional formations: Let my volitional formations be thus; let my volitional formations not be thus.18 (SN III 67)
In effect, then, this analysis suggests that the very aggregate that includes the will is itself unfree; it is not subject to control. What could this mean? If we follow our earlier analysis with respect to rpa, the lack of freedom here would simply amount to our inabili17 Mahasi Sayadaw provides the following explanation. Sakhras are the mental states headed by cetan, volition. There are fifty two kinds of mental states. With the exception of feeling and perception, the remaining fifty constitute the aggregate of volitional formations, sakhrakkhandha. In Sutta discourses, only cetan, volition, is specified as representing the sakhra activities, but according to the Abhidhamma, we have other volitional formations that can produce kamma, such as attention (manasikra), initial application of thought (vitakka), sustained application (vicra), zest (pti), greed (lobha), hatred (dosa), delusion (moha), nongreed, nonhatred, and nondelusion. These fifty kinds of volitional formations are responsible for all kinds of activities, such as going, standing, sitting, sleeping, bending, stretching, smiling, and speaking. These actions, as well as mental activities such as thinking, visual consciousness and auditory consciousness, are carried out and directed by sakhr. (1996: 4950) 18 Sakhr anatt // sakhr ca hida bhikkhave att abhavissasu // na yida sakhr bdhya savatteyyu // labbhetha ca sakhresu Eva me sakhr hontu eva me sakhr m ahesunti // yasm ca kho bhikkhave sakhr anatt tasm sakhr bdhya savattanti // na ca labbhati sakhresu Eva me sakhr hontu eva me sakhr m ahe sunti // //
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ty to make sakhras unafflicted directly by wishing them to be so. In glossing this passage, Mahasi Sayadaw indicates the manner in which we would change our volitional formations if we only could: we would make them all wholesome (kusala) and not unwholesome (akusala) respectively.19 Unfortunately this is impossible. This is a critical consideration, for it suggests that the very mental factors determining the morality of action are not subject to control. If the sakhras are not subject to control, this means that we are unable to directly determine their composition. The mental states that direct our actions the very desires, attitudes, and values we identify with and which determine the morality of our actions are themselves not under control. In this case, it might be said that we are unfree with respect to the volitional aspect of who or what we are, rather than with regard to the aspect of what we do. If this is indeed the implication, then it would appear that the Buddha probably would not have disagreed with the following assertion, famously attributed to Schopenhauer: A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants.20 The Buddhist analysis suggests that the problem of free will is not simply firstorder issue as to whether we can do what we want. There is a much deeper problem one that turns on second-order considerations as to whether we can be what we want to be, or, put another way, whether we can have the wills we want to have. The issue of the freedom of the will is a question regarding whether we have freedom with respect to our own constitutions. The Buddhas answer appears to be negative. While it may be the case that we can be judged empirically free to the extent that we can do as we want, we are not metaphysically free in the sense of being able to directly
Monks, were volitional factors self, they would not inflict suffering and it should be possible to say of them, Let volitional formations be thus (all wholesome), let volitional formations be not thus (unwholesome), and manage them accordingly. (Sayadaw 1996: 49) 20 Quoted in Einstein 1982: 8. Although I cannot locate an exact, original source for this quotation, Schopenhauers position is expressed throughout his essay On The Freedom of The Will (1985). See note 25 below. Along the same lines, Bertrand Russell is also reputed to have quipped that while we can do as we please, we can not please as we please.
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determine the constellation of factors we identify with, and out of which our actions proceed. In the context of this sutta, the reasons for this assertion are clear: the will is not subject to control in this way, because, quite simply, there is no independent entity over and above the shifting configuration of mental factors to do the controlling. There is no self-controlling controller. There is no one (i.e. no single unified being) holding the reins. There is no Self.
Harry Frankfurt and the Buddha

The Buddhas implied position on the freedom of the will can be fruitfully analyzed by comparing it with a recent and influential account of the wills freedom provided by the philosopher Harry Frankfurt. As is the case for Buddhism, in Frankfurts analysis second-order considerations are the critical factor in assessing the wills freedom. Frankfurt notes what he takes to be a unique feature about human beings:
Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, men may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for [] desires of the first order, which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires. (Frankfurt 1982: 8283)
These observations concerning the self-reflective capacities of human beings are directly pertinent to the Buddhist analysis, where they find an obvious resonance in the capacity of human beings to reflect on the nature and composition of the aggregates themselves. Interestingly, however, the conclusions Frankfurt arrives at are rather different from those we have just reached. In brief, Frankfurt argues that a coherent account of free will can be given in terms of the capacity of human beings to form second-order desires and volitions about their first-order desires. To understand Frankfurts account we must note that he identifies the
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will with the first-order desire that actually moves, or would move, an individual to act.21 This he terms the agents effective desire.
(The notion of the will) is the notion of an effective desire one that moves (or will or would move) a person all the way to action. Thus the notion of the will is not coextensive with what an agent intends to do. For even though an agent may have a settled intention to do X, he may none the less do something else instead of doing X because, despite his intention, his desire to do X proves to be weaker or less effective than some conflicting desire.22 (Frankfurt 1982: 84)
Frankfurts account of free will turns on the notion that one is free only if one wants to be moved by the desire that actually does move
This conception of the will is not entirely dissimilar to the general Buddhist understanding of cetan as the mental factor lying behind voluntary behaviour, in virtue of which such behaviour is considered action (kam ma). It should be noted, however, that the Buddhist has a broader conception of action, one that encompasses acts of mind as well as those of body and speech. Cetan is itself a mental action; it might therefore be said that in its case, its being is its doing. Cetan is intention in the sense of being the intention that occurs while doing an action (i.e. a volition or mental impulse). However, as Buddhism accepts the idea of mental action, the activity of planning/intending-to-do a future action is itself a current mental action, with its own cetan. Thanks to Peter Harvey for the latter observation. 22 In identifying the will with effective desire, Frankfurt is adhering to a conception of the will and willing that goes back at least as far as John Locke (16321704). Locke defines the Will as the power to command and to prefer one option over another. Interestingly, from a Buddhist perspective, Locke warns his readers not to fall prey to the tendency of thinking of this power as an actual faculty that has autonomous and real being in the souls of men (1959: 31415). This power is distinguishable from the instances in which an individual exercises his will. Instances of willing or volition are those in which a desire actually moves a person to act. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the Will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing. (Locke 1959: 313314) Thus Locke draws a distinction between the Will and the activity of willing. To will is to be moved to act in some manner.
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one to act. If one does not want to be moved to act by that desire but is nevertheless moved by it then the will is unfree. The example Frankfurt employs as an illustration is that of an unwilling drug addict. Frankfurts analysis of the condition of such a person is that he is the subject of conflicting first-order desires and a second-order volition towards one of these. He both wants and does not want to take the drug. But in taking the drug he is being moved to act in a way that he desires not to. His desire to take the drug on these occasions, because it moves him to act, may be identified with his will. And in this case it is unfree. It is unfree because the agent does not want it.23
In refining his account Frankfurt employs the notion of second-order volitions as a special kind of second-order desire. Second-order desires, in the most general sense, are simply desires for desires. A second-order volition is a second-order desire that has as its object the efficacy of a particular first-order desire. This is an important distinction, insofar as it is possible for someone to want to possess a particular first-order desire without wanting it to be effective. To see this we can imagine the case of another addict, a gambler, who is actually quite happy with his habit, who yet wants to have the desire to give it up, but who does not want this latter desire to be effective. If I didnt want to give it up at least a little bit, he might reason, then my friends wouldnt be sympathetic and lend me the money I need. This person has a second-order desire (a desire for a desire), but not a second-order volition. If, contra Frankfurt (and Locke), we choose to conceive of the will as the desire we identify with, then for this case we could maintain that the unwilling addicts will is free while his action is not. This is, in fact, another well-attested usage of the term will; in saying that one wills something, there is no necessary implication of effort by the agent. Rather, the notion of will is linked with our deepest wishes or values, or even our self-concept. The manner in which Bhikkhu Bodhi speaks of the will (see above) seems to reflect this usage: the will is identified with a very deep desire, in this case the desire to be free from affliction ineffective though this may be. Augustine could be taken as another example of someone who thinks of the will in this way. In general, most philosophical discussions of free will can be usefully divided along the lines of these two different ways of conceiving the will. It is important to be clear about which concept is being presupposed in any case where free will is being discussed; obviously, these two different conceptions of the will will lead to two very different ways of talking about free will.
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But it is clear that most cases in life are not like that of the unwilling addict. Most of us, most of the time, are moved to act by ordinary desires that we want to have move us to act. In such cases we can be said to possess second-order volitions directed towards our wills. We approve of our will. Hence for the most part, on Frankfurts analysis, our actions are freely willed. In fact, this way of thinking about free will provides a good explanation for these cases, in which we feel free in acting and are therefore willing to take responsibility for what we do. Our actions reflect our choices and the values we identify with. In brief, they reflect who we are (or at least who we take ourselves to be). In spite of the refreshing clarity of Frankfurts account of free will, it is not without its difficulties. Here I will mention only two that are particularly relevant to our present concerns. The first difficulty is that an individuals second-order desires and volitions are not consistent through time. A persons deeper values and wishes are subject to change depending on a great variety of internal and external conditions. In Frankfurts terms, we may say that we are inconsistent as to what we want our will to be. Which of ones various selves does one identify as being ones true self? On what basis? This issue is clearly relevant in the context of Buddhism. A second and more serious problem stems from a basic ambiguity in Frankfurts conception of freedom. While it is clear that Frankfurt regards the wills freedom as contingent on the presence of a second-order volition it not is not at all clear that this is a sufficient condition. It would appear that while Frankfurts account may provide a good analysis of those actions we feel free in undertaking and for which we feel responsible, it may not actually address the deeper metaphysical problem presented by determinism.24 This problem can be brought out through the following considerations. A moments reflection reveals an infinite regress that threatens to result when the predication of freedom is made to turn
24 A close reading of Frankfurt suggests that he holds that it must also be the case that the agent could have done otherwise than constitute his will as he did (1982: 94). If this is indeed Frankfurts view, then his account might best be seen as providing insight into the psychology of freedom, rather than addressing its metaphysics.
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on the presence of higher-order volitions. If the freedom of the will is dependent on the presence of a second-order volition towards it, are we free with respect to that second-order volition? Do we not then require a third-order volition to ensure the freedom of the second? Once this sequence gets started we are quickly faced with the prospect of requiring an infinite number of higher-order volitions, each needed to guarantee the freedom of the one below it; ultimately an infinite series of volitions would be required to guarantee the freedom of the will. But this is impossible.25 Perhaps this difficulty could be dealt with by arguing that, as a point of empirical fact, all we ever really do have are desires of the first and second-order or, at most, of the third order. If we choose to speak of even further, higher-order desires and volitions, it is not really clear that we would be referring to anything at all. The thirdorder statement, I want to have the desire to have the effective desire to do X seems rather dubious in terms of its possible point of reference. And it certainly does not appear that by adding another I want to the beginning of the sentence we would be adding any new information about the subjects actual mental life. At some point there is no further I want; the causes for ones desires are impersonal. Ones desires just are, they arise without any choice, or even reflection, being involved.
25 Cf. Schopenhauer 1985: 6: The empirical concept of freedom signifies: I am free when I can do what I will. Here in the phrase what I will the freedom is already affirmed. But when we now inquire about the freedom of the willing itself, the question would now take this form: Can you also will your volitions?, as if a volition depended on another volition which lay behind it. Suppose that this question is answered in the affirmative, what then? Another question would arise: Can you also will that which you will to will? Thus we would be pushed back indefinitely, since we would think that a volition depended on a previous, deeper lying volition. In vain would we try to arrive in this way finally at a volition which we must think of and accept as dependent on nothing else. But if we were willing to accept such a volition, we could as well accept the first as the one we happened to make the last. Consequently, the question would be reduced to a simple: Can you will? But whether a mere affirmation of this question decides the problem of the freedom of the will, is what we wanted to know. So the problem remains unresolved.
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These considerations serve to underline the limitations of Frankfurts account of free will. They return us squarely to our earlier observations, in the Buddhist context, regarding the freedom of the mental states upon which actions are based. As we have seen, it is indeed possible to sensibly ask whether a person has the will they want to have. A determinist will argue that the causes that give rise to the mental states upon which ones actions are based are not subject to control; they are, when one traces them back, ultimately impersonal in nature (in the sense of being e.g. historical, genetic, cultural, etc). Determinists take the fact that choices are caused events very seriously; even if our present awareness can reflect on and evaluate our choices, the thoughts and values entering into these evaluations are, in the last analysis, themselves beyond control at some point they just are; we do not choose them or their causes. The Buddhist position accords with such considerations. There is no final, independent Self at which point the chain of causes and conditions magically comes to a halt. In the last analysis it is not possible to have it of the will, Let my will be thus, let my will not be thus.
The foundations of morality

If this is so, should it then be concluded that the Buddhist position, like that of the incompatiblist determinist, undermines the foundations for moral responsibility? If there is no essential Self to which responsibility may ultimately be attributed, is there then no moral responsibility at all? Interestingly, from the Buddhist perspective the answer would appear to be no. In fact the Buddha appears to have held the unusual view (from the western philosophical perspective) that while the will is not metaphysically free, moral responsibility is just a fact about the way things are. Although ultimately there is no autonomous, permanent self-essence or Self, persons actions do have results that accord with the moral character of those actions. Moral causality is simply one kind of causality operational in the universe. So moral responsibility is simply one kind of causal responsibility. Like it or not, results flow from actions; happiness and suffering are the inevitable results of moral (kusala) and immoral (akusala) action. Such action (kamma) is dis-
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tinguishable as mental, physical, and vocal behaviour that is voluntarily performed or willingly done (i.e. accompanied by cetan); this is the key factor in determining moral responsibility. Freedom of the will is not. The point is that the action is voluntary, not that the will is free.26 In any case, it can be seen that the problem of the compatibility of universal causality and moral responsibility does not appear to have been a concern to the Buddha. Causality in terms of such things as motivations, and karmic results itself is a necessary correlate of morality from the Buddhist perspective.27 What did seem to concern the Buddha, however, was perhaps a not altogether unrelated problem, which may be stated as follows. If a person is ultimately only a series of causally interrelated events, some of which are identified with, how is it that freedom, qua liberation (nibbna) is possible? Put another way: if the five aggregates are ultimately beyond our ability to control, how is it possible that we would ever begin to strive for, much less reach, the goal which is the end of suffering? In the Mahli Sutta, the Buddha provides an answer. The context is a question posed by one Mahali, who has been listening to the teachings of the samaa Praa Kassapa. The latter has been espousing the view that beings are defiled and purified without
A case might be made that it is precisely in these instances of willingly performed behaviour that the will may be said to be free. Thus the will is empirically free, rather than metaphysically free, and this is, from the Buddhist perspective, the only kind of freedom necessary for moral responsibility. But this position is problematic. The notion that kamma is free by definition or nature does not correspond to the manner in which it is actually treated in the Buddhist tradition. It does not rest easily with the basic Buddhist orientation that one should aim to become free from kamma, and indeed that one does become progressively more free from it as one advances on the spiritual path. The idea of free action in Buddhism can probably be best understood as action that is performed when there is freedom from delusion on the part of the agent. Such freedom is, however, not usually attributable to the ordinary person (see below). 27 Buddhism differs from western compatibilist theories that seek to ground judgments of moral responsibility in some kind of intersubjective agreement or social consensus. Morality is objectively grounded in the way things are. Dhamma, qua moral order, is not conventional.
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cause or condition. Such a view would seem parallel that of the indeterminist described at the outset of this paper. The Buddhas explanation as to how it is that one is purified with cause and condition runs as follows:
If Mahali, this form were exclusively pleasurable, immersed in pleasure, steeped in pleasure, and if it were not [also] steeped in suffering, beings would not experience revulsion towards it. But because form is suffering, immersed in suffering, steeped in suffering, and is not steeped [only] in pleasure, beings experience revulsion towards it. Experiencing revulsion, they become dispassionate, and through dispassion they are purified. This, Mahali, is a cause and condition for the purification of beings; it is thus that beings are purified with cause and condition.28 (SN III 70)
The Buddha goes on to give identical analyses with regard to each of the other four aggregates. It is, perhaps, merely fortuitous that this sutta is placed in the Sayutta-Nikya immediately following the Anattalakkhaa Sutta. On the other hand, its placement there could suggest that the early compilers of the canon were aware of the issue raised by the preceding sutta. They may well have sensed the possibility of doubt arising with regard to the compatibility of spiritual freedom and universal causality, given the extraordinary claim that none among the five aggregates are subject to control. This is admittedly speculative, but it is not, perhaps, entirely implausible. In any case, we can see that the Buddha taught that beings are actually constituted in such a way as to allow for the possible at28 Rpa ca hidam Mahli ekantasukha abhavissa sukknupatita sukhvakkantam anavakkanta dukkhena // nayida satt rpasmi nibbindeyyu // // Yasm ca kho Mahli rpa dukkha dukkhnupattita dukkhvakkantam anavakkantam sukhena // tasm satt rupsmi nibbindanti nibbinda virajjanti virg visujjhanti // // Aya kho Mahli hetu ayam paccayo sattna visuddhiy // evam pi sahetu-sapaccay satt vis sujjhanti // // Essentially the same sequence of causes can be found in the Anattalakkhaa Sutta, with the difference that rather than beginning with suffering it begins with the recognition, for each of the aggregates, This is not mine, this I am not, this is not my self. A further difference is that the Mahli Sutta explicitly frames the discussion in terms of causes and conditions.
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tainment of purification and liberation. Among the possible realms of rebirth, it is the realm of human beings in particular that is considered to have just the right balance of pleasure and suffering as to generate the motivation to aspire for freedom. We are lucky!
Towards an account of freedom in Buddhism.

Freedom in Buddhism is not conceived of as a quality of the will. If there is no independent originary source over and above our mental, physical and vocal actions, then there certainly cannot be any free will. Thus the assertion that from a higher perspective the will cannot be said to be either free or unfree is, it seems to me, off the mark. It is precisely from the higher perspective that the will can be seen to be, in truth, unfree. Our lack of free will in this case exactly parallels the Buddhist understanding of personal identity. While it makes sense to talk of persons, there is no Self. It is not the case that such a Self neither exists nor does not exist. From a Theravda Buddhist perspective, this formulation is mistaken. The notion of free will is conceptually bound up with the notion of Self. Just as the Self is ultimately seen to be a delusion, so too is the wills freedom. No Self, no free will. This is a difficult point. It is interesting to note that the Anatta lakkhaa Sutta is not addressed to ordinary persons. It is a discourse directed to an audience of learners or disciples in higher training (sekhas), individuals who have attained the higher perspective that sees things as they really are. There is an important sense in which these individuals, beginning with the stream-enterer (sotpanna), are understood to be free already in a way that is not true of ordinary people (puthujjanas). They are free from the false view of Self.29 The very notion of the sekha as a kind of agent is defined in terms of having undergone a moment of transformative insight into the truth of nonself. There is nothing that it is right
29 They are free of sakkya-dihi, ie beliefs or views that see any of the aggregates as Self, owned by a Self, in Self, or containing Self. Sekhas are not, however, free of the more diffuse, non-specific I am conceit (asmi mna). This only disappears when one reaches arahathood. Thanks to Peter Harvey for this observation. See Harvey 2004: 32.
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to view as in some way related to Self. The first five disciples are said to have experienced this insight some days earlier, upon hearing the Buddhas first sermon, the Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta.30 Upon hearing the second it is said that they became arahats (Bodhi 2000: 1066).31 In closing this essay I would suggest that these considerations concerning the reported audience of the Buddhas second sermon offer us a clue as to how freedom in Buddhism may be best understood. Freedom is principally a predicate of persons and consists in an absence of suffering and its causes. It is thus dependent on the state of knowledge and purity of the awareness of the agent. The ultimate aim of Buddhism is, of course, freedom from suffering. Suffering is a reality that, first and foremost, is to be under stood. Thus freedom means understanding, and then abandoning, the causes and conditions of suffering within oneself. It is this very knowledge of causality (paiccasamuppda) that allows the mind to become liberated. Because different degrees of insight and mental purity may be attributed to the various kinds of spiritual actor described by the Buddha, so too corresponding levels of freedom may be attributed to them. The ordinary person (puthujjana) is not a free person, operating as she does from within the deluded perspective of being an independent actor in control of her life in sasra. Although such an agent may be reflexively aware of her actions, and although such actions may be voluntary, or empirically free in some other sense, they occur in the context of the basic delusion of an underlying I, whence they are regarded as originating independently. Being out of touch with reality in this way, such a persons mind will ineviThis would explain the arguments apparent presupposition that the five aggregates are all that a person is. 31 In earlier articles I have argued that early Buddhist ethics can best be understood as a kind of agent based moral contextualism, in which the key classes of agent are the puthujjana, the sekha and the arahat. Rather than beginning with an examination of the nature of moral action per se, this approach to Buddhist ethics begins by investigating the phenomenology of moral experience belonging to each kind of person. See Adam 2005 and 2008.
30
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tably be trapped in confusion, inconsistent and conflicting desires, and suffering. From the Buddhist perspective this kind of person must be regarded as unfree. The sekha, on the other hand, is a free person in a certain way, having rid herself of the basic delusion of self (and with it, we should add, any notion of an independent will). Being irreversibly oriented away from suffering and its causes and towards nibbna, such a person can be characterized as more consistently having the desires she wants to have and on a firmer basis than is the case for ordinary persons.32 An internal order has been irreversibly established in such a person and she cannot do otherwise than act from within a psychological orientation that is turned towards nibbna. Although the mind of the sekha remains obscured to some extent, afflicted by residual defilements, the complete freedom of nibbna is assured. The arahat has realized nibbna; she has attained spiritual freedom.33 She is a completely free person, being free from all mental defilements including any trace of self-centred desire; indeed because of this she is free from kamma itself.34 In fact, because the arahat is entirely free from desire that she identifies with, she might
32 Different gradations of freedom can be associated with each of the variDifferent ous subdivisions of sekha i.e. the stream-enterer (sotpanna), once-returner (sakadgmin), and non-returner (angmin). In general, although their sla is perfect, they remain subject to various fetters (samyojana), including such unskillful desires as craving for subtle rpa and arpa states. Streamenterers and once-returners are still subject to sense-desires and ill-will. 33 See Harvey 2007: 8184 for a more detailed discussion of the qualities associated with the arahats spiritual freedom. 34 In an earlier article (2005) I have attempted to spell out these distinctions among kinds of persons in relation to some of the key vocabulary of morality employed in the texts, principally the antonymous pairs of kusalaakusala, pua-apua, and sukka-kaha. I have argued that the latter dyad serves as a conceptual bridge between the former two pairs, carrying connotations of each. Whereas kusala is a term with strong epistemic implications, pua principally indicates moral goodness. The two are coextensive. More recently (2008) I have moved towards providing a phenomenological account of the same distinctions. I characterize the action of the sekha as principally (or teleologically) kusala and secondarily (or intrumentally) pua.
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even be described as being free from the will. To put the matter in this way depends, of course, on a conception of the will as desire one identifies with. On the other hand, if we follow Frankfurt and identify the will with the desire that moves one to act then the arahat can also be described as having the will she wants to have, and therefore a free will.35 While no agent can be said to possess freedom of the will in the metaphysical sense of self-causation sought by some western philosophers, the arahat can be said to have a free will, indeed a perfectly free will, in the empirical sense of this expression proposed by Frankfurt. More generally, freedom in Buddhism can be regarded negatively as a freedom from constraints upon a person either internal or external depending on ones focus. That is to say, just as the ordinary person, the learner and the liberated being are free from mental defilements to varying degrees, so too they are free from sasra. The sekha may be contrasted with the ordinary person in that while the latter wanders aimlessly in sasra, the former is consistently oriented towards nibbna a goal she is destined to attain. Alternatively, if we wish to characterize their respective states in positive terms, one may say that each type of person possesses a different degree of knowledge and mental purity. Thinking of freedom principally as a quality of these ideal types, dependent on their respective levels of spiritual realization,
35 One may also say that they conduct themselves freely, in a way that isnt true of the ordinary person their conduct is informed by a veridical awareness of the way things really are. As a consequence their activities are accompanied by a natural sense of freedom. Similar feelings would be associated with the experience of the sekha. As well, we would expect to find in the sekha a new sense of freedom qua relief at being so recently rid of the burden of a belief in Self. Although we cannot examine the idea in any detail in this essay, it should be noted that Buddhism is not unique in maintaining a teleological conception of freedom, one in which freedom is at least in part conceived in terms of conduct that is in accord with ones higher nature. In the case of Buddhism, of course, the paradoxical aspect is that there is no one, ultimately, who possesses such a nature. A case can be made that because there is no Self to serve as a repository of hidden desires, the Buddhist position avoids the dangers associated with such an idea on which see Berlin 1984: 2225.
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allows us to gain a clearer understanding of some of Harveys observations, mentioned at the outset of this paper. We can now see how it is that freedom may be thought of as possessing varying degrees. The suggestion here is that such variation may best be regarded as occurring among kinds of person and not (or at least not principally) within an individual person over the short term (although, of course, an ordinary person may become a sekha and so on). Thus the Buddhas teachings do in fact suggest that freedom admits of degrees. But they do not imply that human beings are possessed of a will that is metaphysically free, or one that is both metaphysically free and unfree, or even one that is neither. From a Theravda Buddhist perspective it would be more accurate to say that while a persons will may be judged empirically free in one sense or another, it definitely is not possible for anyone to possess a metaphysically free will. But for the Buddhist this presents no problem.
Abbreviations
SN Sayutta-Nikya, ed. L. Feer. 5 vols. London 18841898 (Pali Text Society). English translation: see Bodhi (2000).
Bibliography
Adam, Martin T. (2005) Groundwork for a Metaphysic of Buddhist Morals: A New Analysis of pua and kusala, in light of sukka. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 12, 6285. Adam, Martin T. (2008) Classes of Agent and the Moral Logic of the Pali Canon. Argumentation 22, 115124. Berlin, Isiah. (1984) Two Concepts of Liberty. In Liberalism and Its Critics. Ed. Michael Sandel. New York: New York University Press, 1536. Bodhi, Bhikkhu. (2000) The Connected Discourses of the Buddha. 2 vols., Boston: Wisdom Publications. Einstein, Albert. (1982) Ideas and Opinions. New York: Three Rivers Press. Federman, Asaf. (2010) What Kind of Free Will did the Buddha Teach? Philosophy East and West 60, 119. Frankfurt, Harry. (1982) Freedom of the Will and The Concept of a Person. In Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 8195.
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Harvey, Peter (2004) The Selfless Mind. Oxon: RoutedgeCurzon. Harvey, Peter (2007) Freedom of the Will in Light of Theravda Buddhist Teachings. Journal of Buddhist Ethics 14, 3598. Keown, Damien. (1992) The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. London: Macmillan Press. Kuan, Tse-fu. (2009) Rethinking Non-Self: A New Perspective from the Ekottarika-gama. Buddhist Studies Review 26.2, 155175. Locke, John. (1959) An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Ed. A.C. Fraser. New York: Dover Publications, Inc. Sayadaw, Ven. Mahasi. (1996) The Great Discourse on Not Self. Bangkok: Buddhadhamma Foundation. Schopenhauer, Arthur. (1985) On the Freedom of the Will. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. Thanissaro, Bhikkhu. (1996) The Wings to Awakening. Barre: Dhamma Dana Publications. Also available at: http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/thanissaro/wings/index.html, last visited 02-06-2011 Van Inwagen, Peter. (1982) The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism. In Free Will. Ed. Gary Watson. New York: Oxford University Press, 4658.
Buddhist metaethics
Bronwyn Finnigan
Introduction
The nature and scope of Buddhist ethics is a topic of inquiry that is increasingly garnering the critical attention of contemporary Buddhist thinkers. Significantly, much recent work in this field involves attempts to determine which contemporary Western normative ethical theory a Buddhist ethic most closely resembles. For instance, Keown (2001) and, later, Cooper & James (2005: 68) claim that Buddhist ethics is a type of virtue ethics. Siderits (2003, 2007) argues that it is unmistakably consequentialist, as do Williams (1998) and Goodman (2008). Velez (2004) and Clayton (2006) argue that Buddhist ethics is best understood as a combination of virtue ethics and utilitarianism whilst Harvey (2000: 49), though acknowledging the analogies, nonetheless maintains that a Buddhist ethical theory is significantly distinct.1 While a somewhat analogical exposition of a Buddhist ethic may suggest simplification and conflation (even reduction), it is not difficult to see why one might find such a strategy appealing. As Georges Dreyfus (1995) reminds us, the Tibetan Buddhist tradition (to take just one Buddhist lineage as an example) did not develop systematic theoretical reflections on the nature and scope of ethics; nor, indeed, do Indic Buddhist texts provide systematic analyses of ethics and ethical concepts. This is not to overlook the fact that
1 Note that all of the above positions come with various limitations and qualifications. For instance, Goodmans position is limited to Indian Mahyna Buddhist ethics whereas Claytons position is presented in the context of an exposition of ntidevas iksamuccaya.
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Indo-Tibetan traditions had substantive ethical views; moral precepts are advanced and discussed at great length throughout the entire Buddhist tradition. Dreyfus point, however, is that such discussion is often conducted in practical terms (i.e. concerning the implementation and application of precepts) rather than with the kind of rich and systematic reflection about their nature and scope that is typical of contemporaneous treatises focusing on epistemology and philosophy of language. As Dreyfus rightly points out, this dearth in Buddhist ethical theorization causes problems for modern scholars who want to explore the nature of Buddhist ethics. To a large extent, Buddhist ethicists find themselves having to construct Buddhist ethical theories. Given that Western philosophy has quite a robust tradition of ethical theorization, it seems reasonable to exploit analogies with these systems in the attempt to weave together the various Buddhist moral threads.2
2 One might wonder whether Buddhism is in need of ethical theorization. The fact that systematized theorizations were not developed within the Indo-Tibetan traditions may be taken to suggest something distinctive about Buddhist approaches to ethics. For instance, Hallisey (1996) takes this to indicate that Buddhist practitioners and intellectuals employed a kind of ethical particularism which recognises a diversity of values. Hallisey contrasts this notion with ethical theories, interpreted as aiming to provide singular criteria or methods for the resolution of moral conflicts, moral decision-making and action-guidance. Whether or not we infer from the historical lack of ethical theorization in the Buddhist tradition that Buddhism, therefore, has no need for ethical theory will depend on what we mean by ethical theory. Halliseys characterisation of this notion seems consistent with many contemporary Western views on the nature and purpose of normative ethical theorizing; the predicate normative may be taken to suggest that ethical theories aim to provide criteria and methods for figuring out what we ought to do. In response, one might argue that Buddhist canonical texts already provide sufficient resources aimed at advising practitioners on the recognition, instantiation and/or implementation of moral precepts and/or qualities without additionally requiring the introduction of ethical theories, so understood. This is not the only way to think of ethical theory, however. Alternatively, it might be understood as the attempt to coherently explain the nature and role of ethics, in its variety of aspects, within the wider context of the Buddhist
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As in the contemporary Western ethical tradition, questions concerning (normative) ethical theorizing are only one species of ethical concern.3 An additional area of interest is metaethics.4 Metaethical questions primarily concern the nature and status of, and assumptions that support, ethical claims and theories. Such assumptions include, inter alia, various epistemological and metaphysical commitments. One particular metaphysical commitment that has been explicitly considered by most aforementioned Buddhist ethicists is the
philosophical tradition. Ethical theory, on this broader interpretation, seeks to answer questions specifically about ethics (such as its function in Buddhist soteriology; the function of moral precepts for Buddhist ethical practice; the role of analogies and stories for the cultivation of ethical practice) rather than provide instructions or methods for how practitioners should engage in ethical practice. On this broader conception of ethical theory, Halliseys notion of ethical particularism, itself, counts as an ethical theory. For instance, Hallisey claims that ethical particularism is a necessary heuristic for explaining how ethical stories function for Buddhist practitioners (i.e. Hallisey argues that they help sensitise practitioners to morally salient features of situations in order to negotiate conflicts without appeal to criteria). To the extent that ethical particularism seeks to provide an explanation of a certain aspect of Buddhist ethics, ethical particularism, on our broader definition, is an ethical theory. However, Hallisey is right to argue that it is not a normative ethical theory, understood as providing specific methods or criteria to guide moral decision-making as oftentimes conceived by contemporary Western ethicists. This might be taken to indicate that the contemporary Western ethical taxonomies are unduly limited. Indeed, on this broader definition of ethical theory, the division between ethical theory and metaethical concerns becomes much less distinct. However, I shall leave further reflection on this issue for a different paper. 3 See previous note. 4 The contemporary Western ethical tradition also pays considerable attention to practical or applied ethics. Applied ethics proceeds, for the most part, via application of ideas developed in ethical theories to practical situations and cases. Although I shall not discuss applied ethical questions in this paper, it is notable that Buddhist scholars have recently ventured into this territory, offering accounts of how a Buddhist ethic may provide solutions to issues concerning the environment (Cooper & James 2005), abortion (Keown ed. 1998), and bioethics (Levin 2004).
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bearing certain metaphysical views concerning the nature and status of an ontological entity self (Pali atta, Skt. tman) has on ethical theorizing. One of the central tenets of Buddhism is that there is no self (best known in its Pali form as the anatta doctrine). How best to understand this doctrine is subject to much dispute. For many, this doctrine constitutes the ontological thesis that there is no substantial ego underlying our experience we are nothing but a sequence of causally linked psychological and physical events and processes. Whether such events and processes themselves have substantive metaphysical status is a moot issue. For Siderits (2003), the anatta doctrine is not only an ontological thesis (which, he argues, commits us to a reduced level of events and processes with substantive metaphysical status); it also has direct implications for putative Buddhist ethical theorizing. In particular, Siderits argues that the anatta doctrine rules out theorizing Buddhist ethics by analogy with contemporary Aristotelian virtue ethics. His reason for this is the view that virtue ethics presupposes a virtuous agent as bearer of particular virtues. This, he takes it, can be reduced to a metaphysical commitment to a self, which Buddhists would deny. Keown (2001), in stark contrast, defends a virtue ethical model of Buddhist ethics. He argues that Buddhism provides sufficient criteria to allow the individuation of subjects (as persons, perhaps), which, on his view, is all that is required by his Buddhist virtue ethical theory.5 For Keown, pursuing the issue of the ulti5 Indeed, Siderits himself acknowledges a distinction between the concept of person and that of self; whilst Buddhists clearly reject the latter, Siderits argues that they need not deny the pragmatic utility of employing the former. Despite these concessions, I believe that Keowns particular exposition of Buddhist virtue ethics does, indeed, commit him to a substantive account of the nature of self (above and beyond that of merely individuated persons). This is because Keown conceives of action as essentially involving choice which, though not necessarily problematic in itself, is defined by reference to that core of the personality which, Keown maintains, is the final resort for explanation of action (2001: 221). How consistent Keown is in endorsing this view is arguable. However, while Keown may be committed to a substantive view of the self, it does not necessarily follow that all theorizations of Buddhist ethics in virtue ethical terms will necessarily be so
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mate ontological constitution of persons as part of a study of ethics confuses ethics and metaphysics and, hence, does not make for a fruitful line of enquiry (19). Moreover, he protests that although facts are not irrelevant to values they have no priority, and ethical issues must be addressed with ethical arguments: they cannot be brushed aside by reference to facts of a scientific, ontological or metaphysical nature (162). Metaethics certainly should not be pursued or conceived of as merely the joint pursuit of ethics and metaphysics (or science or epistemology). Nor should it be conceived of as a simple-minded attempt to derive evaluative conclusions from purely factual considerations (nor, indeed, to demonstrate the impossibility of ethics by citing the failure to provide such a derivation). Keown is right to protest that this would lead to a number of confusions. However, as Siderits challenge makes clear, legitimate and important questions arise, and need to be addressed, concerning the relationship between metaphysical and epistemological considerations and ethical theories, questions which, in my view, constitute the proper domain of metaethics. Ethical theories are not simply collections or lists of values, they are attempts to explain the nature and role and relationships between these ethical values and thoughts and practices within the wider context of the aims and projects of the Buddhist philosophical tradition. As such, they take for granted various epistemological and ontological views and commitments. If these commitments conflict with received Buddhist theories on the nature of epistemology and ontology, the fact of such conflict seriously challenges the status of the putative Buddhist ethical theory. Having said this, however, Keown is surely right to point out that the mere presence of such conflict does not, in itself, automatically confer priority to the epistemological and ontological theories; we do not simply brush ethics aside in the face of opposition. Arguably all Buddhist lineages recognize there to be an important relationship between the practical and theoretical domains; between ethics (Pali sla, Skt. la) and compassion (karu) on the one hand, insight or wisdom (Pali pa, Skt. praj ) on the
committed.
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other. Given that there is no definitive explanation of the nature of these relationships, why should we assume from the outset that when push comes to shove ethical theories and considerations will, and should, give way? What, then, is the nature of the relationship between Buddhist theories on metaphysics and epistemology (i.e. the insight and wisdom traditions of Buddhist thought) and ethical theorizing? In this paper, I shall investigate certain aspects of this relationship. I shall not seek a definitive and comprehensive answer. Moreover, I shall not proceed by addressing this relationship in terms of the bearing certain metaphysical views about the nature of self may have on certain forms of Buddhist ethical theory. Rather, I shall focus on the bearing certain epistemological considerations concerning the possibility of action have on Buddhist ethical theorizing. My point of departure shall be Keowns highly influential virtue ethical theorization of Buddhist ethics (2001). I shall discuss this ethical theory in relation to a contemporary exposition of two prominent Buddhist epistemological theories, namely, Dunnes exposition of the views of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti (1996). I shall highlight certain points of conflict between these ethical and epistemological theories and will argue that the resolution of this conflict requires revision (either in interpretation of theories or in the theories themselves) by all parties. I shall conclude by arguing for substantive revision to these theories via an engagement with this conflict; in so doing, I hope to exemplify some of the virtues of engaging with a metaethical methodology for the advancement of the respective domains of inquiry.
1. Keowns (virtue ethical) nature of Buddhist ethics

Fundamental to Keowns virtue ethical theorization of Buddhist ethics is the idea that Buddhism is centred on a teleological goal or summum bonum of human endeavour, namely, nirva (or, more specifically, nirva-in-this-life).6 Crucial to this view is the idea
I follow Adam in using Sanskrit words (i.e. nirva, la, karman) in place of the Pali (i.e. nibbna, sla, kamma). One exception, however, is that
6
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that the perfection of ethical conduct (la), together with the perfection of knowledge or insight (pa), is jointly constitutive of nirva. On almost all accounts, a buddha is the paradigm of one who has achieved nirva. It follows from Keowns account that buddhas not only achieve intellectual perfection but engage in ethical conduct; indeed, the perfection of ethical conduct. Moreover, for Keown, the moral precepts that are presented in Buddhist treatises circumscribe the conduct of the Buddha (54). That is, the moral precepts of ethical action developed in the early treatises take descriptions of the Buddhas behaviour as their paradigm. These moral precepts, in turn, form the basis for the preceptual codes common to both the Theravda and Mahyan traditions. To observe the precepts, therefore, is to model ones behaviour on that of the Buddha (31). More specifically, to pursue the goal of ethical perfection, on Keowns account, is to pursue the goal of acting as the Buddha would act. The Buddhas la, or moral perfection, becomes an essential goal for all who aspire to his status (55). For Keown, moral precepts serve a dual function; they both encapsulate condensed descriptions (54) of how the historical Buddha did act as well as provide a model for how a buddha would act (or, how we would act were we to attain nirva). Thus, for instance, given that compassion (karu), generosity (dna) and courage (vrya) are all considered to fall under the umbrella term la (19), and la circumscribes the conduct of the Buddha (54), it follows that the conduct of the historical Buddha not only instantiated these virtues or qualities (i.e. he acted compassionately, generously and courageously) but that buddhas, more generally (i.e. those who attain nirva) also act in ways that are compassionate, generous and courageous. This introduces an important element of normativity into Keowns theory. Insofar as we seek to attain nirva, and a partial constituent of nirva involves acting
I shall retain the original Pali form of pa rather than its Sanskrit form praj. This is because Keown argues for conceptual differences between these two terms and, thus, his claims with respect to one will not automatically transfer to the other.
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in ways that instantiate these qualities or virtues, we should (or ought to) attempt to act in these ways. Crucial to Keowns theory is the rejection of transcendental accounts of buddhahood and nirva. For Keown, nirva is the highest and best form of human life and, hence, the Buddha achieved the fulfillment of human potential, not its transcendence (113); he lived an exemplary moral life (75) with merely a difference in degree, and not in kind, of cultivated ethical goodness from one who is still following the path. What distinguishes a buddha from ordinary fallible beings following the path is not the transcendence of human activity, but the fact that his moral conduct, that is to say his interaction with other beings, is perfect (114). The idea that a buddhas actions or behaviour is to be characterised in much the same way as followers of the path (albeit with a profoundly higher degree of perfection) is controversial. Much recent debate has focused on Keowns claim that every virtuous action (including that of a buddha who has attained nirva) is both kuala (i.e. morally good or skillful) and puya (i.e. karmically meritorious) (123). One locus of controversy concerns the canonical view that an arhat (i.e. a liberated or perfect being) is free from, or has passed beyond the domain of, karma and rebirth. How can a virtuous action be considered both kuala and puya while the agent of the action has passed beyond the domain of karma, puya and apuya? Keown (2001) responds to this challenge by arguing that puya is a function of progress towards kuala; once kuala is achieved, puya becomes redundant (124). According to Velez (2004) this response contradicts the claim that virtuous action, by definition, is both kuala and puya (given that the virtuous action of a buddha is not puya). Nonetheless, Velez can be seen to endorse Keowns putative solution as an important correction to his view. For Velez, actions with the quality of puya are merely instrumental towards nirva whereas actions with the quality of kuala are genuinely constitutive. Significantly, this dispute is conducted on the basis of a common assumption that a buddha (or arhat; i.e. one who has attained nirva) has the capacity to act. The debate concerns what quali ties can be predicated of a buddhas actions (i.e. whether kuala
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and/or puya) not whether or not action is possible. Adam (2005) attempts to defuse this debate by pointing out that the term for action in the Buddhist canon is karman (Pali kamma). Given that the arhat is considered to have reached the goal of having destroyed action (kamma),7 Adam argues that an arhat cannot be considered to act at all.8 According to Adam, an arhats enlightened conduct or awakened activity (77) falls entirely outside the scope of kuala and puya. Note that while Adam denies arhats the capacity for action (karman), he nonetheless acknowledges that they engage in good conduct (76) and activity (77). Thus, even with Adams qualification, it remains the case that the debates that arise in response to Keowns account concern the kind or quality of a buddhas conduct (i.e. whether or not such conduct is karmically efficacious or, in Adams terms, whether or not such conduct counts as action). However, such debates do not question the underlying assumption that it is possible for a buddha or arhat to engage in conduct or activity (i.e. action that is not karmically efficacious). In what follows I shall focus on this underlying assumption and shall set aside the issues of whether or not a buddhas conduct is karmically efficacious; whether or not it should be termed conduct or activity or action; whether or not kuala or puya can be predicated of such conduct or action.
2. Keown continued
As mentioned, Keowns theory of Buddhist ethics is committed to the view that a buddha has the capacity to engage in ethical conduct insofar as ethical conduct is constitutive of nirva. This theory is also committed to the idea that a buddhas capacity for ethical
This is a quote from the Kukkuravatika Sutta in the Majjhima-Nikya, i, 390. 8 This argument depends on the close etymological connection between karman/kamma, as the term used for action, and karman/kamma as denoting the cycle of sasra. Note also that this is not a complete characterisation of Adams argument. At the core of Adams argument is the idea that the terms bright (sukka) and dark (kaha) can be employed to bridge the conceptual gap between pua and kusala. This issue, like that of puya and kuala proper, is outside the scope of this particular paper.
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conduct is characterised in much the same way as that of a follower of the path, albeit with a higher degree of perfection. How does Keown characterise this assumed capacity for ethical conduct (and action, more generally) which underlies his theory?9 There is no simple answer to this question. The dominant thread of Keowns argument focuses on an account of ethical conduct as requiring choice. This notion is first introduced in the context of discussing the Buddhas decision to teach the dharma. According to the Vinaya, after the Buddha attained enlightenment he was asked three times to teach. It is only when he is asked for the third time that he surveys the world with his Buddha-eye out of compassion (kruat) for beings and decides to teach rather than remain silent (Vin 1.6). Keown generalizes from this event the idea that the Buddhas initial hesitation (during which time the Buddha recognized alternative conceptions of human good) and subsequent decision to teach represent a new scale of values introduced by Buddhism (42). Ethical conduct, on this new view, paradigmatically involves choice and choice requires the recognition of alternatives. The idea that ethical conduct involves recognition of alternatives and choice resurfaces in Keowns later discussions of the notion of cetan. Although, again, there are many threads to Keowns discussion of cetan, his focal argument centres on the view that the faculty of moral choice [] for Buddhism is cetan [] it is the pivot around which virtue and vice revolve (195). Indeed, Keown considers cetan, defined as capacity for choice, to be that which determines the moral quality of an action. Keowns argument for this idea turns on an appeal to Abhidharmic literature. For Keown, virtues and vices are dharmas;
9 Henceforth I shall use the terms conduct and action interchangeably insofar as conduct does not have a present perfect form which leads to clumsy expression. Notice, also, that I will assume that what holds for ethical conduct must hold for conduct/action insofar as ethical conduct/action is a subset of conduct/action proper (i.e. it is action of a particular kind, or action performed in a particular way, but action for all that). In this paper I shall focus on ethical conduct, but most of the argumentation can be extended to a concern with action, more generally.
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they are real and objective elements found within the psyche (64). On his account, however, the virtues and vices do not, of themselves, motivate or cause action. Rather, they influence specific moral choices and decisions (214). Cetan, for Keown, is the preceding motivation [] which determines the moral quality of the action (178); cetan is the compass-needle of moral choice (211). A Buddhist virtue ethical theory, on Keowns view, is thus concerned with virtuous choices (222); virtues are dispositions to choose rightly (207). Indeed, by the end of Keowns argument it is no longer the case that the early Buddhist treatises describe the Buddhas conduct; rather, they contain a record of the Buddhas important moral choices (226). Significantly, the notion of cetan defined as choice is intimately connected with that of representing and considering alternative courses of action; there is no such thing as choice without alternatives between which one can choose. This is both recognized by Keown when he introduces the notion of a Buddhas decision to teach as occurring subsequent to his recognition of alternatives, and theorized in his claim that cetan is the outcome of a process that involves initial attention to the matter in hand (vitakka), reflection upon it (vicra), and an intellectual decision or resolution (adhimokkha) (211). Indeed, Keown proceeds to offer cetan as a suitable candidate for the Western philosophical term practical reason. According to this thread of Keowns thought, cetan comes to denote the entire process that generates action, starting from the initial intuition of a good end, subsequent deliberation (cetayitv) about practical choices, and conclusion in choice and action (218). Insofar as cetan is morally determinative, it follows that behaviour that is not produced via this process of cetan is not ethically charged (220). It is especially important to notice that the above characterisations of ethical conduct require that a buddha engages in conceptual thought. The characterisation of cetan in terms of choice (what I call Keowns minimal conception of cetan) requires that a buddha has capacities to represent and choose between alternative courses of action. A course of action is a conceptualized mental item that is entertained or represented, rejected or
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endorsed. The characterisation of cetan as process (what I call Keowns maximal conception of cetan) requires that a buddha also has capacities to reflect, compare and deliberate about these mental items. Both conceptions of cetan presuppose conceptuality. Significantly, however, conceptual thought is held suspect by most Buddhist epistemological theories. Hence, there is reason to think that the epistemological commitments that underlie Keowns theory conflict with the received views of Buddhist epistemology.
3. A dilemma: Dunnes thoughtless Buddha

In order to grasp the precise nature of the conflict that arises between the definitions of ethical conduct that underlie Keowns ethical theory and Buddhist epistemology, we need to consider and address particular epistemological theories. Buddhist epistemology is an umbrella term for a number of sophisticated and highly systematic theorizations. While there is much agreement among these theories (insofar as their proponents each conceive themselves to be consistent with the teachings of the Buddha) there is also considerable disagreement. Hence, in order to show that the presuppositions underlying Keowns theory do, indeed, conflict with received Buddhist epistemological views, we need to locate this disagreement in the context of particular epistemological theories. In what follows I shall focus on Dunnes exposition of two highly influential epistemological theories (i.e. that of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti) and shall demonstrate the extent to which they do, indeed, come into conflict with Keowns ethical theory.10 Both Dharmakrti and Candrakrti are part of an epistemic tradition that considers concepts (vikalpa, kalpan) to be closely linked to ignorance (avidy) and ignorance to be at the root of all suffering. Though the respective analyses of the relationship between concepts, ignorance and suffering vary, that there is such a
10 I shall only provide an overview of these theories and, even then, shall focus only on those aspects that are relevant to this discussion. In particular, I shall not address Dharmakrtis theory of apoha as putative solution to the possibility of inferential knowledge. For detailed discussion of this theory see Katsura 1984; Dreyfus 1997; Tillemans 1999.
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relationship is a shared assumption. It is also important to recognize that both thinkers agree that conceptual thought and inferential knowledge has objects or referents in much the same way as perceptions are considered to have objects or referents. For Dharmakrti, the objects of perception are considered to be unique and momentary particulars (svalakaa). These objects count as real insofar as they can be individuated in terms of the performance of causal functions and are detectable by sense faculties. Unlike perception, however, the objects or referents of conceptual thought and inferential knowledge are not considered to be real; they are words, concepts, universals (smnya), i.e. generally characterised phenomena (smnyalakaa), which have no inherent existence. As a result, Dharmakrti considers such cognitions to be ultimately erroneous or distorted (bhrnta). This is not to undermine the practical benefits of engaging in conceptual thought and inference.11 The salient problem, however, is that, according to Dharmakrti, conceptual thought essentially involves determining the apprehended intentional object as being a real particular when, in fact, the only real particulars are unique and momentary events in causal relations.12 In conceptual thought we combine things that are, in fact, distinct and we direct our anger (krodha), fear (bhaya), and craving (t) towards these pseudo-objects and, thereby, perpetuate suffering. It is not merely the case that, in conceptual thought, we make a mistake about what there really is, conceptual knowledge is not even capable of apprehending (particulars) just as they are because conceptuality is controlled by ignorance (PVSV, 49; Dunne 1996: 532; emphasis added). Dunne (1996) observes that for Buddhists of Dharmakrtis ilk ignorance is the beginningless source of suffering. And on Dharmakrtis view ignorance is also the mental mechanism the internal cause that compels people to lump things together conceptually and suffer thereby (532). Hence, it is not merely conceptuality that is false; it is false because it is (or is rooted in) ig-
11 Although all (conceptual cognitions) are confused, we still define some as instrumental and some as spurious. (PVSV, 49) 12 For a discussion of this point see Tillemans 1999.
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norance. As Dharmakrti himself writes, ignorance is defined as conceptuality. That is, ignorance is conceptuality. Ignorance leads one astray by its very nature (PVSV, 49). In identifying ignorance with conceptuality, argues Dunne, Dharmakrti implies that what is said of ignorance applies to conceptuality. Hence, just as ignorance is an essential cause of suffering, so too is conceptuality. It follows from this that just as ignorance must be overcome to become a buddha, so too must conceptuality (Dunne 1996: 533). Candrakrti, like Dharmakrti, also held the view that conceptuality is incompatible with buddhahood. Candrakrtis major work, the Madhyamakvatra, focuses on investigating the distinction between conventional reality (vyavahra, Tib. tha snyad; savti, Tib. kun rdzob) and ultimate reality (paramrtha; Tib. don dam).13 Although Candrakrti discusses this distinction in a number of ways, that which is relevant to the current discussion is the idea that things which exist in terms of ultimate reality are truly real and things that exist in terms of conventional reality are only provisionally real (i.e. they do not have ultimate or true reality). To this extent, Candrakrtis view is seemingly compatible with Dharmakrtis epistemological distinction between the objects of perceptual knowledge, which are ultimately real, and the objects of inferential knowledge, which do not have ultimate reality but, nonetheless, have a provisional or conventional status given their important pragmatic role in ordinary, everyday discourse. For Dunne, Candrakrtis view is much more radical than that of Dharmakrti insofar as Candrakrti argues that the objects of perceptual knowledge (i.e. svalakaa), themselves, cannot be ultimately real. This is because svalakaas are defined in terms of their causal capacities or functions; the fact of having causal capacities or functions serves to individuate them as particulars. For Candrakrti, the possibility of individuating particulars in terms of their definitive function presupposes that particulars have an essence. However, as Candrakrti argues, that which arises from
13 I here follow Dunne in his citations of probable equivalences between Sanskrit terms and original Tibetan translations (only probable insofar as it remains the case that the Madhyamakvatra and its commentaries are available only in Tibetan).
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causes and conditions cannot have an essence. Hence, the objects of perceptual knowledge are only conventionally real and the only possible ultimate reality is essencelessness (nisvabhvat, Tib. ngo bo nyid med pa) or emptiness (nyat, Tib. stong pa nyid ). According to Dunne, one implication of Candrakrtis extension of conventional reality to the objects of perception is that any experience of the world (i.e. whether it be of persons, tables, the color blue, or a sensation of pain) is necessarily an experience of an ultimately unreal, conventionally constructed thing. If we extended Dharmakrtis identification of ignorance and conceptuality to ignorance and conventionality, it would follow that conventionality, like ignorance, is a source of suffering. Hence, a buddha must not only abandon ignorance, he/she must also abandon conventionality in order to attain nirva. I shall not, here, critique Dunnes exposition of these epistemological theories. Notice, however, that on the assumption that it is correct, these theories have significant implications regarding the cognitive capacities of a buddha. For instance, it follows from this exposition of Dharmakrtis view that a buddha does not engage in any form of conceptual thought. In particular, he does not (or cannot) engage in forms of deliberation or reasoning (which would require the possibility of entertaining, and relating conceptualized thoughts). Nonetheless, for Dharmakrti, a buddha has the capacity for direct, sensory perception (pratyaka) insofar as the objects of perception are real. This is not the case for Candrakrti, however. For Candrakrti, on Dunnes analysis, a buddha does not even have the capacity for perception insofar as the objects of perception are also conventional constructs and, hence, rooted in ignorance. As Dunne argues: not only does such a buddha not see the ordinary things of the world, he does not even know ultimate reality because nothing at all occurs in a buddhas mind. Indeed, it would seem that Candrakrtis buddhas do not know anything at all [] one might even conclude that such a buddha is simply dead (1996: 548). While we need not go as far as Dunne in concluding that a Candrakrtian buddha is (cognitively like one) dead, it should be clear that the implications of these epistemological theories for the possibility of a buddhas capacities for action will be incred-
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ibly steep. In particular, the theories of both Dharmakrti and Candrakrti, on the above exposition, would rule out the possibility that a buddha could act or engage in ethical conduct as characterised by Keown. Both Keowns minimal and maximal characterisations of cetan require that a buddha engage in conceptual thought as part of the process that produces action. Indeed, a buddhas conduct does not count as ethical (it is not ethically charged) unless it is produced by just such a process. And, yet, according to the epistemological theories we have just canvassed, a buddha does not have the capacity to engage in such a cognitive process insofar as a buddha does not have capacities for conceptual thought. If we prioritize the conclusions of these epistemological theories, it seems to follow that Keowns virtue ethical theory is not a plausible theorization of Buddhist ethics insofar as it requires that a buddha can act (or engage in ethical conduct) and is committed to a characterisation of action (or ethical conduct) which presupposes that a buddha has the very capacities that are denied him on epistemological grounds. Hence, we should reject Keowns theory. However, if we alternatively prioritise Keowns theory we could argue that the epistemological theories must be wrong in their characterisation of a buddhas cognitive capacities (or lack thereof). Hence, we should reject the epistemological theories. How do we resolve this dilemma?14
One problematic way to approach the problem might be to appeal to the authoritative status of the disputants (a move not unfamiliar to the Buddhist commentarial tradition). That is, one could argue that we have a choice between accepting the views and theory of Keown, a contemporary Buddhist ethical theorist, or that of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti, Buddhist thinkers whose epistemological theories constitute the background of the entire IndoTibetan logico-epistemological tradition. This is not an uncommon move in Buddhist debates both contemporary and ancient. Such an approach would be fallacious, however; rejecting Keowns theory for reasons concerning relative authority in the tradition would be an ad hominem and has no bearing on the actual substance of his theory, which is what is at issue. Certainly, appeals to authority in support of the truth of particular claims are legitimate argumentative moves (albeit with limitations). However, appealing to the (relative) lack of authority of a disputant to disprove their theory is fallacious.
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In what follows, I shall argue that we can resolve this dilemma only if both parties of the conflict revise their positions in certain crucial respects. I shall argue that these revisions are substantive advances in both ethical and epistemological theorization. I shall conclude that this result reflects favorably on metaethics as a methodology for inquiry.
4. Resolving the dilemma

My first approach to resolving this dilemma involves a return to Keowns virtue ethical theory of Buddhist ethics. The idea that puts Keowns theory in direct conflict with the epistemological theories of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti is the idea that ethical conduct (and action, more generally) requires representation of alternatives and choice of a course of action as an essential part of the process that directly productive of action. Need a virtue ethical theory of Buddhist ethics conceive of ethical conduct in these terms? I think not. The first reason is phenomenological and stems from a reflection on typical actions of ordinary fallible beings. In the course of a typical day we do a multitude of things: we breathe almost continually; blink from time to time; walk from place to place; eat and drink; forget various things; talk to our friends. Some of these things do not count as intentional (e.g. blinking and forgetting). For many philosophers, it is only intentional, volitional action that genuinely counts as action.15 Such is true for many Buddhist thinkers. Indeed, cetan is often translated as volition or intention. It is intention/will (cetan), O monks, that I call action (kamma); having intended/willed, one acts through body, speech or mind (AN III, 415). Now, we might concede that action must be intentional action (or conduct that involves cetan) for it to genuinely count as action or conduct (and not mere behaviour). However, it does not follow that this necessarily commits us to a phenomenology of reflection and choice as directly productive of action. For instance, I typically do not reflect and choose what I say before every utterance I make to my friends. Nonetheless, I (often) intend what I
15
See, for instance, Davidson 1980.
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say when I say it. Similarly, I do not typically reflect and choose to brush my teeth before getting into bed, or to walk down the stairs to the kitchen in the morning, or many other instances of habitual behaviour. Of course I could, and sometimes do. But not always, and this is the point. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to mount a substantive argument in defense of this view, it seems at least plausible to suppose that some, if not much, of our intentional action does not involve a phenomenology of reflection and choice directly prior to action. Now, a defender of Keowns theory may respond to this by conceding that not all instances of intentional action involve conscious reflection and choice immediately prior to, and necessarily productive of, action. However, she may argue that Keowns theory is only committed to the view that ethical conduct is to be characterised in this way. Virtues are dispositions to choose; an action only counts as virtuous if chosen in the light of the virtues. If we deny that reflection and choice are constitutive of the process that generates ethical conduct then there is no way for the virtues to get a grip on our behaviour and, hence, for conduct to count as ethical. It seems, however, that if we have already granted the possibility that intentional action can count as intentional without prior reflection and choice, why cant we also grant the possibility that at least some instances of ethical conduct can be characterised in the same way? Consider, for instance, an ordinary, fallible person writing a monthly cheque to Plan International. Imagine that the person in question has been sponsoring a child for a number of years. Her income is healthy (she is the chair of a wealthy academic department and in no threat of redundancy); she is satisfied that Plan is managing her funds well and that her donation is genuinely contributing to the well being of the child. It is reasonable to suppose that this person does not need to represent alternatives and choose or form the intention to write her monthly cheque every time she writes the cheque; in many cases she simply sees that the payment is due (it might be marked on her calendar, for instance) and responds by writing the cheque. One might say that the intention to send a donation every month was formed way back when she originally chose to sponsor a child and does not have to be remade every time
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she writes the cheque. Writing a cheque for Plan has become a habit, one that she fully endorses. Moreover, even though the person does not represent alternatives and form the intention to send the donation every time she writes a cheque for Plan, if queried, she would freely endorse the action as something she intended to do and could provide reasons that explained why she did it. It does not follow, however, that these reasons and intentions need to have been mentally represented and formed as part of the process that directly produced the action (writing a cheque) for the action to count as intentional. Most importantly, if the act of writing a monthly cheque for Plan genuinely counts as virtuous, this is not because the person was motivated to choose to act in this way. It counts as virtuous because the action, itself, instantiates the virtue in question. A virtue is, characteristically, a disposition for a type of action, not a disposition for a certain type of choice. Notably, if we analyse Keowns own choice-model of ethical conduct, we can see that it already presupposes that types of actions are characterised by virtues. On Keowns account, virtues motivate or inspire or cause us to choose to enact virtuous courses of action. The paradigm object of choice is a course of action. Thus, action-X counts as virtuous, on Keowns account, if we choose to do course-of-action-X (rather than course-of-action-Y). However, it would seem that we choose to do course-of-action-X (rather than course-of-action-Y) insofar as X counts as a virtuous course of action, and Y does not (or X counts as more virtuous than Y, or is more virtuous in this situation or is more relevant etc.). Virtues could only motivate choices if courses of action can be recognized to instantiate virtues. Hence, to use Keowns example, compassion could only motivate the Buddhas choice to teach the dharma if the Buddha recognized that this course of action, teaching the dhar ma, counted as a compassionate action whereas keeping silent did not (or keeping silent was less compassionate or not compassionate given the intended audience, the situation, etc.). Of course what counts as an instantiation of a virtue will only be vaguely demarcated insofar as some action types will instantiate some virtues in some circumstances, but not in others, or at certain times, but not
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others, or in certain ways, but not others.16 Hence, the identification of an action as instantiating a particular virtue will necessarily take a number of factors into consideration. However, if an account of virtuous choice already presupposes the idea of a virtuous type of action (which we can recognize as being virtuous in order to choose to act in that way and, hence for our action to count as virtuous) why cant we simply dispense with the mediating act of choice and speak simply of virtues as being dispositions to perform certain types of actions or to respond in certain types of way (i.e. virtuously, compassionately, courageously), rather than merely dispositions to make certain types of choices to act in certain types of ways? That Keown seems to acknowledge some version of this response-account of virtuous conduct (in contrast to the choiceaccount of virtuous conduct) is arguably evident in his claim that moral virtue is manifested by making the appropriate ethical response in different situations (208) and that generosity and the other virtues involve not merely the bare realization that a practice is good, but also the instantiation of the practice (213). Keown also admits that the term cetan does not merely designate the act of making a choice or decision but may be taken to describe the general moral stance or posture adopted by the psyche and its orientation with respect to ends (213). If we adopt a response-account of ethical conduct, we might interpret this claim as follows: the fact that a person consistently and reliably responds compassionately to certain kinds of situations (and, thereby, instantiates a disposition to respond compassionately), expresses their moral stance or the posture of their psyche and its orientation. Moreover, given that this moral stance or posture was cultivated while they were a follower of the path, and perfected once they became a buddha, one could reasonably argue that their compassionate responses are intentional; the fact that they can respond compassionately as they do (i.e. in the right way, at the right time, to the right object etc.) is the
16 For instance, giving a child some bread might be compassionate in one circumstance but not in another (e.g. if they are allergic); at one time but not another (i.e. if given before a child is about to run); in one way but not another (e.g. if thrown into the dirt at their feet).
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result of a process of self-cultivation in which they have intentionally engaged. This position is consistent with the claim that actions involve cetan, but does not thereby commit us to an account of a buddha explicitly representing options and making choices immediately prior to ethical conduct. Cetan is still required for behaviour to count as action, but the scope of cetan extends over the process of cultivating dispositions for virtuous response rather than constituting choices (or choosing) that necessarily produces the action. Hence, my suggestion is that we revise Keowns choice-model of virtues and, instead, focus on a response-model of virtues. Virtues are dispositions for response, first and foremost, and not limited to dispositions for choice.17 If we accept this revision of Keowns account, we are no longer committed to a view of buddhahood that requires a buddha to represent and choose their actions in order to be considered to engage in ethical conduct. Of course, it may have been necessary for them to represent and choose actions while they were a follower of the path in order to cultivate the dispositions that enable them to respond the way they do. Nevertheless, the perfection of these dispositions is instantiated in their direct and spontaneous ethical responses, their actions are not mere manifestations of represented courses of actions that have been chosen and enacted.
17 Note that the response-model alternative to Keowns choice model uses Keowns presupposed definition of choice, which involves a phenomenology of representation, consideration and weighing up of alternative courses of action. It is an open question whether this is the best way to conceive choice and, hence, whether the response-model may be compatible with alternative conceptions. Choice is a function. It is unclear, however, whether or not the presentation and consideration of alternative courses of actions need be the relevant input and the performance of the function (i.e. choosing) need be a conscious mental event.It is the definition of choice qua deliberatively choosing, presupposed by Keowns ethical theory, that is problematic and that I take as the choice-model in contrast to the response-model advanced in this paper.
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5. Resolving the dilemma (cont.)

Is this response-model of a Buddhist virtue ethics compatible with the epistemological conclusions of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti as presented by Dunne? If so, have we resolved our dilemma? If we consider the view of Candrakrti, as interpreted by Dunne, the answer seems to be no. While a buddha with capacities for virtuous response, as characterised above, need no longer engage in deliberation or represent courses of action as options for choice prior to response (and, hence, need not engage in conceptual thought, broadly construed), a buddha would still need to be able to perceive situations in order to respond to them. A Candrakrtian buddha, on Dunnes analysis, is not capable of perceiving anything and, hence, does not have the required cognitive capacities. A Dharmakrtian buddha, however, is capable of perception. One might argue that if we opt for a Dharmakrtian epistemology over that of Candrakrti, then compatibility between our ethical theory and epistemology is assured and, hence, the dilemma resolved. Our response-model of Buddhist virtue ethics, on this view, is compatible with a Dharmakrtian epistemology and, hence, retains its status as a plausible theorization of Buddhist ethics. Moreover, given an apparent standoff between the epistemological theories of Dharmakrti and Candrakrti, it might seem that the appeal to ethical considerations functions as a means for adjudicating this dispute. As promising as this might sound, however, things are not quite so straightforward. While Dunnes Candrakrtian buddha clearly does not have sufficient cognitive capacities to count as a buddha capable of ethical response, it is not entirely clear that a Dharmakrtian buddha does either. A buddha, according to the response-model, does not merely require perceptual capacities; they need to be able to perceive and respond to situations or composite objects (e.g. disciples, suffering sentient beings etc.) which are, essentially, general. Even if these situations or objects of virtuous actions are not represented and, thereby, recognized as being objects of certain general kinds (i.e. a buddha does not need to think that the perceived object is a sentient being, least of all a suffering
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sentient being, which would be required if, in order for his conduct to count as ethical, the buddha had to choose what to do), nevertheless, what is perceived is an object of a certain kind (i.e. the buddha sees a suffering sentient being) and it is that which stimulates the relevant kind of ethical response. A Dharmakrtian buddha, however, merely has capacities to perceive particulars. What counts as a particular is a matter of much commentarial dispute (particularly in the Tibetan tradition).18 It seems, however, that if Dharmakrti is consistent in maintaining that the objects of perception are free from all conceptuality then he must commit to a view of perceptual objects being unique, momentary and non-persisting events. Such objects, however, do not seem to be the proper objects of ethical response. Dharmakrti might be seen to disagree with this analysis. He writes, even though buddhas and bodhisattvas may act out of compassion for the sake of others, they are faultless because they do not make false impositions (PVSV, 9; Dunne 1996: 539). Dunne interprets this to mean that buddhas do not engage in conceptuality insofar as they do not need to compulsively assume that the object of perception (i.e. the other; a disciple; a suffering sentient being) is anything more than a group of psycho-physical aggregates. However, even on this interpretation, it seems to be only when a group of psychophysical aggregates is seen as a particular object (i.e. a suffering sentient being) that a particular kind of compassionate response is stimulated. If seen as a different object (i.e. an enlightened being), a different kind of response is stimulated. Seeing a group of psychophysical particulars as an object of a certain kind, however, essentially involves combining particulars. If the combination of particulars is essential to conceptuality and, thereby, bound to (if not identical with) ignorance, it follows that the relevant kind of perceptual objects for ethical response is bound to ignorance and, hence is beyond the ken of a buddha. Should we, thus, conclude that the dilemma still holds and that our response-model of Buddhist virtue ethics is incompatible with the demands of epistemology? The answer to this, I propose, turns
18
For extended discussions of this point see Dreyfus 1997; Dunne 2004.
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on how we understand the notion of conceptuality in Dharmakrtis thought. Contemporary commentators seem to divide on what I will call a narrow and a broad interpretation of conceptuality in Dharmakrtis thought. Aspects of the narrow interpretation can be found in Dunne (2004, 2006). According to this view, conceptuality (vikalpa) merely involves the linguistic interpretation of non-conceptual mental images generated by perception.19 That is, perception produces a mental image through contact with sensory objects (2006: 508). This mental image is non-conceptual but has phenomenal content. Conceptuality consists in the subsequent superimposition (samropa) of an unreal conceptual image (kra) such as sameness onto the original image and, thereby, compulsively imput[ing] sameness onto entities that are in fact not the same (2004: 61). Conceptuality is tied to ignorance, on the narrow view, insofar as it involves the (erroneous) imposition of universals onto the non-conceptual images afforded by perception. Crucial to this view is the idea that the non-conceptual images generated by perception are not flawed. Rather it is the perceivers inability to interpret the image, and not the image itself, that is causing the error (2004: 87, my italics). If we pursue the narrow interpretation of conceptuality, it follows that a buddha has capacities for entertaining the non-conceptual mental images afforded by perception but does not super-impose conceptual constructs onto these images. If conceptuality simply involves the explicit thought or linguistic designation (prajapti) of the affordances of perception, then this view of conceptuality may be compatible with the response-model of Buddhist virtue ethics. All that is required for the ethical responsiveness of a buddha is that she is able to perceive (and respond to) objects of certain kinds;
This might be thought to contradict Dunnes earlier claim that on Dharmakrtis view ignorance is also the mental mechanism the internal cause that compels people to lump things together conceptually and suffer thereby (1996: 532). One might reply, however, that this claim identifies lumping things together conceptually as the problem, not the mere act of lumping things together. Whether this is a plausible reply, I shall not here seek to answer.
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she does not also need to subsequently think or reflect or superimpose linguistic designations onto the objects of perception. If the non-conceptual mental images afforded by perception can count as objects of perception and, thereby, be sufficient for the stimulation of behavioural response (an equivalence that would need to be established) and if the formation of such objects does not involve conceptuality, understood as above, then it seems that our ethical theory may be compatible with a Dharmakrtian epistemology and, thus, the dilemma may be resolved. The narrow interpretation of conceptuality in Dharmakrtis thought is not without challenge, however. On the broader interpretation, conceptuality plays a critical function for the very combination of multiple affordances of perception into a single image or object in the mind (which, on this account, occurs prior to superimposition or linguistic designation as conceived on the narrow view). As argued by Katsura (1984), Dharmakrtis particulars are momentary (kaika) and, as such, beyond the scope of perceptual awareness. What we ordinarily experience, however, are undifferentiated continua (santna) of moments, or persisting perceptual objects, and not moments themselves (216). Conceptuality (vikal pa), according to the broader view, is the critical factor involved in unifying the unique, momentary perceptual inputs into persisting, perceptual objects. Given that conceptuality is bound to (or identical with) ignorance, it would seem that perceiving an object (let alone responding to it correctly) is, itself, beyond the ken of a buddha. Hence, on the broader interpretation of conceptuality, our response-version of Keowns theory is not compatible with a Dharmakrtian epistemology. The dilemma remains. Dharmakrti allows for the possibility of yogic perception (yogipratyaka). Could one not argue that a buddha has yogic perception and, thereby, the relevant cognitive capacities? Given recent exegeses of this notion, however, the answer seems to be no. If we follow Dunnes analysis, for instance, the proper objects of yogic perception are truths; in particular, the four noble truths (2006: 497). While the perception of the four noble truths may be advantageous for a buddha, a buddha with capacities for virtuous response, as we have argued, also requires the capacity to perceive
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objects of certain kinds in order to respond appropriately. Thus, yogic perception, on Dunnes analysis, will not help. If we follow Katsuras analysis, by contrast, the proper objects of yogic perception are the innumerable point-instants or moments of material objects and mental phenomena that elude the sense perception of ordinary fallible beings (1984: 216). While this account provides a buddha with (innumerable) objects of perception, it does not present them in a form that is consistent with an account of virtuous responses as generated by dispositions that were acquired through a process of cultivation.20 Again, it seems that an appeal to yogic perception, based on contemporary analyses of this notion, is not going to solve our particular problem.21 Significantly, Katsura (1984) points out an inconsistency in Dharmakrtis thought, which is relevant to our discussion. He notes that while Dharmakrti identifies perception as a form of prama (i.e. a means/source of true knowledge) he nonetheless defines prama as instrumental to the fulfillment of human purpose (arthakriysthiti)22 human activity (pravtti) and experience (222). Practical human activity, Katsura points out, requires perceptual judgment and determination (adhyavasya). Indeed, without these, Katsura argues, perception would have no practical significance at all (226). Perceptual judgment, as characterised by Katsura, is similar to our notion of the objects of perception being of certain kinds. Katsura exemplifies this notion in terms of the perception of a woman as a skeleton (by a monk), as an object of lust (by a lustful man), as a nice dinner (by a dog). Where, for Katsura, perceptual
I discuss this point in more detail in Finnigan 2011a. The notion of yogic perception has only recently received the critical attention of contemporary Buddhist thinkers and, hence, there is reason to anticipate future interpretative variation. Whether or not these variations will be compatible with our response-version of Buddhist virtue ethics is yet to be seen. 22 Prama is non-contradictory knowledge (avisavdijnam). Noncontradictoriness [here] means the existence of the fulfillment of a human purpose (arthakriysthiti). (Pramavrtika, Chapter 2, v1ac, as quoted in Katsura 1984: 219)
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judgment is formed subsequent to the perceived image (i.e. the perceptual judgment a nice dinner is formed after the perception of a woman), according to our response-version of Keowns theory, the perception of a woman is, already, the perception of an object of a certain kind. Despite this difference, it is notable that, on both accounts, it is the perception/perceptual judgment of an object of a certain kind that is the significant factor for the stimulation of conduct or response. For Katsura, perceptual judgment and adhyavasya are required to prompt human activity (224). Moreover, Katsura argues that both of these notions are based in linguistic conventions (saketa, 226). Hence, Katsura may be read as presenting a dilemma for Dharmakrti based on considerations that are internal to his own theory.23 Either Dharmakrti needs to allow for certain forms of conceptuality to be involved in perception to satisfy his own pramic criteria (i.e. such that perception can be considered instrumental to the fulfillment of human purposes), or he needs to omit instrumentality for the fulfillment of human purposes from his criteria of prama such that an entirely non-conceptual perception can be considered a form of prama. The above dilemma can be seen to mirror the dilemma posed by our ethical theory.24 On both counts, it seems that Dharmakrti should either allow some rudimentary form of conceptuality into his account of perception (in order to properly capture the notion of a perceptual object of response which is required for human activity, in general, and ethical response, in particular) or he should redefine conceptuality much more narrowly, possibly akin to the narrow interpretation of conceptuality, such that the perception (or perceptual judgment) of an object of a certain kind is no lonThis is not to make any claim about Katsuras actual intentions in raising these concerns. 24 Further pressure is added by considerations concerning the possibility of a buddha teaching the dharma as discussed in Dunne 1996, Finnigan 2011a and 2011b. As Dunne points out, Dharmakrti allows that kyamuni Buddha spoke. How can we make sense of this, however, if the Buddha does not employ concepts? Dunne attempts to resolve this inconsistency by arguing that a buddha perceives concepts (and, thereby, only employs perceptual knowledge). However, this does not seem to solve the problem insofar as a buddha would need to employ concepts in uttering speech acts.
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ger identified with ignorance and, hence, no longer eliminated on the pathway to buddhahood. Either revision would require a much more sophisticated account of the relationship between conceptuality and perceptions. The upshot of this is that Dharmakrtis theory would not only be compatible with his own definition of prama (and thereby resolve the internal dilemma) it would also resolve the external dilemma that arises when Dharmakrtis epistemological theory is brought into dialogue with Buddhist ethical theory.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, I focused on the relationship between Buddhist epistemological theories and Buddhist ethical theorizing. In particular, I focused on certain epistemological commitments concerning the possibility of action that underlie one prominent theorization of Buddhist ethics (i.e. Keowns Buddhist Virtue Ethics) and demonstrated the ways in which these commitments come into direct conflict with the epistemological theories advanced by two prominent Buddhist thinkers (i.e. Dharmakrti and Candrakrti). Rather than ethical theory being brushed aside or collapsing under the pressure of the conclusions of epistemology (as warned against by Keown), I demonstrated a certain mutuality of revisionary pressure bearing on both parties of the conflict. On the one hand, I demonstrated that insofar as an ethical theory assumes certain underlying epistemological commitments, there is pressure on the theory to be revised in the face of conflict with the established positions of Buddhist epistemological theories. As I have argued, Keowns virtue ethical account of Buddhist ethics can relevantly meet this pressure for revision if it alters from a choice-model of virtue and action to a response-model of virtue and action. Such a revision is both internally consistent with Keowns account remaining a virtue ethical theory and also meets certain aspects of the epistemological demands. In order to completely satisfy the epistemological demands, I have argued, would require some revision on the part of the epistemological theories. Nonetheless, our proposed revision of Keowns theory, from a choice-model to a responsemodel, is a substantial improvement in the theory. Hence, while the pursuit of metaethics may not have resulted in a perfect resolution
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of the conflict that arises between ethical theory and epistemology, it has resulted in the advancement of our ethical theory and this is a significant outcome. On the other hand, insofar as there are internal conflicts with in each of the epistemological theories addressed in this paper as well as conflicts between these epistemological theories, I demonstrated that ethical considerations may be utilized both in the attempt to adjudicate these disputes as well as to add support to particular strategies for the resolution of internal conflicts within these theories.25 I argued that Dharmakrtis epistemological theory could relevantly meet the pressures of our revised responsemodel of Buddhist virtue ethics only if it revises its account of the relationship between perception and conceptuality (or, at least, if scholars can provide a more sophisticated analysis of their relationship). Whether or not this epistemological theory can be revised, or a more sophisticated analysis provided in a way that both meets the demands of our ethical theory and retains consistency with its other theoretical commitments, is beyond the scope of this paper to conclusively answer. One might argue, however, that the arguments raised by Katsura suggest there is already sufficient pressure from considerations internal to Dharmakrtis theory that the theory be revised in ways that would be compatible with the requirements of our ethical theory. Hence, while it may be arguable whether the requirements of our ethical theory, by themselves, provide sufficient reason to motivate revision, consideration of these requirements may be mobilized to support extant revisionary claims. The Buddhist tradition is singularly distinctive in its expressed value of an intimate relationship between ethics and insight, com-
25 In this paper we employed an indirect strategy to adjudicate the dispute between a Candrakrtian and Dharmakrtian epistemology, in Dharmakrtis favor, by appeal to the plausibility of their theories relative to the cognitive requirements of a buddha for ethical response. This strategy would only genuinely adjudicate these epistemological theories, it seems to me, if each theory were established as internally consistent and there being no further point of appeal within the ken of epistemological theorizing to demonstrate one theory as better than the other. That this is the case, for either of these theories, remains to be established.
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passion and wisdom. This value, I believe, introduces a certain demand for mutual attentiveness to, if not drive for, compatibility between the respective domains of Buddhist thought. An epistemological theory that excludes the possibility of ethical conduct is just as problematic, in the context of Buddhist soteriology, as a theory of ethical conduct that requires that which is necessarily excluded on epistemological grounds. While in this paper I have only been able to highlight and put pressure on certain elements in prominent epistemological theories, I have demonstrated that the challenges raised by pursuing an investigation of the relationship between epistemology and ethics stimulates an important revision to one of the most prominent Buddhist ethical theories. This revision, I contend, constitutes a significant improvement to the theory and, hence, exemplifies one of the virtues in pursuing a metaethical methodology.
References Primary sources

PVSV Pramavrttikam: The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. 1960. Serie Orientale Roma, Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente. Aguttara Nikya. The Book of Gradual Sayings. 19326. F. L. Woodward and E. M. Hare tr. London: Pali Text Society. Vinaya, The Vinaya Pitakam. The Book of Discipline. 1964. H. Oldenberg. London: Luzac.
AN Vin
Secondary sources
Adam, M. T. 2005. Groundwork for a Metaphysic of Buddhist Morals: A New Analysis of pua and kusala, in light of sukka. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol. 12, 6185. Clayton, B. 2006. Moral Theory in ntidevas iksamuccaya: Cultivating the fruits of virtue. London: Routledge. Cooper, D. E. and S. P. James 2005. Buddhism, Virtue and Environment. Hants Burlington: Ashgate. Davidson, D. 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Dreyfus, G. 1995. Meditation as Ethical Activity. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol. 2, 2854. _____ 1997. Recognising Reality: Dharmakirtis Philosophy and Its Tibetan Interpretations. New York: State University of New York Press. Dunne, J. D. 1996. Thoughtless Buddha, Passionate Buddha. Journal of the American Academy of Religion Vol. 64(3), 525556. _____ 2004. Foundations of Dharmakrtis philosophy. Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications. _____ 2006. Realizing the unreal: Dharmakrtis theory of yogic perception. Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 34, 497519. Finnigan, B. 2011a. How can a buddha come to act? The Possibility of a Buddhist account of Ethical Agency. Philosophy East and West Vol 61(1), 134159. Finnigan, B. 2011b. A Buddhist Account of Ethical Agency Revisited: Reply to Garfield and Hansen. Philosophy East and West Vol. 61(1), 183194. Goodman, C. 2008. Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality, And Mahyna Ethics. Philosophy East and West Vol. 58(1), 1735. Hallisey, C. 1996. Ethical Particularism in Theravda Buddhism. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol. 3, 3243. Harvey, P. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Katsura, S. 1984. Dharmakrtis Theory of Truth. Journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 12, 215235. Keown, D. ed. 1998. Buddhism and abortion. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. _____ 2001. The Nature of Buddhist Ethics. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. Levin, J. 2004. Functionalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/, last visited 30-07-2011. Siderits, M. 2003. Empty Persons: Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate. _____ 2007. Buddhism as Philosophy. Aldershot, Burlington: Ashgate. Tillemans, T. J. F. 1999. On the So-called Difficult Point of the Apoha Theory in Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakirti and his Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Velez, A. 2004. The Criteria of Goodness in the Pli Nikyas and the Nature of Buddhist Ethics. Journal of Buddhist Ethics Vol. 11, 123142. Williams, P. 1998. Altruism and Reality: Studies in the Philosophy of the Bodhicaryavatara. London: Curzon.
On the auspiciousness of compassionate violence

Stephen Jenkins
In light of the overwhelming emphasis on compassion in Buddhist thought, Buddhist sources that allow for compassionate violence have been referred to as rogue sources and equivocations. A recent article states that, Needless to say, this stance [that one may commit grave transgressions with compassion] is particularly favored by the Consciousness-Only school and in esoteric Buddhism.1 However, the same stance is presented in the Mdhyamika tradition by Bhviveka, Candrakrti, and ntideva, as well as in a variety of stras.2 Allowances for compassionate violence, even killing, are found among major Buddhist thinkers across philosophical traditions and in major scriptures. It is also remarkable how broadly influential a singular source like the Upyakaualya-stra can be. This paper reflects on the question of whether killing can be auspicious in Mahyna Buddhism with secondary reflections on the problems that arise in attempting to apply Western metaethical categories and modes of analysis.3 Studies so far have been reluctant to accept that compassionate killing may even be a source of making merit, choosing instead to argue that even compassionate killing has negative karmic consequences.4 If it is true that the
Kleine 2006: 80. Ngrjuna and ryadeva do not explicitly allow for deadly violence, but do allow for inflicting pain or performing normally inauspicious action based on intention. 3 This is a preliminary report on one dimension of a long-term research project, on compassionate violence. Other dimensions of this study of Buddhist ethics of violence will include a reappraisal of Aokas edicts, comparison with the Dharmastras, mainstream and abhidharmic traditions, tantric ethics, and the violence of warfare. See also Jenkins 2010. 4 See Harvey 2000: 135138.
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compassionate bodhisattva killer takes on hellish karmic consequences, then it would seem that this is an ethic of self-abnegating altruism. Buddhist kings would seem to be in an untenable ideological situation in which even the compassionate use of violence and deadly force to maintain order and security will damn them to hell. Buddhist military and punitive violence, which has historically been a consistent feature of its polities, often including monastic communities, appears to be radically and inexplicably inconsistent with the values expressed by its scriptures and inspirational figures. If there are negative karmic consequences to compassionate killing, then these acts must be read at best as necessary or lesser evils. However, altruism and negative karmic consequences rarely go together in Buddhist thought. A review of the remarkable spectrum of great Buddhist thinkers who have discussed this issue, many of them with reference to the Upyakaualya-stra, shows general agreement that compassionate violence can be an auspicious merit-making opportunity without negative karmic consequences. Since I started working on this issue, which was integral to my doctoral dissertation, others have written on compassionate violence basing their thoughts primarily on Asagas Bodhisattvabhmi and Mahynasagraha, and the iksamuccaya and Bodhicaryvatra attributed to ntideva. Building on the pioneering work of Mark Tatz, I am going to add examples from Candrakrtis commentary on ryadevas Catuatakam, and examine the views of Bhviveka brought to light by David Eckels recent work.5 I also highlight some overlooked details of the Upyakaualya-stra, which has been misread on this issue, and take a fresh look at Asagas foundational work in the Bodhisattvabhmi.6
5 Special thanks to David Eckel for directing me to Bhvivekas treatment in his then unpublished translation. 6 Any merit of this work is largely due to Dr. Sangye Tandar Naga, of the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives in Dharamsala, and the scholars of the Central College of Higher Tibetan Studies, particularly Venerable Lobsang Dorjee Rabling and Professor K. N. Mishra. Geshe Ngawang Samten kindly granted me free housing during an extended research period at what was then called the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies. I am
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Without question the writing of Asaga has been one of the principal sources on the ethics of compassionate killing both within Mahyna traditions and the academic study of religion. He describes a hypothetical situation in which a bodhisattva observes a thief about to commit a mass murder of persons of the highest moral status for the sake of a pittance. Although he does not directly cite the stra, Asaga is almost certainly referring to the Ship Captain Jtaka of the Upyakaualya-stra, the focus for most of the discussion of compassionate killing.7 Killing people such as arhats, bodhisattvas and pratyekabuddhas is the worst kind of murder, which results after death in immediate rebirth in a hell realm. There are no intermediate rebirths in which to moderate the effects of such terrible crimes. They are known in Buddhist traditions simply as the immediates. The bodhisattva, seeing this imminent tragedy, realizes that if he kills the thief then he himself may go to hell. But he decides that it is better that he go to hell than allow this person to suffer such a fate.8
With this attitude, the bodhisattva, having discerned either a neutral or auspicious mind; regretting and employing a mind of empathy alone, then takes that living beings life. [That bodhisattva] becomes blameless and produces abundant merit.9
also indebted to Professor Premasiri Pahalawattage for guiding my reading of many of the Pli sources. 7 The commentator, Jinaputra, merely says that the argument is the same as in the stra (Tatz 1986: 323). 8 My use of the masculine pronoun is based on the fact that Asaga speaks in ways that assume the bodhisattva is male, for instance in discussing sexual transgression. 9 BoBh 113.24114.2. evam ayo bodhisattvas ta prina kualacitto vyktacitto v viditv tyamna anukampcittam evyatym updya jvitd vyaparopayati / anpattiko bhavati bahu ca puya prasyate /; cf. BoBhWogihara 166; Peking Bstan-gyur, Sems-tsam, Shi, 100b3; Tatz 1986: 7071; note that updya has a strong idiomatic relationship with anukampcittam.
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In the discussion of a variety of cases of compassionate ethical transgression, Asaga drives his point home by repeatedly closing with the final phrase expressing the bodhisattvas faultlessness and generation of abundant merit, anpattiko bhavati bahu ca puya prasyate, a total of nine times. One aspect of his description is not entirely clear. He describes the bodhisattva, before the act of killing, as observing a mind that is either auspicious, kuala, or neutral, avykta [often translated as indeterminate].10 This refers to a common abhidharmic classification that distinguishes between auspicious, neutral and inauspicious states of mind. Only the last are affected by the kleas, attraction, revulsion, and delusion, and so have negative karmic outcomes.11 There is disagreement in both modern and classical scholarship about whether this represents a concern for the killers state of mind or the victims.12 Both interpretations have some
In a highly recommended article, Rupert Gethin elaborates the Theravdin view that killing can never be based on auspicious, kuala, or neutral, avykta, states of mind. Therefore killing can never be based on compassion, nor can it be auspicious. The key example is of a king who seems to take pleasure in ordering the execution of a criminal. On a subtle level, the commentaries say his mind is still qualified by aversion. However, all killing is not equally inauspicious; he also shows the broad range of conditions that qualify an act of killing, including the moral status of the victim (Gethin 2004). 11 See Rahula 2001: 149, n. 169, avykta defined; see 49 on a mind neither bad nor pure; Holt 1981: 80. Referring to this threefold division, he discusses how actions which are not affected by the kleas do not have karmic outcomes; see Samyuktbhidharmahdaya i.153154, on three types of citta-samprayukta, i.e. avykta, kuala and akuala. He says that neutral awarenesses [citta] are weak and only strong awarenesses can produce bodily and verbal action. The context is unclear and there is disagreement on this theme, but if this point were generally agreed, then the concern for avyktacittasamprayukta could not be related to the compassionate killer, since killing would not be possible from a neutral perspective. 12 Bhviveka, discussed below, identifies the concern with the bodhisattvas state of mind (Eckel 2008: 188); Tsong-kha-pa notes disagreement, but without identifying the sources, and states that it makes no sense to attribute it to the bandit (Tatz 1986: 215); Paul Demiville reads it as a concern for the bandits sake, perhaps based on the Chinese (1973: 379); in an expansive article that should be the starting point for all interested in these issues, Lambert
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merit. Regarding the thief, the concern would be to assure that the victim die in at least a morally neutral moment. Rebirth has a strong relationship to a persons dying thought, maraacitta. Out of compassionate concern for the victim, one would attempt to take their life in a positive or neutral state, rather than in an inauspicious one. Killing a murderer while they are in a moment of homicidal rage would defeat the purpose, because death in that state of mind would lead to a bad rebirth. On the other hand, if the compassionate killer did not maintain at least a neutral state of mind, they themselves would go to hell. By affirming that they generate abundant merit, Asaga makes clear that the bodhisattva acts with an auspicious intention. One would not expect a neutral intention to result in great merit or for Asaga to advocate killing with a neutral, rather than auspicious, intention. The Upsakala-stra, though not cited by our sources, puts this in striking terms.
Someone may say that one commits an offense of killing whether ones mind is good, bad, or neutral, just as anyone who is burnt by fire or takes poisons will die even if the mind is good, bad, or neutral. Such an argument is not true. And why is it not? Just as some people in the world do not die even if they are burnt by fire or drink poison, so one who kills without a vicious mind does not commit the crime.13
Jinaputras commentary on the Bodhisattvabhmi, from several centuries after Asaga, indicates that the bodhisattva is concerned with his own state of mind.14 This suggests a concern for the compassionate killers own karmic wellbeing. This may seem inconSchmithausen also identified the concern with the bandits state of mind. He gives preference to manuscripts that support this, but without explanation (1999: 59 and n. 67); Tatz also notes differences in Sanskrit manuscripts, but follows the commentary of Jinaputra which appears to identify the concern with the bodhisattvas state (Tatz 1986: 326 and n. 403). 13 Shih Heng-ching 1994: 171. For an extended discussion of killing see Chapter XXIV. The text was translated into Chinese in the early fifth century. Its origins are unclear, but Paul Groner takes it as an authentic Indian source. See Groner 1990: 244; for a similar discussion using the same metaphors in an abhidharmic source see Samyuktbhidharmahdaya i.188189. 14 See Tatz 1986: 326.
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sistent with the bodhisattva ideal, but all the treatments of compassionate killing show a strong concern for the protection and benefit of the killer. This is a crucial point for understanding what often appear to be acts of self-abnegating altruism. The benefit of both self and other is one of the strongest themes in Buddhist thought. In the Benefit of Self and Other Chapter, Svaparrthapaala, of the same text, Asaga explicitly rejects an intention that is strictly interested in benefiting others as inferior to one that benefits both self and others.15 Using an old model from the Nikyas, he divides the possibilities into four: interest in benefiting nobody, only oneself, only others, and both oneself and others.16 Being interested only in others is superior to being interested in only oneself or being interested in nobodys well being. But being interested in the benefit of both self and other is best, since developing oneself is necessary in order to have the ability to benefit others. This is simply expressed in the bodhisattvas vow to attain the pinnacle of self-empowerment, buddhahood, for the sake of benefiting others. A circularity between the benefit of self and others is evident in the fact that it is only through helping others that a bodhisattva can accumulate the vast merit required to attain buddhahood. This relationship can become highly ironic, as the benefit of self and other are profoundly interrelated. As ntideva famously put it:
upon afflicting oneself for the sake of others, one has success in everything. The desire for self-aggrandizement leads to a miserable state of existence, low status, and stupidity. By transferring that same desire to someone else, one attains a fortunate state of existence, respect, and wisdom. All those who are unhappy in the world are so as a result of their desire for their own happiness. All those who are happy in the world are so as a result of their desire for the happiness of others.17
As I have discussed at length elsewhere, although compassion should be disinterested, it is also regarded throughout Buddhist
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BoBh 2122; Jenkins 2003: 5762. AN ii.95; tr. Woodward 1933: 104. This is a common theme. For crossreferencing and commentary see Jenkins 2003: 5664. 17 Bca Chapter VIII, verses 1269; Wallace and Wallace 1997: 105106.
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traditions as highly beneficial to the agent, providing karmic and even physical self-protection.18 The passage above is naturally and correctly read as encouraging suffering for the sake of others. On the other hand, it presents this as a key to happiness, status, respect, good rebirth and wisdom for the agent. Self-benefit is based on benefiting others. This can easily lead to misreading, since the most dramatic examples of self-sacrifice, feeding oneself to a starving tigress or offering ones head, are also incredibly beneficial to the apparent martyr. So when the bodhisattva-killer takes care to have only empathy, anukamp, as he performs the action, he is concerned to protect both himself and his victim from falling into the hell realms.19 The concern for states of mind also bears on another difficult point that bears on the attitude toward this action. I translate Asaga above as saying that the bodhisattva is regretting as he kills. The Sanskrit term here is tyamna, and it has been previously understood either as full of horror20 or feeling constrained.21 The object of negative emotion is unclear, and surely the intention is to express that the situation is regrettable. Demiville loosely, but elegantly, renders this as full of both horror for sin and mercy for the sinner.22 But, in English at least, horror is too strong here
See Jenkins 2003, 2010. The Mahvasa gives an amusing example from the Sri Lankan myth of origin. Sihabahu drew his bow to murder his father the lion, progenitor of the Sinhalas. But, because the sight of his son aroused affection in the lion, his arrows only bounced off. It is only after he realized what was happening that: Anger weakened his compassion and made him vulnerable. The third arrow pierced his body and killed him (tr. Geiger 1986: 53). 19 Anukamp is a common substitute for both maitr and karu. When specifically defined, it signifies emotional sensitivity to the suffering of others. 20 For extensive notes on this obscure and difficult term, see artiyati in Edgerton 1985. It can be understood as meaning grieved, pained, perturbed, disgusted, offended, also, when used as a noun, as meaning shame, humility, distress etc., often in regard to morality. 21 Tatz 1986: 70. 22 plein la fois dhorreur pour le pch et de piti pour le pcheur (Demiville 1973: 379).
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and an equivalent for sin does not occur in the text. If the bodhisattva were experiencing horrific revulsion, then this could not be a merit-making, and therefore auspicious, action. Tatz apparently takes tyamna/dzem bzhin du as feeling constrained, with the sense of moral constraint, or lacking options.23 There is no question that in all accounts the Ship Captain Jtaka is framed in a way that makes killing a last resort. So this does no violence to the meaning.24 However, I use regret with the purpose of relating a more literal meaning of the Sanskrit to the English idiomatic sense of regretting what one must do or that something is ones painful duty. All this emphasis on intention and states of mind sometimes leads to an exaggeration of its importance in Buddhist ethics to the point of claiming that killing is the mental intention to kill. In fact, all sources seem to agree that for there to be killing, there must be an actual living being, and the intention to kill must result in death. Unintentional killing is not murder, but the intention to kill alone does not entail the karma for murder.25 The moral status of the murder victim also has a crucial effect on the karmic repercussions. This is generally true in Indian thought. In the Manusmti, for instance, killing an untouchable may have no more karmic cost than killing an animal.26 So Asaga presents this as an extremely dangerous situation for the bandit by describing the people he is about to murder as bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, etc., i.e. persons of the highest moral quality.
In this passage, Tatz translates feeling constrained. The same Tibetan verb occurs twice more in the root text and in the commentary. There Tatz first translates it as embarrassed and the second time as feeling constrained. Tatz 1986: 72, cf. BoBh 115.22 and Tatz 1986: 75, 222, cf. BoBh 117.16. In both cases the meaning associated with the Sanskrit is more fitting. The same Tibetan term is, however, used to render lajj, shame, in Asagas Mahynasagraha. See Nagao 1994. 24 Jinaputra comments that this is because the bodhisattva has no other means (Tatz 1986: 326). 25 For abhidharmic cross-referencing see Samyuktbhidharmahdaya ii.171, n. 502; for Theravda sources see Gethin 2004: n. 19. 26 tr. Olivelle 2004: 199200.
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He notes that to kill such persons is one of the grave sins called immediates. [The moral calculus becomes even more complex when we consider that the killers relationship to the victim matters too. Killing ones own mother is an immediate, but not killing someone elses.] By the same logic, the situation is entirely reversed for the bodhisattva who is about to kill the depraved bandit. The karmic liability for killing such a person is the lowest possible. This is extremely important for understanding Buddhist penal codes, which have almost always included capital punishment, and Buddhist warfare.27 To give an extreme example cited by Harvey, the Mahparinirva-stra describes killing the morally hopeless, icchntika, as less than killing an ant.28 In any case, the more morally depraved or potentially harmful a person is, the less karmic demerit there is in killing them. So military enemies or slanderers of the dharma are in a dangerous moral category. Even those who merely hold wrong views are destined to be reborn as animals or in hell. This should be taken into account in interpreting the famous case of the Sri Lakan King Duhagmai.29 According to the Mahvasa, he marched to battle against the Tamils with a relic in his spear and a great company of monks, not for the sake of conquest, but to establish the dharma of the Sabuddha. Seeing that he took no joy in the bloody victory, eight arahants flew through the air to comfort him. They reassure him that having killed millions will be no obstruction to his entry into heaven, because his non-Buddhist war victims were accounted as being no more than animals.30 These people were active enemies of the Buddhadharma. The Buddhists he killed count for only one and a half persons. One who had taken refuge counted as half a person, while the other, who had taken precepts, counted as a full person. The story closes with a commitment by Duhagmai to never take a meal without offering to the sagha. The spear with
Florida 2005: 57. Harvey (2000: 138) cites Taish 12.562b. He thanks Victor He. 29 Mhv 170178. 30 The term used for animals here, pasu/Sanskrit pau, is also the technical term for a sacrificial animal. In the Hindu homologization of warfare with sacrifice, this term is often used for victims killed in battle.
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the relic became the axis of a great stpa. This emphasizes that the king also has an ability to make massive merit through his support of the sagha that helps compensate for his negative acts. There is no question that this is an exceptional text that seems shocking, but these are basic Buddhist arguments that particularly support the violence of kings.31 Bhviveka, the great sixth century Mdhyamika, brought out another aspect of karmic causality, which ameliorates the karmic vulnerability of the compassionate killer and harkens back to the Nikkyas.32 A person of high moral quality may be affected far less by a grave sin than a degenerate may be affected by a minor one. As heavily salted water may be rendered undrinkable by just a little more salt, while pure water may take much more and still be drinkable, so a small crime could lead to bad rebirth for a degenerate, while a large one might not for a saint.33 This would also be important for kings, who are generally considered to have large stores of merit. The points drawn out above only begin to explicate the complexity of the factors that condition the act of killing.34 The vulnerability of the compassionate killer is ameliorated by the fact that he has empathy, auspiciousness, and a reservoir of positive merit. Furthermore, his target is the worst sort of person, and the intention is to benefit both himself and his potential victims.35 The vulnerability of the villain, on the other hand, is enhanced by the fact that he is pitiless, has defiled inauspicious intentions, and has no
31 I do not see this story as being as inconsistent with normative Buddhist values as it is often perceived to be. For a different perspective and a variety of contrasting views, see Gethin 2007. 32 Eckel 2008: 186. 33 This seems to be a generally held idea. Loaphala Sutta, AN i.249, offers the same analogy, except that the large body of water is the Gaga. Eckel (2008: n. 327) directs us here to a rich note by La Valle Poussin on the various contingencies on karmic outcomes (La Valle Poussin 1990: 730, n. 217). 34 For a detailed technical discussion in abhidharmic style see La Valle Poussin 1990: 642666. 35 In Asagas case, we can say the ideal intention would also include benefiting himself.
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reservoir of counterbalancing merit. Furthermore his targets are the best sorts of persons, and he seeks petty personal gain for himself alone. A last point we should note from the Bodhisattvabhmi is that it is also a moral downfall to refrain from engaging in various harsh actions, when they are called for to benefit others.36 Candragomin, a seventh century Yogcra remembered as a competitor of Candrakrti, included this point when he famously and influentially summarized Asagas lapaala in only twenty verses.37 Actions performed out of compassion or love with an auspicious intention are without fault. Indeed, even to refrain from harsh or threatening action when it is necessary to benefit others is a moral failure.38
Amputation with kindness

ryadeva, who is considered the next great figure after Ngrjuna in the Mdhyamika lineage, wrote in the third to fourth century C. E., Because of their intention both bad, aubham, and good, ubham, [actions] become auspicious for a bodhisattva.39 Many
bodhisattvo yena kaukaprayogena tkaprayogena sattvnm artha payati ta prayoga daurmanasyrakay na samudcarati / spattiko bhavati[] BoBh 116; Tatz 1986: 74, 221; following Tatzs translation of Tsong-kha-pas commentary, Harvey claims that such an assertion does not occur in the Bodhisattvabhmi (Harvey 2000: 140); however, both Tatzs translation of the root text and Tsong-kha-pas commentary contain this statement. Yet, Tatz also reads Tsong-kha-pa a bit earlier, in commenting on With mercy there is no [deed] without virtue, as saying, [] the two commentaries on the Chapter on Ethics teach that there are occasions when the seven of body and speech murder and the rest are permitted. Aside from this, they do not state that to not engage in them for the sake of others is a fault. Tatz observes here that three Chinese translations of the Bodhisattvabhmi omit this passage, while that of Hsan Tsang includes it. The extent of the omission is not clear (Tatz 1986: n. 396). 37 For rich textual cross-references and commentary see Tatz 1985: 3638; for cross-referencing on compassionate transgression see Tatz 1982: 38, 64. 38 Tatz 1985: 28, v. 12, not to give treatment even comprising affliction. See also 29, v. 20. 39 C Chapter V, v. 105, pp. 249250 (tr. Sonam 1994: 136): bsam pas by ang chub sems dpa la// dgeam gal te mi dgeang rung// thams cad dge legs
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cases of similar statements can be cited from both the stras and stras and all the figures considered here, Asaga, Vasubandhu, ntideva, ryadeva, Bhviveka, and Candrakrti agree on the basic point that a bodhisattva may do what is normally forbidden or inauspicious, akuala.40 Candrakrti, in the early seventh century, first comments on ryadevas verse by defining the inauspicious as that which leads to lower forms of rebirth and the auspicious, kuala, as that which reverses the process of sasra. Auspicious actions result in good births and happiness, while inauspicious actions result in the suffering of birth, old age, and death etc.41 This is a general principle, but it is one which raises the level of ambiguity. Since, for Candrakrti, any act that reverses the cycle of rebirth becomes auspicious, the possibility is opened that any action may be auspicious depending on a variety of factors. If an act of killing may make merit, then it is neither a necessary evil, nor merely value free, but is clearly auspicious. In typical Buddhist fashion, he then proceeds to offer a catalogue of narrative case studies, rather than an abstract analysis. The first example is of a physician, certainly one of the most important and pervasive metaphors for a bodhisattva, amputating a finger that has been bitten by a poisonous snake, thus preventing the spread of greater suffering. Jinabhadra, a sixth century Jain, used the same example:
nyid gyur te// gang phyir yid dei dbang gyur phyir// Karen Lang has been very generous in sharing her forthcoming translation (see Lang tr. 2011) of this section of Candrakrtis commentary and has supported my work on this text for years. 40 To cite some examples that do not otherwise occur in the text: As long as a Bodhisattva does not give up bodhicitta he has not broken the precepts (Upliparipcch-stra, tr. Chang 1983: 269); Even that which is proscribed is permitted for a compassionate person who sees it will be of benefit. (Bca Chapter V, v. 84; Crosby and Skilton 1996: 41) 41 dge ba yang bde ba dang bde groi rnam par smin pai bras bu can yin du zin kyang skye ba dang/ rga ba dang chi ba la sogs pai sdug bsngal sgrub par byed pa nyid kyi phyir na dge legs ma yin no// (C 250).
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A doctor has to cause pain, but is still non-injuring and innocent because his intention is pure There can be nonviolence even when an external act of violence has been committed.42
The awkwardness of this translation, in which there is no violence even when there is violence, is eased somewhat if we substitute non-harm for nonviolence, which is a misleading translation of ahis in Buddhist, Hindu, or Jain thought. Henk Bodewitz points out that the term non-violence, which was never taken before modern Indian times to forbid war or capital punishment, is absent in older English dictionaries and is strongly associated with Gandhi.43 With the use of this term, the Gandhian conception, inspired by Tolstoy, is projected onto the past. In many examples below, it is important to recognize that being harmless may actually require violent action and that restraint from violent action may be harmful. Dictionary definitions of violence often include not only harmful physical force, but also the sense of being morally unwarranted or unjust. We would not normally describe surgery as violence, because it is neither harmful nor unwarranted. For this reason, Tibetan scholars I have worked with have sometimes objected that the compassionate killing of bodhisattvas is not violence. However, the interpretive problem in Indian thought in general is that warfare, torture, animal sacrifice, the horrific punishments of the dharmastras etc. all may fall within the definition of ahis, since they are both warranted and beneficial.44 The same text from which one may pluck apparently unqualified statements of support for ahis may also advocate torture. This is not usually a failure of internal inconsistency. Therefore the word violence is being used in the context of this paper without any moral connotation, since the question is whether violent action, such as killing, may be moral. This also avoids a use of the term that would require one
Dundas 1992: 140. Bodewitz 1999: 17. He also notes that many scholars have misinterpreted ahis as the desiderative of the verb root han, to kill. He suggests noninjury as a translation, but this would not work with examples like killing. 44 See Jenkins 2010 on compassionate warfare and torture.
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to call morally warranted killing, such as a bodhisattva stabbing to death a thief, nonviolent. A morally justified war would even have to be called nonviolent. My use of the term violence indicates injurious physical force, including killing, warfare, punishment and torture regardless of its moral character. An authoritative Buddhist precedent for Candrakrti is found in Ngrjunas Ratnval, an epistle by the foundational Mahyna figure to a Buddhist king. Citing the word of the Buddha from an unknown text,45 Ngrjuna writes:
It is called beneficial to cut off a finger when it has been bitten by a [poisonous] snake. So the Buddha says to even cause extreme pain, if it will help another.46
Chopping off a finger is a painful and violent act that brings to mind the famous Buddhist criminal Agulimla, Finger-garland, who decorated his neck with fingers cut from his victims. The simple act of cutting off a finger might be very similar, but, because of the differing intentions and outcomes, the moral implications are completely different. The action itself is morally neutral, even though we might assume that a compassionate doctor would perform such an amputation with a sense of regret and as a last resort, as described by Asaga. Candrakrti emphatically states that the physician certainly does not accrue demerit for preventing the spread of even greater harm.
Bodhisattvagocaropyaviayavikurvaanirdea 111.a.1, cited in the Strasamuccaya attributed to Ngrjuna, also uses the example of a doctor inflicting pain in advising a king to discipline the unruly, but not in relation to snakebite. 46 Ratnval 181182. Hopkins translates mi bde ba yang bya bar as One should even bring discomfort. This accords with the literal Tibetan, but seems mild for the example of cutting off a finger. For mi bde ba, Lokesh Chandras Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary gives la or simply dukha, which both seem stronger than discomfort; see Hopkins 1998: v. 264, 128; cf. the Mahynasagraha on bodhisattvas assuming the role of a king even inflicting torment on sentient beings to establish them in the code of discipline (Keenan 1992: 88). It is also worth noting, in light of the fact that Ngrjuna is addressing a king, that amputation was a common form of punishment in ancient and more recent Buddhist polities.
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In the Majjhima-Nikya, the Abhayarjakumrasutta uses a very similar analogy of saving a choking child to explain that the Buddha may sometimes use harsh speech. It was well known that the Buddha had spoken harshly to Devadatta and angered him by saying that he was incorrigible and destined for hell. Speech is a form of karmic action capable of causing harm. Most discussions of compassionate transgression include harsh speech and often begin with it. Here the Nigaha Ntaputta prompted Prince Abhaya to ask Gotama whether he would speak unwelcome and offensive words to others, a question which he predicted would be like an iron spike stuck in the Buddhas throat. The Buddha explains his use of harsh speech as follows:
Now on that occasion, a young tender infant was lying on Prince Abhayas lap. Then the Blessed One said to Prince Abhaya: What do you think, prince? If, while you or your nurse were not attending to him, this child, were to put a stick or a pebble in his mouth, what would you do to him? Venerable sir, I would take it out. If I could not take it out at once, I would take his head in my left hand, and crooking a finger of my right hand, I would take it out, even if it meant drawing blood. Why is that? Because I have compassion for the child. So too princeSuch speech as the Tathgata knows to be true, correct, and beneficial, but which is unwelcome and disagreeable to others: The Tathgata knows the time to use such speech. Why is that? Because the Tathgata has compassion for beings.47
This should not be taken as a general endorsement of compassionate transgression, but, for Mahynists, for whom harsh speech is a basic example, this would be very recognizable in terms of their own ideas. Compassion leads a person, who skillfully knows when it is appropriate, to cause pain in another when it has practical benefit. The Buddha makes use of the princes ordinary common sense ethics, rather than a supererogatory model, to illustrate his point. The sutta makes clear that, even if he is correct, the Buddha does not use harsh speech if it will not benefit others. To the degree that we can regard this as an earlier stratum of Buddhist thought, this appears to be a precedent for the basic type of thinking employed by the Mahyna.
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MN i.392, Abhayarjakumrasutta (tr. amoli and Bodhi 1995: 499).
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Candrakrti offers another example of a hunter who kills one of his sons to prevent both from dying. The two sons are arguing at the edge of a precipice and one of them grabs the other with the intention of hurling them both over. Since he cannot reach them, and so has no other option, the hunter shoots one son with an arrow to prevent them both from dying. This case shows a concern for reducing the proportional extent of harm, as in the example of amputation. The Buddha is also often compared to a caravan leader, and in another example we find one whose fellow travelers are cornered by a lion. The caravan leader shoots the lion in the head to protect his company. Demiville cites another caravan story, from the Mah-Upyakaualya-stra, to be distinguished from the Upyakaualya-stra, which appeared very early in China and has had enduring influence.48 In this account a Brahmin is traveling with a caravan, which comes into proximity with a horde of five hundred bandits. The Brahmin kills the scout of the bandits, who was apparently his own personal friend, to prevent him from alerting the murderous band of thieves about his caravans location. Part of his consideration is that, if he tells his companions about the scout, they will kill the scout and become murderers themselves. In this way he prevents 999 people from becoming murderers, i.e. the 500 bandits and the 500 merchants minus himself, by taking on the karma of murder himself.49 Candrakrti also relates the story of a bodhisattva born among lions who saves a large group of people caught in the coils of a
48 He cites Taish 156, vii, 161b162a. Demiville 1973: 379. According to Lewis Lancaster, the Mah-Upyakaualya-stra was first translated into Chinese in the third century (Lancaster 1979: 140). 49 It is not clear if the killer actually goes to hell. One would expect this tale to be a jtaka or avadna, but the Brahmin is not identified as a bodhisattva. Demiville does not give the karmic outcome of the story, except to say that the bandits and travelers are all converted. If he does go to hell, it would be a strong exception to my argument, and the first case I have found of compassionate transgression resulting in karmic penalty. This would also make it an irrational choice for motivating Chinese Buddhists to kill in war, since the assumption would be that they go to hell as a result.
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huge snake. The bodhisattva frightens the snake by mounting the head of an elephant and releasing a great roar. In terror, the snake relaxes its grip and its captives are freed. This is an example of harsh speech as a violent act. In another example, a father accidentally kills his own beloved son. His only son had returned from a long period abroad in a very fragile state of health. The father brings about his sons death by strongly embracing him. This clever example illustrates the fundamental importance of intention by making deep affection result in killing. Most of these stories are told in just a few lines, as if he takes for granted that his readers know the tales.
The ship captain

Candrakrti also uses one of the most famous and influential, yet often misread, passages in Buddhist thought from the Upyakaualya-stra of the ship captain who kills a bandit. This jtaka is cited by both Madhyamaka and Yogcra sources and has continued to be important in modern times.50 It seems to be a combination of two older stories, one in which the Buddha under the same name, Greatly Compassionate, saved five hundred passengers at sea and another in which, as a king, he stabbed a man to death with a spear.51 In this example, Captain Compassionate is faced with the knowledge that a thief intends to kill the five hundred merchant bodhisattvas riding in his ship. He gives this long reflection. If he tells the merchants, they will kill the thief and so suffer the bad karmic results.52 So, forming the compassionate intention to take the negative results upon himself, the ship captain
For examples, see Williams 2009: 152 and 340, n. 12; Welch 1972: 272 288. Thanks to Chris Queen. 51 See n. 56 below. 52 The early stras have many examples of stupid and backsliding bodhisattvas, even bodhisattvas who have forgotten they were bodhisattvas. The fact that the text sees bodhisattvas as capable of killing in anger shows that it does not just indicate near deities with this term. Texts on bodhisattva ethics show a general concern for the fact that bodhisattvas make regular mistakes that require confession and contrition.
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stabs the thief to death with a short spear. In this way, he skillfully benefits the potential mass murderer by saving him from eons in the hell realms. In fact, the thief is reborn in a heaven. [Perhaps this is an early source for the idea seen later in tantric contexts that a compassionate killer can direct the continuum of their victim to a heavenly rebirth.] In the case of someone about to commit a heinous crime, not only is there less sense of negative consequence for the killer, there is even the sense that one is benefiting them by executing them before they can accrue more time in the richly described Buddhist hell realms. This raises the issue of what other crimes also have such bad karma that it would be better to kill the person rather than allow them to be performed. For instance, the immediates often include splitting the sagha and sometimes slandering the dharma. That would imply that enemies from both within and without Buddhism could merit the same violence as someone about to kill a parent or saint. The Mahparinirva-stra, for instance, says that if ones motivation is pure, it is possible to kill someone who is persecuting Buddhists or deriding the Mahyna without incurring karmic retribution.53 The captain also saves the bodhisattva-merchants either from being murdered or becoming murderers themselves by attacking the thief.54 This is highly double edged; the very motivation for killing is based on the devastating negative consequences of murder. One would be better off to be murdered, than to kill without compassion. All these sources agree that killing may be used to prevent others from taking on the karma of murder. The entire story, like many in the Upyakaualya-stra, is framed as an explanation of a problematic event in the Buddhas hagiography. Here the issue is that his foot was punctured by a thorn, which seems to suggest that the Buddha could be affected
Taish No. 375, 12.676b56). Thanks to Jan Nattier. For more examples see Schmithausen 1999: 5758 and n. 60. 54 This is a very potent example in the age of terrorism. On August 11, 2000, the Associated Press reported that Jonathan Burton, a teenage passenger who became combative on a Southwest Airlines flight, was killed by the passengers.
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by karma. The thorn is homologous with the spear with which he stabbed the thief in a past life. As part of a general effort to show that compassionate killing remains an evil, albeit a necessary one, Harvey argues that the thorn shows that the act had various bad karmic consequences, though not as bad as if it had been done without a compassionate motivation.55 But the final word of the stras account explicitly rejects this interpretation. The Buddha merely shows himself to be punctured by the thorn as a skillful technique to teach the law of karma.56 In the process, he prevents another murder by demonstrating the law of karma to some potential killers. For those reasons the Thus-Come-One has a thorn of Acacia stuck in his foot. That also is the skill in means of the ThusCome-One; it is not an obstacle caused by past deeds.57 In another episode from the Upyakaualya-stra, not long after the story of Captain Compassionate, the Buddha knowingly allows a non-Buddhist female ascetic to be murdered.58 Part of the explanation for this is based on the common idea that our days are numbered. The Buddha saw that her lifetime was exhausted in any case. But what about her murderers, who will certainly go to one of the fantastically horrific hells so elaborately described in Buddhist texts? Killing just anyone is not an immediate, but surely the killers of this ascetic will suffer a horrible fate in the hell realms. Shouldnt they be protected by the Buddhas compassion? The murderous death of the ascetic will also have a negative karHarvey 2000: 136. Ap verses 2122, gives another story in which the Buddhas foot is hurt as the result of a past life as a king in which he killed a man with a spear. I became a king and killed a person with a spear. By the ripening of that karma, I was boiled vigorously in hell. In the present life, the Buddha is shown to still experience pain in his foot for that past killing and the karmic effects are not yet exhausted. This Apadna is a catalogue of past-life misdeeds of the Buddha, including several murders. There is no sense that these were compassionate or dharmic acts. A central purpose of the Upyakaualyastra is to reread such tales, which seem to indicate that the Buddha could continue to suffer karmic consequences, in terms of Mahyna buddhology (Ap i.300). 57 tr. Tatz 1994: 77. 58 Ibid., 460.
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mic effect, if she dies in terror. The stra argues that, in this case, bringing dishonor to the opponents of the dharma is a compensating benefit.59 It turns out that the killers were religious competitors of Buddhism. They are referred to as trthika, a name often erroneously translated as heretic, which probably refers to the antecedents of traditions we call Hindu today. The stra explains that the Buddha allowed the woman to be murdered, so that the discredit would fall on her trthika killers. Perhaps this should be read in the light of the fact that, since early times, holding wrong views is in itself sufficient to result in rebirth as an animal or in hell. The opponents of Buddhism, or a misguided Buddhist, would be understood to be leading others to such misfortune. So, both allowing and preventing murder is validated. No specific outcomes or actions are essentially evil. Killing, preventing murder, and allowing a murder are all auspicious within one narrative context.
Making merit with murder and mercy sex

Like Asaga, Candrakrti also says that the Ship Captain benefits himself as well by reversing sasra by myriad ages.60 On this point, I suspect an old mistranslation has been influential. In his iksamuccaya, ntideva directly cites the Ratnamegha-stra on the allowance to kill someone who intends to commit an immediate [and also points out that the rvaka Vinaya allows for the euthanasia of animals.] However a large part of his discussion of permitted transgressions is focused on the Upyakaualya-stra. He cites the jtaka of Jyotis, a Brhmaa youth who broke his vow of abstinence in order to save the life of a woman who threatened to kill herself, if he would not engage in sex with her. In his translation of the iksamuccaya, Bendall rendered a key phrase from the Upyakaualya-stra, cited by ntideva as And so I myself
In the Bodhisattvabhmi, Asaga often makes allowances for more negative behavior in the case of trthikas, for instance in terms of harsh speech or returning abuse. See Tatz 1986: 221223. 60 dge bai rtsa ba des kyang bskal pa stong phrag brgyar khor ba la rgyab kyis phyogs par byas so// (C 253.1).
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young sir, by an impulse of pity, though vile, and full of desire, was set back for ten thousand ages.61 He thus reversed the meaning and presented compassionate transgression as an enormous karmic setback. In his translation of the stra itself, Tatz rendered this instead, Because I generated a thought that was endowed with great compassion but conjoined with transitory passion, birth and death was curtailed for ten thousand years.62 Asaga says in the Mahynasagraha that: Even if a bodhisattva in his superior wisdom and skillful means should commit the ten sinful acts of murder etc., he would nevertheless remain unsullied and guiltless, gaining instead immeasurable merits.63 ntideva, again quoting the Upyakaualya-stra, similarly says in the iksamuccaya, Behold, son of good family, the very action which sends others to hell sends a bodhisattva with skill in means to the Brahmaloka heaven realms, [a traditional result of generating compassion].64 There is no question of the compassionate bodhisattva killer going to hell in these sources. This is consistent with a general pattern in Mahyna thought wherein the more pure a bodhisattvas intention is to go to hell, the less likely she is to do it. The bodhisattva dramatically shortens the path to buddhahood, precisely because of being willing to sacrifice hiser own spiritual progress. The motivational conception and its actual results can be completely different. In fact the motivation can produce the opposite of what is intended; those who intend to endure hell realms do not, precisely because they are willing to do so.
Bendall and Rouse 1971: 163; So ha kulaputra mahkruyacittotpdena-itvarea kmopasahitena daakalpasahasri sasram akrsa; Tatz 1994: 35, n. 49; ik 167. 62 Tatz 1994: 34; for a similar phrase, see Suvaraprabhsottama-stra, tr. Emmerick 1970: 31. Thanks to Mark Tatz for supplying me with the unpublished manuscripts of his Tibetan editions of the Upyakaualya-stra. Note that this also accords with Changs translation from the Chinese (Chang 1983: 456457). Another translation of this episode from the Chinese can be found in Welch 1972: 284286. 63 Keenan 1992: 88. 64 paya kulaputra yad anye nirayasavartanya karma, tad upyakaualyasya bodhisattvasya brahmalokopapattisavartanyam// (ik 167).
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I have not yet located an example where a compassionate killer suffers negative karmic consequences. Bhviveka may offer a highly qualified exception. In arguing that even great evil, ppa, can be overcome, he points to the famous cases of the mass murderer, Agulimla, the patricidal King Ajtaatru, and the wicked King Aoka who turned their lives around by subsequently forming positive intentions.65 As with the thorn in the Buddhas foot, Bhviveka argues that it is only taught that they were reborn in hell to generate confidence in the law of karma, in fact their negative karma had been completely eliminated. They were born there, he then says, like a silk ball that falls down and rises up. They were not touched by the flames of hell. In this way evil can be uprooted without denying the laws of karma.66 The objection is then raised that even the Buddha suffered negative karmic consequences, such as his foot being pierced by a thorn. Bhviveka specifically rejects this, referring directly to the Upyakaualya-stra. He then follows with a discussion of killing with compassion.
Others see someone on the verge of committing a heinous crime (nantarya), know that this action will cause suffering for a long time, and kill that person out of compassion. They certainly know that they will be born in hell, but they adopt a wholesome or indeterminate (avykta) motivation (citta) and kill in order to protect [others]. They accept their own rebirth in hell, but their wholesome [motivation] is sustained by wholesome thoughts like: This is great suffering, but it will not last long. This [motivation] is wholesome, because it is like a
65 The fact that a thematic study of Agulimla and Ajtaatru could easily comprise a book length study shows how important the issue of avoiding the fruition of past inauspicious action was to Indian Buddhists. There are entire stras and sections of others focused on them. The Mahparinirvastra has an extensive discussion. The study of the theme of overcoming the karma of murder will have strong implications for the understanding of Buddhist ethics. This is particularly true for tantric texts, which, with their claim to achieve liberation in the present lifetime, can even avoid the fruition of the immediates which lead directly to hell on rebirth. 66 Eckel 2008: 185. The reference to either neutral or auspicious states of mind still seems unclear to me, since he immediately follows by indicating that the killers intention is auspicious.
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thought that is free from desire and so forth.67 A bodhisattva who commits murder out of compassion, cannot be reproached for this action, because it is not generated by hatred, 68
Bhvivekas exposition, including the reference to wholesome [auspicious] or neutral motivation, is very close to that of the Bodhisattvabhmi, with which he was familiar. He does not say whether the killer actually goes to hell. Nothing would prevent this more than the intention to do so. However, his description of how the compassionate killer considers that the hell experience will not last long may be related to the description of bouncing in and out of hell without being touched by the flames. We can be certain that, if Agulimla is untouched by the flames of hell, that a bodhisattva would have at least as positive an outcome. It would seem incongruous to even correlate the karmic outcomes for a reformed mass murderer and a compassionate bodhisattva killer. But if we take these two together and assume that Bhviveka is indicating that even such a bodhisattva bounces in and out of hell, it would explain the broadly held view of contemporary Tibetan scholars that compassionate killers have an extremely brief experience of hell.69 The
According to Eckel, Vasubandhu presents the identical paragraph in his Vykhyyukti. This seems remarkable, since this is not a citation of the stra (Eckel 2008: 187, n. 333). Demiville notes that the ship captain story is recited in the commentary to Asagas Mahynasagraha as an example of gbhriya la (Demiville 1973: 380). He cites Lamotte 1939: 215216. 68 Eckel 2008: 188. The term wholesome is commonly used as a translation alternative for auspicious. 69 As Eckel acknowledges, the comparison to the bounce of a silk ball, which suggests a momentary contact, remains a difficult translation problem. In a rich footnote, Eckel observes that Sthiramati uses a similar metaphor in commenting on verse 3.8 of Asagas Mahynastrlakra (Eckel 2008: 185, n. 324); in any case, the passage commented on by Sthiramati asserts that anyone possessing the bodhisattvagotra, who takes rebirth in the lower realms, has a brief stay and minimal suffering. The intention of the metaphor is clearly to minimize either the extent or duration of suffering. For the purpose here, the fact that they do not experience the flames of hell is sufficient. Xuanzang offers a similar idiom of the time it takes for a ball of thread to fall to the ground after being tossed up (tr. Li Rongxi 1996: 105). The repeated closeness of Bhvivekas treatment to that of Asaga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati, is remarkable. See also Mahynastrlakra, tr. Jamspal,
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great Tsong-kha-pa cites Bhviveka here with approval.70 However Bhviveka does not emphasize the production of great merit as do Asaga, ntideva and the Upyakaualya-stra itself, instead focusing on overcoming karmic negativity.71
Some qualifications
Candrakrti clearly realizes the possibilities for exploitation in this idea. Later in the same commentary he launches into a jeremiad against a king who seeks to justify violence for the sake of maintaining moral order.72 For Candrakrti, the reason bodhisattvas are not destroyed by such violence, while others are, is that they possess a controlled mind with compassionate intent.73 The opposite is also obviously true. Those who do these things without these qualities face fantastically negative consequences. The tension between these two is perfectly expressed in the Upyakaualya-stra itself, where the express purpose of the story is to actually discourage others from murder, rather than to validate compassionate violence. The Buddha demonstrates the power of karma to a group of potential murderers by showing himself to be pierced by a thorn as an outcome of spearing the thief in his earlier life as Mahkruika the Ship Captain.74 So, even the portrayal of compassionate murder
L. et als. 2004: 27. 70 tr. Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee 2000: 256. 71 The apparent contrast between Bhviveka and his Prsagika opponents raises the interesting question of the relationship between ethics and ontology. nyavda traditions seem to be more ethically liberal than abhidharmic ones. We would expect Bhviveka, with his concern for firmly establishing conventional norms, to perhaps be more conservative than Candrakrti. There is a striking correlation between tathgatgarbha traditions and vegetarianism that is based perhaps on their strong sense of a base consciousness. Sources that validate killing on the basis of emptiness are another further area of exploration. 72 See Lang 1992: 23243. 73 gzhan dag la yang de ltar cii phyir mi gyur zhe na/ sems la dbang thob pa med pai phyir dang/ sems kyi rgyud nyon mongs pa mkhrang zhing nye bar sad pas bzung ba nyid kyi phyir ro// (C 251.3). 74 Tatz 1994: 349; 734. cf. Chang 1983: 431440, 456457.
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is used to discourage murder by malicious people. However, the stra has already shown, consistent with the later interpretations of Asaga, ntideva and Candrakrti, that the ship-captain in fact made enough merit through this murder to reverse sasra by one hundred thousand kalpas and the thorn is merely an upya of the Buddha, not an actual karmic outcome.
Compassionate violence as common sense

In general, compassionate killing is a supererogatory ethic, not one of imitation. It is double edged in opening the possibility for murder precisely to prevent its horrific karmic outcome. Yet Candrakrtis earthy examples also suggest that there is something commonsensical about compassionate violence. Part of the power of Candrakrtis hypothetical cases is that they appeal to natural human responses to protect children and companions. They draw on issues and choices that doctors, leaders, parents or pilots may face in everyday life and derive their force from the fact that they make intuitive sense to people. If bodhisattvas are like ordinary folk, then ordinary folk may be like bodhisattvas. The possibility that this discourse merely elaborates a supererogatory ethic without general significance seems dubious. All the sources view compassionate killing as dangerous. But one would expect Buddhists to attempt, as far as they were able, to behave like bodhisattvas when faced with difficult moral choices. If a bodhisattva is like a physician cutting off a poisoned finger, then a physician is also like a bodhisattva. As in the teachings for bodhisattvas, a good doctor must know what she is doing, have a compassionate intention, and would regret the pain that she causes. Surely, as in the Jain understanding, a doctor performing an amputation need not be a great bodhisattva to avoid terrible karma. When Ngrjuna uses the finger amputation analogy to advise a king that he may have to inflict great pain, he is not speaking to a bodhisattva, but to a very dangerous person. Kings routinely used amputation as a punishment in ancient India. In the broadly cited Bodhisattvagocara-upyaviaya-vikurvaanirdea-stra, the same thinking is applied to penal codes and war-
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fare.75 A king is encouraged to compassionately punish and even torture the unruly in order to discipline them and protect society, but he is not to kill or permanently damage them. He may go to war to protect his family and his people. He should try to avoid war in the first place and carefully consider how his policies are responsible for the creation of enemies. But even if he kills the enemy, as long as he avoids the destruction of life, infrastructure, and nature, he will be blameless and produce great merit. This is stated with almost the same phrasing as Asagas. There is no sense that the king, his warriors, or law enforcement officials must be bodhisattvas. As we consider these sources, all of them framed within or focused on narrative, we should remember that even the early mainstream narrative traditions of Buddhism are full of stories of Buddhist warfare that feature the Buddha in past lives as a weapons master, king, warhorse, execution elephant, elephant mahout engaged in a siege etc.76 In ryaras Jtakaml, a Mahynist collection of birth-stories, the Buddha is described as being born as akra, i.e. Indra, in a past life. Indra is king of the devas and a model of the ideal king. The demonic daityas, another class of lesser deities, challenge him to battle. The battle is described in vivid dramatic detail.
Despite his scruples, everything inclined the bodhisattva to engage in the frenzy of battle: the enemies presumption; the fear people felt, which put an unpleasant curb on their amusements; his own dignity; and the course of action that prudence dictated. There then took place a battle that shattered the nerve of the cowardly and in which armor splintered at the clash of weapon on weapon. Watch out! Now how are you going to escape me? Attack! Thats the end of you! such were the cries as the combatants killed one another.77
See Jenkins 2010. Ibid. 77 trans. Khoroche 1989: 8182. Pli texts also refer to this battle. See for instance SN i.221. Here Indras conduct toward the defeated and bound enemy king is lauded.
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The devas broke ranks and fled under a shower of arrows, and finally Indra himself turned his chariot in retreat. But as he turned his huge chariot to flee the field, he saw that he was about to overrun some nests full of baby birds. I would rather that the demon chiefs battered me to death with their terrible clubs than that I live on with my reputation ruined, under the reproach of having slaughtered these creatures who are distraught with terror.78 In order to avoid crushing them and at the risk of his life, he turned directly back at the pursuing daityas. Shocked by this turn of events, the demonic forces broke rank in turn and were routed by the devas. Victory turned on the compassionate response to baby birds and once again karu proved to be protective. The story is typically ironic in simultaneously validating both deadly warfare and that all decent men should cultivate sympathy for living things. The bodhisattva-king of the devas surely provides a model for the good Buddhist king here.
Closing reflections on metaethics

This paper has been an effort to begin to understand what Indian Buddhist texts say about compassionate killing. I think we are going to keep discovering a Buddhism very different than the one we think we know. Important stras and large bodies of narrative literature are in many cases untranslated. Even major figures such as Candrakrti, Asaga, and Bhviveka have only been partially translated, not to speak of the commentaries. I was fortunate to have the very recent work of David Eckel on Bhviveka. Paul Harrison has recently shown that in many cases we do not even know when ntideva, who has been at the absolute center of the study of Buddhist ethics, is composing or quoting.79 It seems critical for the inherently comparative application of metaethical analysis to Buddhist thought to have a clear object of analysis or pole of comparison, but we have not yet clarified what we intend to analyze even in regard to individual thinkers.
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trans. Khoroche 1989: 83. Harrison 2007: 215248.
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The ethics of compassionate violence are a complex matrix of multiple interrelated and competing concerns, including proportionality, intention, virtue, situation, and consequences conceived from a multiple-life perspective. The basic principle that the auspicious is defined by that which leads to positive karmic outcomes only increases the level of ambiguity by removing the possibility that any action is essentially inauspicious. Although there are many warnings of hell and promises of heaven for specific acts in Buddhist ethical rhetoric, there are as many reminders that the workings of karma are ultimately inconceivable. If karma is inconceivably complex, then the auspicious is equally inconceivable, and so follows Buddhist ethics. I do not mean by ambiguity to say that Buddhists are befuddled or that they do not have clear moral principles. I mean this in the positive sense that lack of moral certainty, appreciation for narrative complexity, rejection of oversimplification, and a high toleration for the almost unfathomable complexity of moral situations can be positive things. I suspect that Buddhist ethics constantly resort to narrative, because it is capable of maintaining tensions and ambiguities and representing diverse voices and multiple levels of concern.80 In Buddhist thought, narrative is as likely to be the commentary itself as it is to be the object of analysis.81 This makes the application of Western metaethics especially challenging, since it tends to function in the opposite way, that is, by clarifying narrative through systematic analysis. The jtakas, avadnas, hagiographies etc. are at least as important for the understanding of Buddhist ethics as any subtle psychological or philosophical analysis, but these are the most neglected texts in modern studies. Legends of ntideva and Asaga may tell us more about how Buddhists understood their ethics than the Bodhicaryvatra or Bodhisattvabhmi, at least in regard to the contexts that held those legends dear. Certainly, in my experience, relatively few Buddhists know the commentarial literature to
I am indebted here to conversations with John Strong. I acknowledge the influence of my dissertation advisor, Charles Hallisey, on this point.
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which most of this paper is devoted, while the story of the ship captain is known throughout the Buddhist world. It is remarkable that Asaga, Vasubandhu, Bhviveka, Candrakrti, and ntideva all resorted to the same brilliant little story of Captain Compassionate, which holds the possibility of auspiciously killing with compassion in dynamic tension with the horror of killing without it. One gets the feeling that Buddhist thinkers are deliberately enhancing the ambiguity, as if only an ambiguous ethic could do justice to lived reality.

AN Aguttara-Nikya. Edited by R. Morris, E. Hardy. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 18851900. Ap The Apadna. Edited by Mary Lilley. Oxford: Pali Text Society, 2000. Bca Bodhicaryvatra of ntideva with the Commentary Pajik of Prajkaramati. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts no. 12. Edited by Sridhar Tripathi. Darbhanga: Mithila, 1988. BoBh Asaga. Bodhisattvabhmi. Edited by Nalinaksha Dutt. Patna: Jayasawal Research Institute, 1978. BoBhWogihara Asaga. Bodhisattvabhmi. Edited by Unrai Wogihara. Tokyo: Seigo Kenyukai, 19301936. Bodhisattvagocaropyaviayavikurvaanirdea [Better known and cited as, but not catalogued as, the ryasatyakaparivarta-stra.] Byangs chub sems bai spyod yul gyi thabs kyi yul la rnam par phrul pa bstan pa. Derge, mDo-sde, Text 146, bKa gyur, Volume Pa 203. 82a141b. C Catuatakam: Candrakrtipratakay Sahitam. Sanskrit and Tibetan. Edited with Hindi translation by Gurucharan Singh Negi, PhD Dissertation. Sarnath: Central Institute Higher Tibetan Studies, 2005. MN Majjhima-Nikya. Edited by V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 18881899. Ratnval Ngrjuna. Ratnval of crya Ngrjuna with the Commentary of Ajitamitra. Edited by crya Ngawang Samten. Sarnath: Central Institute Higher Tibetan Studies, 1990.
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Samyuktbhidharmahdaya see Dessein (tr.) 1999. ik iksamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhistic Teaching Compiled by ntideva Chiefly from Earlier Mahyna Stras. Edited by Cecil Bendall. The Hague: Moutons, 1957. SN Sayutta-Nikya. Edited by L. Feer. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society, 18841898.
Secondary sources
Bendall, Cecil and Rouse, W.H.D. tr. 1971. iksamuccaya: A Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine Compiled by ntideva Chiefly from Earlier Mahyna Stras. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971. Bodewitz, Henk. 1999. Hindu Ahis and Its Roots, in Violence Denied: Violence, NonViolence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History. Edited by Jan E. M. Houben and Karel R. Van Kooij. Leiden: Brill, 1742. Chandra, Lokesh. 19591961. Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture. Reprinted 1990, Kyoto: Rinsen Book Company. Chang, Garma C.C. ed. 1983. A Treasury of Mahyna Stras. London: Penn State. Crosby, Kate and Skilton, Andrew. tr. 1996. ntideva. The Bodhicaryvatra. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Demiville, Paul. 1973. Le Bouddhisme et la Guerre, in Choix dtudes bouddhiques 19291970. Edited by Paul Demiville. Leiden: Brill, 347 385. Dessein, Bart. tr. 1999. Samyuktbhidharmahdaya. Heart of Scholasticism with Miscellaneous Additions. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Dundas, Paul. 1992. The Jains. London: Routledge. Eckel, Malcom David. 2008. Bhviveka and His Buddhist Opponents. Cambridge: Harvard University. Edgerton, Franklin. 1985. Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary. Vol. 2. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Emmerick, R.E. tr. 1970. The Stra of Golden Light: Being a Translation of the Suvaraprabhsottamastra. Translated by R. E. Emmerick. London: Luzac and Co. Ltd. Florida, Robert. 2005. Human Rights and the Worlds Major Religions: Vol. 5, The Buddhist Tradition. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers. Geiger, Wilhelm. tr. 1986. Mahvasa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon. Translated by Wilhelm Geiger into German. Translated from German into English by Mabel Haynes Bode. New Delhi: Asian Educational
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Services, 1986. Gethin, Rupert. 2007. Buddhist monks, Buddhist kings, Buddhist violence: on the early Buddhist approaches and attitudes to violence, in Religion and Violence in South Asia: Theory and Practice. Edited by John Hinnells and Richard King. New York: Routledge. _____ 2004. Can Killing a Living Being Ever Be an Act of Compassion? The analysis of the act of killing in the Abhidhamma and Pali Commentaries, in Journal of Buddhist Ethics. Volume 11, 166202. Groner, Paul. 1990. The Fanwang ching and Monastic Discipline in Japanese Tendai: A Study of Annens Futs jubosatsukai kshaku. in Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha. Edited by Robert Buswell. Honolulu: University Hawaii, 251290. Harrison, Paul. 2007. The case of the vanishing poet: new light on ntideva and the ik-samuccaya, in Indica et Tibetica. Edited by Konrad Klaus and Jens-Uwe Hartmann. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fr Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, 215248. Harvey, Peter. 2000. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holt, John. 1981. Discipline: The C anonical Buddhism of the Vinaya. Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass. Hopkins, Jeffrey. 1998. Buddhist Advice for Living and Liberation: Ngrjunas Precious Garland. Ithaca: Snow Lion. Jamspal, L. et als. tr. 2004. The Universal Vehicle Discourse Literature (Mahynastrlakra) by Maitreyantha/rysaga together with its Commentary (Bhya) by Vasubandhu. Translated by L. Jamspal, R. Clark, J. Wilson, L. Zwilling, M. Sweet, and R. Thurman. Edited by R. Thurman, New York: American Institute of Buddhist Studies, 2004. Jenkins, Stephen. 2010. Making Merit through Warfare and Torture According to the rya-Bodhisattva-gocara-upyaviaya-vikurvaanirdea Stra, in Buddhist Warfare. Edited by Mark Juergensmeyer and Michael Jerryson. New York: Oxford University Press, 5975. _____ 2003. The Circle of Compassion: An Interpretive Study of Karu in Indian Buddhist Literature. Cambridge Buddhist Institute Series, series ed. R. C. Jamieson. Ayrshire, Scotland: Hardinge Simpole Publishing. Currently out of print, but available under the same title as Harvard University Doctoral Dissertation, Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1991. Keenan, John. tr. 1992. The Summary of the Great Vehicle. Translated by John Keenan. Berkeley: Numata Center. Khoroche, Peter. tr. 1989. Once The Buddha was a Monkey, rya ras Jtakaml Chicago: University Chicago Press.
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Kleine, Christoph. 2006. Evil Monks with Good Intentions, in Buddhism and Violence. Edited by Michael Zimmermann. Kathmandu: Lumbini International Research Institute, 6598. Lamotte, tienne. tr. 1939. La somme du grand vhicule dAsaga (Mahynasagraha). Vol. 2, 1939; repr. Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste, 1973. Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. tr. 2000. Tsong-kha-pa, The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment: Lam Rim Chen Mo. Vol. 1. Translated by the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee. Edited by Joshua Cutler and Guy Newland. Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications. Lancaster, Lewis. 1979. The Korean Buddhist Canon: A Descriptive Catalogue. Berkeley: University California. Lang, Karen. tr. 2011. Catuatakam. Unpublished manuscript. _____ 1992. ryadeva and Candrakrti on the Dharma of Kings, in Asiatische Studien: Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Gesellschaft fr Asienkunde tudes Asiatiques: Revue de la Socit Suisse dtudes Asiatiques. 46.1, 232243. de La Valle Poussin, Louis. tr. 1990. Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakoabhyam. Translated by Louis De La Valle Poussin. Translated into English by Leo Pruden. Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1990. Li Rongxi. tr. 1996. The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions: Translated by the Tripiaka-Master Xuanzang under Imperial Order, Composed by ramaa Bianji of the Great Zonchi Monastery. Taish, Volume 51, Number 2087. Translated into English by Li Rongxi. Berkeley: Numata Center, 1996. Nagao, Gadjin. 1994. An Index to the Mahynasagraha. Studia Philologica Buddhica IX, Part 1: Tibetan-Sanskrit-Chinese, Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies. amoli, Bhikkhu and Bodhi, Bhikkhu. tr. 1995. The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Olivelle, Patrick. tr. 2004. The Law Code of Manu. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rahula, Walpola. 2001. Le Compendium de la superdoctrine Philosophie dAsaga. Paris: cole franaise dExtrme-Orient, 1971. Translated from French by Sara Boin-Webb. Fremont, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 2001. Schmithausen, Lambert. 1999. Aspects of the Buddhist Attitude to War, in Violence Denied: Violence, NonViolence and the Rationalization of Violence in South Asian Cultural History. Edited by J. E. M. Houben and K. R. van Kooij Leiden: Brill, 4567. Shih Heng-ching, Bhiku. tr. 1994. Upsaka Precepts. The Stra on
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Upsaka Precepts. Translated by Bhiku Shih Heng-ching. Berkeley: Numata Center. Sonam, Ruth. tr. 1994. Catuatakam. Yogic Deeds of Bodhisattvas. Translated by Ruth Sonam. Ithaca: Snow Lion. Tatz, Mark. 1986. Asagas Chapter on Ethics with the Commentary of Tsong-kha-pa. New York: Edwin Mellen Press. _____ 1985. Difficult Beginnings. Boston: Shambhala. _____ 1982. Candragomins Twenty Verses on the Bodhisattva Vow and its Commentary by Sakya Dragpa Gyaltsen. Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. _____ tr. 1994. The Skill in Means Stra. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Wallace, Vesna and Wallace, Alan. tr. 1997. A Guide to the Bodhisattvas Way of Life. Ithaca: Snow Lion. Welch, Holmes. 1972. Buddhism Under Mao. Cambridge: Harvard University. Williams, Paul. 2009. Mahyna Buddhism: the Doctrinal Foundations. Second edition. London: Routledge. Woodward, F. L. tr. 1933. Aguttara Nikya. The Book of Gradual Sayings. New York: Oxford.
What is it like to be a bodhisattva? Moral phenomenology in ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra1

Jay L. Garfield
1. Introduction: the text, its title and some readings

Bodhicaryvatra was composed by the Buddhist monk scholar ntideva at Nland University in India sometime during the 8th Century CE. It stands as one the great classics of world philosophy and of Buddhist literature, and is enormously influential in Tibet, where it is regarded as the principal source for the ethical thought of Mahyna Buddhism. The title is variously translated, most often as A Guide to the Bodhisattvas Way of Life or Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds, translations that follow the canonical Tibetan translation of the title of the book (Byang chub sems pai spyod pa la jug pa) and the commentarial tradition of Tibet. But that translation itself represents only one of two possible original Sanskrit titles, and a more natural English rendering of either Sanskrit title is simply How to Lead an Awakened Life, and that indeed describes the content of the text admirably. Taking this as the meaning of the title can issue in a kind of gestalt shift in our view of the text, allowing us to see it not so much as a characterization of the extraorThanks to Nalini Bhushan, Caroline Sluyter, Susanne Mrozik and Jan Westerhoff for useful comments on an earlier draft of this essay, and to Barbra Clayton for insightful critique at the International Association of Buddhist Studies XVth Congress. Thanks especially to Steve Jenkins for an extensive, challenging critique, from which I have learned much, and which has improved this paper. Any errors that remain are my own, and probably reflect my inattention to what my colleagues have pointed out. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 333357
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dinary moral life of a saint, but as a guide to moral development open to any of us. I therefore recommend that as an English translation of the title and as an understanding of the subject of the text. ntidevas understanding of how to lead such a life is distinctive, and is very different from accounts of the moral or the exemplary life familiar in the Western tradition. It is, I will argue, primarily a phenomenological account, and that is why I think it important for this account of Buddhist ethics to be taken as a voice in the contemporary philosophical conversation about the nature of ethics and about the proper form of moral theory. When read in the context of contemporary metaethics, and only as an important text in the history of Buddhism, How to Read an Awakened Life gains new importance. The central moral phenomenon taken up in the text is that of bodhicitta, a term I prefer to leave untranslated. This term is usually translated either as the awakened mind or as the mind of awak ening. But thats not very helpful, in part because of the different connotations of citta/sems and mind in Buddhist and Western philosophy, respectively, and in part because of the unclarity of the bare genitive construction in English. Avoiding the temptation to follow attractive philological and metaphysical byways, let me offer this preliminary reading of the term: Bodhicitta is a complex psychological phenomenon. It is a standing motivational state with conative and affective dimensions. It centrally involves an altruistic aspiration, grounded in compassion, to cultivate oneself as a moral agent for the benefit of all beings.2 That cultivation, as we shall see, demands the development of skills in moral perception, moral responsiveness, traits of character, insight into the nature of reality so deep that it transforms our way of seeing ourselves and others, and what we would call practical wisdom. In short, bodhicitta entails a commitment to attain and to manifest full awakening for the
We must tread with care, here however. As Susanne Mrozik has pointed out to me, Stephen Jenkins argues (1998) that altruism may be a bit strong, since, as we shall see below, bodhicitta and the motivations and skills connected to it, are beneficial to the bodhisattva as well as to others. It is, as ntideva will emphasize, always in the end in ones own interest to cultivate bodhicitta.
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benefit of others. A bodhisattva is one who has cultivated bodhi citta in at least one of two senses adumbrated by ntideva, and distinguished below. How to Lead an Awakened Life addresses the nature of bodhi citta and the means of cultivating it. We can read it as a treatise on the distinction between the phenomenologies of benighted and of awakened moral consciousness. ntidevas account of morality has been read in the West as a distinctively Buddhist theory of moral virtue, that is, as structurally Aristotelian, even if very different in content from Aristotles account of virtue and the good life (Keown 2005, 2007). It has also been read as consequentialist (Goodman 2008, Siderits 2007). Each of these readings, I fear, is a symptom of a dangerous hermeneutic temptation to force Buddhist ethics into a Western mould, and while each reading reflects something of the content of ntidevas approach, each misses the heart of the matter. It is true, as proponents of the areteic reading note, that ntideva focuses in How to Lead an Awakened Life on the cultivation of traits of character, and it is true that he contrasts moral virtues such as patience and compassion with moral vices such as a irascibility and selfishness, and recommends virtue over vice, focusing on states of the agent as opposed to actions or obligations. On the other hand, for ntideva the point of all of this is not to lead a happy life, or even to be a good person: bodhicitta does not take the moral agent as its object. The point is to benefit others, as well as oneself.3 Perfection itself, in other words is, for ntideva, neither an end in itself, nor final, nor self-sufficient. This is no virtue theory, and awakening, while analytically related to the perfections, is not a kind of eudemonia analytically related to virtues. It is also true that ntideva urges us to care for the happiness of others, and to reduce their suffering. And it is even true that we can find verses in the text that enjoin us to compare how little our own happiness or suffering is in comparison to that of all sentient
I thank Steve Jenkins for emphasizing that for ntideva, as for most Buddhist ethicists, there is no difference between self and others as objects of moral concern.
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beings in order to motivate us to sacrifice our own interests for that of others. Here is an example many (e.g. both Goodman 2008 and Siderits 2007) cite in support of a consequentialist reading:
Without any hesitation, I relinquish My body, my pleasures, And all virtues achieved throughout all time In order to benefit all sentient beings. III: 104
But to take such verses to be the expression of a kind of consequentialism would be to take them seriously out of context, and to miss the heart of ntidevas account. This verse in particular, as we will see below, occurs in the context of a resolution to abandon selfishness, and to broaden my moral gaze to universal scope, to cultivate a way of seeing myself in the context of a much broader whole in which my own interests are a rather small affair. ntideva does not argue that bodhicitta or the perfections cultivated by the bodhisattva are valuable because of the consequences they entail; and there is never a suggestion that the suffering of one can be balanced against the happiness of another. Whereas for a consequentialist, balances of benefits and harms are the ground of the value of actions or attitudes, but not necessarily their objects, for ntideva, the good of others is an object of bodhicitta, but not the ground of its value. Its value is grounded instead in the fact that it is the only rational way of taking up with the world. And comparison, or tradeoff of suffering and benefit is never on the table.5
All translations are my own, from the sDe dge edition of the Tibetan text, as reprinted in rGyal tshab 1999. As Wallace and Wallace note in ntideva 1997, the Tibetan version of the text differs in many usually minor ways from the available Sanskrit edition of the text. It appears that even early on there were at least two versions of the text, and there is no way of determining whether the Sanskrit edition from which the Tibetan and Indian translators worked was in some respect preferable to that which survives today or not. But it is worth noting that because of the importance this text attained in Tibet, most of the significant commentarial literature refers to the Tibetan version. The notable exception is Prajkaramatis Bodhicaryvatra-pajik, which follows the available Sanskrit. 5 Moreover, as Steve Jenkins points out (1998), in the end there never is a tradeoff most accounts of virtuous action end up with the claim that every one benefits, even those who apparently suffer temporary adversity, although
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Tillemans (2008) sees How to Lead an Awakened Life as centrally concerned with the problem of akrasia, arguing that ntideva is concerned with the problem of how to overcome the conflict between his knowledge of what is best both for himself and for others and his desire for vice. There are certainly passages, for instance those in which ntideva attempts to cultivate revulsion for sexual behaviour that support this interpretation:
If you do not lust for the impure, Why do you repeatedly embrace another Who is only flesh-smeared bones Bound together with sinew? VIII: 52
In passages such as these, ntideva clearly aims to counteract vicious desire by reminding himself of the knowledge of virtue. Nonetheless, as I hope will be clear from the remainder of this discussion, just as the conception of virtue, vice and moral perfection at work in this text are non-Aristotelian, the conception of moral conflict at work in How to Lead an Awakened Life is not Aristotelian. ntideva is more concerned with the conflict between desire or aversion and impersonal aspiration or, perhaps more clearly, the conflict between attachment and freedom than he is in a conflict between knowledge and desire. The akratic desires one thing, but knows that another is better, and the Aristotelian puzzle concerns reconciling rationality, knowledge of the good and desire for the ill. The solution to akrasia is the cultivation neither of more knowledge, nor of other desires, but of moral strength. Not so for ntideva: although confusion, on his account, is the root of desire and aversion, and eliminating that confusion is the ground of awakening, moral conflict for him is not so much cognitive as conative. It is to be resolved by firmly establishing metaphysical knowledge in ones mode of taking up with the world, a knowledge which issues in the relinquishing of desire and the arising of the appropriate aspiration, not through cultivating moral strength. Moreover, for ntideva, since vice is always ultimately rooted in confusion, and the elimination of confusion issues in virtue, there can never be a situation in which one really
perhaps one must take the long view to see those benefits.
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knows what is right but chooses what is wrong. There is always a failure of knowledge, not just of will, in vicious action. It will hence be better to set aside the doxography that helps us to sort Western ethical theories, and to approach ntideva on his own terms in the context of Buddhist ethical thought. The insights we will gain from reading him in this context will repay forbearing to locate him in our landscape. We will focus on the place of the bodhisattva ideal in Mahyna ethics as a preliminary to exploring the phenomenology of morals in How to Lead an Awakened Life.
2. The Buddhist moral outlook and the bodhisattva ideal

Buddhist moral theory is not Western moral theory. What is it? I have argued elsewhere (Garfield unpublished) that Buddhist ethics is best thought of as an attempt to solve a deep existential problem the problem of the ubiquity of suffering and as an attempt to solve that problem by developing an understanding of our place in the complex web of interdependence (prattyasamutpda) that is our world. Buddhist ethics is grounded in the so-called four noble truths. The first two are particularly important for present purposes: (1) that the universe is pervaded by suffering and the causes of suffering, a truth obvious to anyone on serious reflection, though one that escapes most of us most of the time precisely because of our evasion of serious reflection, an insight that, as we shall see, ntideva takes very seriously; (2) that suffering arises as a consequence of actions conditioned by attachment and aversion, each of which in turn is engendered by confusion regarding the nature of reality, a confusion that is a kind of primal cognitive instinct, which includes a tendency to reify ourselves, and that which pertains to ourselves; to take that which is impermanent to be permanent; that which is insubstantial to be substantial; that which is interdependent to be independent. This triune root of suffering is represented in the familiar Buddhist representation of the Wheel of Life with the pig, snake and rooster at the hub, the six realms of transmigration representing aspects of the phenomenology of suffering brutality; pain and despair; insatiable need; arrogance and the need for recognition;
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insensitivity to the pain of others in our own happiness; and the vulnerability and imperfection that comes with being human revolving around them, structured by the twelve links of dependent origination (a detailed psychology of perception and action), all of which is depicted as resting in the jaws of death, the great fear of which propels so much of our maladaptive psychology and moral failure. In the present reading of How to Lead an Awakened Life, I take that representation, one we an imagine ntideva walking past every day on his way to work, as inspiring the text in a very deep way. The most important innovation in Mahyna moral theory, of course, is not the well-known framework of the six perfections, but the installation of compassion as the central moral value and the model of the bodhisattvas compassionate engagement with the world as the moral ideal. The compassion at issue is not a passive emotional response, and not a mere desire. Instead it is a genuine commitment manifested in thought, speech and physical action to act for the welfare of all sentient beings. Compassion in this tradition is founded upon the insight to which ntideva gives voice, that suffering is bad, per se, regardless of whose it is. To fail to take anothers suffering seriously as a motivation for action is, he argues, itself a form of suffering and is irrational.
Self and others are the same, One should earnestly meditate: Since they experience the same happiness and suffering, I should protect everyone as I do myself. VIII: 90 Divided into many parts, such as the hands, The body is nonetheless to be protected as a single whole. Just so, different beings, with all their happiness and suffering, Are like a single person with a desire for happiness. VIII: 91 Even if my own suffering Does no harm to anyone elses body, It is still my own suffering. Since I am so attached to myself it is unbearable. VIII: 92 Just so, even though I do not experience The sufferings of others, It is still their own suffering.
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Since they are so attached to themselves, it is hard for them to bear. VIII: 93 I must eliminate the suffering of others Just because it is suffering, like my own. I should work to benefit others Just because they are sentient beings, as am I. VIII: 94 Since I am just like others In desiring happiness, What is so special about me That I strive for my happiness alone? VIII: 95 Since I am just like others In not desiring suffering, What is so special about me That I protect myself, but not others? VIII: 96 If, because their suffering does not harm me, I do not protect them, When future suffering does not harm me, Why do I protect against it? VIII: 97 The idea that this very self Will experience that suffering is false: Just as when one has died, another Who is then born is really another. VIII: 98 If another should protect himself Against his own suffering, When a pain in the foot is not in the hand, Why should one protect the other? VIII: 99 One might say that even though it makes no sense, One acts this way because of self-grasping. That which makes no sense with regard to self or to others Is precisely the object you should strive to abandon! VIII: 100 The so-called continuum and collection, Just like such things as a forest, or an army, are unreal. Since the sufferer does not exist, By whose power does it come about? VIII: 101 As the suffering self does not exist, There are no distinctions among anyone. Just because there is suffering, it is to be eliminated.
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What is the point of discriminating here? VIII: 102 Why should everyones suffering be alleviated? There is no dispute! If it is to be alleviated, all of it is to be alleviated! Otherwise, I also am a sentient being! VIII: 103
This is a deep insight, and one over which we should not pass too quickly: the bodhisattva path is motivated in part by the realization that not to experience the suffering of others as ones own and not to take the welfare of others as ones own is to suffer even more deeply from a profound existential alienation born of a failure to appreciate ones own situation as a member of an interdependent community.6 Interdependence guarantees that our joys are social joys; our sorrows are social sorrows; our identity is a social identity; the bounds of our society are indefinite. We either suffer and rejoice together in the recognition of our bonds to one another, or we languish in self-imposed solitary confinement, afflicted both by the cell we construct, and by the ignorance that motivates its construction. Compassion, grounded in the awareness of our individually ephemeral joint participation in global life, hence is the wellspring of the motivation for the development of all perfections, and the most reliable motivation for morally decent actions. Compassion is also, on the Mahyna view, the direct result of a genuine appreI must concede that, as Steve Jenkins has urged (personal communication), although dependent origination plays a central role in Indian and Tibetan Buddhist metaphysics, and although confusion is often glossed as the failure to understand or to apprehend interdependence, and although vice is held to be grounded in confusion, there is no explicit assertion in classical Indian Buddhist literature or in Tibetan commentarial literature that virtue arises from the appreciation of community membership, or of interpersonal, or of inter-sentient being connection. The closest an Indian text comes is ntidevas analogy at VIII: 9092 of the moral community to the body. More explicit uses of interdependence as a moral idea await the engaged Buddhism of the 20th and 21st centuries. Nonetheless, it should be clear that the material for the rational reconstruction I offer is present in the classical texts. Moreover, canonical meditation practices in the Tibetan tradition intended to cultivate compassion, such as the visualization of all sentient beings as ones mother, emphasize this point.
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ciation of the essencelessness and interdependence of all sentient beings. Once one sees oneself as nonsubstantial and existing only in interdependence, and once one sees that the happiness and suffering of all sentient beings is entirely causally conditioned, the only rational attitude one can adopt to others is a compassionate one. This is the Mahyna philosophical framework that sets the more specific context for ntidevas project.
3. The structure of the text and the structure of moral experience

As I noted at the outset, the structure of How to Lead an Awakened Life is a clue to ntidevas account of the structure of moral experience. Let us examine that structure in more detail. As a reminder, the chapters run as follows 1. In Praise of Bodhicitta 2. Eplanation of Vice 3. Adopting Bodhicitta 4. Caring for ones Attitude 5. Maintaining Awareness 6. The Perfection of Patience 7. The Perfection of Enthusiasm 8. The Perfection of Meditation 9. The Perfection of Wisdom 10. The Dedication of Merit. Many commentators note immediately that ntidevas presentation of the Mahyna list of the six perfections appears incomplete, leaving out what is generally regarded as the first the perfection of generosity. (The fourth and fifth chapters are really a presentation of the second the perfection of mindfulness.) Tibetan commentators, including the fifteenth century exegete rGyal tshab (1999), and the present Dalai Lama in oral teachings, present a twofold solution to this apparent problem. First, they note, the third chapter,
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on bodhicitta, is replete with references to generous intentions and so can be construed as a presentation of that perfection. Second, they point out, the final chapter, the dedication of merit, addresses generosity at a much deeper level. Here ntideva discusses the experience of giving even ones own moral attainments and aspirations, and the universal scope of moral concern. This return to the theme of generosity is taken by these commentators to present a deliberate contrast between the way generosity is experienced at the beginning of the bodhisattva path in the context of what ntideva calls aspirational bodhicitta and the way it is experienced in the context of the engaged bodhicitta achieved in the cultivation of an awakened life. In chapter III, for instance, we encounter resolutions such as these, as ntideva cultivates the aspiration to lead the awakened life. The generosity he imagines cultivating involves depersonalizing his own motivations and developing a commitment to benefit all beings in direct material ways:
And so I will perform these deeds. Through the virtue I thereby acquire, May I completely alleviate All of the suffering of all sentient beings. III: 6 May I be the medicine For all who are ill. May I be both medicine and physician Preventing the recurrence of illness. III: 7 Through showers of food and drink May I alleviate the pain of hunger and thirst! At times of famine May I be both food and drink! III: 8 To all destitute and miserable beings May I be an inexhaustible treasure! May I be the one who presents them With all their many necessities. III: 9 Without any hesitation, I relinquish My body, my pleasures, And all virtues achieved throughout all time
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In order to benefit all sentient beings. III: 10
In the tenth chapter, on the other hand, the generosity described is that of one who has cultivated engaged bodhicitta. ntideva is now depersonalizing not only his ends, but his own state of being. The transference of merit he envisions involves conceiving of his own virtue not as a state pertaining to him, but as a more general feature of the moral universe, and hence his own experience of himself, as of generosity, is transformed through the cultivation of engaged bodhicitta.
Through the merit attained By my composition of How to Lead an Awakened Life May all beings lead awakened lives. X: 1 Through my merit, may all those In all directions, who suffer In mind or in body Attain oceans of bliss and happiness. X: 2 May my life be just like that of Majur, who strives to benefit All sentient beings Dwelling in the ten directions of space. X: 54 For as long as space endures, For as long as there are beings in cyclic existence, So long may I endure, In order to dispel the suffering of those beings. X: 55
The generosity embodied in aspirational bodhicitta is personal, taking as its intentional object my own contribution to the welfare of the world; the generosity embodied in engaged bodhicitta is im personal, taking as its intentional object only the benefit of others, with my achievements, not myself serving as its condition. This observation provides one interpretative key to a reading of How to Lead an Awakened Life as a treatise on moral phenomenology. But we can go further. ntideva opens the text with reflections on the moral experience of one contemplating serious moral development, writing, as he does throughout the text, in an intensely first-person confessional voice enabling deep phenomenologi-
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cal reflection, and often calling to the Western readers mind the Confessions of Augustine:
There is nothing here that has not been said before, Nor do I have any skill in composition. Thus, I have no concern for others and I have composed my text solely to cultivate my own mind. I: 2 Since my virtue is cultivated, My faith thereby increases in power. Nonetheless, if someone else with an outlook like my own Sees this, it would be meaningful. I: 3
ntideva emphasizes here not only his own moral deficiency, but more importantly that moral practice is aimed principally at self-cultivation. What is to be cultivated, he tells us, is bodhicit ta. ntideva emphasizes its importance, and immediately distinguishes two important degrees of bodhicitta. The first, to be cultivated at the outset of moral development is aspirational bodhicitta, the serious intention to lead an awakened life with a commitment to cultivating ones moral capacities; the second is engaged bodhic itta, the set of spontaneous moral perceptual skills and dispositions that lead one to act in beneficial ways.
When bodhicitta has arisen, in an instant, Even a wretch who is bound in the prison of the cycle of existence Comes to be known as a child of the tathgatas, And becomes an object of reverence in the realms of gods and men. I: 9 In brief, bodhicitta Should be known to be of two kinds: Aspirational bodhicitta And engaged bodhicitta. I: 15 Just as one can tell the difference between One who aspires to travel and a traveler, The learned can tell The analogous difference between these two. I: 16
The second and third chapters explore the nature of vice and the motivation for aspiring to an awakened life. Once again, the exploration of these themes is undertaken through a reflection on
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ntidevas own experience, and emphasizes the interior quality of vice and of the desire to transcend it.
Thus, since I have not realized That I am ephemeral, Through confusion, attachment and aversion, I have committed many kinds of vicious deeds. II: 38 O Protectors, through being inattentive And heedless of this danger, For the sake of this impermanent life I have achieved much that is vicious. II: 42 With distressed glances, I seek protection in the four directions. Which good person Will protect me from this great fear? II: 45 Having seen that there are no protectors in the four directions, I fall into total confusion. With no protectors anywhere, What shall I do in such a state? II: 46
Here we see ntideva taking a state of moral immaturity to be a state of intense suffering, conditioned by confusion and permeated by fear. We will return to this central role of fear in ntidevas distinctive analysis of moral vice below, but the general point to observe at this stage is simply that ntidevas approach to the question, why be moral? at this stage of the text is directly phenomenological: vice feels just terrible, and terrible in characteristic ways.7 And the motivation to moral progress is characterized in similar terms:
Two things need clarification here: first, the sense of the word vice, that I use to translate ppa/sdig pa (often translated as sin see Wallace and Wallace in ntideva 1997: 24, n. 22 for a discussion of this issue; second, the sense in which it feels so terrible. First, vice denotes any state of character, motivation or mind that conduces to maintaining confusion, attachment and aversion, and hence constitutes an obstacle to the liberation from suffering. It thus contrasts with virtue, which conduces to liberation through reducing confusion, attachment and aversion. Vices include such mundane states as selfishness, carelessness and sloth as well as more florid states such as murderous rage or boundless avarice. Second, the fact that vice feels terrible does
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Overwhelmed by fear, I offer myself to Samantabhadra, And of my own accord, I offer this, my body to Majughoa. II: 49 In despair, I cry out for help to The protector, Avalokitevara, Who acts compassionately and inerrantly, Begging him to protect my vicious self. II: 50 Now, having experienced the great terror, Heeding what you once told me, I approach you for refuge so that you Might quickly dispel my fear. II: 53 It makes no sense for me to enjoy the present day Saying to myself, I will not die just now. The time when I will cease to exist Will inevitably arrive. II: 58
The subsequent chapters take up the path to an awakened moral life. The account is rich far too rich to take up in full detail. But the sequence of the chapters demonstrates the strikingly phenomenological approach to ethics adopted by this text. ntideva begins by considering how one, having developed aspirational bodhicitta, cares for and nurtures the attitude; he then turns to how one develops the concentration required to maintain introspective awareness of ones own motivational and affective states; to the development of patience and then enthusiasm for ethical practice. The final chapters of the text address the role of meditation in stabilizing the qualities and ways of seeing cultivated earlier, and finally the importance of a particular kind of wisdom as the foundation of the engaged bodhicitta that is the foundation of awakened life that is, the ability to see all phenomena including oneself, that to which one is intimately related, and other moral agents as
not entail that it is always explicitly experienced as terrible. ntideva anticipates by a bit over a thousand years Freuds insight that our deepest pain may be unconscious that everyday life is often full of pathology precisely because of underlying, unacknowledged, unconscious suffering. Often, as ntideva recognizes here, and as Freud was to discover much later, the recognition of ones own pain is the first step to its resolution.
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empty of inherent existence, as interdependent and as impermanent. For ntideva, the culmination of ethical practice is a cognitively rich perceptual skill a new way of experiencing oneself in the world.
4. Fear and refuge: Suffering, aspiration and awakening as moral development

The role that fear plays in ntidevas account of the phenomenology of moral life is striking, and the diagnosis of this fear is subtle. This point connects deeply with the centrality of the practice of taking refuge in Buddhist life, and one can read this text profitably as an extended meditation on refuge. The very need for refuge itself suggests an overarching experience of fear perhaps a fear whose dimensions and objects are to a large extent opaque to the sufferer. The ultimate source and object of this fear is depicted graphically in the Tibetan representation of the wheel of life, in which all of existence takes place in the jaws of death. The iconography suggests that our cognitive and emotional lives, the constant cycling between states of mind and the experience of being buffeted about by events whether external or internal that are beyond our control, gives rise to so much suffering and is driven in large part by the unconscious awareness and fear of the inevitability of death. That fear engages us psychologically at the hub. Although the awareness of our own impermanence and that of all about which we care constitutes the horizon of our experience, we suppress that fear in confusion, living our lives as though these impermanent phenomena are permanent. This is why Tsong kha pa (2006: 34 35) remarks that confusion, in this sense (avidy/ma rig pa) is not simply the absence of knowledge, but the direct opposite of knowledge a psychologically efficacious and destructive denial of the truth. In this case, as ntideva is aware, it is a denial of what we at a deeper level know to be true, of a troubling knowledge. This confusion born of fear generates attraction and aversion. Our attachment to ourselves, to our own well-being, to our possessions, to our conventions and practices, and in general to all that in the end is a source of suffering, ntideva urges, is at bottom a
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reflexive defensive reaction to the fear of loss. Our aversion to that which we find distasteful is at bottom a reaction to the fact that it reminds us of our own impermanence and vulnerability. Our conviction that we are independent agents interacting with other independent agents a feature of our moral experience that runs both so very deep and so contrary to all that we know upon reflection he urges, is a way of warding off the fear of interdependence, of being out of control, of being subject to the natural laws that issue in our aging, infirmity, reliance on others, and eventual demise. And around the hub cycle our emotions, desires, actions, and experiences, as expressed in II: 38 and II: 42 translated above on p. 346. But fear and awareness of fear are two very different things. Though we all live in fear, we are not, ntideva thinks, all aware of that background of fear, or of its impact on our lives. Moral sensibility properly so-called, according to the account of How to Lead an Awakened Life, arises when one becomes truly aware of the terror that frames ones life and that lies at the root of selfdeception and vice. That awareness generates the impulse to take refuge and to strive for awakening, and as a consequence, the cultivation of aspirational bodhicitta.
From this very moment I go for refuge to The victors, protectors of all beings, Who strive for the purpose of protecting all, And who have great power to completely eliminate all fear. II: 47 Likewise, I honestly go for refuge to The Dharma in which they are completely engaged, Which completely eliminates the fear of cyclic existence, As well as to the assembly of bodhisattvas. II: 488
Moral development is hence a transformation of moral experience; a transition from a life conditioned by terror and unreason albeit perhaps unconscious terror and unrecognized unreason to a life conditioned by confidence and clarity; from a life constituted by phenomenological self-deception to a life constituted by introspective awareness; from a life in which vice is inevitable and taken to be unproblematic just because it is not recognized, or recognized
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as vice, to a life in which the cultivation of virtue is at the centre of ones consciousness.
5. Moral phenomenology as moral theory in Buddhism

One might, if one were a Western metaethicist, think that this rich moral phenomenology is an adjunct to explicit ethical theory, and search for the account of the right or the good, or of virtue or vice that underlies this account of the contrast between the experience of the morally immature and the morally mature agent. One would, however, look in vain. How to Lead an Awakened Life is a text on ethics; indeed, it is one of the most important Indian Mahyna Buddhist ethical treatises, the central ethical treatise for the Tibetan tradition and indeed is firmly grounded in theory articulated in pre-Mahyna rvakayna texts. Nonetheless, How to Lead an Awakened Life is exclusively devoted to an account of the cultivation of moral sensibility and moral experience. Let us explore some examples. Chapter V on maintaining awareness, opens with these verses:
One who wishes to protect his practice Should be careful to protect his mind. If one does not protect ones mind It is impossible to protect ones practice. V: 1 The elephant of the mind Causes much harm and degradation. Wild, mad elephants Do not cause so much harm. V: 2 Nonetheless, if the elephant of the mind Is restrained by the rope of mindfulness, Then all fear is banished, And every virtue falls into our hands. V: 3
Maintaining the focus on the relationship between the dissipation of fear and moral development, ntideva argues that the cultivation of a moment-to-moment awareness of ones own cognitive and emotional states is central to leading an awakened life. The morally benighted are characterized by an inattention to their own mental lives (even if they may be obsessed with an idea of morality); awak-
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ening consists in part in replacing that inattention with mindfulness. Later in the same chapter, ntideva emphasizes, using the metaphors of Buddhist hell imagery (including the notorious hideous women who appear in the trees) that our own suffering is entirely psychological, and that moral development is entirely mental cultivation:
Who so purposefully forged The implements of sentient beings hell? Who constructed the floor of burning iron? And whence have those women come? V: 7 The Sage has explained that The vicious mind gives rise to all of these. So, there is nothing whatever in the triple world More frightening than the mind. V: 8
Perhaps the most widely studied and most beautiful chapter in How to Lead an Awakened Life is that on patience. In this chapter ntideva emphasizes the pervasiveness of anger and aversion in the morally immature state, and the enormous though often unconscious suffering they bring in train, feeding on a cycle linking anger to fear and aggression.9 The predominance of these emotions prior to the cultivation of bodhicitta contrasts with the patience that characterizes awakened moral experience.
All of the virtuous actions Amassed over a thousand eons, such as Giving alms and making offerings to the tathgatas, Are destroyed by a single instance of anger. VI: 1 There is no vice like aversion, and There is no aescetic practice like patience. Hence one should assiduously
9 The unwary Western reader might think that there is a confusion here between emotional immaturity and ethical immaturity. This thought should be resisted, as it rests on a presumption that our emotional life is independent of our moral life. It is central to ntidevas and indeed, any Buddhist conception of the domain of the moral that our emotions are morally significant and morally evaluable. Emotional immaturity is one dimension of moral immaturity; emotional maturity one dimension of moral maturity (see Dreyfus 2002).
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Cultivate patience in a variety of ways. VI: 2 When the thorn of aversion sticks in the heart, The mind finds no peace, Nor can it achieve happiness or joy. Sleep does not come, and ones strength ebbs away. VI: 3
The account of the development of moral consciousness continues with an examination of the role of enthusiasm. Once again, the story of ethical growth is told not in terms of obligations or actions, but in terms of the development of character, which in turn is analyzed experientially.
Thus, after patience one should cultivate enthusiasm. For awakening depends on enthusiasm. Just as without wind nothing moves, Virtue cannot arise without enthusiasm. VII: 1 What is enthusiasm? It is determination to attain virtue. What should we call its opposite? It is to cling to the base, To deprecate oneself and ones tradition. VII: 2 I have not completed this; I have just started this, but it remains half done. When death suddenly arrives, I will think, Alas, I am defeated! VII: 8 When vices are abandoned, there is no more suffering. If one is wise, one is without sorrow. For mistaken conception and vice Are what harm mind and body.VII: 27
The final two chapters of How to Lead an Awakened Life address the more directly cognitive aspects of the awakened moral life, those concerned with establishing how to see reality properly. Meditation is central to ntidevas account, for it is through meditation that one embeds discursive knowledge into ones character. In the following three verses he focuses on various aspects of attachment, its consequences, and how to relinquish it. The first of these considers the impact of the understanding of impermanence on the release from attachment to others, and the development of equanimity; the second addresses attachment to self, and once again, its connection to fear; the third emphasizes more graphically the role of medita-
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tion in reconstructing not our behavior or sense of duty, but our way of seeing the world.
What impermanent being Attaches himself to what impermanent being? For sadly, he will not see her For thousands of lifetimes. VIII: 5 If one thinks such thoughts as I am very rich and respected, And many people like me, When death approaches, fear will arise. VIII: 17 If you do not lust for the impure, Why do you repeatedly embrace another Who is only flesh-smeared bones Bound together with sinew? VIII: 52
Finally, in the chapter on wisdom, ntideva emphasizes both the importance of a deep understanding of metaphysics for moral life, and, more specifically, the fact that the relevant metaphysical view is the Madhyamaka view according to which all phenomena are empty of essence, interdependent, and have only conventional identities. It is important to note here not just that ntideva recommends this metaphysical position as the foundation of awakened life and morality, but, especially in the context of the preceding chapter, that it is a foundation for such a life precisely because once internalized, this view (and for ntideva only this view) transforms ones very experience both of the external world and of oneself, generating a metaphysical vision that enables a moral engagement, thus enabling engaged bodhicitta.10
The Sage taught all of these matters For the sake of wisdom. Therefore, if one wishes to avoid suffering, And to attain peace, one should cultivate wisdom. IX: 1
10 Of course this means that it is not as easy as it sounds to attain moral perfection. Perfect compassion requires perfect wisdom. Nonetheless, this does not mean that it is impossible to cultivate any virtue: the cultivation even of mundane compassion increases wisdom; the cultivation of even a basic understanding of emptiness increases compassion.
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Without an understanding of emptiness A mental state that has ceased will arise once again, Just as when one engages in non-conceptual meditation. Therefore, one should meditate on emptiness. IX: 48 Pride, which is the cause of suffering, Increases due to delusion regarding the self. Since from one, the other necessarily follows, Meditation on selflessness is supreme. IX: 77
Taking the treatise in this way allows us much better to understand the place of the ninth chapter in the text. Its presence and form are puzzling at first. Most of the rest of the text addresses issues immediately recognizable as ethical, such as generosity, patience, etc. And most of the rest of the text is written in a direct, accessible poetic style. And the rest of the text speaks quite directly, without the scholastic device of an interlocutor to whose arguments the text responds. The ninth chapter, on the other hand, is concerned with difficult questions in metaphysics and epistemology, such as the ultimate nature of all phenomena, the relationship between the way things appear and the way they are, the question of the relation between mind and the external world, and about whether consciousness is necessarily reflexive issues not so obviously ethical. Its verses are difficult, highly abstract, and often written in a formal scholastic debate style. It is very difficult to parse, let alone to understand, without a good commentary. One might even reasonably suspect that it is a late graft. The present reading, however, shows why this excursion into abstract metaphysics and epistemology is so important to ntideva, and why it occurs at the conclusion of the treatise, and not, as one might think, given the foundational role of insight in Buddhist theory, at the beginning. It is a central theme of How to Lead an Awakened Life, as it is a central theme of the Buddhist diagnosis of the existential problem of suffering generally, that suffering and the egocentric tendencies it generates and which in turn perpetuate it, are grounded in a fundamental confusion about the nature of reality taking what is in fact interdependent, impermanent and essenceless, on both the subjective and objective side to be independent, enduring, and substantial. This attitude, ntideva urges,
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is not the result of careful metaphysical reflection, but an innate cognitive instinct. A truly awakened life requires its extirpation. This extirpation requires philosophical reflection, but such reflection is not sufficient, given the depth of the cognitive set.11 Even receptivity to that argument requires the cultivation of a moral sensibility that loosens the attachment and aversion implicated with the metaphysical error. But meditative practice is also necessary, in order that reflective thought can become a spontaneous cognitive set, a way of being in the world, rather than a way of thinking about the world, in which we experience ourselves and all around us as we are, interdependent, impermanent, insubstantial.12 This transformation of vision, and consequent transformation of mode of being, even though it is cast in How to Lead an Awakened Life as a direct understanding of ultimate reality, and an understanding of the relation between this ultimate reality and conventional reality, amounts not to seeing behind a world of illusion, but rather to coming to see a world about which we are naturally deceived just as it is, not being taken in by the cognitive habits that issue in that deception. For this reason, just as the historical Buddha, in the presentation of the eightfold path at Sarnath, emphasized that ones view of the nature of reality is a moral matter, ntideva, in his analysis of an awakened life, urges that our metaphysics and epistemology is central to our moral lives. It is because it is this vision that finally transforms aspirational to engaged bodhicitta that this chapter comes at the end, not at the beginning of the text.
6. A distinctive view of moral life

This whirlwind tour through How to Lead an Awakened Life of course cannot do justice to the richness of ntidevas insight and moral thought. On the other hand, I hope that it convinces the reader that in ntidevas account of Buddhist ethics we find a disA mere addition of insight to injury, as a psychoanalyst friend of mine used to say about some cognitive therapies 12 Once again, the fact that meditative practice may be necessary to achieve virtuoso ethical status, this does not mean that meditation is the sine qua non of any moral progress.
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tinctive approach to ethical thought, a perspective not available in mainstream Western ethical thought. When ntideva asks about moral life, he asks not what our duties are, nor what actions are recommended, nor what the relation is between the good and our actions, nor even what would make us individually happy. Instead, he starts with a problem that is to be solved that of the ubiquity of suffering and the standard Buddhist diagnosis of that problem in terms of attachment and aversion rooted in fundamental ontological confusion. He asks how to solve that problem. His solution is distinctive in that it develops a deeper diagnosis of the problem through an analysis of our own experience of ourselves and of our place in the world. It seeks the solution to this problem not at least not directly in a transformation of the world, or even of our conduct, but rather in a transformation of that experience. The task of leading an awakened life a morally desirable life is the task of transforming our phenomenology. It may be tempting either to force this account into a familiar Western form, or even just to graft it on to one, as the phenomenological adjunct to a more familiar metaethical account. I suggest that we resist that temptation, and open ourselves to the possibility of a very different way of understanding ethical aspiration and engagement the path of the bodhisattva.
Bibliography Primary sources

rGyal tshab (1999). Byang chub sems pai spyod pa la jug pai rnam bshad rgyal sras jug ngogs. Sarnath: Gelukpa Student Welfare Committee.
Secondary sources
Drefyus, G. (2002). Is Compassion an Emotion: A Cross-Cultural Exploration, in R. Davidson and A. Harrington, eds., Visions of Compassion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Garfield, J. (unpublished). Buddhist Ethics. http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/documents/BMT.pdf, last visited 30-07-2011
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Goodman, C. (2008). Consequentialism, Agent-Neutrality and Mahyna Ethics, Philosophy East and West 58 (1), pp. 1735. Jenkins, S. (1998). The Circle of Compassion: A Comparative Study of Karu in Indian Buddhist Literature. PhD Dissertation, Harvard University. Keown, D. (2005). Origins of Buddhist Ethics, in W. Schweiker, ed., Blackwell Companion to Religious Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. _____ (2007). Buddhist Ecology: A Virtue Ethics Approach, Contemporary Buddhism 8 (2), pp. 97112. ntideva (1997). A Guide to the Bodhisattvas Way of Life. V. Wallace and A. Wallace, trans. Ithaca: Snow Lion. Siderits, M. (2007). Buddhist Reductionism and the Structure of Buddhist Ethics, in P. Bilimoria, J. Prabhu and R. Sharma, eds., Indian Ethics. London: Ashgate, pp. 283297. Tillemans, T. (2008). Reason, Irrationality and Akrasia (Weakness of Will) in Buddhism: Reflections on ntidevas Arguments with Himself, Argumentation 22, pp. 149163. Tsong kha pa (2006). Ocean of Reasoning: A Great Commentary on Ngrjunas Mlamadhamakakrik. N. Samten and J. Garfield, trans. New York: Oxford University Press.
Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics1

Tom J. F. Tillemans
What is this elusive discipline called Buddhist ethics? As is often the case in modern interpretations and analyses, it is not easy to characterize exactly what a western-inspired term corresponds to in traditional Indian culture, and sometimes its not even clear how a particular term is being used in a burgeoning modern secondary literature on the subject. If we look at Indian and Tibetan literature, the closest term to the western notion of ethics seems to be la, moral discipline, something that is the subject of monastic Vinaya codes, Abhidharma scholastic, bodhisattva literature, Jtaka tales, narrative Avadna literature, some Madhyamaka2 treatises, even tantric texts and so on and so forth in short, a little bit everywhere. Modern scholars have devoted significant efforts to the question as to whether there is a recognizable Western ethical theory be it utilitarianism or virtue ethics that is implicit in all, or at least the most, significant works in this literature. This debate will not be my concern here, although like Jay Garfield (2011) (year) I too think it is difficult to meaningfully attribute such an overriding ethical theory to Buddhism.3 That said, almost all Buddhist literature is certainly profoundly ethical in orientation, even if it is
This article grew out of a lecture to the annual conference of the Center of Buddhist Studies of the University of Kathmandu. My thanks to the Center and its students for their continued informed interest in substantive issues. Thanks also go to Mark Siderits for his helpful feedback. 2 In what follows, for convenience rather than conviction, I adopt the modern convention of using Madhyamaka for the thought and Mdhyamika for the thinkers. 3 For a recent vigorous defense of Buddhist ethics as utilitarianism, see Goodman 2009. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 359378
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not clearly and consistently theoretically oriented. The la discussions do attempt to tell us what we ought to do and why to take a very rough and ready characterization of what ethics is about (Thomson 2001: 6). The codes and advice and obligations involve a sense of should/ought, one no doubt weaker than a Kantian duty, but an ethical demand nonetheless. And la literature does often tell us why, that is, it gives justificatory reasons as to why one should think that such and such ethical demands are genuine and well-founded and others are not. The Buddhists are not just moralizers; they give rationales for what they say ought to be done.4 Is there in any interesting sense a Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics, i.e., an ethics that would be particular to the Middle Way school and follow from or somehow be linked to its subtle analyses of metaphysics? In other words, does the Madhyamaka anti-realist philosophy that all things are empty (nya) of intrinsic nature (svabhva) make any difference to discussions about what people ought to do and why? In many respects Madhyamaka ethics is just general Mahynist Buddhist ethics, no more no less. A radical and purely text-based answer thus might be to say flatly, No, theres no evidence in the texts that would suggest it makes any significant difference at all. One could point out that the position Ngrjuna and other Indian authors seem to espouse is that canonical ethical distinctions remain thoroughly intact in Madhyamaka, all be they transposed from the level of ultimate (paramrtha) to conventional reality/truth (savtisatya). The monastic rules, bodhisattva precepts, love, compassion, and the attention to the law of karma and its often unfathomable consequences remain unchanged. In the auto-commentary to Ngrjunas Vigrahavyvartan verses 7-8 the opponent is depicted as arguing that without real moral intrinsic natures, the typical Abhidharma list of virtuous and non-virtuous mental factors (caitta) could not exist, nor could there be any liberating (nairyika) tropes (dharma) or any of the other factors needed for the path. Ngrjuna, in reply, doesnt contest anything within
4 That why is important: moralizers are happy to tell you what you ought to do moral philosophers differ in that they aim to tell you also what makes it the case that you ought to do the things they say you ought to do (Thomson 2001: 6).
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the classifications of what is virtuous, non-virtuous, liberating and binding. Instead he seeks to show that the whole Abhidharma-style list remains possible for a Mdhyamika providing it is suitably transposed to the proper level of truth. While he thus consecrated very significant efforts to showing that ethics would not be simply precluded in toto by a philosophy of emptiness (nyavda), he did not seem to even entertain the idea that some important aspects of ethics or ethical reasoning would have to be affected or that some new approach to ethical questions would be demanded.5 Often it is said that understanding Buddhist ultimate reality leads to one being convinced of the interconnectedness of all life and that it hence reinforces environmental ethics or universal responsibility; these are themes frequent in popular presentations. In fact this is not what I shall focus upon for the simple reason that talk of interconnectedness and the transformative effect of realizations of the ultimate is found in writings of virtually all Mahynist schools and is not linked exclusively, or even principally, to the Madhyamaka. The potential changes I wish to take up stem from systemic tensions in Madhyamaka positions on worldly reality. I insist on systemic to emphasize that what is at stake is rational reconstruction of the system of Madhyamaka thought and not the discovery of some hitherto unknown textual data. (Not surprisingly, rational reconstructions are predominant nowadays in discussions of Buddhist ethics and especially so when it comes to applied ethical issues, like contraception, responsibilities to future generations, environmental ethics, human rights, etc., that dont have clear textual discussions in canonical literature.)6 The Mdhyamikas nyavda should, if carried through, have significant implications
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As Jan Westerhoff succinctly put it: [Analyses] dealing with the specific ethical consequences of Madhyamaka thought are virtually absent (Westerhoff 2009: 209). 6 Rational reconstruction seems to be what e.g. Damien Keown (2005) is doing in taking up Buddhist positions on issues such as cloning and others that medieval Indian Buddhists certainly were not aware of. Another striking example: investment guidelines for ethical investing by Buddhists in the stock market. The result of the deliberations of Richard Gombrich et al. (2007) is what you find in the Dow Jones Dharma Index.
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for their conceptions of what worldly reality is and on the epistemology that governs knowledge claims and justification on the level of worldly truths. For ethics, this means a break with certain types of justificatory reasoning that Buddhists use on the worldly, or conventional (savti), level. In a chapter on ethics in a book on Indo-Tibetan Buddhist notions of conventional truth/reality, Bronwyn Finnigan and Koji Tanaka (2011) also examine justification in a Madhyamaka approach to ethics, arguing that in a thoroughgoing anti-realist nyavda genuine justification becomes impossible; in its stead we supposedly only find a weaker type of reasoning to tell Buddhists why they should act and think in certain ways rather than others as Buddhists. Now, it is true that in the Madhyamaka and other schools there are many discussions that are little more than homiletics and that involve reasoning which would not stand up, or even be intelligible, outside the church. Such is often the case in Candrakrtis first five chapters of Madhyamakvatra (often cited by Finnigan and Tanaka); it is also what we find in the enormously complicated SvtantrikaMdhyamika scholastic treatments of Prajpramit ethical schemata discussed in the Indian commentarial literature centered on the Abhisamaylakra or in the corresponding Tibetan literature. Nonetheless, not all Madhyamaka ethical reasoning is purely or even essentially destined for the already committed Buddhist far from it. In texts like Bhvivekas Madhyamakahdaya, we find direct polemical confrontations with non-Buddhists to show that their ethical pronouncements are wrong and unjustified, and that the Buddhists views alone are justified. There is also a recurring insistence, by Svtantrika-Mdhyamika authors aligned with Dharmakrtis school, such as ntarakita and Kamalala, that ethical argumentation should be accessible to an open-minded rational being who provisionally suspends religious commitment; this is the so-called judicious person (prekvat) who represents an ideal figure in that she adopts positions, ethical and otherwise, purely on the basis of sound justificatory reasoning alone. It is thus incontestable that there were such rational strategies for justification in non-Madhyamaka and Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics alike. Mdhyamikas not only thought they were important, but that they functioned unproblematically on the level of conventional truth/re-
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ality.7 Of course, one could still maintain that Indo-Tibetan Mdhyamikas were somehow badly wrong about this and that an appeal to conventional truths/realities in justificatory reasoning simply is not compatible with anti-realism at all, philosophically speaking. But this, if right, would end up being the very strong claim that there is a fatal flaw in the numerous sorts of anti-realism East and West, namely, that such philosophies and ethical justification just simply cant mix a priori. I dont see that that general position is established in Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) or elsewhere. I think that Finnigan and Tanaka (2011) were certainly on the right track in focussing on issues of justification. Where I disagree with them, however, is in their position that the Mdhyamikas anti-realism constrains these thinkers to a type of ethics without justification. Well leave aside the Svtantrika-Mdhyamikas, like Kamalala et al., who clearly rely heavily on the robust justificatory reasoning of the Epistemological School (pramavda) transposed onto the domain of conventional truth. The more interesting case is that of the Prsagika-Mdhyamika. Does Finnigan and Tanakas position apply better here? Briefly: I dont think we end up with no justification; on the contrary, justification for a Prsagika can remain strong and not simply an affair of the church preaching to the faithful. Justification would, however, become significantly different from what it is generally in Buddhist ethics. This is because evaluation of actions largely in terms of their humanly unfathomable karmic consequences which is a major part of Buddhist ethical reasoning becomes especially problematic for the Prsagika. What problems does a Prsagika have with this that others dont? The Prsagika, more than other Buddhists, is caught between accepting that justification proceeds via the usual tallying of karmic consequences, on the one hand, and a fundamental methodological constraint, on the other, stemming from their views on
7 The debate about the possibility or impossibility of justification and its compatibility with nyavda is certainly not a new one, and the Madhyamaka answers follow Ngrjunas well-worn strategy of arguing that ethical reasoning functions on the level of the conventional. See Ngrjunas replies to the objections in Vigrahavyvartan 7-8.
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metaphysics. This methodological constraint is that conventional truth and the reasoning based upon it must, in some sense, be in conformity with the worlds ideas and intuitions Prsagikas must remain in keeping what the world acknowledges (lokaprasid dha), and should not, as do the other Buddhist schools, propose radical alternatives.8 Related to this is the idea that argumentation must proceed in keeping with principles recognized (prasiddha/ abhyupagata) by the other party. Indeed Prsagika-Mdhyamikas notoriously claim that a consequence of their nyavda is that they see no reason to go fundamentally against the worlds views, and thus stress that they accept what the world accepts and reject what it rejects as conventional truth, as for a nyavdin there is nothing deeper grounded in real intrinsically existing facts.9 The prescriptive accounts of the other schools, accounts that seek largely to change what the world thinks in order to better conform to entities, end up for the Prsagika as being a reformulation of realism. Lets look at the details. (I will rely on some previous publications giving a more detailed treatment of the Indo-Tibetan ideas and the textual data; the point here is to assess the implications for ethics). What an emphasis on conformity with the world and its ways of reasoning means for Buddhist ethics is, in effect, that the worlds fundamental moral intuitions, epistemic practices and norms are
8 I have taken up the idea of lokaprasiddha and its problems of interpretation in Tillemans 2011. There are obviously better and worse exegeses, the worst being that truth simply is equated with what the majority of people in the world believe to be true. 9 The Prasannapad of Candrakrti cites a famous passage from the Ratnakuastra to show that Madhyamaka acknowledges just what the world acknowledges (lokaprasiddha): The world (loka) argues with me. I dont argue with the world. What is generally agreed upon (samata) in the world to exist, I too agree that it exists. What is generally agreed upon in the world to be nonexistent, I too agree that it does not exist. loko may srdha vivadati nha lokena srdham vivadmi/ yal loke sti samata tan mampy asti samatam / yal loke nsti samata mampi tan nsti samatam. Trisavaranirdeaparivarta (chapter 1) of the Ratnaka. The source is traceable back to Sayutta Nikya III, p. 138. Sanskrit found in Candrakrtis Prasannapad 370,6-8 (ed. L. de la Valle Poussin, St.-Ptersbourg 1903/1913).
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reinstated and legitimized as the grounds for justification.10 And indeed Mdhyamikas do often justify their ethical positions in this way. A good example of Prsagika ethical argumentation that proceeds in terms of the worlds moral intuitions and that uses justificatory reasoning destined for the unconvinced is found in the first four chapters of the Catuataka (C).11 In this text of the third century C.E. Mdhyamika ryadeva and in the Catuatakak (C) of Candrakrti (6th century) we find an elaborate discussion of the four illusions (viparysa) that, according to canonical literature (i.e., Abhidharma), are supposedly present in the minds of worldlings: taking transitory life as permanent, what is painful as pleasurable, what is dirty as clean and what is selfless as having a self. The argumentation follows a pattern. The authors try to show that the worlds superficial attitudes on these matters are in conflict with its deep-seated intuitions if the world reflected it would recognize the four illusions as indeed illusions. Candrakrti here, in effect, uses the methodology he uses everywhere else, i.e. a form of prasaga-method using reductio ad absurdum and opponentaccepted reasons (paraprasiddhahetu) invoking principles that the world implicitly accepts, and will recognize upon reflection.12
10 On the tension between moral theory and intuitions, see McMahan 2000. 11 Translated and studied in Lang 2003, Sanskrit fragments in Suzuki 1994. 12 To rsum the critique in the C and C concerning the illusions (viparysa): the ordinary persons confidence about the future is based on self-deception about his mortality (C I.6-7); worldlings attitudes to mourning are inconsistent (gal ba = viruddha) so that they mourn what on reflection does not deserve it (C I.13); pleasure and happiness are rare, contrary to widespread opinion; upon reflection we see it is actually pain that is prevalent (C II.4); people might think that work is a source of happiness, but it is better seen as largely meaningless and slavish exertion to survive (C II.18); attitudes about beauty and cleanliness are confused and would be seen to be wrong if we reflected upon them (C III.3-5); possessiveness makes no sense (C III.11); kings (and other so-called superior individuals) are more like social parasites, dependent upon others work they have no reason to feel justified of their status (C IV.2); a king who is violent, corrupt or cruel deserves to be denounced, even though he claims to provide protection or to be the father of the people (C IV.11-13), and so on and so on.
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Not only did Candrakrti in C appeal to propositions that the world recognized, but he proposed an account of the pramas (reliable sources of knowledge) that stayed as close as possible to worldly epistemic practices; he deliberately rejected the prescriptive epistemology of the Dignga school. Indeed in chapter XIII of C he ridiculed prescriptive epistemologists as being completely unversed in mundane objects and intoxicated through imbibing the brew of dialectics (Tillemans 1990, vol. 1: 177, 179). The commitment to lokaprasiddha in all things epistemic and ethical is abundantly clear. What difference would such a professed conformity with the worlds moral intuitions and epistemic practices make to Buddhist ethics? It is obvious that ryadeva and Candrakrti were seeking to rationalize and conserve intact a canonical ethical schema and that they did not see their prasaga-method nor their epistemology as in any way placing it in jeopardy. However, unlike the Cs discussion of the four illusions, which is largely argumentation about intuitions and does not involve controversial facts, much of Buddhist ethical argumentation, does crucially rely on problematic facts, typically when actions are evaluated because of their total set of karmic consequences across several lives. While some karmic consequences will be accessible to ordinary reflecting individuals e.g., the general rule that he who lives by violence tends to die by it many will be completely unfathomable by any ordinary human beings, in that they are supposedly unobservable and not inferable from anything observable. These so-called radically inaccessible facts (atyantaparoka) like the details of why one comes to have the particular destiny and rebirth one has are thus supposedly only understandable through scriptures authored by individuals with extraordinary understanding (Tillemans 1999 and 2000). In later Indian and Tibetan Buddhism this extraordinary understanding is increasingly taken to be full omniscience: knowing everything about all. Although Prsagika-Mdhyamikas professed lokaprasiddha across the board on conventional matters, they certainly did not, for all that, abandon recourse to radically inaccessible facts about karma to justify ethical positions. In a sense, they tried to have the
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usual Buddhist cake and eat it, and the result was unsatisfactory. Buddhists, Mdhyamika or not, were certainly aware that persuading people by citing scriptures that werent understood or believed in, or by invoking the idea that the Buddhists teacher was a superior individual (atiayapurua) with supra-normal understanding, were indeed highly problematic in the eyes of the world.13 However, instead of simply siding with the world on this, Mdhyamikas sought an ingenious argumentation strategy whereby critical thinkers could supposedly come to accept scriptural propositions and accept that they be used as justificatory reasons in ethical debate. This Buddhist strategy goes back at least to ryadeva, after which it is taken up by Dignga (5th century) and Dharmakrti (7th century); most modern Tibetan Buddhists continue to promote it as being a critical approach leading to rational proof of otherwise inaccessible facts; it is regularly espoused by the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. In brief, the procedure in the triple analysis (dpyad pa gsum) and scripturally based inferences (gamritnumna)14 is that one first ascertains the truth of a scriptures pronouncements on all the observable matters (pratyaka) it treats as well as on those matters which are rationally accessible (even though unobservable) an immaculate record in these two categories allows one to infer the scriptures accuracy on otherwise completely unknowable matters like karma. This method is indeed present in ryadevas Catuataka XII.5, which tells us that when, in an ethical deliberation, there is doubt about the veracity of the Buddhas descriptions of completely obscure karmic consequences we should be confident in his teachings about them because he was right in other areas, notably the teaching on emptiness.
13 For example, Dharmakrti in PV I.218 says that we would accept what such a superior person says if we could know that he is superior (akyeta jtu so tiaya yadi), the point being that short of us having clairvoyance we simply couldnt know who had such extraordinary knowledge and who didnt. 14 On the so-called triple analysis (dpyad pa gsum) and scripturally based inferences, see chapters 1 and 2 in Tillemans 1999; see also the introduction to Tillemans 1993.
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buddhokteu parokeu jyate yasya saaya/ ihaiva pratyayas tena kartavya nyat prati// When someone entertains doubt concerning the imperceptible things (paroka) taught by the Buddha, he should develop conviction in these very things on account of emptiness (nyat).
The point is that we supposedly can, with our own critical acumen, determine that the teachings on emptiness are an example (dnta) where the Buddha got the facts perfectly right. Therefore, because of his reliability on something essential like emptiness, it is also rational to believe his statements even when we cannot ourselves determine their truth. As Candrakrti puts it in his k to Catuataka XII.5:
Now the [adversary] cannot state even the slightest reason for any uncertainty, and thus this example [i.e., emptiness] is indeed proven. Therefore, you should understand by means of your very own principles alone (svanayenaiva) that the other statements of the Illustrious One, which establish unobservable states of affairs, are also true, for they were taught by the Tathgata, just as were the statements setting forth [that] state of affairs which is the emptiness of intrinsic nature. How then could there be any place for doubt concerning the imperceptible things taught by the Buddha?15
In short, this (and the slightly more elaborate later idea of gamritnumna) is an appeal to the Buddhas track-record in teaching. Its a justificatory argument that one finds in Prsagika-Mdhyamikas like Candrakrti, who commented upon ryadeva, as well as in Svtantrika-Mdhyamikas like Kamalala and ntarakita, who relied on Dharmakrtis method in Pramavrttika (PV) I to prove unfathomable facts inferentially. What is striking for our purposes is that Candrakrti says that the appeal to the Buddhas reliability proceeds by means of your very own principles alone (svanayenaiva). It is clear that Candrakrti wishes to say that this
na ca akyam anena svalpam apy anicayakraa kicid abhidhtum iti siddha evya dnta / tata cnyad apy asamakrthapratipdakavacana bhagavato yathrtham iti pratyat svanayenaiva tathgatopadiatvt svabhvanyatrthbhidhyakavacanavad iti kuto buddhokteu parokeu saayvaka/ Translation and text in Tillemans 1990 vol. 1: 120 and vol. 2: 17-19..
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argument strategy is in conformity with the world and its own epis temic norms. Candrakrti, and perhaps ryadeva, and certainly later Tibetan writers, thus thought that a Madhyamaka philosophy which took conventional truth as what is acknowledged by the world (lokaprasiddha), could also engage in a method that stretched the worlds acceptance to include propositions about unfathomable things. And this is where one gets the distinct impression of a stratagem to have the cake and eat it too. Is Candrakrtis idea nonetheless somehow defensible? Do we actually conform to the worlds own epistemic standards and practices if we invoke such track-records to persuade the unconvinced and doubt-ridden on matters where there are not, and indeed supposedly cannot, be any other empirical evidence or rational arguments. I dont think so. First of all, its implausible to claim that any major scripture will actually pass the test of getting all empirical and all other humanly verifiable matters right. It might get some right, but not all, given that empirical knowledge changes and grows. True, Buddhist writers, like Dharmakrti and probably ryadeva and Candrakrti too, recognized that what really counted was not a track-record of one-hundred percent accuracy on every conceivable trivial matter treated in a scripture or treatise, but accuracy on important or difficult principal topics, such as the four noble truths, emptiness and the like.16 But what kind of rational conviction (pratyaya) could one develop in this way? How would all doubts be eliminated, as ryadeva and Candrakrti say, by reminding oneself of the rightness of the Buddhas teaching on emptiness, for surely the mere fact of getting one very important thing right is not ipso facto a guarantee on anything else. Dharmakrti was quite skeptical about these scripturally based inferences, and said clearly in his Pramavrttikasvavtti to PV I.217 that
See PV I.217: Because he/it is reliable on the principal matters, we can infer [reliability] on the others (pradhnrthvisavdd anumna paratra). For Dharmakrti and his commentators the principal matter is the four noble truths. It is striking that ryadeva and Candrakrti speak of the significance of getting emptiness right: it seems clear that the Mdhyamika in C XII.5 is using a reasoning very similar to PV I. 217, but that the principal matter is indeed emptiness.
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they werent actually bona fide inferences at all na ... anumnam anapyam as they lacked certainty (nicaya). As he recognized, there are just too many counterexamples where a person is correct on one set of things, be they important or not, but falls down hopelessly on other things. (See e.g., his Svavtti to I.318: na kvacid askhalita iti sarva tath/ vyabhicradarant. It is not the case that when one is unmistaken on something, all the rest is similarly [unmistaken], for we see that this [implication] is deviant.) Any observer of human foibles can come up with examples where people get significant things right and fall down on less significant and even comparatively easy matters.17 Now, the first impression one gets in reading this type of critique of scripturally based inference is that the problem raised is just the usual one of the fallibility of induction: we cannot arrive at certainty about the truth of generalizations on the basis of a finite number of confirmations. Indeed, the weakness of induction is a constant theme in Dharmakrti. But if it were only a matter of the well-known failings of induction to generate certainty, one might well reply, So much the worse for Buddhist demands of certainty, and thus become a resigned or even cheerful fallibilist. In that case a fallibilist could say that demonstrated accuracy in certain important matters constitutes at least reasonable grounds for supposing accuracy in another duly related type of matter. After all, it is indeed so that we proceed by such transfers of credibility in many cases where someones proven expertise in one set of matters serves as grounds (all be they fallible) for trusting him or her in another closely related set. (One need only think of expert witnesses in court cases to see that this is indeed common practice.) A suitably fallibilist Candrakrti would then at least be right in saying that this is in keeping with the worlds epistemic standards. Arguably, though, the problem with scriptural inference is not simply the ever-present uncertainty one finds in inductive reasoning. And so merely embracing fallibilism is not the remedy either.
To update things a bit: the math department may be brilliant on the significant theoretical aspects of topology but unable to add up their phone bill correctly.
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The real catch in transferring credibility from one area to another, if we wish to conform to the worlds own norms, is that there must be a type of connection or relevant similarity between the different areas so that the expertise is transferable in a reasonable, albeit fallible, fashion. We are all too familiar with people who are highly qualified in one area say, economics and who then think they can expound on virtually everything else, related or not, and usually with disastrous results. We would say that those would-be experts become unreliable, not because they hadnt at some point understood a lot of significant things rightly or because of some general problem about induction, but because they overstep their qualifications. They take on subjects not clearly related to the area in which they have been recognized to be reliable. Alas, the flaw in a fallible appeal to the Buddhas track-record is similar: it is not at all clear that reliability concerning important general principles like emptiness does reasonably transfer to explanations concerning the details of karma in all their specificity and complexity, because the relationship is not clear. While emptiness of intrinsic nature, as a general principle, may be closely linked with the general feature that phenomena arise dependently due to causes and conditions as Buddhists from Ngrjuna on have stressed,18 knowing that much would hardly suggest that one somehow knows the specific details of what causes what. Now, while ryadeva and Candrakrti seem to have thought that scriptural inferences were an unproblematic way for Buddhists to argue with any opponents, Buddhist or not, in that such inferences were just another case of the worlds extending credence to people on the basis of their past performances, Dharmakrtis position was no doubt much more nuanced. Dharmakrti, in Pramavrttika I and IV, maintained that this type of faith-based reasoning about the specifics of karma would not be persuasive to non-believers; not only is the reasoning extremely uncertain, but many opponents would simply refuse to recognize its subject matter (dhar min), i.e., Buddhist accounts of the details of karmic causality.
See Mlamadhyamakakriks XXIV.18ab: ya prattyasamutpda nyat t pracakmahe Dependent arising, that we declare to be emptiness.
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Nonetheless, Dharmakrtis view was that scriptural inferences, even if they werent fully bona fide, were still somehow to be used, at least in the private context of Buddhists who wished to set out (pravttikma) on the spiritual path. While scripture may provide direction (albeit very fallible) in a closed context of believers, it is not at all probative (i.e., a sdhana) in a public context when appeals to authority are contested. I think that some such distinction between private and public is indeed important to the Buddhist position. On the one hand, Dharmakrti would steer clear of outright denial of karma which no scholastic Buddhist writer can just flatly deny but on the other hand he knows that he cannot and should not use scriptural descriptions of karmic consequences to clinch debates in the public domain, where rebirth and the causality between lives are either contested issues or too obscure to be admitted in fact-based (vastubalapravtta) debates. How might such a public-private distinction work? If we take another type of subject matter, viz. the nature of mind, there is a great difference between a discussion in a private domain, amongst convinced Buddhists, that cites stra or tantra passages on the luminous nature of mind, the subtle consciousness and so forth, and such a discussion in the public domain where the other party is a well-meaning, but non-Buddhist, cognitive scientist working in a secular university. To mix up the private and public domains and say that Buddhist scriptural quotations about otherwise inaccessible features of mind should also be probative for the cognitive scientist would be seen as a rather comical violation of norms of rationality. And if one then goes from bad to worse and persists in somehow saying that the scripture is in any case right because it is the words of the Buddha, etc., this would be seen as not far from fundamentalism. Now, instead of cognitive science, lets take an example of an ethical argument on a contested issue in applied ethics: animal welfare and vegetarianism. People on both sides can and will invoke considerations that are publicly debatable: harm to animals, ecological consequences, health benefits of eating meat or not eating meat, suffering, perhaps rights of animals, speciesism, etc. This is recognizably normal argumentation on such an issue. Things are much different when someone seeks to prove their case by a scriptural quote concerning the unfathomable karmic con-
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sequences of eating meat. For example, a vegetarian may invoke passages from the Lakvatrastra to the effect that a meat-eater will be reborn as a carnivore, or alternatively a meat-eating Tibetan Buddhist might reply to a vegetarian opponent by invoking a (tantric?) teaching that the meat-eater will establish a karmic connection with the animal whose flesh he eats and will in a future life lead the being to enlightenment, etc., etc. Perhaps such ways of thinking would still somehow be meaningful in the private context of committed Buddhist exegetes wondering what their scriptures advise. However, they would certainly become deeply suspect if they left the purely private context of intra-Buddhist religious exegesis. Clearly there are huge philosophical problems about holding any dual perspectives, be they in philosophy of mind or on ethical and religious issues. While private perspectives do sometimes co-exist with what is publicly acceptable, it is another matter as to whether and when they should co-exist, if at all.19 The question thus remains whether some dual perspectives are to be preserved, and which ones, or whether norms of rationality dictate that we always seek unity. Dharmakrti, if I read him rightly, thought that at least in ethics a purely intra-Buddhist perspective on some key matters, while publicly unarguable, could be more than simple irrationality. For our purposes, however, we shall have to leave that larger philosophical problem on hold. In any case, the shift to such a private perspective will not enable scriptural argumentation about karma to be used convincingly in an adversarial debate on ethics, as ryadeva and Candrakrti thought it could be used and as Buddhists often do try to use it. Instead, following the worlds norms, this would be an illegitimate shift from one perspective to the other, i.e., an attempt to promote certain Buddhist ethical ideas
It is of course no secret that many intelligent, scientifically minded peoscientifically ple hold weird private ideas e.g. on medicinal remedies, on ways to ensure good luck, on CIA conspiracies, etc., etc. ideas that they know would be unacceptable in a public discussion with their peers. Such types of dual perspectives, however, are not of much interest to us here, as they would usually be dismissed as simply irrational.
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in the public domain all the while insulating them from criticism by stressing peoples epistemic incompetence. Recently the philosopher Owen Flanagan (2006), in a lecture on Buddhism and science, confronted much the same problem where Buddhists priced certain problematic subjects outside critical debate: he coined the term epistemological protectionism. (This may capture the problem better than the accusations of dogmatism that are sometimes bandied about). Such a protectionist approach would claim that one could cite reasons e.g, scriptural passages to provide proof in a public debate, but at the same time preserve them from criticism by making them unassailable to anyone but the largely convinced alone. I think it is clear that in a critical approach to ethics appeals to humanly unfathomable facts are also protectionist in this way. They too fail to conform to what the world, on reflection, values and demands in debate on contested issues, namely, that a discussion, if not between the already convinced, must be open for both parties to criticize and evaluate on the basis of publicly accessible information. Once one puts into question the Mdhyamikas use of scriptural inferences to give knowledge of unfathomable karmic consequences, his appeal to the omniscience of the Buddha is also going to be in considerable trouble. In both cases one is pricing much ethical debate outside the realm of criticism, or worse, engaging in a type of protectionism. However, there are also other reasons as to why a Mdhyamika should feel particularly uncomfortable in invoking a literal notion of omniscience to clinch an ethical debate. The problem arises that if the Buddha supposedly has knowledge of all things in all their details, including the unfathomable effects of karma, this looks to be tantamount to him understanding how things are in themselves, by their own intrinsic nature (svabhvena). And that would be precluded by a Mdhyamikas thorough-going antirealism realist Buddhist schools might have some way to accept it, but it seems that the Madhyamaka would be in an especially delicate position. Literal omniscience seems in effect to be a Gods Eye point of view of the world, a view sub specie aeternitatis, and
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that is one way to formulate what an anti-realist holds to be impossible.20 Of course, the subject of omniscience and the different views that Buddhists have had about it historically are matters upon which I cannot reasonably embark here. In later Indian Buddhism and in its Tibetan successors we find in one way or another several versions as to what full-fledged omniscience is, and some versions would be closer to a crypto-realism than others. (There has also been, over time, an evolution from a limited conception of omniscience where an omniscient being supposedly knows one or a few essential things about everything, to a much stronger type of knowledge.)21 For our purposes well contrast two quite different versions of omniscience. If we take, for example, a conception such as that of the 14th century Tibetan writer Klong chen rab byams pa who distinguishes between dualistic mind (sems) and primordial gnosis (ye shes) or Mind itself (sems nyid), omniscience is taken as primordial gnosis/Mind itself rather than dualistic mind dualistic mind is in fact something to be eliminated.22 Omniscience for Klong chen pa, like primordial gnosis, is a special type of understanding free from all objects (yul). In such a case, there seems to be no question of an omniscient being knowing each and every thing in all its details that would per impossibile be a sort of dualistic mind (sems). Gnosis/omniscience is a type of transcendent understanding in which the very idea of a thing/object is absent. On the other hand, if we take omniscience as it seems to be understood by later Indian commentators on Dharmakrti or by Tibetan
The characterization of metaphysical realism as involving the Gods Eye perspective is due to Hilary Putnam (see, e.g., Putnam 1981: chapter 3). 21 See McClintock 2010. 22 Cf. Klong chen rab byams pa, Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan, gSung thor bu, p. 384: mdor bsdu na khams gsum pa i sems sems byung cha dang bcas pa thog ma med pa nas brgyud pa i bag chags can sgrib pa gnyis kyi ngo bo dzin cing/ bskyed par brten pas spang bya yin zhing dgag dgos par bshad pa yin no/ In short, the three realms dualistic minds (sems = citta), mental factors (sems byung = caitta), and their qualities are subject to imprints coming down from beginningless [time], have as nature the two obscurations and rely on production. As such, it is explained that they are to be eliminated and should be stopped.
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Mdhyamika writers such as Tsong kha pa, it does seem to involve essentially an amplification ad infinitum of peoples cognition of objects to arrive at all of them in all their details. It is this latter, more literal, version that would seem to run thoroughly afoul of anti-realism. Where does this critique of the Mdhyamika appeals to trackrecords and omniscience leave us? I think we have to admit that Prsagikas attempted the impossible in professing lokaprasid dha all the while trying to recuperate unfathomable karma in ways that the world itself would supposedly accept. My argument so far has been that this is not likely to work and that some hard choices therefore have to be made. Now, one of the more attractive features of Buddhism is, and has been for a long time, its openness to discussion and its emphasis on reason. We see this strongly in the present Dalai Lamas commitment to dialogue based on empirical methods and rationality what Flanagan (2006) called a welcome mat to open, public, debate.23 What I think needs to be offered in ethics, in largely the same constructive spirit as that of Owen Flanagans article on science, is a sober note: this welcome mat will attract few long term visitors if contemporary Buddhists, Mdhyamikas included, continue to justify their ethical views on the basis of facts knowable only via a scripture whose author had omniscient knowledge. What then would nyavdin Buddhist ethics look like without such a heavy reliance on radically inaccessible facts and Gods Eye omniscience? I think a partial answer is something like the following: if moral intuitions and personal attitudes become more dominant in ethical debate, rather than scripture and omniscience, ethics becomes humanized and to quite a degree secularized; the extended welcome mat will be genuinely attractive. The opposite tendency however will keep Buddhist ethics oriented towards religious
Here is how Flanagan (2006) reformulated the Dalai Lamas invitation to dialogue. The Welcome Mat: Come sit by my side, my Western scientific and philosopher friends. Tell me what you know. I will teach you what I know. We can debate. But in the end it is our duty, on both sides, to change our previous views if we learn from the other that what we believe is unfounded or false.
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fundamentalism and increasingly out of touch with contemporary concerns. Both these competing visions were in fact combined in various degrees in Buddhist schools, just as they are in most major world religions. The important feature of the Madhyamaka for Buddhist ethics is that it, more than any other school, insists on the primacy of what the world acknowledges, rather than upon humanly unfathomable facts that are as they are for all time. This, if carried through, would be a significant move away from fundamentalism and towards the humanization of ethics.
Bibliography Primary sources

C C PV Catuataka, see Suzuki 1994, Tillemans 1990. Catuatakak, see Suzuki 1994, Tillemans 1990. Pramavrttika, chapter on inference for oneself (svrthnumna). See PVSV. PVSV Pramavrttikasvavtti. Ed. R. Gnoli, The Pramavrttikam of Dharmakrti. The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Rome, 1960. Mlamadhyamakakriks. Ed. L. de la Valle Poussin. Mlamadhyamakakriks (Mdhyamikastras) de Ngrjuna, avec la Prasannapad commentaire de Candrakrti. Osnabrck: Biblio Verlag, 1970. Sems dang ye shes kyi dri lan of Klong chen rab byams pa. In Kun mkhyen klong chen pa dri med od zer gyi gsung thor bu. Reproduced from xylographic prints from A dzom brug pa chos sgar blocks. 2 volumes. Pema Thinley, Gangtok, 199?.
Secondary sources
Finnigan, B.; Tanaka, K. 2011. Ethics for Mdhyamikas. In: The Cowherds (eds.). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 221-231. Flanagan, O. 2006. Science for Monks: Buddhism and Science. Written version of the keynote lecture to the symposium on Mind and Reality at Columbia University. See www.usc.edu/schools/college/crcc/private/flanagan_lectures/Science_for_Monks.pdf, last visited 23-02-2011. Garfield, J. L. (2011). What is it like to be a Bodhisattva? Moral pheno-
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menology in ntidevas Bodhicaryvatra.Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [2011] 333357. Gombrich, Richard et al. 2007. Dow Jones Indexes and Dharma Investments to Launch New FaithBased Indexes. See http://www.asria.org/news/ press/1201231179, and
http://www.djindexes.com/mdsidx/html/pressrelease/press_hist2008. html, last visited 23-02-2011.

Goodman, C. 2009. Consequences of Compassion. An Interpretation and Defense of Buddhist Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Keown, D. 2005. Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lang, K. C. 2003. Four Illusions. Candrakrtis Advice to Travelers on the Bodhisattva Path. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McClintock, S. L. 2010. Omniscience and the Rhetoric of Reason:
ntarakita and Kamalala on Rationality, Argumentation, and Religious Authority. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
McMahan, J. 2000. Moral Intuition. In: LaFollette, H. (ed.). The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, 92-110. Putnam, H. 1981. Reason, Truth and History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Suzuki, K. 1994. Sanskrit Fragments and Tibetan Translation of Candrakrtis Bodhisattvayogcracatuatakak. Tokyo: Sankibo. Thomson, J. J. 2001. Goodness and Advice. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Tillemans, T. J. F. 1990. Materials for the Study of ryadeva, Dharmapla and Candrakrti. 2 volumes. Vienna: Arbeitskreis fr Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien Universitt Wien. Tillemans, T. J. F. 1993. Persons of Authority. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Tillemans, T. J. F. 1999. Scripture, Logic, Language: Essays on Dharmakrti and his Tibetan Successors. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Tillemans, T. J. F. 2000. Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika. An Annotated Translation of the Fourth Chapter (Parrthnumna). Vienna: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Tillemans, T. J. F. 2011. How Far Can a Mdhyamika Buddhist Reform Conventional Truth? Dismal Relativism, Fictionalism, Easy-Easy Truth, and the Alternatives. In: The Cowherds (eds.). Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 151-165. Westerhoff, Jan. 2009. Ngrjunas Madhyamaka. A Philosopical Intro duction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Miracles and superhuman powers in South and Southeast Asian Buddhist traditions
Contributions to a panel at the XVth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Atlanta, 2328 June 2008 Guest editor
David V. Fiordalis
Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine1

David V. Fiordalis
False prophets can bring about false miracles through their magic arts, which are the same in appearance as true miracles wrought by true prophets through divine power. Pierre dAilly, De falsis prophetis2
Despite the fact that scholars have recognized for a long time that Buddhist literature contains numerous marvelous and fantastic events, there have been reservations about the use of the word miracle in the context of Buddhism. When the word has been used to speak about Buddhism, scholars have tended to note that Buddhist miracles are not miracles in our Western sense, speaking as though there were a single Western understanding of the concept that could be used to measure the Buddhist understanding. By contrast, scholars have generally been less reticent to speak of magic and magical powers in Buddhism. What they generally mean by preferring magic to miracle is that, in Buddhism, extraordinary powers are not thought to be violations of natural law. They
1 I would like to thank Luis Gmez and John Strong for reading earlier drafts of this essay and making helpful comments. I also want to thank them, as well as Bradley Clough, Kristin Scheible, Rachelle Scott and Patrick Pranke, for their participation in a panel at the IABS Congress in Atlanta, 2008, dedicated to the exploration of miracles and superhuman powers in South and Southeast Asian Buddhist texts and traditions. That conference panel and the essays currently collected in this issue of the Journal, which are based on the presentations made in Atlanta, testify to what we feel has been an enjoyable, timely and fruitful confluence of scholarly interest in the topic of the wonders and wonderment in Buddhist literature and beyond. 2 Quoted in Caciola 2006: 295.
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can be acquired through the use of mantras or meditation, and these are thought to be quite natural processes. Therefore, goes the argument, it is more appropriate to speak of marvels or wonders or magical powers in Buddhism.3 More work is needed to determine whether this generalization accurately portrays the complex and nuanced Buddhist discourse on the miraculous. One should note initially that these terminological preferences strongly reflect the Western history of the concepts of miracle and magic. These concepts have complicated and intertwining histories, having been conceived in tandem for many centuries. As the 14th century French Catholic theologian Pierre dAilly suggests in the quote above, discerning between miracles and magic has not always been easy. Traditionally, miracle has had a positive connotation, used to refer to wondrous events that a particular tradition, the Christian tradition, holds to be authentic and authoritative, while magic has been used pejoratively to refer to other traditions (or others within ones own tradition whose motives and authority one wishes to question). The application of the concept of magic has therefore been criticized on the grounds that it implies skepticism about the claims and motives of others.4 In a connected but distinct usage, magic also evokes images of maFor example, chapter twelve of Andy Rotmans recently published translation of the Divyvadna is the Prtihrya-stra, which Rotman translates The Miracle Stra. In a footnote (Rotman 2008: 429, n. 580), he cites T. W. Rhys Davids opinion that Buddhist miracles are not miracles in our Western sense. There was no interference by an outside power with the laws of nature. It was supposed that certain people by reason of special (but quite natural) powers could accomplish certain special acts beyond the power of ordinary men. See Rhys Davids 1899, Vol. 1: 272. Thus, throughout his translation, Rotman speaks of the Buddha performing miracles (prtihrya) by means of his magical powers (ddhi), but for a Medieval Christian reader like Pierre dAilly, this would seemingly imply the falsehood of the displays. 4 For one recent discussion and some useful references, see Burchett 2008. For another critique of the anthropological category of magic, see also de Sardan 1992. For the use of this terminology in modern anthropology, cognitive theory and psychology of religion, see, for instance, Rosengren, Johnson, and Harris, eds., 2000, and the various publications of Pascal Boyer. For references to Boyers work and more, see Luis Gmezs discussion and bibliography in his article below.
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gicians who entertain and amaze the gullible with illusions and trickery. Yet, in our Post-Harry Potter age, who would argue that the magical does not also have positive senses in many peoples minds, and that the term does not overlap considerably with miracles and marvels in describing a broad range of supernatural phenomena? These terms exist within a constellation of concepts that includes the natural and supernatural, divine and diabolical, as well as science and religion.5 Their complex, interrelated history ought to make us pause before we sketch our generalizations too broadly across cultures, time periods and religious traditions. As in Western discourse, one finds no single Buddhist understanding of the miraculous, but a plurality of voices and perspectives that likely changed over time. These Buddhist voices share a common, though complex and differentiated vocabulary, which they employ to describe an array of different types of miracles, magic arts and superhuman powers. Rather than eliminating one or another of our terms for translation at the outset, we need to consider all our vocabulary as we seek to understand the Buddhist discourse on the miraculous and to convey our understanding to others. Our words may still prove insufficient, but keeping our options open will at least allow us to show that Buddhist literature does sometimes draw its own distinctions between miracles and magic, even though these distinctions are inconsistently maintained. This may be seen though analysis of the common threefold classification of miracles in non-Mahyna Buddhist literature.6 In some Buddhist sources in Pli and Sanskrit, rival ascetics call the Buddha a magician. In the Upli-sutta of the Majjhimanikya, for instance, a Jain ascetic tries to dissuade Mahvra from sending his lay disciple, Upli, to refute the Buddhas doctrine, saying: For the ascetic (i.e., the Buddha) is a magician (myvin). He knows a concealing magic by which he deceives the disciples of
For further explorations of this history, in addition to Caciolas work cited above, see also Flint 1994 and Bartlett 2008. 6 Here, the designation non-Mahyna also excludes Tantra. For recent treatment of the concepts of miracle and magic in the Vimalakrtinirdea and selected Mahyna stras and stras, see Fiordalis 2008 and 2012. See also Luis Gmezs article in the current volume of JIABS.
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other ascetics teachers.7 In the Sphurthavykhy, Yaomitras sub-commentary on the Abhidharmakoabhya, the question is raised, How do the other rival ascetics, such as Maskari Gola and others, criticize the Buddha? Yaomitra then gives two citations:
In a treatise of the Nirgranthas, it is said: Who displays his superhuman powers (ddhi)? The magician Gotama does. Also, they say, Every hundred ages a magician of this type appears in the world and cause the people to be consumed by his magic.8
In these examples, being called a magician carries a pejorative connotation, but it also portrays the grudging respect and resentment that the Buddhas rivals appear to feel towards him, at least as seen through the eyes of the Buddhas own followers. The Buddha is called a magician, because he displays his superhuman powers, but the quotes also suggest that the Buddha succeeds at winning a large following by doing so. One may contrast such accusations with the Buddhist monastic rule that prohibits monks and nuns from displaying their superhuman powers in front of laypeople. This well-known rule appears in the Cullavagga of the Pli Vinaya, where the Buddha criticizes the Arhat, Piola Bhradvja, for using his superhuman powers to fly up and retrieve a sandalwood bowl placed upon a scaffold by a skeptical layperson.9 Alternate versions of the story
MN i.375. AKVy 319. 9 Vin ii.112. In fact, the episode elicits two rules in the Pli Vinaya. Monks and nuns are prohibited from displaying superhuman powers in front of the laity, and they should not use alms-bowls made of wood. This creates an ambiguity about precisely why the Buddha found Piola Bhradvjas act objectionable. Another version of this story, found in the Dhammapada commentary, provides more insight into the motivations of the characters, but interestingly remains ambiguous on precisely why the Buddha found the act objectionable. In that version, Piola Bhradvja seems to display his powers in order to prove the validity of the dharma, and not for the sake of the bowl, but when the Buddha asks Piola why he displayed his powers, no response is given before the Buddha prohibits the display of superhuman powers. See Dhp-a iii.203. In both these versions, but far more strongly in the Vinaya, the Buddha appears to prohibit displays of superhuman powers
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are also found in the Vinaya collections of the Dharmaguptakas, Mahsakas, and Sarvstivdins, as well as the Pli commentary on the Dhammapada, where it prefaces the narrative cycle of the Buddhas miracles at rvast and Skya.10 Yet, despite the fact that the Buddha claims in the Cullavagga that miraculous displays of superhuman powers (iddhi-pihriya) will not generate faith in those without faith, nor increase the faith of the faithful, and castigates Piola for displaying his powers for the sake of a mere bowl, many exceptions to the rule appear throughout Buddhist literature. Do these many exceptions justify the claim made by rival ascetics (through Buddhist sources) that the Buddha did, in fact, display his superhuman powers in order to win disciples, or at least that Buddhists told many stories that he did? Certainly, there are many stories of the Buddhas miracles, and some doctrinal discussions of miracles and superhuman powers put forth the view that such displays can and did bear positive results. However, another scripture that criticizes such displays, and that has garnered a fair amount of attention from scholars in search of Buddhist views on the miraculous, is the Kevaa-sutta of the Dgha-Nikya.11 It has been suggested that this scripture expresses a rationalistic perspective,12 which it may, but it also may be said to distinguish between true miracles and false miracles or magic. In it, a lay follower named Kevaa suggests to the Buddha that he instruct his monks to perform miraculous displays of superhuman power (iddhi-pihriya) or superhuman feats (uttarimanussa-dhamma) so that the prosperous people of Nand will
in front of laypeople, because he feels that Piola retrieved the bowl out of covetous desire for it. 10 For a French translation of the Vinaya versions, see Chavannes and Lvi 1916: 233247. For an English translation of the version in the Dhammapada commentary, see Burlingame 1921, Vol. 30: 3538. For another discussion of Piola, see Strong 1979. 11 DN i.211ff. The alternate spelling of the title and of the name of the Buddhas chief interlocutor in the discourse is Kevaha. 12 Gmez 1977: 221. The passage does indeed seem to rationalize the wondrous in one sense, and that is by classifying it. For other discussions of the Kevaa-sutta, see Gethin 1987: 187, and Granoff 1996.
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develop even more faith in him.13 The Pli commentary tells us what Kevaa might have had in mind: flying above the city and performing a pyrotechnic display for the townspeople below. The implication seems to be that the laypeople of Nland who bear witness to such a display would give even more support, material and otherwise, to the Buddhist sagha. The Buddhas initial response sounds somewhat reluctant, if not downright perfunctory: I dont give such instruction to the monks, saying, Go, monks, and perform miracles or superhuman feats for the white-clothed laypeople. Kevaa is persistent, however, and after he asks a third time, the Buddha gives the following explanation:
Kevaa, I have declared that there are three types of miraculous display, having directly realized them by my own higher knowing (abhi). What are the three? They are the miraculous display of superhuman powers (iddhi-pihriya), the miraculous display of telepathy (desan-pihriya), and the miraculous display of instruction [in the dharma] (anussan-pihriya).
Here the Buddha mentions one of the most common classifications of miracles in Buddhist literature. It is found in a wide range of sources, with an important alternate list also attested in the Mahvastu.14 This standard threefold typology also appears in the
13 The Pli term, iddhi, for which the Buddhist Sanskrit is ddhi, not sid dhi, has no simple equivalent in English. Since it is derived from the root, ardh, to grow, the term literally means success or flourishing. My preference for translating it as superhuman power, at least in this context, derives partly from the fact that Buddhist texts like this one sometimes gloss the term with uttarimanussa-dhamma, which can be translated more literally as a superhuman quality or characteristic. Another text that does so is the Prtihrya-stra of the Divyvadna. For a different, though related, sense of the term uttarimanussadhamma, see the fourth prjika rule in the Pli Vinaya (Vin iii.91ff.), which dictates that the punishment for those who lie about possessing superhuman qualities that they do not really possess is expulsion from the monastic order. 14 See, for instance, Ps ii.227229. The Mahvastu contains the same threefold listing as above (Vol. 1: 238), but also attests a variant list (Mv iii.137138): miraculous displays of superhuman power (ddhi-prtihrya), miraculous displays of instruction (anusan-prtihrya), and miracu-
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Abhidharmakoabhya and the Catupariat-stra, as we will see below. As the dialogue with Kevaa continues, the Buddha criticizes the display of superhuman powers and telepathic ability:
[The Buddha said, Suppose] someone who has faith and trust sees [a monk] doing these things. He tells this to someone else lacking in faith and trust, saying, Isnt it marvelous, sir, isnt it amazing (acchariya vata bho, abbhuta vata bho), the great power and great might of this ascetic! The one who lacks faith and trust would say, It is only by means of a Gandhr spell (Gandhr nma vijj) [or] a Maik amulet (Maik nma vijj) that he can perform [such things]. What do you think, Kevaa, wouldnt someone lacking in faith and trust say that to the man who possesses faith and trust? Reverend Sir, he would say that, [answered Kevaa.] That is why, [the Buddha responded,] I see danger in [such miraculous displays], and am troubled, ashamed and disgusted [by them].15
Here, the Buddha raises doubts about the efficacy of displaying superhuman powers to impress skeptical people. He then goes on to laud teaching of the dharma, apparently suggesting that it is the true miracle. Is the Buddha of this discourse speaking metaphorically when he calls teaching the dharma a type of miracle? If not, then how can teaching the dharma be considered a type of miracle? Perhaps the discourse means to align the display of superhuman powers with magic, separating the act of teaching the dharma from superstition in the same way that rational science is sometimes distinguished from magic (and religion). Although plausible, one problem with this interpretation is the fact that the semantic range of vijj (Skt: vidy), the term translated here as magic, includes the variety of mundane sciences, as well. Another problous displays of teaching the dharma (dharma-dean-prtihrya). This alternate suggests, perhaps, that the most significant underlying opposition in the tripartite scheme of miracles is that between superhuman powers and teaching the dharma. 15 DN i.212214. For stylistic reasons, my translation condenses two nearly identical exchanges into one.
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lem is that the Kevaa-sutta does not suggest that the Buddha and other Buddhist monks do not actually possess various types of superhuman powers. Rather, it implies the opposite, while raising the question of how a skeptical person can discern between true miracles and false miracles or magic, an issue that we have seen also occupied Medieval Christian theologians. It would seem that both Buddhists and non-Buddhists accused each other of being magicians. Here, the Kevaa-sutta suggests that magical powers are ubiquitous, and thus their display does not necessarily prove the superiority or uniqueness of the Buddha and his message, as teaching the dharma seems to do. The Abhidharmakoabhya also discusses the three types of miracles, arguing like the Kevaa-sutta that teaching the dharma is the best kind of miracle.16 While the reasoning of the Kevaasutta is compressed into a few statements, Vasubandhu elucidates two lines of argument to explain why the miracle of teaching the dharma should be considered the best of the three miracles. Firstly, echoing the logic and terminology of the Kevaa-sutta, he argues that the first two types of miraculous display are also achievable by means of magic spells. For instance, the Gndhr vidy gives one the power of flight, while the kaik vidy grants the power to know the thoughts of others. Not so for the miracle of teaching the dharma; one cannot teach the dharma simply by using a spell. Vasubandhu draws a parallel between the three types of miracle and the various capabilities that the Buddha achieves as part of his awakening. It is not possible, Vasubandhu argues, to perform the miracle of teaching the dharma without truly possessing the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements (rava-kaya-jna), which is the third of the so-called three knowledges(vijj, vidy) and the sixth of the so-called super-knowledges or superpowers (abhi, abhij).17
Chapter seven, verse forty-seven and commentary. AKBh 868869. Note as well that the Bodhisattvabhmi also articulates this parallel between the three types of miracle and the three relevant super-knowledges. See BoBh, p. 54. For a detailed analysis of the abhis in Pli canonical literature, see Bradley Cloughs article in the present volume of JIABS.
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However one classifies it, the knowledge of the destruction of the defilements seems to involve both certainty about ones own attainments and true knowledge of the nature of reality (yath-bhtajna). Such knowledge forms the basis for teaching the dharma, and perhaps this is why descriptions of it often make reference to basic Buddhist doctrines like the Four Noble Truths. Teaching the dharma would then provide evidence that a person has truly achieved sainthood (arahant, arhattv), for it is the unique possession of buddhas and Buddhist saints. Thus, for Vasubandhu, teaching the dharma is the best form of miracle, because it provides evidence of true sainthood, being based on knowledge of the true nature of reality. To this extent, Vasubandhu seems to support the reasoning of the Kevaa-sutta. However, Vasubandhu gives a second line of reasoning to explain why the miracle of teaching the dharma is the best of the three miracles. He argues that the first two types of miraculous display are useful only for impressing people as to what is preeminent (pradhna-varjana-mtra).18 With the miracle of teaching the dharma, however, it is possible to obtain the preeminent, what one truly desires, the ultimate good (hita), freedom from suffering. For, Vasubandhu writes, it is said that true success (ddhi the term I have been translating superhuman power) is [achievable] only through teaching the means [of achieving freedom from suffering].19 Vasubandhus second line of argument seems to be that teaching the dharma is foremost among the miracles, because it will ultimately lead the faithful person along the path to the ultimate good. While teaching the dharma is still seen by Vasubandhu as the best type of Buddhist miracle, he also seems to accept on this second line of reasoning that miraculous displays of superhuman powers and telepathic ability can play an important role. They are efficacious for the purposes of initial conversion. This more moderate
18 For further discussion of this phrase, see Luis Gmezs article below (Gmez 2011: 517). 19 anusanaprtihryea tu hitena iena phalena yogo bhavaty upyopaded ity evvaya ddhir ity ucyate. AKBh 869.
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position on the display of superhuman powers is also indicated by Vasubandhus discussion of the meaning of the word, prtihrya, the word that I have been translating as miracle. Vasubandhu defines prtihrya as at the outset, carrying away (haraa) people who are ready to be disciplined (vineyamanas). He explains the verbal prefix prti- as a combination of two prefixes, pra + ati, the former signifying the beginning and the latter extreme intensity.20 Or, Vasubandhu tells us, miracles are called prtihrya because they seize (pratiharanti) people who hate or are indifferent to the dharma.21 One may doubt the philological accuracy of these etymological explanations, but there can be little doubt that they are intended to draw a clear connection between miracles and religious conversion.22 In these Buddhist discussions of miracles and superhuman powers, one can perhaps hear an echo of another way in which miracles have sometimes been distinguished from magic. In the words of
20 vineyamanasmdito tyartha harat prtihryi prtisabdayor dikarmabhrthatvt. AKBh 869. 21 pratihatamadhyasthn mansyebhi pratiharantti prtihryi v. AKBh 869. 22 Here, the term conversion is used primarily to cover the sense of the Sanskrit terms given above, namely, prtihrya and varjana. Nevertheless, the use of the term also brings up issues of comparative analysis not dealt with here. Though a full exploration is beyond the scope of this article, it bears mentioning that the connection between miracles, displays of superhuman power and religious conversion in the sense used here is emphasized and further developed in Mahyna Buddhist narrative and doctrine. According to the Mahprajpramit-upadeastra, the bodhisattva develops the superpowers (abhij) in the interest of other beings and performs miracles so that the minds of other beings may become pure. If the bodhisattva did not perform miracles, he would not be able to inspire as many beings to strive for the ultimate good. See Lamotte 19441980, Vol. 4: 18191820. The Bodhisattvabhmi (BoBh p. 46) also explains that one of the purposes of superhuman power (ddhi) is to introduce people into the Buddhas teaching by converting (varjayitv) them with a miraculous display. See Gmezs discussion and translation of this passage in his article in this volume of JIABS (Gmez 2011: 531). There are nevertheless Mahyna critiques of displays of superhuman powers, particularly in the Chan/Zen traditions. See Gmez 1977 and Bielefeldt 2002.
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Richard Swinburne, miracles must have religious significance, that is, they must contribute significantly towards a holy divine purpose for the world. By contrast, extraordinary events lacking religious significance are more appropriately characterized as magical or psychic phenomena rather than as miracles.23 While the distinction between religion and magic remains problematic (as does the term conversion), along with the meaning and application of these terms in a Buddhist context, some Buddhist narratives and doctrinal discussions seem to suggest that certain events are made miraculous by reason of their connection to the Buddhas sacred mission to lead people beyond suffering. Acts of teaching the dharma and displays of superhuman powers are clearly among them. A miracle story from the Avadna-ataka, a 1st century collection of Buddhist narratives, includes a passage on miracle suggestive of this sacred purpose. The tenth story of the eighth varga features a woman named Virpa so distressed that she tries to commit suicide by hanging herself in a cave. Just as she is about to do so, the Buddha (apparently using his superhuman powers) becomes aware of her and emits a golden light from his body, which cuts the rope. At this point, the story lapses into a semi-scholastic list seemingly meant to explain the miracle. According to the story, six conditions (sthna), when manifested in the world, produce (prdurbhva) a miracle (crydbhuta): 1) the Buddha, 2) the dharma and Vinaya taught by the Buddha, 3) a human being, 4) born in the land of the ryas, 5) having all the sense organs in working order, 6) (and) freely desiring the good dharma.24 Among other things, this list suggests that Buddhist miracles are not mere wonders, but somehow derive from the Buddhas mission or purpose
23 Swinburne 1970: 89. One should also note that Swinburne, having made this point, proceeds with his analysis based on Humes definition of miracle as a violation of natural law. One may usefully compare with the definition and treatment of miracles found in MacCulloch 1908, Vol. 8: 676 690. 24 Av ii.55. The passage does not clearly differentiate the six conditions. My division reflects my own interpretation, but there are certainly other ways of dividing this list into six components.
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to lead living beings to freedom from suffering. After performing the miracle, the Buddha teaches the dharma to Virpa, who then becomes an arhant. Notice how the story seems to integrate the three types of miracle (manifesting superhuman powers, telepathic ability, and teaching the dharma) within a single narrative. In order to get a fuller sense of a Buddhist miracle, the threefold typology of miracles found in the Kevaa-sutta and elsewhere ought to be compared with another typology present in the Pli commentaries, but also found in a variety of forms elsewhere. This second typology lists specific events that constitute the skeleton of the Buddhas final lifetime. For instance, in the commentary on the Mahpadna-sutta of the Dgha-Nikya, one finds the following statement:
[As Bodhisattvas in our final birth], we will display miracles (pihriya) that will, among other things, shake the earth, which is bounded by the circle of ten thousand mountains, when (1) the allknowing Bodhisattva enters his mothers womb, (2) is born, (3) attains awakening, (4) turns the wheel of the dharma, (5) performs the Twin Miracle (yamaka-pihriya), (6) descends from the realm of the gods, (7) releases his life force, [and] (8) attains cessation.25
In his ground-breaking article on the miracle of rvast, Alfred Foucher highlights another important example of an eightfold series of such events, a 5th century stele found at Srnth with eight panels depicting a slightly different set of events.26 These lists of events in the last life of the Buddha can be related to a wider set of lists of varying lengths, including lists of four, five, six, twelve, and even a list of thirty. Classified under different names, from miracles (pihriya) to wondrous and amazing things (ac
DN-a ii.412. It is interesting to compare this series of events with the list of causes of earthquakes found in the Mahprinibbna-sutta (DN ii.108 109). At some point between sutta and commentary, natural causes and the superhuman powers of ramaas, brhmaas and gods have been replaced by the miracle of rvast and the descent from the Heaven of the Thirty-three. 26 Foucher 1909. English translation in Foucher 1917. For the image, see Foucher 1917, fig. 19.1. In the stele, the Buddhas conception and the release of his life-force are replaced with episodes in which the Buddha tames the maddened elephant and receives a gift of honey from a monkey.
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chariya-abbhuta-dhamma, crya-adbhta-dharma) to events that the Buddha must perform (avaya-karaya), these events collectively form what John Strong has called the Buddha-life blueprint.27 As the quote above suggests, the fact that earthquakes and other wondrous and amazing things occur during these events is one of the characteristics connecting them as miracles. Such signs and wonders help to indicate their religious significance.28 If one compares the threefold typology with this list of eight miracles, certain events come into focus, such as the first sermon and the miracle cycle at rvast and Skya, examples in which the Buddha teaches the dharma or displays his superhuman powers in order to win converts and further his mission. Another event that is not contained in the above lists, but nonetheless sheds an important light on the tension contained in the threefold typology of miracles, particularly between teaching the dharma and displaying superhuman powers, is the story of the conversion of the three Kyapa brothers. Described as a thaumaturgical impasse,29 the story of the conversion of the Kyapa brothers, three rival Brahmin ascetics with many followers of their own, occurs in the narrative cycle at the beginning of the Mahvagga of the Pli Vinaya. The sequence begins just after the Buddhas awakening and tells the story of how the Buddha establishes his ministry and wins his first disciples. Thus, it includes other well-known events, such as the first and second sermons, as well as the conversions of Yaas, King Bimbisra, riputra and Maudgalyyana. The narrative cycle is also present in the Vinaya collections of other mainstream Buddhist schools and in the Catupariat-stra, while the Mahvastu contains an alternate version of the story of the three Kyapas.30 Comparing
John Strong 2001: 1013. One might compare this with the Chinese concept of resonance, discussed in Kieschnick 1997: 96ff. 29 Gmez 1977: 222. 30 The passages in the Vinaya collections of the Mahvihra Theravda (i.e. the Pli version), Mahsaka, and Dharmaguptaka have been ana28 27
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several versions of this story not only clarifies the relationship that was thought to exist between the three types of miracles; it illustrates that different Buddhists conceived this relationship differently. The basic story of the impasse, as it appears in the Mahvagga and in the Catupariat-stra, is as follows. In his attempt to convert the eldest Kyapa brother, the Buddha performs many displays of his superhuman powers. After the performance of each miracle, which the Mahvagga suggests numbered 3,500 in total,31 Kyapa thinks to himself, Certainly, the great ascetic possesses great superhuman power (mah-iddhika), great, wondrous presence (mah-anubhva).but he is no saint (arahant) like I am.32 Thus, the Buddha and Kyapa reach an impasse. After many displays of superhuman power, Kyapa remains unconverted. The point thus far appears to be that displays of superhuman power are insufficient to establish the superiority of the Buddha and convert the rival ascetic. Interestingly, however, the first of the Buddhas displays of superhuman power in the Mahvagga, and by visual accounts the one most closely associated with the occasion, sufficiently impresses
lyzed in detail by Andr Bareau (1963). In addition to these versions is the Caupariat-stra, which is nearly identical to the version found in the Mlasarvstivda-vinaya. Bareau does not include an extensive analysis of the Mlasarvstivda-vinaya or the Caupariat-stra. For an explanation of his reasons for not doing so, see Bareau 1963: 89. For the Sanskrit edition of the Caupariat-stra, as well as the Tibetan, see CPS. For the Mahvastu version, see Mv iii.425ff. 31 Vin i.34. The early translators, T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg, suggest that the passage containing this reference to the total number of miracles was interpolated, perhaps due to the fact that the comment seems rather out of place in the flow of the narrative. See Rhys Davids and Oldenberg 1885, Vol. 3: 133. There is no such phrase in other versions of the story. See Bareau 1963: 316. Whether it is a later addition or not, the passage nevertheless emphasizes the fact that the Buddha performed many marvelous displays of superhuman power on the occasion. In the Catupariatstra, the number of miracles totals eighteen. 32 Vin i.32. In the Catupariat-stra, sometimes Kyapa alternatively says, .but I am a saint like him CPS 244. Other versions also alternate between the two phrases.
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Kyapa that he invites the Buddha to stay with his community and agrees to provide him with material support. For his first miracle, the Buddha asks to spend a night in Kyapas fire-lodge. Kyapa is reluctant to allow it, because a fierce, fire-breathing snake also lives in the fire-lodge, and he is concerned the Buddha might be hurt. The Buddha insists, however, and Kyapa finally relents. So, the Buddha spends the night in the fire-lodge and succeeds in taming the fire-breathing serpent through a miraculous display of his power over the element of fire. The snake and the Buddha engage in a duel of fire, with the snake breathing smoke and fire, and the Buddha, by means of the fire-element concentration (tejodhtusamdhi), emitting flames from his own body, until finally the snake is subdued. The next morning, the Buddha emerges from the fire-hut with the serpent coiled up in his alms bowl, providing an image that is used to depict the event in Buddhist art.33 The language used in the Mahvagga to describe Kyapas reaction to this miraculous display is important to consider. Kyapa becomes serene (abhippasanna) as a result of this miraculous display of superhuman power (imin iddhipihriyena), and invites the Buddha to stay. One might say that he becomes receptive to the faith. The word I have translated as serene is merely an adjectival form derived from the Pli term pasda or prasda in Sanskrit. Prasda is a complex concept without a simple equivalent in English. It means faith and trust, but also beauty and serenity, as when the mind is unclouded and free of doubt. It also means mental receptivity to faith, as characterized by awe and veneration. The literal meaning of the term, prasanna, settled, also evokes a sense of purity and clarity. When dirty water has been allowed to sit and the sediment has sunk to the bottom, the clear water that remains is prasanna. Returning to our story, only the Pli version contains this description of Kyapas reaction. Curiously, the entire episode of the taming of the snake is told twice in the Pli, first in prose and then again in verse. In the prose portion of the Mahvagga, as in the versions found in the Vinayas of other mainstream Buddhist
33
Rhi 1991: 71. For a few images, see Ingholt and Lyons 1957, figs. 8789.
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schools and in the Catupariat-stra, Kyapas reaction remains merely skeptical. The Buddha may have power, Kyapa thinks, but he is not my equal, or alternatively, he is merely my equal. Only the sentence that concludes the versified version in the Pli describes Kyapa as serene as a result of the miraculous display of superpower. By using the term, abhippasanna, the text may simply be trying to say that Kyapa is pleased with the Buddhas performance, but it may also reflect the fact that Kyapa is becoming receptive to the Buddhas advances. One could say that this miraculous display of superhuman power does what Vasubandhu suggests that such displays ought to do. It makes an initial impression that leads to Kyapas conversion. Kyapa is not converted by the snake-taming miracle, however. Only in the version found in the Mahvastu is Kyapa converted by the snake-taming miracle, but that version differs from the others in several other important respects as well. For one thing, the snake-taming miracle occurs at the end of the sequence of miracles, not the beginning. Another important difference is that, in the Mahvastu, the Buddha and Kyapa both display their superhuman powers in a wonderworking contest, which the Buddha eventually wins. Most versions suggest, on the contrary, that Kyapa does not display his own powers. His conversion occurs only after a series of unsuccessful displays of the Buddhas superhuman powers. In the Mahvagga, for example, the Buddha finally uses his telepathic powers to become aware of Kyapas continued insistence that he is equal to or greater than the Buddha, and determines that the confused man will continue to think thus for a long time. Therefore, the Buddha decides to shock (savejayan) him.34 He says to Kyapa, You are not a saint, Kyapa, nor have you attained the path to sainthood. The path you walk will not lead you to become a saint, nor will it lead you to the path to sainthood.35 It
For a classic discussion of the concept of savega, see Coomaraswamy 2004. For further discussion of the concepts of pasda and savega, and their importance in another interesting miracle story of the Buddha, the story of the Buddhas journey to the island of Sri Lanka, see Kristin Scheibles article in this volume. 35 Vin i.32.
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seems that this trenchant demonstration of the Buddhas ability to read Kyapas thoughts has the desired effect. In the Catupariatstra, although no reference is made to the Buddhas intentions, once the Buddha has contradicted him outright, Kyapa thinks to himself, The great ascetic knows my mind with his mind!36 He then converts to Buddhism. It may seem that the employment of telepathic ability is somewhat anti-climactic after the wondrous displays of so many superhuman abilities. Yet, the Buddhas ability to read Kyapas mind, coupled with Kyapas inability to read the Buddhas, provides a clear indication of his superiority.37 In the story of the Buddhas miracles at rvast in the Divyvadna, it is stated that even lesser beings, such as tiny biting ants, can read the Buddhas mundane (laukika) thoughts, but not even solitary buddhas, the Buddhas disciples or the gods can perceive his supermundane (lokottara) thoughts.38 In any case, if an important theme of the story were the ineffectiveness of superhuman powers to convert Kyapa, then one would expect to find a clearer contrast between the displays of superhuman powers, telepathy and teaching the dharma. If one ignores the verse section and focuses only on the prose, then perhaps the Pli version suggests such a contrast, but in the Mahsakavinaya, for instance, the Buddha contradicts Kyapa while levitating in the air.39 If the point were to emphasize the ineffectiveness
CPS 302. The significance of the Buddhas ability to read the minds of others in the Pli nikyas is amply demonstrated in Brad Cloughs article in this volume. 38 See Divy 161. Again, although it lies beyond the scope of the current article, the distinction between laukika and lokottara is highly operative in Buddhist discussions of miracles and superhuman powers, and it may be one of the best places to begin exploring Buddhist notions that roughly approximate Western distinctions between the natural and supernatural. I hope to explore this distinction in further detail in a future article, but for the moment one may refer to discussions of it in the articles by Pat Pranke and Brad Clough in the present volume. 39 Bareau 1963: 304. For discussions of the importance of levitation in South Asian religions, see Hocart 1923, Brown 1928, Mahony 1987 and Strong 1983.
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of superhuman powers, then this would seem decidedly odd. Thus, alternate versions of the story suggest that not all Buddhists drew a sharp contrast between the different types of miraculous displays. In fact, although it is true that the Buddha converts Kyapa in the Mahvagga and Catupariat-stra by means of the display of his telepathic ability, the Buddha uses all three types of miracle in these stories, one after the other, and more or less equally. The Buddha first employs his superhuman powers, then utilizes his telepathic abilities, and finally teaches the dharma. Specifically, the Buddha preaches the famous Fire Sermon. The theme of fire is an important one throughout the story of the Kyapa brothers. The Kyapa brothers are said to make fire sacrifices before their conversion. The Buddha chooses to impress Kyapa by taming his fire-breathing snake, and he does so by relying on his own mastery of fire. Finally, the Buddha returns to the theme of fire in the Fire Sermon, expressing the teaching that everything is on fire (sabba ditta). Here burning is made into a metaphor for the fact that all conditioned things are conjoined with passion, hatred, and confusion, the three root afflictions. So, the Buddha uses the metaphor of fire to teach the fire-worshipping Kyapa brothers about detachment. It seems that the editor of the Catupariatstra also recognized the importance of fire in the story, because the description of the Buddhas awakening that prefaces the text specifically mentions the fire-element concentration, the only description of the Buddhas awakening to do so, so far as I am aware. After hearing this teaching, the three Kyapa brothers and their followers all become Arhats. Thus, from the various versions of the story, it seems not only that superhuman powers and telepathic abilities are effective and possibly necessary (though maybe insufficient) means of conversion, but also that teaching the dharma is a type a miracle insofar as it leads people to the greatest good, to use Vasubandhus phrase. Although the Pli version does not explicitly use the typology of three types of miracle to refer to the various events that occur in the story, the Catupariat-stra and alternate versions in other Vinaya collections do structure the narrative in terms of the three types of miracles, with the Fire Sermon explicitly described as a miracle of teaching the dharma.
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When the Fire Sermon is described as a miracle of teaching the dharma, something curious also occurs in the description of the miracle of mind-reading in the Catupariat-stra. If one compares it with the description of the miracles of mind-reading and teaching the dharma in the Kevaa-sutta, it appears that the two types of miracles have been condensed into one, or perhaps vice versa. Here is the description of the miracle of mind-reading in theCatupariat-stra, restored with the help of the Tibetan translation of the Mlasarvstivda-vinaya:
Monks, this is your mind (cittam). This is [your] mind (manas). This is [your] consciousness (vijnam). Consider (vitarkayata) this. Dont consider that. Think about (manasikuruta) this. Dont think about that. Abandon (prajahata) this. Dont abandon that. Having taken up(upa sapadya) this and realized [it] directly with the body, practice it.40
Now, compare this with the description of the miracles of mindreading and teaching the dharma in the Kevaa-sutta. First look at the description of mind-reading:
This, Kevaa, [is the miracle of mind-reading ability.] A monk points out (disati) the very mind (citta pi) of another being, another person. He points out the very mental state (cetasika pi). He knows the gross thoughts; he knows the subtle thoughts (vitakkita pi disati; vicrita pi disati). [And he says,] This is in your mind (cittam). This is your mind (mano). Your mind is here.
And here is the description of the miracle of instruction or teaching the dharma in the Kevaa-sutta:
Consider (vittakketha) this. Dont consider that. Think (manasikaro tha) this way. Dont think that way. Renounce (pajahatha) this. Having taken up this (idam upasampajja), practice [it].41
The parallel phraseology of these passages is striking in that the Catupariat-stra includes, as one single passage, a slightly condensed, but clearly parallel version of the explanations of both the second and the third types of miracle, which are so strongly
40 41
CPS 320. DN i.213214.
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opposedin the Kevaa-sutta.42 This parallel raises some difficult questions about the intertextual history of the tripartite scheme, as well as the interrelationship between the three types of miracles, particularly the miracles of mind-reading and instruction. In this context, we should recall the alternate classification of the three miracles found in the Mahvastu, where the second and third types of miracles are the miracle of instruction (anusan-prtihrya) and the miracle of teaching the dharma (dharma-deanprtihrya), respectively.43 This classification seems to bear a strong resemblance to the descriptions of the three types of miracles that we find in the Catupariat-stra. What are we to make of these alternate classifications and descriptions of the three types of miracles, and can we assume beyond doubt that one is necessarily earlier or later than the others? The story of the conversion of the Kyapa brothers in the Mahvagga and Catupariat-stra depicts the three miracles in an ordered sequence. While the Kevaa-sutta suggests that some Buddhists tried to create a tension between displaying superhuman powers or telepathic abilities and teaching the dharma, the story of the conversion of the Kyapa brothers suggests that not all Buddhists perceived this tension in the same way. Some may not have perceived any tension, at all.44 In the case of the so-called
In addition, a sequence of miracles more or less corresponding to those of the Catupariat-stra occurs on the 11th, 12th and 13th days, respectively, of the miracle at rvast in the version found in the Dharmaguptaka-vinaya. Indeed, on the thirteenth day, the Buddha is said therein to preach the Fire Sermon. See Takakusu and Watanabe, eds., 19241932, Vol. 22, number 1428: 949c950a. English translation is in Rhi 1991: 234235. 43 See n. 14 above. 44 Indeed, this point can be strengthened by returning to the Kevaa-sutta. As we now possess it, the sutta appears to contrast the miraculous display of instruction (anussan-pihriya) with the miraculous displays of superhuman powers and telepathy, as we saw above, but then directly afterwards it equates the miracle of instruction with various other attainments that are commonly found throughout the suttas of the Dgha-Nikya. Among them are mastery of the four states of meditation (jhna), the ability to create mind-made bodies, the various superhuman powers (iddhi), the other superknowledges (abhi), including telepathy and so forth. All these attain42
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Twin Miracle (yamaka-pihriya), performed by the Buddha at rvast, one finds another instance in which the three types of miracles appear to be employed equally and more or less simultaneously. Here is a pertinent passage from the Dhammapada commentarys description of the event:
On that day, the Teacher walked up and down performing the [Twin] Miracle, and as he did so, he taught the dharma to the audience, not wearying them with uninterrupted discourse, but giving them sufficient opportunity to refresh themselves from time to time. Thereupon, the audience sent up shouts of applause. Hearing the shouts of applause that arose from the audience, the Teacher straightaway looked into the hearts of the great multitude, and in sixteen ways perceived the disposition of mind of each one. So quick is the movement of the mind of the Buddhas, that in case any person took pleasure (pasanna) in any teaching or in any display of superhuman power, the Buddha taught the dharma and displayed his superhuman power in accordance with the temper and disposition of each person. As he thus taught the dharma and displayed his superhuman powers, a great multitude of living beings obtained clear comprehension of the dharma.45
Here, displaying superhuman powers, telepathic abilities and teaching the dharma are combined into one miraculous display, with the passage concluding by emphasizing its great efficacy. At this point in the story, the Buddha again appears to read the minds of those in the audience, and thus concludes that no one is capable of asking him appropriate questions. So, he magically produces a double of himself, and he and his double engage each other in a dialogue on the dharma, resulting in many more millions
ments, including those the miraculous display of which the Buddha criticizes just beforehand, are equated with the miracle of instruction in the Kevaasutta. Despite this fact, virtually all modern translations, from Rhys Davids onwards, have been abbreviated in such a way as to make this contradiction less apparent. For the redactors of the Dgha-Nikya, however, perhaps there was no clear contradiction between displaying superhuman powers and teaching the dharma. For an alternative discussion of this issue and different conclusions, see Meisig 1993. I owe John Strong for this reference and for impressing upon me the irony of this apparent contradiction in the text. 45 Dhp-a iii.215. My translation modifies slightly that of Burlingame 1921, Vol. 3: 47.
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of beings attaining comprehension of the dharma. Thus, on one interpretation, even the Twin Miracle itself combines the display of superhuman power and the act of teaching the dharma. While the miracle performed at rvast is arguably the paradigmatic example in Buddhist literature of the Buddha displaying his superhuman powers, and despite the fact that the display is greatly embellished in this and other versions of the story, later artistic representations of the event continue to depict the Buddha in the gesture of teaching, perhaps indicating that teaching the dharma remained an important component of the miracle in the minds of some Buddhists.46 This essay has explored doctrinal discussions of the three types of miracles, using this typology to analyze a few Buddhist miracle narratives, which in turn, simultaneously clarify and obscure the tripartite classification. Not all Buddhist miracle tales refer to the three types of miracles, however. Nor do all of them seek to distinguish displays of superhuman power or telepathic ability from acts of teaching the dharma, or to criticize the display of the former. Among other things, miracle tales of the Buddha are concerned with demonstrating in one way or another his superiority vis--vis divine beings of various types, Buddhist disciples of various levels of attainment, rival teachers, and others, while highlighting the religious significance of the Buddhas sacred mission.47 Oftentimes, these goals are achieved precisely through the display of superhu46 Many such images from Gandhra are listed in Rhi 1991: 197206. For a few examples, see Ingholt and Lyons 1957, figs. 252ff.; Kurita 19881990, Vol. 1, figs. 400401, Vol. 2, fig. 79; Foucher 1917, figs. 19.1, 20, 21.1, 23.12, 25.226.2; Huntington 1986, figs. 24. Brown 1984, figs. 6, 910. 47 John Strong has also studied a range of stories that feature the failure of the power of flight on the part of Buddhist monks and even the Buddha himself in a former birth. One would think that such stories would work against the idea that the Buddha and his monks and nuns are superior to others who possess superhuman powers. Rather than reducing the prestige of the Buddha and his monks, however, Strong argues that such stories also emphasize their superiority, paradoxically, by indicating that their powers are the real thing. See Strong 1983. A revised and unpublished English version, When Magical Flight Fails: A Study of Some Indian Legends about the Buddha and his Disciples, was presented by Professor Strong at the University of Michigan on March 28, 2008.
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man powers. Rivals may be exposed as magicians or frauds, while the Buddha dominates or outpaces them with his own superhumanpowers, which are greater, in terms of raw power, than their own.48 In a similar vein, miracle tales featuring eminent Buddhist monks and nuns who display their superhuman powers may, in addition to demonstrating their own attainments, establish by extension the preeminence of the Buddha, his teachings and institutions.49 In conclusion, work remains to be done to understand the nature and significance of miracles, magic, and superhuman powers throughout a fuller range of Buddhist narrative and doctrine. Yet, scholars have been too quick to conclude from a few scant criticisms of displaying superhuman powers that Buddhism rejects the miraculous wholesale in favor of some sort of rational humanism that reflects modern predilections. For one thing, making this argument requires that one disregard the many Buddhist stories in which the Buddha or his eminent disciples perform acts of conversion by displaying their superhuman powers. Scholars have suggested that such stories are merely popular or represent later (often a euphemism for degenerate) traditions. Yet, these are problematic conclusions. This investigation has focused primarily upon what are, by most accounts, elite narrative and scholastic traditions. Some of the stories considered here, such as those from the Vinaya collections of the mainstream Buddhist schools, may even date from a relatively early period.50 Just how early is difficult to say and
An example of this is the story of Sirigutta and Garahadinna, found in the Dhammapada commentary (Dhp-a i.435445). The similarity of this story to the Mahyna stra known as The Prophecy of the Magician Bhadra (Bhadramykara-vykaraa) has been recognized by Konstanty Rgamey (1990). 49 The story of Piola Bhradvja in the Dhammapada commentary is one such example. See n. 9 above. For another, see Rachelle Scotts discussion in this volume of the important story of Mahpajpat Gotams nirva, which was translated for the first time into any Western language by Jonathan Walters (1995). 50 There has been some scholarly debate on the age of the relevant section of the Vinaya relative to other portions of the collection. For one theory, see Frauwallner 1956: 154. For a critical assessment of his theory, see Lamotte
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I will not proceed to speculate here, but more and more, scholars of Buddhism are coming to see the popular reflected in the elite and vice versa. When we calibrate our reading of Buddhist stories to the terms that Buddhists use, then even ostensibly familiar events, like the first sermon, the paradigmatic example of teaching the dharma and also an act of conversion, can take on new shades of meaning. The other major argument that has been used to deny the significance of miracles in Buddhism is comparative. If a miracle is defined as a violation of the laws of nature by a supernatural agent, then perhaps displays of superhuman power in Buddhism do not fit this definition. Yet, one may question the adequacy of this definition, even with respect to a Western context. There are other important elements to the concept of the miracle, such as the wondrous signs and portents that accompany such events. Above all, one could argue, miracles provide evidence of the beneficence and holiness of the agent. That is, they have religious significance for the world. When defined in such a way, this concept of miracle then becomes relevant to Buddhism. However, discerning miracles from magic also then becomes important. The ambivalence towards the display of superhuman powers in Buddhist literature derives, at least in part, from questions about its evidentiary value in a world in which it is difficult to discern between true miracles and false ones. While the distinction is not always clearly maintained, we have seen that Buddhist literature does indeed sometimes distinguish between miracles and magic in order to argue for the supremacy and unique holiness of the Buddha, and by extension, his doctrines, institutions and eminent disciples.
References
Primary sources
AKBh Abhidharmakoabhya s. AKVy.
1988: 177179.
Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine AKVy
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str, Svm Dvrikdsa, ed. 1998. The Abhidharmakoa & Bhya of crya Vasubhandhu with Sphutrtha commentary of crya Yaomitra. Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati. Speyer, J. S., ed. 19061909. Avadnaataka: A Century of Edifying Tales Belonging to the Hnayna. Bibliotheca Buddhica 3. St. Petersburg: lAcadmie Impriale des Sciences. Dutt, Nalinaksha, ed. 1978. Bodhisattvabhmi. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Waldschmidt, Ernst, ed. 1962. Das Catupariatstra: Text in Sanskrit und Tibetisch, Verglichen mit dem Pli nebst einer bersetzung der Chinesischen Entsprechung im Vinaya der Mlasarvstivdins. Teil III: Textbearbeitung: Vorgang 2228, Abhandlungen der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Klasse fr Sprachen, Literatur und Kunst, Jahrgang 1960: Nr. 1. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Rhys Davids, T. W. and J. Estlin Carpenter, eds. 18901911. Dgha-nikya. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Rhys Davids, T. W., J. Estlin Carpenter and William Stede, eds. 19681971. The Sumagalavilsin, Buddhaghosas Commentary on the Dgha-Nikya. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Smith, H. and H. C. Norman, eds. 19061915. Commentary on the Dhammapada. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Cowell, E. B., and Robert A. Neil, eds. 1970. The Divyvadna: A Collection of Early Buddhist Legends. Amsterdam: Philo and Oriental Presses. Trenckner, Vilhelm, ed. 18881925. The Majjhima Nikya. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Senart, mile, ed. 1977. Le Mahvastu. Tokyo: Meicho-FukyKai. Taylor, A. C., ed. 19051907. Paisambhidmagga. 2 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Oldenberg, Hermann, ed. 18791883. Vinayapiaka. 5 vols. London: Pali Text Society.
Secondary sources
dAilly, Pierre. 1706. De falsis prophetis. In I. L. Ellies Dupin, ed., Joannis Gersonii Opera Omnia. Antwerp: Sumptibus Societatis. Bareau, Andr. 1963. Recherches sur la biographie du Buddha dans les Strapiaka et les Vinayapiaka anciens: De la qute de lveil a la conversion de riputra et de Maudgalyyana. Paris: cole Franaise
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dExtrme-Orient. Bartlett, Robert. 2008. The Natural and the Supernatural in the Middle Ages. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bielefeldt, Carl. 2002. Disarming the Superpowers: The abhij in Eisai and Dgen. In Daihonzan Eiheiji Daihonki Kyoku, ed., Dgen zenji kenky ronsh. Fukui-ken: Eiheiji, pp. 10181046. Brown, Robert L. 1984. The rvast Miracles in the Art of India and Dvaravati, Archives of Asian Art 37, pp. 7995. Brown, William Norman. 1928. The Indian and Christian Miracles of Walking on the Water. Chicago: Open Court. Burchett, Patton. 2008. The Magical Language of Mantra, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 74.4, pp. 807843. Burlingame, Eugene W., trans. 1921. Buddhist Legends: translated from the original Pali text of the Dhammapada commentary. 3 vols. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Caciola, Nancy. 2006. Discerning Spirits: Divine and Demonic Possession in the Middle Ages. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Chavannes, duoard and Sylvain Lvi. 1916. Les seize arhat protecteurs de la loi, Journal Asiatique 8, pp. 550, 189304. Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. 2004. Samvega: Aesthetic Shock. In The Essential Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. Bloomington: World Wisdom, pp. 193199. Fiordalis, David. 2008. Miracles and Superhuman Powers in South Asian Buddhist Literature. Ph.D. Dissertation: University of Michigan. _____. 2012. The Wondrous Display of Superhuman Power in the Vimalakrtinirdea: Miracle or Marvel? In Jacobsen, Knut, ed., Yoga Powers: Extraordinary Capacities Attained Through Meditation and Concentration. Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, pp. 97125. Flint, Valerie. 1994. The Rise of Magic in Early Medieval Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Foucher, Alfred. 1909. Le Grand miracle du Buddha rvast, Journal Asiatique 13, pp. c. _____. 1917. The Beginnings of Buddhist Art. Paris: Paul Geuthner. Frauwallner, Erich. 1956. The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature. Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medeo ed Estremo Oriente. Gethin, Rupert. 1987. The Path to Awakening. Ph.D. Dissertation: Manchester University. Gmez, Luis O. 1977. The Bodhisattva as Wonder-worker. In Lewis Lancaster, ed., Prajpramit and Related Systems. Berkeley: University of California, pp. 221262.
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_____. 2011. On Buddhist wonders and wonder-working. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011]: pp. 513554. Granoff, Phyllis. 1996. The Ambiguity of Miracles: Buddhist Understandings of Supernatural Power, East and West 46, pp. 7996. Hocart, A. M. 1923. Flying Through the Air, Indian Antiquary 70, pp. 8082. Huntington, John. 1986. Sowing the Seeds of the Lotus: A Journey to the Great Pilgrimage Sites of Buddhism, Part III, Orientations 17.3, pp. 3246. Ingholt, Harald and Islay Lyons. 1957. Gandhran Art in Pakistan. New York: Pantheon. Kieschnick, John. 1997. The Eminent Monk. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Kurita, Isao. 19881990. Gandra Bijutsu. Tokyo: Nigensha. Lamotte, tienne. 19441980. Le trait de la grande vertu de sagesse. 5 vols. Louvain: Bureaux du Muson. _____. 1988. History of Indian Buddhism from the Origins to the aka Era. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste. MacCulloch, J. A. 1908. Miracles. In James Hastings, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. Vol. 8. New York: Charles Scribners Sons, pp. 676690. Mahony, William K. 1987. Magical Flight. In Mircea Eliade, ed., The Encyclopedia of Religion. Vol. 5. New York: MacMillan, pp. 34953. Meisig, Konrad. 1993. On the Precanonical Shape of the Kevaddha Sutta as Compared with Kien-ku-king. In Premier Colloque Etienne Lamotte. Louvain: Institut Orientaliste, pp. 6370. Rgamey, Konstanty. 1990. The Bhadramykravykaraa: Introduction, Tibetan Text, Translation and Notes. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Rhi, Ju-hyung. 1991. Gandharan Images of the Sravasti Miracle: An Iconographic Reassessment. Ph.D. Dissertation: University of California, Berkeley. Rhys Davids, T. W., trans. 1899. Dialogues of the Buddha. 3 vols. London: Pali Text Society. Rhys-Davids, T. W. and Hermann Oldenberg, trans. 1885. Vinaya texts. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rosengren, Karl, Carl Johnson, and Paul Harris, eds. 2000. Imagining the Impossible: Magical, Scientific, and Religious Thinking in Children. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rotman, Andy, trans. 2008. Divine Stories: Part One. Boston: Wisdom.
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de Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier. 1992. Occultism and the Ethnographic I: The Exoticizing of Magic from Durkheim to Postmodern Anthropology, Critique of Anthropology 12.1, pp. 525. Strong, John. 1979. The Legend of the Lion-Roarer: A Study of the Buddhist Arhat Piola Bhradvja, Numen 26, pp. 5088. _____. 1983. Wenn der magische Flug misslingt, In H. P. Duerr, ed., Sehnsucht nach dem Ursprung. Frankfurt: Syndikat, pp. 50318. _____. 2001. The Buddha: A Short Biography. Oxford: Oneworld. _____. 2008. When Magical Flight Fails: A Study of Some Indian Legends about the Buddha and his Disciples. Paper read at the University of Michigan on March 28, 2008. Swinburne, Richard. 1970. The concept of miracle. New York: St. Martins Press. Takakusu, J. and K. Watanabe, eds. 19241932. Taish shinsh daizky. Tokyo: Taish issaiky kankkai. Walters, Jonathan, trans. 1995. Gotams Story. In Donald Lopez, ed., Buddhism in Practice. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 113 138.
The higher knowledges in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya

Bradley S. Clough
He who knows his previous lives, Sees heavens and hells, And has attained the exhaustion of birth; A sage who has mastered the higher knowledges, Who knows his mind is purified, freed from all passions; Who has eliminated birth and death; Wholly given up to the pure life; Who has transcended all things; Such a one is called Buddha.1
This passage from the Pli Nikyas, which celebrates one who has achieved Buddhisms highest goal of awakening, is like many other writings in the Buddhist traditions of South Asia and elsewhere, in its inclusion of the abhis (Sanskrit: abhijs) or higher knowledges as one of the integral factors in the process of liberation. The overall acceptance of the idea of attainment of certain extraordinary psychic powers by those adepts who have reached advanced stages of meditation is one of the most ancient and consistent features of South Asian Buddhism, from early Pli texts to treatises of the latter phases of the Mahyna in this region. Despite the large amount of significance given to the achievement of these higher knowledges by Buddhist traditions, and the importance assigned to their use in soteriological processes, scholarship has largely steered clear of the study of the abhis, perhaps due to a reluctance to
MN ii 144. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 409433
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acknowledge their presence in systems frequently characterized as rationalist and non-mystical. This article is the first in a series of three that will address the role that the abhis played in various phases of South Asian Buddhist history. Later pieces will address the place of the abhis, first in the Abhidharma literature and meditation manuals of nonMahyna schools, and second in the stra and stra literature of the Mahyna. Our focus here will be on the importance of the abhis in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya, with an eye towards reasons for the abundant discussion of them in these texts. As a result it is hoped that some further light will be shed on certain pedagogical, epistemological and soteriological concerns of the early centuries of South Asian Buddhism, as preserved by the Theravda tradition. Granting that the central emphasis in Buddhism has never been on meditation as a method for attaining supernormal powers, and also that the self-serving manifestation of them, as well as their direct pursuit, has usually been condemned, the basic premise here is that the abhis nevertheless have long been an important part of Buddhist systems, and have had a greater religious role than previous scholarship has appreciated.
I. The abhis as presented in the Sutta- and Vinaya-Pitakas of the Pli canon
In the earliest strata of the Pli canon, one usually finds five abhis listed: 1) knowledge of the varieties of supernormal power (iddhi vidha). 2) divine ear element (dibbasotadhtu). 3) knowledge comprehending the mind or cognizing others thoughts (cetopariyaa/paracittavijnana). 4) knowledge of recollection of past lives (pubbenivsnussatia). 5) divine eye, or knowledge of passing away and rebirth (dibba cakkhu/cutu paptaa).
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From the earliest tradition on, these five higher knowledges have been regarded as mundane (lokiya) achievements, attainable by Buddhist and non-Buddhist adepts alike. When possessed by someone who did not follow a Buddhist path, they were seen as inferior because such a person remained tainted with the savas or influential defilements,2 which Buddhist paths aimed at removing in the pursuit of liberation. Thus, in the Pli suttas one frequently finds a sixth abhi added, which is knowledge of the destruction of the influential defilements (savakkhayaa). This higher knowledge was said to be accessible only to Buddhists and was considered supermundane (lokuttara), since it was essentially the equivalent of the pa (Sanskrit: praj) or the liberating insight that realized nibbna (Sanskrit: nirva). However, this sixth abhi was dropped from lists of the post-canonical Theravda tradition, due in most part, I believe, to an increasing distinction made between results of vipassanbhvan or insight meditation as the only effective means of finally eliminating the savas, and the fruits of cultivating the jhna states of meditative absorption (cultivated through another meditative process, samathabhvan or tranquility meditation), which are said to produce the abhis.3 In general, the five abhis besides iddhi imply the internal subjective power of intellectual facilities, which are purified and developed by a method of systematic extension from immediate experiences to more distant ones, or from material and gross sensations to ethereal, refined, and even divine ones. In contrast, iddhi signifies the controlling power of both the subjective and objective, manifesting itself in control of both mind and matter. Before turning to this abhi and the perceived spiritual benefits of it and the other higher knowledges, we will first take into consideration, in the interests of presenting an accurate and balanced picture of
The Pli texts typically list three savas, namely: 1) kmsava the sava of (craving) sensory pleasure; 2) bhvsava the sava of (craving) continued exisitence; and 3) avijjsava the sava of ignorance. Sometimes a fourth sava is added, namely dihsava the sava of (wrong) views. 3 To be specific, the texts uniformly agree that it is in the fourth level of jhna that one can develop the five abhis.
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these powers as presented in early Pli works, ways in which they were considered to be potentially problematic.
A. The abhis: dangers and limitations

Most of the scholarship that has dealt with the abhis has tended to focus on Buddhas apparent ambivalence towards, and denunciation of, such pursuits. Certainly any complete treatment of our topic must consider this aspect, as well as the potential for misuse of the powers and the limitations of their use, as perceived by tradition. Perhaps the most frequently cited episode involving Buddha and the miraculous is the story of an encounter between Buddha and a fellow samaa ascetic. Buddha asks the ascetic what he has gained from 25 years of austerities, and the ascetics proud response is that he could cross over water, like the river that both were standing by, by walking on it. The bemused Buddha replies that this seems like little gain for so much effort, since for the price of one coin, he could cross the river by boat. But this story may well betray the anxiety many scholars feel about wonder-working in Buddhism, for this much cited story cannot be found in any primary Buddhist source; rather, it is an uncited story taken from Conze 1959: 104. Still, there are also clear signs in primary sources of the Buddha being presented as being wary of dependence upon of excess attention to supernormal powers. In one telling sutta, the dim-witted disciple Sunakkhata, who is constantly awestruck by the miraculous displays of charlatans whom he considers arahants, threatens to leave the san gha unless Buddha agrees to teach him the iddhis. The Buddha scolds, So, Sunakkhata, whether miracles are performed or not, the purpose of my teaching the dhamma is to lead whoever practices it to total cessation of suffering. Then what purpose would the performance of miracles serve? Consider, you fool, how great this fault of yours is.4 There was also danger of mistaking the attainment of iddhi for high states of spiritual accomplishment. To regard the iddhis
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DN iii 4.
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as signs of incipient success had other potential dangers, in that they were available to non-Buddhist yogins as well. Even the great villain of the Pli Nikyas, Devadatta, possessed these abilities. Worse yet would be to mistake acquisition of the iddhis for the final abode of nibbna. It was probably with these dangers in mind that tradition has Buddha making the distinction between noble (ariya) and ignoble (anariya) iddhis. The supernormal powers available to Buddhist adepts and non-Buddhist yogins alike were labled ignoble, since they were seen as being concomitant with the savas and worldly attachment. The only truly noble iddhi is the accomplishment (one meaning of iddhi) of abiding mindfully in equanimity (upekkh), indifferent to both that which is unpleasant and that which is pleasant.5 Instead of furthering ones involvement in sasra as the ignoble iddhis can do, the noble iddhi of equanimity overcomes the polarities which disturb ones life in the world. Thus it is said to be without impurities and attachment. Along very similar lines, Buddha is presented as putting the wondrous in proper perspective in his formula of the three miracles (pihriya). The three are the miracles of supernormal powers (iddhis), mind-reading (desan), and instruction (anussani). In the Kevaha Sutta, a householder from Nland encourages Buddha to perform miracles in order to increase peoples faith. Buddha replies that he does not teach dhamma by telling monks to perform miracles, and proceeds to outline the three pihriyas. As for iddhis, he says that skeptics will dismiss them as a magical Gandharan charm, and concludes, That is why, O Kevaha, seeing the danger of [such supernormal powers], I dislike, reject, and despise [them].6 As for the power of mind-reading, it is dismissed on similar grounds. Teaching is the best miracle, Buddha says, and he then proceeds to discuss the dhamma in terms of the path of training culminating in arahanthood, a path that still, it is worth noting, includes cultivation of the jhnas, which therefore entails realizing the supernormal powers and mind-reading, and the rest of the abhis! Still, the main message here seems to be
5 6
DN iii 112. DN i 213.
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that it is only instruction on what to do and what not to do on the path that is truly valuable to the faithful.7 Likewise, Buddha was also portrayed as being wary of performing miracles that might confuse the uninitiated about what was truly important in his teaching. In the Cullavagga section of the Vinaya, Buddha scolds the disciple Piola Bhradvja, who has been encouraged by the irrepressibly wonder-working Moggallna to engage in a contest of iddhi powers. Clearly opposed to any purposeless exhibition of iddhi for its own sake, Buddha calls Bhradvjas actions unfitting for a samaa and likened them to performing a strip-tease for money. It was this very event that led Buddha to declare the precept that forbids monks from displaying supernormal powers.8 The only other Vinaya rule involving the abhis concerns falsely claiming possession of supernormal powers. This is a prjika (one who has committed a grave transgression against the monastic rules) offense, warranting expulsion from the san gha.9 Finally, it must be pointed out that a thorough reading of the Pli Nikyas reveals that the abhis were not always deemed a necessary part of the path to nibbna. The sources indicate that actually a relatively small percentage of disciples were advanced enough in cultivation of the jhnas to have attained them. Most arahants seem to have been liberated by insight meditation alone. In one passage, Buddha says that out of 500 monks, 60 have what are called the three vijjs, which are synonymous with the final three abhis; 60 have followed the path that has resulted in them becoming what is called liberated in both ways (ubhatobhgavimutta);10 and the
For a full treatment of the pihriyas (Sanskrit: prtihryas), see David Fiordalis article in this volume. 8 Vin ii 112. 9 Vin iii 91. 10 Both in the Pli Nikyas and among modern academics, there is no universal agreement on what it means to be liberated in both ways. Scholars have tended to assert that it means a person described in many Nikyan passages as liberated by insight and liberated in mind, but the evidence does not bear this out. A definition found only once in the Nikyas says that when a monk is able to attain the eight liberations (meaning the jhnas of the form and formless realms [Pais ii 3840]) in forward and reverse order, he
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rest are said to have attained what is called liberation by insight (pavimutti) alone, which is the result of a path that does not involve cultivation of the higher jhnas and the abhis.11
B. Iddhividha
How light is my body, Touched by abundant joy and bliss! Just as a tuft of cotton floats on the breeze, In the same way my body seems to float.12
The word iddhi is derived from a verb root meaning to prosper or succeed (Pli: i; Sanskrit: ardh/dh). So while the common meaning of iddhi is success/achievement/prosperity, in the context of South Asian meditative traditions, it usually denotes supernormal or wonder-working power, implying both psychic and physical powers which lead to accomplishment or success. When discussing these so-called supernormal powers, it is important to bear in mind that these abilities should not be considered miraculous in the sense of being contrary to the Buddhist understanding of mental processes. Iddhi powers are not the results of some suspension of the processes of mind or nature, but are rather the by-products of the mastery of these processes. In this sense iddhi could be translated simply as success, meaning that attainment of it is indicative of progress along the path, particularly meditative attainment. These supernormal powers are therefore more important for what they signify, which is the attainment of a certain important level of soteriological success in practice (namely realization of the fourth jhna of meditative absorption, the state which enables one to cultivate these powers), than they are as powers in and of themselves. That the iddhi powers are considered non-miis considered liberated in both ways (DN ii 7071). But the most frequently occurring and only other definition says that such a person is one who has attained all nine meditative absorptions of the form and formless realms, and then goes on to see their impermanence by means of insight (AN iv 453; MN i 477481; et freq.). 11 SN i 191. 12 Th i 104.
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raculous by-products indicating progress in meditation is seen in the gloss of the great Theravda commentator Buddhaghosa, which renders iddhi as effectiveness of means and success in the sense of attainment.13 The Pli term iddhividh literally means kinds of success. To see what kinds of success were held to be available to the meditation adepts of early Buddhism, attention must be given to the locus classicus for the presentation of the abhis, the Smaaphala Sutta, where the iddhis are presented as both the immediate results of systematic meditation, and as the hidden powers of the human mind. According to this sutta, after the five hindrances (nvaraas),14 which are considered conducive to unreflective involvement in the realm of desire have been eliminated, absorption (appan) in the four jhna meditative states is possible. It is upon attaining the fourth jhna that one is able to cultivate the supernormal powers and the other abhis. What follows is the oft-repeated stock description of how the abhis are acquired, as it is given in this sutta:
When the mind is thus concentrated, pure, cleansed, free from stains, free from corruptions, supple, pliant, steady, and unperturbed, one directs and thoroughly turns the mind to knowledge and vision.15
It is noteworthy that the abhis occur in the fourth jhna level of the form realm, where not only has the normal perception (sa) of the desire realm been left behind, but also where the four mental factors of the previous jhnas, which are initial thought (vit akka), sustained thought (vicra), mental joy (pti) and bodily bliss (sukha) have also been eliminated. Only in the fourth jhna, characterized by equanimity (upekkh) and purity of mindfulness (sati parisuddhi), is the mind concentrated, purified, and flexible enough to possess a higher and more direct knowledge of the true nature of things. Indeed, what is implied here will be explicitly stated by
Vism 12.21. They are: 1) sensual desire (kmacchanda); 2) ill-will (bypda/ vypda); 3) sloth and torpor (thnamiddha); 4) mental agitation and worry (uddhaccakukkucca); and 5) doubt (vicikicch). 15 DN i 76.
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later tradition: It is these very eight factors of mind just mentioned in the passage given above factors such as concentration, purity, pliancy, etc. that are the proximate cause for realization of the abhis.16 Next, after having observed that ones mind is dependent on ones impermanent, disintegrating body, one directs ones mind to the creation of what is called a mind-made body (manomayakya). One creates from this mind-made body another body (aakya), which has form and is complete in all its limbs and faculties.17 This process is likened to a person pulling a reed from a sheath, a sword from its scabbard, or a snake from its skin.18 It is this other body, created by the mind in the fourth jhna, as opposed to the body subject to its usual frailties, that one employs to acquire iddhi and the other abhis. A major issue that has been raised here is the scholarly argument that says that since the abhis involve this mind-made body and not ones normal body, they can be interpreted as mere ideations or mental projections of sorts. In this attempt to explain away this abhi, we see here another example of scholars anxiety, in this case about the supernormal powers as truly realizable. While this argument may be valid to a degree, it is important to remember that according to Buddhism, the mind is the sixth sense, and as such it is not different from the other senses. Therefore these ideations are no less real than other types of sensory experience.19 Having created the body made of mind, one then directs attention to iddhividh, the various kinds of supernormal power. The version given in the Smaaphala Sutta is stereotyped, found without variation in eighteen other places in the canon, as well as many times in the later commentaries and meditation manuals of the Theravda tradition, and also in Mahyna literature. The passage goes as follows:
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Vism 12.9. Pais ii 210211. Pais ii 211; Vism 12.139. Johansson 1969: 48.
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Being one he becomes many; being many he becomes one again. He appears and vanishes. He goes unhindered through walls, enclosures, and mountains, as if through air. He dives in and out of the earth, as though in water. He walks on water as though on broken ground. Seated cross-legged, he flies in the sky like a winged bird. With his hand he touches and strokes the moon and sun, so mighty and powerful. He travels as far as the Brahma world.20
Unfortunately, the Pli canon does not provide much more information regarding the techniques by which one would obtain each of these eight extraordinary abilities. However, later meditation manuals, particularly the Visuddhimagga, do.
C. Dibbasotadhtu
As is presented in the Smaaphala Sutta, the meditator, in the same concentrated and purely mindful state of the fourth jhna as was described above, directs his attention to the cultivation of the divine ear element. The rather brief stereotyped passage, which is also found frequently in the Pli canon, provided the model upon which later texts expanded, is as follows:
he directs and turns the mind to the divine ear element. With the divine ear element, which is purified and surpasses the human, he hears both kinds of sounds, the divine and the human, those that are far as well as near.21
This power is likened to the ability to distinguish between the various kinds of drums heard at the same time. It is a tremendous expansion of auditory perception in both extent and depth, without the medium of the actual sense organ. The formula implies not only the ability to perceive sounds from realms extremely far away, but also the ability to understand non-human beings in other realms. Unfortunately, the suttas and Vinaya provide very little information about the potential uses of this power or the techniques applied for attaining it. Divine ear appears to be the least important of the abhis. Unlike the other abhis, its role and usage in Buddhist
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DN i 78. DN i 79.
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epistemological and soteriological schemes is unclear. Except from the point that the ability to hear sounds from other realms might confirm the Buddhist cosmological teaching of the existence of beings in these realms (the Buddhist worldview of the five or six destinies), it does not really serve to verify key Buddhist teachings, the way the other abhis do, as we will see. Most importantly, it seems to lack the revelatory nature of the other abhis, in that it adds little additional information to ones understanding of the way things truly are. Furthermore, there is not much pedagogical use for the divine ear. This too separates it from the other remaining higher knowledges, which can be used to help others enter into or progress along the path. However, it is certainly conceivable that the power could be used to impress others, and thus be a possible skillful use of means (upya) that might convert others. However, here we need to bear in mind the Buddhas usual discouragement of using supernormal powers to convert, as displays of them could mislead others about what is truly important in the dhamma.
D. Cetopariyaa/paracittavijnana
As presented in the Smaaphala Sutta, the meditator, still equipoised in the fourth jhna, is next able to read others minds in the following manner:
He knows and distinguishes with this mind the minds of other beings or other persons. He knows the mind of passion to be with passion; he knows the mind without passion to be without passion. He knows the mind of hate to be with hate; he knows the mind without hate to be without hate. He knows the deluded mind to be deluded; he knows the undeluded mind to be undeluded. He knows the distracted mind to be distracted; he knows the attentive mind to be attentive. He knows the unexpanded mind to be unexpanded; he knows the expanded mind to be expanded. He knows the surpassed mind to be surpassed; he knows the unsurpassed mind to be unsurpassed. He knows the concentrated mind to be concentrated: he knows the unconcentrated mind to be unconcentrated. He knows the liberated mind to be liberated; he knows the unliberated mind to be unliberated.22
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DN i 7980.
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The text goes on to say that one who possesses this abhi knows the workings of anothers mind with the same familiarity as one who can observe ones face in a mirror or pan of water and notice whether there is a mote on it or not.23 The Pli canon speaks of several different degrees of telepathic mind-reading. The early stereotyped formula given above seems to imply that an adept could come to know only the general character of anothers mind. But in the same stratum of thought, a much more detailed knowledge is suggested: One can know the mind (citta), the states of mind (cetasika), the initial thoughts (vitakka), and the trains of thoughts (vicrita) of other beings and persons.24 In another passage, the Buddha claims to know by this abhi the specific thoughts (parivitakka) in the mind of a brhmaa student. In the Aguttara-Nikya, there are said to be four ways of knowing anothers mind. They are: 1) observing external signs; 2) obtaining information from others; 3) listening to the vibrations of thought of another as he thinks; and 4) comprehending the mind of another and observing how the mental dispositions are ordered so as to be able to predict which subsequent thoughts might arise.25 The great attention given to the different types of knowledge of others minds in the suttas suggests that this abhi was considered extremely important by early tradition. Indeed, one can see its usefulness in a variety of applications. As the references to knowing trains of thoughts and the order of thoughts indicates, there seems to be a conviction that through this abhi one can gain a more certain knowledge of mental phenomena. The AguttaraNikya passage just quoted even says that Buddha and his disciples were able to discern how certain thoughts followed other thoughts. This clearly suggests that one could gain a vipassan-like awareness of the mental continuity and the ever-changing nature of thought processes. This also could be seen as a precursor to Abhidhamma and its explantions of how the mind works, of how certain thoughts follow other specific thoughts. This insight into the transient nature
23 24 25
DN i 80. DN i 213. AN v 170171.
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of thoughts that make up the mind is a key, liberating realization along the Buddhist path, and it is intriguing that this type of awareness of momentariness or impermance, phenomenologically quite similar to the third foundation of mindfulness, could be gained while meditating in the fourth jhna. This affirms the description of the fourth jhna as being a state of mindfulness, and at the same time seems to counter the not infrequent Buddhist claim that such insight only comes from vipassan practice. Not only did this abhi provide valuable insight into the workings of the mind and thus quite likely contributed to Buddhist theories of mental connections eventually articulated in full in the Abhidhamma, as well as verify the Buddhist understanding of mind as a continuity or succession (santati/santna) of momentary thoughts but it also could serve as a verificatory tool for affirming attainment of certain states of spiritual advancement. When a disciple attained arahanthood (arahatt), it was common for him or her to declare gnosis (am vykaroti) by announcing, Destroyed is rebirth, lived is the holy life, done what is to be done. I am assured that there is no more life in these conditions.26 The Buddha set forth six ways to scrutinize this claim, which involved such methods as simply asking the person what he or she had realized. But because a person could conceivably lie or be mistaken in response to such an inquiry, it was said that the only certain means for determining anothers attainment was for a Buddha or disciple to read the others mind with his or her own mind (cetas ceto paricca parivittakam aya).27 Knowledge of others minds could also be combined with divine eye to gain insight into the workings of sasra. One first applied divine eye in order to see other beings in other destinies faring according to their kamma, and then would employ knowledge of their thoughts. In this way one could come to know what beings in hell, animal, and hungry ghost realms suffer. This could provide powerful incentive to take up or practice harder the path to liberation, just as could the knowledge of the minds of those abiding in human and
26 27
DN i 84; MN i 184, 255256, 348, 496, 522, ii 239, iii 36, 287; et freq. AN v 161164.
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divine realms who had attained an almost nirvanic state of calm, equanimity, joy, and insight. Knowledge that those whose kammas have given them less advanced but still very good human or even divine destinies could likewise provide powerful incentive to live a morally good life. A section from the Nikyas on mind-reading that seems to have been entirely overlooked by scholars discussing the abhi of mind-reading is from the Mahshanda Sutta of the MN. It is remarkable in that like what has been discussed in the last two paragraphs, the Buddha speaks of using this abhi both in a way that could confirm that nibbna is a truly existent reality and provide insight into the workings of kamma and the different kinds of actions that lead to rebirth in either good or bad destinies. But it addition to this, the Buddha is said to have gained the ability to become aware of the minds of even those who had attained nibbna! In this discourse, the Buddha describes in some length how he, by understanding (or, perhaps better, encompassing) mind with mind (cetas ceto paricca), can see beings passing into the five destinies28 and the kinds of action that lead to rebirth in each. Here again a way into seeing not only that the law of kamma is actually in effect, but also a way of coming to know in a very practical way what kinds of behaviors typically lead to either bad or good destinies, is provided by this soteriologically important abhi. But of at least equal importance in this section on the results of encompassing mind with mind is the Buddha asserting that this supernormal ability can affirm a persons attainment of nibbna (to be precise, the Buddha sees that any being who here and now enters upon and abides in the liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom that are without the influential impurities because of the destruction of influential impurities).29 So, once again we find this abhi leading to key realizations that certain very central Buddhist beliefs in this case including the conviction that nibbbna truly exIt seems that in the earlier strata of discourses in the Nikyas, the destiny of life as a demon (asura) is not yet included as one of the possible destinies of living beings. Later texts add the asura destiny to make up the better known list of six destinies. 29 MN i 76. The whole section just discussed is MN i 7476.
28
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ists (making this abhi a direct, experiential confrimation of the third noble truth) are actual, true realities. Receiving affirming knowledge that nibbna is indeed attainable also could function very well to motivate one to greater effort in practice, knowing that such a state certainly exists. Finally, this abhi could also be used as a teaching tool to benefit others. The tradition holds that Buddha and his chief disciples used it to preach the dhamma with the most success, because they knew the mental states of the individuals they were instructing. So this abhi could be a powerful form of skillful means (upya). And, as any student of Buddhism knows, tradition attributes to Buddha the constant concern with students mental disposition, so that he could respond in the most soteriologically useful way.30 In this respect, this abhi is quite likely to have been a highly valued skill for teachers of Buddhist traditions.
E. The three vijjs

The next three abhis divine eye, recollection of past lives, and knowledge of the exhaustion of the impure influences are collectively known as the three knowledges. Before I treat each individually, I will discuss them as a group. These three abhis are most important for the tradition, as they stand at the very core of descriptions of Buddhas experience of liberating awakening. The three vijjs can be distinguished from the other abhis in that they are considered clear visions (parisuddhaadassana) experienced by Buddha under the bodhi tree. As represented in the Veraja Sutta of the Aguttara-Nikya and the Bhayabherava and Mahsaccaka Suttas of the Majjhima-Nikya, Buddha received these clear visions on his night of awakening by attaining the four jhnas, but not proceeding to the meditations of the formless realm. In the first watch of the night, he directed his mind to the knowledge of many thousands of his own previous births, in each case recalling his name, class, food ingested, experiences of pleasure and suffering, and death. By this knowledge it is said that
30
See, for example, Dhp-a iii 215.
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ignorance was overcome, clear vision arose, darkness was overcome, light arose,31 and that he became diligent, ardent, and selfcontrolled.32 In the second watch, by means of the pure divine eye, Buddha saw beings reaching destinies according to their deeds. Again, ignorance was overcome, clear vision arose, etc. In the third watch, he directed his mind to the exhaustion of influential defilements (savas) and to the realization of the four noble truths. The recognition that these higher knowledges were factors that essentially and directly led to Buddhas liberating awakening is crucial to an appreciation of the role of the abhis in Buddhist tradition. It is quite noteworthy that, as set forth in these particular traditional accounts, it is these three knowledges in particular, not insight into selflessness, dependent origination, the four noble truths33 or any of the other insights considered central to Buddhism, which function to eliminate ignorance and consequently liberate Buddha. That these three knowledges have been seen as absolutely essential to the path to liberation is brought out in several passages found elsewhere in the the Pli Nikyas. Perhaps the most telling example of the value attributed to these knowledges is the TevijjaVacchagotta Sutta, in which Buddha is asked if it is correct to say that he is omniscient (sabba). Buddha replies that it is not correct, but that it would be correct to describe him as one who possesses the three knowledges.34 He goes on to say that he recollects former lives in all modes and details, comprehends that beings are inferior, superior, beautiful, ugly, well-faring and ill-faring accordMN i 22; 248249. MN i 22; 248. 33 The versions of the enlightenment found at SN 22:26 and 12:65 focus respectively on insight into selflessness and dependent origination as the central realizations of the Buddhas experience of awakening. DN ii 3035 presents the former Buddha Vipass as attaining enlightenment by virtue of contemplating both dependent origination and the selfless nature of the aggregates.The famous first sermon of the Buddha, on Setting in motion the wheel of the dhamma (Dhammacakkappavattanasutta) presents Buddha basing his enlightenment on insight into the four noble truths. 34 MN i 482.
32 31
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ing to their actions, and abides in the liberation of mind and the liberation by insight realized by the higher knowledge of the destruction of the savas.35 Thus, the significance given to the three knowledges (at DN ii 275 they are said to be the things to be realized, and at AN ii 65 they are said to be the characteristics of a noble monk [ariyabhikkhu]) expands the role and importance of the abhis even further. Not only are they of illuminating, verificatory (confirming as they do the Buddhist understanding of the workings of kamma and sasra), and pedagogical value, but they also describe the types and limits of knowledge which Buddha and the arahants possessed after liberation. At other points in the canon, Buddhas scope of knowledge appears to be far broader than these abhis, but this threefold knowledge formula is clearly represented as being of more soteriological significance to him than omniscience. In the suttas, Buddha often directs his discourse to the three vijjs as a topic of great spiritual value. In fact, many passages equate the attainment of arahanthood itself with the realization of the three vijjs. For example, the Mahssapuru Sutta says that a bhikkhu who acquires the three vijjs in the fourth jhna is called a samaa, a brhmaa, one who is cleansed, an attainer of knowledge, wellversed in sacred learning, a noble person, and an arahant.36
F. Pubbenivsnussatia
The stereotyped formula, found in the Smaaphala Sutta and elsewhere,37 is as follows:
I remembered many previous existences: one, two, three, four, five births, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty births, a hundred, a thousand, a hundred-thousand births, many eons of destruction, many eons of creation, and many eons of world destruction and creation. In such a place such was my name, such my clan, such my appearance (or class: vaa), such my food, such experiences of pleasure and pain,
35 36 37
ibid. MN i 278. Such as MN i 22 and i 248.
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and such limits of my life. When I passed away from there, I arose elsewhere, and there such was my name, such was my clan. and when I passed away from there, I arose elsewhere. Thus I remembered many previous existences, with their conditions and particulars.
There are some curiosities and contradictions that occasionally arise with respect to this abhi. Some passages even speak of the ability to remember (anussarati) future lives!38 And there was a minor controversy that would reach near inconceivable proportions in Abhidharma discussions over the length of different beings memories, that had its seeds in the earlier suttas. At one point, Buddha says that he can recall only as far back as 91 kalpas.39 At other points, he claims to remember an immeasurable amount of kalpas.40 Besides the tales in the Jtaka, which always end with the Buddha exercising this abhi to recall that he was that very living being discussed in the story, there are numerous instances in the suttas where the Buddha recalls his former lives, although unlike the distinctive pattern found in the Jtaka, they do not always carry the emphasis on improved spiritual development over many lifetimes. From a Buddhist perspective, clearly the most useful knowledge to be gained from memory of past lives is confirmation of the teachings of cyclic existence and rebirth. As already stated, such memories could provide powerful incentive to be free from sasra. There is, however, an interesting sutta which shows that a Buddhist interpretation was not the only possible conclusion taken from this abhi. In the Brahmajla Sutta, Buddha admits that certain other samaas and brhmaas, by means of their attainment of certain states of samdhi, are able to call to mind several hundred-thousand past lives. This experience, however, only
Demiville 1927: 291. Bodhi (2000) says that the Sratthappaksin (SN-a), in commenting on SN v 176, speaks of the elder who remembers both a thousand eons of past live and a thousand eons of future lives. 39 MN i 483. 40 J i 25, 83; Pv iv 17; Dhp-a i 88.
38
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serves to confirm their reifying, eternalist views. This memory of theirs confirms their beliefs that the self and the world are eternal, like a mountain peak which gives birth to nothing new, set firmly like a post. These beings rush around, circulate, pass away, and are born, but their self remains eternally.41 Thus it appears that even one of the three vijjs can possibly further misunderstanding from a Buddhist point of view.
G. Dibbacakkhu/cutpaptaa
The following stereotyped formula as it appears in the Smaaphala Sutta is as follows:
He directs and turns his mind to the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth of beings. With the divine eye, which is purified and surpasses the human, he sees beings passing away and being reborn: inferior and superior, fair and ugly, happy and unhappy in their destinies, as kamma directs them. He understands, these beings, on account of of bad conduct in body, speech, and mind, reviling noble ones, have wrong view, and will suffer the fruits of kamma due to their wrong view. Upon the break-up of their bodies after death, they are reborn in a lower world, in a bad destiny, a state of suffering, hell. But those beings, on account of good conduct of body, speech and mind and not reviling noble ones, have right view, and will receive the fruits of kamma due to their right view. Upon the break-up of their bodies after death, they are reborn in a good destiny, a divine world.42
This knowledge is likened to a person standing on a terrace looking over a crossroads, viewing others as they pass in and out of doorways.43 Divine eye, as presented in the suttas, seems to have two distinct aspects to it. The first is the ability to see contemporaneous events beyond the range of normal vision. For example, Anuruddha, considered foremost among Buddhas disciples in mastery of divine eye, is said to have the power to see a thousand worlds.44
41 42 43 44
DN i 13. DN i 82. DN i 83. MN i 213 says he sees a thousand worlds (sahassa loknam vo
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Second, divine eye is also directed towards gaining a knowledge of the passing away and rebirth of beings, which would give one not only an understanding of the workings of kamma, but also the liberating insight into the fluctuating nature of things, as one witnesses the ever-changing conditions of the lives of those faring according to their kammas. So, once again, the tremendous soteriological import of an abhi can be seen. In the Mahshnda Sutta, Buddha declares that one with divine eye comprehends each of the five destinies,45 the course of action leading to each destiny, and how that being fares according to kamma, so that upon death the next fitting destiny is reached.46 This obviously also has ramifications for Buddhist ethics, as again such knowledge would provide one with an increased understanding of what kinds of deeds lead to better rebirths and what kinds of deeds lead to worse ones. In a later Pli text, the chief disciple Moggallna wants to use this abhi to lift the veil of an unknown deva-world, so that he might benefit and encourage beings by reporting back that beings are faring very well there, due to their previous good deeds on earth.47 One could well see this abhi, with the insights it brings into kamma and that which leads to rebirth in higher and lower destinies, as well as into the ephemeral nature of samsaric conditions, as a central basis from which Buddha designed his course of practice for the spiritual advancement of sentient beings.
H. savakkhayaa
Finally, at the end of the Smaaphala Sutta, the meditator, still concentrated in the fourth jhna, directs and turns his mind to the destruction of the savas or influential impurities. The passage,
loketi), and SN v 176 and v 299 say I directly know a thousand worlds (sahassa lokam abhijnmi). 45 This discourse is interesting, in that it first describes how divine eye leads to insight in the five destinies, but also, as we saw above, describes how mind-reading leads to the same insight. 46 MN i 73. 47 Vimalatthavilsin (commentary on the Vimnavatthu of the KhuddakaNikya), p. 4.
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which is identical to certain descriptions of Buddhas awakening in the third watch of the night, is as follows:
He knows as it really is, this is suffering. He knows as it really is, this is the cause of suffering. He knows as it really is, this is the cessation of suffering. He knows as it really is, this is the path leading to the cessation of suffering. He knows as it really is, these are the savas. He knows as it really is, this is the cause of the savas. He knows as it really is, this is the destruction of the savas. He knows as it really is, this is the path leading to the destruction of the savas. And through this knowledge and vision, his mind is liberated from the sava of sensual desire, his mind is liberated from the sava of desire for continued existence, his mind is liberated from the sava of ignorance. The knowledge arises in him, this is liberation, and he knows: Birth is ended, the pure life has been led, done is what is to be done, there is no further life in these conditions.48
This is likened to a person with good eyesight seeing the oysters, gravel, and fish in a clear pool.49 This abhi is said to be the final fruit of the samaas life, more excellent and perfect than the previous fruits, which include the five other abhis. The savas or influential impurities of sensual desire (kma), desire for continued existence (bhava), and ignorance (avijj), which, along with hatred (dosa), are the main causes of attachment to sasra, and with their elimination comes nibbna. Ancient South Asian Buddhists and modern Western scholars alike distinguish this as the distinctively Buddhist abhi, knowledge of which prevents misuse or misinterpretation of the other five higher knowledges. Not surprisingly, it is called the supermundane (lokuttara) abhi, since it is equivalent to the attainment of nibbna. The sixth abhi is the criterion of arahanthood; the arahant had to know for himself/ herself that his/her savas, his/her obsessions, were destroyed. The Pli commentaries call it arahattasdhana, the proving or producing of arahanthood. So, essentially, liberating awakening is finally gained through the sixth abhi, since the final requirement is that one verify it
48 49
DN i 84. ibid.
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by knowledge of the destruction of the savas. But what is most intriguing about this part of the Smaaphala Sutta and identical sections of some other suttas something quite unusual which scholars apparently have failed to see as noteworthy is that these texts describe that by directing ones mind to the destruction of the savas while abiding in the fourth jhna, liberation can be attained. This would seem to directly contradict the paths of those who are said to be liberated by mind (cetovimutta) and liberated in both ways (ubhatobhgavimutta), since these forms of liberation involve attainment of even higher states of meditative absorption the aru pa sampattis or formless states of meditative attainment as a means to liberation, as well as the path of those adepts said to be liberated by insight (pavimutta), since they do not even attain the lower jhnas as part of the liberating discipline. So, what we seemingly have here is a description of another way to nibbna. Furthermore, it also should be noted that the descriptions in these texts do mirror certain descriptions of both Buddhas awakening experience and his parinibbna, which are achieved via the fourth jhna.50 It must also be noted that it is only in the context of a few texts that liberation is presented as being attained solely through realization of the abhis in the fourth jhna. Much more frequently found are passages which acknowledge that it is necessary to cultivate insight (vipassan), in addition to ethics (sla) and the high states of samdhi or concentration that are the hallmark of samathabhvan or mental cultivation of tranquility. For example, we have the stock phrase, he should fulfill the moral precepts, be intent upon internal serenity of mind, be posssesed of insight 51
The description of the Buddhas awakening taking place while absorbed in the fourth jhna is found at MN i 247249, and the description of the Buddha entering into parinibbna via the fourth jhna is found at DN ii 156 and SN i 157158. 51 MN i 3336; et freq.
50
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II. Conclusion
While we have seen at the outset of this paper that the early Pli materials display an ambivalent and even critical attitude towards the use of supernormal powers, it is clear that no picture of Buddhisms ideal figures (not only does the chief disciple Moggallna come to mind here, but Buddha himself is associated with many miraculous feats which space has not permitted me to look at here), nor any picture of its pedagogical, epistemological, and soteriological concerns, would be complete without consideration of the abhis. While we have seen that there were path alternatives that apparently did not involve cultivation of the abhis, such is the diversity of the early Pli discourses that there are very important discussions, such as those found in the significant Smaphala Sutta (certainly a major statement on early Indian Buddhist and Theravdin soteriology) that place the abhis at the very heart of the Buddhist endeavor. The description of no less crucial an event than Buddhas own awakening experience also makes at least some particular higher knowledges central realizations. Essentially, the abhis confirm an underappreciated conviction of much of these texts, which is that certain crucial Buddhist forms of knowledge and insight can be developed not just through vipassanbhvan but through samathabhvan and its jhna states of deep concentration and mindfulness as well. As is said on several occasions in the suttas, It is natural that one in a state of concentration knows and sees things as they really are.52 The abhis were reckoned by compilers of the suttas as both the corollary and sometimes crowning features of arahanthood, and in many stock phrases and formulas, abhi is listed among the chief values of Buddhism. For example, they are virtually equated with the religions final goal in the stock phrase, this pure life leads to complete detachment, to freedom from desire, to cessation, to peace, to higher knowledge, to complete awakening, to nibbna.53
52 53
AN v 3, v 313; et freq. DN ii 251; et freq.
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Although some of the abhis, particularly iddhi and divine ear, could not always be seen as highly valuable in and of themselves, they certainly could function at least as reliable signs of progress along the path of meditation practice, as indications that that one is transcending the normal limits of the phenomenal world to which one is bound. As for the power of mind-reading, it could be a beneficial teaching device and was clearly distinguished as the only foolproof way of assessing others levels of spiritual attainment. We have also seen that certain abhis, especially knowledge of past lives and divine eye, were deemed highly useful by the tradition for the purpose of experiential illumination and confirmation of certain Buddhist truths, such as sasra, kamma, dukkha, anicca, and nibbna. And, as is often repeated in the suttas, the sixth abhi affirms the Four Noble Truths. The Buddha is famous for saying that his teaching is verifiable by experience (ehipassika).54 Through meditation, the adept is deemed able to extend the normal limits of human experience and knowledge and, by attaining the abhis, one is enabled to experientially substantiate key Buddhist teachings. Thus on many levels, some significant early Pli material appears to insist that the abhis provide insights into many of the most significant truth claims of Buddhism.

References to Pli texts are to the roman-script editions of the Pali Text Society, England, by volume number and page.
AN Dhp-a DN Aguttara-Nikya, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy. 5 vols. London 18851900. Dhammapada-ahakath, ed. H. C. Norman. 5 vols. London 19061914. Dgha-Nikya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter. 3 vols. 18901911.
54
DN ii 217, iii 5, 227; SN i 9, iv 41, 272; v 343; AN i 158, ii 198.
The higher knowledges in the the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya J MN Pais Pv SN Th Vin Vism
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Jtaka, together with its commentary, ed. V. Fausbll. 6 vols., London 1877-1896. Majjhima-Nikya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers. 3 vols. London 18881899. Paisabhidmagga, ed. A. C. Taylor. 2 vols. London 1905 1907 Petavatthu, ed. J. P. Minayeff. London 1888. Sayutta-Nikya, ed. L. Feer. 5 vols. London 18841898. Theragth, ed. H. Oldenberg and R. Pischel, rev. K . R. Norman, L. Alsdorf. Londen 21966. Vinayapika, ed. H. Oldenberg. 5 vols. London 18791883. Visuddhimagga, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. 2 vols. London 1920 1921.
Secondary sources
Bodhi, Bhikkhu tr. 2000. The Connected Discourses of the Buddha, Volume II. Boston: Wisdom Publications. Conze, Edward 1959. Buddhism: Its Essence and Development. New York: Harper and Row. Demiville, Paul 1927. Sur la mmoire des existences antrieures, in Bulletin de lcole Franaise DExtrme-Orient. Tome XXVII: 283-298. Johansson, Rune 1969. The Psychology of Nirvana. London: George Allen and Unwin.
Priming the lamp of dhamma The Buddhas miracles in the Pli Mahvasa
Kristin Scheible
Stories of the Buddhas miracles certainly function as narrative hooks for an engaged audience, and serve as reminders of his potent presence. But I read the Buddhas miracle stories, or at least those that occur at the outset of the fifth century Pli Mahvasa, as more than signs of his aptitude and authority. I argue that they function on a deeper level than strategic literary exemplification of the persuasiveness of the Buddha to convert. The Buddhas miracles serve to engender particular emotional responses that in turn incite ethical transformation. There has been a lot of scholarly interest of late in relics and images, and how they function to compel individuals to perceive a productive proximity to the Buddha even in his absence. Just as the efficacy of Buddha images is not ascribed to human agency, so, too, the narratives of the Buddhas miracles perform work that transcends mere didacticism or representation of the miraculous nature of the Buddha. Robert Brown suggests, With their wondrous size and priceless material, [Buddha images] appear not so much as artistic or archaeological facts, but rather as part of a miraculous epistemology, a way of knowing through the miraculous.1 I assert that this miraculous epistemology is fundamentally operative in Pli narrative literature, whether it is evident in how the environment responds to the Buddha through earthquakes, garlands and perfume, or how animals are moved to serve the Buddha; or how items of use behave bizarrely, such as bowls moving upstream; or at times when the Buddha himself is performing a miracle, straight1
Brown 1998: 26. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 435451
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up and unmediated.2 In other words, the miracles employed in Pli texts arent simply another clever narrative device to hook a readers attention; they work upon that reader. Miracle stories in fact reflect the power they portray within the text in the work they do outside the text. A reader sufficiently prepared to expect miracles is worked upon, or primed, for the dhamma, much in the way the characters within the stories are terrified, subdued, awed, transformed, calmed, convinced, converted, and compelled to achieve higher spiritual stations by their exposure to the Buddhas miracles. Much as a soaking in good oil will prime a lamps wick for the lighting, miracle stories prepare the audience for the cultivation of potent emotions and resultant ethical transformation. Miracles have often been dismissed by scholars as little more than a method of pandering to the bhaktic and magical beliefs3 of the masses, and as mythical and secondary accretions. But miracles are employed throughout Buddhist texts to titillate productively; they prime audiences for the profundity of religious truths and cultivation of a miraculous epistemology. The presence of miracle stories is not a marker for establishing a line between monk and lay interests. We have abundant evidence of monkish interest in miracles; for example, Xuanzang was the epitome of a monk who was nonetheless, and obviously, undeterred by magic and who recounted many miracles without hesitation.4 And paramount monk Buddhaghosa himself becomes the central character in a miraculous meeting of monks recounted in Buddhaghosuppatti.5 In this paper, I look at a literary product of the religious virtuosi of fifth century Sri Lanka written for the consumption by other monks. Sure enough, in its very opening chapter it launches immediately
2 Abundant examples of the forms and functions of such miracles can be found in the articles by Bradley Clough (2011) and David Fiordalis (2011) within this volume. 3 This is the stance taken by Conze in his Buddhist Thought in India (1973: 32), quoted in Brown 1998: 29. 4 Ibid. More work needs to be done with the slippery categories of magic and miracle; see Fiordalis (2011). 5 Buddhaghosuppatti, attributed to Mahmagala. Edited by James Gray. London: Luzac & Co. 1892.
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into a narrative rich in the miraculous, a literary strategy to prime its readers. The Pli Mahvasa opens with a narrative account of the Buddhas three visits to the island of Lak. Certainly these postEnlightenment escapades of the Buddha serve to lend an air of legacy and legitimacy to the Buddhism of Sri Lanka, and the narrative that places the Buddha on the island of Lak proper serves to relocate the light of the dhamma, a narrative argument for the recentering of the Buddhist world. The Buddha visits the island at specified moments on the timeline in his biography.6 The appearance of the Buddhas physical presence in Lak in the midst of his accepted biographical trajectory may be miraculous in and of itself he must fly there, flight being a common miracle. Or can we consider the power of flight a miracle at all? Is it simply far along on the spectrum of possible human endeavors, a superpower to be sure, but one that may be humanly developed?7 It could be argued that some miracles are not in fact miraculous, but instead completely reasonable effects of extraordinary human agency. As Robert Brown suggests,
It seems that the power that explains the ability to produce miracles is rather clearly identified in this regard, with a not particularly mysterious nor mystical way of achieving it. In short, when we are talking about human beings (including the Buddha) performing miracles, the superhuman power needed for their performance is more of an understandable human achievement than an incomprehensible characteristic of a divinity. It appears to me that within the context of the Buddhas life, the possession of iddhi, the ability to perform miracles,
The visits occur in the ninth month, fifth year, and eighth year after the Buddhas Enlightenment. 7 As noted by Bradley Clough in his article (2011: 418), flight of the Buddha is frequently listed in the Pli canon among the iddhi-vidh: He goes unhindered through walls, enclosures, and mountains, as if through air. He dives in and out of the earth, as though in water Seated cross-legged, he flies in the sky like a winged bird. With his hand he touches and strokes the moon and sun, so mighty and powerful. He travels as far as the Brahma world. Samaaphala Sutta, Dgha-Nikya ii.78
6
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and the occurrence of the miracles themselves are not outside of natural laws for Buddhist believers and thus not unexpected.8
Perhaps, then, we should assume that the ability to fly is not wholly unnatural or even unexpected, but rather supernatural, and reason enough for those who cannot fly to be rather impressed by it. In the narrative it serves two functions, first to convey the Buddha to a new terrain and secondly, to impress the audience (both the yakkhas and ngas within the text and the audience outside it). But in two of the three visits to Lak, the Buddha moves beyond the expected miracle of flight and manipulates the environment, causing a terrifying darkness before revealing light. In the first visit, the Buddhas goal is the removal of the yakkhas, and in the second, the conversion of the ngas. (The third visit is not aimed at conversion, but instead teaching a community of established Buddhists we see the ngas already Buddhists who support the sagha, and so no dark/light conversion miracle is required). Other than the obvious narrative merits of a scintillating opening chapter to hook the audience, what is the reasoning behind the inclusion of miracle stories at the very outset of what is ostensibly a Buddhist historical text? What are the characteristics of the miracles the Buddha performs therein? And what may be the desired lasting effects of the relaying of the miracles to a primed audience? I believe plausible answers may be found in the text itself, beginning with the proem that explicitly enunciates the intended cultivation of emotions of savega (anxious thrill) and pasda (serene satisfaction), and palpably illustrated in the stories of the Buddhas miraculous manipulation of light and dark in the first chapter. How do miracles cultivate a response? Characters model an emotional response within the text, which may be mimicked at least the first time one encounters the story by the audience outside the text. But after the first encounter, the miracle can no longer shock the reader/hearer; miracles are multifaceted in their function because they can only shock once. I would classify miracles in literature as expected miracles, both because the story as it is rendered in the Mahvasa offers no new narrative (the miracle
8
Brown 1998: 30.
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stories are told in the earlier Dpavasa and other sources) and because within the text there are clues, subtle and obvious markers, that point toward the intended effect of the Buddhas miracles and help to construct the textual community. Beginning with the subtle, the Buddha Gotama is motivated to prepare the island of Lak for the future reception of his dhamma, in verse I.20:
For Lak was known by the Conqueror as a place where the ssana would shine,9 from Lak, filled with the yakkhas, the yakkhas must (first) be driven out.10
Even before the Buddha visits the island, the reach (and very image) of his influence (ssana)11 is conceived using the image of the dhamma as radiant light. Already the reader has certain expectations for the way the dhamma will be represented in the text, and choices in the language used and metaphors employed will heighten the satisfaction and emotional effect of the audience. Repeating words that conjure the image of light, such as the Buddhas epithet Light of the World (lokadpo), or to the light of the dhamma (dhammadpa), helps to cultivate a readers sensibilities and expectation on a subtle and cumulative linguistic level.
The work of savega and pasda

Miracles involving complementary elements such as fire and water, or darkness and light, are of the familiar repertoire of the Buddha familiar to those who have already encountered them. In fact, miracles of the Buddha are limited in the forms they take i.e., the miracle of fire and water, or flying through the air.12 The expected
Wilhelm Geiger translates ssanujjotanahna as a place where his doctrine should (thereafter) shine in glory, when glory is nowhere implied in the term. See Geiger 1912: 3. Obviously the addition of glory adds fuel to the fire of Sinhalese Nationalist discourse. 10 Mahvasa 1.20: Ssanujjotanahna Lak t jinena hi / yakkhapuya Lakya yakkh nibbsiy ti ca// 11 Ssana is an inherently practical concept that defies singular translation; it can be rendered as variously as instructions, dispensation, and religion. See Walters 2000: 105. 12 The point is that miracles are specific to individuals, deities, and re9
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quality of these particular miracles is buttressed by the structure of the narrative. The desired, cumulative, transformative effect of the text would come to be after a reader is primed through various narrative techniques. Hearing the various epithets of the Buddha, or the dhamma described in terms of light would prime the reader, and the miracle stories even more so. Just in case the desired, cumulative, transformative effect remains elusive to the interpreter, however, explicit reading instructions are provided in the proem. At the very outset of the Mahvasa there is a clear articulation about the intended effects that the stories encountered within should cause. The first few lines of the proem of the Mahvasa, in the voice of the compiler, clearly articulate the intended result of the darkness and light will be to produce savega and pasda for the reader/hearer:
This [vasa] avoids the faults of that one, [it is] easy to grasp and bear in mind, producing anxious thrill (savega) and serene satisfaction (pasda), and [it is] handed down through tradition. Listen to this one, causing anxious thrill and serene satisfaction, in this way the grounds for making anxious thrill and producing serene satisfaction.13
The final verse of the proem, where attention drawn to the ethically transformative efficacy of hearing the text, is very interesting because it sets up or prefigures the refrain that is repeated at the conclusion of each chapter within the text. This verse essentially
ligions and are limited in forms. There are, of course, many interesting explanations as to which miracles are performed and why, but in the most fundamental way it is a matter that individuals and deities perform miracles that are meaningful, practical, and useful rather than willful and arbitrary. Thus, for example, the Buddha and his monks flew through the air in large part because the Buddha and the sagha were teachers who were required to be in many places to spread the dharma and serve as a wide field for merit making. Brown 1998: 30. 13 Mahvasa 1: 3 Vajjita tehi dosehi sukhaggahaadhraa pasdasavegakara sutito ca upgatam 4 Pasdajanake hne tath savegakrake janayant pasda ca savega ca sutha ta
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means: let this text initially provoke such a response in the hearer [you] so that the ethical/emotional response itself can serve that person as the grounds or foundation for further expressions of or manifestations of these emotions. In case one has not sufficiently digested the intention, these expectations are repeated in the verse that closes each chapter: Here ends [the number of the chapter, followed by its title], made for the anxious thrill (savega) and serene satisfaction (pasda) of good people.14 The cultivation of savega and pasda is considered to have implications not just for the evolving emotional sates of the reader/ hearer, but also for the actions and ethical choices he will make after being transformed by the emotional states. Andy Rotman has considered the actively compelling side of the generation of prasda (Pli: pasda) that has practical consequences for the laity. He suggests that Buddhist orthopraxy essentially traps individuals and forces the act of giving:
Individuals who come and see prasda-generating objects are compelled to make offerings. Not doing so would be tantamount to admitting that prasda has not arisen in one. And if prsada has not arisen in one, then presumably one has not accrued the vast amounts of merit such objects are capable of generating [I]t is only the deviant who manages to get prasda wrong.15
As the first chapter of the Mahvasa illustrates, the Buddhas miracle within the text is what traps the yakkhas and ngas in the text to feel and then behave in certain ways, and the miracle stories trap the audience outside the text, instigating reactions to mirror the emotional and ethical responses modeled in the text. To be included among the virtuous listeners to whom the text is directed, a reader/hearer willingly submits to this form of entrapment and its concomitant acts of support to the religious community responsible for its production. If we extend Rotmans idea about the compelling dimension of prasda-generating objects to the
Sujanappasdasavegatthya kate Rotman 2003: 557. Kevin Trainor (1997: 167171) also discusses the motive to act based on the feelings of pasda aroused by seeing the relics of the Buddha perform miracles.
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ethically inspiring power of this narrative, we see that no reader of this text, circumscribing a particular textual community as it does, wants to find himself a deviant. The narrative structure of the Buddha using terrifying darkness followed by enlightening light to great effect is strategically deployed in the proem as an abbreviated form to prime the reader for the full impact of the narrative itself. I argue that the Buddhas miraculous manipulation of darkness and light reaches beyond the characters to be an effective narrative technique to provoke anxious thrill (savega) and feelings of serene satisfaction (pasda) in the reader/hearer. Easy to grasp and bear in mind, it produces in the hearer the antithetical emotional states of agitation (savega) and satisfaction (pasda) that engender further production of religious emotion and serenity. These antipodal emotions are necessarily developed in the order I have specified, as we will see in the following narrative when the Buddha causes fear followed by calm. The more agitated or fearful the characters (and by extension the readers) become, the greater the sense of calm, joy, clarity and satisfaction upon resolution of the hardship. Savega, according to Steven Collins, is the more intense of the two emotions. He defines the two terms in his translation of the first chapter of the Mahvasa as follows:
Serene confidence is pasda, animation savega. One cannot convey all the nuances of these terms. The first is often said to occur at Buddhist Stpas; it is a clarity of mind, calmness, and a conviction in the religious value of what, or who evokes that feeling. The second is a stronger emotion (from a root meaning to tremble or quiver), and is used when some shock inspires an increase in the intensity of religious feelings and intentions.16
In other words, the desired effects of the text are not simply emotional responses in the realm of aesthetic response. Instead, the expectations are for the hearer to be religiously moved by the catalyst.17 These two emotional qualities are employed in a sequential
Collins 1998: 593, n. 2. To be religiously moved in this context is no mere abstraction. I agree with Steven Berkwitzs assessment of the pragmatic consequences of the
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way in the Mahvasa to heighten the religious effect. The shock of savega is not simply titillation; it is explicitly the feeling of shock and awe, and most importantly, it compels one to act on heightened religious feelings and intentions. Maria Heim notes that savega, translated variously as agitation, urgency, thrill, fear, and anxiety, is often used in Pli sources to indicate fear that is capable of instigating a sense of moral and religious urgency.18 The resulting calm after the storm, pasda, is integrally related to the shock process that it follows. Concomitant with the satisfaction of pasda is a conviction in the religious value of the catalyst for that emotion, typically the Buddha. These emotions thus operate in a religious sphere and the catalyst for such an emotional response is the miraculous display by the Buddha. The darkness of ignorance, viscerally felt in the savega, is replaced with the clarity and light of the dhamma, which generates pasda. This equation occurs for the reader/hearer outside the text as well, as the initial reaction of the interpreter encountering the story would be empathetic fear, which is replaced by the serene confidence of clear understanding once the tension of the savega is resolved. The semantic field of the term pasda is also broad, enveloping meanings such as serene satisfaction and joy as well as clarity and light. The blindness of ignorance is dispelled by the heightened sensitivity brought on through washing facts with an aura of the light of the dhamma. The terrible darkness that is samsra can, through the Buddhas miraculous expression of compassion, be transformed into calm and peace.
heightening of ones emotional states by the text. Stemming from his work on the Sinhala Thpavasa, he developed an argument where he is not merely suggesting that historical narratives evoked or elicited feelings of gratitude from within the hearts of medieval Buddhist devotees, but instead he argues that gratitude is a cultural disposition instilled by historical narratives and then embodied in a moral subjectivity that is understood to condition devotional acts of making offerings (pj) to the Buddhas relics. Berkwitz 2003: 582. 18 Heim 2003: 546. Heim also notes that it is a tool for the Tathgata to stir up religious motivation in those mired in complacency and comfort. Ibid. 547.
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First visit of the Buddha

In his first visit to the island to dispel the yakkhas (demonic beings), the Buddha uses his iddhi to fly through the sky, and then, hovering over the island, he employs an effective attention-getter:
24 Standing in the air at the spot of the [future] Mahiyagaa Thpa, he made them anxious with rain, wind, blinding darkness and the like. 25 The yakkhas, afflicted by their fear, begged the fearless Jina for fearlessness. The Jina, giver of fearlessness, said to the extremely distressed yakkhas: 26 Yakkhas, I will remove this fear and dukkha of yours; all gathered here, give me a place to sit. 28 Having destroyed their darkness, cold and fear, on the ground given by them the Jina spread an animal skin rug and sat there.19
The epithet Jina, Conqueror, is an especially salient one, and further evokes the feeling of submission felt by the yakkhas terrified by the resulting darkness. While strongly felt, the fear from the darkness is but a temporary state. Fear and darkness destroyed, calm and light restored, the Buddha takes a seat, but the miracle is not yet over. The pattern of savega followed by pasda repeats, but with a fear-inducing fire followed by the gift of a calm island respite. The mat upon which the Buddha sits begins to burn at the edges, pushing the yakkhas back toward the edges of the island, frightening the yakkhas once more and effectively clearing the island for the Buddha. Through
19
Mahvasa 1: 24 Mahiyagaathpassa hne vehyasa hito Vuhivtandhakrdi tesa savejana ak 25 Te bhayabhaya yakkh ycu abhaya jina jino abhayado ha yakkhe te tibhayaite 26 Yakkh bhaya vo dukkha ca harissmi ida aha tumhe nisajjahnan me samagg detha me idha 28 Bhaya sta tama tesa hantv tadinnabhmiya Cammakhaa attharitv tatthsno jino tato
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his superpowers, the Buddha draws a neighboring, pleasant island20 near, and placing the yakkhas on it, he thus made this island worthy of men.21 After expelling the yakkhas, the Buddha returns to his prior location in Uruvela. Lak is cleared of the yakkhas, but the light hasnt remained situated in its new place. It is interesting to compare this account to the version contained in the earlier Dpavasa, where the Buddhas magical manipulation of darkness and storm is slightly more expanded: The man, standing like a yakkha of great magical power and great psychic powers, made in an instant dense clouds full of thousands of rain drops, rain, cold wind, and darkness.22 It seems significant that the Buddha is mistaken by the yakkhas as one of their own kind. He most decidedly is not; he is the Buddha, while the yakkhas are unworthy of even entering the path toward Buddhahood, according to this vignette. The darkness terrifies the yakkhas; the empathetic reader, carried away by the narrative, should similarly feel a sense of awe, even terror, toward the Buddha at hearing of his exploits. The natural world is thus manipulated in the service of the Buddhas ethical mission as he restores the light, but it is not the more gentle yet penetrating light of the dhamma. It is heat, a ravaging kind of light:
Just as the sun shines midday in the summer season, so terrifying heat was set in the body of the yakkhas. Just like the heat of the four suns at the conclusion of a Kappa, even more so was the heat sent of the seat of the Teacher.23
While the intended conversions will ultimately rely on light, here it is great heat, not explicitly light, that terrifies the yakkhas. The
Giridparamma Mahvasa 1.43: Eva dpa ima katv manussraham issaro 22 Dpavasa I.54: hito naro iddhi vikubbamno yakkho va mahiddhi mahnubhvo khaiya ghan meghasahassadhr pavassati stalavtaduddini// 23 Dpavasa I.5859: hite majjhantike kle gimhna suriyo yath / eva yakkhna tpo kye hapita drua // Yath kappaparivae catusuriytapo/ eva nisdane satthu tejo hoti tatuttari//
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Buddha uses heat to help him purge the land of unwanted yakkhas, and saves the light for his conversion of the ngas.
Second visit of the Buddha

The second visit follows a familiar narrative trajectory; things are getting messy in Lak and the Buddha, motivated by his omniscience and compassion, uses his superpowers to visit once more. A nga family feud is brewing, and an uncle and nephew are fighting over a jeweled throne. Again, the Buddha employs his superpowers to get the attention of his audience (both the ngas on the battlefield within the narrative and the audience trapped in samsra outside the text the readers/hearers for whom the text is supposed to work). Again, we see the powerful manipulation of light and dark, calm and storm, elements that are utterly natural in the appropriate context but that become miraculous when manipulated by the great iddhi of the Buddha. Once again, the miraculous display of dark and light are used to bring the audience (inside and outside the text) to desired emotional states:
58 Seated there mid-air over the middle of the battlefield, the Dispeller of Darkness produced awe-inspiring darkness for the ngas. 59 Comforting those tormented by fear, he again revealed the light. Satisfied having seen the Sugata, they venerated the feet of the Teacher. 60 The Jina taught to them the dhamma that creates peace, delighted, they both together gave the throne to the Sage.24
After this powerful display, the Buddha teaches, and lands on the ground, and accepts the contested throne as a seat as well as food and drink from the ngas. From his place, his station on the ngas
24
Mahvasa 1: 58 Sagmamajjhe kse nisinno tattha nyako tama tamonudo tesa ngna bhisana ak 59 Asssento bhayae te loka pavidhasayi te disv sugata tuh pde vandisu satthuno 60 Tesa dhamma adesesi smaggikaraa jino ubho pi te patt ta pallaka munino adu
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own terrain, the Buddha then established in the refuges and precepts 80 million land-and sea-ngas. The Buddha uses the same terrifying technique with the dark followed by the light, but here it is a technique used to prime the ngas for conversion, rather than expulsion. The ngas are duly primed by the miracle to be able to hear the dhamma, and they are also moved by pasda to respond by giving the contested throne to the Buddha, modeling homage. Recall Andy Rotmans comment, that, Individuals who come and see prasda-generating objects are compelled to make offerings. Not doing so would be tantamount to admitting that prasda has not arisen in one. What might the message be for the audience outside the text, once that audience is initiated into this miraculous epistemology?
Conclusion
The recapitulation of the fully transformed nature of this island is expressed explicitly in terms of light in the climactic verses that conclude the Mahvasas first chapter, capitalizing on the language of light that has been employed throughout the chapter. The climax of chapter one corroborates my interpretation of the form and function of this particular miracle. In the very thorough translation by Steven Collins:
So the Leader of boundless sagacity looked to the benefit of Lak in the future, and saw the advantage to the crowds of Gods, snakes (i.e. ngas) and the like in Lak at that time. The Light of the World (lokadpo), abounding in compassion, came to the good island (sudpa) three times, and therefore [or: through him] this island (Dpoaya), radiant with the light [or: lamp] of the dhamma (dhammadipvabhs) became highly respected by (all) good people.25
Mahvasa 1.84: Eva Lakya ntho hitam amitamat yati pekkhamno tasmi klamhi Laksurabhujagagadnam attha ca passa g tikkhattum eta ativipuladayo lokadpo sudpa dpo tenyam si sujanabahumato dhammadpvabhsti Translation in Collins 1998: 598.
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Buried in a provocative and lengthy footnote to this section in his appendix, Collins explores this modified chiasmus (A-B-B-A) (Lokadpo/sudpa / Dpoaya/dhammadpa) (Light of the World / good island / this island / light of the dhamma), modified because the meaning changes through each word. The Light of the World (the Buddha) thus poetically sets his sights on the primed island and transfers the light of the dhamma. Collins also pays attention to the homonymous pun involving the Pli term dpa, which means both island (Sanskrit dvpa) and lamp (Sanskrit dpa). Because the verb avabhasi (ava + bhasati) means radiant or shining, it obviously refers to dpa as lamp. The context of the sentence reveals the meaning: the subject, lamp of dhamma, does the shining, not the island itself which is instead pictured as a primed recipient. The radiance reflects the miraculous light that was at the heart of the chapter. Deliberately employing language of light, this chiastic structure follows the structure of transformation, the function of the miracle stories that came before. Considering the narrative role of the Buddhas miracles in the first chapter, we can discern a chiastic structure at play that justifies my argument about the emotional aims (and concomitant ethical transformations and behaviors). Dhammadpa26 is the light of the dhamma that shines, not the island of the dhamma that shines forth. Also, the chosen epithet for the Buddha here is Lokadpo, or light of the world, and in the miracle examples we have analyzed here we have seen that the epithet saliently corresponds with the narrative (so, Jina [conqueror] when the Buddha is in the process of conquering). As Collins remarks, it would make little sense to call the Buddha in this context island of the World.27 This slesa, or double entendre, of dpa was a nuanced pun utilized by the fifth century Mahvihran community responsible for the formulation of the Mahvasa, especially as it occuThe popular translation of the term dhammadpa as island of dham ma does not in fact reflect the light (dpa) of the dhamma that is in the text, but instead anachronistic, nationalistic overtones. Note Ananda Guruges (mis)translation, came to be resplendent as the righteous Dhamma (Guruge 1989: 496). 27 Collins 1998: 599, n. 17.
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pies such a prominent place in the running mythical narrative that establishes the Buddhas dhamma on the island of Lak. For the community of interpretation at the time of its composition, surely the dual meaning of dpa was not only meant, but skillfully employed to extend the miraculous effect on its hearers. The semantic field of the term is broad and multifaceted, and this allows the work of the text to enter the literary rather than documentary mode. The miraculous, powerful light imagery utilized throughout the chapter sensitizes, prepares, or transforms the listener in a particular way. The island, metaphorically like a lamp, has been primed, or made ready, by the Buddha through his miraculous actions. In this scenario, the Light of the World is an agent of transformation who is brimming with compassion (like the oil for the lamp), the requisite ingredient to insure the lamps viability. That this is argued by a fifth century Mahvihra text is no mystery; the text is quite clear for whom and why it has been composed (the end of each chapter reiterates the refrain, composed for the anxious thrill (savega) and serene satisfaction (pasda) of good people). Reading or hearing the text one becomes a participant in rendering its world wish;28 who would want to be left out of the good people the text is claiming for its intended audience? To understand the dark-and-light miracle, to be an engaged participant in this miraculous epistemology, is to move forward on ones spiritual path. The text asserts a particular worldview (namely, its centrality for the recentered Buddhist cosmos) and a particular wish, that good people are primed and transformed by hearing it. That the concluding pun plays on the Pli homonyms dpa and dpa capitalizes on the fact that the reader himself, a good person, has been primed for the dual resonance. Encountering the dhammadpa, light of the dhamma, in this context means that the reader, too, is being subjected to the powerful tool of the Buddha a miraculous, penetrating light. The transference of dhamma is to a good island (sudpa), namely an island that has been primed to receive the pervasive and
World wish is the term used by the contributors to Querying the Medieval in place of worldview to emphasize the constructive quality of the zeitgeist. See Inden et al. 2000.
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penetrating light of the dhamma. Just as the Mahvasa itself has been composed for the anxious thrill (savega) and serene satisfaction (pasda) of good people, so this statement makes a claim about the ethical propensity of the islands inhabitants. Just as a wick in a lamp must be primed, soaked in oil, before it will accept the flame, so the lamp/island is primed to receive the dhamma, and so the fifth century community is primed through the use of miracles in literature to participate in a miraculous epistemology.29
Literature
Berkwitz, Steven. History and Gratitude in Theravda Buddhism, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71/3 (2003) 579604. Brown, Robert. Expected Miracles: The Unsurprisingly Miraculous Nature of Buddhist Images and Relics, in Images, Miracles and Authority in Asian Religious Traditions, edited by Richard H. Davis. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1998. Clough, Bradley S. (2011). The higher knowledges in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011] 409433. Collins, Steven. Nirva and Other Buddhist Felicities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1998. Conze, Edward. Buddhist Thought in India. London: Allen & Unwin 1962; reprinted 1973. Dpavasa Oldenberg, Hermann (ed. and trans.), Dpavasa: an Ancient The image of a lamp with a wick needing to be primed would have likely been a ubiquitous one for the fifth century community of production. Geiger gleans information about lamp use from the Mahvasa and Clavasa as follows: Among the smaller household articles first of all lamps (dpa) must be mentioned. The wicks were made of strips of stuff and the oil with which the lamps were filled, was sometimes a fragrant one (73.76), as the madhukaoil pressed from the seeds of the tree Bassia laitfolia, or sesamum-oil (34.55 56), or camphor-oil (85.41, 89.43). The terrace of Duhagmas palace was lit with fragrant oil lamps (25.101). The Brazen Palace in Anurdhapura caught fire from a lamp and was destroyed during the reign of that rulers successor (33.6). He also notes how widely lamps were used in festivals, where temples and streets would be illuminated. Granted, all of this information is relayed through the text itself, and cannot be verified by external sources. Geiger 1960: 47.
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Buddhist Historical Record. London:Williams and Norgate 1879. Fiordalis, David V. (2011). Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011], pp. 381408. Geiger, Wilhelm. The Mahvasa or The Great Chronicle of Ceylon. London: Pli Text Society 1912. Geiger, Wilhelm. Culture of Ceylon in Mediaeval Times. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1960. Guruge, Ananda P. Mahvasa. Colombo: Associated Newspapers of Ceylon 1989. Heim, Maria. The Aesthetics of Excess, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71/3 (2003) 532554. Inden, Ronald, Jonathan Walters, and Daud Ali (eds.), Querying the Medieval. New York: Oxford University Press 2000. Mahvasa Wilhelm Geiger (ed.), The Mahvasa. London: Published for the Pali Text Society by Luzac 1958. Rotman, Andy. The Erotics of Practice: Objects and Agency in Buddhist Avadna Literature, Journal of the American Academy of Religion 71/3 (2003) 555578. Trainor, Kevin. Relics Ritual and Representation. New York: Cambridge University Press 1997. Walters, Jonathan. Buddhist History: The Sri Lankan Pli Vasas and their Commentary, in Inden et. al 2000, 99164.
On saints and wizards Ideals of human perfection and power in contemporary Burmese Buddhism1
Patrick Pranke
1. Introduction2
In the early eighteenth century, reformist monks in Upper Burma revived from long dormancy the practice of vipassan meditation and along with it the belief that even in the present decadent age it is possible to attain liberation from sasra in a single lifetime. While encountering initial resistance, over the course of the next century vipassan practice received royal patronage and won acceptance from the countrys monastic hierarchy. By the time
Early drafts of this essay were presented at the conference Buddhisms Occult Technologies at McMaster University in April 2008; the panel Miracles and Superhuman Powers in Buddhism at the XVth International Association of Buddhist Studies conference at Emory University in June 2008; and the Southeast Asian Studies Friday Forum at the University of Wisconsin in November 2009. The essay in its present form was presented at the International Burma Studies conference at the Universit de Provence in July 2010 and incorporates material from field-work conducted in Burma in 2009. I wish to thank to Niklas Foxeus, Guillaume Rozenberg and Bndicte Brac de la Perrire for their helpful criticisms of this essay. I also wish to thank Donald Stadtner and Thomas Patton for generously sharing with me valuable information on relics and other Buddhist sacra gathered during their field-research in Burma. 2 Pli proper names of persons and texts in this essay that are of Burmese provenance are transcribed without diacritics according to their Burmese pronunciation except when their Pli spellings have already entered the scholarly literature. Buddhist technical vocabulary in Pli is transliterated according to the convention of the Pali Text Society.
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Burma regained independence from Britain in 1948 the vipassan insight3 meditation movement had become thoroughly institutionalized and integrated into the orthodox Theravda establishment, even while it spawned charisma cults devoted to the veneration of alleged living arahants. By all measures, the popularization of vipassan was one of the most significant transformations in Burmese Buddhism in the modern era. Yet, in addition to vipassan, the same period witnessed the rise of an alternative soteriology, one whose methods and orientation fall largely outside the parameters of contemporary Theravda orthodoxy. Known in Burmese as the weikza-lam or Path of Esoteric Knowledge, this tradition has as its goal not the termination of sasric life in nibbna as an arahant, but rather its indefinite prolongation through the attainment of virtual immortality as a weikza-do or Buddhist wizard. Because it operates at the periphery of Burmese orthodoxy, the weikza-lam has at times been subject to criticism, especially by votaries of vipassan. Despite this, the modern Burmese arahant and the weikza-do share many qualities as ideal types including their ability to work wonders, and after their demise, to leave behind bodies that are immune to decay. In this essay I will compare the arahant and the weikza-do as ideals of human perfection in contemporary Burmese Buddhism and discuss the contested religious claims of the traditions they represent. As part of this discussion I will review what is known of the modern evolution of these traditions in Burma noting their possible historical antecedents.
3 In the nineteenth century the term vipassan and its corollaries sama tha and bhvan were translated into English in a variety of ways by British civil servants, Christian missionaries and Orientalists. See e.g. Buchanan 1801: 272; Judson 1852: 503, 680; Childers 1875: 429, 580. The term insight became the preferred translation equivalent for vipassan among Burmas Anglophone intelligentsia by the early twentieth century. See e.g. Shwe Zan Aung and Rhys Davids 1910: 210-212; U Nyana 1981: 1-32. On the dating of U Nyanas work see Braun 2008: 345-346.
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2. The revival of vipassan and its initial reception

It seems that prior to the eighteenth century in Burma, as elsewhere in the Theravda world, it was generally believed that it was no longer possible to attain enlightenment and hence nibbna through vipassan or any other means during the present age. The reason given for this was that the Buddhas 5000-year ssana had by that time simply declined too much for such an attainment to be within reach.4 What was left for faithful was the path of merit-making by means of which they could hope to be reborn in the presence of the future Buddha, Ariya Metteyya, many millions of years from now. At that time, as Metteyyas disciples, enlightenment and liberation would be easy.5 The earliest known record of someone who challenged this assumption is that of a monk from the Sagaing Hills in Upper Burma named Waya-zawta whose movement flourished during the reign of Maha-damma-yaza-dipati (r. 17331752). Waya-zawta promised his followers sotpanna through angm status if they would follow his teachings. Unfortunately for his disciples, upon his death his movement was suppressed by the Burmese crown as heretical. Writing a century later, the scholar-monk Monywe Hsayadaw (17671835) noted somewhat wryly in his royal chronicle, Mahayazawin-gyaw,
4 While the belief that the Buddhas ssana or religion is in decline and will one day disappear from the world is pan-Buddhist, the notion that it will last specifically 5000 years is particular to the Theravda and is first attested in the 5th-century commentaries of Buddhaghosa and in the Mahvasa. See e.g. Jayawickrama 1986: 27; Geiger 1993: 18. Note that Geiger gives five hundred years where it should read five thousand years (pacavassasahassni). 5 Since at least the 11th century, inscriptions at Pagan and elsewhere in Burma have recorded the wish of donors to attain liberation as disciples of Ariya Metteyya or to become bodhisattas at that time. See e.g. Ray 1946: 162; Pe Maung Tin 1960: 383384. Liberation at the time of Metteyya has also been the most commonly made wish of scholar-monks expressed in the colophons of their learned treatises. See e.g. Namaw Sayadaw 1992: 162. Richard Gombrich (1995: 333334) reports that as late as the 1960s, the majority of Buddhists in Sri Lanka held the view that liberation is impossible until the advent of Maitr (Metteyya).
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An elder monk named Waya-zawta, who lived in the village of Watchek, used to preach to followers of his doctrine that they had become ariya sotpannas. Many monks and laymen became his disciples and soon they could be found in every town and village of Upper and Lower Burma declaring, I have become a sotpanna, I have become a sakadgm! After Waya-zawta died, an investigation was held of monks dwelling at his place who continued to preach his doctrines. When these monks admitted to their teachings, the king had them defrocked and ordered them to shovel elephant and horse manure [in the royal stables].6
Nothing more is known of Waya-zawtas movement or its doctrines, but one can speculate as to why it gained such wide popularity and why this in turn aroused hostility from the king. During the first half of the eighteenth century the then Burmese Nyaungyan Dynasty (15971752) was in precipitous decline. Historically, conditions of uncertainty and unrest have often prompted religious thinkers across cultures to reappraise their traditions in pursuit of truths and benefits more relevant for a world in crisis. The promise of immediate ariya attainment, the highest felicity of the Buddhas dispensation, must have seemed especially attractive amidst the warfare and anarchy of the time. It is possible that the kings suppression of Waya-zawtas movement was carried out for purely doctrinal reasons, but it also may have been prompted by political considerations, if for example it were perceived ideologically as a kind of de-facto lese majeste. That the king, as a layman, is always inferior in religious status to monks is taken for granted in the Theravda scheme of things and is not an issue.7 But if the king
6 Monywe Sayadaw, Maha-yazawin-gyaw, University of Michigan Library, microfiche reel 24, pp. 17778. See also Lieberman 1984: 194 195. 7 On the intrinsic superiority of sagha members over laypersons regardless of the virtues, spiritual attainments or social rank of the latter see Muni Sutta Vaan in Suttanipta Atthakath (Paramatthajotik), Yangon: Thathana-yay uzi htana pon-hneik taik, 1974: 261262. As a consequence of their elevated status, monks strictly speaking were not subjects of the king. In contrast, any layperson not otherwise dedicated to a monastery or pagoda was regarded as the kings property, his kyun, a term that means subject, servant or slave depending on the context.
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claimed himself to be a bodhisatta, which was a common royal assertion in Burma, it would mean that by Theravda definition he was also a puthujjana, an ordinary unenlightened person, and hence religiously inferior to any of his lay subjects who happened to be ariyas.8 Given that the charisma of Burmese kingship was defined in Buddhist terms, having lay subjects roam about the kingdom claiming to be ariya sotpannas and angms might have been perceived as a political threat especially at a time when the Burmese monarchy was enfeebled and pressured from all sides.
3. The monk Medawi and Konbaung court patronage

Shortly after Waya-zawtas movement was suppressed, during a civil war which saw the destruction of the Nyaung-yan Dynasty, a young scholar-monk named Medawi (17281816) began writing vipassan manuals in the vernacular. Couched in the language of abhidhamma, these are the very earliest how-to vipassan books we possess from Burma. Medawis earliest manual was completed in 1754, just two years after a new Burmese dynasty, the Konbaung (17521885), was founded.9 Other works followed in quick succession. In the introduction to his Namarupanibbinda Shubwe completed in 1756, Medawi criticizes what he sees as the defeatist attitude of his contemporaries regarding the utility of meditation practice and the possibility of liberation in the present day. As part of his argument he significantly redefines what it means for the Buddhas religion to go extinct.
Abandoning what should be abandoned, and practicing what should be practiced according to [the Buddhas] instructions, [these two things together] is what is called completing the religion of practice (paipatti ssana). And it is only by completing the religion of practice that one completes the religion of realization (paivedha ssana), Judson 1852: 190. 8 Unlike in the Mahyna, where bodhisattvas are defined as enlightened beings, the Theravda claims they remain unenlightened puthuj janas until attaining buddhahood in their final existence. See Shwe Zan Aung and Rhys Davids 1969: 168. 9 Hte Hlaing 1973: 112113.
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which is [none other than] the path and fruit of liberation. [This being the case], should anyone ever believe, I am unable to practice even so much as is necessary to attain the path and fruit of stream-entry! and [on the basis of this belief] only abandon what should be abandoned and being content with the moral purity so attained, not engage in anyfurther practice, then for that person it can be said that the religion of practice has gone extinct.10
We see in this passage that for Medawi the decline and disappearance of the Buddhas religion is no longer an eschatological consequence of some cosmic devolution, but rather it occurs at the level of the individual, whenever anyone, out of complacency or a lack of confidence, chooses not to strive for enlightenment. The core of Medawis meditation manual is a discourse on the three marks of existence: anicca, dukkha, and anatt, as they pertain to the five aggregates. Following the standard outline for scholastic treatises of the period, he cites passages from authoritative Pli sources, gives a word-by-word exegesis of these, and concludes each section with a summary in Burmese prose. Medawi wrote over thirty meditation manuals during his career and appears never to have been harassed by the Konbaung court. Indeed, during the reign of Bodaw-hpaya (r. 17821819), one of the dynastys most religiously active and innovative monarchs, he was granted a royal title and a monastic endowment for his work on vipassan.11 Perhaps because of the influence of Medawis meditation manuals, Konbaung-era monastic chronicles written from the perspective of the royally-backed Thudamma ecclesiastical council begin to reflect a gradual shift in opinion regarding the possibility of enlightenment in the present age. In the Ssanasuddhidpaka written in 1784, for example, there is no discussion of vipassan practice or of ariya status per-se as playing a role in Burmese monastic history. Rather, the import and strategy of the text is to affirm the legitimacy of the Thudamma hierarchy by documenting its lineage through valid lines of ordination and by arguing for the correct-
10 11
Medawi 1968: 59. Hte Hlaing 1973: 113.
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ness of its interpretation of monastic discipline.12 In contrast, when we look at the Vasadpan, a Thudamma chronicle composed a decade later (c.1797), arahants are made to play a major role in the founding of Burmas sagha lineages. Yet all of them are Buddhist saints of the past, with none flourishing later than the fourteenth century.13 Turning to the Thathana-linkara Sadan written in 1831, we find that the focus has shifted to the present with an assertion reminiscent of Medawis stance that it is wrong to assume that enlightenment is not possible today. The text contains accounts of more recent saints than are listed in the earlier chronicles and reviews the theory of the ssanas 5000-year decline as given in the commentaries. It argues that the Buddhas religion remains strong and that the era of ariya arahant attainment will long endure in the Burmese kingdom.14 Finally in the Ssanavasappadpaka, written in 1861, it is stated matter-of-factly that persons possessed of extraordinary meditative attainments flourish in the present age, and should anyone choose to take up the practice of vipassan, it is surely possible that that person could attain arahantship in a single lifetime.15 It seems that, at least to a degree, the monastic establishment was moved in the direction of acknowledging contemporary ariya
12 The Ssanasuddhidpaka is the earliest of several Thudamma (P. Sudhamm) chronicles written in the Konbaung period. It acknowledges the role of arahants in the convention of the first three Buddhist Synods in ancient India but makes no mention of arahantship beyond that. See Nandamala 1980: 2324. Commenting on that text in 1796, the then thathanabaing (patriarch of the order), Maungdaung Hsayadaw, stated emphatically that the existence of ariyas is inconsequential for the perpetuation of sagha lineage. See Nyanabhiwantha 1959: 588591. 13 The last named arahant in the Vasadpan is Deibbasek who dies in 1337. Mehti Hsayadaw 1966: 9398. It should be noted that the Vasadpan is wrongly attributed to Mehti Hsayadaw by the editors of the 1966 published edition which I reference here. An examination of extant manuscripts shows that it was written by Mehti Sayadaws contemporary Zinalinkayadaza. I wish to thank Alexey Kirichenko for bringing this important point to my attention. 14 Maha-damma-thingyan 1956: 108117. 15 Pasm 1961: 70; Law 1986: 80.
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attainment by the rise of reform factions within the sagha in the mid-nineteenth century, many of which promoted the practice of vipassan to one degree or another as part of their reforms. The most radical of these was led by a monk known as Hngettwin Hsayadaw, the Bird-cave Abbot, named after his monastery in the Sagaing Hills. Formerly a royal tutor of the queen at Mandalay, he famously rejected the worship of Buddha images, claiming that the customary food offerings attracted rats. A strict disciplinarian, Hngettwin Hsayadaw not only required his monks to be punctilious in their observance of Vinaya, but also to practice vipassan meditation daily perhaps a first in Theravda monastic history.16 He even demanded that his lay supporters do the same. Over time Hngettwin Hsayadaws disciples coalesced into an autonomous monastic fraternity that continues to flourish today. Indicative of its original commitment to vipassan, the official title of the Hngettwin fraternity in Pli is Catubhummika Mah Satipahna Nikya. Hngettwin Hsayadaw was not the only reformer to establish himself in Sagaing. By mid-century during the reign of Mindon (r. 18531878), the hills of Sagaing were honeycombed with meditation caves and dotted with forest monasteries.17 King Mindon himself enthusiastically promoted interest in vipassan at the royal court and under his patronage several treatises on vipassan were composed. Particularly significant were the works of Mindons royal minister U Hpo Hlaing (18301883) who was notable for his avid interest in western science and efforts to reconcile this new perspective with abhidhamma. This synthetic approach was passed on to his protg, the scholar-monk, U Nyana, who later became famous as Ledi Hsayadaw, arguably the most significant promoter of vipassan in the modern period.18
16 While the Vinaya places many obligations upon the monk, one thing it does not require is that he practice meditation. That has always been optional. 17 For a summary of nineteenth-century Burmese monastic history as it pertains to reformist factions and forest monks in Sagaing see Htin Aung 1966: 336. 18 See Braun 2008: 6270.
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4. Ledi Hsayadaw and the modern vipassan movement

Ledi Hsayadaw (18461923) is regarded as the founder of the vipassan movement as it is known today. This movement began to coalesce only after the British conquest of the Burmese kingdom in 1885. Ledi Hsayadaw wrote numerous vernacular manuals on abhidhamma and vipassan beginning in the 1890s, and taking advantage of the printing press, he published widely to promote literacy in Buddhist doctrine and to propagate amongst the general populace what he believed to be the correct practice of vipassan based on scriptural norms. His purpose in this work was not only to facilitate the spiritual progress of the Buddhist faithful, but to fortify Burmese culture against what he regarded as the corrupting influences of the new foreign regime and to defend Buddhism against the polemics of Christian missionaries.19 In outline and content, Ledi Hsayadaws manuals are similar to those written one hundred and fifty years earlier by the monk Medawi. But unlike his Konbaung-era predecessor, Ledi Hsayadaw argued for the utility and necessity of vipassan practice for everyone, even those who hoped for future liberation as disciples of Metteyya Buddha. In his Bodhipakkhiya-dpan written in 1905, Ledi Hsayadaw asserted that while the traditional path of merit making could result in an auspicious rebirth at the time of Metteyya, it could not by itself generate the perfections (pram) necessary to be able to attain liberation through Metteyyas teachings. Only merit making done in conjunction with vipassan practice, undertaken in this life, could afford one that chance.20 Even while Ledi Hsayadaws interpretation of vipassan and his efforts to popularize its practice were innovative in many ways, he remained largely traditional in his acceptance of most Burmese Buddhist customs and popular beliefs. Of particular significance here was Ledi Hsayadaws defense of the Burmese notion that the corpses of deceased arahants remain immune to decay even though this idea is not attested in authoritative Pli sources. In the
19 20
Braun, 2008: 179181. Ledi Hsayadaw 1981: 170171.
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Uttamapurisa-dpan, a treatise on the attributes of ariyas written in 1900, he asserted,

[B]efore attaining buddhahood the Blessed Ones aggregates were tainted with the corruption of the kilesas and the grime of kamma. After attaining buddhahood no such corruption or grime remained [It is for this reason that] the corpses of buddhas and arahants neither decay nor emit foul odor, instead they remain fresh just as when they were alive Their mental aggregates are utterly purified and so generate physical bodies that are pure [Therefore] do not listen to the heretical doctrine (micch-vda) that claims that only the enlightened mind is the Buddha and that the body is not the Buddha.21
Not surprisingly given the Burmese saghas devotion to Buddhist scholasticism, the lack of textual authority for this view-point gave reason to some scholar-monks to reject Ledi Hsayadaws argument. In the Yahanda Pyathana, a treatise on contemporary arahantship, the scholiast Thadammodaya Hsayadaw sharply criticized the belief that the corpses of arahants do not decay, noting that in scripture the Buddha himself declared his own body to be a mass of corruption even while he was alive.22 How then could the bodies of dead arahants not putrefy? In a footnote to the argument, the texts editor comments that the preservation of corpses nowadays is achieved through embalming, a practice he irreverently equates
21 Ledi Hsayadaw 2003: 494495. Here Ledi may have been responding to a heterodox group of iconoclasts called derisively paramats that allegedly advocated the worship of the Buddhas enlightened mind (nyandaw) to the exclusion of all else. Scott 1963: 147-149. One of the possible inspirations for Ledi Hsayadaws own views may have been the Alaungdaw Kathapa cave-shrine located northwest of Monywa. According to local legend the cave contains the incorruptible corpse of the Buddhas great disciple, Mahkassapa, which will reanimate at the time of Metteyya and auto-incinerate in the future Buddhas hand. Kawinda 1994: 19. The legend is not attested in Pli sources and has its origins in the Sanskrit Buddhist tradition of north India. Strong 1991: 6164. 22 The reference being made here is to the famous story of Vakkali Thera, a monk who was infatuated with the sight of the Buddhas physical form. In the story, the Buddha describes his own physical body as foul, and admonishes Vakkali to try to see the dhamma as his true body. Malalasekera 1974: 799800.
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with taxidermy.23 In spite of occasional criticisms of this sort, Ledi Hsayadaws opinion has prevailed and today represents the majority view of the vipassan movement and of Burmas religious establishment. Since Ledi Hsayadaws time, many vipassan organizations have been established, each promoting its own meditation techniques. These typically are based on interpretations of the Satipahna Sutta and the cultivation of mindfulness (sati). Most of the contemporary vipassan methods entail the practice of mindfulness meditation exclusively while eschewing the cultivation of tranquility meditation (samatha) and the blissful states (jhna) and supernormal powers (iddhi, abhi) associated with it.
5. The cult of living arahants

Almost all of the modern vipassan groups were founded by charismatic monks,24 and while there is no recorded instance where any of them declared themselves to be enlightened this being prohibited by the monastic code many were deemed by their disciples, and by the public at large, as having attained arahantship, or if not that, then nearly so.25 The modern hagiographies that have grown up around these meditation masters often report not merely on their piety but also on their supernormal powers to fly through the air, to appear in two places at once, to predict the future, etc.26 this in spite of the fact that the meditations these teachers prescribed and
Thadammodaya Hsayadaw 1954: 4950. The most well-known exception is the lay vipassan lineage of Hsaya Thet-gyi (18731945), U Ba Khin (18991971), and S. N. Goenka (1924). 25 Mahasi Hsayadaw (19041982), for example, whose vipassan organization is the largest and most influential in Burma, was believed by many to be an angm. 26 Such claims are quite common in Burma. It is reported, for example, that the meditation master Thabeik Aing Hsayadaw (18931968) could be seen gathering alms in one place while appearing simultaneously someplace else. Thathanawithudi 1975: 315316.
23 24
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allegedly utilized were, by contemporary definition, not productive of such powers. It would be wrong however to assume that the hagiographies of the alleged saints of the modern vipassan movement are concerned chiefly with either the miraculous or with the charisma of the saints themselves. Instead, the principle focus of these stories is on the Buddhist doctrine (taya, P. dhamma) and the method of meditation (shuni) taught by these teachers. Sometimes presented in the form of pithy dialogues between master and disciple, these expositions are characterized, virtually without exception, by their close adherence to doctrinal norms laid out in Pli scripture and commentary as interpreted by the Burmese Theravda establishment. This emphasis on textual authority is in part a consequence of the fact that most of the prominent vipassan teachers were themselves scholar-monks. It is also indicative of how, in the evolution of the modern vipassan movement, the teacher became ancillary to the doctrines and method of meditation he taught. This was an important step in the institutionalization of vipassan in the twentieth century.27 Around each prominent teacher there arose a wipathana yeiktha or vipassan hermitage. This was an entirely new institution in the history of Burmese Buddhism devoted exclusively to the prac27 Max Weber theorized that nascent religious (and political and military) movements routinize and institutionalize the charisma of their founders as a necessary stage in their evolution towards long-term stability. Movements that fail to do this typically do not long survive the demise of their founders. Eisenstadt 1968: 4865. This sociological dictum is illustrated in the recent researches by Ingrid Jordt (2007: 1534) on Mahasi Hsayadaws meditation hermitage, the Thathana Yeiktha, and by Keiko Tosa (2009: 239264) on the pilgrimage center of Thamanya Hsayadaw. Jordt describes how emphasis on meditation technique and institutional discipline allowed the Thathana Yeiktha to flourish after Mahasis death in 1982, while Tosa shows how Thamanya Hsayadaws center declined rapidly following his demise in 2003 because it had remained exclusively focused on devotion to the hsayadaw himself. Juliane Schober (1988: 2628) has argued that an inability to transition to new leadership following the passing of charismatic founders is characteristic of the weikza-lam in general and accounts for the ephemeral nature of most weikza-lam associations.
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tice of meditation and designed to accommodate large numbers of mostly lay practitioners during retreats.28 The teachings and method of the founding meditation master became the signature of each of these wipathana yeikthas and remained a constant whenever daughter centers were established. As the exposition of Buddhist doctrine by all of the teachers was virtually the same, it was the meditation method, the shuni, in particular that became the single most important criterion by which vipassan groups distinguished themselves from one another and argued over what constitutes correct practice.29 The vipassan movement during the first half of the twentieth century catered mostly to the urban middle-class which emerged during the British period. Now after a century of development the movement has spread among all social classes with wipathana yeikthas in almost every city and town, and even village monasteries hosting vipassan retreats. The heyday of the associated cult of living arahants was really the mid-twentieth century, which witnessed many charismatic monks raised to national prominence for their aptitude in meditation and Buddhist scholarship. This cult of charisma was part and parcel of the optimistic fanfare surrounding newly won national independence in 1948, and the 2500th anniversary of the Buddhas parinibbna in 1956, which was celebrated in
28 While the wipathana yeiktha was a new institution, its religious activity was modeled after the traditional lay practice of observing the fortnightly Buddhist Sabbath (uposatha). On the full and new moons, lay persons who wish to do so gather at monasteries or pagodas to pray and to temporarily take upon themselves additional precepts (sla) beyond the normal five. These additional precepts, such as not eating after noon, not using perfumes and refraining from sexual activity, render their lives, for the duration of the Sabbath, akin to those of novice monks. Burmese wipathana yeikthas typically impose the same uposatha precepts on meditators for the duration of retreats. 29 Braun (2008: 394401) argues that the emphasis on meditation technique witnessed today emerged only after Ledi Hsayadaw, whose own writings focused on abhidhamma literacy. A question worth posing is whether, during the preceding Konbaung period, any such distinction between meditation technique and abhidhamma literacy was ever sharply drawn.
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Rangoon with the convention of the Sixth Buddhist Synod.30 It was believed by many Burmese Buddhists at that time that the world had entered upon a new age of enlightenment, that at this halfway point of the ssanas decline there was a sudden upsurge in the capacity of individuals to attain liberation, and that all this was the fulfillment of an ancient prophesy.31 How else to account for this abundance of arahants in the land? 32 The archetypes of the modern Burmese arahant are first and foremost the svaka disciples of the Buddha described in the Pli Tipiaka and commentaries, and of no less importance, native hero-saints whose legends are recorded in Burmese chronicles. Chief among the latter is Shin Arahan, the Mon saint who famously converted the Burmese king, Anawrahta, to Buddhism in the eleventh century and became the first Buddhist patriarch of the kingdom
Among the most well-known meditation masters alleged to be ara hants during this period were Sunlun Hsayadaw (18771952), Thaton Zetawun Hsayadaw (18681954), Mogok Hsayadaw (18991962), Mohnyin Hsayadaw (18741964), Webu Hsayadaw (18951977), and Taungpulu Hsayadaw (18961986). See Hte Hlaing 1973: 253ff. 31 This belief in the significance of the 2500th anniversary of the Buddhas parinibbna played an important role in weikza-lam circles as well, where it often took on millenarian connotations. Some believed, for example, that the contemporary acclaimed weikza-do, Bo Min Gaung (d. circa 1952), was prophesied to assume the role of a dhammarj at this time. Paw U 1954: 7780. On the scope of weikza-lam millenarian expectations during this period see Foxeus 2011: 58-75. 32 The notion that the world was destined to enter an age of enlightenment at the halfway point of the ssanas lifespan is not attested in Pli scripture or commentary for which reason it was by no means universally accepted. The idea was taken up for consideration by the Sixth Buddhist Synod (19541956) which rejected it as contradictory and as lacking textual support. Atthakatha-thangayana Pathama-thannipata Thangayana Si-sit-hkan, Yangon: Naingan-daw boda-thathana a-hpwe, 1958: 139 147. Subsequent publications by the Ministry of Religious Affairs that discuss the ssanas lifespan omit reference to the theory. See e.g. Ledi Kelatha 1980: 715. It is perhaps for this reason that today only a minority of vipassan groups advocate the view, most notably those following the teachings of S. N. Goenka.
30
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ofPagan.33 Equally prominent are Soa and Uttara, native sons according to Mon tradition, who missionized the Mon homeland of Rmaa in Lower Burma in the third century BCE.34 While endowed with supernormal powers, used always judiciously to overcome obstacles to their missions, these saints are chiefly remembered as propagators of the faith whose importance was that they introduced the Buddhas ssana to a given place and inaugurated a valid line of ordination there. Having completed their tasks in the service of the religion, they quietly passed away in nibbna. There are other more marvelous paradigms of arahantship available in Burmese legend and folklore from which the vipassan movement could have drawn inspiration, such as the immortal ara hant, Shin Upagot, a remover of obstacles who dwells in a brazened palace beneath the southern ocean.35 But it is the less exuberant models mentioned above, revered not so much for their powers but for what they established that at least officially are the ones thus far preferred by the modern proponents of vipassan.
6. The Buddhist wizard and the weikza-lam

The Burmese weikza-do, being a powerful Buddhist thaumaturge, cuts a very different figure. A master of esoteric arts and possessed of extraordinary magical potency, he makes full and flamboyant use of his powers to assist good people and defend the Buddhas
33 The Burmese legend of Shin Arahan and King Anawrahta, in turn, is closely patterned after the story of Dhammsoka found in the Mahvasa. See e.g. Pe Maung Tin and Gordon Luce 1923: 7075; Geiger 1993: 2849. 34 Through this and related legends the Mons and the Burmese identify Lower Burma as Suvaabhm, the Golden Land. The legend of Soa and Uttara, which first appears in the Dpavasa, was recast into its familiar Burmese form in the 15th-century Kaly inscriptions of King Dhammacet. See Taw Sein Ko 1892: 4849; Oldenberg 1992: 159160. 35 Shin Upagot dwells in his submarine palace awaiting the advent of Metteyya Buddha. The legend has its origins in Sanskrit Buddhist sources and makes its debut in Burma in the 11th-century Lokapaatti. For a synopsis of the legend and cult of Shin Upagot in contemporary Burma see Strong 1991: 209219.
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ssana. The weikza-do makes his debut as a Buddhist hero in early nineteenth-century Burmese folklore in the figure of a wizard named Bo Bo Aung. Bo Bo Aung is portrayed as a white-clad turbaned layman who leads a righteous army in the service of a cakkavatt king named Setkya-min. Setkya-min has as his task the defeat of evil and the ushering in of a Golden Age in preparation for the immanent advent of Metteya Buddha.36 The notion that Metteyya will appear in the near future falls outside the parameters of normative Theravda, but nevertheless the idea seems to have enjoyed considerable popularity among the general populace of the time.37 Beginning in the nineteenth century, the Setkya-min myth inspired numerous pretenders to the throne to launch millenarian uprisings, first against the Burmese crown, and then against the British colonial government; the last and most famous of these being the Saya San rebellion of 193031.38 After independence in 1948 under the government of U Nu, weikza-lam associations (ga ing) that were millenarian in orientation were treated with suspicion and occasionally harassed.39 And since the military coup of 1962, the public profession of millenarian Setkya-min ideology has
36 The figure of Setkya-min is based on an historical namesake, the crown-prince Setkya (18121838). Prince Setkya was assassinated in 1838 by his uncle, Tharrawaddi, who usurped the Burmese throne. Being a royal, Setkyas blood could not be shed so he was drowned in a velvet sack in accordance with protocol. The legend arose that the prince did not die but was spirited away to heaven by the weikza-do, Bo Bo Aung. There he waits in occultation for the propitious time to return to the world. Sarkisyanz 1965: 154155; Ferguson and Mendelson 1981: 6768. On the evolution of the Setkya-min myth see Foxeus 2011: 5158. 37 Even King Bodaw-hpaya (r. 17821819) appears to have contemplated for a time that he himself might be an incarnation of Metteyya, although no official proclamation of such a claim was ever made. See Tun Aung Chain 2004: 186211. Mendelson (1961b: 229237) has shown how flexible conceptions about Metteyya can be at the level of popular belief. 38 Sarkisyanz 1965: 155165. For a recent reappraisal of the Saya San rebellion, however, see Aung-Thwin 2003. 39 Personal communication with Niklas Foxeus, January 2009.
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been effectively banned with no weikza-lam groups openly making such claims out of fear of reprisal.40 Another, more popular weikza-lam orientation, however, holds to the normative Theravda eschatology which asserts that the religion of Gotama Buddha will last for 5000 years, of which about 2500 remain. The disappearance of the religion will be followed by a period of several millions of years, only after which Metteyya will finally appear. Weikza-lam associations that accept this scenario devote their energies not to the ushering in of a Golden Age, but to the prolongation of the practitioners longevity so that he might encounter Metteyya Buddha in a single lifetime. These non-millenarian, future oriented weikza-lam groups seem always to have been the majority, and they continue to flourish today.41 A common permutation on the above scenario has the weikza-do await the parinibbna of Gotama Buddhas relics, an event that will occur at the end of the current 5000-year ssana.42
40 In a 1979 address to the Central Committee of the Burma Socialist Program Party, General Ne Win singled out for condemnation the Shweyin-gyaw weikza association, comparing its alleged dangerous doctrines to those of the Rev. Jim Jones who ordered the mass suicide of his followers in Jonestown, Guyana in 1978. Ne Win 1985: 376377; Foxeus 2011: 81. General Ne Win allegedly banned military personnel from joining weikza-lam associations on the grounds that such membership undermined the chain-of-command. Personal communication with U Myint Thein in Rangoon, 1987. 41 Melford Spiro (1982: 162190) was the first to distinguish these two types of weikza practice which he deemed millennial Buddhism and eschatological Buddhism respectively. The two types of weikza orientation correspond to Jan Nattiers (1988: 2532) Here/Now and Here/Later typology of Maitreya myth attested historically in Chinese Buddhism. On possible Chinese influences on the Burmese weikza-lam tradition see nn. 6770 below. 42 The weikza association Manosetopad Gaing headquartered in Pegu, for example, has as its primary eschatological focus the parinibbna of the Buddhas relics. Kan Sein c. 1987: 15; Pranke 1995: 358.
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7. Weikza-lam theory and practice

The weikza-lam is an esoteric religious system that requires initiation under a master or hsaya,43 and instruction in a repertoire of occult sciences whose mysteries may not be shared with outsiders. As such, the weikza-lam contrasts with normative Theravda Buddhism which is exoteric in its teachings and observances. Apprenticeship in the weikza-lam entails training in any one or several of the following disciplines: the use of magical incantations and spells (mandan); alchemy (aggiyat), particularly those subtypes associated with the manipulation of mercury (byada) and iron (than); traditional medicine (hsay), which includes indigenous and Chinese pharmacopoeias and Indian Aryuveda, and importantly because of its efficacy, the casting of runes or magical diagrams (in, aing, sama). Runes are typically understood as devices for protection or healing and can be drawn on amulets that are either worn or inserted under the skin, or tattooed on the body. Alternatively they can be written on slips of paper which are then either rolled into pills or burnt into ash and swallowed as medicine.44 In addition runes are used to demarcate boundaries on the ground, especially for rites of initiation and exorcism. All of these esoteric techniques are arranged under a classification system of sciences (weikza, P. vijj), the vocabulary of which is culled chiefly from Pli sources.45 While training in esoteric sciences is incumbent on disciples of the weikza-lam, normative Buddhist practices are not neglected
43 Hsaya is the Burmese corruption of P. cariya and generically means simply teacher. Sometimes teachers in this tradition are referred to as weikza-hsayas masters of esoteric knowledge or hsay-hsayas masters of medicine to distinguish them from other teachers. 44 For an account of the composition and use of in and sama see Thomas Patton, In Pursuit of the Sorcerers Power: Sacred Diagrams as Technologies of Potency, unpublished paper presented at the 2010 International Burma Studies Conference, Marseille.
The broadest Pli category under which these various sciences are arranged is gandhr-vijj (Burmese pronunciation gandari-weikza). Included under this term are also any extraordinary powers (siddhi) or meditative attainments (abhi) short of enlightenment. Kan Sein c.1987: 7. On the Pli textual sources for this vocabulary see n. 71 below.
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and indeed are typically emphasized as essential for any progress to be made. The most important of these are the observance of the five Buddhist precepts (sla) and the cultivation of various meditations assimilated to the Theravda category of samatha tranquility meditation. Lay weikza-lam practitioners will often take on the eight or ten precepts of the Buddhist Sabbath for extended periods of time as the added renunciation enhances their spiritual potency (hpon); while samatha in particular is considered efficacious for its capacity to deliver supernormal powers. Both the observance of precepts and tranquility meditation are viewed as necessary catalysts that actuate the other sciences.46 Equally important, they equip the weikza-lam practitioner with the moral superiority and mental strength needed to exercise control over a host of spirits (nat) ranging from the demonic to the benign whose power must be tapped to unlock the secrets of critical herbs, potions and incantations.47 At the level of everyday practice, hsayas of the weikza-lam act as healers, exorcists, purveyors of magical protection, and prognosticators for clients and the faithful. Ideally the hsaya will not charge a fee for his services, his generosity being part of his discipline and training. One such hsaya whose clinic I visited in Rangoon diagnosed patients according to the following procedure.48 After inquiring about the patients condition, he would prepare himself by calming his mind with a preliminary meditation. Then, once readied, he would extend his hands over the patients body to sense an aura that indicated the etiology of the ailment and hence the remedy to be prescribed. According to the hsaya, illness arises from three general causes. Diseases such as measles or food poisoning, etc., are ordinary physical conditions treatable either with indigenous medicine or, if that proves ineffective, with western medicine or treatment. Or the malady could be caused by payawga, a malevolent influence of supernatural origin such as black magic or
46 In his fieldwork in on weikza tradition Mendelson (1963: 786-807) confirmed the widespread belief in the efficacy of precepts as catalysts for the other sciences. 47 Kan Sein c.1987: 8. 48 From field notes taken in 1987 at the clinic of Hsaya U Htun Htun, a weikza-lam practitioner in Rangoon.
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spirit attack. In such cases the hsaya would have to engage the dark forces in battle using all the occult instruments at his disposal. This carried with it some risk for the hsaya, as there was the possibility that he could be defeated and harmed, but if successful the patient would be returned to normalcy. On the other hand, the disorder might be diagnosed as an irreversible consequence of karma (kam), such as retribution for an unmeritorious deed (akutho), in which case there is no cure, and the patient would be advised to engage in religious devotion as a way to prepare for the inevitable.49
8. The weikza-do as Buddhist immortal wizard

In keeping with the ultimate aim of the system, weikza-lam practitioners also work for their own physical perfection, applying the same sciences to their own bodies so as to render them invulnerable to injury or decay. The principal metaphor is alchemical, where the corruptible body is transformed into a stable substance, just as base metals which tarnish are transmuted into gold.50 It is upon completing this transformation that the practitioner becomes a weikza-do, a possessor of [esoteric] knowledge. Another term for such an accomplished one is htwet-yat-pauk, which literally means exit place and signifies the adepts own body as the point of exit whence he escapes the mortal plane. In weikza-lam manuals the final stage of transition from mortal master to immortal wizard is portrayed in a variety of ways depending on the sectarian affiliation of the authors. In one of the more dramatic scenarios the hsaya has his disciples prepare for him a coffin in which he will lay unconscious. The coffin will be sealed and placed within a specially prepared chamber, perhaps an ordination hall because of its sanctity, or buried in the ground. At this time, the hsaya will be helpless against the forces of darkIn Buddhist causal theory, the specific type of karma being referred to here is called aparpariya vedanya kamma. Unlike other karmas whose consequences can be modified or obviated through appropriate action, the consequences of this type of karma are inevitable and cannot be avoided. See Bodhi 2000: 205. 50 Kan Sein c.1987: 6; Spiro 1982: 165.
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ness that will surely try to destroy him. To defend him disciples will draw protective diagrams, recite the appropriate incantations and arm themselves with alchemical stones (datlon) to hurl at evil forces as they try to enter the consecrated space. After a pre-determined lapse of time the coffin will be opened and if the disciples find it empty with only clothes left behind, they will know that their hsaya had successfully de-materialized his body and escaped as an immortal.51 A person who makes the transition in this manner is called an ashinhtwet, or one who exits alive. A variation on this scenario has the successful practitioner leave behind an incorruptible body in the form of a mummy to serve as a kind of relic for veneration by the faithful. A weikza-do who departs in this way is called an athay-htwet or one who exits through [apparent] death apparent because although the body is dead, the mind of the practitioner did not itself die when exiting the body but ascended to the realm of the immortals perfectly alive.52 A third possibility, of course, is that upon opening the coffin the disciples find a rotting corpse, at which point they will realize that their hsaya had failed in his purpose and died a mortal death. While weikza-dos are freed from the limitations of physicality, they continue to communicate with their mortal followers imparting instructions either in dreams or meditations, or in person. Sometimes they take over the body of a disciple for a period of time, or even reanimate the corpse of a recently deceased individual whatever is necessary to accomplish some needful task in the world.53 Regardless of the means, the communication weikzaKan Sein c.1987: 8; Spiro 1982: 170; Htin Aung 1962: 43. According to Theravda metaphysics, when mortals die their minds undergo a moment of death consciousness (cuticitta), which terminates the present life, followed immediately by a moment of rebirth consciousness (paisandhi-citta), which initiates the next life. Bodhi 2000: 122 124. In weikza-lam theory, when a perfected htwet-yat-pauk exits the body his mind forgoes these two moments and simply continues uninterruptedly in the same life. For a discussion of the destination of htwet-yatpauks after their exit from the mortal plane see Foxeus 2011: 177182. 53 Mendelson (1961a: 560-580) reported a variety of differing interpretations among weikza associations regarding the manner in which htwet-yat-pauks communicate with disciples. The Ariy-weizz associa51 52
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dos maintain with human beings is understood as a sign of their altruism, since contact with mortal flesh is believed to be repulsive to their refined sensibilities. Because they are ever present in the world and are devout Buddhists, weikza-dos can be supplicated for protection, for spiritual advice, and for mundane boons as well. In popular religious art weikza-dos have been aggregated into a shifting pantheon of some twenty individuals, comprised of both historical and legendary figures. Among them are laymen such as Bo Bo Aung, typically clad in white, Buddhist hermits (yathay) wearing monk-like robes and conical hats, and Buddhist monks. The most popular weikza-do today is the layman Bo Min Gaung who is believed to have shed his mortal body in 1952.54 Hsayas of weikza-lam associations often claim to be in communication with one or several of these figures, and invariably trace their own lineage of masters, real and apocryphal, back to individuals included on the list. Variations in the standard pantheon marked in lithographs by who has been painted in and who has been painted out are most often traceable to rival weikza associations and reflect their own sectarian interpretations of weikza-lam history. In weikza-lam theory, the acquisition of supernormal powers and extraordinary long-life are in and of themselves lokiya or mundane worldly attainments. But the weikza-lam also presents itself as a fully developed lokuttara supra-mundane salvation system; one that it sees as wholly in keeping with Theravda orthodoxy, while at the same time offering an alternative to the standard soteriology recognized by the religious establishment. Taking for granted the normative eschatology that places Metteyyas advent in the far distant future, the weikza-lam argues that its esoteric practices are a more assured way of encountering the future Buddha than mere merit-making. The superiority of the weikza-lam derives from its unique approach to the task. First, by removing the inevitability of death, the weikza-do avoids the vagaries of the rebirth process
tion described by Foxeus (2011: 180-183) asserts that weikza-dos generate bodies that are stored in hidden grottos which they can enter and exit at will. These bodies are used when acting in the human world. 54 Mendelson 1963: 798804.
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that can cast even a virtuous person into hell as the consequence of some long forgotten misdeed performed in a previous life. This is of critical importance because once fallen into that woeful state the duration of ones torment there will be so long that all chance of encountering Metteyya Buddha will be lost. Second, advocates will point out that the motivation for taking up the weikza-lam is intrinsically meritorious because by definition perfected wizards use their esoteric knowledge to protect the Buddhas religion from the forces of evil. Hence the advantages of becoming a weikza-do: having made himself immune to death he is guaranteed to encounter Metteyya in this very life, and having equipped himself with magical powers so that he might defend the Buddhas religion, he is well positioned to earn the merit necessary to be liberated by Metteyyas salvific teachings. But the weikza-do is not compelled to attain nibbna at that time as an arahant disciple of Metteyya. Instead, like Gotama, he may choose to strive for full buddhahood himself, in which case he would extend his sojourn in sasra for a myriad of lifetimes more. Or, he may choose to remain as he is, a Buddhist wizard, combating evil and doing good indefinitely. The weikza-lams attitude toward the modern vipassan movement is one of polite reservation. While generally acknowledging that liberation is possible in the present age through insight meditation, votaries of the weikza-lam sometimes question whether it is as easyto attain as claimed by some contemporary teachers of vipassan.55 At the same time weikza-lam practitioners often eschew vipassan practice themselves out of fear that they might attain nibbna too quickly, thus depriving Buddhism and the world of their magical protection.
55 The Manosetopad Gaing, for example, holds that in the present decadent age samatha and vipassan lack real efficacy unless the body is first fortified through cultivating the esoteric sciences it prescribes. Kan Sein c. 1987: 56; Pranke 1995: 347348.
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9. Ambiguous and variegated origins of the weikza-lam

The history of the weikza-lam is obscure. The term weikza-do is a Burmese corruption of the Pli, vijj-dhara, a word that appears already in the Jtakas where it simply refers to a magician or wonder-worker with no soteriological significance.56 In Burmese literature also, the term only began to take on its present religious connotations in the nineteenth century with the figure of Bo Bo Aung. Prior to that the weikza-do was a stock character in Burmese legend and drama assimilated to the zawgyi or Burmese alchemist, a romantic figure who, because of the acuity of his sense of smell, was often portrayed farcically as having to resort to fruit maidens plucked from trees to satisfy his sexual needs.57 As a mere zawgyi, the weikza-do was not nearly as powerful or long-lived as he was to become in later weikza-lam literature. Nor did he yet possess any gravitas quite the contrary he was even portrayed as somethinggood to eat, since consuming the flesh of a zawgyi was believed to give one superhuman strength.58 But in his transformed guise as a heroic Buddhist wizard the weikza-do shows remarkable similarity to the awe-inspiring mahsiddha, the great accomplished one, of medieval Buddhist tantra from Bengal. Several of the eighty-four mahsiddhas of that tradition are portrayed as having attained immortality through alchemy and meditation, and as serving as protectors of the Buddhas religion till the coming of Maitreya.59 A common epithet of the
56 The equivalent Sanskrit term, vidy-dhara, occurs with similar meanings in Hindu literature. Monier Williams 1976: 964. Vidy-dhara takes on more specific connotations akin to what is found in the weikzalam in Buddhist and Hindu tantra. See note 60 below. 57 Htin Aung 1966: 45. 58 A paradigm for this belief is the famous legend in the Maha-yazawingyi (c. 1724) of two temple boys who gain supernormal strength by eating the body of an alchemist. So strong did they become that the kings of Thaton and Pagan grew fearful and had them murdered. The term used for alchemist in the story is the compound weikza-do zawgyi. Kala 1934: 186188. 59 The most famous mahsiddha who waits for Maitreya is the alchemist and philosopher Ngrjuna. See Dowman 1985: 112122. The
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mahsiddha in tantric literature is vidy-dhara.60 The Tibetan historian Trantha (15751634) claimed that mahsiddhas had transmitted Buddhist tantra to Burma in ancient times,61 the possibility of which is suggested by Mahyna and tantric imagery found at Minnanthu, a twelfth-century temple complex located on the outskirts of Pagan.62 And as late as the fifteenth century, inscripparadigm of the mahsiddha is itself patterned after an earlier Indian Buddhist archetype of the long-lived/immortal arhat who awaits the coming of Maitreya. In one of the Sanskrit permutations on the Mahkassapa legend mentioned above the saint does not die but remains alive in a meditative trance. The arhat Piola Bhradvja likewise waits in the world for Maitreya, in his case as punishment for his greed. Over time the list expanded to include four, eight and sixteen arhats. These became known in China as the sixteen luohans. See Lamotte 1988: 690694. Similarly, in Burma there is the popular belief in eight arahant worldprotectors known as the four dead and four living lords (thay-lay-pa shin-lay-pa). The list includes Mahkassapa among the dead lords and Shin Upagot among the living lords. All await the advent of Metteyya Buddha. Kawinda 1994: 148. 60 The vidy-dhara (Tib. rig dzin) is a stock figure across all Indian and Tibetan tantric traditions and is typically associated with alchemy, particularly the manipulation of mercury. David White (1996: 5557) describes a late (14th century) Indian tantric practice he calls Siddha alchemy that is similar in its techniques to methods found in the weikza-lam. In both systems mercurial alchemy is combined with yogic techniques for the transformation of the body and attainment of immortality. In the case of Burmese alchemy, iron competes with mercury as the metal of choice. Htin Aung 1962: 47. It should be noted that in weikza-lam praxis, the manipulation and consumption of runes (in, aing, sama) often displaces literal alchemy to achieve the same transformation. See Kan Sein c. 1987: 1415. A similar science of edible letters (za yig) is attested in the Tibetan treasure text (gter ma) tradition. Characters are written on slips of paper which are then consumed for medicinal, protective or soteriological ends. Garrett 2009: 8791. 61 Trantha asserts that during the Indian Pla Dynasty (8th12th cent. CE), Mahyna and Mantrayna flourished in Burma and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and that after a period of decline, the tantric Guhya-mantra was reintroduced into the region by disciples of the Tamil mahsiddha ntigupta. Chattopadhyaya 1980: 330331. 62 See Strachan 1989: 129131. Strachan, however, denies that the imagery at Minnanthu implies the presence of Mahyna or tantric prac-
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tions record that tantric texts, along with Theravda scriptures, were donated to monasteries in Upper Burma.63 Modern critics of weikza-lam practice have used this historical information to link the weikza-lam to a sect of allegedly heretical monks at ancient Pagan known as the Ari, who are reviled in Burmese chronicles for their moral corruption and addiction to magic and spirit worship.64 Another possible source of influence can be traced to the reign of the Konbaung king, Bodaw-hpaya (r. 17821819) who, in the early nineteenth century imported from north India numerous treatises on Hindu calendrics, numerology, medicine and alchemy. These were translated from Sanskrit and Bengali into Burmese.65 That there is some historical connection between this and the emergence of the weikza-lam is suggested by the fact that the figure of King Bodaw-hpaya plays a major role in the legend of Bo Bo Aung.66
tices. 63 These included the Mahklacakka and its k, and the Myuvacana, lit. Cheating Death possibly a text devoted to life extending practices. Bode 1965: 108. Trantha claims the Klacakra remained extant in Burma throughout its history. Chattopadhyaya 1980: 331. 64 See e.g. Zotipala 1983: 269270. While the Ari monks of Pagan have been held up as the epitome of religious decadence in Burmese chronicles for centuries, little is known about their actual practices or sectarian affiliations. Kala 1934: 181-182. Charles Duroiselle (191516: 7993) among others maintained that they were Mahyna tantrikas influenced by the Buddhism of Bengal. Than Tun (1959: 99118), in contrast, rejected this identification arguing they were instead a long-established monastic fraternity at Pagan that had simply remained aloof from reformist trends introduced from Sri Lanka beginning in the 12th century. In any case, it was through western scholarship that the terms Mahyna, tantra and Hnayna etc., first entered the Burmese lexicon in the early twentieth century whence they have become grist for sectarian polemics. 65 Nyanabhiwantha 1959: 520524. 66 According to the legend Bo Bo Aung and Bodaw-hpaya were childhood friends. When they grew up Bo Bo Aung became a monk in Sagaing while Bodaw-hpaya became king and built his new capital across the river. One day Bo Bo Aung discovered a manuscript with instructions on how to make magical diagrams (in). He mastered this science and returned to lay life whereupon Bodaw-hpaya tried to kill him out of fear and jealousy. The confrontation ends when Bo Bo Aung humbles the king with
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On the other hand, when we look at specific weikza-lam techniques for achieving physical invulnerability and descriptions of the weikza-dos exit from the mortal plane, we find close parallels with Chinese Daoist procedures for attaining immortality through corpse deliverance (shijie) in which the physical body is shed like a cicada husk and the immortal spirit is set free.67 Of the many scenarios for transition envisioned in Daoist sources, leaving behind an incorruptible body and leaving behind little or nothing at all, match closely the two Burmese categories of athay-htwet exit through [apparent] death and ashinhtwet exit alive that mark the apotheosis of the weikza-lam practitioner.68 Yet not all of the similarities with Chinese concepts appear to be Daoist in derivation. Daoism, for example, does not ascribe any particular meaning or value to mummies. In Chinese Buddhism, however, the mummified remains of Buddhist masters are typically viewed as relics imbued with power, and hence treated as icons for veneration.69 This approximates the Burmese treatment of such bodies, be they the remains of alleged arahants or of htwet-yat-pauks.70
his magic. Hpay Hkin 1949: 5457; Ferguson and Mendelson 1981: 67. 67 See Cedzich 2001: 11. 68 Needham 1974: 301ff. Chinese techniques of exorcising tombs to protect corpses from demon attack are also similar to the strategies used by disciples of the would-be htwet-yat-pauk to protect him while he lay helpless in his coffin. See Bokenkamp 1999: 239242. On Chinese Buddhist permutations on these Daoist beliefs see Sharf 1992: 131; Ritzinger and Bingenheimer 2006: 3794. 69 Blum 2004: 208. The most well-known example of this is the mummified and lacquered body of the sixth Chan patriarch, Hui-neng (638713) enshrined in the Tsao-hsi Temple in Hsin-chou. Keown 2003: 114115. Robert Sharf (1992: 9) makes the following observation regarding beliefs underlying the veneration of mummified masters in the Chan tradition, the purity of mind simultaneously effects the purity of the physical body and the elimination of the defilements that lead to decomposition after death. The bodies of Buddhist masters who resisted decay after death were accordingly worshiped as reservoirs of meritorious karma and spiritual power. This assessment is strikingly similar to Ledi Hsayadaws remarks regarding the incorruptibility of the corpses of ara hants. 70 The use of runes (in, aing, sama) as medicines and devices for pro-
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While possible Indian and Chinese influences on the Burmese weikza tradition could go back centuries, it was not until the turn of the twentieth century that the weikza-lam received what may be regarded as its capstone, and this through the writings of none other than Ledi Hsayadaw. Of particular importance was his Vijjmaggadpan composed in 1898. In that work, Ledi Hsayadaw set out to define all of the various knowledges and sciences (weikza; P. vijj) then current in the Burmese religious landscape and arrange them into a hierarchy along the lokiyalokuttara axis. While his intention was to show how supra-mundane lokuttara vipassan is superior to all other sciences and the only one able to deliver liberation, Ledi Hsayadaw also presented an explication of mundane lokiya weikza-lam praxis in the idiom of abhidhamma.71 This was to provide later generations of weikza-lam apologists with an authoritative vocabulary and theoretical structure with which to articulate their system and defend it against criticism.72
tection likewise has close parallels in Daoist and Chinese Buddhist practices. Strickmann 2002: 123132, 170179; Bokenkamp 1997: 253 n. 20. Frances Garrett (2009: 107108) posits a Chinese origin for the similar edible letter (za yig) tradition found in Tibetan Buddhism. Chinese immigration into Burmas heartland increased significantly during the Konbaung Dynasty and this may have contributed to the emergence of weikza-lam practices at that time. Thant Myint-U 2001: 5556. Following the trauma of the first Anglo-Burmese war (182426), it may also have been a factor in the creation of the Setkya-min myth. Maitreyan millenarianism had played a role in Chinese history for centuries, and the nineteenth century witnessed a resurgence of Maitreya-inspired uprisings in Manchu China. DuBois 2004. 71 Technical terms were adopted principally from the Abhidhamma Vibhaga and from the Paisambhidamagga of the Khuddaka Nikya. Categories included beda-weikza (P. veda-vijj), manta-weikza (P. manta vijj), gandari-weikza (P. gandhri-vijj), lokiya-weikza (P. lokiya-vijj), ariya-weikza (P. ariya-vijj), sintamaya-eiddhi (P. cintamaya-iddhi), and weikzamaya-eiddhi (P. vijjmaya-iddhi). Ledi Hsayadaws list of terms and definitions are met with frequently in weikza-lam manuals. See Ledi Hsayadaw 1985: 291293; Kan Sein c. 1987: 27. 72 Pranke 1995: 348.
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10. Sectarian polemics and weikza-lam apologetics

While the general public and the sagha at large remain for the most part neutral towards the weikza-lam, fairly strident objections to its practice are on occasion made by lay practitioners of vipassan. Besides accusations that weikza-lam practice can lead to insanity or is just quackery, critics charge that its infatuation with immortality is tantamount to a rejection of the Buddhist doctrine of non-self, which states that there is no abiding eternal soul to be found. Weikza-lam advocates respond by referencing abhi dhamma la Ledi Hsayadaw, where they point out that the mind and body of a weikza-do is no more possessed of a self or soul than the mind and body of an ordinary mortal. Appealing to the Mahparinibbna Sutta, they note that the Buddha himself could have lived for an entire eon had he been asked to do so. To the criticism that the desire for extraordinary long life betrays an attachment to existence and a fear of death mental defects that a true Buddhist saint transcends they respond that it is out of compassion that the Buddhist wizard prolongs his life, sticking around in crummy sasra for the sake of others.73
11. The saint and the wizard

According to a popular collection of hagiographies published in 1973, more than a dozen arahants and lesser ariyas have appeared in Burma since the turn of the twentieth century, all associated with the burgeoning vipassan movement.74 Of the saints on that list, the last to pass away was Taungpulu Hsayadaw in 1986. The public devotion shown to the more famous of the acclaimed ara hants surpassed that given to any other national figures. Besides miracles reported by disciples, and occasional queries posed by the Ministry of Religious Affairs to check for orthodoxy,75 confirmaA synopsis of remarks made by Hsaya U Htun Htun taken from interviews in 1987. 74 Hte Hlaing 1973, matika. 75 Sunlun Hsayadaw, who was illiterate, was famously questioned by scholar-monks on his understanding of dhamma. His responses were
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tion of a revered meditation masters attainment was sought after his death in the ashes of his funeral pyre. If he left relics (datdaw, P. dhtu), usually in the form of crystallized pellets, his arahant ship was confirmed, if not, it was still a maybe.76 Funerals of these saints were attended by tens of thousands after which their relics were enshrined in pagodas or kept in their home monasteries. Yet, unlike Buddha relics, which are national palladiums venerated by every Buddhist in the country, the cremated relics of Burmas modern arahants are relatively neglected.77 But as we have seen, according to Burmese belief, arahants can also leave behind incorruptible bodies, and these seem always to have elicited greater interest on the part of the wider Buddhist community. Perhaps this is because there is more ambiguity as to what they represent, for both saints and wizards are capable of the same attainment,78 and there are well-attended shrines in Upper and Lower Burma dedicated to the remains of both types of religious hero. Housed in impressive halls and often covered in gold-leaf,
judged to be wholly consistent with scripture. Hte Hlaing 1973: 528ff. 76 Only arahants can leave such relics, but then only if they have made a resolution to do so. The failure of a cremation to produce relics, therefore, does not necessarily prove the deceased was not an arahant. 77 Rozenberg 2011: 92. Illustrative of this indifference are the relics from the cremation of the acclaimed arahant Mogok Hsayadaw, which are interred in a rarely visited pagoda situated along the road leading from Amarapura to Sagaing. Relics of cremated arahants are, in fact, quite common in Burma and typically not held in sufficient esteem to be enshrined. The Kyaikkasan Pagoda in Rangoon, for example, possesses a large collection of relics of alleged Pagan-era arahants, not as part of its reliquary cache but kept on display in a glass jar in its museum. The museum attached to the Myathalun Pagoda in Magwe has in its collection the relics of no less an eminence than Mahmoggalna, one of the Buddhas two chief disciples. These are kept in a nondescript wooden and glass display case. I wish to thank Donald Stadtner for this information on the Kyaikkasan and Myathalun Pagodas. 78 The status of a charismatic teacher can be ambiguous even while he is alive. Keiko Tosa (2009: 240) and Guillaume Rozenberg (2011: 110) both describe how prior to his death the famous monk Thamanya Hsayadaw (19122003) was regarded by some votaries as an arahant and by others as a htwet-yat-pauk.
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these mummified bodies attract thousands of pilgrims a year.79 The veneration shown to the preserved remains of acclaimed arahants and of weikza-dos is identical mimicking that shown to Buddha relics prostrating, circumambulating and reciting prayers; and the wishes made by votaries: for health, for prosperity, and for happy rebirth, and so on, are likewise the same. So in the end, while the respective traditions which they represent remain at odds, these two ideals of human perfection the arahant worshipped because he has died his final death, and the weikza-do because he will live on forever find a kind of resolution and a common meaning in the eyes of the Buddhist faithful in the bodies they leave behind.
Bibliography
Aung-Thwin, Maitri. Genealogy of a Rebellion Narrative: Law, Ethnology and Culture in Colonial Burma, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 34 (3), Oct 2003, pp. 393419. Blum, Mark L. Death, Encyclopedia of Buddhism vol. 1, New York: Macmillan Reference USA. 2004, pp. 203210. Bode, Mabel. The Pli Literature of Burma, Rangoon: Burma Research Society, 1965. Bodhi, Bhikkhu. A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: The Abhi dhammattha Sangaha of cariya Anuruddha, Onalaska: BPS Pariyatti Editions, 2000.
79 The most famous mummy of an acclaimed arahant is that of Sunlun Hsayadaw, which is preserved at Sunlun-gu Monastery in Myingyan in Upper Burma. It is displayed in an ornate gilt and glass sarcophagus surrounded by a circumambulatory walkway. Other notable full-body relics of acclaimed arahants include the gilded mummy of U Pyinnya (18641961) at Shwe-pauk-pin Monastery in Dala and the body of Zalun Hsayadaw, U Thuzata (19041984) kept at a modest shrine at Ngapali. A video of the latter can be found on YouTube Myanmar Rakhine Monk Undecomposed Body. The body of the htwet-yat-pauk, Dipa Aye-mya Hsayadaw, U Nandathiri (19101985), is enshrined at the Shin-hpyu Shin-hla Pagoda in Sagaing. The most impressive shrine to a weikza-do is the Maha Hsay Wingaba Pagoda in Insein Township, Rangoon. Built in 1958 as an elaborate Buddhist theme-park, it houses the gilt body of the Karen htwet-yat-pauk, U Thuriya. It should be noted that, just as in the case of arahants, the htwet-yat-pauks whose bodies are venerated in this way are invariably monks.
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Bokenkamp, Stephen R. Early Daoist Scriptures, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999. Braun, Erik. Ledi Sayadaw, Abhidhamma, and the Development of the Modern Insight Meditation Movement in Burma, Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2008. Buchanan, Francis. The Religion and Literature of the Burmans, Asiatick Researches or Transactions of the Society instituted in Bengal for the en quiring into the History and Antiquities, the Arts, Sciences and Literature of Asia vol. 6, London: Bunny and Gold, 1801, p. 272. Cedzich, Ursala-Angelika. Corpse Deliverance, Substitute Bodies, Name Change and Feigned Death: Aspects of Metamorphosis and Immortality in Early Medieval China, Journal of Chinese Religions 29, 2001, pp. 168. Chattopadhyaya, Lama Chimpa Alaka. Tranthas History of Buddhism in India, Calcutta: K. P. Bagchi & Co., 1980. Childers, Robert Caesar. A Dictionary of the Pali Language, London: Trubner & Co., 1875. Dowman, Keith. Masters of Mahmudr: Songs and Histories of the EightyFour Buddhist Siddhas, New York: State University of New York Press, 1980. DuBois, Thomas. Millenarianism and Millenarian Movements, Encyclopedia of Buddhism vol. 2, New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2004, pp. 537540. Duroiselle, Chas. The Ar of Burma and Tntric Buddhism, Annual Report of the Archaeological Survey of India, 191516, pp. 7993. Eisenstadt, S. N. The Nature of Charismatic Authority and its Routinization, Max Weber on Charisma and Institution Building: Selected Papers, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968, pp. 4865. Ferguson, John P. and E. Michael Mendelson. Masters of the Buddhist Occult: The Burmese Weikzas, Contributions to Asian Studies 16, 1981, pp. 6280. Foxeus, Niklas. The Buddhist World Emperors Mission: Millenarian Buddhism in Postcolonial Burma, Ph.D. dissertation, Stockholm: Stock holm University, 2011. Garrett, Frances. Eating Letters in the Tibetan Treasure Tradition, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 32 (12), 2009 (2010), pp. 85114. Geiger, Wilhelm. The Mahvasa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon, New Delhi: AES Reprint, 1993 Gombrich, Richard. Buddhist Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in the Highlands of Ceylon, London: Kegan Paul International, 1995.
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Hpay Hkin, U. Bo Bo Aung hning Kyin-zin, Yangon: Thaung sa-pon-hneik taik, 1949. Hte Hlaing, U. Yahanda hning Poggo-htu-mya, 4th ed. Yangon: Thinga myitta thila-shin sa-thin taik, 1973. Htin Aung. Folk Elements in Burmese Buddhism, London: Oxford University Press, 1962. Htin Aung. Burmese Monks Tales, New York: Columbia University Press, 1966. Jayawickrama, N. A., tr. The Inception of Discipline and the Vinaya Nidna, London: Pali Text Society, 1986. Jordt, Ingrid. Burmas Mass Lay Meditation Movement: Buddhism and the Cultural Construction of Power, Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007. Judson, A. A Dictionary, Burmese and English, Moulmain: American Mission Press, 1852. Kala, U. Maha-yazawin-gyi vol. 1, ed. Saya Pwa, Yangon: Myamma thudethana a-lin, 1934. Kan Sein. Manosetopad Gaing-daw-gyi i Pan-taing hning Lan-zin, Yangon: privately published by the author, c. 1987. Kawinda. Alaung-daw Kathapa Thamaing-thit, Yangon: Aung-so-mo-younsum pon-hneik taik, 1994. Keown, Damien. A Dictionary of Buddhism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Lamotte, Etienne. History of Indian Buddhism from the Origins to the aka Era, tr. Sara Webb-Bonn, Louvain: Universit Catholique de Louvain, 1988. Law, B. C. History of the Buddhas Religion, 2nd ed. Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1986. Ledi Hsayadaw. Ssanavisodhan vol. 1, Yangon: Hanthawadi pitakat ponhneik taik, 1954. Ledi Hsayadaw. Bodhipakkhiya-dpan, The Manuals of Buddhism, Rangoon: Department of Religious Affairs, 1981, pp. 165218. Ledi Hsayadaw. Vijjmagga-dpan, Ledi Dipani Paung-hkyup vol. 2, Yangon: Thathana-yay uzi htana pon-hneik taik, 1985 , pp. 291355. Ledi Hsayadaw. Uttamapurisa-dpan, Ledi Dipani Paung-khyup vol. 4, Yangon: Ledi dipani htun-ka pyan-pwa-yay a-hpwe, 2003. Ledi Kelatha. Arahanta Withodani hkaw Yahanda Sit-tan, Yangon: Thathanayay uzi htana, 1980. Lieberman, Victor. Administrative Cycles: Anarchy and Conquest, c. 1580 1760, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
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Maha-damma-thingyan. Thathana-linkara Sadan, Yangon: Hanthawadi pitakat pon-hneik taik, 1956. Malalasekera, G. P. Dictionary of Pali Proper Names, London: Pali Text Society, 1974 Medawi. Satugiri Shu-bwe Kyam vol. 1, Yangon: Thudammawati sa-ponhneik taik, 1968. Mehti Hsayadaw. Vasadpan, Yangon: Hanthawadi pon-hneik taik, 1966. Mendelson, E. Michael. A Messianic Buddhist Association in Upper Burma, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London 24 (3), 1961a, pp. 560580. Mendelson, E. Michael. The King of the Weaving Mountain, Royal Central Asian Journal 48, 1961b, pp. 229237. Mendelson, E. Michael. Observations on a Tour in the Region of Mount Popa, Central Burma, FranceAsie 179, 1963, pp. 786807. Mendelson, E. Michael. Sangha and State in Burma: A Study of Monastic Sectarianism and Leadership, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1975. Namaw Sayadaw, Tatiya. Slavisodhan, Yangon, Thathana-yay uzi htana pon-nheik taik, 1992. Nandamala. Ssanasuddhidpaka, Yangon: Thathana-yay uzi htana ponhneik taik, 1980. Nattier, Jan. The Meanings of the Maitreya Myth, Maitreya, the Future Buddha, ed. Alan Sponberg and Helen Hardacre, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 2347. Needham, Joseph. Science & Civilization in China vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974. Ne Win. Myanma hso-shay-lit lam-zin pati okkata-kyi i hkit-pyaung tawhlan-yay thamaing-win mein-hkun paung-kyup, a-mhat 1, Yangon: Myamma hsoshelit lanzin pati baho kawmati htana gyok, 1985. Nyana, U, tr. The Vipassan-dpan: The Manual of Insight, The Manuals of Buddhism, Rangoon: Department of Religious Affairs, 1981, pp. 132. Nyanabhiwantha. Amay-daw Hpyay, Mandalay: Zambu meik-hsway pitakat sa-ok saing-kyi, 1959. Oldenberg, Hermann, tr. The Dpavasa: An Ancient Buddhist Historical Record, New Delhi: AES Reprint, 1992. Pasm. Ssanavasappadpaka, Patna: Nava Nlanda Mahvihra, 1961. Paw U. Weikza-do Aung Min Gaung i Htwet-ya-pauk Yazawin, Yangon: Miba myitta pon-hneik taik, 1954. Pe Maung Tin and Gordon Luce, tr. The Glass Palace Chronicle of the Kings of Burma, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923.
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Buddhism, miraculous powers, and gender Rethinking the stories of Theravda nuns
Rachelle M. Scott
In November 2009, a group of senior monks affiliated with Wat Nong Pah Pong, an internationally renowned Thai temple in the forest tradition of Ajahn Chah, met to consider their official reaction to the ordinations of four women by Ajahn Brahmavamso at a branch monastery in Perth Australia. Their initial response was to solicit an acknowledgement of wrongdoing from Ajahn Brahm; when he did not comply, they unanimously revoked the status of his monastery, Bodhinyana Monastery, as an official branch monastery. This act by senior Thai monks not only severed Ajahn Brahms affiliation with Wat Nong Pah Pong, it also represented a clear denunciation of the attempt to establish a bhikkhun (fully ordained nun) order within the Thai sagha. Their response echoed the reactions of a majority of Thai monks to the 2001 smaer (novice) ordinations of Dr. Chatsumarn Kabilsingh (now Bhikkhun Dhammanand), a respected Buddhist scholar and professor of philosophy at Thammasat University in Bangkok. Dr. Chatsumarns supporters viewed her smaer and subsequent bhikkhun ordinations as a bold call for the admittance of women into the Thai sagha. Her critics viewed her actions as divisive to Thai Buddhism. Both the cases of Ajahn Brahm and Bhikkhun Dhammanand made international headlines because they highlighted a debate within Thailand and around the world regarding the relatively low status of female renouncers (mae chi, Thai) in Thai society and in other Theravda Buddhist countries.1
A version of this paper was first presented at the International Association of Buddhist Studies conference, Atlanta, June 25, 2008. For an exJournal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 489511
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Since there are no officially sanctioned ordained nuns in the Theravda tradition today, contemporary nuns generally are afforded neither the religious status nor the social status granted to their male counterparts. At best, Thai Buddhists regard them as pious laywomen who observe the eight precepts.2 At worst, they are viewed with suspicion, pity, and even contempt. In an editorial in the Bangkok Post, Sanitsuda Ekachai writes:
Outside religious circles, it is widely believed that young nuns have entered the sisterhood because they are broken-hearted while old nuns living at monasteries are perceived as mere temple hands. And beggars posing as nuns only worsen their already lowly image. Unlike monks, nuns get very little social support and must work, usually in menial jobs, to support themselves.3
In order to counter negative stereotypes and to improve the status of nuns, Sanitsuda, along with a number of other social activists and progressive monks and nuns, seeks to transform this image of the Thai nun from heart-broken young woman or old temple-maid to a legitimate representative of the Buddhas teachings and practice. For those who support the reestablishment of the bhikkhun order, legitimacy is linked to ordination; as a result, many search for ways, either through recourse to historical analysis, textual reinterpretation, or a hermeneutic of social ethics, to support the reintroduction of an official order of nuns. Other supporters focus less on ordination and more on improving the education of nuns.4 Khunying Kanittha Wicheancharoen, a former womens rights activist and lawyer, for instance, spearheaded the founding of the Mahapajapati Theri College for nuns in Nakorn Ratchasima in order to provide
tensive discussion of recent debates over bhikkhun ordination in Thailand, see Seeger 2008. 2 Pious men and women commonly observe the eight precepts, especially in their later years. The eight precepts include observance of the paca sla training precepts along with these additional rules: abstention from eating at an unseasonable time; from participating and attending musical and theatrical events and wearing perfumes and jewelry; and from the use of high or luxurious beds. 3 Sanitsuda Ekachai 1996. 4 See Brown 2001 and Lindberg Falk 2007.
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nuns with the same opportunity for higher education as their male counterparts. Other activists have supported Dhammajarinee Witthaya, a school for young girls and nuns in Ratchaburi, which offers an affordable education for under-privileged young women. Still others showcase how the simple lives of contemporary mae chi, which are detached from the formal institutions of Buddhist monasticism, already embody the ethos of the Buddhist tradition.5 Within these discourses, advocates promote ordination, modern education, and simple living as the vehicles through which contemporary Thai nuns may improve their social standing.6 These efforts undoubtedly will aid in altering discourses about nuns in Thailand and in other Theravda Buddhist countries. They promote positive images of female renouncers, which counter the disparaging stereotypes of the young broken-hearted nun and the old temple-maid. There are, however, other sources for religious authority, respect, and adulation in the Theravda tradition. Advanced skills in meditation, for instance, have long been a source for authority within the Buddhist tradition. In the so-called popular traditions of South and Southeast Asia, this authority has often been established and mediated through the possession of miraculous powers (itthirit, Thai, iddhi, Pli) and superhuman knowledge (apinya, Thai; abhi, Pli). Within this tradition, there are stories of nuns in the past and in the present who have established
Brown 2001: 2627. Those who favor the model of the educated nun do so within a modernist framework that equates religious status with a modern religious education. The most distinguished and highly-respected monk in Thailand today, for instance, is Phra Prayudh Payutto, a Buddhist scholar-monk who is renowned for his completion of the nine exam levels at a remarkably young age. The other ideal, which is promoted in academic and reformist discourses today, is that of the humble, simple nun. In the current postmodern age, this ideal nun, along with her male counterpart, serves as a counterpoint to the forces of religious consumerism and global capitalism. In these circles, academics and social critics alike criticize what they perceive to be narcissism and rampant materialism within the ranks of the organized sagha; in contrast, they praise those monks and nuns who embody simplicity in the face of an increasingly consumer-oriented Thai society.
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authority as religious teachers and exemplars through their possession and use of miraculous powers. Stories of miraculous events and supernormal powers abound in the Pli canon, in the Pli commentaries, in the historical chronicles of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, and in the vast vernacular literature of South and Southeast Asia that relay stories about Buddhist images, relics, amulets, and contemporary meditation masters. In fact, the sacred biographies of the Buddha and Buddhist saints are peppered with stories of miracles and superhuman powers stories of reading minds, of conquering demons and spirits, of displays of power for the purpose of conversion, and of miraculous travels to Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia as well as to the various heavens and hell-realms. In these stories, Buddhist authority is established and mediated through the possession and demonstration of miraculous powers. The central story of the Buddhas awakening, for instance, involves his ability to view his own karmic past and the past of others. This is not a trivial attainment, but rather, a vital part of the nibbnic experience. These two powers comprise the two of three knowleges (tevijja) that one attains directly before awakening. The story of the Buddhas awakening provided the foundation for the common belief that advanced skills in meditation enable practitioners to view their own karmic legacies and that of others too. In other sections of the canon, these special abilities are listed as two of the Buddhas six abhi (higher powers), which include possession of magical powers (iddhividha), the divine ear (dibbasota), the ability to penetrate the minds of others (para-sattna ceto pajnti), the ability to remember all of his former lives (pubbe nivsa-anussati), the divine eye (dibba-cakkhu), and the extinction of all cankers (asavakkhaya), which facilitates purity of mind and grants awakening. One who possesses the last abhi is an ara hant; those who possess only the first five abilities are powerful beings who may be close to awakening but who are not yet fully awakened. As with the three knowledges, these powers both validate and mediate authority within the Buddhist tradition. This is as true for the Buddhist saints as it is for the Buddha himself.
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The story of Phra Mahmoggallna, the master of psychic powers, who conquers Nandopananda, the royal nga (serpent), for instance, is simultaneously a story about the power of Phra Mahmoggallna and the authority of the Buddha. This story is found in Buddhaghosas Visuddhimagga (the Path of Purification), a famous fifth-century CE commentary on the Buddhist path. According to the story, the Buddha flew to the highest heavens with Phra Mahmoggallna and 499 other monks. When they passed Nandopanandas dwelling, the nga king became enraged. In order to subdue him, Phra Mahmoggallna transformed himself into a huge royal nga and then fought the serpent king. After Phra Mahmoggallna had won, he forced Nandopananda to pay his respects to the Buddha.7 Miraculous powers serve to authenticate the spiritual abilities of exemplars and to disseminate the Buddhas teachings. These exemplars are preservers of the tradition, whose importance is elevated by the parinibbna of the Buddha. They preserve the tradition not simply through their study and teaching of Buddhist doctrine they preserve the tradition through the purity of their practice and, I would argue, through their possession and use of miraculous powers. In the Mahyna tradition, miraculous powers function as an advanced soteriological tool for the bodhisattvas liberation of sentient beings. While the use of miraculous powers is not an explicit part of the path within the Theravda tradition, their use, as described in the stories of the Buddha and Buddhist saints, is for similar ends: to disseminate the dhamma and to lead others to awakening. In Thailand, one of the most popular and beloved of Buddhist saints is Phra Malai (Phra Maleyya, Pli), who traveled to the heavens and hells to preach the Buddhas dhamma to all sentient beings.8 In addition to these well known examples, the Pli canon and local traditions possess similar stories about Buddhist nuns who use their miraculous powers in the service of the dhamma. These stories demonstrate how miraculous powers functioned as both a
7 For a description of this story and other tales of Mahmoggallnas miraculous powers, see Hecker 2003. 8 See Brereton 1995.
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source and sign of spiritual authority. While they do not negate the undeniable presence and impact of misogynistic ideas about women in Buddhist texts and societies, they do offer another interpretive lens for examining the lives of Theravda nuns and their followers. We therefore must reexamine which sacred biographies we choose to highlight and how we choose to read them. The story of Mahpajpat Gotam, the first Buddhist nun, is an instructive example.
Mahpajpat Gotam
The story of Mahpajpat Gotam, the Buddhas foster-mother and aunt, is well-known today in both academic and Buddhist circles because her story of renunciation and awakening is also the founding story of the bhikkhun sagha. The Pli version of this story is located in the Cullavagga (chapter ten). Following the death of her husband, Mahpajpat asked the Buddha to allow women to be ordained. The Buddha initially refused Mahpajpats request, and Gotam departed from the Buddha in tears. Rather than accepting this as his final proclamation on the issue, however, Gotam cut off her hair, donned saffron-colored robes, and together with 500 other women headed towards the town of Vesl where the Buddha was staying. When nanda, the Buddhas attendant, discovered her wish to be ordained, he petitioned the Buddha on her behalf. After much debate, the Buddha finally acquiesced to nandas request, with the provision that Mahpajpat accept eight additional rules (garudhamma). These rules clearly placed bhikkhun under the authority of monks and thereby institutionalized the inferior position of the bhikkhun sagha. In the Cullavagga version of this story, the Buddha laments that his admittance of women into the order will have a deleterious effect on the duration of his dhamma: it now will last only half as long. In other versions of this story, the Buddha is willing to put his dhamma at risk not for the sake of Mahpajpat Gotam and her followers but for nanda, whose own progress on the path may be jeopardized by his being distraught over Mahpajpat.9
9
See the translation in Strong 2008: 6368.
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When read from a modern feminist perspective, the story of the founding of the bhikkhun order presents a conflicted message for Buddhists and scholars who attempt to reconstruct early Buddhist views on womens religiosity. From one perspective, the story of the founding of the bhikkhun order demonstrates the power and determination of Mahpajpat, who was, according to the tradition, the first fully ordained Buddhist nun in the sagha of Gotama Buddha. Early Orientalist scholars, such as I.B. Horner, Mabel Bode, and Caroline (Foley) Rhys-Davids, clearly viewed Mahpajpat as a symbol of and for womens power,10 as do many contemporary nuns today who see their lives in Mahpajpats struggle for ordination. Bhikkhun Kusuma, a contemporary Theravda nun, for instance, praises Mahpajpat and her 500 followers for their determination. She writes,
I think that it is pertinent to point out here that Sakyan women took a bold step in making this historic march in spite of the Buddhas reluctance. By their very honesty of purpose, they convinced the Buddha, as well as the tradition-bound Indian society of the fifth centry B.C.E., that monastic freedom was as essential for women as for men. The Buddha, therefore, granted their request. This incident is an eye-opener for us today. It proves beyond any doubt that if our intentions are pure, no amount of obstacles can hinder us. In all humility, I myself am a witness to this fact, for I am a Sri Lankan who dared to become a bhikkhun.11
This portrait of Mahpajpat, as the determined nun who fought for equal rights for Buddhist women, arises within specific interpretive contexts. In the first case, Horners, Bodes, and Rhys Davids portraits of Mahpajpat as a liberated woman must be situated within broader Western discourses on liberal feminism in
10 I.B. Horner, an early English scholar of Pli Buddhist texts, argues that, in the Vinaya the woman called Mahpajpati is represented as the leader of the womenher many attempts and failures to win her hearts desire bear witness to the her determination, no less than to the urgency of the need which prompted her Horner 1930: 102103. For an excellent review of the perspectives and contributions of I.B. Horner, Mabel Bode, and Caroline Foley Rhys-Davids, see Collett 2006. 11 Bhikkhun Kusuma 2000: 11.
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the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the second case, the portrait of Mahpajpat as a woman who fought for ordination against all odds fits well within contemporary discourses on the restoration of the bhikkhun order in Theravda Buddhism. Other scholars and practitioners today view Mahpajpat through a slightly more critical lens. For them, the story of her ordination reveals the misogynistic character of early Buddhism in ancient India whether you attribute these negative statements in the Pli canon to the Buddha or to the male redactors of the texts.12 From this perspective, Mahpajpat is portrayed as relatively weak figure in the story: she not only accepts the eight additional rules she is unable to convince the Buddha to ordain women in the first place. Liz Wilson, for instance, argues that Mahpajpat, far from being a liberated woman, only reinforced female subordination: she renounced only after she became a widow, and she submitted to the eight additional rules.13 Scholars commonly base their interpretations of Mahpajpat as a Buddhist practitioner and as a woman upon her story of renunciation. There is, however, another important story of Mahpajpati in the Pli canon, which is not as widely known in the West. It is the story of her last encounter with the Buddha, when she asked him to grant a different request. It is located in the Ther-apadna, a collection of stories about the lives and past lives of early Buddhist nuns composed around the second century bCE.14 This story has striking parallels to that of Mahpajpats request for ordination, but in this story the Buddha does not relay doubts or concerns about the contamination of the sagha by female renunciants; rather, in this story, Gotama Buddha requests that Mahpajpat demonstrate her miraculous powers in order to prove to skeptics that women can experience nibbna, the summum bonum of Buddhism. In this story, Mahpajpat went to the Buddha to request permission to die for permission for her great going out (parinibbna).
See Lang 1986 and Paul 1985. Wilson 1996: 143145. 14 I rely here on Jonathon Walters translation of the Gotam-apadna in Walters 1995: 113138.
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The Buddha granted her request, but he asked that before she died she demonstrate her powers to those fools who doubt that women can grasp the truth.15 In order to prove definitively the spiritual power of Mahpajpat, the Buddha asks her to demonstrate her miraculous powers to the skeptical crowd. The apadna then details the miraculous powers of Mahpajpat.
Gotam bowed to the lord then leaped into the sky. Permitted by the Buddha, she displayed her special powers. She was alone, then she was cloned; cloned, then alone. She would appear, then disappear; she walked through walls and through the sky. She went about unstuck on earth and also sank down in it; she walked on water as on land, without breaking the surface. Cross-legged, she flew like a bird across the surface of the sky16
Following her impressive display of miraculous powers, the narrator of her apadna states that Gotams actions persuaded those who were skeptical of a womans spiritual abilities. Gotam then told her audience how, after numerous lifetimes, she had become an arahant (an enlightened disciple of the Buddha). Following the recitation of her sacred biography, she then used her miraculous powers for the last time: She flew into the air and died. The 500 women who had accompanied her on her final visit to the Buddha also, at that moment, passed into their final nibbna. In his eulogy for Gotam, the Buddha said, Know this, O monks, she was most wise, with wisdom vast and wide. She was a nun of great renown, a master of great powers. She cultivated divine-ear and knew what others thought. In former births, before this one, she mastered divine-eye. All imperfections were destroyed; shell have no more rebirths.17 There are a number of striking parallels and contrasts between the story of Mahpajpati Gotams death and the story of her renunciation. In both stories, she seeks permission from the Buddha for her going forth in the first case, it is for her ordination and in the second case, it is for her parinibbna, her final going forth. The
15 16 17
Ibid. 126. Ibid. 126127. Ibid. 137.
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cast of characters is also the same in both stories: Gotama Buddha, Mahpajpat, her 500 female followers, and even nanda. But the tone of these two stories is radically different, as is the portrait of Mahpajpat herself. In the story of her renunciation, she is portrayed as determined, but weak: she acquiesces to the Buddhas refusal to ordain women and to his eventual proclamation that bhikkhun accept the eight additional vows. It is nandas argument that eventually persuades the Buddha, not Gotams. In the Gotam-apadna, however, Gotam is presented as a spiritual master and leader. She is determined and powerful. In the ordination story, the Buddha asks her to undertake rules that place her in an inferior position to that of monks. In the death story, however, the Buddha asks her to demonstrate her power to those who continue to doubt her abilities and spiritual attainments. So, what is the power of Mahpajpat Gotam? For those who view her as a champion of the rights of women, her power is expressed through her determined fight for ordination. For those who view power as the right to be independent of male authority, then the story of Mahpajpat only highlights how the bhikkhun sagha was inextricably trapped by the confines of a patriarchal society. The apadna text, however, describes Mahpajpats power in traditional Buddhist terms: she is a master of the three special knowledges (tevijja), the four analytical knowledges (paisambhida-a), the eight deliverances (aavimokh), and the six higher knowledges (abhi). These powers are a reflection of her spiritual perfection.18 She was an arahant (an awakened one). She possessed the ultimate power of wisdom (pa), and she possessed a wide range of miraculous powers: she could fly through the air, emit flames from her body, and see all of her past lives with her divine eye. It was because of her elevated spiritual status that the earth trembled and the gods wept upon her death. It was because of her spiritual power that 500 women followed her into parinibbna.
In fact, Jonathon Walters (1994) argues that the Gotam-apadna portrays Gotam as a female Buddha. One clue is the use of the name Gotam throughout the text instead of Mahpajpat.
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While the story of Mahpajpats fight for equality is wellknown in the West, the story of her death and her display of miraculous powers is relatively unknown.19 The relative obscurity of her death story is not surprising given the fact that over the past two hundred years of Theravda Buddhist scholarship, scholars have sought to de-emphasize tales of miracles and superhuman powers within the Buddhist tradition in favor of stories that present Buddhism as a rational and ethical philosophy. In fact, many modern scholars and practitioners of Theravda Buddhism have used miraculous powers as a wedge between Theravda, the purported orthodox tradition, which denounces miraculous powers, and that of the perverted and corrupt Mahyna and Vajrayna, which revel in them.
Contemporary nuns and miraculous powers

Given this propensity to ignore miraculous powers as a source of authority, it is not surprising that recent scholarship on contemporary Buddhist nuns in the Theravda tradition pays little to no attention to nuns with miraculous powers. Rather, this literature tends to focus on their need for ordination, improved education, and the recognition of how their simple lives embody authentic Buddhist religiosity. There are, however, two contemporary Thai nuns, Mae chi Thosaphon (or Thanaphon)20 and Khun Yay Ubasika Chandra Khonnokyoong, whose lives do not fit the portrait of the average Thai nun painted by most scholars and activists today. These nuns already possess authority within their respective communities. Their authority does not stem from ordination, education, or simple living; rather, their authority, like Gotams, is mediated and valiJonathon Walters is the principal exception to this generalization. Liz Wilson also mentions the Gotam-apadna in her book, Charming Cadavers, but she interprets the text in a radically different way from Walters. In her reading of the text, the parallels between Gotam and the Buddha, such as their mutual offering of milk (Gotam nurses the infant prince, and Gotama gives her the milk of the dhamma) only highlight Gotams inferiority to the Buddha. See Wilson 1996: 3032. 20 Mae chi Thosaphons lay name is Thanaphon, and her early publications use both names.
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dated through their miraculous powers. Both nuns are relatively well known public figures: one is a popular television personality whose life is the focus of several best-selling books, and the other founded the largest new temple in Thailand, the Dhammakya Temple (Wat Phra Thammakai). As we shall see, these two nuns receive patronage and respect because they are viewed by their supporters as powerful religious persons who, through the power of their meditation, have developed superhuman knowledge (ap inya, Thai; abhi, Pli) and miraculous powers (itthirit, Thai, iddhi, Pli). As with the stories of the great arahants of the past, such as Phra Moggallna and Phra Malai, the sacred biographies of these nuns focus on their extraordinary powers: the ability to read-minds, to travel to the various realms of existence, to know the karmic heritage of other people, and even to heal those who are afflicted with karma-induced sickness. These stories serve as proof to their followers of the elevated spiritual status of these nuns.
Mae chi Thosaphon

Mae chi Thosaphon first came to my attention in April 2005 as I was perusing through bookstores in Bangkok. I noticed that in Thai language bookstores, in malls, grocery stores, street markets, and at the universities, that the face of one particular nun was prominently displayed on the covers of two best-selling books, Koet Tae Kam (Birth from Karma) and Koet Tae Kam 2 (Birth from Karma Two).21 The nun was Mae chi Thosaphon, whose popularity has increased in recent years due to her ability to know the karmic history of individuals. This is one of the powers listed as one of the three knowledges (tevijja), which are accomplished right before awakening, and this power is one of the six abhi (higher powers). Her abilities were showcased on the popular television show, Chuamong Phitsawong (Surprise Hour), which combined ghost stories and tales of mysterious events with Mae chi Thosaphons karma-readings. In her segment of the show, she interviewed people, many of whom were celebrities, and told them about their karmic pasts. Mae chi Thosaphons karma-readings became so popu21
Burapha Phadungthai, Koet Tae Kam, and Koet Tae Kam 2, 2005.
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lar in contemporary Thailand in 2005 that two books about her life and her karma-readings became bestsellers. While television may be a relatively new medium for the display of miraculous powers, the stories themselves are not. As in the case of Phra Malai and other Buddhist saints, Buddhists can interpret Mae chi Thosaphons display of such powers as a definitive sign of her advanced spiritual state. According to her biography in Koet Tae Kam, Mae chi Thosaphon began to develop miraculous powers as soon as donned the white clothing of a mae chi. In fact, at that moment, she felt an energy flow throughout her body (phlang ngan). In the first few days of her meditation practice, she acquired the ability to view her past lives. Not long after that, she was able to read the minds of others. When her teacher, Luang Pho Prichad, realized that she had obtained the power of clairvoyance, he informed her that this was one of the aphinya (abhi, Pli, special knowledges), which develops from advanced meditation practice. He told her that this was a power that she needed to harness. He warned her not to forecast the future of others but rather, to focus only on her own progress. If she did read the minds of others, she should do so in a detached manner. According to her biography, her teacher then tested her powers, who validated both her adeptness at stilling the mind and at seeing objects that are hidden from the ordinary eye.22 In fact, Mae chi Thosaphons biography abounds with tales of her miraculous powers. One such power is her ability to heal those who are suffering from karma-sickness (rokh kam), which, according to Mae chi Thosaphon, is commonly misdiagnosed by modern physicians. By touching the body, she is able to determine whether a particular ailment or injury is the result of natural causes or the result of karma. In one story, Mae chi Thosaphon touched a patients knee and determined that the injury was the result of previous karmic actions. The patient had hurt someone in the past, and now the injured party was an angry spirit, who was enacting revenge by inflicting pain upon the patients leg. In order to
22
Burapha Phadungthai, Koet Tae Kam, p. 4255.
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stop the pain, the patient had to transfer merit to the spirit.23 Mae chi Thosaphon served a pivotal role in this exchange. She acted as a medium for the transfer of merit. In another story, Mae chi Thosaphon touched the head and chest of a patient with rheumatism. Through the power of her meditation, she was able, according to the story, to transfer a life-force (pran) from herself to the weakened patient.24 Another power that is detailed in her biography is her power to forecast events in the future and in some cases, to affect the course of events and to avert disaster. For instance, one story credits Mae chi Thosaphon with protecting Thailand from the dreaded SARS disease.25 These powers, while important to her spiritual resume, are not the central focus of her public persona. The most popular skill that Mae chi Thosaphon possesses is her ability to know the karmic legacies of other people (luang ru kam). This was the power that was showcased on the television show, Chuamong Phitsawong. On the program, Mae chi Thosaphon would appear sitting next to one of the shows hosts and a guest, usually a Thai celebrity, who wanted to know the reason for unfortunate events in his or her life. In one story, a former Thai actress, Muan Fan, appeared on the show. She asked Mae chi Thosaphon why so many bad things had happened to her: she had become a minor wife of an important Thai businessman; she had become pregnant with his child; she had lost her husband, and she now no longer had work in the entertainment industry. Mae chi Thosaphon told her that this series of events occurred because of her past karma. In a previous life, she had been the first wife of a high-ranking man, and when she had found out that her husband had a minor wife, she used black magic to torture her. As a result, the minor wife committed suicide. According to Mae chi Thosaphon, Muan Fans problems were the karmic results of her previous actions. To counter this force, Mae chi Thosaphon recommended that Muan Fan meditate on loving-kindness.26
23 24 25 26
Ibid. 57. Ibid. 5859. Ibid. 7273. Ibid. 138.
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Chuamong Phitsawong is no longer on Thai television, but Mae chi Thosaphons popularity has continued to grow. Books about her life, her karma readings, and her interpretations of dhamma continue to top the best-seller list in Thailand even as new stories about miracles and special powers emerge and circulate in the Thai public sphere. Her popularity has also extended to the institutions of modern establishment Buddhism. In May 2009, Mae chi Thosaphon was awarded an honorary doctorate in Social Affairs from Mahachulalongkorn University by the acting head of the Supreme Sangha Council. She received the doctorate for her many acts of khwam di (good deeds). This honor not only granted her a university degree but also legitimized her authority within contemporary Thai Buddhism. Mae chi Thosaphons story demonstrates how one Thai nun has overcome the stereotypical portrait of mae chi as old and broken-hearted temple-maids through her reputation as one who possesses the special powers of clairvoyance, healing, and reading karma.
Khun Yay Ubasika Chan

Another contemporary nun, who was similarly renowned for her skills in meditation, was Khun Yay Ubasika Chandra Khonnokyoong (19092000).27 Khun Yay was perhaps the most influential nun in Thai Buddhist history. Her life defied the typical characterization of Thai nuns as marginal and largely irrelevant to the religious landscape. She was one of the principal founders of the Dhammakya Temple (Wat Phra Thammakai) in 1970, a temple that has now grown to a membership of over 200,000 practitioners. Her followers consider her to be the chosen one the favorite pupil of the much beloved Luang Pho Sot (18841959). Luang Pho Sot was the highly respected abbot of Wat Paknam who was believed to have re-discovered the meditation technique (wicha thammakai) that was used by Gotama Buddha. Before Luang Pho Sots death, he entrusted Khun Yay with the dhammakya lineage. She was the
The word ubasika (upsik, Pli) technically means a laywoman. In Thai, it is reserved for especially pious laywomen, most of whom follow the eight precepts.
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one who would pass down wicha thammakai to the next generation. If numbers are an indication of success, then clearly Luang Pho Sot was right to entrust her with the lineage, for the temple that she founded, the Dhammakya Temple, has one of the largest followings in all of Thailand. As in the case of her teacher, Luang Pho Sot, and the famed monks of the forest tradition, Khun Yay established her authority through advanced meditation practice, not through modern education. In fact, Khun Yays lack of education actually helped to legitimize her power. Her followers highlighted the fact that she was illiterate because this authenticated her ability to garner religious wisdom through meditation rather than through academic study. Khun Yays popularity at Wat Paknam grew as the result of her reputation as a meditation adept who possessed miraculous powers. In particular, her followers believed that she could travel to the various realms of existence to communicate with deceased relatives, to transfer merit to them, and to help people understand the karmic influences in their lives today. Khun Yay began her meditation training in wicha thammakai in 1927 at the age of 18.28 She initially studied under the tutelage of Ubasika Thongsuk, who was at that time a laywoman who taught the meditation technique of Luang Pho Sot. After training with Ubasika Thongsuk for six years, Khun Yay had the opportunity to study with Luang Pho Sot at Wat Paknam. Upon meeting Khun Yay, Luang Pho Sot granted her immediate access to his advanced meditation group (the meditation workshop) without having to take the usual tests that measure spiritual abilities. According to her sacred biography, Luang Pho Sot did not require her to take these tests because he recognized Khun Yays advanced skills in meditation. Because of Khun Yays inherent spiritual ability, it was not long before she attained the highest levels of dhammakya meditation.
28 Most of the biographical material on Khun Yay is taken from interviews with Dhammakya members in 199899, 2001, 2005, and 2009. In addition, I refer to two published sources: Anuphap Haeng Bun (December 3, 2000), which was a Dhammakya publication that reprinted a sermon by Phra Dhammachayo on the life of Khun Yay, and from Second to None.
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Khun Yays power of seeing and knowing29 enabled her to help alleviate the suffering of others. Khun Yay quickly gained a reputation as an especially skilled meditation adept who could tell anxious families where their relatives had gone after death, and if need be, to assist these families in transferring merit to their deceased loved ones. If, for example, one believed that a relative had been reborn in one of the hell-realms, Khun Yay could use the power of her meditation to travel to this realm, to instruct the relative in the dhamma, and to transfer merit from the family to him. According to Phra Dhammachayo, the abbot of the Dhammakya temple, Khun Yay could move as easily among the various realms of existence as she could move from building to building within the temple grounds.30 As in the case of Mae chi Thosaphon, Khun Yay also developed a reputation for being able to read minds, to see the past lives of people in order determine the cause of their particular problems, and to facilitate the healing of the sick and injured. Khun Yay was also consulted on missing-persons cases. Of all of the stories of Khun Yays miraculous abilities, the most well known is Khun Yays heroic diversion of Allied bombs during World War II. According to Luang Pho Sots and Khun Yays biographies, the advanced meditation group at Wat Paknam collectively destroyed a number of Allied bombs through the use of their miraculous powers. One account went so far as to say that America had initially planned to drop an atomic bomb on Bangkok, but that the advanced meditation group used their miraculous power to able to avert such a horrible catastrophe in Thailand. Needless to say, critics of the Dhammakya temple often find great amusement in these tales going so far as to publish cartoons of Khun Yay flying in the air with her body strapped around a bomb. But to the faithful these stories validate her remarkable power and skill. Her ability to perform miracles, to know things beyond ordinary knowledge, to travel effortlessly through the realms of existence are all stand-
29 The Dhammakya Foundation translates the word adassana (perfect knowledge) as seeing and knowing in Second to None, p. 32. The possession of adassana is one characteristic of arahantship. 30 Anuphap Haeng Bun (December 3, 2000), pp. 34.
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ard indications of spiritual prowess within the Theravda tradition. These were signs of her advanced skills in meditation. In fact, it was this story of Khun Yays diversion of Allied bombs that drew the interest of a young college-student, Chaiyabun Suddhipol (the future abbot of the Dhammakya Temple), to Wat Paknam in 1963. He came because he had read a magazine entitled, Vipassana Banteungsarn, which relayed the heroic tales of Khun Yay and the others nuns who were part of the World War II campaign.31 For the young Chaiyabun, these powers were ample evidence of Khun Yays advanced wisdom and skill in meditation. While Khun Yay had thousands of students over the course of her lifetime, her tutelage of Chaiyabun had a significant impact on her life. Chaiyabun, who was later ordained as Phra Dhammachayo, became the first abbot of the Dhammakya Temple, and together he and Khun Yay transformed the Dhammakya Temple from a small meditation center to one of the largest and fastest growing temples in Thailand with a following of over 200,000 practitioners. To commemorate her contributions to the Temple and to the spread of wicha thammakai, the Temple cast a golden statue of her in January 1998, an honor usually reserved only for the Buddha, important Buddhist saints, and contemporary abbots.32 When she died in September of 2000, the Temple delayed her cremation for over a year in order to grant more people the opportunity to pay their respects to her and to make merit on her behalf. Thai Buddhists afford this courtesy only to the holiest of individuals in Thailand.33 To my knowledge, it was the first time that such respect had ever been paid to a nun in Thailand.34 Over the course of that
Second to None, p. 83. The importance of Khun Yay to the Temple is also on display at the Dhammakya store, where one can purchase Khun Yay memorabilia such as necklaces, pendants, and books. 33 The body of Luang Phau Sot, for instance, has never been cremated. One can still pay respect to his physical body at Wat Paknam in Thonburi, Thailand. 34 There are, however, striking parallels between the grandness of Khun Yays funeral and that of Mahpajpats as it was described in the Gotamapadna.
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year, weekly services at the temple included lengthy sermons on the life of Khun Yay, which were reproduced in the Dhammakya Foundations publication Anuphap haeng bun (The Miracle of Merit), and memorial meditation sessions in front of her casket, which was on display in the large assembly hall. On the day of her funeral, February 3, 2002, attendance at the temple purportedly surpassed 250,000. Shortly thereafter, the temple began construction on a large, pyramid-shaped, golden memorial for Khun Yay. Today, the memorial hall houses the golden image of Khun Yay, which is located in the meditation section of the memorial, and it displays a museum-like exhibit of Khun Yays life, which commemorates her life as a meditation master and founder of the Dhammakya Temple. The reverence paid to Khun Yay during her lifetime and after her death by the Dhammakya community is striking given the general cultural prejudices against female renunciants in contemporary Thailand. Despite her elevated status within the Dhammakya community, however, scholars who are interested in the topic of women and Buddhism rarely mention her. One reason for this lack of attention may be her affiliation with the Dhammakya Temple. Over the past three decades, the Dhammakya Temple has been embroiled in several headline-making controversies. In 1998, the Temple was the focus of a yearlong controversy over its marketing of a miraculous occurrence at the temple, its purported commercialization of Buddhism, and its controversial teachings on nibbna.35 During that time, the national press portrayed Khun Yay as one of the masterminds behind the Dhammakya Temples purported commercialization of Buddhism and its proselytization of miraculous occurrences at the Temple.36 As a result of this wider public image of Khun Yay, many have overlooked her extraordinary story of power and prestige.
See Scott 2009. See Chans Donation Methods Blasted, The Nation, December 1, 1998.
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Conclusion
The literature on Thai nuns today has greatly improved our understanding of the lives of Thai nuns from young women who decide to leave home to pursue a quiet life of simplicity to activists who seek to improve their lives and the lives of others by supporting bhikkhun ordination and modern education. There are nuns, however, whom we continue to ignore. The nuns who are absent from this discussion are the nuns whose authority stems from their insight and miraculous powers nuns such as Mae chi Thosaphon and Khun Yay Ubasika Chan. One might argue that the stories of Mae chi Thosaphon and Khun Yay are not as valuable to our understanding of the lives of Buddhist nuns since their authority is linked to dubious forms of Buddhist practice a highly sensational television program (Chuamong Phitsawong) and a highly controversial Buddhist movement (Dhammakya Temple), but I would object to such an assessment. It rests upon a dichotomy between the authentic tradition, which is commonly constructed as a rational, text-oriented philosophy, and its popular variants that contain deviant teachings and practices (such as a focus on miraculous powers). Early Orientalist scholars embraced this dichotomy when they dismissed miraculous powers as irrational additions to an essentially rational ethical philosophy. Orientalist scholars, for instance, often focused on the Buddhas purported condemnation of miraculous powers in the Kevaa-sutta,37 rather than noting the performance of miraculous feats in the Apadna literature. It is not a coincidence, therefore, that English translations of the Apadna was a relatively low priority for the early members of the Pli text society.38 At the same time, Buddhist reformist discourses in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depicted the focus on
37 While this sutta may express an anti-miraculous power sentiment within the canon, one might also interpret the story as a story about the proper use of Buddhist miracles. As in the story of Piola who shows off his miraculous abilities to win a contest, one might argue that the Buddhist tradition maintained that miraculous powers are to be used for teaching, not for the purpose of advancing ones own personal glory. See Davis 1998: 1314. 38 Walters 1994: 366367.
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miraculous powers within so-called popular Buddhism as backward and steeped in superstition. Walpola Rahula, a modernist Sri Lankan monk, for instance, referred to the pursuit of magical powers as nothing but spiritual perversion.39 These biases against magical powers continue today, although now they are no longer simply deemed as superstitious or backward; today, they are disparagingly characterized as acts of false advertising, which lead religious consumers to buy dubious religious items and to patronize allegedly corrupt monks and nuns. Such judgments have led many to disregard the role of miraculous powers in contemporary Thai Buddhism or to regard them as a sign of decadence and corruption. Distinctions between authentic Buddhist religiosity and so-called deviant forms are found within the Buddhist tradition, but these distinctions should be the focus of our study; they should not be taken as self-evident truths about the nature of authentic Buddhism. One consequence of the tendency to dismiss the importance of miraculous powers within the Theravda tradition has been our failure to recognize how miraculous powers have served to authenticate the spiritual power of Buddhist nuns in the past and in the present. While stories of nuns with miraculous powers may not be as well known in Theravda Buddhism as they are in the Mahyna and Vajrayna traditions, the stories do, nevertheless exist. As we saw in the case of Mahpajapt Gotam, the Ther-apadna, a second-century bCE canonical text, is full of references to nuns who possess miraculous powers.40 In addition, the Mahvasa, one of the chronicles of Sri Lanka, possesses stories of nuns with miraculous powers who help the Buddha to establish the tradition on the island by using their special powers to transport branches of the Bodhi tree from India to Sri Lanka.41 Moreover, in the biography of one of Thailands most famous modern forest saints, Phra Ajahn Man, we find a story of an eighty-year-old mae chi, who frequently
Rahula 1974: 68. For an extensive reference to selections from the Ther-apadnas, see Acariya Dhammapala 1999. I am greatly indebted to Ayya Tathaaloka Bhikkhun for bringing these stories to my attention. 41 See Geiger 1950: 103.
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conversed with the venerable monk about her attainments in meditation and her powers of clairvoyance and of special communications with beings in other realms of existence. We are told that her attainments rivaled that of many bhikkhus.42 Their stories and the stories of contemporary nuns, such as Mae chi Thosaphon and Khun Yay Ubasika Chan, do not negate the undeniable presence and impact of misogynistic ideas about women in Buddhist texts and societies; they do offer, however, another interpretive lens for examining the lives of Theravda nuns and their followers. In so doing, their examples change the discourse on Buddhist nuns from a discourse focused solely on the difficulties faced by contemporary Theravda nuns to a discourse about how some Theravda nuns attained religious authority despite the substantial prejudice against female renunciation in South and Southeast Asia.
Bibliography
Acariya Dhammapala, The Commentary on the Verses of the Thers. Oxford: Pali Text Society 1999. Anuphap Haeng Bun (December 3, 2000). Bhikkhun Kusuma. Inaccuracies in Buddhist Womens History, in Inno vative Buddhist Women: Swimming Against the Stream, ed. by Karma Lekshe Tsomo. Richmond: Curzon 2000, 512. Brereton, Bonnie Pacala. Thai Tellings of Phra Malai: Texts and Rituals Concerning a Popular Buddhist Saint. Southeast Asian Program, Tempe: Arizona State University 1995. Brown, Sid. The Journey of One Buddhist Nun: Even Against the Wind. Albany: State University of New York Press 2001. Burapha Phadungthai. Koet Tae Kam. Bangkok: Midia op Midia 2005. _____. Koet Tae Kam 2. Bangkok: Midia op Midia 2005. Collett, Alice. Buddhism and Gender: Reframing and Refocusing the Debate, Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 22/2 (2006) 5584. Richard H. Davis, Introduction: Miracles as Social Acts, in Images, Miracles, and Authority in Asian Religious Traditions, ed. by Richard H.
42
Phra cariya Mah Bauw asampanno 1995: 260263.
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Davis. Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press 1998, 122. Geiger, Wilhelm, transl. The Mahvasa or the Great Chronicle of Ceylon. Colombo: Ceylon Government Information Department 1950. Hecker, Hellmuth. Mahmoggallna: Master of Psychic Powers, in Great Disciples of the Buddha: Their Lives, Their Works, Their Legacy, ed. by Bhikkhu Bodhi, Boston: Wisdom Publications 2003, 69105. Horner, I.B. Women Under Primitive Buddhism: Lay women and Alms wom en. New York: E.P. Dutton 1930. Karen C. Lang, Lord Deaths Snare: Gender Related Imagery in the Theragatha and the Therigatha, Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 2 (1986) 6379. Lindberg Falk, Monica. Making Fields of Merit: Buddhist Female Ascetics and Gendered Orders in Thailand. Seattle: University of Washington Press 2007. Paul, Diana. Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in the Mahayana Tradition. Berkeley: University of California Press 1985. Phra cariya Mah Bauw asampanno, The Venerable Phra cariya Mun Bhridatta Thera Meditation Master, trans. by Siri Buddhasukh, Bangkok: Potcharakarn Publication 1995. Rahula, Walpola. What the Buddha Taught. Revised Edition. New York: Grove Press 1974 [first ed. 1959]. Sanitsuda Ekachai, Crusading for Nuns Rights, Bangkok Post, September 4, 1996. Second to None: The Biography of Khun Yay Maharatana Upasika Chandra Khon-nok-yoong. Pathumthani: Dhammakaya Foundation 2005. Seeger, Martin, The Bhikkhun-Ordination Controversy in Thailand, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 29/1 (2008) 155184. Scott, Rachelle M. Nirva for Sale? Buddhism, Wealth, and the Dhamma kya Temple in Contemporary Thailand. Albany: State University of New York Press 2009. Strong, John. The Experience of Buddhism: Sources and Interpretations. Third edition, Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth 2008. Walters, Jonathon. A Voice from the Silence: The Buddhas Mothers Story. History of Religions 33/4 (May 1994), 358379. _____. Gotams Story, in Buddhism in Practice, ed. by Donald Lopez. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1995, 113138. Wilson, Liz. Charming Cadavers: Horrific Figurations of the Feminine in Indian Hagiographic Literature. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1996.
On Buddhist wonders and wonder-working

Luis O. Gmez
The present issue of the Journal presents five papers on the topic of the miraculous or the marvelous in South and Southeast Asian Buddhism.1 In the following pages I will attempt to assess their contribution and outline as best as I can any new avenues of research suggested by the results and conclusions presented in these papers. I have chosen as their unifying theme the phrase, wonders and wonder-working. In this way, I avoid the more esoteric thaumaturgy, and, more importantly, I bracket (at least provisionally) the problematic term magic. With these words I also try to find a neutral ground to move our discourse away from another word upon which some religious groups claim exclusive rights: miracle. This is meant only to move the discussion along such terms do not seem to me so problematic that I should avoid them as a matter of principle. I also use the term wonder advisedly, since these papers cover a wide range of phenomena and accounts of phenomena, and perhaps the only thing that brings them together is the idea of a belief in awe-inspiring, unusual (though natural) and extraordinary events. My reading of these papers, moreover, inspired some reflections about the place of wonder, wonderment, awe, and mystery in Buddhist discourse and apologetics, and perhaps in religious discourse generally.
As indicated elsewhere, the papers of David V. Fiordalis (2011), Bradley S. Clough (2011), Kristin Scheible (2011), Patrick Pranke (2011), and Rachelle M. Scott (2011) were presented in condensed form as part of a panel at the IABS Conference in Atlanta, Georgia in 2008. I had the privilege of acting as the respondent to this panel. The following is a much revised and expanded version of the comments I presented on that occasion. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011) pp. 513554
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The papers reflect a stage in the scholarly discourse of Buddhist Studies in which we have begun to move away from the tendency to exoticize, if not stigmatize, magic, thinking of it as the wholly other, a way of looking at the world alien to the way we understand it. In particular in the oral versions of these five papers delivered at the IABS Conference, one could sense that these scholars, as scholars, felt comfortable, at home, in the world of magic, wanting to understand the significance of the discourse on the miraculous from within the cultural contexts where it occurs. Still, much remains to be done on this topic that has haunted students of Buddhism for over a hundred fifty years, even when the debate is confined to canonical accounts of wonder-working.2 In the following pages I wish to highlight some of the contributions of the papers under review, and suggest ways in which we can move forward in understanding the way wonders and wonder-working function and are understood within Buddhist traditions.
Talking about the impossible

The authors of the papers under review have also been cautious in their use of the problematic terms miracle and magic, wisely choosing to concentrate on traditional categories and the contexts in which such categories are found. Bradley Clough and David Fiordalis focus their reflections on well-known canonical materials, offering a fresh look that questions some unexamined assumptions about the significance of concepts such as ddhi and abhij. Both of them, but especially Clough, highlight the diversity of the Pli materials. Without rushing into idle speculation about relative chronology, they show that the terminology of the miraculous was not stable or consistent across time (not even within the Pli canonical corpus). They both show ways in which such shifts in meaning can be exploited for what they can teach us about variations in usage and reference.
2 Consider that many of the issues discussed in this number of the Journal can be found in Burnouf 1852: 310312, 820824, and continue in many of the early works of the Pali Text Society. Many of the early sources are referenced in note 1 to Lamottes Trait (19491980: I 329).
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Exploring one such cleavage, Clough argues convincingly that the abhis were not always deemed a necessary part of the path to nibbna, and that the tradition recognized the possibility of a path of insight without the higher jhnas.3 But, he also shows that in more than one account of the Buddhas liberating awakening it is the three knowledges (tivijj) that are deemed crucial, and sufficient. This is especially true in texts that define these knowledges as divine eye, recollection of past lives, and knowledge of the exhaustion of the savas.4 In these texts it is these three knowledges, he concludes, not insight into selflessness, dependent origination, the four noble truths or any of the other insights considered central to Buddhism, which function to eliminate ignorance and consequently liberate Buddha. (Clough 2011: 424) The three vijjs represent possibly one of the oldest attempts at making sense of the Buddhas awakening, a type of abstract ordering of ancient ideas about path and goal. Clough does well to emphasize the importance of at least some of the early usages of the term. The concept and apparent referent of the three vijjs illustrate the difficulty or impossibility of pinpointing a single, exact meaning for concepts such as abhi and iddhi (key normative and canonical terms denoting some of the most central features of Buddhist notions of the miraculous). But its use, especially in the Smaaphala-sutta, also shows that at one point abhi was used primarily to refer to liberating knowledge and that its value as superordinate term in the list of 5 or 6 abhis is probably younger. It is, after all, a well known fact of Pli philology that in the older strata of the language the verb from which the term is derived simply means to know or understand fully.5
3 The discussion has been with us for quite some time see la Valle Poussin 1929, 1937a, 1937b, and the literature referenced in Gmez 1999. 4 For instance, in the Veraja-sutta (AN IV.177179), referenced by Clough, each of the vijj (with an inversion of the order of the first two) corresponds to a separate watch of the night of the Buddhas awakening. 5 See, e.g., Suttanipta (Sn), prose p. 16, and stanzas 534, 743, 10411042.
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Clough observes that the Smaaphala-sutta also seems to contradict classical descriptions of how one attains liberation by/ of mind (ceto-vimutti), because in the sutta, and some parallel passages, one can reach the state of an arhant presumably without pure analytic insight and through sheer meditative effort, without ascending to the arpa-sampattis. He concludes such is the diversity of the early Pli discourses that ... discussions, such as those found in the ... Smaphala-sutta ... place the abhis at the very heart of the Buddhist endeavor. (Clough 2011: 431) But I think he has also shown that in the early textual strata under consideration the abhijs were not wonder-working abilities (much less feats of magic), but rather, wondrous modes of knowing and understanding. In the end Clough has given us yet one more example of how a single term cannot be taken to be univocal across all strata of the canonical tradition. This is particularly relevant when we consider the contribution of David Fiordalis, who, as already pointed out, also seeks to understand the plurality of voices and perspectives (Fiordalis 2011: 383) found in the classical literature. Fiordalis is also struggling with the question of how the tradition understood miracles, but instead of following a term or a family of closely related terms, as Clough has done, Fiordalis examines some key passages where a judgement is expressed on the nature and value of the miraculous feats referenced by words such as prtihrya, ddhi and abhij. He examines several contexts and classical discussions regarding the belief (embodied in these three terms) in the human capacity to influence external bodies and minds through powers attained by Buddhist meditation virtuosi the so-called psychic, or prodigious powers of buddhas and advanced disciples. He considers, for instance, the Jain critique, voiced by Upli, that accuses the Buddha of being a mere magician (myvin) aword that, in this context, most likely means a performer of deceptive trickery or even a fraud.6 The Buddhist reply to this accusation
The word my is ambiguous; the breadth of its semantic field can be appreciated by a quick look at the corresponding columns in Bhtlingk-Roth.
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seems reasonable enough: the miracle of teaching is far superior to the other two, and the Buddha excels in the performance of this wondrous feat. But, Fiordalis presents a nuanced picture of the argument. Referencing the Abhidharmakoa, he notes that the other two miracles are not to be dismissed as useless, for they do serve a purpose: they serve to attract an audience to more important things: the far superior wonder of teaching.7 We could say, paraphrasing Scheibles paper: the first two types of wonder-working prime the audience for the third wondrous transformation. The marvel of the first two lies in the way they make the audience receptive to the teaching, but the power of the third of the three extraordinary abilities rests on the marvel of teaching itself. Nonetheless, a close reading of Clough and Fiordalis suggests that the Kevaddha-suttanta (DN I.211223), Exhibit A, in the case for a Buddhist rejection of miracles and the supernatural or for at least a nuanced or a hierarchical understanding of the three types of wonder-working gives us very little to work with, and can yield more than one interpretation. I would add that the same can be said
It can be a deception, a deceptive trick, as in the above context, it can be the work of an illusionist (mykra), but, it can be a display of unusual skill, as in the case of buddhas and bodhisattvas (see below). The two extreme poles of the semantic spectrum (and the implicit sustained pun) are at the heart of the Bhadramykravykaraa. Bhtlingk-Roths Gaukler, Taschenspieler doesnt quite cover the full spectrum of the semantic field. Monier Williams offers: illusion-maker, a conjurer, juggler. This is a bit broader, but still restricted. One should note that the Tibetan standard equivalent for ddhi is rdzu-phrul, a word that, when applied to a non-Buddhist referent, implies trickery and deception as well. Also compare, the etymologically related sprul/sprul-pa, and the semantically related sgyu/sgyu-pa (illusion, deceit, hypocrisy) and sgyu-mkhan (trickster, illusionist). 7 Fiordalis (2011: 389) quotes the compound as pradhna-varjanamtra perhaps: only to turn them in the direction of more important things. The Lusthaus-Hackett edition in Gretil reads, pradhnam varjanamtra. Still, I suspect the reading pradhna-varjana-mtra (dependent on tbhy) is to be preferred here. By the way, this whole section of the Abhidharmakoa (VII.4548) is worth a more careful reading, as it addresses the question of the relationship between various kinds of knowledge and spiritual powers.
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of the approximate parallel passages in the Sagrava-sutta (AN I.168173). It is clear, nonetheless, that these two texts reject or disparage all wonders other than the wonder of teaching. For the Kevaddha, the reason is that the first two types of wonder, ddhi and mindreading, could be accomplished by means other than the power of a buddha or advanced disciple. The text is, therefore, establishing a difference between what is relatively ordinary (or a matter of technique) and what is truly extraordinary. In the Sagrava the criteria that separate the first two wonders (pihriya) from the third appear to be a matter of who benefits from the wonder-working feat, a distinction that is taken to imply that the first two are not different from the magicians show. Thus, Sagrava explains that one can say of each of the first two (AN I.172): Whoever performs this feat does so only for his own benefit. This wonder, Gotama, appears to be of the same nature as a feat of magic.8 The reason for preferring the third is even terser: this is the one wonder, Gotama, acceptable to me (khamati), the most excellent and most sublime (abhikkantatara/patatara). One can add further complications to the picture by considering the commentary on the Sagti-stra, the Sagtiparyya (Taish, xxvi, 1536, 389b17390a9), which does not separate the third from the other two prtihryas, rather, it establishes a criterion internal to each of the three wonders: a seemingly miraculous event of any one of the three types is not a true wonder (prtihrya) if it does not have the full effect required by the definition of the power, explained for each of the wonders as follows:9
[1] If a monk, being one, can become many, etc., but he is not able to make others know and perceive [this feat], even if it is called an
8 A more dynamic translation would be: seems to have the superficial qualities associated with mere magical show my-sahadhamma-rpa viya khyati. 9 This analysis is based on the Chinese version of Xuanzang. I do not know if the fragments of a commentary found among the Gndhr manuscript fragments contain any portion of this passage that could shed light on the problems textual and interpretive presented by this portion of the text.
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extraordinary magical power, it is not called a wondrous display.10 ... [2] If a monk, through signs or words, is able to accurately take note of the thoughts of others, etc., as explained above, and if, once the Venerable arises from meditation, he ponders and measures [what he has perceived], taking note of all that is according to truth and all that does not accord with truth, if he then cannot make others know and perceive [what he knows], although it can be called the power of taking note of the thoughts of others, it is not called a wondrous display. ... [3] If a monk, is able to explain to others: this is the noble truth of suffering, that I have fully known, etc., as explained above, down to this is the noble truth of the path that leads to the extinction of suffering, which I have cultivated, if then others, after hearing this do not feel receptive to the truth (*satynulomika-kanti) and are not able to directly observe mundane truth in all its aspects, then, although it can be called the power of teaching, it is not called a wondrous display. ...
Here the prtihryas are, once more, seen as either common or extraordinary ways of impressing others with striking gestures and displays of power, but only extraordinary or wondrous when they fulfill a particular function something that, of course, only buddhas and advanced disciples can accomplish. Returning to Fiordaliss argument, he broadens the range of the types of phenomena denoted by the word prtihrya. He considers other examples of prtihrya (pihriya), reflecting on the fact that the life of a buddha is seen as one continuous act of wonderworking it is not a biography, we could say, it is miracle com10
Here, extraordinary magical power stands for shnbin-zzai, which, I assume, translates ddhibala; on the other hand, wondrous display is my compromise between a mechanical rendering of shdo, assuming it renders prtihrya, and my understanding of Xuanzangs translation of the text (if shdo is his interpretive translation). In this I am, on the one hand, projecting the Indic text of the stra onto the Chinese translation of the Commentary, as was often done by Stache-Rosen & Mital (1968: I 8990), and on the other, I am assuming that shdo reflects Xuanzangs contextual rendering of the word as an instructive display. However, a quick check of Xuanzangs translation of the Vimalakrti-nirdea actually shows shnbin rendering prtihrya but shdo does not appear in the Xuanzangs translation of the stra.
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mon human beings cannot fathom it, cannot conceive of anyone doing what they know buddhas are able to do. As if the marvel of buddhahood were not wondrous enough, other prodigious events reinforce the message of the hagiography. For instance, the commentary on the Mahpadna-sutta of the Dgha-Nikya, explains that the major events in the life of a buddha are all accompanied by the prodigious manifestation of earthquakes (of the whole Earth, of course).11 Fiordalis grapples with the question of the significance of such events, or, as one could rephrase the question: why are these miracles (pihriya) and wondrous and amazing things (acchariyaabbhuta-dhamma, acrya-adbhta-dharma) so important, and why are they necessary (avaya-karaya)? He discovers hints of an answer in the legend or myth of kyamunis contest with the three Kyapa brothers. In the account of this encounter given in the Catupariat-stra, Fiordalis sees a fusion of the two main types or tropes of the miraculous (the marvel of teaching vis vis the other two, presumably inferior, marvels). As he cautiously puts it, it appears that the two types of miracles have been condensed into one, or perhaps vice versa. (Fiordalis 2011: 399) But I wonder whether this condensation is not yet another example of a pervasive trope in Buddhist literature: a person who knows reality can change reality,12 one who understands all mental processes can know all thoughts, and the teacher is one such perD ii.412, which Fiordalis compares with the list of causes of earthquakes found elsewhere in, e.d., DN ii.108109 (Mahprinibbna-sutta). This is a point worth further study, as is his aside stating that natural causes and superhuman powers have been replaced by the miracle of rvast and the descent from the Heaven of the Thirty-three. I wonder whether there is in fact a displacement or replacement, and not simply a cultural gulf between our notion of natural and the classical Indian way of understanding what is ordinary and what is extraordinary. 12 Consider the eccentric relationship between the semantic fields of our contemporary concept of knowledge and classical Indian concepts such as vidy and jna. The overlap between the two universes of discourse becomes fuzzy at best the moment we ask the crucial question of what are the mechanisms by which knowledge can become effective action.
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son. The trope is a statement of a commonly accepted belief, but it can also lead to (relatively common) playful narrative tropes (as I shall discuss cursorily below). Fiordalis notes one such literary twist (although he does not highlight the humor in the story), when he summarizes the Twin Miracle (that is, the actual doubling of the Buddhas person), displayed only to create a worthy conversation partner for the Buddha. He interprets the serious side of the story: the miracle combines the display of superhuman power and the act of teaching the dhar ma, also noting that in the fully embellished rvast legend, later artistic representations of the event continue to depict the Buddha in the gesture of teaching. (Fiordalis 2011: 402) This last point seems to blend elegantly with some of the reflections in Kristin Scheibles close reading of selected passages in the Mahvasa. Her take on the miraculous nuances the discussion in a different direction. It seems to me that her paper is concerned mostly with narrative effect (although, here, as in all five papers, there seems to be a certain blurring of the boundary between actual events and narrative events). Her foils are aptitude and authority as possible ways to understand the apologetic and narrative function of the miraculous. Against this foil (but not rejecting it altogether), she prefers to see the wonder-working events in the Mahvasa narrative as effective means of producing emotional responses that in turn incite ethical transformation. I am not completely sure one can distinguish clearly this function from that of miracles as signs of ... aptitude and authority that are, in Scheibles words, strategic literary exemplifications of the persuasiveness of the Buddha. (Scheible 2011: 435) I find it difficult to make the distinction, unless I assume that Scheible is separating potential suasive power from an actual, empirically verifiable, emotional response, and from an actual ethical transformation (which I take to mean a change in behavior). Ultimately, the distinction does not hold, unless one can establish a clear dichotomy between literary device and literary effect, or a distinction between talk about obligatory emotion and emotion itself, or between authority, power and persuasiveness.
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But, be that as it may, I find her concept of priming promising, or at least tantalizing. I also pick up a hint for my own reflections from her understanding of the subtle identification between the reader (or hearer) of a story and the characters in that story as a way to understand the imaginal world of Buddhist wonder-working. Both characters and readers are worked upon, or primed, for the dhamma, ... [they are] terrified, subdued, awed, transformed, calmed, convinced, converted, and compelled. I will revisit these issues towards the end of this paper, suffice it to say at this point that one can understand priming to be a bridge between the possible actual event, the narrative event, and the belief that the narrative is the event. I am not sure, however, if this implication is intended by Scheible. As to the readers (or the audience), I dont know that they are compelled to have a religious experience or an ethical transformation, but they are in some way convinced; that is, the story can generate or reinforce religious conviction. Moreover, as Scheible astutely points out, miracles are employed throughout Buddhist texts to titillate productively. (Scheible 2011: 436) But, titillate may not be the best word. It seems to me that this choice of words is in tension with the way Scheible describes this stimulation as the revelation of the profundity of religious truths and [the] cultivation of a miraculous epistemology. This choice of words (partly borrowed from Robert Brown) may be hyperbolic, for Scheible later on states (again, seeming to conflate event, narrative and mythos) that some miracles are not in fact miraculous, but instead completely reasonable effects of extraordinary human agency. (Scheible 2011: 437) In explaining her idea of completely reasonable effects she approvingly appropriates Browns statement to the effect that the possession of iddhi, the ability to perform miracles, and the occurrence of the miracles themselves are not outside of natural laws for Buddhist believers and thus not unexpected. I would agree with Scheible and Brown, but, expected does not mean ordinary. I think there is a way in which a person within that cultural world-view will expect a miracle, but will nonetheless see it as extraordinary, as striking (perhaps the etymological
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meaning of prtihrya), and, to borrow a pivotal term from Boyer (2001, 1996, 2003, 2004, 2008), counterintuitive.13 After all, the gap between a buddha or a bodhisattva and an ordinary human being remains; it is what allows for that tension that Scheible (2011: 438, 441, 442) describes as the cultivation of the opposite emotions of savega and pasda.14 Hence, miracles are in fact extraordinary, though expected. The belief (established and expected) that buddhas are superhuman contributes to the feeling of awe, which is a required component for the audiences predictable emotional state, and willingness to believe (another connotation of prasda).15
13 For an interesting example of the ways in which an expected and socially determined event can cause wonderment, surprise and excitement, because it is extraordinary, see Davis 1998. 14 Scheibles terse definitions of these emotional states leave out some important elements of contrast, the opposition between the two being more subtle than she leads us to believe. The anxiety of savega is a type of pressured disquiet, the counterpart of which is the serene trust (faith) of prasda (one is not simply serene and satisfied when standing in front of a Buddha image, one also feels safe, protected, and convinced hence, prasda can bring joy and faith, and can be an emotion as intense as savega, an emotion sometimes called vega see note 27 below). Then again, the serenity of prasda is the opposite of the (often violent) agitation and restlessness, even fear, of savega. Hence thrill does not always capture that emotion. Fear and thrill are closely related emotions, one may think of the adrenaline rush of a rollercoaster as thrilling, but normally we imply a pleasurable fear not a fear requiring a radical change in behavior. Besides, not all fears are thrilling: for instance, the fear of ppa or dukha (both of which cause savega and a sense of urgency called udvega), we would not call a thrill. Furthermore, I wonder if a miracle would produce savega; as we shall see presently, it can produce a special kind of vega: prti-vega (a rush of joy), which is in fact closer to prasda than one would think. 15 I am not sure I can agree with her judgement that the suasive power of a story is limited to only that initial experience when the story is still novel, that after the first encounter, the miracle can no longer shock the reader/hearer, or that miracles are multifaceted in their function because they can only shock once. If we think of these wonders as actual miracles, we should note that those who believe in miraculous or magical healing, will always be moved (not shocked) every time they feel the effect of the magic. Or, if we think of these wonders as literary events, we can note that predictable art forms can continue to have their intended effect or variants thereof throughout many performances. Isnt this the case, say, with the third
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In the perspective of the texts under consideration, it is fair to say that miracles are, indeed, completely reasonable effects of extraordinary human agency. This is precisely why they are types of jna (not the effect of supernatural agency). But, they are miraculous, insofar as they are inconceivable to those of us who do not possess the required knowledge or meditative skill. They may communicate religious truths, but above all they fill the audience with wonder and awe in the face of knowledge and power beyond comprehension (acintya). They are meant to compel the believer to have a set of hot cognitions either creating emotionally laden shifts in belief or, more often, reinforcing already established beliefs.16 Above all, I think it is crucial to distinguish the socially compelling from the ethically compelling, if by the latter one intends to signal a major shift in individual behavior commitment and the heightening of a sense of conviction do not require ethical transformation. Notwithstanding these minor points of disagreement, I would argue that Scheibles analysis adds an essential component to the discussion: wonder-working as a literary event, the focus of which is the observer or listener, even more than the putative performer. She has shown that the miracle must be read within a context wider than philology or indigenous commentary. She has also shown the importance of an affective factor even if that factor, I have argued, is difficult to identify. Her conclusions in fact reinforce and highlight some of the points discussed in the papers by Pranke (2011) and Scott (2011).
or fourth time one enjoys and laughs at Tartuffe or Falstaff? Again, opera is, I would say, predictable melodrama, and yet, arent there those of us who cry every time Mimi or Lakm die, yet once more? Expected and exaggerated, perhaps sometimes bordering on the ridiculous, and yet, a powerful art form. 16 I enclose in quotes the phrase hot cognitions advisedly, since the phrase has become more or less a shibboleth easily misused. I am referring to the subtle interaction (or fusion) of emotion and cognition described, for instance, by Greenberg & Safran (1984); Abelson (1963) came up with the catchy phrase long before more recently, see Morris, Squires, et al. 2003, and Lodge & Taber 2005, both of which form part of a growing literature on emotion and political reasoning, but I think much can be extrapolated from this research and applied to religious belief (see, for instance, Thagard 2006).
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In the Burmese weikza-lam discussed in Prankes paper, wonderworking takes a slightly different form. Pranke compares this noncanonical current to contemporary Theravda beliefs surrounding the figure of the arahant. His paper reveals certain overlap in both conceptions, despite the obvious tensions at the institutional and doctrinal level. It is also tantalizing to see the extent to which this non-monastic tradition uses many of the themes and tropes of traditional Buddhist rhetoric.17 However, as Pranke clearly shows, this is a tradition that we must categorize with a typology different from the one that can be used to understand canonical accounts of the miraculous. In those accounts, the dominant trope is that of the power of samdhi. This is consistent with the rhetoric of the Burmese vipassan tradition, whose history, from Medawis first vipassan manual (1754) to the present, is summarized in Prankes paper. The path of vipassan is grounded on an ascetic or moral practice (abandoning what should be abandoned, and practicing what should be practiced) which leads to realization (paivedha), which is [none other than] the path and fruit of liberation. (Pranke 2011: 457458) If the arahant should display any extraordinary faculties or miraculous powers, these are the fruits of this cultivation. With or without wonder-working, the arahant seeks the goal of liberation, nibbna. Although it is not stated in so many words, this is the narrative of sainthood as embodied in the life (or lives) of the Buddha. The weikza-lam, on the other hand, uses a narrative that appears to be historically and rhetorically (at least in the specific context studied by Pranke) in tension with the buddhaarahant narrative. Insofar as this alternative narrative is a Buddhist narrative, it seems
17 This is not the place to discuss this fascinating labyrinth of parallels to other Buddhist traditions (and I do not consider myself capable of exploring the historical roots of these parallels), but one should note that the weikzalam uses the doctrinal trope of the decay of Dharma as the justification for an alternative paradigm of sainthood, it uses the trope of Maitreyanist millenarianism, and exploits creatively the rich polysemy of the concept of vidy as a term for a contemplative liberating knowledge that denotes charismatic miraculous power as well as spiritual insight.
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to center (at least rhetorically and apologetically) on two Buddhist themes: the need to wait for the arrival of Maitreya (Metteya) and the power of vidy as the science of wonder-working. The most distinctive feature of the weikza-lam (in contrast to the path of the arahant) is the idea of a technique or sets of techniques that make the weikza-do a competent or successful practitioner (I will not say a successful wizard or thaumaturge, because I am not sure any of these words truly encompasses the wide variety of functions that define his role). These are techniques in the full sense of the word: they are skills developed by acquired knowledge and training, and include the use incantations and spells (mandan), alchemy (aggi yat), particularly . . . the manipulation of mercury (byada) and iron (than), traditional medicine (hsay), and the drawing of runes or magical diagrams (in, aing, sama). (Pranke 2011: 470, slightly edited). These arts are the tools of the trade that enable the weikzado to serve as wonder-working healer or protector, but also hold the secret for his capacity to transform himself. Nonetheless, as Pranke notes (470471), the weikza-do will not neglect normative Buddhist practices. These are essential for any progress to be made, and include renunciation, moral restraint, the celebration of the Buddhist Sabbath. In agreement with well established Buddhist belief, it is assumed that abstinence increases spiritual potency (hpon); while samatha in particular is considered efficacious in producing supernormal powers and for attaining skill in the sciences that are the weikza-dos vidy. In fact, even knowledge of the particulars of herbs, potions and incantations is enhanced by a life of ascetic and moral restraint. Despite this important point of agreement, the practitioners of these techniques do not have the external appearance of a monk (and hence would not be regarded as arahants); and yet, they can demonstrate (perhaps we could say they seek to demonstrate) their sainthood by other means. For, as an important effect of the application of weikza-lam techniques and self-discipline, the weikza-do can display liberation by either abandoning the body completely (literally disappearing) or by attaining an incorruptible body. Their vidy allows them to create a body beyond injury or decay. Although, the principal metaphor is alchemical, where the cor-
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ruptible body is transformed into a stable substance, just as base metals which tarnish are transmuted into gold, the idea is not wholly foreign to Buddhist traditions, and can be seen as the flipside of nibbna. Whether the weikza-do becomes an ashinhtwet, or one who exits alive, literally disappearing, or an athay-htwet, one who exits through [apparent] death, leaving behind a mummy considered an incorruptible relic, the weikza-lam seems to have come full circle. The powers of a weikza-do may not tally, on the surface, with the practice (paipatti) of the arahant, but, nonetheless, he can demonstrate his sainthood by becoming any one of these two arahant-equivalents: the one is no longer visible (his absence demonstrating his attainment) or the one who remains in a transfigured body. The difference does not seem to me to be as radical as suggested in Prankes initial depiction of the literal doctrinal stance that this tradition has as its goal not the termination of sasric life in nibbna as an arahant, but rather its indefinite prolongation through the attainment of virtual immortality as a weikza-do. For, one can easily see how the weikza goal can be construed as an equivalent of nibbna. What is more, it can also be construed as the miraculous side of the abstract notion of nibbna: to be liberated, and absent, and to be absent and present (in relics or teachings) are both miraculous events. Unless one settles for an abstract philosophical definition, liberation, as an event can only be imagined as something wondrous, an awe-inspiring, powerful happening and presence. Pranke hints at the points of possible homology (historical or simply typological) between arahant and weikza-do when he states that they share many qualities as ideal types including their ability to work wonders, and after their demise, to leave behind bodies that are immune to decay. (454) In fact the two types fit into a similar frame of expectations so that their rivalry or mutual suspicion reflects the fact that they compete for similar audiences or at least, audiences sharing the same presuppositions with regard to sainthood and the miraculous.
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Before turning to the last of the five papers, I would like to point to the importance of the narrative implicit in a system where the miraculous is inseparable from either the absence of the saint (his exit, and the proof of the exit in a sacred and charismatic absence) or his presence in a transfigured body that proves the liberation of his mind. Although it may seem only remotely connected to Buddhist ideals, it is, I would argue, an extension of the idea of liberation as wondrous, magical event, an idea that takes many forms in Buddhist history to mention only the one that I will reconsider in the last parts of this paper, this set of tropes can be seen as a variant of the idea of the bodhisattva as wonderworker, mykra, an idea that feeds into the later ideal of the siddha. Although the main topic of Scotts analysis is the use of certain narrative or rhetorical strategies to redress gender inequality within the Thai sagha, and hence addresses mainly issues of authority, she accomplishes her goals through a detailed and often perceptive description of a variety of strategies. She may not be speaking of the suasive power or the emotional charge of narratives of miraculous events, like Scheible, but there is no question that her analysis underlines the rhetorical function of miracle stories magic as a story, and story as rhetorical social strategy. As already noted with respect to Prankes paper, the miraculous event is invariably embedded in an account, and the account, the telling of how it happens, is what gives reality and power to the saints charisma. Among several strategies she highlights the most visible and dramatic effects of meditation: miraculous powers (Thai, itthirit; Pli, iddhi) and superhuman knowledge (Thai, apinya; Pli, abhi) ... As with the list of tevijja (the triple knowledge), these powers both validate and mediate authority within the Buddhist tradition. This is as true for the Buddhist saints as it is for the Buddha himself.18 She reminds us of the stories of Mahmoggallna, which show that authority is derived both from the display of extraordinary accomplishments (I would not know whether spiritual or psychic would be the best word to describe such accomplishments they are best left as ddhi and abhij), but also from the implicit or
18
Quoted from Scott (2011: 491492) with minor editorial changes.
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explicit raw power of the miracle, a power that compels or forces others to submit. As we saw earlier, earthquakes are introduced as narrative devices to remind us of the sacred and extraordinary character of events in the life of a buddha lest we forget. Similarly, in the living rhetoric of Scotts saints, narratives of sainthood do not limit themselves to extolling the saints wisdom (pa), merit and virtue (puya/gua), or meditative accomplishments (as samdhi, dhyna, sampatti in their restricted technical sense), they must prove that this person enjoys the external manifestations of the power of sainthood. This is especially crucial when the audience may have reasons to doubt the validity of invisible things like wisdom, merit, and mental concentration, or when the holder of such powers does not fit conventional notions of sainthood (as when a woman presents herself as a master of meditation in a society in which even her status as a nun can be called into question). Scott gives us a classical example as well. Thus, the Buddha asks Mahpajpat Gotam to show her spiritual status to an audience of unconvinced monks, and she must demonstrate that she can fly through the air, emit flames from her body, and see all of her past lives with her divine eye. (Scott 2011: 498) But, the Thai nuns studied by Scott display a wider range of abilities, skills not included in traditional lists of ddhi or abhij skills that we have seen as putatively distinctive of the Burmese weikza-do. These additional powers include healing (at least those illness due to karma - which Mae chi Thanaphon, for instance, can diagnose by touching the patients body). Khun Yay displays quasishamanic abilities that allow her to see (through meditative power, of course) where the deceased have gone after death, and thereby somehow assist them and their surviving relatives. Conspicuously absent in Scotts examples is the use of ritual means it appears that a special effort is made to foreground knowledge and mental power.19 In this, Scotts wonder-workin nuns differ from Prankes
I also wonder if these women are also skilled in the art of talk therapy (as some curanderas in Mesoamerica can be). I invite Scott to ask herself this question in any future studies.
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weikza-do, who, as their very name suggests, rely more on the mastery of a vidy, that is a science or technique, more than a cognitive or contemplative state brought about by moral and contemplative discipline. Pranke and Scott bring us back to the present, reminding us that understanding ancient or arcane texts is, in the end, about understanding real human beings and human circumstances. With the classical materials we do not always have the means of imagining such contexts. The contemporary examples (Pranke and Scott), moreover, provide concrete examples of how the miraculous event is both narrative and (for the believer) embodied presence.
Further reflections
Notwithstanding significant differences in perspective and in the materials studied, these five papers converge on a number of implications. Although most of the events described in the first three papers can hardly be called magic there is no ritual setting, no utilitarian end all five papers bring out the intimate, if not necessary, connection between sainthood (spiritual value) and its concrete manifestations as wondrous events. Overall, the dominant tropes are the display of marvelous actions or apparitions that demonstrate the performers accomplishments as a virtuoso of self-control. The goal of such control can be encapsulated in two words vidy and abhij, and the power or skill is denoted by the word ddhi. From these studies we learn that abhij can be a goal unto itself, that it can be the fruit of a concentrated mind achieved by means that do not necessarily conform to the classical templates for praj, or amatha and vipayan (Clough). But we also learn that at least part of the neat hierarchy forming our heuristic for Buddhist wonder-working collapses. Levels fuse, and they seem to do so with a purpose (Fiordalis). The miraculous in fact may take center stage, backgrounding wisdom and liberation (Clough, Scott). Or the skills and techniques of the thaumaturge may become the ultimate strategy to achieve either embodied liberation or the presence of disembodied transcendence (Pranke). And a close
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reading of miracle narratives opens the door to the manipulation of compulsory emotion (Scheible). If we learn anything from these papers it is the way in which the terminology and the conception are not monolithic, and the ideas can be used to a variety of purposes, yet, the variety of purposes and tropes seems to converge on a constellation of themes: human action fostered and controlled by mental culture, a power born of discipline and necessary for the practice of the holy life, especially for its culmination in a vague state traditionally called liberation (vimukti), and the external manifestation or proof of that power and extraordinary freedom. If I may now pick up some of these threads, I would like to point to other dimensions of the wonder-working trope as it can serve to integrate various aspects of doctrine and belief. First, I note the way in which Asaga (in a passage referenced in a note in Fiordaliss paper [2011: 390]) sees the function of the lower forms of wonder-working (those that are not direct or explicit teaching):20
Now, this twofold miraculous power accomplishes, in a few words, two tasks for buddhas and bodhisattvas. First, by gaining the favor of sentient beings with the prodigious display of such powers, it brings them to the teachings of the Buddha. Second, this power confers benefit and assistance to suffering beings in many countless forms and in different ways.
These lines encapsulate an important difference between the main function of wonder-working in Pli sources and its role in Mahyna sources. In the passage just quoted, a certain intellectual bias persists here too the working of miracles is distinguished from the marvel of effective teaching. Nonetheless, this power confers benefit and assistance. In Mahyna stra literature we can speak of a subtle shift, by means of which the wondrous and the didactic fuse into a more or less integral whole, dharma is in
20 Bodhisattvabhmi, p. 46: s punar e dvividhpi ddhir buddhabodhi sattvn samsato dve krye nipdayati/ varjayitv v ddhiprtihryea sattvn buddhasane vatrayati anugraha v anekavidha bahu nnprakra dukhitn sattvnm upasaharati. A parallel passage occurs in the Mahynastrlakra (bhya to V.5).
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itself a miracle, and miracles are themselves exemplifications of dharma (Gmez 1977). In a certain sense, we could say, the act of preaching during or after a miracle becomes the miracle that teaches or the teaching is itself a miracle. Furthermore, the salient aspect of these miraculous events is not the point at which teaching takes place, but the performance itself. This shift occurs at several rhetorical levels. One dramatic example is the way in which samdhi becomes a type of performance (ddhi is, after all, the visible manifestation of mental prowess).21 One does not exactly withdraw into an inner state of concentration, but rather, uses a state of concentration to reveal (by the sheer power of the concentration) to an audience a particular vision of an alternative (or parallel) reality e.g., turning an ordinary mundane setting into the Dharmadhtu. This displacement of meaning is reflected, for instance, in the many names of samdhis; each samdhi comes to signify a different window into such parallel realities (Lancaster 1976). At the doctrinal or conceptual level this is reflected in the addition of four perfect virtues to the, arguably older, list of six pramits. The additional virtues are all, in one way or another, expressions of the bodhisattvas saving will, skill and power: upya, praidhna, bala, jna (the latter in the full meaning of the word in the context of saving, wonder-working wisdom). Descriptions of all ten pramits in the stras become (if we judge by the number of words utilized) more a panegyric of the bodhisattvas wonderworking power than discussions of ethical doctrines. This is especially notable in the Daabhmika, and in similar stras in the Buddhvatasaka collection, such as the Stra of the Bodhisattvas Ten Practices.22
21 Consider, for instance, how one could conceivably jump from ddhipda to ddhiprtihrya. This is perhaps a misreading from the point of view of both philology and orthodoxy, but it is not far from the shift we shall see presently in the use of the word vimoka. 22 Tibetan (Sde-dge 305a5333b2) Yon tan gyi me tog shin tu bstsags pa shes bya ba byang chub sems dpai spyod pa bstan pa, The ten practices of the bodhisattva as taught by the Bodhisattva known as the One who Gathers the Flowers of Virtue. In the Chinese version attributed to the Central
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The shift also occurs in changes in the way traditional tropes of wonder-working are placed within narrative passages. Words like ddhi, abhij and prtihrya change ever so slightly in function, qualified or nuanced by new terms or spins on old words that change, at least, the role of the old miracles. This new usage includes words and phrases such as vikurvaa, vikurvita-prtihrya, sarvbhijarddhi-vikurvaa-prtihrya, rddhi-vikurvaa-abhi nirhraa, bhija-ribht, dharma-jna-rddhi-my-abhij-sar valokadhtu-spharaa, maha-rddhi-vikur vita, nirmita-upam-abhijvikur vita-vait-prpta, vimoka, vimoka-viaya, bodhisattva-vi moka-vikur vita, and vimoka-viaya-jna-vikrita.23 The term vimoka is especially interesting, since it puns by juxtaposing a canonical meaning of the term (vimoka as the gradual release of the mind from its bondage to object and concept in meditation) with one of the words concrete referents, derived from the root vi-muc-, literally, to release or let go, to shoot out. In the context of the Mahyna stras, the word will mean the act and process of manifesting a projection of oneself, releasing copies of ones body or emanations thereof, in a display of wonder-working all as the result of meditational prowess. The actual manifestation of the vimoka (in contrast to the mental process or state causing the manifestation) is a literal shower of marvels, usually displayed with several goals in mind: demonstrating the bodhisattvas ethical and meditative accomplishments, showing his wonder-working prowess, teaching the dharma, demonstrating the nature of reality, assisting living beings either with direct help or through teaching the dharma.24
Asian translator iknanda, the so-called Avatasaka in 80 Scrolls, this stra is Book 21 and is called Book of the Ten Modes of Action (Shxng pn) Taish 279(21), vol. X, 102b24111a20. The equivalent in the Chinese translation of the Indian translator Buddhabhadra, the version known as the Avatasaka in 60 Scrolls, it forms Book 17, titled The Ten Modes of Action of the Bodhisattva Garden (or bouquet) of Virtue (Gngd-huj-psshxng pn) Taish 278(17), vol. IX, 466b3474c26. 23 Randomly culled from notes on Daabhmika and Gaavyha. 24 Needless to say, the canonical meanings of the term coexist in the same stras that use the word in this peculiarly Mahyna sense. The reader will
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The word defies translation, precisely because it plays on two very different meanings of the word. Edgertons brief entry on the term encapsulates the difficulty the term presents and perhaps exemplifies the way our expectations regarding reality and religious doctrine can compound the semantic problem. I quote the entry under bodhisattvavimoka:25
Bodhisattva-vimoka means a Mahyna method of salvation; various fanciful names are given to such mystical (and not specifically described) methods; e.g. in Gv 261.4 a night-goddess claims to have learned the Bodhisattva-vi called samantabhadraprtivipulavimalavegadhvaja.
The problem with the definition is, well, that it is mystical in the weakest sense of the word. What are mystical methods if not methods we do not understand? And if they were not specifically described, how could we understand them? But, as a point of fact, these methods are described in detail. Granted that description and method (if those are the proper terms) are culture-bound; but, still the whole point of these extended and at times tiring passages is to describe the way in which the bodhisattvas accomplish and manifest their release, in the sense I have just described that is to say, faut de mieux, their liberating manifestations.26
also notice (here and in the passages to be quoted in the following pages) that there is a certain overlap between the concept of vimoka and that of nirma (which would mean, if we go with the etymology, a constructed [copy or projection of oneself], but which seems to be more a phantom body or a person with all the attributes of a human being except its own mind). The ontological status of both a vimoka and a nirma is not clearly defined although their functions are described in detail, see, for instance, Mahynastrlakra VII.57, IX.5676, XI.30 (stanzas and commentary). 25 Quoted with minor typographic changes. 26 Parenthetically, note that repetition in this genre of literature may be a device combining the expected form of ritual with the suasive power of doctrinal formulae, a ritualized narrative in which repetition (of apparitions, miracles, and word) reinforces its claim to factuality. More on this below.
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Let us consider briefly one such act of release, the samanta bhadra-prti-vipulavimala-vegadhvaja-vimoka referenced by Edgerton. The text first introduces this spiritual accomplishment of the Night Goddess (rtridevat) Pramudita-nayana-jagad-virocan with these words:27
[Sudhana] saw the Night Goddess Pramudita-nayana-jagad-virocan in the midst of the circle of the Blessed Ones assembly, seated on a lion throne in the calyx of a flower, having attained mastery of the bodhisattvas higher concentration (bodhisattva-samdhi) [known as the samdhi holding up] the Banner of the Abundant and Pure Torrent of Samantabhadras Joy (samantabhadra-prti-vipula-vimala-vegadhvaja).28 And he saw, emanating from every one of her pores clouds resplendent with the various acts [expressive of her] perfections, beginning with her generosity, a pleasing sight for all sentient beings, casting light on all sentient beings, illuminating all sentient beings, a kindly sight in the eyes of all sentient beings. Those were clouds that displayed her acts of generosity responding with a calm voice according to the aspirations of all sentient beings, ... clouds filled with the wondrous apparition of the inconceivably difficult acts of renunciation of the bodhisattvas of the three times.
The first thing we notice is that the text does not begin speaking about this as a vimoka, though the term is used several times in
Gaavyha, Suzuki 243 (Vaidya 188189). I take the name of the goddess to mean She who Illuminates the World with her Joyful Glance (her Joyful Eyes, or Countenance), a name appropriate to her accomplishment, and reminiscent of some ways of imagining Avalokitevara (spyan-ras gzigs). Avalokitevaras vimoka in the Gaavyha (Suzuki 209216/Vaidya 159 164) in fact establishes a clear connection between his commitment to come to the rescue of living beings and the power of his wonder-working. 28 Torrent here translates vega, which I think in this passage fits somewhere in the range of meanings suggested by Bhtlingk-Roths with the list Andrang, Schwall (des Wassers, der Fluth), starke Strmung, starker Erguss (von Thrnen) ... heftige , schnelle Bewegung (insbes. geschwungener oder geworfener Waffen), ... heftiges Auflodern, Ausbruch (eines Schmerzes, einAuflodern, er Leidenschaft u.s.w.), Aufregung but, clearly connoting a torrent of feeling. (See also note 14, above). The enthusiastic joy felt by bodhisattvas engaged in the practice of a bodhisattva (samantabhadracary) is compared to a rushing stream or a rushing army, and the samdhi signals or announces the arrival of such an emotional rush.
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the following lines (Gaavyha, Vaidya 196ff.). It is presented as a samdhi, reminding us of the canonical roots of the conception: vimokas are the fruit of samdhi. Yet, the emphasis here is not on meditation, but on its fruits, and these are not only soteriological (perhaps ethical, perhaps symbolic), but certainly miraculous. And it is not only that the narrative is meant to be miraculous, but that a vimoka is in fact a kind of miracle (albeit occurring only in narrative time at least insofar as we can tell from the stra). The stra proceeds to describe the Goddesss vimoka in detail, in a passage that includes many of the classical Mahyna terms for the wonder-working of buddhas and bodhisattvas:29
As clouds of magically generated bodies (nirmakya),30 teaching the dharma to sentient beings, emanated from every pore on the skin of the Night Goddess Pramudita-nayana-jagad-virocan, [Sudhana] saw, in every detail and at every step the development of virtuous thought moments by the Goddess in her previous births, beginning with the way she acquired her provision [of merit and wisdom] since she first formed her aspiration to awakening. And [Sudhana also saw how those bodies] engaged in continuous and uninterrupted acts of praise for the arising of the aspiration to awakening, gladly adopted birth and death (cyuty-upapatti-parigraha) continuously and without interruption[.]31
Gaavyha, Suzuki 250252 (Vaidya 193195). The usual translation of kya as body, is, as translations go, acceptable, but one must bear in mind that, with reference to buddhas or bodhisattvas, it denotes the whole embodied person. In that sense it is similar to some uses of the term tmabhva. As to nirma, the literal meaning, is an object fashioned or constructed through artifice, not a creation out of nothing, but a recombination of elements, mostly mental or moral forces controlled by the power of samdhi. As applied to non-sacred magic, the usual conception is that of illusion: making the audience see an object where there is none, or seeing an object as different from what it actually is. 31 In other words, the vimoka displays the previous lives of the Night Goddess and the bodhisattva practices she performed in every possible world she visited in the past. It is a live demonstration of the bodhisattvas career. It is, so to speak, a performed recollection of past lives.
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The vimoka is therefore the vehicle or the process by which the Night Goddess (as a bodhisattva) carries out her salvific action, adopting multiple personae whether we understand these as phantom bodies or as duplications of herself is not crucial for understanding the passage. These many persons or bodies evidently respond to their environments, and, presumably to the variety of human beings ready to receive the teaching. Hence, the various apparitional beings projected by the Goddess
adopted different bodies and personalities (tmabhva-parigraha) continuously and without interruption, adopted the full range of human names continuously and without interruption, approached good virtuous friends continuously and without interruption, ... attained higher states of concentration (samdhi) continuously and without interruption, and in acquiring those higher states of concentration had a vision of the buddhas continuously and without interruption, ... [He saw how those bodies] were continuously and without interruption in possession of the knowledge (jna) that penetrates [everywhere in the world seen as the] Sphere of Dharma (dharmadhtu), were continuously and without interruption in possession of the knowledge that [allowed them] to gaze [at sentient beings everywhere] in the World of Sentient Beings (sattvadhtu), ...
The link between this sort of miraculous apparition and earlier canonical notions of the extraordinary powers (abhij) is established in the lines that follow:
[He saw how those bodies] continuously and without interruption acquired for their first time the divine eye (prathama-divyacakus),32 continuously and without interruption were able to [hear and] cognize (vijapti) for the first time with the divine ear (prathamadivyarotra), continuously and without interruption acquired for their first time the knowledge of the thoughts of other sentient beings (prathama-parasattvacittajna), continuously and without interruption acquired for their first time the recollection of the past lives of themselves and of other sentient beings (prathama-tmaparasattva32 Each of those duplicated bodies of the Night Goddess shows the first time she attained such powers, but I wonder if the implication is not that the bodies also repeat (as a display or re-performance) every time she manifested them again (in a future rebirth she would not be acquiring the power, but merely recollecting or recovering it from her past experience).
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prvanivsnusmti), continuously and without interruption acquired for their first time the conditions giving them the extraordinary capacity (ddhi) to effortlessly (anabhisaskra) remain grounded in the absence of any substantial thing (abhva-pratih),33 continuously and without interruption acquired for their first time the prowess of [manifesting] the accomplishments of great miraculous powers (ma harddhivikrama) that allow them to pervade [all] regions [of the universe], continuously and without interruption gained mastery over the liberating manifestations (vimoka) of the bodhisattvas,34 continuously and without interruption gained the inconceivable passage through this the ocean of the liberating manifestations of the bodhisattvas, continuously and without interruption acquired [the capacity to] work the transforming power (vikurvita) of the bodhisattvas, continuously and without interruption acquired the prowess (vikrama) of the bodhisattvas, and continuously and without interruption acquired [all other marvelous faculties,] up to accessing the most subtle knowledge (jna) of the bodhisattvas ...35
As she preached the dharma, the Night Goddess was able to adapt her voice to the expectations of her audience: teaching to some with a voice that could make the world shake down to the cosmic disk of wind, to others with a voice that would murmur down to the cosmic disk of water, to others with a voice like the crackling of a fire, or the roaring of the ocean, with the voice of god kings or of the king of the ngas, the voice of asuras and gandharvas, of human monarchs and brahmins, or even with the voice and speech of all other sentient beings. And Sudhana could see the clouds of magically generated bodies multiplying, for all sentient beings, the objects created in Pramudita-nayana-jagad-virocans liberating manifestations (vimokaviaya) with all sorts of playfully ornamented emanations (savimokavikrita). With this twist we begin
The compound is analyzed according to Tib., Sde-dge Vol. A, fol. 105b.1, thog ma dngos po med pa la rab tu gnas te/mngon par du bya ba myed [sic.] pai rdzu phrul thob pai rkyen gcig nas gcig tu brgyud cing dab chag pa dang/ text of the TBRC digital version of the Sde-dge Black Bkagyur, p. 210. 34 Here vimokapratilbha, which may be redundant. 35 Here, jna seems to mean an even higher knowledge and skill than the other extraordinary accomplishments just described.
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to see a shift to the soteriologic or salvific function of the vimoka, for Sudhana could see that each of the magically produced bodies in these clouds of magically created apparitions
in each moment of thought would purify an indescribable number of innumerable buddha-fields in the ten directions. He saw that they were liberating (vimocyamna) infinitely boundless oceans of sentient beings from all the pains of the unfortunate destinies of rebirth, establishing an infinitely boundless universe of sentient beings in the fortunate states of gods and humans ... in the terraced levels of the rvakas and pratyekabuddhas ... bringing in one moment of thought infinitely boundless oceans of sentient beings to the tenth terrace [of the bodhisattva].
Sudhana contemplates this vision, listens attentively to the teaching being imparted, ponders and understands the significance of these events, all of this
because of the transforming and overpowering effect, the inspiration (vikurvita-vabhit-anubhvena) of Pramudita-nayana-jagad-virocans inconceivable bodhisattva manifestation (acintya ... bodhisattva vimoka), [called] the Banner of the Abundant and Pure Torrent of Samantabhadras Joy, because [such liberating power] was due to the practice of a similar conduct in the past, and because he had been directed and authorized with the blessing (dhihndhihitatvd) of the tathgatas.36
36 For the time being I offer this translation of the crucial term adhihna only as une traduction de pis aller. An adhihna, in this context, is an act of appointment by an obviously higher being (a buddha), directing and authorizing a disciple (usually a bodhisattva) to receive a teaching (especially one that will give the appointee special abilities or powers). Hence, the crucial ritual use of the term, especially in so-called Tantric Buddhism, where the concept has been translated in Tibetan as byin-gyis rlob-pa, possibly, to invoke or confer by speech a position of rank or majesty, the corresponding noun is these days usually translated into English as empowerment. In Chinese, traditional equivalents ranged from chng, to receive an order or a commission (from a superior), to the more explicit suh or wih, to accept provisionally (a position or a charge), finally settling on jich, to give support and direction, to exert control over the latter having become the most common term for the ritual enactment of an adhihna. This is yet another example of a peculiar sort of miraculous intervention. The concept is worthy of further study cf. Visuddhimagga (Vism) 378388, 405406,
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Sudhana was also capable of witnessing and appreciating this marvelous display because his inconceivable roots of good had come to maturity, rending him a worthy vessel for the practice of the perfect good conduct of the bodhisattva (samantabhadr bodhisattvacary). I will not belabor the point or explore further yet other Mahyna uses of the wonder-working trope. One need only consider the variety of treatments, ranging from the marvels of a purified field and its creation, purification, or marvelous purification, to the irony of Vimalakrtis apparent contradictions (literal and figurative wonder-working in the same passage), and the less humorous ambiguity in the display of Maitreyas kgara. A quick consideration of this diversity, and the complexity of the images considered in the five papers in this issue shows, in my view, that there is no simple answer to the question of what is a Buddhist miracle, much less a single answer to the question of the meaning and significance of Buddhist narratives of prodigious events. However, the short passage quoted above shows that at least in one witness (the Gaavyha) one can argue that wonder-working powers serve, at the same time, a variety of functions and conform to a variety of tropes that work across several layers of meaning that could be called, for lack of a better term, the doctrinal levels or underpinnings of wonder-working, to wit: meditation as concentration, meditation as liberating power, meditation as magical power, the illusory character of reality (which is, after all, like a magical trick, my, or a magical creation, nirma), the uniqueness of buddhas, the salvific action of bodhisattvas, the transcendent freedom of liberation as a sequence of wondrous events, etc. In the Gaavyha, however, these tropes also integrate the wisdom of the story-teller, for, with the concept of vimoka, the story embodies the encounter between imaginal events and reader (audience) response, what is more, the text could be taken to suggest that the story itself responds to the reader (the Night Goddess, in transforming the reader, transforms herself).
Daabhmika, Chapt. 1, stanzas 1719.
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Concluding observations
So far, I have avoided miracle and magic,37 mostly following traditional Indian Buddhist categories in their contexts, and using English words that seemed to me more neutral. Nonetheless, one cannot avoid asking how one is to speak about beliefs, practices and narratives that refer to what appears to us to be impossible. I should note, first, that some of the examples collected in all five of the papers in this issue of the Journal fit a narrow definition of miracle: there is a sense in which they are miraculous, that is, they are caused or performed by buddhas and bodhisattvas, who somehow interfere in the normal order of things, and whose magical acts and the fruits thereof are considered to be somehow superior or radically different from those of other teachers and wonderworkers. Sudhana is transformed because of his own merit, but, he is ready to be transformed, above all, because he has been inspired, overpowered and transformed (vikurvita-vabhit-anubhvena)38 by the wondrous apparition or manifestation (vimoka) wrought by the goddess, and because he has been blessed and authorized by the majestic authority of the tathgatas (dhihndhihitatvd). Such miraculous acts are, of course, different from the acts of those who are mere performers of tricks of magic (mykra, when the term is used pejoratively). But these examples raise another issue that I believe is raised in the five papers I have reviewed, at times coming to the surface, at times hiding beneath the surface, like a thread running through a tapestry. It is the question mostly raised by Scheible, about the function of the rhetoric of narrative. In three of the five papers, all the examples adduced are stories about wonder-working, not actu37 The reader may have noticed I have used the words magic and magical in quotation marks, and also when referring to nirma, which are usually considered to be similar to the acts of a magician that is, the mykra, the performer who does tricks of magic independent of any ritual context. 38 Slightly changing the order of the terms to arguably reflect a more natural English order. It is not clear to me that the original implies any particular hierarchy.
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al, observable examples of what a believer might consider a miracle or a feat of magic. Even doctrinal statements regarding the miraculous accomplishments of buddhas and bodhisattvas harken back to a tradition of miracle stories (see especially Fiordaliss paper). Fictional or not, these stories invite us to ask a number of questions. We may ask what would be the most appropriate way of understanding the events depicted, or the depiction of these imaginal events, and we may also ask what the purpose or function of such depictions might be. First, as to the nature of the events, the stories reflect a culture that assumes (even in its literate and elite modalities) the occurrence of feats of wonder-working, actual and expected from certain types of virtuosi, but, nonetheless extraordinary, in fact, in contemporary cognitive theory we would say, they are supernatural events.39 I have suggested above, moreover, that the events depicted fall into different points on a spectrum: from an event that seems like a true miracle, yet is nothing but a cheap trick (the skill of a mere illusionist, like Bhadra),40 to the illusion created by a buddha or a bodhisattva, which is a real illusion in other words it is the fruit of a type of true knowledge, jna (or abhij) that is intellectual perceptual and instrumental knowledge, an understanding and control over the natural order of things, such that allows the knower to change that order. The association of wonder-working with control hides an implicit world-view that includes a valuation of reality, of cognition and of the ultimate good. We may then speak (faut de mieux) of an
39 Some of my colleagues in Buddhist Studies may resist the term (the same way some resisted for a long time the adjusted, secular usage of theology without reference to a theos), but the term is an expedient short hand for the theory of the counterintuitive first formulated by Boyer (1994). 40 Rgameys (1938/1990) translation of sgyu-ma-mkhan as juggler perhaps reflects the old dictionary entries on mykra, but Bhadra is obviously not a a simple juggler (unless one uses the term loosely to mean a fraud); he creates illusions or miraculous apparitions (my) that are deceptive or fraudulent (another meaning my), but nonetheless fool his audiences into believing that they are the real thing (the definition of real thing, being, of course, always contested). See notes 6, 34 and 35, above.
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ontology, an epistemology and a soteriology of wonder-working. The master of meditation is also a master magician and a master of reality, and in this mastery lies the liberating power of meditation, as if ddhipda were simultaneously the basis for liberation and the basis for extraordinary, wondrous powers (or, perhaps better, in the inverse order). This multivalence in the significance of wonder-working is at the heart of the narratives that form the object of the five papers I have examined and of the materials I have adduced. Such polysemy is found in early as well as late texts. In non-Mahyna literature one can mention as an example the Buddhas encounter with the highway robber Agulmla, as recounted in the Agulmla-sutta of the Majjhima-Nikya (MN II.97106).41 In this canonical passage, the power of iddhi appears to have three functions: the literal (presupposing a belief in the existence and efficacy of such powers), the suasive (an instrument for teaching within the narrative), and the iconic (the embodiment of some aspect of the object of the teaching perhaps of both an experience of freedom and an experience of reality). The highway robber Agulmla follows the Buddha with an intent to murder him; but then,
the Blessed One willed a mental power (iddhbhisakhra abhikhsi/abhisakresi) such that Agulmla, running with all his might, could not overtake the Blessed One who kept walking at his normal pace. At this, the highway robber Agulmla thought: For sure this is extraordinary! For sure this is marvelous!42 For I am used to running
See also E. W. Burlingames (1921) elegant translation of the equivalent story in the Dhammapada-ahakath (Dhpa III.614). This legend represents an early antecedent of Mahyna tropes exemplified by the Suhiparipcch Taish, xi, 310(36), where the Buddhas wonder-working powers move Majur to attack him with a sword, knowing all too well that the Buddha, the sword and Majur are empty, and hence at rest, inactive, incapable of doing anything. 42 These two expressions, acchariya vata bho, abbhuta vata bho, are part of the puzzle, and deserve further study. They represent the Buddhist equivalent of the concept of counterintuitive: surprising and overpowering.
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after even ... a gazelle overtaking it and catching it. But now, on the contrary, running with all my might, I cannot overtake this shramana who walks at his normal pace. He stopped and called out to the Blessed One, Stop, shramana, stop shramana! I stand still, Agulmla, why dont you stop? ... Then Agulmla addressed the Blessed One in verse: While walking, shramana, you say, I stand still. But to me standing still, you say, you have not stopped. I ask you, shramana, for the meaning of this. How do you stand still? How is it I have not stopped? Always and everywhere, Agulmla, I stand still, for I have cast off violence toward all living things. But you cannot stop yourself in how you treat living beings. Therefore, I have stopped and you have not.
In this story the power of stopping is a marvel at four levels: the ddhi that allows a buddha to literally control the movement of others, ddhi as the mental power of concentration, the ddhi of equanimity as self-restraint, and the ddhi of a liberating, faithinspiring teaching (Agulmla understands, surrenders, and joins the Order). There is still, however, no indication that the feat of wonder-working reveals something about the nature of reality. This fourth meaning of ddhi will find full expression in the Mahyna witness, for instance the Vimalakrti-nirdea and the Suhimatiparipcch of the Ratnaka.43 To these four layers of meaning I will add a fifth: the wonder of the story itself. We would then have five layers, five tropes, which, for lack of better words, I will call (1) the literal the feat of wonder working, (2) the wonder of meditative power (power over mind and power of mind), (3) the wonder of virtue and benevolence (here, the ceasing of aggression and hostility and the birth of a benevolent attitude), (4) the wonder of liberation (stillness as a state of freedom),
43
See note 41.
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(5) the wonder of persuasion (the aesthetic or affective dimensions of the story, its function as rhetoric device). To approach a conclusion, I would now like to focus briefly on the last of these layers suggesting some way that we could begin to understand the phenomenon of these narrative events, suggesting some possible avenues for future research. Despite obvious difference in style and genre, one may compare the events narrated in the Agulmla-sutta with those found in the Gaavyha-stra: both texts imply a resonance between doctrine, magic, and story, and between the events of a story and a kind of script for the events (imaginal or actual) of liberating insight and liberating power. The various levels suggest a concept of resonance for which I believe certain Chinese models of aesthetic response may be useful, or at least suggestive of a starting point. The link between this aesthetic conception and Buddhist miracle stories has been summarized skillfully by D. Stevenson who uses this link to understand what he calls the structure and organization of miracle tales, but which I rather call the semiotic layering of the tales. In the words of Stevenson (1995: 429):
[P]ivotal [to the thematic structure and organization of miracle tales is the] notion of numinal sympathy or response (lingying or yingxian)44 ... Implicit in virtually all of the miracle tales (and, indeed, Chinese Buddhist hagiography as a whole) is the age old Chinese discursive structure of stimulus (gan), response (ying),45 and causal impetus or nexus (ji or jiyuan).46 ... spiritual progress and sanctity entail
I assume Stevenson uses the less common numinal intentionally, to distinguish it somehow from numinous, but I am not sure. At any rate, the Chinese conveys a sense of correspondence or resonance (yng) with the spirit world (lng), an almost natural response that makes the spirits become present or manifest (yngxin). 45 The stimulus (gn) is the emotional stimulus and the emotion itself (also gn): a feeling is what moves the heart/mind; the ensuing movement of the heart is the correspondence, yng, of event and feeling. As a verb, gn means both to affect and to be affected, also to move or stir (feelings); as a noun, affect or feeling. 46 The word j actually denotes a machine, instrument or device that functions by responding to some sort of input and produces a predictable effect
44
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a resonance between the aspirant and the sacred order at large, rather than the appropriation of one solely by or in terms of the other.
The resonance, sympathy or sympathetic accord presupposes a resonance-device or a mechanism (here conceived as somehow spiritual) which we may imagine as a psychological predisposition that makes the stories effective.
As the gangying metaphor would have it, spiritual presence or manifestation (ying) whether that presence be construed as the descent of the buddhas, the arousing of the thought of enlightenment, auspicious omens, miraculous responses, even enlightenment itself is effected by the devotee coming into sympathetic accord or tally with the hidden sacred order and forging a causal impetus or nexus (ji, jiyuan) that stimulates (gan) a flow or manifestation of sacred power. Miraculous response, as such, is the function of a commutative interaction between aspirant and the sacred order and not purely the work of either thaumaturgy on the part of the subject or numinal intrusion on the part of the cult object. (Stevenson 1995: 429)
Mutatis mutandis, we may speak of a similar nexus between sacred (or wonder-working) narrative and religious action and emotion whether these are expected (as they often are) or seemingly novel and spontaneous. The narrative is what Stevenson describes as a manifest trace of the expected or effected response:
Often characterized as a manifest trace, sign, or event, the very concept of a stimulus working to produce a given miraculous response implies the presence of an a priori pattern or network of principles that lurks beneath the surface of manifest events, mysteriously structuring their ebb and flow. (Stevenson 1995: 429)
This suggests that the human receptor of the narrative is expected to experience the telling and retelling of stories of wonder-working as a virtual equivalent of the miraculous event, and as such, infused with the same power to change reality, cognition, and the moral
(the primary meaning of j being device or machine), but it can also refer to mechanical power and to a hidden mechanism. The yun (technically, a causal link or conditioning stimulus) defines a relationship that in this case operates to link the subject with the world of wonders and magic through the sacred object or sacred narrative.
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status of the human being. It is an expectation, no real change need occur, other than a confirmatory experience, and any change that might occur will be, for the most part, an expected change. But, whether it is a confirmatory or a transformative experience, the reception and response is only possible because the narrative has a real-life equivalent in the readers imaginary and because it creates or sustains a world for him. The psychological insight behind the device we call miracle tales is an understanding of this power of narrative, a power that mimics miraculous powers. Transposing this model (or metaphor) to contemporary language, we may speak of a (not so surprising) correspondence between narrative and an inner human mechanism that instinctively orders experience in terms of human or human-like agents, and in terms of their powers and of predictable sequence of interactions between these agents (the narrative); furthermore, adding, from the Chinese metaphor, an important element to this mechanism: the interaction between audience and narrative (teaching, icon) is as much affective as it is cognitive (the Chinese heart is both mind and the seat of emotion). The correspondence takes place both in the imaginary (understood as a cognitive module) and in a bodymind response (the emotional validation of the virtual world present in the imaginary). Needless to say, these observations lead in the direction of the contemporary concept of modules or mental systems of brain functioning, which is, arguably, one of the dominant model among cognitive scientists. I am only suggesting that in studying the materials under review in this article we should take note that, once we accept the existence of a human-like agent module, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the imaginary agents that populate our view of human and superhuman reality have, by necessity, feelings, and exist in a narrative time in which people have emotional reactions. Furthermore, when they speak to us, they also seem to take for granted our agency and our affective nature, hence, when we communicate with them (in visions or through dramatic representation in narrative or ritual), in some way we communicate with our whole being: body as body, mind as mind, and body-mind as emotion.
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I believe this may be what Scheible is trying to get at in her paper. The extensive passage from the Gaavyha I have summarized above represents a traditional expression of this complex set of expectations where body, speech and ideation meet in a particular story line. Several factors meet, and not simply in our interpretation: a reader/receptor (represented by Sudhana), a culturally defined set of human and superhuman agents (Sudhana and the Night Goddess), interacting in a predictable event sequence (which is at the same time the wondrous event, the vimoka) populated by yet other embodied beings acting through time, and an expected cognitive and emotional response or responses (explicitly dictated by the narrative itself). The basic structure of the model of brain systems can be described in a variety of ways, but, we can express it succinctly, following Pyysiinen, in the simple formula: modules or procedures that organize experience either reflectively or reflexively (Pyysiinen 2009: Appendix. 191). Religion does not belong to a particular module (Boyer 1995), rather, categories and concepts used in the domain of religious or ritual thought and practice often have specific internal features and a complex relationship to everyday categorization and conceptualization (Srensen 2002: 181). Sacred narrative (mythos as story-telling, not mythos la Cassirer or la Eliade) is no exception to this rule; sacred narrative and miracle-tales straddle both modules, and, insofar as they also elicit a spectrum of affective reactions, generate something more than categorization and conceptualization hence the power of religious narrative (as narrative and as religious evocation) leading us to draw inferences and make predictions on the basis of temporal relations and similarity (Pyysiinen 2009: Appendix, 191) in a magical world, but also on the basis of the intuition of emotion (vague as it may be). The process is more powerful than a simple inference or prediction, and therein is (am I allowed to say this?) the mystery and the magic of both the religious and the narrative imagination, both of which meet in miracle-tales generally, and in conventional stories of wonder-working, to create a hybrid that is more than the sum of its parts. This is in some ways comparable to the magic produced by the narratives of talk-therapy (Bernstein 2002; Brottman 2009), crossing the boundaries that
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separate the memory as cognition and memory as affect and bodily response (Westen & Gabbard 2002). Sacred narrative straddles both systems, and therein lies its function and its power. But stories are also the part of the mental systems that is most tightly bound to the minds embodiment, i.e., affect, emotion sentiment. And, narratives about the miraculous touch that embodied level with greater force than any marvels of teaching they make us feel, as it were, possessed. Thus, miraclestories are not only conceptually different from doctrine, they are affectively different. Perhaps more powerful than the marvel of teaching, but only if the latter is understood to be marvelous merely in a metaphorical sense. Yet, not all Buddhists would see it that way after all, is there a human teacher who could teach as persuasively as the Buddha? Are his pedagogical skills not, in fact, more than human (even if we do not take into account his wonderworking powers and the suasive force they embody)? Once in the Mahyna, there is little room for doubt: buddhas and bodhisattvas are not just eloquent teachers (which they are, to boot), they are wonder-working teachers, and the distinction between teaching and wonder-working begins to collapse on itself. We still need to understand how conviction and belief actually arise in a human being. We need to understand two elements of belief: suggestibility and surrender. These are not only elements of religious conviction, they are part and parcel of the experience of learning and teaching, of certainty and persuasion, as much as they are part of various social strategies to modulate and sooth doubt and anxiety, as well as strategies meant to shock and gain influence (Frank 1974, Galanter 1993). What makes the miracle persuasive? What makes the story feel so much like a miracle that we want to understand miracles through the stories? What may sometimes appear to be devious or deceptive, is, in the end mysterious, and (almost?) magical. Therein may lie the power of priests, doctors, politicians, psychoanalysts, and, (dare we say it?) teachers.47
47
Borrowing from Adam Phillips 2002.
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References
Pli sources
References to Pli texts are to the roman-script editions of the Pali Text Society, England, by volume number and page.
AN D Dhp-a DN MN Sn Vism Aguttara-Nikya, ed. R. Morris, E. Hardy, 5 vols. London 18851900. Drgha-gama (= Dgha-Nikya) Dhammapada-ahakath, ed. H. C. Norman, 5 vols. London 19061914. Dgha-Nikya, ed. T. W. Rhys Davids, J. E. Carpenter. 3 vols. 18901911. Majjhima-Nikya, ed. V. Trenckner, R. Chalmers. 3 vols. London 18881899. Suttanipta, ed. D. Andersen, H. Smith. London 1913. Visuddhimagga, ed. C. A. F. Rhys Davids. 2 vols. London 1920 1921.
Sanskrit sources
Bodhisattvabhmi Dutt, Nalinaksha. (1978). (Ed.). Bodhisattvabhmi. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute. Daabhmika Johannes Rahder (1926). (Ed.) Leuven. Gaavyha or Gaavyha-stra Suzuki, Daisetz Teitaro & Idzumi, Hokei. (1949). (Eds.). The Gaavyha-stra. New rev. ed. Tokyo: Society for the Publication of Sacred Books. Vaidya, P. L. [Parasurama Lakshmana]. (1960). (Ed.). Gaavyhastram. Bauddha-saskta-granthval (Buddhist Sanskrit Texts), No. 5. Darbhanga: Mithila Insititute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning. Vimalakrtinirdea Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taish University. (Ed.). (2004). Vimalakrtinirdea. Transliterated Sanskrit-Text, collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations (Bonzkantaish Yoima-ky). Tokyo: Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taish University.
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Davis, Richard H. (1998). Introduction: Miracles as Social Acts. In Davis 1998a: 122. Davis, Richard H. (1998a). ed., Images, Miracles and Authority in Asian Religious Traditions. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press. Fiordalis, David V. (2011). Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011], pp. 381408. Frank, J. D. (1974). Persuasion and Healing: A Comparative Study of Psychotherapy. Rev. ed. New York: Schocken. Galanter, Marc. (1993). Cults: Faith, healing, and coercion. New York: Oxford University Press. Gmez, Luis O. (1977). The Bodhisattva as Wonder-worker. In Lewis Lancaster, ed., Prajpramit and Related Systems (Berkeley: University of California), pp. 221262. _____. (1999). Seeing, touching, counting, accounting: Skhya as formal thought and intuition. tudes asiatiques/Asiatische Studien (Zeitschrift der Schweizerischen Asiengesellschaft, Revue de la socit Suissese-Asie) 53(3), pp. 693711. Greenberg, L. & Safran, J. (1984). Integrating affect and cognition: A Perspective on the Process of Therapeutic Change. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 8, 559-578. _____. (1987a). Emotion in Psychotherapy: Affect, cognition and the process of change. New York: Guilford Press. _____. (1987b). Affect, cognition and action. In H. Eysenck, & I. Martin, eds., Theoretical Foundations of Behaviour Therapy. N.Y.: Plenum. la Valle Poussin, Louis de. (1929). Extase et spculation (dhyna et praj). In Indian studies in honor of Charles R. Lanman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), pp. 135136. _____. (1937a). Musla et Nrada: le chemin du nirva. Mlanges chinoises et bouddhiques 5(19361937), pp. 189222. _____. (1937b). Le bouddhisme et le yoga de Patajali. Mlanges chinoises et bouddhiques 5(19361937), pp. 223242. Lamotte, tienne. (Trans.). (19441980). Le trait de la Grande Vertu de Sagesse de Ngrjuna (Mahprajpramitstra). 5 vols. References are to the volume number (in roman numerals), followed by the page number in Arabic numerals. The five volumes appeared under various imprints during an interval of 36 years. Tome I: Bibliothque du Muson 18; Louvain: Institut Orientaliste & Publications Universitaires 1944 (repr. 1966 the reprint erroneously lists 1949 as the date of the first ed.). Tome II: Bibliothque du Muson 18; Louvain: Institut Orientaliste & Bureau du Muson 1949 (repr. 1967). Tome III: Publications de lInstitut Orientaliste
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de Louvain 2; Louvain: Universit de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste 1970. Tome IV: Publications de lInstitut Orientaliste de Louvain 12; Louvainla-Neuve: Universit de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste 1976. Tome V: Publications de lInstitut Orientaliste de Louvain 24; Louvain-la-Neuve: Universit de Louvain, Institut Orientaliste 1980. _____. (Trans.). (1962). Lenseignement de Vimalakrti (Vimalakrtinirdea). Bibliothque du Muson 51. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, Institut Orientaliste. Lancaster, Lewis. (1976). Samdhi Names in Buddhist Texts. In O. H. de A. Wijesekera, ed., Malalasekera Commemoration Volume (Colombo: Kularatne & Co.), pp. 196202. Lodge, Milton & Taber, Charles S. (2005). The Automaticity of Affect for Political Leaders, Groups, and Issues: An Experimental Test of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis. Political Psychology 26(3), pp. 455482. Morris, James P., Squires, Nancy K., Taber, Charles S. & Lodge, Milton. (2003). Activation of Political Attitudes: A Psychophysiological Examination of the Hot Cognition Hypothesis. Political Psychology 24(4), pp. 727745. Pranke, Patrick. (2011). On saints and wizards: Ideals of human perfection and power in contemporary Burmese Buddhism. Journal of the Inter national Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011], pp. 453488. Pyysiinen, Ilkka. (2009). Supernatural Agents: Why We Believe in Souls, Gods, and Buddhas. New York: Oxford University Press. Rgamey. Konstanty. (1938/1990). The Bhadramykravykaraa: Intro duction, Tibetan Text, Translation and Notes. First ed. Warsaw 1938. Reprinted, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1990. Safran, J. & Greenberg, L. (1986). Hot cognition and psychotherapy process: An information processing/ecological perspective. In P. Kendall, eds., Advances in cognitive behavioral research and Therapy (New York: Academic Press), Vol. 5. 143-177 _____. (1987). Affect and the unconscious: A cognitive perspective. In R. Stern, ed., Theories of the Unconscious. Hillsdale, N.J.: The Analytic Press. _____. (Eds.). (1991). Emotion, Psychotherapy & C hange. New York: Guilford. Scheible, Kristin (2011). Priming the lamp of dhamma. The Buddhas miracles in the Pli Mahvasa. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011], pp. 435451. Scott, Rachelle M. (2011). Buddhism, miraculous powers, and gender Rethinking the stories of Theravda nuns. Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 33 (2010) [published 2011], pp. 489 511.
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Srensen, Jesper. (2002). The Morphology and Function of Magic Revisited. In I. Pyysiinen & V. Anttonen, eds., Current Approaches in the Cognitive Science of Religion (London Continuum), pp. 177202. Stache-Rosen, Valentina & Mital, Kusum. (Eds.). (1968). Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im lteren Buddhismus, II. Das Sagtistra und sein Kommentar Sagtiparyya. [Nach Vorarbeiten von Kusum Mital bearbeitet von Valentina Stache-Rosen]. In 2 parts: Teil I & Teil II. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin. Institut fr Orientforschung. Verffentlichung 65/12 (Sanskrittexte aus den Turfanfunden, herausgegeben im Auftrage der Akademie von Ernst Waldschmidt, IX). Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Stevenson, Daniel. (1995). Anthologized selections under the headings Pure Land Buddhist Worship and Meditation in China, Tales of the Lotus Sutra, and Death-Bed Testimonials of the Pure Land Faithful. In Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., Buddhism in Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press), respectively pp. 359379, 427451, and 592602. Thagard, Paul. (2006). Hot Thought: Mechanisms and Applications of Emotional Cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Westen, Drew & Gabbard, Glen O. (2002). Developments in Cognitive Neuroscience: I. Conflict, Compromise, and Connectionism. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 50, pp. 5398.
Notes on contributors
Martin T. adam is Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Victoria, Canada, where he is cross-appointed with the Department of Pacific and Asian Studies. He received his Ph.D. from McGill University in 2003. Recent articles have appeared in the Buddhist Studies Review, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, and Argumentation. A collaboration with Wayne Codling, Buddhist Perspectives on Terrorism, appeared in Bryan Rennie and Philip T. Tite (eds.), Religion, Terror and Violence: Religious Studies Perspectives. New York 2008. Ongoing research interests include Buddhist meditation theory and practice, Buddhism and hermeneutics, Buddhist ethics, and mysticism. His present research is specifically focused on ideas of agency and action in early Buddhist moral thought.
Martin T. Adam Department of Pacific and Asian Studies University of Victoria PO BOX 3045, Stn CSC Victoria, B.C. V8W 3P4 Canada E-mail: mtadam@uvic.ca
William Chu is the Chair of Religious Studies Department at University of the West, California. Two book projects of his are near completion: A BuddhaShaped Hole Yinshun (19062005) and The Spiritual Crisis in Contemporary Chinese Buddhism & A Buddhist Solution to the God Problem. His research foci include early Buddhist meditation and contemporary Chinese Buddhism. He is also the creator of the Contemplative Studies concentration at the University of the West.
William Chu 8003 Tuscany St. Fontana CA 92336 USA E-mail: mooninhands@gmail.com
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Bradley S. Clough teaches courses on Asian religions at The University of Montana. He has published several articles and book chapters on early Indian Buddhism and the history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. His new book, Noble Persons Paths: Diversity and Controversy in Theravada Buddhist Soteriology, is forthcoming from Cambria Press.
Bradley S. Clough Liberal Studies/Asian Religions LA 101 The University of Montana 32 Campus Drive Missoula, MT 59802 USA E-mail: Bradley.Clough@mso.umt.edu
Vincent EltsChingEr completed his PhD at the University of Lausanne (2003) and has been a research fellow at the Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia (Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna) since then. After a series of studies dedicated to the Buddhist epistemologists polemics against Brahmanical orthodoxy, his research interests have shifted to the religious background and apologetic programme of late Buddhist philosophy in India. His publications include monographs on Buddhist polemics against the caste system (2000), Dharmakrtis views of mantras (2001) and the Buddhist epistemologists critique of the Mms doctrine of the authorlessness of the Veda (2007).
Vincent Eltschinger Austrian Academy of Sciences Institute for the Cultural and Intellectual History of Asia Apostelgasse 23 1030 Vienna Austria E-mail: veltsch@oeaw.ac.at
Bronwyn Finnigan is a Professional Teaching Fellow in the Philosophy Department at the University of Auckland. Her research focuses on the nature of action and agency as an interface for issues in philosophy of mind and ethics. Her recent publications address this issue in the context of Indo-Tibetan Buddhist philosophical traditions (Madhyamaka and Pramavda) as well as Classical Chinese (Confucianism and Daoism). She is currently working on a foundational analysis of the practical intellect as a
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form of rationality engaged in unreflective ethical action.

Bronwyn Finnigan Department of Philosophy University of Auckland Private Bag 92019 Auckland, New Zealand 1142 E-mail: bronwyn.finnigan@gmail.com
David V. Fiordalis is currently Assistant Professor and Co-Chair in the Department of Religious Studies at Linfield College in McMinnville, Oregon. Previously, he has taught Sanskrit, Classical Tibetan, Buddhist Studies and Asian Religions at Kathmandu University and Albion College, among other institutions of higher education. He received his doctorate from the University of Michigan in 2008 with a dissertation on the topic of miracles and superhuman powers in South Asian Buddhist literature. At present, he is working on a book on Indian Buddhist miracle traditions.
David V. Fiordalis Department of Religious Studies Linfield College 900 SE Baker St. McMinnville, OR 97128 USA E-mail: fiordalisi75@gmail.com
Jay L. garFiEld is Doris Silbert Professor in the Humanities, Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Logic Program and of the Five College Tibetan Studies in India Program at Smith College, Professor in the graduate faculty of Philosophy at the University of Massachusetts, Professor of Philosophy at Melbourne University and Adjunct Professor of Philosophy at the Central University of Tibetan Studies. Among Garfields most recent books are The Oxford Handbook of World Philosophy (edited with William Edelglass, Oxford 2010), Western Idealism and its Critics (CUTS Press 2011), Indian Philosophy in English from Renaissance to Indepdendence (with Nalini Bhushan, Oxford 2011).
Jay L. Garfield Department of Philosophy Smith College Northampton, MA 01063 USA E-mail: jgarfield@smith.edu
Luis . gmEz is A. F. Thurnau Emeritus Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, Religious Studies and Psychology and formerly The Charles O. Hucker Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor. He is currently Professor
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Investigator at El Colegio de Mxico, Mxico. His research interests include Mahyna Buddhism in India, stra and stra literature, Buddhist exegesis and hermeneutics, as well as Psychology of Religion. His most recent publication is Camino al despertar: el Bodhicaryvatra de ntideva, traduccin castellana del texto snscrito, estudio y notas. Ediciones Siruela, Madrid 2009.
Luis scar Gmez Rodrguez Centro de Estudios de Asia y frica El Colegio de Mxico Camino al Ajusco Nm. 20 Mxico DF, Mxico 01000 E-mail: lo2gomez@gmail.com
Peter harvEy (PhD, Lancaster 1981) is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Sunderland, UK. His research focuses on early Buddhist thought and practices, and Buddhist ethics. He edits Buddhist Studies Review, journal of the UK Association for Buddhist Studies, having founded the Association in 1995 with Ian Harris, and from 2002 to 2011 ran an online MA Buddhist Studies program. He is author of An Introduction to Buddhism: Teachings, History and Practices (University of Cambridge Press 1990, 2nd edn. 2012), The Selfless Mind: Personality, Consciousness and Nirvana in Early Buddhism (Curzon Press 1995) and An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics: Foundations, Values and Practices (University of Cambridge Press 2000). He is currently working on Spiritual Nobility in Early Buddhism: Noble Path, Noble Persons, and the Four True Realities that they See.
Peter Harvey 10 Cedar Drive Farewell Hall Durham City, DH1 3TF United Kingdom E-mail: peter.harvey@sunderland.ac.uk
Stephen JEnkins is Professor of Religious Studies at Humboldt State University. He received his doctorate from Harvard University in 1999. His research has been primarily focused on Buddhist concepts of compassion, their philosophical grounding, and their ethical implications. His most recent publication is Making Merit through Warfare According to the Arya-Bodhisattva-gocara-up-
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yaviaya-vikurva-nirdea Stra, in Mark Juergensmeyer and Michael Jerryson (eds.), Buddhist Warfare. New York 2009.
Stephen Jenkins Religious Studies Humboldt State University Arcata, CA, 95521 USA E-mail: Stephen.Jenkins@humboldt.edu
Richard F. nanCE is Assistant Professor of South Asian Buddhism in the Department of Religious Studies at Indiana University, Bloomington. He is the author, most recently, of Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Buddhism (New York 2012).
Richard F. Nance Department of Religious Studies Indiana University Bloomington 230 Sycamore Hall Bloomington, IN 47405-7005 USA E-mail: rfnance@indiana.edu
Patrick PrankE is an Assistant Professor of Religious Studies in the Department of Humanities at the University of Louisville where he teaches Asian religions with a focus on South and Southeast Asian Buddhism. Pranke received his doctorate in Buddhist Studies from the University of Michigan in 2004. He has conducted research and worked in Burma and northern India for a number of years and is affiliated with the Buddhist academy, Thitagu Kaba Buddha Takkatho, in Sagaing, Burma. His research interests include Burmese monastic history and historiography, sagha-state relations, Buddhist scholasticism, weikza tradition and Burmese popular religion. His interests in north India include village Hinduism, pilgrimage and the geography of sacred sites. In the United States his interests include immigrant Buddhism and the dynamics of integration.
Patrick Pranke Department of Humanities Bingham Humanities Bldg 200F University of Louisville Louisville, KY 40208 USA E-mail: ppranke@umich.edu
Kristin sChEiblE is an Assistant Professor of Religion at Bard College. Her Ph.D. dissertation entitled For the Anxious Thrill and Serene Satisfaction of Good People: Rethinking the Pli Mah-
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vasa (Harvard University, 2006), examines the ethically transformative power of narrative tropes and characters in the Pli Mahvasa, an important historical source in the construction of Theravda Buddhism.
Kristin Scheible Religion Program, Bard College Box 5000 Annandale-on-Hudson, NY 12504 USA E-mail: scheible@bard.edu
Rachelle M. sCott is an Associate Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Tennessee-Knoxville. Scotts research focuses on contemporary Theravda Buddhism in Southeast Asia. Her first book, Nirvana for Sale?: Buddhism, Wealth, and the Dhammakya Temple in Contemporary Thailand (SUNY 2009), examined the controversy over a Thai temples wealth and proselytization techniques in the 1990s. Her next project examines the emergence of new prosperity goddess cults in Thailand.
Rachelle M. Scott 501 McClung Tower Department of Religious Studies University of Tennessee Knoxville, TN 37996 USA E-mail: rjacobs2@utk.edu
Tom J. F. tillEmans is Emeritus Professor of Buddhist Studies at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. His recent work has been largely on comparative philosophy and Madhyamaka. Latest publication: Mark Siderits, Tom Tillemans, Arindam Chakrabarti (eds.), Apoha. Buddhist Nominalism and Human Cognition. New York 2011. He is chief editor of The 84000 (http://www.84000. co), a project to translate Buddhist canonical texts.
Tom J. F. Tillemans Section de langues et civilisations orientales Universit de Lausanne CH-1015 Lausanne Switzerland E-mail: Tom.Tillemans@unil.ch
Abraham vlEz dE CEa is Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Religion at Eastern Kentucky University. His research interests lie in the areas of early Buddhism (historical Buddha), Buddhist Ethics, and Buddhist-Christian Studies. His hermeneutical goal is to provide the most accurate and charitable interpretation of the Buddha of the Pli Nikyas. His critical-con-
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structive goal is to explore how the Buddhas thought may help address current ethical and theological problems. He has published four books in Spanish, Buddha (1998), Buddhism (2000), Ngrjuna (2003) and together with Amadeo SolLeris Los Sermones medios del Buddha (1999). In English, he has published articles in Buddhist Studies Review, Journal of Buddhist Ethics, BuddhistChristian Studies (Sophia), Philosophy East and West.
Abraham Vlez de Cea Department of Philosophy and Religion Case Annex 268 Eastern Kentucky University Richmond, KY 40475 USA E-mail: Abraham.Velez@eku.edu
Alexander WynnE is an Assistant Editor on the Dhammachai Tipitika Project, Wat Dhammakaya, Thailand, and an Assistant Editor for the Journal of the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies. His major research interests are Pli literature, Theravda Buddhism and the history of Indian Buddhism, in particular the evolution of the Buddhas teachings in the pre-Asokan period. He has written two other articles on historical and conceptual aspects of early Buddhist teachings on the self, which can be found in the Thai International Journal of Buddhist Studies, volume I (2009).
Alexander Wynne 168 Prescot Road Aughton Nr. Ormskirk Lancashire L39 5AG United Kingdom E-mail: alxwynne@hotmail.com
The International Association of Buddhist Studies

Cristina Scherrer-Schaub (Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, Paris) President Richard Salomon (U. of Washington, Seattle) Vice-President Ulrich Pagel (SOAS, U. of London) General Secretary Jrme Ducor (U. of Lausanne) Treasurer Regional Representatives: Janet Gyatso (Harvard University, Cambridge MA) Kazunobu Matsuda (Bukkyo University, Kyoto) David Seyfort Ruegg (London) Peter Skilling (Bangkok) Directors at large: Max Deeg (Cardiff University, Wales UK) Andreas Doctor (Center for Buddhist Studies, U. of Kathmandu) Paul Harrison (U. of Stanford, Palo Alto) Pascale Hugon (IKGA, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna) Helmut Krasser (IKGA, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna) Sara McClintock (Emory University, Atlanta) Anupa Pande (National Museum, New Delhi) Parimal Patil (Harvard University, Cambridge MA) Akira Saito (U. of Tokyo)
According to article V 1 (g) and (h) of the Constitution of the IABS, the previous president (i.e., Oskar von Hinber) and the General Secretary (i.e., Tom Tillemans) will remain on the Board as Directors at Large for a four year term. The four regional representatives and the editors of the JIABS (i.e., Birgit Kellner and Helmut Krasser) will also be on the Board. The International Association of Buddhist Studies, founded in 1976, is devoted to promoting and supporting scholarship in Buddhist Studies in all its aspects, past and present, around the world. Membership is open to scholars of all academic disciplines. Membership dues are USD 55 for full members, USD 30 for student members, USD 1300 for life members. Subscriptions to the JIABS for libraries and other institutions are USD 90. Dues and subscriptions may be paid in the following ways: 1. NEW: Online by Paypal (http://iabsinfo.net/index.htm#payment) 2. by direct bank to bank transfers in US dollars or in the equivalent amount in Euros or Swiss francs. The transfers should be to the IABS accounts at the Banque Cantonale Vaudoise, Pl. StFranois, Ch-1001 Lausanne, Switzerland (SWIFT CODE: BCVLCH2L, clearing no. 7677), account numbers, 983.51.04 for US dollars, 5042.09.82 for EUR and 983.51.02 for Swiss francs. 3. by Visa or Mastercard 4. by cheque payable to the Association Internationale dtudes Bouddhiques (IABS). There will be no supplementary charges for cheques drawn in Swiss currency on Swiss banks. Otherwise, please add 10 dollars or 15 Swiss francs to cover our processing charges. 5. by Euro cheque in Swiss francs. Prospective members from developing countries may contact the Treasurer concerning subsidized membership rates. Dues and subscriptions are payable per calendar year by December 31 of the previous year. Payments other than direct bank transfers should be sent to Dr. Jrme Ducor, Dept of Oriental Languages and Cultures, Anthropole, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.
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William Chu The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643) Vincent Eltschinger Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology Part II Richard F. Nance Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth On the privileged lie Alexander Wynne The tman and its negation Martin T. Adam No self, no free will, no problem Bronwyn Finnigan Buddhist metaethics Jay L. Garfield What is it like to be a bodhisattva? Peter Harvey An analysis of factors related to the kusala/akusala quality of actions Stephen Jenkins On the auspiciousness of compassionate violence Tom J. F. Tillemans Madhyamaka Buddhist ethics Abraham Vlez de Cea Value pluralism in early Buddhist ethics David V. Fiordalis Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine Bradley S. Clough The higher knowledges in the Pli Nikyas and Vinaya Kristin Scheible Priming the lamp of dhamma The Buddhas miracles in the Pli Mahvasa Patrick Pranke On saints and wizards Ideals of human perfection and power Rachelle M. Scott Buddhism, miraculous powers, and gender Rethinking the stories of Theravda nuns Luis O. Gmez On Buddhist wonders and wonder-working Notes on the contributors
Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies JIABS Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)

Jiabs 33-1,2 2010

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JIABS

Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies

Volume 33 Number 12 2010 (2011)

Indian Buddhist metaethics

Guest editor: Martin T. Adam

239 267 299

Stephen JEnkins On the auspiciousness of compassionate violence

Guest editor: David V. Fiordalis

David V. Fiordalis Miracles in Indian Buddhist narratives and doctrine

The timing of Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty (1368-1643)

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Cited in Araki (Yang) 1978: 372373. Dasheng ru lengqie jing, T. 16.619620.

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Abbreviations and bibliography Abbreviations

Yogcra resurgence in the Ming dynasty

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology1 Part II

For Jacques May

2.1. Dependent origination

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

2.2. Ignorance, inference, and the path toward salvation

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Ignorance, epistemology and soteriology (2)

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

2. Exceptions to the general rule

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

3. Returning to a house on fire

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

4. Buddhas as perfected speakers: on truth and benefit in Pli texts

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth

5. Deception in the Pli jtaka literature

Tall tales, tathgatas, and truth