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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI JACKSON DIVISION

KENNETH W. ADAMS, ET AL. VS. RANKIN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, ET AL.

PLAINTIFFS CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:67CV4156-TSL-MTP DEFENDANTS

RANKIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICTS MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PEARL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR EXPERT DISCLOSURE OF MICHAEL D. KENT AND FOR AUTHORIZING EXPERT DISCLOSURE VIA RULE 31 DEPOSITION ON WRITTEN QUESTIONS; AND IN SUPPORT OF RCSDS MOTION TO QUASH PPSDS SUBPOENA TO TESTIFY AT A DEPOSITION SERVED ON MR. KENT, RCSDS MOTION TO STRIKE DEPOSITION ON WRITTEN QUESTIONS OF MICHAEL D. KENT, AND RCSDS MOTION TO EXCLUDE MICHAEL D. KENT AS AN EXPERT WITNESS FOR PPSD RANKIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT (RCSD), by counsel, respectfully submits its MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO PEARL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICTS (PPSDS) MOTION FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME FOR EXPERT DISCLOSURE AND DEPOSITION OF MICHAEL D. KENT, AND IN SUPPORT OF RCSDS MOTION TO QUASH DEPOSITION SUBPOENA, MOTION TO STRIKE DEPOSITION, AND MOTION TO EXCLUDE MICHAEL D. KENT AS AN EXPERT WITNESS FOR PPSD: I. INTRODUCTION A. Longstanding Litigation: This desegregation case began in 1967. At that time Rankin County School District (RCSD) covered the entirety of Rankin County. Pearl Public School District (PPSD) was created by the City of Pearl in 1976. Four annexations by the City of Pearl led to the anomalous result of territory outside PPSD but within the municipal limits of

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the City. For its part, the City of Pearl consistently represented in those annexation proceedings that annexation had no effect on school district boundaries or on PPSD. B. PPSDs Demand for Money and Students: Things have changed. PPSD now wants more tax base and it is looking to RCSD for the tax money. PPSD now says its black student population is growing too large. It says that without 8.5 acres of predominantly white territory being taken from RCSD and given to PPSD, essentially the annexation areas that are part of the City of Pearl but outside PPSDs 1976 boundaries, there is a possibility that ten years from now PPSD may reach the tipping point when blacks will constitute just under 45% of the students enrolled in PPSDs schools, triggering white flight and eventually leading to a predominantly black school system like Jackson Public School District. Its demand is based on speculation. C. PPSDs Six Experts: On May 9, 2012, PPSD designated six (6) experts that it says will support its claims [Doc. 60], and it filed written reports of five (5) of those experts [Docs. 571, 57-2, 57-3, 57-4 and 60-1] . May 9 was the deadline established under the Agreed Scheduling Order for PPSD to comply with the expert designation and report requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 26(a)(2)(A) and (B). No written report was filed for the sixth PPSD expert, Michael D. Kent. D. Michael D. Kent: Mr. Kent is the focus of a PPSDs motion in which PPSD says it cannot provide a written expert report prepared and signed by Mr. Kent that includes the detailed information required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). Instead, PPSD wants to depose Mr. Kent on written questions1 on July 16, 2012, over two months from now. It wants to do this without regard to the explicit requirement of Rule 26(b)(4)(A) that it provide its expert report before deposing its expert. RCSD has attempted to resolve this unusual issue of substituting an expert written report under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) with an expert deposition on written questions. RCSD requested a reasonable extension of the expert designation and report
1

The written questions listed in PPSDs Rule 31 deposition notice include every core issue in this litigation that will be addressed by RCSDs experts. These include current and future demographics of PPSDs student population, projected enrollment trends and projected population growth in the Pearl area, school funding and school finance issues bearing on assessed valuation, taxation policies, and the financial impact of PAZ/PPSD enlargement on PPSDs tax base and on RCSD, quality of educational opportunities, educational equality and educational achievement levels provided by schools in PPSD, and the effects of racial diversity of the PPSD student population on learning and educational achievement. (Deposition on Written Questions of Michael D. Kent [Doc. 56], 5/11/12).

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deadline for its experts,2 but PPSD decided to hold RCSDs feet to the fire, insisting that RCSD file its expert reports by the June 9, 2012 deadline set in the scheduling order.3 In PPSDs Designation of Expert Witnesses (Doc. 57, 5/11/12), which accompanied its motion now before this Court, it stated: Pearl PSD will not oppose any reasonable extension of any other deadline in the Agreed Scheduling Order [Doc. 43] that may be made necessary hereby. [PPSDs Designation of Expert Witnesses, pp. 4-5 [Doc 57], 5/11/12]. E. PPSDs Opposition to Extension of Deadlines: PPSD has now set a deposition of its sixth expert for July 16, 2012 and opposes RCSDs request to extend the expert designation and report deadlines by a reasonable period of time. It has done so in utter disregard of Rule 26(b)(4)(A), which makes provision of the experts report a condition precedent to conducting the expert deposition. Such an extension would give RCSDs experts the opportunity to review deponent Mr. Kents opinions, the basis and reasons for them, the data or information he considered in forming his opinions, any exhibits relied on by deponent Kent in giving his deposition testimony, and other cases in which deponent Kent has previously testified as an expert. Even though Mr. Kent is being subpoenaed to give deposition testimony on July 16, 2012 covering many of the core issues that RCSDs expert witnesses will address, PPSD refuses to agree to a reasonable extension of the expert designation and report deadlines for RCSDs experts in order to accommodate the July 16, 2012 deposition of PPSDs sixth expert witness. For these reasons and for reasons set forth herein, RCSD opposes the PPSDs motion for enlargement. For the same reasons, RCSD has moved to quash PPSDs deposition subpoena served on Mr. Kent, moved to strike the Deposition on Written Questions of Mr. Kent, and moved to exclude Mr. Kent as an expert witness for PPSD. Alternatively, RCSD requests this Court to approve and authorize a reasonable extension of the deadlines for RCSDs experts to be designated and their written reports to be filed, a request PPSD has rejected as wrong.

Exhibit A May 16, 2012 E-Mail from Mr. Griffith. Exhibit A May 18, 2012 E-Mail from Mr. Robertson.

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II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS A. This Courts Agreed Scheduling Order required PPSD to file its Rule 26 designation of experts and expert reports on May 11, 2012. PPSD has designated six experts, each of whom it anticipates providing expert opinion testimony at trial within the meaning of Rule 26(b)(4)(A). It has submitted reports for five. As to its sixth expert, Michael D. Kent, it seeks an extension of the expert report deadlines that have been in effect since January 31, 2012 and asks this Court to approve an unorthodox method of securing an expert report from Mr. Kent through a Rule 31 deposition on written questions to be taken on July 16, 2012. PPSD does this while insisting that RCSD proceed with designating its experts, submitting its cross-questions to the Rule 31 questions that are set forth in the Deposition of Mr. Kent (actually, a document that serves as a notice of deposition) and providing their written reports on June 11, 2012 as provided under the scheduling order. B. Timely disclosure: PPSDs attempt to substitute the formalistic and rigid procedure of a Rule 31 deposition for an appropriate expert written report unfairly ignores the Agreed Scheduling Order and the paramount need for timely Rule 26 expert disclosure. Such timely disclosure is keyed to trial [and] occurs before summary judgment motions are made, and the rule therefore may affect what is usable in support or opposition to such motions. 8A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, and Richard L. Marcus, Fed. Prac. & Proc. 2031.1, at 42 (2010). C. Each of the five experts already designated by PPSD and for whom it has filed written reports were contacted by PPSD well before the May 9, 2012 expert designation and report deadline. Each of these five experts were engaged to do their work within a time frame that enabled each of them to file his or her report by the May 9, 2012 deadline set forth in the Agreed Scheduling Order. No exception should be made for PPSDs sixth expert. D. Explicit Compliance as Best Practice: The best practice for complying with the requirements for a timely expert designation and expert report under local rules, Rule 26 (a)(2)(A) and (B), and Rule 26(b)(4)(A) is to comply with the expert disclosure rules explicitly.4 PPSD elected to forego explicit compliance with the expert disclosure rules with respect to its
4

As Judge Barbour recognized in Robbins v. Ryans Family Steak Houses East, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 448, 453 (S.D. Miss. 2004), the best practice regarding the designation of any expert is for the attorney to comply with [Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B)] explicitly and submit to the other party a written report prepared and signed by the witness.

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sixth expert, scheduled the deposition of its expert without providing the report of that expert and thus without complying with the explicit requirements of Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and proposed to take that experts deposition over two months later on written questions. PPSD erred in assuming it could depose its expert in this manner in lieu of a timely submitted report. E. Hamburger factors: Both the Fifth Circuit and the U.S. District Judges in the Southern District of Mississippi have consistently held that four factors must be considered in determining whether to exclude an expert who is not properly designated or whose expert opinions are not timely disclosed5 under the rules: (1) the explanation for the failure to identify the witness PPSD talked with its sixth expert witness on April 16, 2012, yet waited to file its motion until late afternoon on May 11, 2012, the due date for its expert designation and report deadline. PPSD has not been diligent in doing so. This factor militates against allowing Mr. Kents testimony. (2) the importance of the testimony PPSDs counsel will not or cannot say6 what possible opinions this sixth expert witness may give in his deposition on written questions, but this much is clear: This expert witness is apparently not of critical importance to PPSDs case, especially in light of the five experts PPSD has already designated and for whom timely reports have been filed. This factor militates against allowing Mr. Kents testimony. (3) potential prejudice in allowing the testimony PPSDs effort to delay complying with the expert reporting requirements of Rule 26 does in fact prejudice RCSD. It has received nothing from PPSD about the subject matter of the opinions or the basis for those opinions. RCSD can only guess at what this witness may say based on a parsing of PPSDs written deposition questions, many of which track PPSDs prolix pleadings. It is also clear that many of these questions deal with and relate to the same core issues as will be addressed by RCSDs experts, yet RCSD is expected to disclose its
5

As a word of caution to future litigants, this Court is not shy about striking delinquent opinions. Hilderbrand v. Levi Strauss & Co., 2011 WL 2946717, at *6 (S.D. Miss. 2001), citing Bradley v. Cooper, 2007 WL 4624613, at *7 (S.D. Miss. 2007) 6 Although we do not know exactly what he will say, former Supt. Mike Kent will not be introducing any new topic that has not been covered to one extent or another by one or more of our other experts. (Exhibit A May 18, 2012 E-mail from Mr. Robertson)

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experts and produced their written reports before Mr. Kent gives his deposition testimony. This factor militates against allowing Mr. Kents testimony. (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice This is not a case in which a continuance will cure the potential prejudice to RCSD, although RCSD has proposed as an alternative that the Court consider authorizing an extension of deadlines for designation of its own experts and filing of their written reports following the Kent deposition, while maintaining all other relevant deadlines for completion of discovery, motions and pretrial. PPSDs proposal to substitute an experts deposition testimony for a formal written report is an affront to both the letter and spirit of the expert disclosure rules. It is unfair. It is wrong. And it will prejudice RCSD by upending this Courts Scheduling Order, marginalizing this Courts control of its docket, ignoring the explicit directive of Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and sandwiching RCSDs experts between PPSDs rebuttal experts and Mr. Kent. It is for good reason that such a distortion of Rule 26 has never been authorized. This factor militates against allowing Mr. Kents testimony. Either denial of PPSDs Motion for Enlargement or a reasonable extension of RCSDs expert designation and report deadline for all of its experts would be fair and reasonable alternatives. III. APPLICABLE LAW RELATING TO EXPERT DISCLOSURE A. The factors enumerated in Hamburger v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 361 F .3d 875, 883 (5th Cir.2004), militate against allowing a party to engage in this kind of tactical delay that trumps the Courts control of its docket while it treats the expert disclosure rules as discretionary. As the Fifth Circuit found in Hamburger, trial courts are not obligated to continue a trial when the Hamburger factors militate against permitted expert testimony from a witness whose report has not been timely filed, since [o]therwise, the failure to satisfy the rules would never result in exclusion, but only in a continuance. Because of a trial courts need to control its docket, a partys violation of the courts scheduling order should not routinely justify a continuance.7 B. RCSD is neither rigid nor formalistic with respect to about enforcement of the rules. Before filing its response and opposition to PPSDs motion it sought in good faith to work out a
7

Hamburger, 361 F. 3d at 883-84.

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compromise arrangement8 with PPSD that would enable PPSD to proceed with its expert deposition of Mr. Kent upon written questions, extending the deadline for RCSD to file all of its expert designations and all of the written reports of its experts 30 days later, but PPSD would not agree. Timely and complete disclosure of expert opinions and anticipated expert testimony in the manner and format contemplated by Rule 26 is crucial in this case, and no exception should be carved out for PPSDs sixth expert. C. The breadth, scope and sheer magnitude of the proposed expert testimony from PPSDs witnesses defy imagination, assuming each survives Daubert challenges. For example, over two dozen fields of expertise are described for PPSDs five experts for whom it has submitted written expert reports and C.V.s as required by Rule 26 include: public educational administration and policy at the national, state and local levels, public school racial and ethnic pupil placement, furtherance of quality and equality of educational opportunities in public schools, stability of public school pupil populations, measures of success in public school desegregation and the long term stability thereof, measures of educational achievement and school success, school patronage, public school finance, public school desegregation nationally and in Mississippi, public policy, maintenance, success and stability of voluntary and court-ordered desegregation plans,

The solution proposed by RCSD was that PPSD depose Mr. Kent on July 16, 2012 as noticed or on such earlier date as it can reasonably do so, following which RCSD shall have 30 days to designate its experts and file their reports, with all remaining depositions of experts to be completed and all other discovery completed by October 5, and all remaining deadlines provided by the agreed scheduling order to remain unchanged. This proposal would give PPSD a clear incentive to expedite the taking of Mr. Kents deposition. Alternatively, PPSD could depose Mr. Kent on July 16 as planned, following which RCSD would designate its experts and file their reports by August 16, with all other deadlines set forth in the agreed scheduling order to be moved back at least 60 days, with a revised scheduling order to be agreed upon and submitted to District Judge Tom Lee for approval. (Exhibit A May 16, 2012 E-Mail from Mr. Griffith)

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response of school patrons to policies pursued in furtherance of quality and equality of educational opportunities in public schools and to changes in housing and pupil demographics, white flight, the tipping point, school districts achievement of unitary status, school district demography, enrollment and pupil population projections, boundary modifications and redistricting, demographic analyses and migration in the Deep South including Mississippi, small area population projections and estimates and use of U.S. Census data, city and regional planning, enlarging municipal corporate limits, criteria in annexations, political and other redistricting, economic and community development, county, municipal and other local public finance, ad valorem assessment and taxation, and local population demographics.

D. PPSD provided no CV for its sixth expert, nor did it delineate any statement, list or description of opinions and the basis for those opinions. It ignored Rule 26(b)(4)(A). What it provided on the May 9 deadline for furnishing its expert report was a deposition subpoena and notice of deposition of Michael D. Kent pursuant to Rule 31, FRCP, setting forth written questions cover every core issue in this litigation that will be addressed by RCSDs experts, including the following: (1) current and future demographics of PPSDs student population, (2) projected enrollment trends and projected population growth in the Pearl area,

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(3) school funding and school finance issues bearing on assessed valuation, taxation policies, and the financial impact of PAZ/PPSD enlargement on PPSDs tax base and on RCSD, (4) quality of educational opportunities, educational equality and educational achievement levels provided by schools in PPSD, and (5) the effects of racial diversity of the PPSD student population on learning and educational achievement. E. RCSDs experts should have a reasonable opportunity to review and evaluate Mr. Kents expert testimony on these issues before RCSD designates any of its experts and submits any of their written reports. PPSD must provide its expert disclosures at the times and in the sequence that the court orders. F.R.Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B) and (C). Rule 37(c)(1) puts teeth into this requirement by automatically excluding any evidence not properly disclosed under F.R. Civ. P. 26(a). The policy undergirding Rule 26 expert disclosures is clear and applies to this attempt by PPSD to do an end-run around the expert report requirement: In these days of heavy caseloads, trial courts in both the federal and the state systems routinely set schedules and establish deadlines to foster the efficient treatment and resolution of cases. Those efforts will be successful only if the deadlines are taken seriously by the parties. Parties must understand that they will pay a price for failure to comply strictly with scheduling and other orders and that failure to do so may properly support severe sanctions and exclusion of evidence.9 F. Rule 26s policy will be undercut if PPSD is allowed to substitute a Rule 31 deposition for an expert witnesss signed written report.10 Such a cavalier departure from the explicit requirements of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(b)(4)(A), coupled with disregard of the Agreed Scheduling Order cannot be permitted in light of its prejudicial effect on RCDC. This prejudice will only be aggravated by Rule 31s notoriously inflexible procedure that would also require
9

Wong v. Regents of the University of California, 410 F. 3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005). The report must contain (1) a statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them;(2) the facts or data considered by the witness in forming them; (3) any exhibits that will be used to summarize or support them; (4) the witnesss qualifications, including a list of all publications authored in the previous ten years; (5) a list of all other cases in which, during the previous four years, the witness testified as an expert at trial or by deposition; and (6) a statement of the compensation to be paid for the study and testimony in the case. F.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(B).
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RCSD to formulate and file cross-questions 14 days after service of the notice of the deposition, after which RCSD is expected to wait until July 16, 2012 before Mr. Kents answers to the direct questions are known.

G. The expert disclosure and report rules are no ordinary set of guidelines that can be set aside on a whim, nor does a cumbersome deposition upon written questions drafted by PPSDs counsel provide the equivalent to an adequate expert report.11 Rather, the importance of the proposed expert testimony of PPSDs sixth expert witness, Michael Kent, cannot singularly override the enforcement of local rules and the scheduling order. His formal testimony in response to written questions under the rigid procedure of Rule 31 is no substitute for a written report. A similar effort to avoid compliance with Rule 26 was rejected in Griffith v. Northeast Illinois Reg'l Commuter R.R. Corp., 233 F.R.D. 513, 517 (N.D.Ill.2006). There the court held that the plaintiff failed to comply with the requirement for a Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report, where it designated its expert, Dr. Spiro Stamelos, as a treating medical professional of whom plaintiff intended to ask questions under Fed.R.Evid. 702, 703 or 705. Attached to the designation was Dr. Stamelos' curriculum vitae and a transcript of plaintiff's counsel's questioning of Dr. Stamelos under oath in the presence of a court reporter regarding his opinions as to the plaintiff's present and future medical condition and damages. The transcript consisted of 12 pages almost entirely of leading questions posed by Griffith's attorney, and Dr. Stamelos' response to those questions. 233 F.R.D. at 517. Dr. Stamelos had opined that [i]f [Griffith] continues this present work, ... I believe that this man will have to have surgery to work any job. Or he will have to quit working altogether because the condition will become very, very disabling. Id. While that opinion was probably intended to support the plaintiff's claim for damages, the plaintiff's disclosure of Dr. Stamelos as a treating physician provided virtually no information about the basis for the opinion. The only foundation for Dr. Stamelos' opinion regarding Griffith's present work and its impact on his future disability was the hypothetical posed by Griffith's attorney; the doctor had no way of knowing whether the hypothetical bore any resemblance to Griffith's actual work duties.

11

See Griffith v. Northeast Regional Commuter R.R., 233 F.R.D. 513 (N.D. Ill. 2006)(disclosure of opinions by plaintiffs expert held not a written report setting forth expert opinions and their basis where the disclosure consisted of a transcript of plaintiffs counsel asking leading questions and the expert answering those questions.)

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H. There is an equally serious deficiency in the Rule 31 Substitute proposed by PPSD. If, as PPSD is requesting, the Rule 26(a)(2)(B) expert report requirement can be satisfied by a subsequent deposition upon written questions, notwithstanding the fact that Rule 26(b)(4)(A) makes the provision of an expert report a condition precedent for a party to take the experts deposition, all drafted by PPSDs counsel, the inherent problem of a lack of foundation for the transcribed opinions will present a problem for this Court as the Daubert gatekeeper as well. Rule 31s procedure for submitting cross-questions, redirect questions, re-cross questions and objections in writing before the deposition is taken is beyond archaic. Such an unrealistic and inflexible procedure will prejudice RCSD by forcing it to disclose on June 11, 2012 long after its own experts have submitted their written reports to disclose deficiencies, methodological flaws, and questions of reliability relating to this sixth experts proposed testimony that will not be given via Rule 31 deposition until July 16, 2012. The formalistic procedure of a Rule 31 deposition on written questions cannot provide meaningful information about the basis for the opinions expressed by Mr. Kent, and he will be effectively insulated from a searching, thorough, and narrowly tailored cross-examination that is directed to the reliability of data, the witness methodology in applying and interpreting that data, and the detailed inquiry into whether the data, information, and facts relied on by the witness are actually generally accepted. Moreover, RCSD will be forced to do engage in this archaic procedure after after PPSD has already had one opportunity to file rebuttal reports directed at RCSDs experts. In effect, PPSDs Rule 31 expert deponent will be able to testify after all of RCSDs experts have been required to submit their required expert reports, statements of opinions, and bases for those opinions. This is neither fair nor consistent with the letter and spirit of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and Rule 26(b)(4)(A), and it make a mockery of the scheduling order. I. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), the Supreme Court emphasized that the federal trial judge has a special obligation to act as a gatekeeper to screen out purported scientific expert testimony that is not both relevant and reliable. In Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147-48, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Court held that the same standard applies to all expert testimony. Whether the proposed expert seeks to base his testimony on professional studies or entirely on personal experience, the expert must employ the same level of intellectual rigor that
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characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field. Id. at 152. Thus, the court as gatekeeper has a duty to exclude testimony in the guise of expert opinion that does not meet the standards of Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 702 requires that such testimony be based on sufficient facts or data, be the product of reliable principles and methods, and result from the witness' reliable application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case. A skillfully executed, piercing and properly tailored Daubert examination is precluded when a proposed expert testifies in response to written questions and is not subject to a rigorous cross-examination. Daubert does not presuppose a scripted examination process, and it never did. Moreover, this Courts gatekeeper role will be compromised by such an unorthodox procedure as the one proposed by PPSD. J. Finally, if PPSD truly believed this testimony was in fact important for PPSDs case, then PPSD must have known and must have realized how critical it was for PPSD to timely designate Mr. Kent as an expert witness and furnish his written report within the reasonable deadlines set by this Courts scheduling order and required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A) before making the first move to schedule his expert deposition. PPSDs motion for enlargement should be denied as untimely under the Agreed Scheduling Order and noncompliant with the expert report requirement of Rule 26(a)(2)(B) and the pre-deposition reporting requirement of Rule 26(b)(4)(A). The above reasons and the exigencies that have been created by PPSDs precipitous actions provide justification, moreover, for this Court to grant RCSDs Motion to Quash PPSDs Subpoena to Testify at a Deposition served on Mr. Kent, RCSDs Motion to Strike Deposition on Written Questions of Michael D. Kent , and RCSDs Motion to Exclude Michael D. Kent as an expert witness for RCSD. Each of these motions has been filed separately, but the legal underpinnings for each are provided in this MEMORANDUM OF AUTHORITIES. In the alternative, this Court has ample judicial discretion to require PPSD to do precisely what RCSD proposed. This Court may consider authorizing and approving a reasonable extension of the expert designation and report deadlines for all of RCSDs experts, requiring such designations to be made and reports to be filed 30 days after the completion of the deposition of Mr. Kent.

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CONCLUSION For the above reasons, RCSD respectfully submits that RCSDs Motion for Enlargement is without merit and that this Court should deny it. Alternatively, this Court may consider exercising its judicial discretion to authorize and approve a reasonable extension of the expert designation and report deadlines for all of RCSDs experts, requiring such designations to be made and reports to be filed 30 days after the completion of the deposition of Mr. Kent, with all corresponding deadlines appropriately adjusted. Respectfully submitted, this 21st day of May, 2012. RANKIN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT By its Attorneys Griffith & Griffith, Attorneys By: _/s/ Ben

Griffith___________________

Benjamin E. Griffith, MSB #5026 Phelps Dunbar LLP By: _/s/Joseph

Adams_____________________

Joseph L. Adams, MSB #10591 Harrell & Rester By: __/s/ Fred Harrell_______________________ Fred M. Harrell, Jr., MSB #3165

Of Counsel: GRIFFITH & GRIFFITH 123 South Court Street P. O. Drawer 1680 Cleveland, MS 38732
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Phone No. 662-843-6100 Fax No. 662-843-8153 Joseph L. Adams, Esq. Phelps Dunbar, LLP P.O. Box 16114 Jackson, MS 39235-6114 Office: 601-360-9708 Cell: 601-927-8597 Fax: 601-360-9777 Email: adamsjo@phelps.com Fred M. Harrell, Jr. Harrell & Rester Attorneys at Law 306 E. Government Street Brandon, MS 39042 Phone: (601) 825-7236 Fax: (601) 825-7237 Email: harrell.rester@bellsouth.net

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Benjamin E. Griffith, one of the attorneys for Rankin County School District, do hereby certify that I have this day electronically filed the above Memorandum of Authorities in Opposition to PPSDs Motion for Enlargement, with the Clerk of the Court using the ECF system, which has sent notification of such filing to each of the following:
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E. Charlene Stimley Priester, Esq. Melvin V. Priester, Esq. Priester Law Firm 820 North Jackson Street Jackson, MS 39202 ecpriester@priesterlawfirm.com mpriester@gmail.com COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFFS Alfred B. Jernigan, Jr. Assistant U.S. Attorney Chief, Civil Division 188 East Capitol Street, Ste. 500 Jackson, MS 39201 Email: al.jernigan@usdoj.gov Christopher S. Awad, Esq. U.S.D.O.J. Civil Rights Division Educational Opportunities Section Patrick Henry Building 950 Pennsylvania Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530 Email: christopher.awad@usdoj.gov COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Arthur F. Jernigan, Jr. Harris, Jernigan & Geno, PLLC P.O. Box 3380 587 Highland Colony Parkway Ridgeland, MS 39158 Email: ajernigan@harrisgeno.com Ajernigan@hjglawfirm.com
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James L. Robertson Paul E. Barnes Wise, Carter, Child, & Caraway, P.A. P.O. Box 651 Jackson, MS 39205 Email: jlr@wisecarter.com peb@wisecarter.com COUNSEL FOR PEARL PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT

This the 21st day of May, 2012.

Ben Griffith____________
Benjamin E. Griffith

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