Case Digest

Triplex vs. PNB Facts: Here, petitioner assails the order of the trial court disallowing the admission in evidence of the testimony of Roque on the opinion of the OGCC. By that fact alone, no grave abuse of discretion could be imputed to the trial court. Furthermore, the said order was not an error of jurisdiction. Even assuming that it was erroneous, the mistake was an error in judgment not correctable by the writ of certiorari. Held: The determination made by the trial court regarding the admissibility of evidence is but an exercise of its jurisdiction and whatever fault it may have perpetrated in making such a determination is an error in judgment, not of jurisdiction. Hence, settled is the rule that rulings of the trial court on procedural questions and on admissibility of evidence during the course of a trial are interlocutory in nature and may not be the subject of a separate appeal or review on certiorari. They must be assigned as errors and reviewed in the appeal properly taken from the decision rendered by the trial court on the merits of the case

Certiorari defined -Certiorari as a special civil action is proper when any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy at law. The writ may be issued only where it is convincingly proved that the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, or an act too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or that the trial court exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Purpose of Certiorari -To correct that impression and to avoid clogging the appellate court with future certiorari petitions it should be underscored that the office of the writ of certiorari has been reduced to the correction of defects of jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose.

Esquivel vs. Ombudsman Facts:

Case is all about a police officer allegedly to have been arbitrarily detained by herein petitioner mayor and his brother. The issue arises when the ombudsman recommends the filing of charges against them and that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over criminal case. Petitioner wants a writ of prohibition to stop Sandiganbayan to assume criminal jurisdiction.

Held: Note that a writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim.39 As earlier discussed, the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24777-78 is clearly founded on law. Second, being an extraordinary remedy, prohibition cannot be resorted to when the ordinary and usual remedies provided by law are adequate and available. Prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient to afford redress.

David vs. Rivera Facts: Ejectment case MCTC ordered respondent to vacate the land; respondent filed a petition for prohibition on ground that MCTC has no jurisdiction. They want to prevent the enforcement of the MCTC order which states that respondent should vacate. Petitioner contends that the petition for prohibition must failed as appeal was available. Held: As earlier pointed out, jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters is now expressly vested in the DAR, through the DARAB. With the facts doubtlessly presenting a question of jurisdiction, it follows that the respondent has availed of the proper, speedy and adequate remedy which is the special civil action of prohibition. It is a settled rule that prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels.

Prohibition defined -Directed against a person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions, or ministerial functions in which a person or entity must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Purpose -Prevent the exercise of jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim.

Militante vs. CA Facts: Petitioners land was covered by the Government Urban Land reform program. This was granted and given time to relocate informal settlers living in his land. The issue arises when the order of demolition which was then validated was not implemented by NHA Manager Annabelle Carandang as the land was expropriated under PD 1315. Hence a petition for prohibition is filed. Held: Prohibition is a preventive remedy. It seeks for a judgment ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be illegal. In the case at bar, petitioner does not pray that respondent Carangdang should be ordered to desist from relocating the squatters. What petitioner challenges is respondent Carangdang's refusal to implement the demolition clearance issued by her administrative superiors. The remedy for a refusal to discharge a legal duty is mandamus, not prohibition. Petitioner is not also entitled to writ of mandamus as mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is incumbent upon petitioner to show that he has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant of the writ of mandamus. He failed to discharge this burden. The records show that there is no direct order from the NHA General Manager addressed to respondent Carangdang to evict the squatters

and demolish their shanties on the subject property. The NHA demolition clearance issued by General Tobias on January 21, 1982 was addressed to Mayor Asistio, the mayor of Caloocan City. The clearance's revalidation by NHA General Manager Monico Jacob was likewise addressed to Mayor Asistio.

Mandamus defined - is a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Purpose -Is to compel the performance of an act which a tribunal, corporation, board, or person unlawfully neglects to do.

DISTINGUISHED FROM EACH OTHER Certiorari Directed against a person exercising to judicial or quasijudicial functions Object is to correct Prohibition Mandamus

Directed against a person Directed against a person exercising judicial or quasi-judicial exercising ministerial duties functions, or ministerial functions Object is to prevent Object is to compel

Purpose is to annul or modify the Purpose is to stop the proceedings Purpose is to compel performance of the act required and to collect proceedings

damages Person or entity must have Person or entity must have Person must have neglected a acted without or in excess of acted without or in excess of ministerial duty or excluded jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of another from a right or office discretion discretion

Prohibition Always the main action Directed against a court, a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions Ground must be the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction

Injunction May be the main action or just a provisional remedy Directed against a party

Does not involve a question of jurisdiction

Prohibition To prevent an act by a respondent

Mandamus To compel an act desired

May be directed against entities exercising judicial May be directed against judicial and non-judicial or quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions entities Extends to discretionary functions Extends only to ministerial functions

Mandamus Clarifies legal duties, not legal titles

Quo warranto Clarifies who has legal title to the office, or franchise Respondent usurps the office

Respondent, without claiming any right to the office, excludes the petitioner

Certiorari as a Mode of Appeal (Rule 45)

Certiorari as a Special Civil Action (Rule 65)

only questions of law may be raised

question of whether the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion may be directed against an interlocutory order of the court or where not appeal or plain or speedy remedy available in the ordinary course of law

involves review of judgments, awards, or final orders

filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment or filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, final order or resolution appealed from, or of the order or resolution denial of the petitioners MNT or MfR; the SC may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of 30 days stays execution of the judgment, award or order appealed from lower courts or judges thereof are not impleaded Execution is not stayed unless a TRO or a writ of PI has been issued the lower court or judge is impleaded as a public respondent MfR is a condition precedent, subject to exceptions original jurisdiction is invoked; SC exercises its power of control and supervision over proceedings of the lower court de Leon: Extension of 15 days may be granted for compelling reasons de Leon: May be filed in all courts of general jurisdiction

Prior MfR not required appellate jurisdiction is invoked

de Leon: Exension of 30 days may be granted for justifiable reasons de Leon: Filed with only the SC

de Leon: SC may deny the decision motu propio

Panama vs. CA Facts: Ownership of land is in issue. Respondent was ordered to vacate the property and the sheriff is ordered to implement the Writ of Execution commanding the sheriff "to cause the [respondents]to forthwith remove from said premises" and to restore petitioner thereto. This was followed by a Writ of Demolition, ordering the sheriff to destroy and demolish respondents houses and constructions, it appearing that despite the earlier writ, respondents refused to vacate the lot "subject-matter of these cases".

On November 6, 1997, respondents went to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 45879, praying the appellate court to restrain the sheriff from implementing the writ of demolition, which, according to them, the sheriff is poised to implement the next day, November 7, 1997. Court of Appeals grants the petition of the respondent and order sheriff not to implement the writ. Petitioner contends that the CA should have dismissed the prohibition filed by respondents as prohibition is granted only when there is no more plain, speedy and adequate remedy available. That what respondent should do is to appeal and not to stop the sheriff. Held: Appeal as a remedy is available only in cases where there is an error of judgment on the part of a court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency. An error of judgment is one which a court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction and which error is reviewable only by appeal. It is, therefore, an instance where a court having jurisdiction on the subject matter of the case renders an erroneous decision. As to the issue that respondent should had filed a petition for certiorari and not prohibition, the court says: Besides, the special civil action of certiorari is directed only against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. It is not available as a remedy for the correction of acts performed by a sheriff during the execution process, which acts are neither judicial nor quasijudicial but are purely ministerial functions. Upon the other hand, prohibition is directed against a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. Likewise, certiorari and prohibition differ as to purpose. For while certiorari is aimed at "annulling or modifying" a proceeding, prohibition is directed at "commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified in the petition".

Enriquez vs. Macadaeg Facts: Respondent judge refused to grant the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner for the venue is improperly laid as the land in issue is in Negros and not in Cebu. So a writ of mandamus is sought by the petitioner. Held: Respondent judge committed a manifest error in denying the motion, mandamus is not the proper remedy for correcting that error, for this is not a case where a tribunal "unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office" or "unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right." It is rather a case where a judge is proceeding in defiance of the Rules of Court by refusing to dismiss an action which would not be maintained in his court. The remedy in such case is prohibition (section 2, Rule 67), and that remedy is available in the present case because the order complained of, being merely of an interlocutory nature, is not appealable. While the petition is for mandamus, the same may well be treated as one for prohibition by waiving strict adherence to technicalities in the interest of a speedy administration of justice pursuant to section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court.

Madrigal Transport vs. Lapanday Holdings Corp. ( Certiorari and Appeal Distinguished) Facts: The case is all about of insolvency. Issue arises when petitioner files a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the decision of lower court which grants respondents motion to dismiss for failure of Madrigal to state cause of action. Issue: The Honorable Court of Appeals committed egregious error by ruling that the order of the lower court which granted private respondents Motions to Dismiss are not proper subjects of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Held: Petitioner claims that it correctly questioned the trial courts Order through its Petition for Certiorari. Respondents insist that an ordinary appeal was the proper remedy. We agree with respondents. In fact, appeal and certiorari are two different remedies that are mutually exclusive; they are not alternative or successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefore is grave abuse of discretion. Basic is the rule that certiorari is not a substitute for the lapsed remedy of appeal. In the case at bar, certiorari will not lie as the issue is the error of judgment specifically the granting of motion to dismiss. It is not an error of jurisdiction in which certiorari is proper.

Aquino vs. CA

Facts: A case of illegal dismissal was brought by petitioner and contends that he did not receive retirement benefits. Respondent argue that it comply requirements in labor code. NLRC founded with the respondent and CA affirmed ruling of NLRC. Hence this petition for certiorari. Held: One of the requisites for the issuance of a writ for certiorari is that there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The special civil action of certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a suit fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum despite the availability of the remedy of appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be used as a substitute for appeal, where the latter remedy is available. If any, the petitioner's proper recourse would have been to elevate the assailed CA decision to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, let alone the fact that the petitioner erroneously resorted to Rule 65 when appeal by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 was available, the error is worse compounded by the circumstance that the petitioner did not file any motion for reconsideration with the CA prior to the filing of the present petition. The general rule is that a previous motion for reconsideration in the court of original proceeding is necessary before invoking the certiorari jurisdiction of a higher court. A petition for certiorari will not generally be entertained unless the public respondent has had, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct or rectify the error imputed to him.

RULE 65 and RULE 45 DISTINGUISHED a. In appeal by certiorari, the petition is based on questions of law which appellant wants to resolve in the appellate court. In certiorari as an original action, the petition raises the issue as to whether the lower court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. b. In rule 45 it involves review of judgment, award or final order on the merits, while in rule 65 it is directed against interlocutory order of the court prior to appeal from the judgment or where there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy. c. In rule 45 it must be filed within the reglementary period for appeal, while in rule 65 it should be filed not later than sixty days from notice of judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed. d. Rule 45 stays the execution of judgment, while rule 65 does not unless Preliminary Injuction or TRO is issued. e. In rule 45 lower courts are not impleaded, while in rule 65 the parties are the aggrieved party against the lower court and prevailing. In other words, the lower court is impleaded. f. In rule 45 prior filing of MR is no required while in rule 65 MR is condition precedent subject to exceptions.

g. In rule 45 courts is in appellate jurisdiction and power of review, while in 65 court is in exercise of original jurisdiction under its power of control and supervision over the proceedings of lower courts.

Topacio vs. ONG Facts: Petitioner question the appointment of respondent ONG as a associate Justice in SandiganBayans as he is disqualified for being an alien. Petitioner filed a prohibition so that ONG will ceased from discharging his duties. Held: The title to a public office may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto proceedings; and it cannot be assailed collaterally, even through mandamus or a motion to annul or set aside order. In Nacionalista Party v. De Vera,the Court ruled that prohibition does not lie to inquire into the validity of the appointment of a public officer. x x x [T]he writ of prohibition, even when directed against persons acting as judges or other judicial officers, cannot be treated as a substitute for quo warranto or be rightfully called upon to perform any of the functions of the writ. If there is a court, judge or officer de facto, the title to the office and the right to act cannot be questioned by prohibition. If an intruder takes possession of a judicial office, the person dispossessed cannot obtain relief through a writ of prohibition commanding the alleged intruder to cease from performing judicial acts, since in its very nature prohibition is an improper remedy by which to determine the title to an office. Even if the Court treats the case as one for quo warranto, the petition is, just the same, dismissible. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or unlawfully held or exercised the public office, and may be commenced by the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, as the case may be, or by any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another. Nothing is more settled than the principle, which goes back to the 1905 case of Acosta v. Flor, reiterated in the recent 2008 case of Feliciano v. Villasin, that for a quo warranto petition to be successful, the private person suing must show aclear right to the contested office. In fact, not even a

mere preferential right to be appointed thereto can lend a modicum of legal ground to proceed with the action.

Morabe vs. Brown Facts: This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila denying a petition of the chief of the Wage Administration Service for the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang by the respondent William Brown. Held: It is evident that the court a quo erred in considering that mandatory injunction is preventive in nature, and may not be granted by the Court of First Instance once the act complained of has been carried out. The action of the petitioner is not an action of injunction but one of mandamus, because it seeks the performance of a legal duty, the reinstatement of Pablo S. Afuang. The writ known as preliminary mandatory injunction is also a mandamus, though merely provisional in character.

Herrera v. Barretto - JURISDICTION is the power to hear and decide cases [Herrera vs. Baretto& Joaquin, 25 Phil. 245]. It is the power with which courts are invested with the power of administering justice, that is, for hearing and deciding cases. In order for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties [Republic Planters Bank vs. Molina, 166 SCRA 39]. -PRINCIPLE OF THE EXERCISE OF EQUITY JURISDICTION is a situation where the court is called upon to decide a particular situation and release the parties from their correlative obligations but if it would result in adverse consequences to the parties and the public, the court would go beyond its power to avoid negative consequences in the release of the parties [Agne vs. Director of Lands, 181 SCRA 793; Naga Telephone Co. vs. CA, 48 SCAD 539].

-Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein is what makes up jurisdiction. Where there is jurisdiction of the person and the subject matter, the decision of all other question arising in the case is but an exercise of that jurisdiction.

Microsoft v. Best Deal Computer Center Corporation Facts: In the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court petitioner submits that the court a quo gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it ruled that the law does not allow an ex parte provisional remedy of seizure and impounding of infringing evidence. It maintains that Sec. 216.2, Part IV, of RA 8293 authorizes such order. It concedes though that while RA 8293 does not expressly mention the provisional and ex parte nature of the remedy, nonetheless, Art. 50 of the TRIPS Agreement amply supplies the deficiency.

Held: Petition Dismiss. Petitioner asserts that respondent trial court gravely abused its discretion in denying its application for the issuance of an ex parte order. However, other than this bare allegation, petitioner failed to point out specific instances where grave abuse of discretion was allegedly committed. It was never shown how respondent tribunal supposedly exercised its power in a despotic, capricious or whimsical manner. There being no hint of grave abuse of discretion that can be attributed to the lower court, hence, it could be safely held that the assailed orders were rendered in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction. Significantly, even assuming that the orders were erroneous, such error would merely be deemed as an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. As long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. The distinction is clear: A petition for certiorari seeks to correct errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the court's findings. Where a court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment. Certiorari under Rule 65 is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Petitioner's rights can be more appropriately addressed in the appeal.

Campos vs. Wislizenus Facts: The rule enunciated in the case just cited would apply to a case where the proper service of notice on the candidates voted for was challenged and the court determined upon the facts presented, after hearing the allegations of the parties and their arguments based thereon, that service had not been made as required by law. Such a determination involves a mixed question of law and fact; and it is a rule, as stated in the case cited, that, where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the determination of a question of fact and that question has been determined by the court after a hearing, that determination is conclusive and can not be attacked collaterally.

Held: Where the jurisdiction of the court depends upon the existence of facts, and the court judicially considers and adjudicates the question of its jurisdiction, and decides that the fact exist which are necessary to give it jurisdiction of the case, the finding is conclusive and cannot be controverted in a collateral proceeding.

Santos v. Tarlac Facts: Judge withdraws his compromise decision on an expropriation case, and petitioner contends that a judge cannot do that as it will result to a grave abuse of discretion. Held: The fact that the decision was rendered upon a compromise, gives it no greater validity than if it had been rendered after a trial. It stands on the same footing as that of an ordinary judgment which may be opened or vacated on adequate grounds, such as fraud, mistake or absence of real consent.
No abuse of discretion is shown by the petitioners, and by abuse of discretion we mean such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Leung v. OBrien Facts: Petitioner question the power of the lower court in issuing writ of attachment on basis of cause of action of money lost in gaming. He stress that such basis is not contemplated by law and such issuance is in excess of its jurisdiction. The basis of cause of action is ACT 1757 sec. 7.

Held: Petition denied, the lower court has the power to issue writ of attachment as the cause of action was based on contract which the basis is ACT 1757. Thus it has authority to grant the writ. Indeed the repeated use of expression excess of jurisdiction shows that the lawmaker contemplated the situation where a court, having jurisdiction should irregularly transcend its authority as well as the situation where the court is totally devoid of lawful power.

Erroneous Exercise of Jurisdiction In the case of Napa v. Weissenhagen, the court emphasize that in much as the court is within its jurisdiction, all questions and decisions made is conclusive and however it be erroneous or irregular, they cannot be corrected by certiorari. It is clear at a glance that the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction to consider a motion to dismiss the appeal and the exercise of that jurisdiction did not result in its loss, it having been exercised in accordance with the established forms and methods of procedure prescribed by the practice of the country. Writ of certiorari will not be issued unless it clearly appears that the court to which it is to be directed acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in performing the acts complained of. We have also held that if a court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the person, decision upon all question pertinent to the cause are decisions which its jurisdiction and however irregular or erroneous they may be, they cannot be corrected by certiorari.

Threatened Excess of Jurisdiction Although the court has the power to try a case or has jurisdiction, it shows an acts which is equivalent to exercise the power without a legal basis or not containing evidence, hence it is an attempt or a threat to excess of jurisdiction

Yangco vs. Rhode Held: The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This Code only grants the rights to alimony to a wife. This status not appearing by a final judgment, the court is without jurisdiction to make any order in the matter. Therefore mandamus is the proper remedy upon the facts related.

Plain, Speedy, Adequate Remedy Definition San Pedro v. Hon. Asdala Facts: The honorable court of appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in (sic) excess of jurisdiction in denying the petition for certiorari and for failure to resolve the issue rose in the certiorari regarding the jurisdiction of the metropolitan trial court to take cognizance of a case of accion reinvindicatoria.

Held:
Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. Hence, certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal, especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned such loss or lapse.

Camutin vs. Spouses Potente Facts: There is an unlawful detainer case between the petitioner and respondent. MCTC suspend the proceeding until after the accomplishment of amicable settlement in the Lupon. Petitioner files a case of certiorari on the ground that MCTC erred in suspending the case and RTC in dismissing the petition. Held: Petition dismiss for being moot and academic as the MCTC has revive the unlawful detainer case and its subsequent dismissal thereof on the grounds afore stated have rendered the resolution of the present petition for review superfluous and unnecessary.

Certiorari is an extraordinary remedy available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. While a petition for certiorari is not allowed against any interlocutory order issued by the court in the unlawful detainer or ejectment case, in the case at bar, the filing of a petition for certiorari challenging the MTCs Orders dated 5 June 2007 and 16 August 2007 cannot be deemed a dilatory remedy resorted to by petitioners. Petitioners could also not appeal from the orders of the MTC because these only ordered the indefinite suspension and archiving of the case. The case was not resolved on the merits so there is actually no decision from which petitioners can appeal. Thus, the RTC could have validly ruled on the petition for certiorari instead of dismissing it on the ground that it is a prohibited pleading.

Exception to the rule on no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy Sim v. NLRC Facts: Petitioner was alleged to have been illegally dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the finding of Labor Arbiter that petitioner was not illegally dismissed. Hence petitioner files a petition for certiorari under 65 but failed to filed a MR. It contends that her case is an exception to the rule. Held: Under Rule 65, the remedy of filing a special civil action for certiorari is available only when there is no appeal; or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A plain and adequate remedy is a motion for reconsideration of the assailed order or resolution, the filing of which is an indispensable condition to the filing of a special civil action for certiorari. This is to give the lower court the opportunity to correct itself.

There are, of course, exceptions to the foregoing rule, to wit:

(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

Petitioner, however, failed to qualify her case as among the few exceptions, she said her case is purely questions of law. In fact, the Court notes that the petition filed before the CA failed to allege any reason why a motion for reconsideration was dispensed with by petitioner. It was only in her motion for reconsideration of the CA's resolution of dismissal and in the petition filed in this case that petitioner justified her non-filing of a motion for reconsideration.

Prohibition against Accomplished Acts Alcantara et al vs. Ermita Facts: On October 13, 2005, lawyers Samson S. Alcantara, Ed Vincent S. Albano, and Rene B. Gorospe, herein petitioners, filed with this Court the instant petition for prohibition in their capacity as Filipino citizens and taxpayers. They alleged that under Article XVII of the Constitution, President MacapagalArroyo has no authority to participate in the process to amend or revise the Constitution. Likewise, she has no power to create a Consultative Commission to study and propose amendments and allocate public funds for its operations.

Held: From the foregoing, it is evident that the writ of prohibition is one which commands the person to whom it is directed not to do something which he is about to do. If the thing is already done, it is obvious that the writ of prohibition cannot undo it, for that would require an affirmative act, and the only effect of a writ of prohibition is to suspend all action, and to prevent any further proceeding in the prohibited direction. In other words, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain future action. Prohibition, as a rule, does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli. The Consultative Commission has been dissolved. Consequently, we find no more reason to resolve the constitutional issues raised by petitioners.

Judicial Functions -has the power to determine what the law is, what are the legal rights of the parties, and undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.

Ministerial Acts Pefianco vs. Moral Facts: In her petition for mandamus, respondent Moral miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for Held: Moral is not entitled to petition for mandamus. Mandamus lie only to ministerial duties and the writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. Ministerial Acts - are acts to be performed in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority without regard to the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.

Pimentel vs. executive Secretary Facts: The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United Nations even without the signature of the President. Held: We rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states. Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of

the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate. The 1935 and the 1973 Constitution also required the concurrence by the legislature to the treaties entered into by the executive. Section 10 (7), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provided: Sec. 10. (7) The President shall have the power, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate, to make treaties xxx.

MANDAMUS TO DIRECT EXERCISE OF JUDGMENT IN A PARTICULAR WAY Hipos vs. Judge Bay Facts: CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NO PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION? Held: Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court. In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the City Prosecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Bays exercise of judicial discretion. There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available

anymore. If petitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay

Mandamus to Enforce Contractual Obligations Comelec v. Judge Quijano-Padilla Facts: Here, the primordial question to be resolved is -- may a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project? Held: Writ of mandamus has never been considered as an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of contract rights of a private and personal nature and obligations which rest wholly upon contract and which involve no questions of public trusts or official duty. Indeed, strictly speaking, it never lies where the party aggrieved has adequate remedy at law, and its aid is only to be invoked to prevent an absolute failure of justice in cases where ordinary legal processes furnish no relief. Akin to our rulings cited above, we hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce the COMELEC's alleged contractual obligations with PHOTOKINA. It has other adequate remedy in law. Moreover, worth stressing is the judicial caution that mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Here, the alleged contract, relied upon by PHOTOKINA as source of its rights which it seeks to be protected, is being disputed, not only on the ground that it was not perfected but also because it is illegal and against public policy.

CONTINUING MANDAMUS MMDA vs. Residents of Manila Bay Held: MMDA has no discretion as to what portion of manila bay to clean. There are laws which clearly establish that MMDA has ministerial duties to clean up areas in manila bay. The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what are assigned them under existing laws. All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.

CLEAR and DEFINED RIGHT Manalo vs. PAIC Savings Bank Facts: On December 4, 1985 or when respondent Vargas failed to exercise her right of redemption within the one (1) year redemption period, respondent bank ipso facto became the absolute owner of the lots. Surprisingly, however, on December 23, 1992, she sold the property for P18,000,500.00 to Angsico, who eventually transferred his rights to petitioner. Not only that, on August 24, 1994, respondent Vargas still leased to petitioner a portion of the subject lots. Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4, 1985, respondent Vargas could no longer legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner. In his complaint, petitioner alleged that he has legal interest in the subject lots, having initially leased a portion of the same from respondent Vargas and then purchased the whole area from Angsico. He prayed that the trial court issue a writ of mandamus compelling respondent bank (1) to allow him to redeem and/or repurchase the subject lots for P18,000,000.00; and (2) to release to him TCT No. 6076 Held: we hold that mandamus is not the proper recourse to enforce petitioners alleged right of redemption. To begin with, mandamus applies as a remedy only where petitioners right is founded clearly in law and not when it is doubtful. In varying language, the principle echoed and reechoed is that legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well-defined, clear and certain. Verily, when respondent bank became the owner of the lots on December 4, 1985, respondent Vargas could no longer legally transfer, cede and convey the property to petitioner, thus petitioner has no founded and legal right. UP vs. CA Facts: In the case at bar, the Board of Regents determined, after due investigation conducted by a committee composed of faculty members from different U.P. units, that private respondent committed no less than ninety (90) instances of intellectual dishonesty in her dissertation. The Board of Regents' decision to withdraw private respondent's doctorate was based on documents on record including her admission that she committed the offense. Petitioners argue that private respondent failed to show that she had been unlawfully excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which she is entitled so as to justify the issuance of the writ of mandamus. They also contend that she failed to prove that the restoration of her degree is a ministerial duty of U.P. or that the withdrawal of the degree violated her right to the enjoyment of intellectual property.

Held: In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan,24 this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P. from the exercise of its academic freedom. In that case, a student who was found guilty of dishonesty and ordered suspended for one year by the Board of Regents, filed a petition for mandamus and obtained from the lower court a temporary restraining order stopping U.P. from carrying out the order of suspension. In setting aside the TRO and ordering the lower court to dismiss the student's petition, this Court said: [T]he lower court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, 1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower court's finding that the implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning. From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the petitioner being required. It is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment.

When and Where to File Laguna Metts vs. Caalam Facts: Respondent was illegally dismissed. Labor arbiter ruled in its favour but the NLRC ruled in favour of herein petitioner. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under rule 65 and filed a MR to extend their time to file. Petitioner assails the motion for extension on the ground that there can be no more extension. Held: Petition granted, rules of court under rule 65 sections 4 has been amended that petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.

The rationale for the amendments under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC is essentially to prevent the use (or abuse) of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to delay a case or even defeat the ends of justice. Deleting the paragraph allowing extensions to file petition on compelling grounds did away with the filing of such motions.

Lapid v. Laurea Facts: Lapid filed a complaint against the respondent school for allegedly suspending their son. In the trial court, they filed a motion to declare respondent on default but this was denied. They filed again a motion for reconsideration but again denied. The CA upheld the denial, hence this petition. Held:Petition dismissed. There are three material dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution was received; second, the date when a motion for new trial or for reconsideration was filed; and third, the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. In the case before us, the petition filed with the CA failed to indicate the second date, particularly the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration. As explicitly stated in the aforementioned Rule, failure to comply with any of the requirements shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition. The rationale for this strict provision of the Rules of Court is not difficult to appreciate. As stated in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, the requirement is for purpose of determining the timeliness of the petition, thus: The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. x xx (Stress supplied.)

Person Aggrieved Concepcion vs. Comelec Facts:

Concepcion filed a petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the comelecs resolution. Comelec contends that the petition should be denied as petitioner has no legal interest or not the person aggrieved entitled to the writ. Held: In a situation wherein the order or decision being questioned underwent adversarial proceedings before a trial court, the "person aggrieved" referred to under Section 1 of Rule 65 who can avail of the special civil action of certiorari pertains to one who was a party in the proceedings before the lower court.

IndespensablePaty Golangco v Fung Held: The petitioner did not join the People of the Philippines as a party in his action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. He thereby ignored that the People of the Philippines were indispensable parties due to his objective being to set aside the trial courts order dated May 23, 2001 that concerned the public aspect of Criminal Case No. 95-145703. The omission was fatal and already enough cause for the summary rejection of his petition for certiorari. The petitioner did not also obtain the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to his petition for certiorari. At the very least, he should have furnished a copy of the petition for certiorari to the OSG prior to the filing thereof,[8] but even that he did not do. Thereby, he violated Section 35(l), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292 (The Administrative Code of 1987), which mandates the OSG to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party.

Although the petition for certiorari bore the conformity of the public prosecutor (i.e., Assistant City Prosecutor DaniloFormoso of Manila), that conformity alone did not suffice. The authority of the City Prosecutor or his assistant to appear for and represent the People of the Philippines was confined only to the proceedings in the trial court.

DOJ Rulings Alcaraz vs. Gonzales

Facts: Alcaraz was charge for attempted murder. But the DOJ secretary move for withdrawal as Gonzales was not able to prove it beyond reasonable doubt. Gonzales file a petition for review under rule 43. Alcaraz opposed and contends that rule 65 should be the proper remedy. Held: The threshold issue is whether the petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy of respondent. We agree with petitioner's contention that respondent resorted to an improper remedy when he filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. It bears stressing that in the determination of probable cause during the preliminary investigation, the executive branch of government has full discretionary authority. Thus, the decision whether or not to dismiss the criminal complaint against the private respondent is necessarily dependent on the sound discretion of the Investigating Prosecutor and ultimately, that of the Secretary of Justice. Courts are not empowered to substitute their own judgment for that of the executive branch. The resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is subject to appeal to the Justice Secretary who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercises the power of control and supervision over said Investigating Prosecutor; and who may affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the ruling of such prosecutor. Thus, while the CA may review the resolution of the Justice Secretary, it may do so only in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, solely on the ground that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. It bears stressing that the Resolution of the Justice Secretary affirming, modifying or reversing the resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor is final. Under the 1993 Revised Rules on Appeals (now the 2000 National Prosecution Service Rules on Appeals), resolutions in preliminary investigations or reinvestigations from the Justice Secretary's resolution, except the aggrieved party, has no more remedy of appeal to file a motion for reconsideration of the said resolution of such motion if it is denied by the said Secretary. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since there is no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary course of law.27

Interlocutory actions are taken by courts when a Question of Law must be answered by an appellate court before a trial may proceed or to prevent irreparable harm from occurring to a person or property during the pendency of a lawsuit or proceeding. Generally, courts are reluctant to make interlocutory orders unless the circumstances surrounding the case are serious and require timely action.