PILAR ATILANO vs.

CHUA CHING BENG Date: March 29, 1958 Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga

ISSUE: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her husband where she refused to live with him on account of some misunderstanding she had with the husbands immediate relatives. RULE: No. Defendant-appellant given the option to

FACTS: Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May, 1951. They lived in Manila with the parents of the defendant. In October of that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a vacation. Plaintiff stayed behind, telling the defendant that she would go back to him later. On September 1953, however, plaintiff filed a complaint of support (P200 per month) against her husband, alleging estrangement since October 1952, incessant bickering and the his inability to provide a home for them without his parents.

support wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his parents home. Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any support. SC Decision: giving the defendant husband Chua Ching Beng the option of supporting his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the parents of the husband. Should plaintiff wife refuse to abide by the terms of this decision, then the defendant-appellant shall be considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his wife. RATIO:

Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however, he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns to Manila and lives with him in a domicile separate from his parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the residence of the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for The person obliged to give support may, at his option, fulfil his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of CFI: Plaintiff is granted a monthly allowance in the amount of 75 pesos. Thus, husband is only obliged to pay for support if The defendant then filed a petition that elected to fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay City. CFI: Denied petition. CA: Presented to SC for Adjudication under Section 17-6 of RA 296. there is moral or legal reason for him not to provide support in own home. In this case, the primary reason for her leaving are the in-laws and even if this would be seen as legal basis, the fact that husband promised that if she came home he would provide a separate home for them negates this basis. in case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto; Article 299 (Civil Code)

pendente lite with the CFI,

Misunderstanding with in-laws does not constitute a moral or legal obstacle that may prevent defendant from fulfilling the said provision. The law provides the husband with the authority to fix the conjugal residence. The fact that he is willing to establish a residence separate from his parents renders the plaintiffs objections to living with her in-laws moot. ONAS v JAVILLO (1934) 59 Phil 733 Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5 children. After Ramonas death, he married Rosario Onas and they had 4 children. - During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land were acquired. Partition was made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage. Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She alleges the following errors: All the properties acquired during the second marriage were acquired with the properties of the first marriage. same did not TC erred in approving the partition include all properties of the dated September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the deceased. ISSUES and RULING: 1) W the community partnership shall continue to exist between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased husband or wife - NO - When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community ceases, for the principles of an

ordinary partnership are not applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules. Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any effect for community of property is admissible and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between husband and wife, and serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by the death of one of the partners. Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annulled or when during the marriage and agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as the spouses are united. 2) W the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage - NO - Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim no share.

3) W the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid - NO - Was based on the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage. ** The property corresponding to the first marriage consists of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of land were acquired during the second marriage.

del Rosario vs del Rosario Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with a son got married. They lived

together in the house of the defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left the conjugal home in 1942.

wife (when Silva knew all the time that he could not marry Esther Peralta because of his undissolved marriage to an Australian woman, a prior wedlock that he concealed from appellee).

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to support Facts Esther in good faith regarded herself as Saturnino's RATIO. Yes. As the marriage vow does not include making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal justification for wife's refusal to live with husband, taking into account the "traditional hatred between wife and her mother-in-law". It is true that wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the residence (Art. 58 CC), but this right does not inlcude compelling the wife to live with the mother-in-law, if they cannot get along together. Alimony/support will be set according to the husband's ability to pay. Silva vs. Peralta, 110 Phil 57 ELENITA LEDESMA SILVA - plaintiff-appellant ESTHER PERALTA - defendant-appellee Prayer: (1) Appellant Elenita Silva should be awarded moral damages for Esther Peralta's unauthorized use of the designation of "Mrs. Esther Silva"; (2) The award of pecuniary damages against appellant Saturnino Silva is unwarranted by the facts and the law. Issue WON damages awarded to appellee are a natural and direct consequence of Silva's deceitful maneuvers in making love to appellee, and inducing her to yield to his advances and live with him as his Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in 1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920, defendant Dolores went away from their common home and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the part Date: August 11, 1921 P: Street, J. Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo FACTS: Silva v Peralta unauthorized use of the designation as the wife of another by use of surnames should be charged of damages. MARIANO B. ARROYO. Plaintiff and appellant, vs. DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant and appellee Art. 378 CC - The unauthorized or unlawful use of another person's surname gives a right of action to the latter. Doctrine lawful wife. Saturnino made Esther believe that they were really married

of her husband. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. CFI: Ruled in favor of the defendant -she was granted alimony amounting to P400, as well as other fees In this case, a cross-complaint took place. Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights, and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as his wife. ISSUE: WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home; WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of conjugal rights/absolute order/permanent mandatory injunction. Plaintiff is granted a judicial declaration of defendants lack of sufficient cause to leave the domicile.

the two parties. Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to return to the domicile.

When people understand that they must live togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes (Evans v. Evans)
On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not within the province of the courts to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with much criticism. Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the

RULE: NO on both issues. Defendant is admonished to return to the conjugal home. The permanent mandatory injunction may not be granted. RATIO: On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was present. Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this recognizes the de facto separation of

defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is her duty to return.