FederalismandImmigration:WilltheCourt ChooseFederalUniformityorStatesRights inImmigrationLaw?

TheConstitutionataCrossroads

Introduction
DuringtheoralargumentsinArizonav.UnitedStates,thechallengetoArizonasaggressive immigrationenforcementlaw,theSupremeCourtsJusticesdisplayedakeeninterestinthetension betweenstatesovereigntyandthefederalgovernmentsauthoritytosetuniformnaturalizationand immigrationlaw.ThefollowingexchangebetweenJusticeAntoninScaliaandSolicitorGeneralDonaldB. Verrilli,Jr.,isaprimeexampleofthisimmigrationfederalismdebate: JUSTICESCALIA:[T]hegovernmentcansetforththerulesconcerningwhobelongsinthiscountry. Butif,infact,somebodywhodoesnotbelonginthiscountryisinArizona,Arizonahasnopower? Whatdoessovereigntymeanifitdoesnotincludetheabilitytodefendyourborders? GENERALVERRILLI:YourHonor,theFramersvestedinthenationalgovernmenttheauthorityover immigrationbecausetheyunderstoodthatthewaythisnationtreatscitizensofothercountriesisa vitalaspectofourforeignrelations.1 *** JUSTICESCALIA:....[But][t]heConstitutionrecognizesthatthereissuchathingasstateborders, andthestatescanpolicetheirborders.... GENERALVERRILLI:ButtheycannotdowhatArizonaisseekingtodohere,YourHonor,whichisto elevateoneconsiderationaboveallothers.Arizonaispursuingapolicythatthatmaximizesthe apprehensionofunlawfullypresentaliens,sotheycanbejailedascriminalsinArizona,unlessthe FederalgovernmentagreestodirectitsenforcementresourcestoremovethepeoplethatArizona hasidentified.2 Theconstitutionalobjectivesofstatesovereigntyandfederaluniformityandtheclash betweentheseobjectiveshavegrownincreasinglyimportantinimmigrationlaw.Recently,anumber ofstates,notablyArizona3andAlabama,4haveenactedimmigrationlawsthatthreatentoencourage

Arizonav.UnitedStates,No.11182,tr.at35(April25,2011). Id.at36. 3 SupportOurLawEnforcementandSafeNeighborhoodsAct,S.B.1070,amendedbyH.B.2162(Ariz.2010). 4 AlabamaTaxpayerandCitizenProtectionActof2011,Ala.Laws535,etseq.(2011).SeealsoGa.Code165 46,175100(2011);S.C.Code169460,23660(2011);Miss.Code71113(c)(i)(2011).
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racialprofilinganddiscriminationbylawenforcementofficers,landlords,andbusinesses,aswellas resultintheunlawfuldetentionofU.S.citizenssuspectedofbeingundocumented.Thestates, however,assertthattheyaremerelysteppingintodowhatthefederalgovernmenthasfailedto accomplishnamely,deterandarrestunlawfulmigrantsandthattheseattritionthrough enforcementpoliciesmirrorfederalstandards.Morebroadly,thesestatesarguethatour Constitutionssystemoffederalismpreservesaninherentstateauthoritytoenforceimmigrationlaws andpolicetheirownborders.ThisspateofaggressivestateimmigrationlawswillrequiretheSupreme Courttoclarifythefederalgovernmentsauthorityoverimmigrationlaw,ontheonehand,andthe powerspreservedforthestatesontheother. Indeed,theCourtisatthismomentconsideringtheseissuesasitcraftsitsdecision,likelytobe handeddownverysoon,inArizonasappealfromtheinjunctionagainstkeyprovisionsofArizonas showmeyourpaperslaw,SB1070,issuedbyafederaldistrictcourtandupheldbytheU.S.Courtof AppealsfortheNinthCircuit.5TheRobertsCourthasbeenideologicallysplitoverthecontentand contoursofimmigrantsrights,aswellasthebalanceofpowerbetweenthestatesandthefederal governmentonimmigrationissues.TheCourtrecentlyupheldtheLegalArizonaWorkersActin ChamberofCommercev.Whiting,6withtheconservativeJusticesvotinginfavorofupholdingtheAct, andthemoreliberalJusticesdissenting.7WhileWhitingisarelativelynarrowrulingbasedonspecific statutorylanguage,conservativesseeabroaderstoryemerging.8KrisKobach,coauthoroftheanti immigrantlawsinArizonaandAlabama,hasclaimedthat,[a]lthoughtheSupremeCourtsdecisionin WhitingdidnotdirectlyaddressArizonasSB1070,itgreatlybooststheprospectsofsuccessnotonlyfor thatlaw,butalsoforimmigrationenforcementbillsinanumberofstates.9Inthewakeoforal argumentsintheSB1070case,opponentsofattritionthroughenforcementlawsareconcernedthat Kobachmayberight.10 WiththeArizonacase,theCourthastheopportunitynotonlytosubstantiallyaffectthe conditionsunderwhichimmigrantsliveintheUnitedStates,butalsotosignificantlyreshapetheway principlesoffederalismandpreemptionapplyintheimmigrationcontext.TheConstitutions federal/statebalanceofpowerinthecontextofimmigrationlawisatacrossroads.

TextandHistory:ImmigrationandCitizenship
Throughseveralprovisions,theConstitutiondelegatesthepowertoregulateimmigrationand naturalizationtothefederalgovernment.First,theConstitutionprovidesthatCongressshallhave

UnitedStatesv.Arizona,641F.3d339(9thCir.2011). 131S.Ct.1968(2011). 7 Thevotewas53;JusticeElenaKaganrecused. 8 KrisKobach,LawandBorder,NationalReview,July4,2011,availableat http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/271090/lawandborderkriswkobach?pg=2 9 Id. 10 See,e.g.,AdamLiptak,JusticesSeemSympathetictoCentralPartofArizonaLaw,April25,2012,availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/26/us/consideringarizonaimmigrationlawjusticesareagaininpolitical storm.html?_r=1&ref=arizonaimmigrationlawsb1070

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PowerTo....establishanuniformRuleofNaturalization...throughouttheUnitedStates.11AsJames Madisonexplained,thisprovisionwasincludedintheConstitutiontoimproveupontheflawedArticles ofConfederation:

Thedissimilarityintherulesofnaturalizationhaslongbeenremarkedasafault inoursystem,andaslayingafoundationforintricateanddelicatequestions.... The new Constitution has accordingly, with great propriety, made provision againstthem,andallothersproceedingfromthedefectoftheConfederationon thishead,byauthorizingthegeneralgovernmenttoestablishauniformruleof naturalizationthroughouttheUnitedStates.12 Significantly,AlexanderHamiltonspecificallyusedthefederalpoweroverimmigrationand naturalizationtoillustrateaconstitutionalauthoritygrantedtothefederalgovernmentthatwouldbe repugnantandcontradictoryifexercisedbyastate.13Referringspecificallytotheclausewhich declaresthatCongressshallhavepowertoestablishanUNIFORMRULEofnaturalizationthroughout theUnitedStates,Hamiltonexplainedthat[t]hismustnecessarilybeexclusive;becauseifeachState hadpowertoprescribeaDISTINCTRULE,therecouldnotbeaUNIFORMRULE.14 Furthermore,becauseimmigrationlawsaffectforeignnationalswithinU.S.borders,theyare alsoacomponentofforeignaffairs.CongresshasauthoritytoregulateCommercewithforeign NationsundertheCommerceClause,15andthefederalgovernmenthasbroadpowerundertheForeign AffairsClauses.16AstheSupremeCourthasheld,thesupremacyofthenationalpowerinthegeneral fieldofforeignaffairs,includingpoweroverimmigration,naturalizationanddeportation,ismadeclear bytheConstitution,itshistory,andprecedent.17FromourConstitutionsverybeginnings,then,itwas

U.S.CONST.art.I.,8,cl.4. FederalistNo.42,26566,267(JamesMadison).SeealsoTHE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787(Max Farrand,ed.)(1911),Aug.9,1787(statementofJamesMadison)(acknowledgingthatthe[NationalLegislature]is tohavetherightofregulatingnaturalization);id.,Aug.13,1787(statementofAlexanderHamilton)(Therightof determiningtheruleofnaturalizationwillthenleaveadiscretion[sic]totheLegislatureonthissubjectwhichwill answereverypurpose.). 13 FederalistNo.32,at194.SeealsoHinesv.Davidowitz,312U.S.52,68&n.22(1941)(distinguishingbetweenthe morerobustpreemptionofstateregulationregardingtherightsandlibertiesofaliens,wherepowerhasbeen exclusivelygrantedtothefederalgovernmentundertheConstitution,andstateregulationinareaswherethe Constitutiondoesnotofitselfprohibitstateaction,asinmattersrelatedtointerstatecommerce,suchasstate purefoodlawsregulatingthelabelsoncans). 14 FederalistNo.32,195(emphasisinoriginal). 15 U.S.CONST.art.I,8,cl.3. 16 TheseClausesincludethepowertodeclarewar,foundinArticleI,Section8,Clause11,theSenatespowerto adviseandconsenttotheappointmentofambassadors,foundinArticleII,Section2,Clause2,and,finally,the presidentialpowertomaketreatieswiththeadviceandconsentoftheSenate,foundinArticleII,Section2,Clause 2. 17 Hines,312U.S.at62&n.9(notinghow[t]heimportanceofnationalpowerinallmattersrelatingtoforeign affairsandtheinherentdangerofstateactioninthisfieldareclearlydevelopedinFederalistpapersNo.3,4,5,42 and80).
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understoodthatthefederalgovernmentspoweroverimmigrationwouldpreempteffortsbythestates toregulateimmigrationandnaturalization.18 Ofcourse,ourconstitutionalstructureofgovernmentalsoholdsfasttotheideathat,asJames Madisonexplained,[t]hepowersreservedtotheseveralStateswillextendtoalltheobjects,which,in theordinarycourseofaffairs,concernthelives,libertiesandpropertiesofthepeople;andtheinternal order,improvement,andprosperityoftheState.19Thisresidualsovereigntyinthestatespreserves stateauthorityoverthepublichealthandsafetyofthestatescitizens,unlessthefederalgovernment hasdisplacedstateauthoritypursuanttotheSupremacyClause.Indeed,intheabsenceofastrong federalpresenceintheimmigrationfield,somestatesdirectlyregulatedimmigrationandcitizenship withintheirbordersduringtheearlyyearsofthenation.20 However,thechangesmadetotheConstitutionbytheFourteenthAmendmentunderscored thefederalgovernmentsexclusivepoweroverimmigration,naturalization,andcitizenship.Draftedin 1866andratifiedin1868,theFourteenthAmendmentmadenationalandstatecitizenshiparightofall personsbornornaturalizedintheUnitedStatesandextendedtoallpersonsresidingintheUnited Statesguaranteesofequalprotectionofthelawsanddueprocessoflaw.Operatingintandemwiththe NaturalizationClause,theFourteenthAmendmenttookawaythepowerofstatestodecidewhether personseithernativeorforeignbornwouldbecomecitizens.21 WhiletheFourteenthAmendmentclarifiedthatthestateshadnopowerovercitizenship,the debateoverhowtheConstitutionsprinciplesoffederalisminteractwithexpresslydelegated immigrationauthorityhascontinued.EveninareaswheretheConstitutionclearlydelegatesauthority tothefederalgovernment,supportersoftherecentwaveofstateimmigrationlawspointtoevidence thatthedraftersofourConstitutionexpectedlocallawenforcementofficerstocarryoutfederallaw evenifthestatesdonothavetheconstitutionalauthorityoverthesubstanceofthelaw.Forexample, MadisonsuggestedinFederalist45thatfederaltaxcollectionwillgenerallybemadebytheofficers,

WhiletheConstitutionreferstonaturalization,notimmigrationspecifically,theSupremeCourthaslong recognizedthattheNaturalizationClausealsogivesCongressexclusiveauthoritytoenactthespecialized regulationoftheconductofanalienbeforenaturalization,andthatthesupremacyofthenationalpowerinthe generalfieldofforeignaffairs,includingpoweroverimmigration,naturalizationanddeportation,ismadeclearby theConstitution.Hines,312U.S.at62.JusticeScaliaacknowledgedduringtheargumentoverArizonasSB1070 thattheConstitutionsreferencetonaturalizationhasbeeninterpretedtoencompassimmigrationpolicymore generally.Arizona,tr.at35. 19 FederalistNo.45,29293. 20 SeeGeraldL.Neuman,StrangerstotheConstitution:Immigrants,Borders,andFundamentalLaw(1996). 21 OtheraspectsoftheFourteenthAmendmentfurtherextendedCongressspoweroverimmigrationatthe expenseofthestates.TheFourteenthAmendmentspecificallygrantsCongressthepowertoenforceits guarantees.U.S.CONST.amend.XIV,5(TheCongressshallhavethepowertoenforce,byappropriate legislation,theprovisionsofthisarticle.).WithintwoyearsoftheAmendmentsratification,Congressusedits enforcementpowertoprotecttheconstitutionalrightsofresidentaliens,rejectingchargesthatCongresswas improperlystrik[ing]entirelyatthepolicepoweroftheStatesoverthesubjectofimmigration.Cong.Globe,41st Cong.,2ndSess.1536(1870)(Sen.Casserly).Statescouldnotusetheirpolicepowertorobimmigrantsoftheir ordinarycivilrights.Cong.Globe,41stCong.,2ndSess.3658(1870).SeealsoInreAhFong,1F.Cas.213,218 (C.C.D.Cal.1874)(holdingCaliforniastatuteregulatingarrivalofChineseimmigrantspreemptedbythefederal EnforcementActof1870)(opinionofField,J.). Crossroads:Immigration Page|4
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andaccordingtotherules,appointedbytheseveralStates.Statesevenplayedaroleinimmigration lawduringtheearlyyearsofournation,withthefederalgovernmentrelyingonstatecourtstorecord applicationsforcitizenshipandtoregisteraliensseekingnaturalization.22Thefederalgovernment, however,readstheConstitutionasprohibitingstatesfromsecondguessingCongressschosenmethod ofhowandthroughwhomitimplementsitsdelegatedpowers.23

FederalPower,ImmigrantsRights,andtheSupremeCourt
Inseveralearlycases,theSupremeCourtrecognizedtheexclusiveauthorityofthefederal governmentonmattersofimmigrationandnaturalization.InChiracv.Chirac,24forexample,Chief JusticeJohnMarshalldeclaredthatthepowerofnaturalizationisexclusivelyinCongress,andheld thatafederaltreatybetweenFranceandtheUnitedStatesdefiningthepropertyrightsofFrench immigrantsresidingintheUnitedStatespreemptedaMarylandlawtothecontrary.Sixdecadeslater, inChyLungv.Freeman,aunanimousCourtaffirmedthat[t]hepassageoflawswhichconcernthe admissionofcitizensandsubjectsofforeignnationstoourshoresbelongtoCongress,nottheStates.25 IntheCourtsview,thisspecificallydelegatedfederalauthority,togetherwithguaranteesofthe FourteenthAmendment,sharplylimittheauthorityofstatestodeny[aliens]entranceandabode.26 WhileChyLungwasunanimous,inothercasesaminorityofJusticesrejectedthisbroadviewof congressionalpowerandinsistedthateachofthestateshadthesoleandexclusiverighttojudgefor herselfwhetheranyevilwastobeapprehendedfromtheintroductionofalienpassengersfromforeign countriesandhadarighttoexcludethemifshethoughtpropertodoso.27 ThistensionbetweenJusticeswhoseektopreservefederaluniformityintheareaof immigrationandnaturalization,andthosewhoarejustas,ifnotmore,concernedwithprotectingstate sovereignty,continuestothisday.Inmoderncases,thistensionhasmainlyplayedoutincasesdealing withhowtheCourtsrulesforpreemptionofstatelawareappliedintheimmigrationcontext.Justices favoringfederaluniformityhavearguedforbroadpreemptionofstateimmigrationlawsandimposeda burdenonthestatestoshowthatstatelawsareharmoniouswithfederallawsinthisarea.Justices favoringstatesovereigntyhaveinsistedthatitisthefederalgovernmentsburdentoshowthatstate lawsareincompatiblewithfederalstatutes. Forexample,in1941,inHinesv.Davidowitz,theSupremeCourtstruckdownaPennsylvania statutethatrequiredalienstoregisterwiththestate,carryastateidentificationcard,andpayanominal annualfee.WritingforasixJusticemajority,JusticeHugoBlackstatedthatspecializedregulationof theconductofanalienbeforenaturalizationisamatterwhichCongressmustconsiderindischargingits constitutionaldutyToestablishanUniformRuleofNaturalization....28TheCourtconcludedthat

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Printzv.UnitedStates,521U.S.898,90506(1997)(discussinglaws). BrieffortheUnitedStates,Arizonav.UnitedStates,at24. 24 Chiracv.Chirac,15U.S.259,269(1817). 25 ChyLungv.Freeman,92U.S.275,280(1876). 26 Truaxv.Raich,239U.S.33,42(1915). 27 PassengerCases,48U.S.283,468(1849)(Taney,C.J.,dissenting). 28 312U.S.52,66(1941). Crossroads:Immigration Page|5

thepowertorestrict,limit,regulate,andregisteraliensasadistinctgroupisnotanequaland continuouslyexistingconcurrentpowerofstateandnation,butthatwhateverpowerastatemayhave issubordinatetosupremenationallaw.DissentinginHines,JusticeHarlanStonearguedthattheCourt haderredbybroadlyinterpretingfederalimmigrationlawtopreemptstateregulationinthisareaand byfailingtorecognizethatafterentry,analienresidentwithinastate...issubjecttothepolice powersofthestate....29StonearguedthattheCourtshouldhavefollowedthelongestablished principleofconstitutionalinterpretationthatanexercisebythestateofitspolicepower...is supersededonlywheretherepugnanceorconflictissodirectandpositivethatthetwoactscannotbe fairlyreconciledorconsistentlystandtogether.30 InhisopinionforaunanimousCourtinthe1976caseDeCanasv.Bica,31JusticeWilliamBrennan attemptedtostitchtogetherthevariousthreadsofthemajorityanddissentinHines.TheCourt reiteratedthatthe[p]owertoregulateimmigrationisunquestionablyexclusivelyafederalpower,32 whichincludesauthorityoverwhoshallbeadmitted,theperiodtheymayremain,regulationof theirconductbeforenaturalization,andtheconditionsoftheirnaturalization.33Atthesametime, however,theCourtexplainedthatithasneverheldthateverystateenactmentwhichinanywaydeals withaliensisaregulationofimmigrationandthuspersepreempted.34Reconcilingthesecompeting statefederalinterests,theDeCanasCourtnotedthatCongresshadnotenactedlegislationaddressing sanctionsagainstemployerswhoknowinglyhireunauthorizedmigrants,andthusupheldCalifornias statuteimposingsuchsanctionsasharmoniouswithfederalregulation.35 TheharmonyontheCourtinDeCanasdidnotlastlong.Sixyearslater,inTollv.Moreno,the CourtstruckdownaMarylandpolicythatdeniedinstatetuitionbenefitstocertainclassesofaliens residentinthestate.JusticeBrennan,againwritingforthemajority,reaffirmedthepreeminentroleof theFederalGovernmentwithrespecttotheregulationofalienswithinourborders,andfoundthata discriminatorystatetuitionpolicywaspreemptedintheabsenceofevidencethatCongressever contemplatedthataState...mightimposediscriminatorytuitionchargesandfeessolelyonaccountof thefederalimmigrationclassification.36Inalongandspiriteddissent,thenJusticeWilliamRehnquist, joinedbyChiefJusticeWarrenBurger,criticizedthemajorityforfailingtoapplyapresumptionagainst preemptionandobservedthatneitherCongressunexercisedconstitutionalpoweroverimmigration andnaturalization,noritsexerciseofthatpowerinpassingtheINA,precludestheStatesfromenforcing lawsandregulationsthatproveburdensometoaliens.37 ThemajorityanddissentingopinionsinTolldefinethecontoursoftheideologicaldisputeover thefederal/statebalanceinimmigrationlawthatisplayingoutinUnitedStatesv.Arizonatoday.InToll,

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Hines,312U.S.at76(Stone,J.,dissenting). Id.at80(Stone,J.,dissenting)(quotingSinnotv.Davenport,63U.S.227,243(1859)). 31 424U.S.351(1976). 32 Id.at354. 33 Id.at358n.6(quotingTakahashi,334U.S.410,419(1948). 34 Id.at355. 35 Id.at356. 36 458U.S.1,10,17(1982). 37 Toll,458U.S.at27(Rehnquist,J.,dissenting). Crossroads:Immigration Page|6

JusticeBrennansmajorityopinionexplainedthatDeCanaswastherareexampleofastatutethat survivedthebroadruleofpreemptionofstateregulationbecauseCongressintendedthattheStatesbe allowedtoregulatetheemploymentofillegalaliens.38Indissent,JusticeRehnquistreadDeCanas broadly,arguingthatitsupportedhisviewthatthefederalpoweroverimmigrationandnaturalization doesnotpreclude[e]theStatesfromenforcinglawsandregulationsthatproveburdensometo aliens.39 ThequestionnowiswhethertheRobertsCourtwillmaintainthestrongandexclusivefederal poweroverimmigrationormovethelawinlinewiththenJusticeRehnquistsargumentsindissent, holdingthatstateshaveinherentpowertoprotecttheirownbordersandthatfederalcourtsshouldbe hesitanttostrikedownstateregulationaspreemptedbyfederalimmigrationlaw.

TheArizonaCasesandtheRobertsCourt
Oneyearago,inChamberofCommercev.Whiting,40anideologicallydivided53majorityofthe RobertsCourtJusticeElenaKaganrecusedrejectedclaimsbybusinessandcivilrightsgroupsthat Arizonas2007LegalArizonaWorkersAct(LAWA)intrudesuponfederalimmigrationpolicyregarding aliensemployment.WhileWhitingaddressedafairlynarrowstatutoryquestionanddidnotfully addressthebroaderconstitutionalquestionsabouttherespectiverolesofthefederalandstate governmentswithrespecttoimmigration,thedecisionwascloselywatchedforcluesabouthowthe Courtwouldaddressthewiderrangingattemptsbystates,includingArizona,todealwithperceived problemsassociatedwithillegalimmigration.ThecluesgivenbytheCourtsmajoritywerenot encouragingtoopponentsofthesestatelaws. WhitinginvolvedthemeaningoftheexpresspreemptionprovisionoftheImmigrationReform andControlAct(IRCA),whichprohibitsstateandlocalgovernmentsfromenforcinganylawthat imposespunishmentonthosewhohireunlawfulaliens,butallowsstateandlocalgovernmentsto imposesanctionsbylicensingandsimilarlaws.TheWhitingmajorityopinion,authoredbyChief JusticeJohnRobertsandjoinedbyJusticesAnthonyKennedy,AntoninScalia,ClarenceThomas(inpart), andSamuelAlito,readIRCAslicensingexceptionbroadlyandLAWAssanctionsnarrowly,findingthat Arizonaslawimposingmoreonerouspenaltiesthanfederallawdoesforhiringunlawfulaliensfall[s] squarelywithinIRCAslicensingexception.Inthemajoritysview,bynarrowlydraftingLAWAto closelyfollowfederallaw,Arizonahastakentherouteleastlikelytocausetensionwithfederallaw.41 Thedissentingopinions,authoredbyJusticesStephenBreyer(joinedbyJusticeRuthBader Ginsburg)andSoniaSotomayor,disagreed.TheyinterpretedLAWAasconflictingwiththefederal regimeforcontrollingemploymentofunauthorizedmigrants.AsJusticeBreyerwrote,Arizonaslaw wouldundermin[e]Congresssefforts(1)toprotectlawfulworkersfromnationaloriginbased

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Toll,458U.S.at13n.18. Id.at27(Rehnquist,J.,dissenting). 40 131S.Ct.1968(2011). 41 Id.at1987. Crossroads:Immigration Page|7

discriminationand(2)toprotectlawfulemployersagainsterroneousprosecutionorpunishment.42In herseparatedissent,JusticeSotomayorinvokedCongresssexpressgoalofuniformenforcementofthe immigrationlawsoftheUnitedStates,43andobservedthatitwasimplausiblethatCongressintended forthe50Statesandcountlesslocalitiestoimplementtheirowndistinctenforcementandadjudication proceduresfordecidingwhetheremployershaveemployedunauthorizedaliens.44 ThisTerm,theCourtisrevisitingtheseissuesinafarmoresignificantcase,Arizonav.United States,whichstemsfromArizonascontroversialSB1070law.SB1070requireslocallawenforcement officerstoverifytheimmigrationstatusofanypersonwhomtheystopordetainwheneverreasonable suspicionexiststhatthepersonmightbeillegallypresentintheUnitedStates,makesitacrimetobein thestatewithoutimmigrantregistrationpapers,makesitacrimeforanundocumentedimmigrantto seekemploymentinArizona,andauthorizespolicetomakeawarrantlessarrestiftheyencounter someonetheybelievehascommittedacrimethatcouldleadtodeportation.Theseprovisionswere blockedfromgoingintoeffectbyafederaldistrictcourtinArizonabecausetheywerelikelytobe preemptedbyfederallaw,andtheNinthCircuitupheldtheinjunction. IntheSupremeCourt,ArizonahassweepinglyassertedthatArizonaofficialshaveinherent authoritytoenforcefederallaw.45TakingapagefromJusticeRehnquistsdissentinToll,Arizonahas arguedthattheCourtshouldapplythepresumptionagainstpreemptiontoupholdArizonasregulation, makingthepointthatSB1070anditsfocusonattritionthroughenforcementisparalleltofederal law,anddoesnotconflictwithanyidentifiablefederalstatute.46Thisargumentwasmadeagainand againbyformerGeorgeW.BushSolicitorGeneralPaulClementduringoralargument:inSB1070, Arizonaadoptedthefederalstandardsasitsown,andismerelyenforcingfederallaw.Hence,Arizona arguesthataclearanddirectconflictbetweenstateandfederallawakeyingredientofany preemptionclaimismissing. ArguingfortheUnitedStates,SolicitorGeneralDonaldVerrillicounteredthisargumentby detailingthewaysinwhichArizonasdecisiontoenactitsownimmigrationpolicyrunsupagainst federalimmigrationlawandfrustratestheExecutivediscretionthatisnecessarytobalancethemyriad concernsofimmigrationlaw,suchasforeignaffairs,deploymentoflimitedresources,andhumanitarian concerns.TheUnitedStatesalsoemphasized,initsbriefsandatoralargument,theConstitutionstext, history,andstructure.PushingbackonArizonasargumentthatstateshavearoletoplayinprotecting theirborders,theSolicitorGeneralarguedthattheConstitutionunmistakablygivesthefederal governmentexclusivepowertoregulateimmigrationandconsidertheforeignpolicyimplicationsof howthenationtreatsnoncitizenswithinitsborders.GeneralVerrilliarguedthattheenjoined provisionsofSB1070weretrumpedbyfederallawunderdoctrinesoffieldandconflictpreemption.

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Id.(Breyer,J.,dissenting). Id.at2003(Sotomayor,J.,dissenting)(quotingIRCA,115,100Stat.3384)(internalquotationmarksand alterationomitted). 44 Id. 45 BriefofPetitioners,Arizonav.UnitedStates,at23. 46 Id.at26. Crossroads:Immigration Page|8

TheCourtsrulinginArizonav.UnitedStatesisexpectedbeforetheendofJune,anditcould haveaprofoundimpactonhowprinciplesoffederalismapplyintheimmigrationcontext.Amajorityon theCourthasneverembracedtheconceptofinherentstateauthoritytoenforceimmigrationlawora presumptionagainstpreemptionintheimmigrationcontext.Shoulditdosonow,suchachangeinthe baselineruleswouldeffectivelyallowstates,includingArizona,tochoosehowtoenforceimmigration lawwithintheirborders,unlessanduntilCongressactedtooverturnthesestatepolicychoices.While suchcongressionalactioniscertainlypossible,gridlockseemsmorelikelyinCongressonthisissuefor theforeseeablefuture,leavingstatesfreetopursuepoliciessuchasArizonasgoalofachieving attritionthroughenforcement.InitsArizonaruling,theCourtcouldmakethefederalgovernment workmuchhardertoensurethatitsmyriad,weightyinterestsinimmigrationlawandpolicyfrom foreignaffairstodueprocessarerespectedinthestates. Inalonglineofrulingsgoingbacktothe19thCentury,theSupremeCourthasconsistentlyheld thatthefederalpoweroverimmigrationandnaturalizationisplenaryandexclusive,andthattheroleof statesmustbesignificantlylimitedtoensureauniformfederalpolicy.IftheCourtreversescoursein Arizona,theConstitutionsbalanceofpowerbetweenfederalandstategovernmentsonimmigration policy,andtherightsofimmigrantswithinourborders,couldbeinforamajorshift.

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