LRWIN 1ULIO v.

PLOPLL OI 1HL PHILIPPINLS and

A11Y. CARLOS 1. SO
G.R. No. J6J032, J6 September 2008, SLCOND DIVISION, (Velasco, J.)

1vtfo`. articte. cavvot be cov.iaerea a. qvatifiea riritegea covvvvicatiov vvaer tbe
.ecova aragrab of .rt. :1 of tbe RPC rbicb eevt. frov tbe re.vvtiov of vatice a
fair ava trve reort, vaae iv gooa faitb, ritbovt av, covvevt. or revar/., of av, ;vaiciat,
tegi.tatire, or otber officiat roceeaivg. rbicb are vot of covfiaevtiat vatvre, or av, .tatevevt,
reort, or .eecb aetirerea iv .aia roceeaivg., or of av, otber act erforvea b, vbtic officer. iv
tbe eerci.e of tbeir fvvctiov.. 1bi. articvtar rori.iov ba. .ererat etevevt. rbicb vv.t be
re.evt iv oraer for tbe reort to be eevt frov tbe re.vvtiov of vatice. 1be rori.iov cav
be ai..ectea a. fottor.: v oraer tbat tbe vbticatiov of a reort of av officiat roceeaivg va, be
cov.iaerea riritegea, tbe fottorivg covaitiov. vv.t ei.t:a) 1bat it i. a fair ava trve reort of a
;vaiciat, tegi.tatire, or otber officiat roceeaivg. rbicb are vot of covfiaevtiat vatvre, or of a
.tatevevt, reort or .eecb aetirerea iv .aia roceeaivg., or of av, otber act erforvea b, a
vbtic officer iv tbe eerci.e of bi. fvvctiov.; b) 1bat it i. vaae iv gooa faitb; ava c) 1bat it i.
ritbovt av, covvevt. or revar/..

Respondent Atty. Carlos Ding` So o the Bureau o Customs, iled
our separate inormations with the Regional 1rial Court in Pasay City. 1he
inormation charged petitioners Lrwin 1ulo, as author,writer, Susan Cambri, as
managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and
Philip Pichay, as president o the Carlo Publishing louse, Inc., o the daily
tabloid Revate, with the crime o libel in connection with the publication o the
articles in the column Direct lit` in the issues o May 11, 1999, May 12, 1999,
May 19, 1999, and June 25, 1999.

In petitioner 1ulo`s series o articles, he targeted one Atty. Ding` So
o the Bureau o Customs as being inoled in criminal actiities, and was using
his public position or personal gain. le een called Atty. So an embarrassment
to his religion, saying i/ar va ,ata avg iva/agago at vagvava/ar .a vi,evbro vito.`
le accused Atty. So o stealing rom the goernment with his alleged corrupt
actiities. And when Atty. So iled a libel suit against him, 1ulo wrote another
article, challenging Atty. So, saying, ^agatit itovg taravtaaovg .i Atty. So aabit
bivabavta,av /o .i,a at ivexpose avg /agagvbav vi,a .a |Bureau o Customs|.`

In his deense, petitioner 1ulo admitted that he did not personally
know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to the publication o
the subject articles. le testiied that he did not write the subject articles with
malice. le testiied that his criticism o a certain Atty. So o the South larbor
was not directed against the complainant, but against a person by the name o
Atty. Ding` So at the South larbor. 1ulo claimed that it was the practice o
certain people to use other people`s names to adance their corrupt practices.
le also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research o his
allegations beore he published them, and relied only on his source at the Bureau
o Customs.

On one hand, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim
that they had no participation in the editing or writing o the subject articles, and
are thus not liable.

1he R1C ound petitioners 1ulo et at. guilty o the crime o libel. On
appeal, the Court o Appeals dismissed the petition and airmed the judgment
o the R1C. lence, this petition.

ISSULS:

1, \hether or not the articles o 1ulo are protected as qualiied
priileged communication or are deamatory and written with
malice, or which he would be liable

2, \hether or not Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay are liable or the
crime o libel

HLLD:

Petition DISMISSLD.

1ulfo's articles cannot be considered as qualified privilege
communication.

1he ]ovrvati.t`. Coae of tbic. adopted by the National Union o
Journalists o the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that it has
standards to ollow in the exercise o press reedom, that this reedom carries
duties and responsibilities. Art. I o said code states that journalists recognize
the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantie errors
promptly.` Art. VIII states that journalists shall presume persons accused o
crime o being innocent until proen otherwise.`

In the present case, it cannot be said that 1ulo ollowed the ]ovrvati.t`.
Coae of tbic. and exercised his journalistic reedom responsibly.

1he trial court ound 1ulo`s accusations against Atty. So to be alse, but
1ulo argues that the alsity o contents o articles does not aect their
priileged character. It may be that the alsity o the articles does not proe
malice. Neither did or;at r. Covrt of .eat. gie journalists carte btavcbe with
regard to their publications. It cannot be said that a alse article accusing a
public igure would always be coered by the mantle o qualiied priileged
communication. 1he portion o or;at cited by 1ulo must be scrutinized
urther:
Len assuming that the contents o the articles are alse, mere
error, inaccuracy or een alsity alone does not proe actual malice.
Lrrors or misstatements are ineitable in any scheme o truly ree
expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable
care, the press should not be held to account, to a point o suppression,
or honest mistakes or imperections in the choice o language. 1here
must be some room or misstatement o act as well as or misjudgment.
Only by giing them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously
and eectiely unction as critical agencies in our democracy.

Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise o press reedom must
be done consistent with good aith and reasonable care.` 1his was clearly
abandoned by 1ulo when he wrote the subject articles. 1his is no case o mere
error or honest mistake, but a case o a journalist abdicating his responsibility to
eriy his story and instead misinorming the public. Journalists may be allowed
an adequate margin o error in the exercise o their proession, but this margin
does not expand to coer eery deamatory or injurious statement they may
make in the urtherance o their proession, nor does this margin coer total
abandonment o responsibility.

or;at may hae expanded the protection o qualiied priileged
communication beyond the instances gien in Art. 354 o the RPC, but this
expansion does not coer 1ulo.

1he expansion speaks o air commentaries on matters o public
interest.` \hile or;at places air commentaries within the scope o qualiied
priileged communication, the mere act that the subject o the article is a public
igure or a matter o public interest does not automatically exclude the author
rom liability. or;at allows that or a discreditable imputation to a public oicial
to be actionable, it must be a alse allegation o act or a comment based on a
alse supposition. As preiously mentioned, the trial court ound that the
allegations against Atty. So were alse and that 1ulo did not exert eort to
eriy the inormation beore publishing his articles.

1ulo oered no proo or his accusations. le claimed to hae a source
in the Bureau o Customs and relied only on this source or his columns, but did
no urther research on his story. 1he records o the case are beret o any
showing that Atty. So was indeed the illain 1ulo pictured him to be. 1ulo`s
articles related no speciic details or acts committed to proe Atty. So was
indeed a corrupt public oicial. 1hese columns were unsubstantiated attacks on
Atty. So, and cannot be countenanced as being priileged simply because the
target was a public oicial. Although wider latitude is gien to deamatory
utterances against public oicials in connection with or releant to their
perormance o oicial duties, or against public oicials in relation to matters o
public interest inoling them, such deamatory utterances do not automatically
all within the ambit o constitutionally protected speech. Journalists still bear
the burden o writing responsibly when practicing their proession, een when
writing about public igures or matters o public interest. As held in v Re: vit
P. ]vraao:

Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist
who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth, or that a newsman may
ecape liability who publishes derogatory or deamatory allegations against
a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bova fiae to establish
beorehand the actual basis o such imputations and reuses to submit
proo thereo when challenged to do so. xxx

]vraao also established that the journalist should exercise some
degree o care een when writing about public oicials.

1ulo has clearly ailed in this regard. lis articles cannot een be
considered as qualiied priileged communication under the second paragraph o
Art. 354 o the RPC which exempts rom the presumption o malice a air and
true report, made in good aith, without any comments or remarks, o any
judicial, legislatie, or other oicial proceedings which are not o conidential
nature, or any statement, report, or speech deliered in said proceedings, or o
any other act perormed by public oicers in the exercise o their unctions.`
1his particular proision has seeral elements which must be present in order
or the report to be exempt rom the presumption o malice.

1he articles clearly are not the air and true reports contemplated by the
proision. 1hey proide no details o the acts committed by the subject, Atty.
So. 1hey are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word o
one unnamed source. Good aith is lacking, as 1ulo ailed to substantiate or
een attempt to eriy his story beore publication. 1ulo goes een urther to
attack the character o the subject, Atty. So, een calling him a disgrace to his
religion and the legal proession. As none o the elements o the second
paragraph o Art. 354 o the RPC is present in 1ulo`s articles, it cannot thus be
argued that they are qualiied priileged communications under the RPC.

Breaking down the proision urther, looking at the terms air` and
true,` 1ulo`s articles do not meet the standard. lair` is deined as haing
the qualities o impartiality and honesty.` 1rue` is deined as conormable to
act, correct, exact, actual, genuine, honest.` 1ulo ailed to satisy these
requirements, as he did not do research beore making his allegations, and it has
been shown that these allegations were baseless. 1he articles are not air and
true reports,` but merely wild accusations.

Len assuming argvevao that the subject articles are coered by the shield
o qualiied priileged communication, this would still not protect 1ulo.

1he test to be ollowed is that laid down in ^er Yor/ 1ive. Co. r.
vttirav, and reiterated in tor r. Peote, which should be to determine whether the
deamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that
it was alse or with reckless disregard o whether it was alse or not.

1he trial court ound that 1ulo had in act written and published the
subject articles with reckless disregard o whether the same were alse or not, as
proen by the prosecution. 1here was the inding that 1ulo ailed to eriy the
inormation on which he based his writings, and that the deense presented no
eidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. 1ulo cannot
argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there was
no malice attendant in his articles. 1he test laid down is the reckless disregard`
test, and 1ulo has ailed to meet that test.

1he prosecution was able to present the testimonies o two other
witnesses who identiied Atty. So rom 1ulo`s articles. 1here is the certiication
that there is only one Atty. So in the Bureau o Customs. And most damning to
1ulo`s case is the last column he wrote on the matter, reerring to the libel suit
against him by Atty. So o the Bureau o Customs. In this article, 1ulo
launched urther attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due to
the exposs 1ulo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the
Bureau o Customs. 1his last article is an admission on the part o 1ulo that
Atty. So was in act the target o his attacks. le cannot now point to a putatie
Atty. Ding So` at South larbor, or someone else using the name o Atty. So as
the real subject o his attacks, when he did not inestigate the existence or non-
existence o an Atty. So at South larbor, nor inestigate the alleged corrupt acts
o Atty. So o the Bureau o Customs. 1ulo cannot say that there is doubt as to
the identity o the Atty. So reerred to in his articles, when all the eidence
points to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.

Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay are also guilty of the crime
of libel

1he claim that they had no participation does not shield them rom
liability. 1he proision in the RPC does not proide absence o participation as
a deense, but rather plainly and speciically states the responsibility o those
inoled in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter o
whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles,
because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.

As 1ulo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not
ulill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say
that they are not liable because they did not ulill their responsibilities as editors
and publishers. An editor or manager o a newspaper, who has actie charge
and control o its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be
equally liable with the owner or the publication therein o a libelous article. On
the theory that it is the duty o the editor or manager to know and control the
contents o the paper, it is held that said person cannot eade responsibility by
abandoning the duties to employees, so that it is immaterial whether or not the
editor or manager knew the contents o the publication. In erviv r. Peote of tbe
Pbitiive., the Court held that the publisher could not escape liability by
claiming lack o participation in the preparation and publication o a libelous
article.