Corpus vs.

Tanodbayan Petitioners Natividad Corpuz, Aurora Fonbuena, Josie Peralta, Cresencia Padua, Dominador Bautista and Leola Neog were members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the January 30, 1980 elections; petitioner Epifanio Castillejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was then a candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Private respondent Esteban Mangaser, an independent candidate for vice. mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Ferdinand E. Marcos charging the petitioners with violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting centers during the election. On instruction from the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) the Regional Election Director of San Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and on September 29, 1981 submitted its report recommending to the COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. On October 29, 1981, private respondent Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed with the COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. On November 26, 1981 the COMELEC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties and on the same charges previously dismissed by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office entered its appearance for the respondents (except Director Epifanio Castillejos and Edgar Castillejos) and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of the COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their office. (Rollo, p. 102) A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and preliminary injunction. This Court after considering the pleadings filed and deliberating on the issues raised considered the comment of the Solicitor General an Answer to the petition and considered the case submitted for decision. In the landmark case of the De Jesus v. People (No. L-61998, February 28, 1983, 120 SCRA 760) this Court dealt with the following question of first impression relative to the rival claim of jurisdiction over election offenses committed by public officials: Which of these entities have the power to investigate, prosecute and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office the Commission on Elections and the Court of First Instance (now the regional trial court) or the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan? This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, thus: The grant to the COMELEC of the power, among others, to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of election and the concomittant authority to investigate and prosecute election offenses is not without compelling reason. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan, We perceived neither explicit nor implicit grant to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office as contradistinguished from the clear and categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978.

An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of its allembracing power over the conduct of elections. WHEREFORE, inasmuch as the charge of electioneering filed against the petitioners had already been dismissed by the COMELEC for insufficiency of evidence, the petition is hereby granted and the complaint filed by private respondent being investigated anew by the Tanodbayan charging the petitioners with the same election offense, DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Nuez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Information were filed against Rufino V. Nunez before Sandiganbayan on 21 February and 26 March 1979 for the crime of estafa through falsification of public and commercial documents committed in connivance with his co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. Thereafter, on 15 May, upon being arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and juridical grounds. A week later, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration was filed a day later, and was likewise denied. Nunez filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court, claiming that Presidential Decree 1486, which created the Sandiganbayan, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution. Issue: Whether the trial of the accused, a public official, by the Sandiganbayan unduly discriminates against the accused, in light of the difference of the procedures (especially appellate) in the Sandiganbayan vis-a-vis regular courts. Held: The Constitution provided for but did not create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan, with jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law. It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential Decree. Classification must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. The constitution specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan, precisely in response to a problem, i.e. dishonesty in the public service, the urgency of which cannot be denied. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as 17 January 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein, whether petitioner is a private citizen or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Further, the omission of the Court of Appeals as intermediate tribunal does not deprive protection of liberty. The innocence or guilt of an accused in the Sandiganbayan is passed upon by 3-judge court of its division. Moreover, a unanimous vote is required, failing which the Presiding Justice shall designate two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. If convicted, the Sandiganbayan en banc has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was committed to justify a reversal of the judgment.

Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan Facts: Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought in a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus (GRs 79690-707) to restrain the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from

proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on 2 February 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to file cases with the Sandiganbayan. He also prayed that Tanodbayan Gonzalez be restrained from conducting preliminary investigations and filing similar cases with the Sandiganbayan. (GR 80578), and further prayed that the petition be consolidated with GRs 79690-707). Ultimately, he prayed that, after proper proceedings, final judgment be rendered annulling the acts of Gonzalez as "TanodbayanOmbudsman" after 2 February 1987 relating to the investigation of complaints against Zaldivar, particularly: (1) Annulling, for absolute want of jurisdiction, the preliminary investigation conducted, and the Resolution rendered, by Gonzalesin TBP CASE 87-01304; (2) Prohibiting and restraining Gonzales from filing any criminal Information as a consequence of the void preliminary investigation he conducted in TBP CASE 87-01304, or annulling the criminal Information in the said case which may, in the meantime, have already been filed; and (3) Prohibiting and restraining Gonzales from conducting preliminary investigations in, and filing criminal informations for, such other complaints/cases now pending or which may be filed against Zaldivar with the Office of the Special Prosecutor. The Supreme Court issued the restraining orders prayed for. Issue: Whether the Tanodbayan has the authority to conduct preliminary investigation and to direct the filing of the criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan. Held: Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to "Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient." (Sec. 13, par. 1) The Constitution likewise provides that "the existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution." (Art XI, Section 7) Now then, inasmuch as the duty is given to the Ombudsman, the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective 2 February 1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority. Under the present Constitution, the Special Prosecutor (Raul Gonzalez) is a mere subordinate of the Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) and can investigate and prosecute cases only upon the latter's authority or orders. The Special Prosecutor cannot initiate the prosecution of cases but can only conduct the same if instructed to do so by the Ombudsman. Even his original power to issue subpoena under Section 10(d) of PD 1630, is deemed transferred to the Ombudsman, who may, however, retain it in the Special Prosecutor in connection with the cases he is ordered to investigate. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD 1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are identical or similar. The Special Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held it in the first place.