http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/trusting/unit5all.

html Excerpt from: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Definition of "fiduciary duties" by Tamar Frankel Vol.2, p.127-128 fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties fall into two broad categories: the duty of loyalty and the duty of care. These duties vary with different types of relationships between fiduciaries and their counter-parties ('entrustors'). Recently, courts have imposed fiduciary duties on union officers, physicians and clergymen. Fiduciary relationships appear in many legal contexts: contracts, wills, trusts and elections (e.g. of corporate directors). However, fiduciary duties and remedies draw on a common source equity. Thus, in addition to damages a remedy in common law fiduciaries must account for ill-gotten profits even if their entrustors suffered no injury a remedy in equity. The similarities and differences among fiduciary relationships explain why law regulates fiduciaries in the first place, and why the regulation varies with different classes of fiduciaries. Therefore, before discussion fiduciary duties we discuss the features by which fiduciary relationships can be recognized. Features of Fiduciary Relationships. (1) Fiduciary relationships are service relationships, in which fiduciaries provide to entrustors services that public policy encourages. Bailees, escrow agents, agents, brokers, corporate directors and officers, partners, co-venturers, lawyers and trustees all render service to entrustors. Some fiduciaries, such as partners, may be both fiduciaries and entrustors of each other. (2) To perform their services effectively, fiduciaries must be entrusted with power over the entrustors or their property ('power'). The extent of entrusted power varies with the parties' desires and terms of their arrangements. Arrangements in which entrustors are precluded from controlling their fiduciaries in the performance of their services, categorized in law as 'trust', vest far more power in the fiduciaries than arrangements, categorized in law as 'agency', in which entrustors control their fiduciaries in the performance of their services. The extent of vested power depends also on the freedom of entrustors to remove their fiduciaries and retrieve the entrusted property. The magnitude of the powers entrusted to fiduciaries is also related to the cost of specifying the fiduciaries' future actions. Thus the services of escrowees and bailees, which do not require broad discretion, can be spelled out easily in advance, while the services of investment managers and trustees, which require broader discretion, can be described only in general terms because the details depend on future unknown circumstances. (3) The sole purpose of entrustment is to enable fiduciaries to serve their entrustors. Entrustment enables fiduciaries to use entrusted power for other purposes for their own use or the use of third parties. Entrustors' losses from abuse of entrusted powers can be higher than their benefits from the fiduciaries' services. therefore, and entrustor will not hand over $100 to a fiduciary if the probably loss of the $100 from the fiduciary's

embezzlement, (e.g., a 50% chance) exceeds the expected gain from the relationship (e.g. $5). (4) Entrustors' costs of monitoring fiduciaries' use of entrusted power are likely to exceed entrustors' benefits from the relationship. For example, if the adviser's interests conflict with those of the entrustors, the value of their advice, even their expert advice, is doubtful. Monitoring such conflicts of interest is costly. Similarly, the very utility of the relationship for clients would be undermined if the clients must watch over their discretionary investment managers to prevent abuse of power. (5) Entrustors' costs of monitoring the quality of fiduciary services are likely to be very high, because most fu services involve expertise that entrustors do not possess. These monitoring costs may exceed the benefits to entrustors from the relationship. In addition, the quality of some services cannot be determined by their results: a defendant may lose his case even if his lawyer has performed brilliantly. The quality of some services cannot be easily established at the time of performance: it may take years to discover that a will is faulty. (6) The fiduciaries' costs of reducing the entrustors' monitoring costs may exceed the benefits to fiduciaries from the relationship. Fiduciaries can reduce entrustors' monitoring costs by 'bonding', insurance and third-party guarantees, provided their costs do not exceed their benefits from the relationship. Because of these limits, their efforts may not e enough to fully cover the entrustors' risk of loss. (7) Alternative external controls that reduce entrustors' risks, such as market controls, either do not exist or are too weak. Courts recognize new fiduciary relations when, in their opinion, the historical protections of entrustors have eroded. For example, physicians recently joined the family of fiduciaries as they became involved in conflict of interest situations when physicians own pharmacies that supply their patients' medicines, or when the interests of the physicians' employers conflict with the patients' optimal medical treatment. The purpose and effect of fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties are imposed when public policy encourages specialization in particular services, such as money management or lawyering, and when the entrustors' costs of specifying and monitoring the fiduciaries' functions threaten to undermine the utility of the relationship to entrustors. The ultimate effect of the law is to provide entrustors with incentives to enter into fiduciary relationships, by reducing entrustors' risks and costs of preventing abuse of entrusted power, and of ensuring quality fiduciary services. Judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties shifts entrustors' costs to taxpayers. The law imposes on fiduciaries duties that limit their freedoms but increases their marketability by endowing them with a reputation for honesty backed by reputation. Excerpt from: Fiduciary Law

by Tamar Frankel California Law Review, May, 1983, 71 Ca. L. Rev. 795 p.797-802 The purpose of this Article is to inquire into the nature of fiduciary relations and the policies, principles, and rules that govern them. Part I discusses status, contract, and fiduciary relations. It shows that fiduciary relations are sufficiently distinct and important in our society to warrant treating the law applicable to them as a separate area of the law. I THE IMPORTANCE OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONS AND FIDUCIARY LAW A. The Rise of the Fiduciary Society Societies may be distinguished by the predominant social and legal relations through which their members interact. This is not to suggest that only one kind of relation exists in any given society, but merely that in each society one type of relation is paramount, and that, as social trends change, relations tend to shift and merge. Although it is probably incorrect to say that societies have evolved in a linear manner according to their predominant social relation, i.e., from status to contract to fiduciary relations, one can observe changes in a society's basic relations. Law should reflect the changes in societal structure. Thus, a major reason for recognizing and developing a separate body of fiduciary law is that our society is evolving into one based predominantly on fiduciary relations. The body of law governing fiduciary relations can affect and be affected by this social trend. Fiduciary relations and the rules that govern them can be better understood when compared to two other important relations: status and contract relations and the laws that govern them. The comparison involves three features. The first deals with the contribution of each type of relation to each party's needs and desires. The comparison deals, second, with the effect of the relation on the balance of power between the parties. The two are interrelated. While a relation with others is essential to each party's survival, n11 such a relation may also create a dependence of one party on another, that can in turn limit the freedom of choice of the person who is dependent. The third feature with which this comparison deals is the role of law in the relation, and its effect on the provision of each party's needs, on each party's freedom from coercion by the other, and on the structure and promotion of the relation. 1. Primary Social Relations a. Status

The parties to a status relation must rely on each other to satisfy their needs and desires. In a status relation, such as that of parent and child, one party (the Power Bearer) usually has a partial or full monopoly over the means for satisfying the needs of the other party (the Dependent). The Power Bearer can coerce the Dependent into service and obedience by manipulating, increasing, or decreasing the satisfaction of the Dependent's needs. As a result of the Power Bearer's monopoly, the Dependent generally defers to the will of the Power Bearer in order to ensure the means for his n12 own survival. Although the Power Bearer may attempt to minimize the care he gives and maximize the service he extracts, the Power Bearer takes care of the Dependent in order to ensure the Dependent's services or other benefits from the relation for himself. In other words, the Power Bearer furthers his own interest by avoiding gross abuse of his power over the Dependent. n13 In sum, in status relations the Power Bearer dominates the Dependent and the Dependent's freedom is limited in order to ensure the means for his survival, but the Power Bearer must also limit abuse in the exercise of his power in order to meet his own needs. The law plays a crucial role in the establishment of a status relation. To a substantial extent, the law rather than the parties determines the entry and exit from the relation. n14 Moreover, the law vests power in the Power Bearer and even supports a monopoly on the power. The law rarely interferes in the exercise of the power, setting only broad outer limits and leaving the Dependent with few or no alternatives for satisfying his needs. n15 In most status relations, the law gives higher priority to the security of both parties than to freedom for the Dependent. n16 b. Contract The parties to a contract relation must also rely on each other to satisfy their needs or desires. Unlike the parties in a status relation, however, neither can use force or monopoly to achieve his purpose. Instead of asserting personal dominance over the other party, each party must persuade the other to exchange. Nevertheless, the parties are in conflict, as each party must protect himself from the other's self-interested behavior. Unlike the parties in status relations, contract parties have many options for satisfying their needs. They determine their own needs, they bargain to obtain them, and they can enforce their bargains. The law provides each party to a contract with equal legal freedom to make independent decisions as to what to bargain for, and what to give in exchange. Contract frees each party from domination by the other, making them more independent than in a status relation; but its price is [*800] the absence of security. No party to a contract has a general obligation to take care of the other, and neither has the right to be taken care of. The main role of the law in contract relations is to prohibit the use of force and monopoly, and to enforce the rules the parties freely set for themselves. The law does not make the rules or the contract, although it may facilitate the bargaining process. In addition, the law encourages markets to offer numerous options to each individual from which to satisfy his needs by exchange.

c. The Fiduciary Relation As in a status relation, one party to a fiduciary relation (the entrustor) n17 is dependent on the other (the fiduciary). This dependence, however, is seldom as broad and pervasive as that in status relations. By definition, the entrustor becomes dependent because he must rely on the fiduciary for a particular service. n18 The fiduciary, however, does not provide every service that the entrustor may need or desire. Furthermore, the fiduciary himself is not independent, except perhaps in the area of his particular function. He must seek other fiduciaries for other services. For example, money managers generally rely on physicians for medical treatment, while physicians may look to managers for investment advice. Thus, in a society with many types of fiduciaries, each person may sometimes be a Power Bearer and at other times be a Dependent. Like a prospective party to a contract, an entrustor often can choose among alternative fiduciaries and negotiate the terms of the relation. A fiduciary rarely has a monopoly over the entrustor's needs. Moreover, unless the entrustor agrees, the fiduciary cannot manipulate the terms of his performance once the relation has been established. In contrast to contract and status relations, in which both parties seek to satisfy their own needs and desires through the relation, fiduciary relations are designed not to satisfy both parties' needs, but only those of the entrustor. Thus, a fiduciary may enter into a fiduciary relation without regard to his own needs. Moreover, an entrustor does not owe the fiduciary anything by virtue of the relation except in accordance with the agreed-upon terms or legally fixed status duties. Therefore, in a fiduciary relation, the entrustor is free from domination by the fiduciary, although he may still be coerced in parallel status relation. Thus, fiduciary relations combine the bargaining freedom inherent in contract relations with a limited form of the power and dependence of status relations. Accordingly, the law of fiduciary relations should, if possible, preserve the best aspects of status and contract relations. It is desirable for the entrustor to depend on the fiduciary to satisfy certain needs. But it would not be desirable for fiduciary law to impose the relation on either law should permit the parties to enter into the relation freely and to ensure that the fiduciary will not coerce the entrustor. The model of fiduciary law that is built in the remainder of this Article seeks to achieve these goals. 2. Status, Contract, and Fiduciary Societies One is tempted to follow in Sir Henry Maine's footsteps and state that there has been an evolution from status to contract to a fiduciary society. n19 Yet as a matter of history, Maine's thesis is subject to criticism. n20 Societies are too complex, diffuse, and manyfaceted to sustain a theory of linear societal evolution. Nevertheless, a society's entire structure can be influenced by its predominant relation. I believe it is therefore safe to assert that certain societies are more suited to particular types of relations, and that an examination of these societies can demonstrate how these relations work.

A feudal society, such as the one that existed in England during the Middle Ages, is based primarily on status. Such a society is static, because the status of Power Bearers and Dependents is predetermined [*802] by law. Furthermore, in a status society Dependents have few options for taking care of themselves, making their security precarious. Finally, personal dominance of one individual over another is common and accepted in such a society. In a contract society, individuals n21 can provide for their basic needs, and can gain by exchanging the surplus they produce. In addition, such a society offers many options for its members to satisfy their needs. A contract society values freedom and independence highly, but it provides little security for its members. An example of a society based primarily on contract is the market society of the United States during the Industrial Revolution. I submit that we are witnessing the emergence of a society predominantly based on fiduciary relations. This type of society best reflects our contemporary social values. In our society, affluence is largely produced by interdependence, n22 but personal freedom is cherished. Society's members turn to an arbitrator, the government, to obtain protection from personal coercion by those on whom they depend for specialized services. A fiduciary society attempts to maximize both the satisfaction of needs and the protection of freedom. Unlike status and contract societies, a fiduciary society emphasizes not personal conflict and domination among individuals, but cooperation and identity of interest pursuant to acceptable but imposed standards. It permits the government to moderate between altruistic goals and individualistic, selfish desires, as well as between the social goal of increasing the common welfare and the individual desire to appropriate more than a "fair share." Excerpt from: Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules by Tamar Frankel Oregon Law Review, Winter, 1995, 74 Or. L. Rev. 1209 p.1210-1215 This Article examines the status of fiduciary rules as default rules: whether, and how, entrustors can waive fiduciary duties owed to them. n6 Contractarians argue that fiduciary rules constitute default rules around which the parties can bargain. n7 Anti-contractarians argue that at least some rules are mandatory and cannot be waived. n8 In my opinion, most fiduciary rules consti- [*1212] tute default rules. However, entrustors may only waive fiduciary duties owed to them if they follow a two-step procedure. First, entrustors must be put on clear notice that, with respect to the particular duties that they waive, they can no longer rely on their fiduciaries; instead, the entrustors must fend for themselves. Second, the fiduciaries must provide entrustors with information acquired

by virtue of their position as fiduciaries to enable entrustors to make an informed independent decision regarding the waiver. The reasons for this procedure stem from the unique nature of fiduciary relationships and the law governing them. In varying degrees the relationships expose entrustors to extraordinary risks. Entrustors must entrust power or property to the fiduciaries because the fiduciaries could not perform their services effectively otherwise, n9 yet this exposes entrustors to the risk that the fiduciaries will appropriate the entrusted property or interest, or misuse the power entrusted to them. The appropriation or abuse of power can result in a loss that far exceeds the potential gain from the fiduciaries' services. In addition, entrustors become dependent on their fiduciaries and may not be able to monitor the quality of their services because: (1) the skills involved are not easily acquired or understood; (2) the cost to entrustors of monitoring and evaluating such services would undermine the utility of the arrangement; and (3) there exists no other effective alternative monitoring mechanism. In sum, fiduciary rules reflect a consensual arrangement covering special situations in which fiduciaries promise to perform services for entrustors and receive substantial power to effectuate the performance of the services, while entrustors cannot efficiently monitor the fiduciaries' performance. n10 Fiduciary law addresses the unique aspects of this relationship. First, the law vests in entrustors the legal right to receive quality fiduciary services. It imposes on fiduciaries a duty to exercise care and skill, akin to the tort of negligence. Second, the rules vest in entrustors the legal right to rely on the honesty of their fiduciaries by imposing on fiduciaries a duty of loyalty, as well as other specific duties, in order to deter fiduciaries from misappropriating the entrusted property or interests. This part of fiduciary law is akin to the crime of embezzlement n11 and the tort of conversion. n12 The status of fiduciary rules as default rules conflicts with the fiduciaries' duties of loyalty and reliability. While bargaining with their fiduciaries on the issue of waiver, entrustors must fend for themselves as independent parties. Their right to rely on their fiduciaries must be eliminated. In fact, during the bargaining, the entire relationship must be terminated. Fiduciary law allows such termination of the relationship with respect to specified transactions only if the parties follow a specific procedure. This procedure is designed to ensure an effective transition from the fiduciary mode in which entrustors rely on their fiduciary, to a contract mode in which parties rely on themselves. That is why fiduciaries must put entrustors on notice that, in connection with the specified transaction, entrustors cannot [*1214] rely on their fiduciaries. n13 That is why entrustors must be capable of bargaining independently with their fiduciaries and have the capacity to enter into bargains. That is also why, to allow entrustors to make informed decisions, fiduciaries must provide them with information regarding the transaction, especially when the fiduciaries acquired this information in connection with the performance of their services to the entrustors. This procedure is, and should remain, mandatory. n14

In addition, circumstances exist where fiduciary duties are not waivable for reasons such as doubts about the quality of the entrustors' consent (especially when given by public entrustors such as shareholders), and the need to preserve institutions in society that are based on trust. Further, non-waivable duties can be viewed as arising from the parties' agreement ex ante to limit their ability to contract around the fiduciaries' duties. n15 Under these circumstances fiduciary rules should generally be mandatory and non-waivable. I then examine three possible solutions to public entrustors' protection. One is the proposed contractarian view which would eliminate fiduciary law and lead to the creation of property rights for corporate management in its office. The second solution is to impose all or most fiduciary rules as mandatory rules and ignore so-called consents by public entrustors. The third is to establish a government office as surrogate for consent by public entrustors, along the scheme established in the Investment Company Act of 1940. n16 There are, no doubt, other solutions as well. I conclude that private and public fiduciaries should be subject to a separate body of rules and reject the contractarian view. Excerpt from: Contract and Fiduciary Duty by Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel The Journal of Law and Economics, 1993, 36 J.L. & Econ. 425 p.426-29 Ever since Ronald Coase published "The Problem of Social Cost," it has been understood tha tlegal rules can promote the benefits of contractual endeavors in a world of scarce information and high transactions costs by prescribing the outcomes the parties themselves would have reached had information been plentiful and negotiations costless. [FN3] Legal rules cannot transfer wealth from agents to principals not so long as the price agents collect for their services is unregulated. Acting on moral belief that agents ought to be selfless will not make principals better off; it will instead lead to fewer agents, or higher costs of hiring agents. With powers hedged in by competition and the price system, judges must choose between promoting the parties' contracting (and thus increasing both private and social wealth) and frustrating it (injuring the parties and society). That is not a hard choice. Providing, as a public service, the rules the parties themselves would have chosen in a transaction-cost-free world fosters instrumental and ethical objectives at the same time. So, we concluded, a "fiduciary" relation is a contractual one characterized by unusually high costs of specification and monitoring. The duty of loyalty replaces detailed contractual terms, and courts flesh out the duty of loyalty by prescribing the actions the parties themselves would have preferred if bargaining were cheap and all promises fully enforced. The usual economic assessments of contractual terms and remedies the apply. Fiduciary duties are not special duties; they have no moral footing; they are the same sort of obligations, derived and enforced in the same way, as other contractual undertakings.[FN4] Actual contracts always prevail over implied ones. Obligations implied to maximize value in high-transactions-costs cases may have some things in common, but differences in the underlying transactions will call for different "fiduciary" obligations, just as actual contracts differ across markets.

 II Objections to a contractual understanding of fiduciary duties take several forms. [FN7] One is that judges simply do not talk like Ronal Coase. No, they don't; but we seek knowledge of when fiduciary duties arise and what form they take, not theories of rhetoric a theory of what judges do, not of explanations they give. Another is that the contractual perspective cannot explain the structure of the legal rules. Such an objection is compelling, if true. Is it true? Excerpt from: The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts by John H. Langbein Yale Law Journal, December, 1995, 105 Yale L.J. 625 p. 625-631 I. INTRODUCTION We are accustomed to think of the trust as a branch of property law. The Restatement(Second) of Trusts defines the trust as "a fiduciary relationship with respect to property," [FN1] and the codes [FN2] and treatises [FN3] say similar things. This way of speaking about the trust omits an important dimension. The contractarian claim. In truth, the trust is a deal, a bargain about how the trust assets are to be managed and distributed. To be sure, the trust originates exactly where convention says it does, with property. The Restatement says, "A trust cannot be created unless there is trust property." [FN4] The owner, called the settlor, transfers the trust property to an intermediary, the trustee, to hold it for the beneficiaries. We treat the trustee as the new owner for the purpose of managing the property, while the trust deal strips the trustee of the benefits of ownership. The distinguishing feature of the trust is not the background event, not the transfer of property to the trustee, but the trust deal that defines the powers and responsibilities of the trustee in managing the property. Sometimes the trust deal also confers significant discretion upon the trustee over dispositive provisions, that is, in allocating the beneficial interests among the beneficiaries. The settlor and the trustee may express their deal in detailed terms drafted for the particular trust, or they may be content to adopt the default rules of trust law. Either way, the deal between settlor and trustee is functionally indistinguishable from the modern third-party- beneficiary contract. Trusts are contracts. Trust without contract. The contractarian account, presupposing a separate trustee, does not embrace the declaration of trust, which is a mode of trust creation that allows the transferor of property simply to declare himself or herself trustee for the transferee. [FN5] This twoparty trust lacks a separate trustee. The settlor cannot contract with himself or herself, and

accordingly, we see that trust can arise without contract, without the characteristic deal between settlor and third-party trustee. Because the declaration of trust dispenses with what is normally the most desirable attribute of the trust, that is, the ability to *628 have a third party manage the trust property, the declaration of trust plays a relatively peripheral role in modern practice. In order not to interrupt the main theme of this Article, I discuss the declaration of trust in an appendix. I explain that the declaration sometimes serves as a way station to the creation of a true third-party trust, and that in other settings the declaration turns out to be a doctrinal ruse for validating transfers that are not in function trusts. The contractarian theme. This Article sets forth the grounds for understanding the conventional three-party trust as a prevailingly contractarian institution. More is at stake in this choice between contract and property formulations of the trust than mere labelling. In Part IV of this Article, I explain why the law of fiduciary administration, which is the centerpiece of the modern trust, is overwhelmingly contractarian. Especially in conflict-ofinterest cases, greater attention to the contractarian character of the trust would improve outcomes. [FN6] Sensitivity to the contractarian character of the trust can be traced to Maitland's celebrated lectures on Equity, [FN7] published posthumously in 1909. Even in the late fourteenth century, observed Maitland, when the English Chancellor first began to enforce the trust, the trust "generally ha[d] its origin in something that we can not but call an agreement." [FN8] "[The] trust was originally regarded as an obligation, in point of fact a contract though not usually so called." [FN9] F.H. Lawson, writing in 1953 in one of the central works of modern comparative law, pointed out that "the three- cornered relation of settlor, trustee, and [beneficiary] ... is easily explained in the modern law in terms of a contract for the benefit of a third party." [FN10] Our black letter law has resisted the insight that trusts are contracts. The second Restatement of 1959, carrying forward the language of the first Restatement of 1935, [FN11] declares: "The creation of a trust is conceived of as a conveyance of the beneficial interest in the trust property rather than as a contract." [FN12] ... History. There was always a component of contract in the trust relationship, but profound changes in the character and function of the trust from the second half of the nineteenth century onward have intensified the *629 contractarian basis of the trust. The trust originated as a conveyancing device for holding real property, often ancestral land. The modern trust has become a management regime for a portfolio of financial assets. ... Function. Part IV of the Article develops the intrinsic functional correspondence between contract and trust. The bedrock elements of contract are consensual formation and consensual terms. Trust displays both. I follow for trust the insights of the law-andeconomics literature, which has emphasized the contractarian basis of fiduciary duties in modern corporation law. I concentrate on the two central duties of trust fiduciary law, loyalty and prudence. My theme is that, despite decades of pulpit-thumping rhetoric about

the sanctity of fiduciary obligations, fiduciary duties in trust law are unambiguously contractarian. The rules of trust fiduciary law mean to capture the likely understanding of the parties to the trust deal, which is why both the duty of loyalty and the duty of prudence yield to the more particularized intentions that the parties may choose to express or imply in their trust deal. I depict the default regime of trust law as a type of standardized contract, and I point to some instances in which the contractarian perspective should improve outcomes in trust law. ... It is not my purpose to fold the law of trusts into the law of contract. Like other legal institutions that have been deeply influenced by modern contractarian analysis, such as the corporation or the marriage, the trust has an institutional integrity and convenience that fully justifies its independence. My purpose is simply to show that contractarian analysis illumines, and at times helps us improve upon, what we do with the trust. ... Excerpt from: The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis by Henry Hansmann, Ugo Mattei New York University Law Review, May, 1998, 73 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 434 p.438-445 I Contrasting Approaches to Trust-Like Relationships In a prototypical Anglo-American trust, three parties are involved: the "settlor" transfers property to the "trustee," who is charged with the duty to administer the property for the benefit of the "beneficiary." Any of these three roles may be played by more than one person. Also, the same person may play more than one of the three roles. In particular, the settlor and the beneficiary may be the same person, in which case the trust involves a simple delegation of responsibility for managing property from the settlor/beneficiary to the trustee. Since, in what follows, we shall often be concerned with efforts to construct trust-like relationships in the absence of trust law, it will be helpful to have generic labels for the three characteristic parties to such relationships - labels that do not carry with them the legal implications of the terms "settlor," "trustee," and "beneficiary." Consequently, unless we are clearly talking about a situation in which the law of trusts applies, we shall refer to the three parties to a trust-like relationship as the "Transferor" (who performs the settlorlike role), the "Manager" (who performs the trustee-like role), and the "Recipient" (who occupies the beneficiary-like role). Likewise, we shall refer to the property that the Transferor transfers to the Manager, to be managed on behalf of the Recipient, as the "Managed Property." A. The Common Law Approach

The Anglo-American concept of the trust, together with the equity jurisprudence of which it forms a part, is the fortuitous product of the peculiar historical path followed by English law. The writ system, around which the jurisdiction of the common law courts was organized during the reign of Henry II, became rigid toward the end of the thirteenth century, largely precluding the creation of new writs. All common law remedies had to be worked out within the structure of the existing writs. At the time, covenants were not enforceable unless made under seal, and remedies like injunctions and specific performance were unavailable. With the exception of the obsolete legal procedures of the writ of right, the pecuniary award was the only remedy available in a court of law, and it was available for only a very limited number of causes of action. n12 According to the conventional account, the writ system led to frequent acts of injustice, and when the situation became intolerable, the Chancellor began to grant relief in the form of in personam orders to the wrongfully sanctioned defendant. n13 By the fifteenth century, the Court of Chancery had formed and developed its own remedial devices. The dual common law/equity system, typical of Anglo-American law, was born. n14 Prior to the intervention of equity, an effort to create an enforceable trust-like relationship under the common law would have failed. The Manager would have become the full owner of the Managed Property and her obligation to administer that property for the advantage of the Recipient would have been purely moral: Because she was the full owner, neither the Transferor nor the Recipient could have claimed anything against the Manager in a common law court. In contrast, equity ultimately recognized that, while the Manager was the owner at law, her right was restricted by another property interest, that of the Recipient. n15 Recipients therefore were provided with equitable remedies against an unfaithful Manager. This system of rights and remedies was described by saying that the Manager (trustee) had legal ownership, while the Recipient (beneficiary) had equitable ownership. n16 This subdivision of property rights caused little conceptual difficulty in the common law system, which, from an early stage, recognized that property rights need not be concentrated in the hands of a single owner, but rather could be divided among more than one individual, either in time (estates) or in content (incidents of tenure). Since the beneficiaries were considered property owners, and not holders of mere contractual rights, it naturally followed that they could claim their interests against everybody (except against a purchaser for value without notice of the trust) and obtain proprietary remedies. On the other hand, since the trustee held legal title to the trust property, his transfers of property were not impaired by the existence of the trust. n17 Rather, when the trustee exchanged the trust property for other property, the beneficiary's interest and the trustee's duties attached to the new property received in the exchange. Moreover, if the trustee wrongfully transferred trust property to somebody other than a purchaser in good faith without notice of the trust, then, through the remedy called "tracing," the beneficiary's property interest continued to attach to the transferred property, and the transferee was considered to hold the property and all of its proceeds in trust for the beneficiary, who was the equitable or beneficial owner of the property. n18

B. The Civil Law Approach Continental law evolved along a very different path. The development of the law was not in the hands of practitioners organized around a centralized system of justice. n19 Rather, academic lawyers in the universities were the leading force in the development of the law. The law itself was to be found not in a register of writs, but in the Justinian compilation. n20 A dual legal system never arose. A general theory of contract as a source of obligations was developed early on by scholars, and the notion of obligation remained central to continental legal theory. Consequently, in the continental legal tradition it was obligation that played the most important role in framing trust-like arrangements. n21 This was facilitated by the fact that, in the continental systems, the remedy of specific performance came to be available for the enforcement of any kind of obligation arising from contract, delict, or unjust enrichment. n22 Despite its substantial generality and flexibility, however, the civil law of obligations did not evolve to fully encompass trust-like arrangements. On the contrary, the civil law developed important taboos that would be violated by trust law rules of the form that evolved in England. In particular, trust doctrine runs counter to the so called unitary theory of property rights. n23 During the French revolution, divided property rights came to be considered characteristic of feudalism. As a consequence, it was thought that the number of restricted property rights had to be strictly controlled and limited. The numerus clausus theory was developed, stating that divided interests in property must be strictly confined to a small number of well-defined types, such as servitudes on real property, mortgages, and usufructs. n24 Although this theory was largely the product of the folklore and ideology of the French revolution and lacked a well articulated general rationale, it enjoyed tremendous success and continues to have a strong influence on the civil law. Since the particular division of property rights embodied in the private trust cannot be fit within any of the limited forms of divided property rights recognized by the civil law, the trust has been considered an impermissible arrangement. n25 This is not to say that European law makes no provision for the formation of trust-like relationships. n26 To begin with, European law has various special purpose institutions that serve as substitutes for the trust in certain well-defined situations. These include, for example, special guardianship institutions to manage assets on behalf of minors or incompetents. n27 In addition, for a more general class of transactions that do not fall within the narrow confines of these special institutions, contractually based relationships can be established that have some of the attributes of a trust. The most general of these relationships is the "romanistic fiduciary transaction," or fiducia. This device is essentially a creation of legal scholars that has found its way into the case law, rather than a relationship explicitly recognized by the civil codes. n28 It is typically created by means of a contract between the Transferor and the Manager. In the paradigmatic case, the Transferor formally transfers the property involved to the Manager, who becomes the legal owner of the property, while at the same time the two parties enter into a contract under which the Manager becomes the agent of the Transferor and promises

to manage the property for the benefit of the Recipient, who becomes a third party beneficiary of the contract. Because, following the dictates of the civil law regime, the Recipient has no property rights in the Managed Property, enforcement of the Transferor's contract with the Manager is the only means of control over the Managed Property that is available to either the Transferor or the Recipient. Nevertheless, since that contract can be specifically enforced under the law of European civil law countries, the Recipient can obtain a degree of protection that is similar in some respects to the protection available in the common law trust. For example, he can regain possession of the Managed Property upon the expiration of the arrangement as long as the property still remains in the Manager's possession - that is, it has not been transferred by the Manager to a third party purchaser. Under this arrangement, the Manager is the sole owner of the Managed Property. This means that she has the capacity to transfer it or otherwise contract for its use in any way. The natural consequence is that a third party who acquires Managed Property from an unfaithful Manager is always protected, even when he knows that the Manager is acting in bad faith. To deal with this problem, legal theory and case law have evolved in some civil law countries to provide trust-like remedies through which the Managed Property can sometimes be recovered from a third party who acquired it in bad faith from an unfaithful Manager, though the scope of this protection is generally not as broad as that afforded by the trust. n29 Another important difference between the fiducia and the common law trust involves the treatment of insolvency - a subject we shall return to in detail below. Strong evidence that the fiducia and other civil law institutions for establishing trust-like relationships n30 do not provide completely adequate substitutes for the common law trust can be found in the fact that, despite the very peculiar institutional setting in which the law of trusts developed, the trust has come to be adopted in a number of jurisdictions beyond the core common law countries. n31 Further evidence can be found in The Hague Convention on the Law of Trusts, to which a group of civil and common law countries became parties in 1985. n32 The Convention establishes choice of law rules providing for recognition, in nontrust jurisdictions, of trusts and trust law from foreign jurisdictions. The principal rationale for the Convention, as well as the principal difficulty in its drafting and the principal source of resistance to its adoption, was the general absence in civil law countries of legal institutions analogous to the common law trust. n33 ***************__________________________________*********************** Fiduciary Duty Law & Legal Definition Fiduciary duty is a legal requirement of loyalty and care that applies to any person or organization that has a fiduciary relationship with another person or . http://definitions.uslegal.com/f/fiduciary-duty/

Fiduciary Duties

The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Definition of "fiduciary duties" by Tamar Frankel Vol.2, p.127-128. fiduciary duties. Fiduciary duties fall . http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/trusting/unit5all.html Motherboard BIOS Initializes Itself The Motherboard BIOS sends the following to the screen: fiduciary duty legal definition of fiduciary duty. fiduciary duty ... An individual in whom another has placed the utmost trust and confidence to manage and protect property or money. The relationship wherein one person has . http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/fiduciary+duty Fiduciary responsibility May 31, 2009 . III. Key findings. Part I Legal commentary on fiduciary duty and the implementation of. ESG in investment mandates. Recognised fiduciary law . http://www.unepfi.org/fileadmin/documents/fiduciaryII.pdf SCSI Controller BIOS Initializes The SCSI controller BIOS sends the following to the screen: Adaptec AHA-2940 Ultra/Ultra W BIOS v 1.23 (c) 1996 Adaptec, Inc. All Rights Reserved. <<< Press for SCSISelect(TM) SCSI ID:LUNNUMBER #:# 0:0 - MICROP 3243-19 1128RQfiduciary duty in lawV Drive C: (80h) SCSI ID:LUNNUMBER #:# 1:0 - SEAGATE ST51080N - Drive D: (81h) SCSI ID:LUNNUMBER #:# 2:0 - HP C2520A SCSI ID:LUNNUMBER #:# 5:0 - Sony CD-R-625 Bios installed successfully! Breach Of Fiduciary Duty - Attorney, Lawsuit, Law Suit, Case, Claim ... Breach of Fiduciary Duty information: find an attorney for Breach of Fiduciary Duty litigation, news and information on Breach of Fiduciary Duty cases, attorneys . http://fiduciary.legalview.com/ Hardware Summary The motherboard BIOS then displays the following summary of its hardware inventory: Real Estate Agency Law - A Real Estate Agent's Fiduciary Duties Real estate agency law says that a real estate agent who takes on the capacity of . http://realestate.about.com/od/realestatebasics/p/fiduciary_duty.htm BLACKTHORNE LEGAL PRESS

Oct 25, 2001 . The Law of Fiduciary Duties. With Citations to the California Authorities. by Rafael Chodos, Esq. (c) 2000. NOVEMBER 2011: The hardcover . http://www.blackthornelegal.com/ Business Laws : What Is a Fiduciary Duty? - YouTube Nov 1, 2008 . A fiduciary duty in business is a service relationship where an individual who owes a duty to a person empowering the trust, performs a service. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=px5ioIgioLQ Fiduciary Duty | LII / Legal Information Institute Definition. A fiduciary duty is a legal duty to act solely in another party's interests. Parties owing this duty are called fiduciaries. The individuals to whom they owe . http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law. Victor Brudney. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons . http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2072&context=bclr Breach of Fiduciary Duty - The Legal Practitioner Breach of Fiduciary Duty. People in a position of trust or fiduciary relationship, such as officers, directors, high-level employees of a corporation or business, . http://legal.practitioner.com/regulation/standards_9_3_6.htm OS/2 BootManager Menu Fiduciary Responsibility of Association Directors: Practical ... The law of fiduciary responsibility can be viewed as having two purposes. The first is moral or educational in nature. The law sets a standard for appropriate . http://www.hoa-law.com/publications/fiduciary-responsibility-of-associationdirectors.shtml Law Reviews | Fiduciary Duties In a law review article published 50 years ago, Cambridge law professor L.S. Sealy reviewed two centuries of English case law on fiduciary relationships. http://fiduciarydutiesblog.com/category/law-reviews/ "Fiduciary / F. Duty" Defined & Explained - Lectric Law Library Definition of "Fiduciary / F. Duty" from the 'Lectric Law Library's Legal Lexicon. http://www.lectlaw.com/def/f026.htm

Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions Lessons from ... Oct 24, 2002 . In Anglo-American law, fiduciary duty is the core legal concept to address conflicts among directors/managers and shareholders. The concept . http://www.ssrn.com/abstract_id=343480 Breach of Fiduciary Duty his or her fiduciary duties to a client. A claim for breach of fiduciary duty is generally based upon state law, although at least one federal statute may give rise to . http://www.pli.edu/product_files/EN00000000000595/89176.pdf Breach of Fiduciary Duty in Legal Malpractice Gets Fees - Blog ... A lawyer's breach of fiduciary duty alleged in a Legal Malpractice case refunds legal fees, or, disgorges fees from the lawyer. Alleging only a legal malpractice . http://www.appellate-brief.com/blog/entry/breach-of-fiduciary-duty-in-legal-malpracticegets-fees.html

Lilo is started If the BigLinux Oregon Fiduciary Duty - Brague Law - Oregon Education Law If you invest unwisely or imprudently, then you will likely be found to in breach of your fiduciary duties to your mother-in-law and will likely be liable for her losses. http://www.braguelaw.com/5.html Lilo prints LILO Fiduciary Responsibility of Association Board ... - Third Street Law Jan 12, 2012 . Board members of Homeowner Associations, just like corporate directors, have what is called a fiduciary duty to the members of the . http://thirdstreetlaw.com/2012/01/fiduciary-responsibility-of-board-members-andpotential-liability/ Minority Shareholder/Fiduciary Duty Mass Law Blog U.S. District Court Judge William Young's recent decision in Talentburst, Inc. v. Collabera, Inc. is worth study. Talentburst is the former employer of Raj Pallerla. http://masslawblog.com/minority-shareholderfiduciary-duty/ Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Business Lawyers Smith Garg Fiduciary duty is a special type of duty owed where there has been a special relationship created between individuals or between an individual and an entity. http://www.smithgarglaw.com/articles-breach-of-fiduciary-duty.html

The following line is from /boot/message: >> Press Fiduciary Duty Of Doctor And Patient | LegalMatch Law Library May 11, 2011 . Find Fiduciary Duty Of Doctor And Patient and Attorneys in your area. A doctor has a fiduciary duty of confidentiality towards a patient. http://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/fiduciary-duty-of-doctor-and-patient.html The following line is the prompt from /sbin/lilo: boot: Note: If Lilo is not used, then the boot code built into the head of the Linux kernel, linux/arch/i386/boot/bootsect.S Legal Duties of Association Board Members - Whitepapers ... The following article is designed to clarify the delegation of duties, explain the fiduciary duties imposed by law on association officers and directors, and suggest . http://www.asaecenter.org/Resources/whitepaperdetail.cfm?ItemNumber=12217 Fiduciary in California. Who is a fiduciary? What are fiduciary duties? Fiduciary duties arise as a matter of law "in certain technical, legal relationships." (GAB Business, supra, 83 Cal.App.4th at p. 416.) While this list of special . http://www.christian-attorney.net/fiduciary_california.html Linux-2.2.12 Breach of a Fiduciary Duty Ernst Law Group Breach of A Fiduciary Duty is a business tort that occurs when there is a position of trust between someone and the business. A fiduciary duty is a legal . http://www.ernstlawgroup.com/breach-of-a-fiduciary-duty/ lilo.conf. TRUST AND FIDUCIARY DUTY IN THE EARLY COMMON LAW of another party, a beneficiary.1 Fiduciary duties are duties enforced by law and imposed . put trust and fiduciary duty at the heart of modern law. In her honor . http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/journals/bulr/documents/SEIPP.pdf The Linux Kernel Initializes The kernel code in /linux/arch/i386/boot/setup.S Common Law Casebook - Fiduciary Duties Directors and officers have a fiduciary relationship with the corporation, resulting in a duty of care to avoid harm to the corporation, a duty of loyalty by placing the . http://www.translegal.com/common-law-casebook/fiduciary-duties Trampoline.S and Trampoline32.S General counsel, fiduciary duties under Delaware law - The Deal ...

Oct 5, 2011 . Three recent cases confirm that the position of general counsel in the modern corporation has become more challenging. http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/general-counsel-fiduciary-duties-underdelaware-law.php zImage Breach of Fiduciary Duty | Utah Business Lawyer | Stavros Law, P.C. Accused of or harmed by a breach of fiduciary duty in Salt Lake County, Utah? Call Stavros Law, P.C., to consult free with a proven attorney: 801-428-0719. http://www.stavroslaw.com/Commercial-Business-Litigation/Breach-of-FiduciaryDuty.shtml bzImage What Does Fiduciary Duty Mean? | Home Guides | SF Gate A fiduciary may be an agent, a broker, an attorney or a legal guardian who has a . back to Roman law, which recognized the duties of a "fiduciary" to deliver an . http://homeguides.sfgate.com/fiduciary-duty-mean-6753.html linux/arch/i386/head.S at its start), printing the following 2 lines from linux/arch/i386/boot/compressed/misc.c Fiduciary Duties of Trustees | LII / Legal Information Institute Trustees have certain legal duties in relation to the management of the trust. The most important duty is the duty of loyalty. Since trustees are the legal owners of . http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duties_of_trustees The i386-specific setup.S Atlanta, Georgia Breach of Fiduciary Duty Attorney :: Breach of ... The Adams Law Offices, LLC - Atlanta, Georgia Breach of Fiduciary Duty Attorney Marietta, Georgia Trust Fraud Lawyer. http://www.atlantabusinesslitigationlawyer.com/lawyer-attorney-1766641.html Processor, Console, and Memory Initialization This runs linux/arch/i386/head.S which in turn jumps to start_kernel(void) in linux/init/main.c Executor and Administrator Responsibility and Accountability Once appointed, the executor or administrator of an estate has fiduciary duties which are imposed under Georgia law. The fiduciary duties imposed by Georgia . http://www.duncanadamsattorney.com/lawyer-attorney-1510550.html linux/kernel/module.c Colorado Homeowners Association Law Blog: Fiduciary Duties of ... Fiduciary duties arise from special relationships that the law recognizes. Examples of fiduciary relationships include doctor-patient, attorney-client, .

http://www.cohoalaw.com/governance-fiduciary-duties-of-board-members-anoverview.html From this point on the kernel messages are also saved in memory and available using /bin/dmesg Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Minneapolis, MN - The Kuhn Law Firm Breach of Fiduciary Duty Minneapolis Business Law. Fiduciary duties arise where one person (i.e., the agent) agrees to act for and on behalf of another (i.e., . http://thekuhnlawfirm.com/business-and-corporate-litigation/breach-of-fiduciary-duty/ /var/log/message Boston Practice Areas - Connecticut Business Law Firm Call 860-266-4925 to talk to a lawyer at Raymond Law Group LLC in . Breach of Contract & Interference with Contracts Breach of Fiduciary Duty Business . http://www.raymond-bennett.com/CM/Custom/TOCBoston.asp linux/init/version.c: Natural Law and the Fiduciary Duties of Business Managers* The Nature of Fiduciary Duty. Professor Austin Scott, who for many years was the leading American scholar in the field of trust law, wrote in 1949 an important . http://www.acton.org/sites/v4.acton.org/files/pdf/8.1.27-51.ARTICLE.Johnston, %20Joseph,%20F.--Natural%20Law%20and%20the%20Fiduciary%20Duties%20of %20Business%20Managers.pdf console_init(..) in linux/init/main.c causes the following line from linux/drivers/console.c to be printed: Console: colour VGfiduciary duty in law+ 132x60 calibrate_delay() in linux/init/main.c prints the following line: FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES OF ... FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES OF. CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS ration Law (the DGCL) to bind the corporation; . http://www.rrdonnelley.com/financial/Downloads/PDF/Fiduciary_Duties_and_Other_Resp onsibilities_of_Corporate_Directors_and_Offiers.pdf mem_init() in linux/init/main.c causes the following line from linux/arch/i386/mm/init.c to be printed: Memory: 127952k/131008k available (952k kernel code, 412k reserved, 1652k data, 40k init) buffer_init() in linux/init/main.c causes the following line from linux/arch/i386/mm/fault.c to be printed: Fiduciary Duty vs. The Three Laws of Robotics - Kent Pitman - Open ... Feb 2, 2009 . Fiduciary Duty vs. The Three Laws of Robotics. Rate: 19 Flag. Email. Click " Submit Abuse" if you feel this post is inappropriate. Explain why .

http://open.salon.com/content.php?cid=98229 check_bugs() in /linux/init/main.c causes the following lines from linux/include/asmi386/bugs.h to be printed: Fiduciary Duties Delaware Corporate Law Update Mar 5, 2012 . Today the Court of Chancery released a memorandum opinion (available here) rejecting much of defendants' summary judgment motion in a . http://evanwilliford.wordpress.com/category/fiduciary-duties/ PCI Bus Initialization mpci_init() in linux/init/main.c causes the following lines from linux/arch/i386/kernel/bios32.c to be printed: Separation of Fraud, Breaches of Fiduciary Duty and Contract ... [T]he duty tortiously or negligently breached must be a common law duty, not one . fraud in the inducement and breach of fiduciary duty against the agent. http://www.mhlrt.com/articles/articles_lowry_dutycontract.htm pci_init() in linux/init/main.c causes the following line from linux/drivers/pci/pci.c to be printed: PCI: Probing PCI hardware linux/drivers/quirks.c prints the following: Fiduciary Duty in Transitional Civil Law Jurisdictions In Anglo-American law, fiduciary duty is the core legal concept to address conflicts . Keywords: incomplete law, transition economies, fiduciary duty, law . http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.196.6078&rep=rep1&type=pdf Network Initialization socket_init() in linux/init/main.c causes the following network initializations: linux/net/socket.c prints: Default Fiduciary Duties in Delaware LLCs - Conglomerate Blog ... Feb 16, 2012 . In 2009 Chief Justice Myron Steele of the Delaware Supreme Court wrote a law review article arguing "that default fiduciary duties violate the . http://www.theconglomerate.org/2012/02/default-fiduciary-duties-in-delaware-llcs.html linux/net/unix/af_unix.c prints: Portland Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawyer - The Mead Law Firm P.C. Experienced counsel in breach of fiduciary duty claims. Contact the Mead Law Firm, in West Linn, Oregon, to schedule an appointment.

http://www.meadsmith.com/Business-Law/Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty-PartnershipDisputes.shtml linux/net/ipv4/af_inet.c prints: Estate Attorney Florida Breach of Fiduciary Duty/ Heir ... Under Florida law, a fiduciary duty exists whenever a person places confidence or trust in another person regarding a particular transaction or in financial affairs, . http://www.florida-probate-lawyer.com/litigation/breach-of-fiduciary-duty-heirbeneficiary-rights/ linux/net/ipv4/ip_gre.c prints: GRE over IPv4 tunneling driver linux/net/core/dev.c prints: early initialization of device gre0 is deferred linux/net/core/rtnetlink.c prints: Initializing RT netlink socket The Kernel Idle Thread (Process 0) is Started fiduciary duty in lawt this point a kernel thread is started running init() which is one of the routines defined in linux/init/main.c TRUST PROTECTORS, AGENCY COSTS, AND FIDUCIARY DUTY ramifications for fiduciary duty law. 10 See generally Robert C. Ellickson, Adverse Possession and Perpetuities Law: Two Dents in the Libertarian Model of . http://www.cardozolawreview.com/pastissues/sterk.website.pdf init() must not be confused with the program /sbin/init Fiduciary Duty Breaches Lawyer, Attorney, Breach of Fiduciary Duty ... The fiduciary breach of duty lawyers at the Burk Law Firm understand the complexities of fiduciary relationships and can help you fight back if you've been a . http://www.burklaw.com/fiduciary-duty-breaches/ mkswapd_setup() in linux/init/main.c causes the following line from linux/mm/vmscan.c to be printed: Sayles | Werbner - Breach of Fiduciary Duty Litigation Sayles Werbner has an international reputation as a 'go to' trial law firm in complex business litigation, catastrophic personal injury cases, product safety . http://www.swtriallaw.com/news-and-events/breach-of-fiduciary-duty-lititgation.html Device Driver Initialization The kernel routine linux/arch/i386/kernel/setup.c Board of Director Fiduciary Duties

Board of Director Fiduciary Duties. This article reviews directors duties in the private company context. Board of director duties and responsibilities are briefly . http://www.shajlaw.com/media/reports/BoardofDirectorFiduciaryDuties.pdf /sbin/init: Generic Parallel Port Initialization The parallel port initialization routine linux/drivers/misc/parport_pc.c prints the following: parport0: PC-style at 0x378 [SPP,PS2,EPP] Character Device Initializations The following 3 lines are from linux/drivers/char/serial.c: CORPORATIONS: A Manager's Fiduciary Duty Under the Delaware ... Apr 4, 2012 . Legal research on corporations law. "A Manager's Fiduciary Duty Under the Delaware LLC Act," by Charlene Hicks, National Legal Research . http://www.nlrg.com/business-law-legal-research/bid/76749/CORPORATIONS-AManager-s-Fiduciary-Duty-Under-the-Delaware-LLC-Act The following line is from linux/drivers/char/lp.c: Law at the End of the Day: Edward Waitzer on Fiduciary Duty and ... Mar 6, 2012 . The subject of the article is sustainability and fiduciary duty, and consequently on welfare maximization and the mechanics of legal, social and . http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2012/03/edward-waitzer-on-fiduciary-duty-and.html linux/drivers/char/rtc.c prints: Fiduciary Duties and Potential Liabilities of Directors and Officers of ... Duty of Care; Duty of Loyalty. Under state corporate law, directors of solvent corporations have two basic. fiduciary duties, the duty of care and the duty of . http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0003/materials/tip3.pdf Block Device Initializations linux/drivers/block/rd.c prints: Rfiduciary duty in lawM disk driver initialized: 16 RAM disks of 8192K size linux/drivers/block/loop.c prints: loop: registered device at major 7 linux/drivers/block/floppy.c prints: Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal Insider ... result, assuming state law provides the requisite fiduciary duty, one can plausibly . examining the implications of adopting state law fiduciary duty concepts as . http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1740&context=wlulr

SCSI Bus Initialization The following lines are from aic7xxx.c, scsi.c, sg.c, sd.c or sr.c in the subdirectory linux/drivers/scsi: (scsi0) Re-Examining Legal Transplants: The Director's Fiduciary Duty in ... Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law. INTRODUCTION. The transplantation of legal rules from one country to another is commonly observed around the . http://www.jstor.org/stable/3649132 Amazon.com: Fiduciary Duty and the Atmospheric Trust (Law, Ethics ... Charles Sampford, Foundation Dean, Law School at Griffith University and later foundation director of the Key Centre for Ethics, Lord Justice and Governance. http://www.amazon.com/Fiduciary-Atmospheric-Trust-Ethics-Governance/dp/1409422321

CITES BY TOPIC: fiduciary duty Aug 16, 2009 . Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, p. 625: Fiduciary duty. A duty to act for someone else's benefit, while subordinating one's personal . http://famguardian.org/TaxFreedom/CitesByTopic/FiduciaryDuty.htm Case law | Fiduciary Duties A recent case illustrates the need for a beneficiary to exercise care when making a bid at a trustee sale. In Biancalana v. TD Service Company (Oct. 31, 2011) . http://fiduciarydutiesblog.com/category/case-law/ Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Los Angeles Business Law Attorney Has someone failed in their fiduciary duty to you? Get a Los Angeles business law attorney from the firm to examine your case and seek remuneration. http://www.businesslawlosangelesca.com/Business-Law/Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty.aspx TORT LITIGATION: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF SPOUSES AND NON ... FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF SPOUSES. AND NON-PHYSICAL TORTS. EDWIN J. ( TED) TED TERRY, JR. KARL E. HAYS. ANDREA (ANDI) FOLTZ. Law Offices of . http://www.utcle.org/eLibrary/preview.php?asset_file_id=1794 Initialization of Kernel Support for Point-to-Point Protocol The following initialization is done by linux/drivers/net/ppp.c which prints: Phoenix AZ Breach of Fiduciary Duty Attorney | Scottsdale Arizona ... Arizona estate dispute or allegations? Call 602-639-4618 for counsel from a proven Phoenix breach of fiduciary duty lawyer at the Starr Law Firm, PLC. http://www.delougherylaw.com/Trust-and-Probate-Administration/Breach-of-FiduciaryDuty.shtml

Examination of Fixed Disk fiduciary duty in lawrrangement The following lines are from linux/drivers/block/genhd.c: Partition check: sda: sda1 < sda5 sda6 sda7 > sda2 sda3 sda4 sdb: sdb1 < sdb5 > Construction Contracts, Fiduciary Duty and Fraud | Construction Law ... Oct 25, 2010 . Christopher G. Hill, LEED AP and Virginia construction lawyer discusses a recent case in which the Fairfax Virginia Circuit Court discusses a . http://constructionlawva.com/construction-contracts-fiduciary-duty-fraud/ Meeting Your Fiduciary Responsibility - United States Department of ... It provides a simplified explanation of the law and regulations. . Diversification another key fiduciary duty helps to minimize the risk of large investment . http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/publications/fiduciaryresponsibility.html Init Program (Process 1) Startup The program /sbin/init is started by the "idle" process (Process 0) code in linux/init/main.c Velasco on Aspiration and Corporate Fiduciary Duties Feb 5, 2012 . Of particular concern is the increasing popularity, in legal and scholarly circles, of the notion that fiduciary duty standards of conduct are . http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2012/02/velasco-on-aspiration-and-corporatefiduciary-duties.html /sbin/init then completes the initialization by running scripts and forking additional processes as specified in /etc/inittab Fiduciary Duties in Divorce - Roseville Family Law Attorney | Rocklin ... If you are going through a divorce, you or your spouse may need to comply with certain fiduciary duties. To learn more, contact us at 916-797-1575. http://www.cecilcianci.com/Family-Law/Fiduciary-Duties-in-Divorce.html Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified ... Boston College Law School Faculty Papers. 1-1-1994. Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and. Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of . http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1151&context=lsfp and reads /etc/inittab, a copy of which follows: New York Breach of Fiduciary Duty Attorney :: Breach of Fiduciary ... Breach of Fiduciary Duty. Some relationships are so close and trusting that the law imposes special obligations on the persons being trusted, who are called . http://www.newyorklitigator.com/lawyer-attorney-1626209.html

SAYING I DO TO FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY - Law Firm ... SAYING I DO TO FIDUCIARY RESPONSIBILITY By: Hal Bartholomew, CFLS and Beverly Brautigam, CPA Reprinted from California CPA Volume 73, No. http://www.divorcepage.com/CM/PublicationsandPresentations/FiduciaryResponsibillity.asp Breach of Fiduciary Duty - Alcala Law Firm Alcala Law Firm - San Francisco Stockbroker Fraud Lawyer - Menlo Park, California Broker Misconduct Attorney. http://www.alcala-law.com/lawyer-attorney-1451596.html Breach of Fiduciary Duty | Wittenberg Law- Business Finance And ... Breach of Fiduciary Duty. A fiduciary may be defined as a person (or institution) that provides a service that requires expertise and is socially important. http://wittenberglawyers.com/legal-services/investment-adviserbroker-misconduct/breachof-fiduciary-duty/ Texas Breach of Contract Lawyer | Houston Fiduciary Duty Attorney ... The attorney at The Womack Law Firm handles breach of contract and fiduciary duty cases throughout the Houston, Texas metro area. To set up a consultation . http://www.markwomacklaw.com/PracticeAreas/Breach-Contract-Fiduciary-Duties.asp ::: Fiduciary Duties and Marriage - Palm Desert Family Law Lawyer Palm Springs divorce attorney Thurman Arnold wants to make fiduciary duties transparent for you. http://www.thurmanarnold.com/Practice-Areas/Fiduciary-Duties-and-Marriage.aspx Fiduciary Duty - Law Office of Walter S. Cowger Accused of breach of fiduciary duty? Call attorney Walter S. Cowger, in Dallas, Texas, at 214-743-4190. More than 35 years of experience. http://www.cowgerlaw.com/Practice-Areas/Fiduciary-Duty.shtml When this is processed at the very end of the booting process, the following lines are printed: Fiduciary Definition "A fiduciary duty imposes the highest duty in law on the party holding the duty - the fiduciary - to act altruistically for the sole benefit of the beneficiary, to the . http://www.duhaime.org/LegalDictionary/F/Fiduciary.aspx Breach of Fiduciary Duty Litigation - Missouri Employment Law ... Attorney Kevin J. Dolley represent clients in breach of fiduciary duty, professional liability and legal malpractic claims. Attorney Kevin J. Dolley provides . http://www.missouriemploymentlawattorney.com/Labor-and-Employment-Law/BusinessLaw/Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty-Litigation.aspx

Legal Negligence Denver Colorado Lawyer | Breach Fiduciary Duty ... Over 20 years of experience. Attorney Douglas E. Meier, of Meier & Giovanni, in Denver, Colorado, handles legal malpractice claims involving allegations of . http://www.meierandgiovanini.com/Practice-Areas/Negligence-Breach-of-FiduciaryDuty.shtml Upon entering run level 2 it prints: INIT: Entering runlevel: 2 Notice how /sbin/init waited for the bootwait action to finish before going to run level 2, the default runlevel specified by the id:2:default: entry in /etc/inittab Legal Malpractice Law Review : Professional Responsibility Case ... Plaintiffs allege that defendants had a duty to disclose this information to them. Issue: Did the law firm have a fiduciary duty to the limited partners? Ruling: No. http://www.legalmalpracticelawreview.com/ /etc/inittab these are: rc 2 /etc/init.d/rc takes the parameter 2 and walks through each link in the directory /etc/rc2.d Stockbroker Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Fraud ... Banks Law > Stockbroker Negligence, Breach of Fiduciary Duty, and Fraud . If they fail to do so, and the broker makes a mistake or violates a law or policy, the . http://bankslawoffice.com/stockbroker-negligence-breach-of-fiduciary-duty-and-fraud /etc/rc.d/rc2.d Illinois Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawsuit Attorney Chicago Lawyer ... Konicek & Dillon, P.C. is an Illinois breach of fiduciary duty attorneys' office located in Chicago, Illinois. As legal malpractice lawyers, they provide legal . http://www.konicekdillonlaw.com/Firm-Overview.shtml /etc/inittab also specifies that all 6 virtual consoles shall be set up in run level 2: /sbin/agetty 9600 tty1 /sbin/agetty 9600 tty2 /sbin/agetty 9600 tty3 /sbin/agetty 9600 tty4 /sbin/agetty 9600 tty5 /sbin/agetty 9600 tty6 Each of the agetty's starts a login shell, /sbin/login, and after a log-in, starts /bin/sh which is typically a symbolic link to /bin/bash. Fiduciary Duty Default Standards Applicable to LLC Jan 31, 2012 . Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties LLC, C.A. No. 4390-CS (Del. Ch., Jan. 27, 2012), read opinion here. What this Case is Abo ut and Why it . http://www.delawarelitigation.com/2012/01/articles/chancery-court-updates/chanceryexplains-basis-for-fiduciary-duty-default-standards-applicable-to-llc/

For illustrative purposes, I have made my /etc/init.d/rcS script indicate when it is started and we get the following: Texas Breach of Fiduciary Duty Lawyer ... - The Kim Law Firm Do you need to speak with an attorney about a case involving a breach of fiduciary duty? Contact The Kim Law Firm in Houston, Texas. For assistance, contact . http://www.thekimlawfirm.com/PracticeAreas/Breach-of-Fiduciary-Duty.asp /sbin/login copies the file /etc/issue to the screen before prompting for the user name and password: The law governing the termination of a law partner has both ... The fiduciary duty required between law partners has been variously characterizes as one of the utmost good faith,. 8 one of the utmost good faith and honesty . http://www.outtengolden.com/files/LawPartnerExplusion.pdf The Bash Shell is Started The bash shell, /bin/bash A PHYSICIAN'S FIDUCIARY DUTY TO - Washington University Law ... legal duty to disclose EMRs to their patientsa duty that flows from fiduciary law. As will be discussed, physicians owe various fiduciary obligations to their . http://lawreview.wustl.edu/inprint/86/5/spinos.pdf /etc/profile which set the system-wide environment variables: Fiduciary Duties Attorney / Milwaukee Wisconsin ... - Corris Law The Fiduciary Duties Attorneys at Corris Law are here to aggressively represent you in when you need a Business Litigation Lawyer. For free consultation in . http://www.corrislaw.com/practice-areas/fiduciary-duties/ States List Clergy on Sexual Assault & Fiduciary Duty Laws & States ... Nov 8, 2011 . States Listing Clergy on Sexual Assault Laws and Fiduciary Duty Laws and States with Clergy as Mandatory Reporters Predator List - Child & . http://www.educatingtoendabuse.com/id19.html Next, Bash executes the script in /root/.profile for user-specific customizations: Miami Elder Law & Abuse Attorney | Breach of Fiduciary Duty ... Call Miami, Florida, financial elder abuse attorney Randy A. Bryant at the Bryant Law Firm, at 888-423-7158, if your elderly loved one was financially abused or . http://www.miamiprobatefirm.com/Elder-Law-Abuse-Fraud-Recovery/ In this case, it merely has the shell execute the script .bashrc INSOLVENCY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF DIRECTORS

2007), the court concluded that under Delaware law, no fiduciary duties were owed to creditors when a company was in the zone of insolvency. The court . http://www.bergersingerman.com/articles/files/articles/Eaton/Eaton%20DBR %20Article.DOC .profile and .bashrc set user-specific customizations, but only .bashrc SEARCH PARAMETERS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES FOR ... - Frascona In most states, fiduciary duties exist as a matter of law in agency relationships, in addition to any other duties or obligations specified in your buyer agency . http://www.frascona.com/resource/oef701buyer.htm .profile New York Law School :: nyls law review fiduciary duty The Law Review issue contains 11 articles written by speakers from a conference titled, The Delaware Fiduciary Duty of Good Faith after Disney: Meaningful or . http://www.nyls.edu/news_and_events/nyls_law_review_fiduciary_duty/ In my case for root, /root/.bashrc contains: Advisor Liability for Trustee's Breach of Fiduciary Duty | The Connor ... Feb 9, 2011 . The case turns on many issues, including a relatively clear breach of fiduciary duty by the Trustee, but it also suggests the attorney advising the . http://jonconnorlaw.com/last-will-and-testament-trusts-estates/advisor-liability-fortrustees-breach-of-fiduciary-duty/ San Francisco Investment Lawyer | Berkeley Breach of Fiduciary ... San Francisco investment lawyer and securities law attorney Jeffrey A. . or a breach of fiduciary duty in Minneapolis, securities lawyer Jeffrey A. Feldman can . http://www.jeffreyfeldman.com/ Fitapelli Law | Common Stockbroker Claims | Breach of Fiduciary Duty Stockbrokers are required to place the interest of the client first. 'Breach of fiduciary duty' occurs when a broker refuses to do so. Find out if you're eligible for . http://www.stockfraudlawyer.info/common-stockbroker-claims/breach-of-fiduciaryduty.html Orlando Legal Malpractice Attorney | Central Florida Breach of ... Attorneys have a fiduciary duty to handle your legal matter with great care, honesty and integrity. If your attorney failed to handle your case with professionalism . http://www.sdtriallaw.com/PracticeAreas/Orlando-Legal-Malpractice.asp Fiduciary Duties of Trustees Learn about the fiduciary duties of trustees. Including duties of a trustee to a trust and its beneficiaries, particularly regarding investment and financial matters. http://www.mitchell-attorneys.com/legal-articles/fiduciary-duties-of-trustees-ininvestment-and-financial-matters/

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Some relationships are so close and trusting that the law imposes special obligations on the persons being trusted, who are called fiduciaries. (The person that reposes trust in the fiduciary is called the cestui que trust.) Such relationships include the relationship that a lawyer has with his client, a director of a corporation has with the shareholders, partners have with each other, an agent has with his principal, a sales agent has with the manufacturer, and an accountant has with his customer. In some cases, even a creditor may owe his debtor a fiduciary duty. Consider, for example, a homeowner who borrows money to buy a coop apartment. The lender will typically require the homeowner to give the shares in the cooperative building to the lender, a practice called pledging the shares. If the homeowner defaults in repaying the loan, the lender owes him a fiduciary duty in selling the shares. That duty may require the lender to use commercially reasonable means to get the best price possible. And it doesn't matter that a contract may say that a party is an independent contractor. It's the realities of the relationship that governs whether there is a fiduciary relationship, not the labels put on the relationship by a contract. Thus, for example, in some instances a franchise agreement may give rise to a fiduciary duty. The three duties imposed by a fiduciary duty are a duty of care, a duty of loyalty and a duty of honesty. Violating any of those duties may subject the fiduciary to a law suit. Thus, for example, if a stock broker fails to give an investor information about one of his stocks, the broker may have violated the duty of care imposed on him by his fiduciary duty to the investor. One form of a breach of fiduciary duty is called self-dealing, where the fiduciary does something to help himself at the expense of the other party. For example, if the trustee managing investments in a trust diverts a valuable opportunity away from the trust and into his own business, that's a form of self-dealing. Similarly, if the manager of a pension fund permits an investment advisor to manage the fund in return for a bribe, that's a breach of fiduciary duty. If the fiduciary's contract with the beneficiary breaches a fiduciary duty, the law will refuse to enforce the contract. The officers and directors of corporations bear a fiduciary responsibility to the corporation and to its shareholders. If the officers and directors waste corporate assets, that's a breach of fiduciary duty that may subject them to liability. In addition, the majority shareholder has a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder. So, let's suppose the majority shareholder refuses to declare a dividend to force the minority shareholder to sell his interest, that could be a breach of fiduciary duty. But it isn't just the fiduciary who's liable. Under New York law, a person who induces a breach of fiduciary duty is also liable. This may be helpful if the fiduciary is judgment proof-- i.e., without the assets to pay a large judgment. Under New York law, the injured party may sue a relatively peripheral figure that induced the breach, who may have the resources to pay a judgment. The existence of a fiduciary relationship imposes on the fiduciary a duty to volunteer relevant facts. That is, in an arms-length relationship, neither party is required to volunteer facts. But in a fiduciary relation, the fiduciary is required to disclose relevant facts. Failure to do so gives rise to a fraud claim. Thus, for example, if a fiduciary is selling real estate to the cestui que trust, the fiduciary is obligated to volunteer all the relevant facts. One of the benefits of a fiduciary duty is that it permits the beneficiary of a duty to impose a constructive trust on property in the hands of the fiduciary. It's like having a mortgage on the property, so that, under certain circumstances, if the property is sold, the beneficiary can follow the property into the hands of the new owner. The existence of a fiduciary duty may help people who are strangers to the fiduciary relationship. For example, a guarantor of a loan may assert any defenses available to the borrower. Thus, if the lender breached a fiduciary duty to the borrower, the guaranty may assert that

breach in the lender's action on the guaranty. Another benefit of being able to allege a breach of fiduciary duty is that doing so entitles the plaintiff to seek punitive damages. Unlike compensatory damages, which seek to compensate, punitive damages are meant to punish and deter recurrence, and are therefore not limited to the amount of the plaintiff's loss. Thus, a claim of punitive damages enables a plaintiff to increase the size of his claim, and have a significant bargaining chip in the lawsuit.

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