  
Witnessing and Testifying
Perceiving something and giving evidence
of it. These two notions are distinct from
each other but interrelated, insofar as the
one is the prerequisite of the other. Also,
the act of perception results in knowledge
that can later be passed on, and so may be
considered to be oriented towards the
future; bearing evidence, by contrast, refers
to the past. Thus, witnessing and testifying
establishes a chain of information, with the
witness serving as a connecting link be-
tween a past event and a person inquiring
about it. From an epistemological point of
view, however, this chain consists of two
different relationships. On the one hand,
the witness’ relationship to the event in
question is normally characterized by trust
in his own perception; the inquirer, on the
other hand, must always decide whether
the witness is credible and, therefore,
whether the information he is obtaining is
true. Since the practice of witnessing and
testifying is one of the most important
methods of arriving at a decision in the
field of law, formulating criteria to ensure
the credibility of the witness has always
been of pivotal importance.
The Arabic counterpart to the English
notion of “witnessing and testifying” is
derived from the root sh-h-d, which occurs
 times in the Qurān, mainly in the first
verbal form. The verb shahida ( times)
covers a set of notions that includes: first,
“to be present (at)” or “to be (eye)witness
(of )” (with acc.: e.g.  :; :; :;
:); second, “to bear evidence of some-
thing” (bi-, seldom alā), or “against some-
one or oneself ” (alā; e.g.  :; :;
:; :); and, third, “to declare” or
“to profess” (with acc. or anna, “that”; e.g.
 :; :; :; :; with even God as
its subject:  :). Likewise, the active par-
ticiple shāhid ( times, including its plural
forms shāhidūn, shuhūd and ashhād ) and the
492
verbal adjective shahīd ( times, including
the dual shahīdān and the plural shuhadā )
mostly refer to the eyewitness of deeds and
events (e.g.  :; :; :), to the wit-
ness who gives evidence in the court either
in this world or in the hereafter (e.g.
 :; :; :; see ; 
) and to the witness who attests
to his faith (q.v.) or beliefs (e.g.  :;
:; :; not shahīd ).
Finally, the verbal noun shahāda ( times)
signifies the “manifest” in contrast to al-
ghayb, “the hidden” (see   
), in the recurrent formula ālim
al-ghayb wa-l-shahāda (“[God] knower of the
unseen and the visible”; e.g.  :; :;
cf. :). It also denotes witnessing the con-
clusion of an agreement (e.g.  :;
:; see   ) and
testifying to one’s knowledge (e.g.  :;
:; see   ),
while in  :,  its meaning comes close
to that of an oath (see ). There are,
however, several instances where it is not
easy to determine in which sense words
derived from the root sh-h-d should best be
understood (e.g.  :, ; :; :;
:; :).
At any rate, due to its complex shades of
meaning, the term shahāda with its deriva-
tions gained central importance in three
different fields of Islamic culture. It refers,
first, to witnessing in a judicial context,
second, to the credo statement, “I confess
(ashhadu) there is no god except God,
Mu
ammad is the messenger of God” (see
  ) and third, to martyr-
dom (see ).
Two types of witnesses: attesting and testifying
In the Qurān, the notion of witnessing is a
main issue in the description of events on
judgment day, on the one hand, and in the
prescriptions for procedural rules in penal
and civil law cases in this life, on the other
(see    ; 
 493
 ). These two usages
should be treated separately.
To give an idea of the impending divine
judgment at the end of time, the
Qurān — aside from referring to the met-
aphor (q.v.) of the mechanical and hence
impartial scale (e.g.  :-; :; see
  ) — evokes above
all the imagery of a great trial. The
Qurān, however, hardly talks about the
course of events at this trial; rather, it fo-
cuses on the impact of two kinds of evi-
dence that will be presented there: )
written documents (see  
  ;  
 ), and ) the testimony
of witnesses. Both draw their authority
from the close surveillance to which hu-
man beings are subject during their life-
time. Nothing that happens on earth
escapes God (cf.  :; :; see 
 ). Therefore: “God is suf-
ficient as witness“ (shahīd,  :; cf. :;
:; :; :; and sometimes God is
called raqīb, “watcher,” e.g.  :; :;
both designations belong to his “most
beautiful names,” al-asmā al-usnā; see 
  ). Also he ( :;
:; :), or rather some angelic beings
who are mostly called “our messengers”
(rusulunā; e.g.  :; :; see ) or
“guardians” (āfiīn,  :; afaa,  :;
cf. :; :; :-), write down the
deeds of every human being (see
 ).
According to some verses (q.v.), on judg-
ment day there will be one comprehensive
book (q.v.; kitāb) for all ( :; :; cf.
:); according to others, there is one
book for the sinners and one for the pious
( :, ; see ,   ),
one for each community (umma,  :-;
see     
), or one record for each individual
( :-, ; :, ; :, ). Be that
as it may, the notion of celestial registers of
  
deeds belongs to the common religious
heritage of the Near East (see 
  ). In the Qurān, as well as
in biblical texts (cf. Malachi :-; Daniel
:; Revelation :), written documents,
whether collective or individual, are the
decisive evidence in the last judgment. In
fact, due to their precision and compre-
hensiveness, these writings themselves dic-
tate unmistakably the final fate of the souls
(see ;   ). The
events on judgment day do not themselves
serve to determine the verdict — since
God is all-knowing, this is already
clear — but rather to demonstrate that the
divine verdict is just (see  
). Therefore, on judgment day
the records of deeds will be made public:
they will be spread open before the souls
( :; :; :); they will be handed
over to them ( :; :, ; :, );
everyone has to read his own register aloud
( :, ; :). Thus the pious as well
as the sinners, after gaining insight to the
records of their deeds, will acknowledge
the supreme divine justice ( :; :;
:f.).
The second piece of evidence that plays a
major role on the day of judgment, the
testimony of witnesses, is only ever men-
tioned in connection with evil-doers
( : might appear to be an exception,
but as the context shows, the sinner is the
focus of attention here, too; see 
). Those who are summoned to
appear as witnesses before the tribunal in-
clude first of all the messengers of God,
who are to testify against the peoples to
whom they have been sent (e.g.  :, ;
:-; :, ; :).  : is rel-
evant here, too. Concerning the Muslim
community, it says: “… that you may be
witnesses against humankind (shuhadāa alā
l-nās), and that the messenger may be a
witness against you (alaykum shahīdan).…”
Here, as well as in  : where nearly the
   
same formula recurs, the context in which
it appears has to do with Muslim ritual
duties, especially prayer (q.v.;
alāt; see also
   ). Thus, it could
be argued that these verses imply that the
believers, while performing their duties,
are considered to act as witnesses for God
in face of the unbelievers (see  
). The mainstream of Muslim
exegesis, however (see   
:   ), relates
this expression to the role of Mu
ammad’s
community on the day of judgment: Rely-
ing on what their Prophet taught them, the
members of the community will testify that
God’s messengers indeed conveyed their
message to the nations. And the nations in
turn, impressed by the Muslims’ privileged
status, will exclaim: “This community, they
all were nearly prophets!” (see abarī,
Tafsīr, ad loc.)
Another important group who will be
gathered to give evidence are the
shurakā — the associates (whom the
unbelievers venerated beside God; see
  ). When they are
asked whether they led the unbelievers
astray (q.v.), they will renounce them and
give the unbelievers full responsibility (q.v.)
for their conduct ( :-; :-; cf.
:; :; :-; :; :). The
unbelievers will be called upon to produce
witnesses for their own claims, but they will
be unable to comply ( :; cf. :;
:; :; etc.) — a motif that also
recurs in the polemical passages of the
Qurān (e.g.  :; :-; :; see
   ) and
that can be traced back to God’s tribunal
on the heathen nations in Isaiah : f. In
this context, mention must also be made of
 :-. It says that on judgment day
“every soul shall come, and with it a driver
(sāiq) and a witness” (shahīd,  :): “…
And his comrade (qarīnuhu) shall say, ‘This
is what I have, made ready’” ( :); and,
494
“ ‘Our lord (q.v.), I made him not insolent,
but he was in far error’” (q.v.;  :; see
also   ). The
question of who the “driver,” the “witness”
and the “comrade” are, is not easy to an-
swer. Aside from other, partly metaphorical
interpretations, Islamic exegesis usually
takes the “driver” to be a kind of heavenly
court usher; while the “witness” is gener-
ally understood as the angels who record
the human deeds. These angels, however,
are nowhere else expressly called “wit-
nesses” (see above). As for the soul’s
“comrade” who denounces him, al-
Zamakhsharī (d. ⁄; Kashshāf,
ad loc.) explains that it is a satan (see
) who was sent to seduce him (cf.
 :; :; :; :; :). This
“comrade,” then, is reminiscent of the
Judaic conception of Satan as an angel of
God whose office it is to tempt human be-
ings on earth and to act as heavenly pros-
ecutor against them before the last
judgment (Zechariah :; Job : f.; Ps.
:). Finally, God will also enable the
limbs and sense organs of the unbelievers
to testify to their actions ( :-; :;
:). Thus, left alone without any witness
for the defense, the unbelievers — human
beings and jinn (q.v.) — will give evidence
against themselves and end up in hell
( :; :; see   ).
Now, while the qurānic view anticipating
the events of the last judgment is char-
acterized by trust in the triumph of divine
justice, the qurānic attitude towards
legally relevant matters in worldly affairs
takes a rather more realistic tone. This is
demonstrated clearly in the prescriptions
related to the attesting and testifying wit-
nesses. (As to terminology, in the Qurān,
both shāhid and shahīd signify both the at-
testing and the testifying witness [see
above]. But since shahīd later acquired the
meaning of “martyr,” Islamic jurispru-
dence then began using the term shāhid
 495
exclusively for the witness in legal matters.)
The Qurān expressly demands the pres-
ence of witnesses for five kinds of
acts — four of them belonging to civil law,
one to penal law. These include: the agree-
ment on a financial obligation ( :; see
), the delivery of property (q.v.) to
orphans (q.v.) by their guardian ( :; see
), the drafting of the last
testament ( :-; see ),
the decision on the continuation or dis-
solution of a marriage after the prescribed
waiting period (q.v.;  :-; see also
  ), and the execu-
tion of the add-punishment for fornication
( :; see   ).
(It could be argued that  :, man sha-
hida… al-shahr implies that witnesses are
required to attest to the new moon [q.v.],
as well, but this is not at all clear. For
the discussion concerning the ruyat
al-hilāl — “attesting of the new
moon” — see Lech, Geschichte, i, -; see
also ; ). As for the last-
named act, i.e. punishing a fornicator, the
reason for the attendance of witnesses lies
in the special character of the qurānic
add-regulations. Because they are pre-
awna mina l-shuhadā), that if one of the
scribed by God, they cannot be altered,
and it is the duty of the community of be-
lievers to implement them duly if the ac-
cused is found guilty (see  
). The execution of the punish-
ment is therefore a public concern, and the
witnesses represent the community. In this
respect, Muslim commentators speak of
tashhīr — public exposure. But since  :
  
four, witnesses, analogous with the pre-
scriptions concerning fornication (see
below).
In contrast, the other instances men-
tioned above ( :; :; :-; :-)
deal with private-law agreements. There,
the number of the witnesses has to be (at
least) two.  :, the extremely long āyat
al-dayn — the verse of debt — deals with
witnessing agreements concerning finan-
cial obligations. It lays down the following:
first, that a scribe has to fix such agree-
ments in writing; and, second, that two
witnesses must be called in to attest to the
drafting of the contract, in order to be able
to give evidence of its proper course in
case of future legal contest. Now, this pre-
scription conforms generally with the cor-
responding regulations in Talmudic law. In
the Talmud, however, women are excluded
from acting as attesting and testifying wit-
nesses (cf. Josephus, Antiquities, bk. , chap.
, par. ) except in the case of typically
female matters. The Qurān, on the other
hand, stipulates the rule: “If the two be not
men, then one man and two women, such
witnesses as you approve of (mimman
tar
two women errs the other will remind her”
(see    ; ).
According to the anafīs, this means that
the testimony of two women and one man
may be accepted for all cases, except for
add and qi
ā
(retaliation [q.v.]). The other
Islamic schools of law, however, restricted
this possibility mainly to financial transac-
tions and otherwise conceded women the
simply says: “Let a party (āifa) of the be-
lievers witness their punishment,” the
teachings from the scholars diverge as to
the minimum number of witnesses re-
quired. According to al-abarī’s (d. ⁄
) commentary, Mujāhid (d. bet. ⁄
and ⁄) considered the presence of
only one person to be sufficient; the major-
ity, however, prefer at least three, but better
right to testify in matters within their spe-
cial realm of knowledge. In such matters,
the judge could confine himself to the tes-
timony of women only — although the
required number of female witnesses in
these cases differed from school to school.
 : stipulates that after the idda — the
waiting time of three menstural periods
(qurū; cf.  :; see -
   
) — the husband’s decision whether to
retain his wife or to part from her must be
attested to by “two men of equity from
among yourselves (dhaway adl minkum).” It
continues: “and perform the witnessing to
God (wa-aqīmū l-shahādata lillāh).”  :
uses the same notion, i.e. “two men of
equity” should be present when a testa-
ment is made. Both should come “from
among yourselves (minkum),” but if the tes-
tator faces death away from home, two
others (ākharāni min ghayrikum) will do as
well. For the Shāfiī and Mālikī jurists (just
as for the anafī exegete al-Zamakhsharī),
this differentiation between “from your-
selves” and “from others” refers to the rel-
atives of the testator and to strangers.
Scholars of the anafī tradition (and also
the Shāfiī commentator al-Suyūī [d. ⁄
]), however, explain it as referring to
Muslims on the one hand, and to non-
Muslims on the other, allowing the “People
of the Book” (q.v.) thereby to witness in
this special case, when no Muslims can be
found. (As a rule, the testimony of the
“People of the Book” is admissible only
when it concerns their own religious com-
munities.) In the continuation of  :,
ī, pl. qu
āt) is re-
the wording leaves space for interpretation,
as well. It says the witnesses should be de-
tained after prayer (
alāt) and, in case of
doubt, made to swear by God ( fa-yuqsimāni
bi-llāh): “We will not sell it for a price, even
though it were a near kinsman (see
), nor will we hide the testimony of
God (lā naktumu shahādata llāh), for then we
would surely be among the sinful.” Here, it
is neither entirely clear whether the pre-
scriptions mentioned refer to the first pair
of witnesses, those “from among your-
selves,” or to the second pair, the “two oth-
ers”; nor whether the moment of drafting
the last testament or giving evidence of
this act at a later time is intended.
As to the criteria of witness credibility,
adl — equity — is the only one expressly
496
mentioned in the Qurān ( :; :).
There, this term sometimes implies a cer-
tain legal competence (cf.  :; :); in
later times, however, it was usually under-
stood as referring generally to a good repu-
tation. Al-Shāfiī (d. ⁄) defined it as
“acting in obedience (q.v.) to God” and
added that one’s surface impression of a
person suffices to attest to his adl. In ad-
dition to adl, later Islamic scholars also
drew up lists of further criteria for both the
attesting and the testifying witness. These
criteria include the following: the witness
should be a Muslim (thus, Jews and
Christians are normally excluded from
witnessing, see above; see  
;   ),
a free man (urr; see   ),
in full possession of his mental faculties
(āqil; see ), have attained the age
of majority (bāligh; see ), not be
suspected of having personal interests in
the case (nafy al-tuhma; the classical defini-
tion of the testimony is ikhbār bi-aqqin lil-
ghayri alā ākhar), and not have been
previously punished by add because of
defamation ( ghayr madūd fī l-qadhf; cf.
 :). The judge (qā
sponsible for examining whether the wit-
nesses meet these conditions before the
court. Now, while the external conditions
can easily be checked, the verification of
the adāla is problematic. (Since adl can
also be used as an adjective, it is often re-
placed by “ adāla” as a noun.) According to
the procedure of tadīl — declaring one’s
equity — it is incumbent upon the judge to
make secret enquiries about a candidate’s
reputation and private life, and to question
him in public, before accepting him as a
witness.
Adāla understood as good reputation is,
however, an extremely flexible notion and
can be interpreted arbitrarily. Therefore,
one finds in the sources that not only the
belief in the doctrine of free will (see
 497
  ), but also
eating in the streets or breeding pigeons
and the like could disqualify someone from
acting as a witness. Due to the subjective
nature of interpreting this term, private-
law agreements could easily be contested
later on by denying the adāla of the wit-
nesses that attested to the act. To minimize
this risk, already in the second⁄eighth cen-
tury, judges started to confer a permanent
status of adāla to a limited group of per-
sons, who were then regularly examined.
The presence of these officially approved
witnesses at the closing of contracts and
passing of sentences secured the legality of
these acts. In this way, a class of notarial
witnesses, the shuhūd udūl (sing. shāhid adl ),
evolved. They belonged to the judge’s en-
tourage, but could also work independently
as notaries, attesting and testifying legal
acts, drawing up deeds and documents.
The notary profession (which was called
adāla, as well) required specialist knowl-
edge of law and legal jargon — the
ināat
al-wirāqa, arithmetic, calligraphy (q.v.) and
so on, and was the subject of the treatises
  
trial against Abraham [q.v.; Ibrāhīm], and
 :-, the acquittal of Joseph [q.v.]
through circumstantial evidence). Only in
two passages are precise prescriptions
given:  : says: “Such of your women as
commit indecency (al-fāisha), call four of
you to witness against them ( fa-stashhidū
alayhinna arbaatan); and if they bear wit-
ness ( fa-in shahidū), then detain [the
women] in [their] houses until death takes
them or God appoints for them a way.”
 :, too, demands the testimony of four
witnesses: “And those who accuse honor-
able women but bring not four witnesses
(bi-arbaati shuhadā), scourge them with
eighty lashes (see ) and never
afterward accept their testimony
(shahāda).” While this verse deals with the
accusation of fornication (zinā), the delict
in  : is interpreted either as lesbian sex
(siāq; see ) or fornication,
as well. In the latter case, the difference
between the penalty in  : (house arrest
or a divine decision) and the one in  :,
where a hundred lashes are prescribed for
the fornicator, is clarified by taking re-
of ilm al-shurū — the discipline pertaining
to the conditions (of the notary profession).
Conversely, the evidentiary weight con-
ceded to written documents — although
recommended in  : (and decisive in
the hereafter; see above; see -
) — was originally very limited, at
least in theory: Those witnesses who
attended the drafting of a document had
to reappear before the court in order to
testify to its validity. It was only for practi-
cal reasons that written documents
eventually became fully admissible as
evidence — chiefly by a revaluation
of the witnesses’ signatures on the
document — except in cases of add and
qi
ā
.
Concerning the role of witnesses testify-
ing before a worldly court, the Qurān con-
tains very little information (cf.  :, the
course to the supposed order of revelation
(see   ;
   ;
  ): first,  :
came down; it was then replaced by  :;
this in turn was superseded by the notori-
ous verse of stoning (q.v.), the āyat al-rajm,
“whose recitation is abrogated but not
its validity“ (mā nusikha tilāwatuhu dūna uk-
mihi; Suyūī, Itqān, naw ; see
).
Be that as it may, two items deserve men-
tion here: First, Islamic jurisprudence has
always restricted the necessity of the tes-
timony of four (male) witnesses to zinā (and
siāq) only. For all other cases, murder
(q.v.) and manslaughter included (see
), two witnesses suffice — a rule
which is in accordance with Mosaic law (cf.
Deuteronomy :; : f.). The witness’
   
statement before the judge has to be in-
troduced by the formula, “I testify by God”
(ashhadu bi-llāh), or simply “I testify” and is
considered an oath (qasam). Second, he
who cannot call four witnesses to support
his charge is guilty of defamation (qadhf )
and risks not only losing his right to give
evidence, but also a corporal punishment,
one which is only slightly milder than the
punishment for the fornicator. (It is char-
acteristic of the qurānic add-prescriptions
that they are followed by restrictive clauses,
which gave rise to discussions about their
respective fields of application; besides
 :-, see  :-; :-, -.) Within
the sphere of marriage, however, in
 :- the Qurān allows the procedure
of liān, which entitles the husband, instead
of calling four witnesses, to swear four
oaths that his accusation is true. And be-
cause the truth of these oaths normally
cannot be verified, he then has to declare
in a fifth oath that, in case of perjury, he
should be subject to God’s curse (q.v.). In
order to evade punishment, the accused
wife in turn must invalidate her husband’s
oaths, swearing four times that he is a liar
and a fifth time that she, too, if lying,
should incur the wrath of God (see ).
Insofar as in the liān each of them is invok-
ing an ordeal, it can be compared with the
mubāhala, the mutual curse in  :.
There are yet other instances in Islamic
law where an oath may replace the tes-
timony of a witness. Except for the
anafīs, all other schools accept the oath
( yamīn) of the plaintiff together with the
testimony of another man as valid in
financial matters. It is also valid the other
way round: if the plaintiff ’s testimony is
not based on sufficient evidence, the de-
fendant can reject the accusation by means
of an oath. Finally, in a situation where
there is strong, but not sufficient, evidence
against a person suspected of killing some-
one else, i.e. when there are neither two
498
eye-witnesses nor the confession of the cul-
prit, the practice of qasāma is allowed as
supplementary evidence. This consists in
the swearing of fifty oaths, either by fifty
men or by fewer persons who then have to
swear more than once in order to make up
the required number. According to the
anafīs, the qasāma on the part of the rela-
tives of the suspect, swearing that they
were neither involved in the crime nor do
they know the culprit, prevents the mecha-
nism of retaliation. For the Mālikīs, how-
ever, the qasāma is an instrument for the
relatives of the victim. Their fifty-fold oath
that the suspect is doubtless the offender
increases the weight of the available,
legally insufficient evidence to a sufficient
degree.
As a rule, giving evidence is a duty for the
Muslim community, but if someone can
thereby be exonerated, the duty is indi-
vidual (cf.  :). Nevertheless, in cases
of add-delicts, it is laudable to keep one’s
knowledge to oneself in order to spare the
suspect the corporal punishment.
The profession of faith
In its second meaning, the term shahāda
refers to the credo statement of Islam.
Although there exist some slight varia-
tions in wording (see Fischer, Gestalten;
Alī,
alāt,  f.,  f.), the shahāda essen-
tially consists in the bipartite slogan
“There is no god except God (lā ilāha
illā llāhu)” and “Mu
ammad is the mes-
senger of God (Muammadun rasūlu llāhi).”
It is therefore also called “the two
words” — al-kalimatān — its first part be-
ing the kalimat al-tawīd — the word of
God’s oneness — (or, with respect to its
sound, the tahlīl), its second part the kalimat
al-rasūl — the word of the Prophet. For the
Shīa (q.v.) it is commendable, though not
indispensible, to add a third phrase,
namely: “ Alī is the friend of god“ (Aliyyun
waliyyu llāh; as to the alleged Alawite
 499
shahāda see Guyard, Fetwa, ; Firro,
Alawīs, f.; see also    
;  .  ). In Islam, the
shahāda is considered a performative ut-
terance: Saying it intentionally in the pres-
ence of a Muslim audience means
embracing Islam or emphasizing one’s
affiliation to it. By speaking the formula “I
confess (ashhadu)” that precedes the whole
declaration and that may be repeated be-
fore its second — and, as far as the Shīites
are concerned, also its third — part, the
performative nature of the shahāda is made
explicit. In the philological tradition of
Islam, this special character is mostly ref-
ered to as inshāī, what can be rendered
approximately as “declarative,” in contrast
to pure statements, which are classified as
ikhbārī, i.e. “infor mative” (see the discus-
sion in Ālūsī, Kanz, f.).
As a performative, the shahāda requires
publicity. This public nature of the shahāda
shows above all in its prominence in the
whole complex of the Islamic common
prayer, the
alāt: First of all, it is part of the
adhān — the call to prayer — which means
that it can be heard loudly from above the
minarets (see ) five times a day in
artistic rendering, sometimes even collec-
tively performed (Damascus) or with in-
strumental accompaniment (Mashhad). It
thereby became one of the most noticeable
features of the Islamic world. It then fig-
ures in the ijāba — the individual Muslim’s
response to the adhān — and in the
iqāma — the repetition of the adhān
immediately before the prayer starts. In
addition, at the end of every two
rakas — series of ritual acts in the
alāt (see
  ) — and at the
end of each
alāt itself, the believer utters
the tashahhud — a set of phrases which in-
cludes the shahāda, too. (Because one has to
raise the forefinger of the right hand while
saying lā ilāha illā llāhu in the tashahhud, this
finger is also called the shāhid — the confes-
  
sor.) But beyond this importance in daily
ritual, the shahāda accompanies the Muslim
literally throughout his or her whole life: It
is a custom to whisper it into the ear of the
new-born child, a Muslim should die with
it on his lips (see    ),
and the deceased, before being buried (see
), is reminded of it so that he or she
may know what to answer when asked in
the grave by the two angels Munkar and
Nakīr (q.v.).
These practices illustrate that the shahāda
is considered the essential message of
Islam. Accordingly, al-Ghazālī (d. ⁄)
used it as his starting point to unfold
Islamic dogma (aqīda) in his “Revival of
the religious sciences” (Iyā ulūm al-dīn, i,
f.), and the th⁄th century theologian
al-Sanūsī concludes his creed (q.v.), saying:
“The meanings of all these articles of be-
lief are brought together in the words,
‘There is no god exept God; Mu
ammad
is the messenger of God’ ” (see Watt,
Islamic creeds, ). Therefore, every Mus-
lim is admonished to remember the
two words constantly; according to the
Shāfiite scholar al-Bayjūrī (d. ⁄),
the Islamic teachers of law — the
fuqahā — recommended that one should
repeat it at least three hundred times a day.
Generally, the first part of the shahāda,
the kalimat al-tawīd, is considered to imply
the second part, the kalimat al-rasūl, as well
(see e.g. Sharānī, Fat, ). But not only for
this reason do the words lā ilāha illā llāhu
hold a great fascination. Theology dis-
cusses the logical structure of its phrasing
as an exception clause and the philosophi-
cal implications of this (cf. Bayjūrī, āshiya,
f.; see    ;
   ). With its
distinctive rhythm and sound, it became a
prefered formula for the dhikr-exercises of
the mystics (see ; 
  ) and for exorcisms (cf.
Schimmel, Sufis). The graphical shape of
   
its letters made it a favorite motif for cal-
ligraphic embellishments (see 
). The number of these letters and
the existing symmetries among them invite
to further speculations about hidden har-
monies (cf. Canteins, Mirroir; see also
). And popular imagination
all along was able to decipher it in natural
phenomena like flowers, trees or swarms of
bees. Thus, the shahāda is one of the most
important constituents of communal iden-
tity in Islam. This is clearly expressed in a
prophetic saying that calls the believers the
“people of lā ilāha illā llāhu” (cf. Ghazālī,
Iyā, i, ). Despite this popularity,
however, the origins of the shahāda remain
rather obscure.
In order to express the core idea of
monotheism, the Qurān uses various
formulations, e.g. the statement of  ::
laysa ka-mithlihi shayun, “Like him there is
naught,” the rhetorical question  :: hal
min khāliqin ghayru llāhi, “Is there any
creator apart from God?” (see ;
   ), and the
command in  :: qul huwa llāhu aadun,
“Say: He is God, one.” Two kinds of
formulas, however, are especially
prominent. There is, on the one hand, the
positive statement ilāhukum ilāhun wāidun,
“Your god is one god” (six times, e.g.
 :; :; :; :) with the
variations “He (huwa) is one god” (three
times:  :; :; :) and “God
(allāhu) is one god” (once only:  :). As
A. Baumstark pointed out (Zur Herkunft),
this formula can be traced back
indirectly — via a supposed Jewish-Arabic
version of Aramaic translations (see
 ) — to Deuter-
onomy :, the opening verse of the
shema — the Judaic creedal prayer: “Hear,
O Israel: The lord ( yhwh) our God, the
lord ( yhwh) is one.” In its historical
context, Deuteronomy : originally
500
demanded Israel’s exclusive cultic
veneration of Yahweh alone, while
implicitly conceding the existence of other
gods for other nations. In exilic times,
however, after Israel’s turn to exclusive
monotheism, i.e. to the negation of the
existence of other gods, this verse could no
longer be understood in its original sense,
and the predicate “one” had to be
interpreted in an absolute way (cf.
Rechenmacher, “Außer mir gibt es keinen
Gott!,”  f.). The same holds true, of
course, of the qurānic formula as well,
and, thus, the Muslim commentators
explain the predicate wāid as meaning
“one in essence” or “the unique one,” etc.
(cf. abarī, Tafsīr, ad  : and compare
the different translations of this formula).
On the other hand, there is the exception
clause, “There is no god but he” (lā ilāha
illā huwa, thirty times, e.g.  :, ;
:; :; :) with the alternative
endings “but I” (illā anā, three times:
 :; :; :), “but God” (illā llāhu,
twice:  :; :) and “but you” (illā
anta, only  :). According to Baum-
stark (Zur Herkunft), the wording lā ilāha
illā huwa ultimately echoes Deuteronomy
:,  and must have been part of a pre-
Islamic Jewish-Arabic cult prayer. In fact,
many passages where this phrase figures
exhibit a distinctive Jewish-Christian
coloring, e.g. when combined with
Hebrew or Aramaic borrowings like
al-qayyūm — “the everlasting” ( :; :)
and rabb al-ālamīn — “the lord of all
being” ( :-), in connection with the
biblical motif of the throne ( :; :;
:-; :; see   ) or in
juxtaposition to al-ramān — “the
all-merciful” — the name under which
God was venerated in pre-Islamic times by
the Jews of the Yemen (q.v.), e.g.: “Your
god is one god; there is no god but he, the
all-merciful, the all-compassionate” (al-
 501   

ramān al-raīm,  :; cf. :; :). seldom used:  :; :; :). This
Thus, it must be assumed that the phrase lā principle is clearly stated in  ::
ilāha illā huwa was, at the time the Qurān
originated, a popular slogan in Arabian
Jewish or Christian circles. But then, the
way the Arabic proper name “God,” Allāh,
becomes connected with this phrase in the
Qurān, shows how the new religious
movement first adopted and, later on,
started to monopolize it. There are verses
where the word Allāh simply precedes the
lā ilāha illā huwa (e.g.  :; :; :; cf.
:), while in others, Allāh is almost
defined by means of it ( :; cf. :;
:; :, -). After a short hymn to
al-ramān on the throne,  :, which runs
“God (Allāhu), there is no god but he, his
are the most beautiful names (lahu l-asmāu
l-usnā),” may be read as a justification for
the use of the Arabic Allāh in connection
with the exception clause (cf.  :).
One may discern another attempt to justify
this connection in  :, where the praxis
of confessing lā ilāha illā huwa is somewhat
illogically attributed to Allāh himself.
Finally, in two verses the name Allāh enters
the exception clause itself and constitutes
the kalimat al-tawīd. And it is especially
noticeable that in both instances the
preceding verbs indicate that the resulting
slogan lā ilāha illā llāhu was already in use
for purposes of teaching and proselytizing
(see    
): “When it was said to them (idhā
qīla lahum): There is no god but God
(Allāh), they were scornful” ( :; cf.
:).
A central motif in the Qurān is the
emphasis on the authority (q.v.) of the
prophetic duty (see  
). One of the means to
effect this, is to equate the belief in and the
obedience (q.v.) to God with the belief in
and the obedience to the messenger (rasūl;
the term “prophet,” nabī, by contrast, is
“Whosoever obeys (man yui) the
messenger (al-rasūl), thereby obeys God”
(cf.  :). And thus, many qurānic
orders and regulations are enforced with
formulations like “Those only are
believers, who believe in (āmanū bi) God
and his messenger and who, when they are
with him upon a common matter, go not
away until they ask his leave” ( :; cf.
:; :) or with the imperative “Obey
God and obey the messenger!” (e.g.  :;
:; cf. :). And although there are
some short catechisms which add further
elements, like the belief in angels and the
scriptures of revelation or the performance
of the prayer and the payment of the alms
(zakāt; e.g.  :; :; :; see
), verses like  : suggest
that obedience is in the end the decisive
criterion for salvation (q.v.): “Whosoever
obeys God and his messenger, he will
admit him into gardens underneath which
rivers flow” (cf.  :; see ). It is
characteristic, however, not only of these
passages, but of the Qurān as a whole,
that this messenger remains without a
name, except for four verses —  :;
:; : and : (see   
) — which identify Muammad
(q.v.) as the messenger of God and as a
recipient of revelations. It has been
suggested that these verses were later
insertions into the Qurān; Islamic
tradition, too, doubted the genuineness of
at least  : (see Suyūī, Itqān, naw ;
Nöldeke,  , ii, f.; van Ess,  , i,  n. ).
Anyway, at the end of   — after the
divine promise to his messenger: “You (pl.)
shall indeed enter the inviolable place of
worship (al-masjid al-arām; see 
)” in verse  and after the
assurance that God sent his messenger to
make the “religion (q.v.) of truth” (q.v.; dīn
   
al-aqq) prevail over all religion in verse
 — the final verse ( :) identifies this
messenger and extols his supporters. This
is the only qurānic instance of what later
was to become the second part of the
shahāda: “Mu
ammad is the messenger of
God.”
In the Qurān can be found at least three
ways to declare one’s belief in and
obedience to God and his prophet: first,
the formula “We hear and we obey (saminā
502
Opinions differ considerably about when
and how the shahāda as credo statement
developed. According to K. Cragg
(Shahādah), it was used in the Prophet’s
Medinan period (see ) as a formula
for conversion, but its wording probably
belonged to an even earlier time. M.J.
Kister (Study) connects the origin of the
twofold shahāda with the experiences of the
wars of apostasy (q.v.; urūb al-ridda) after
the death of the Prophet. A.J. Wensinck
wa-aanā; see also   )”
with which the believers accepted the
covenant (q.v.) with God ( :) and with
which they submit to the decisions of the
prophet ( :; this formula ultimately
goes back to Deuteronomy :, and
therefore, the Qurān especially connects it
with the Israelites, although in a
deliberately distorted form; cf.  :; :;
see   ). Second, there is
the confession of faith “We believe”
(āmannā,  :, ; :; :; sometimes
with additions such as “in God and the last
day” or “in God and the messenger, and
we obey”:  :; :; cf. :). That this
is not merely an expression of an inner
conviction, but should rather be under-
stood as a performative utterance which
confers upon its speaker a privileged status,
is clear from verses like  :- and :
(this latter verse plays exactly on the
possible double use of āmannā; cf.  :).
Finally, the verb shahida is used to signal the
consent of the children of Adam (see 
 ), of the prophets and of the
Children of Israel in the covenant (mīthāq)
with God ( :; :; :). But there are
also instances where it obviously signifies a
formal declaration of loyalty (q.v.) to the
messenger of God, e.g.: “How shall God
guide a people who have disbelieved after
they believed, and bore witness (shahidū)
that the messenger is true?” (anna l-rasūla
aqqun,  :; cf. :; as for  :, see
above).
(Tashahhud) argues that the shahāda must
be comparatively early since it is part of
the
alāt-rite and that it was customary to
proclaim it at conversion to Islam in the
second half of the first century .. — a
view largely adopted by W.M. Watt
(Formative period), too. By contrast, T. Nagel
(Inschriften) thinks that from ⁄- on-
wards the Umayyad caliph (q.v.) Abd al-
Malik (r. -⁄-) propagated
especially the second part of the shahāda
against the inner-Islamic opposition of the
Zubayrids in order to legitimize the pro-
phetic tradition, the
adīth (see  
  ), as an authoritative
source of its own. Finally, A. Rippin
(Muslims) assumes that the shahāda “re-
ceived its final shape fairly late” and that it
gained acceptance as the first of the five
pillars of Islam not before the third Islamic
century.
Thus, the problem of the early history of
the shahāda can be summarized in three
questions: First, at what time were the two
kalimas combined with each other? Second,
what was the underlying intention thereby?
And, third, when did the shahāda gain
general acceptance as a set phrase to
express Muslim identity? To start with,
there is no evidence that the two parts of
the shahāda were combined with each other
before the second half of the first century
.. Both formulas were originally inde-
pendent from each other. When, for
instance, the phrase “Mu
ammad is the
 503
messenger of God” begins to appear on
coins (see    ),
from ⁄- onwards, it is introduced by
the basmala (q.v.), but not accompanied by
the kalimat al-tawīd. There exist several
variations, especially to this latter phrase.
For example, a south Jordanian graffiti (see
also    ),
probably from the first century .., runs:
“O God, I do call you to witness that you
are God. There is no god but you
(allāhumma innī ushhiduka annaka llāhu lā ilāha
illā anta).” The favorite wording, however,
of the Umayyads — still preserved in the
tashahhud — is: “There is no god except
God alone, he has no associate (wadahu lā
sharīka lahu).” From the seventies of the first
Islamic century onwards, both words of
the shahāda appear together. In ⁄-, a
drachma was issued in Sistan which on its
reverse bears a Pahlavi text very close in
meaning to the shahāda (see ).
And from ⁄ on, there are Arab-
Sasanian and Arab-Byzantine coins with
both the basmala and shahāda on the
margin. These examples, however, are still
tentative efforts to link the notion of the
exclusiveness of God with the claim that
Mu
ammad is his messenger. Both words
of the shahāda were freely combined with
other religious phrases, too. There is, for
r Kharāna). In addition, it
example, the outer inscription of the am-
bulatory of the Dome of the Rock (see 
    )
from ⁄-. In five sections, the text
emphasizes the two basic ideas of the
shahāda, and in each of these sections, both
kalimas appear. They do not, however,
make up a distinct unit, but are rather
divided from each other by additional for-
mulas. Likewise, in the standard legend on
the Umayyad coins from Abd al-Malik’s
reform (⁄- onwards), the two kalimas
are separated from each other and are
given different weight: The obverse has the
Umayyad version of the first kalima as cited
  
above, and the reverse gives the text of
  (without the initial “Say: He”), while
the legend on the margin runs: “Mu
am-
mad is the messenger of God. He sent him
with the guidance and the religion of
truth, that he may uplift it above every re-
ligion, though the unbelievers be averse”
(cf.  :; :; also  :; see above).
Only when the Abbāsids came to power
and struck new coins, did the kalimat al-
rasūl take the place of   on the reverse
and thereby became the true counterpart
of the kalimat al-tawīd on the obverse (see
also    ).
This epigraphic and numismatic material
suggests that it was in the period from the
reign of Abd al-Malik (r. -⁄-)
until the Abbāsid assumption of power in
⁄, that both words of the shahāda
first became combined with each other and
finally coalesced into a set phrase express-
ing Muslim identity. Therefore, it is not
likely that the shahāda should have been
used before Abd al-Malik’s reign as a slo-
gan for conversion. By contrast, there is
plenty of evidence that at least throughout
the first⁄seventh century allegiance to
Islam was expressed — besides many other
formulations — by a declaration of the
type: “I believe” (āmantu; see Ory, Aspects;
Abbott, a
seems that before the seventies of the first
century ..⁄ the end of the seventh cen-
tury .., none of the rival factions in early
Islam — Zubayrids, Alids, Khārijīs (q.v.)
and Umayyads — explicitly mentioned the
Prophet in their creedal formulas (see be-
low). But then, the decision of Abd al-
Malik to promote the kalimat al-rasūl hardly
had an inner-Islamic background. Since
the phrase “Mu
ammad is the messenger
of God” ascribes God-given authority to
the Arab Mu
ammad, it is more likely that
it was originally directed towards the non-
Arab, non-Muslim subjects in the new em-
pire and emphasized the Umayyad
   
dominance in the field of religion, too.
This becomes especially evident in the in-
scriptions of the Dome of the Rock. In any
case, Abd al-Malik’s propagation of the
two words of the shahāda created for him
serious diplomatic tensions with the
Byzantines (q.v.; see Walker, Catalogue of
the Arab-Byzantine and post-reform Umaiyad
coins, liv).
The discussion of the term islām, as pre-
served in the medium of the
adīth — the
prophetic tradition — shows how the
shahāda started to play a role in theology.
Given the fact that eventually islām was
defined by five “pillars” (arkān, sing. rukn),
A.J. Wensinck (Creed, f.) argued that defi-
nitions, which are less complex, can be
considered preliminary stages belonging to
an earlier date. Besides a tradition that de-
fines islām solely by five daily prayers, obe-
dience and the fast of Ramaān (e.g.
Muslim,
aī, K. Īmān, ), three principal formative utterance. This strongly suggests
groups of
adīths can be distinguished:
first, traditions that emphasize the exclu-
sive veneration of God and add three fur-
ther, mostly ritual duties (e.g. Muslim,
aī, K. Īmān, , , , , ); second, tra-
ditions where a catalogue of five pillars is
established, which, however, do not include
any declaration of loyalty towards the
Prophet (e.g. Muslim,
aī, K. Īmān, , , from the common ritual of the
alāt among
); and, third, the kind of tradition where
the bipartite shahāda figures as the first of
the five pillars of islām, either in answer to
Gabriel’s (q.v.) examination of the Prophet
or introduced by the formula, “Islam is
built upon five” (e.g. Muslim,
aī,
alāt). What we do know is, on the one
K. Īmān, , ). Wensinck rightly called this
type “a masterpiece of early Muslim theol-
ogy.” Its importance lies in the fact that it
holds the middle position between the
Murjiī thesis that the public confession of
uruhu, f.), and
faith (īmān) alone establishes one’s status as
a believer, on the one hand, and the
Khārijī rigorism with its emphasis on
aī, K.
alāt, ). On
504
works, on the other (see  ; 
). All the traditions of this type go
back to Abdallāh b. Umar (d. ⁄), a
personality famous for his neutrality during
the Umayyad civil wars and therefore a
suitable candidate for the attribution of
such a compromise solution. The
names in the isnāds — the chains of
transmitters — point, however, to the
milieu of proto-Sunnī traditionalists of the
second⁄eighth century who, equally
opposed to Murjiīs, Alids, Khārijīs and
Qadarīs, formulated these traditions and
put them in circulation.
Now, the instruction in these
adīths to
testify to both kalimas (“Islam is the
testimony [shahāda] that there is no god
but God and that Mu
ammad is the
messenger of God…”), signals, first, that,
at that time, they both belonged together
and, second, that they were used as a per-
that the shahāda must already have been
part of the adhān and the tashahhud in the

alāt-rite. It is of great interest to know
when the
alāt got its final shape but this is
still an open question. Wensinck’s argu-
ment, that the
alāt must have been stan-
dardized shortly after the Prophet’s death
“since there are no traces of deviation
the sects” (Creed, ), as plausible as it
seems at first sight, is after all an argument
ex nihilo. We do not even know at what time
the five daily prayers were introduced (cf.
Alverny, Prière; Rubin, Morning; Monnot,
hand, that according to Muslim tradition
the Prophet was taught the adhān either
during his ascension (q.v.) to heaven or
while sleeping in the lap of Alī (cf. Ibn
Bābawayh, Man lā ya
that he taught the tashahhud “the way he
used to teach us a sūra (q.v.) of the
Qurān” (Muslim,
 505
the other hand, there are indications that
the Umayyads more than once enforced
alterations in the rite of the
alāt. During
the revolt of Ibn al-Ashath (-⁄-),
for example, their opponents reproached
them with the demise of the
alāt, and, at
Dayr al-Jamājim, the battle cry of the
qurrā (see    ;
   ) runs: “Revenge
for the
alāt!” What they meant by this,
however, is not at all clear; further research
is neccessary. For use of the term shahāda to
mean “martyrdom,” see .
Matthias Radscheit
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Wives of the Prophet
The Prophet is usually said to have had
thirteen wives or concubines, of whom
nine survived him. But there is some
dispute as to the identity of the thirteen.
Some modern Muslim biographers have
linked the large size of the Prophet’s
harem to the fact that all of the
Prophet’s marriages had been con-
cluded by the time that the early
Medinan revelation of  : limited the
number of wives to four (Haykal, Life of
Muammad, ; see  
). Conversely, an Orientalist his-
torian of the qurānic text has suggested
that the Prophet had only four wives at
the time of the revelation of  : (Stern,
Marriage, -; see --
    
).