00 Final Revised Transline 2010 02081

Framework for Analyzing Separation Distances between Transmission Lines in Wyoming
Final Report
August 26, 2009 (Revised February 2010) Submitted to:
Authors: Robert Henke ICF International Sr. Vice President Judah Rose ICF International Sr. Vice President Ken Collison ICF International Vice President Venkat Banunarayanan ICF International Sr. Manager Kiran Kumaraswamy ICF International Sr. Associate Casey Jacobson ICF International Associate Nishit Pande ICF International Analyst
Wyoming Infrastructure Authority 200 E. 17th Street, Unit B Cheyenne, Wyoming 82001
ICF International 8310 S. Valley Hwy. Suite 240 Englewood, Colorado 80112-5806 303-792-7800
2009ICFInternationalAllRightsReserved ThisreportwasproducedbyICFResources,LLC(anICFInternationalcompanyhereafterreferredto asICF)inaccordancewithanagreementwiththeWyomingInfrastructureAuthority(Client). Clientsuseofthisreportissubjecttothetermsofthatagreement.

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NotetoReaders:WiththeexceptionofTable22,allcontentinthisdocumentremainsunchanged.
Acknowledgements
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Theauthorswishtoacknowledgethefollowingindividuals.Independentreviewersofthedraftreport providedconstructivecommentsandhelpfulsuggestionsandincludedMr.BobEaston,WesternArea PowerAdministration;Mr.DougLarson,ExecutiveDirector,WesternInterstateEnergyBoard;Mr.Jeff Miller,ColumbiaGrid;Mr.BradNickell,WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil;Mr.AlanEdwards,AE Consulting;andoneanonymousreviewer.Mr.WaltGeorge,NationalProjectManager,BureauofLand Management(BLM)WyomingStateOfficecontributedvaluableinputregardingtheBLMsrightofway (ROW)andotherpolicies.ProponentsoftransmissionprojectsinWyomingrespondedpromptlytothe authorsqueriesabouttheirprojects.Mr.SteveEllenbecker,DirectorofGovernmentalandExternal RelationsandEnergyAdvisortoGovernorFreudenthal,WyomingInfrastructureAuthority (www.wyia.org)providedtimelyinformationorsuggestionsinresponsetomultiplerequestsbythe authors.TheauthorsthankMr.EllenbeckerandtheWyomingInfrastructureAuthorityBoardof Directorsforinitiatingandfundingthisprojectandforallowingtheauthorstoconductanindependent study.Theopinionsexpressedinthisreportarethoseoftheauthors.Thisreportisavailableto downloadaticfi.com/wytransmission.
FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistancesbetweenTransmissionLinesinWyoming
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TableofContents
TABLEOFCONTENTS
1.1 1.2 1.3
EXECUTIVESUMMARY...............................................................................................................ES1 CHAPTER1INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................11
ProjectBackgroundandNeed...................................................................................................11 TransmissionLineSeparationFactorsandStudyApproach......................................................12 TheWesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil(WECC)System .................................................13 . 1.3.1 DemandandGenerationintheWECCSystem.............................................................15 1.3.2 TransmissionintheWECCSystem...............................................................................16 1.3.3 NeedforLongDistanceHighVoltageTransmissionLinesintheWECCSystem.........17 1.4 WyomingRegionDescription..................................................................................................18 1.5 DemandandGenerationinWyoming.......................................................................................19 1.6 ProposedTransmissionLinesinWyoming ..............................................................................110 . CHAPTER2LITERATUREONTRANSMISSIONLINESEPARATION...............................................21 2.1 ImpactofReliabilityRulesonLineSeparation ..........................................................................21 . 2.1.1 IndividualUtilityCriteriaforLineSeparation...............................................................25 2.1.2 ExistingSeparationsAmongTransmissionLinesSharingaCorridor............................27 2.1.3 LineSeparationAmongProposedTransmissionLinesSharingaCorridor.................210 2.1.4 SummaryofConversationswithProponentsofNewTransmissionLinesandother Stakeholders...............................................................................................................211 2.2 InfluenceofOtherFactorsonLineSeparation........................................................................214 2.2.1 LandUseandEnvironmentalConstraints..................................................................214 2.2.2 ConstructionandMaintenanceCostandTime..........................................................215 2.2.3 ElectricalandMagneticFields....................................................................................215 2.2.4 HistoricalNERC,WECC,andOtherOutageData........................................................215 2.3 Summary..................................................................................................................................226
CHAPTER3LINESEPARATIONEVALUATIONFRAMEWORK.....................................................31
3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 4.1 Approach....................................................................................................................................31 KeyIssues...................................................................................................................................32 DeterminingLineSeparationDistanceAnExample ...............................................................33 . FrameworkDevelopment..........................................................................................................37 FactorsthatInfluenceLineSeparationDistance.......................................................................38 ProblemFormulation.................................................................................................................39 SolutionProcess.......................................................................................................................310 ComponentsofLineSeparationDistance..................................................................................42 4.1.1 AbsoluteMinimumLineSeparationDistance..............................................................42 4.1.2 CaseSpecificIncrementalMinimumLineSeparationDistance...................................42 4.1.3 IncrementalRegionalMinimumLineSeparationDistance..........................................43 RecommendedRangeforMinimumLineSeparationDistance...............................................418 ConclusionsandRecommendations........................................................................................420
CHAPTER4ESTIMATINGLINESEPARATIONDISTANCESINWYOMING...................................41
4.2 4.3
CHAPTER5REFERENCES...........................................................................................................51 APPENDIXAWYOMINGGENERALBACKGROUNDINFORMATION ..........................................A1 .

A.1 A.2 A.3 A.4 Topography...............................................................................................................................A1 LandOwnership........................................................................................................................A1 Weather....................................................................................................................................A2 NaturalResources ....................................................................................................................A2 .
APPENDIXBSUMMARYOFHISTORICALDATAONTORNADOESINWYOMING......................B1
FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistancesbetweenTransmissionLinesinWyoming iii
TableofContents APPENDIXCDETERMININGPROBABILITYOFATORNADOMAKINGCONTACTWITHTWO TRANSMISSIONLINES...................................................................................................C1

C.1 C.2 Determiningtheprobabilityofatornadostrikingtwolinesandtheassociatedoptimal separationdistanceassumingafixedpointoforigin................................................................C1 TornadoPathCalculationsusingMonteCarloMethod ............................................................C2 .
APPENDIXDDETERMININGLINESEPARATIONDISTANCESFORTWOREPRESENTATIVE TRANSMISSIONLINEROUTESINWYOMING................................................................D1
D.1 D.2 D.3 D.4 Route1......................................................................................................................................D1 Route2......................................................................................................................................D2 ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses................................................................................D3 Route1AlternativeMethod..................................................................................................D4
LISTOFTABLES
Table11.AreaCoveredbytheWECCSubregions....................................................................................13 Table12.20082009DemandForecastforWECCanditsSubregions.....................................................15 Table13.WECCCapacityMix...................................................................................................................16 Table14.WECCExistingandPlannedTransmissionLineMileage...........................................................17 Table15.WyomingTotalInstalledGenerationCapacity......................................................................19 Table16.WyomingNetGenerationbyEnergySource......................................................................110 Table21.SummaryofContingenciesandSystemLimitsorImpactsforNERCCategoryC.....................22 Table22.WECCDisturbancePerformanceTableofAllowableEffectsonOtherSystems......................24 Table23.CommonCausesofMultipleLineOutagesandMitigationMeasures.....................................25 Table24.WECC500kVTransmissionLinesPotentiallySharingaCommonCorridor.............................28 Table25.WECC345kVLinesPotentiallySharingaCommonCorridor...................................................29 Table26.TypeofTransmissionLineandTotalOutagesReportedbyRespondingUtilities..................218 Table27.500to600kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode..................................................................219 Table28.300to400kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode..................................................................219 Table29.200to300kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode..................................................................220 Table210.CausesandNumbersofCommonModeOutagesin2006 ..................................................221 . Table211.CausesandNumbersofCommonCorridorOutagesin2007...............................................222 Table212.ArizonaPublicService500kVLinesSharingaCommonCorridor........................................222 Table213.DatabaseofCommonCorridorLineOutages.......................................................................223 Table214.SummaryofResults(Corrected)...........................................................................................223 Table215.WesternAreaPowerAdministration115kVTransmissionLineOutageData (20072009)..........................................................................................................................224 Table216.WesternAreaPowerAdministration230kVTransmissionLineOutageData (20072009)..........................................................................................................................225 Table217.WesternAreaPowerAdministration345kVTransmissionLineOutageData (20072009)..........................................................................................................................225 Table41.CalculatedSeparationDistanceBetweenTwoTransmissionLinesToAvoidMultipleLine OutagesCausedbyaSingleTornado...................................................................................411 Table42.TornadoClassandFrequencyinWyoming.............................................................................412 Table43.ProbabilityofOutageofTwoLinesHitbyaSingleTornadoat DifferentSeparationDistances............................................................................................413 Table44.ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses..............................................................................414 Table45.LightningStrikesinWyomingCountiesConsideredinthisStudy(19942008)...................415 Table46.NumberofFireOccurrencesInWyomingCounties(19972008)........................................416
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TableA1.2007WyomingCoalProductionbyMine................................................................................A4 TableA2.WyomingCrudeOilProvedReserves(millionbarrels) ...........................................................A6 . TableA3.TotalDevelopableWindEnergyGeneratingCapacity.............................................................A8 TableA4.WyomingTotalRenewableCapacity....................................................................................A8 TableB1.AreaandTornadoCharacteristicsforSouthernandEasternWyomingCounties................... 1 B TableC1.ResultsofMonteCarloAnalysis...............................................................................................C3 TableD1.RouteNumber1ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof8,400feetandExpectedOutagesper Year.........................................................................................................................................D1 TableD2.RouteNumber1ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof0feetandExpectedOutages PerYear...................................................................................................................................D2 TableD3.RouteNumber2ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof6,900FeetandExpectedOutagesper Year.........................................................................................................................................D3 TableD4.RouteNumber2ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof0FeetandExpectedOutages perYear...................................................................................................................................D3 TableD5.ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses..............................................................................D3 TableD6.RouteNumber1AlternativeMethodResultingLineSeparationVaryingbyCounty..........D4
LISTOFFIGURES
Figure11.WECCSystem...........................................................................................................................14 Figure12.WECCSubregions.....................................................................................................................14 Figure13.WECCSubregionalPlanningGroups(SPG)..............................................................................18 Figure14.ProposedTransmissionLineProjectsinWyoming................................................................111 Figure21.OutageCauseforParallelLinesinBonnevillePowerAdministrationData15YearHistory...26 Figure22.ROWDiagramforDeversPaloVerdeCircuit2Line..............................................................210 Figure23.DiagramofTypicalTower......................................................................................................211 Figure24.WECCOutagesbyCategoryfrom1992to2007....................................................................217 Figure25.TotalNumberofOutagesintheRockyMountainPowerAreaSystemfrom1992to2007.218 Figure31.InitialMinimumLineSeparationDistance...............................................................................33 Figure32.MinimumLineSeparationDistancetoAvoidMultipleOutagesduetoTransmissionTower Collapse....................................................................................................................................34 Figure33.OptimalLineSeparationDistance(conceptual)......................................................................38 Figure34.RangeofVariationforOptimalLineSeparationDistance.......................................................39 Figure35.ProcessFlowchartforDeterminingLineSeparationDistanceComponents.........................312 Figure36.FlowchartforDeterminingtheREGMINComponentofLineSeparationDistance.............312 Figure37.ApproachtoDetermineSeparationDistance........................................................................313 Figure41.ProposedTransmissionLineProjectsinWyoming..................................................................41 Figure42.MaximumWindSpeed(miles/hour)inWyomingfrom19592008........................................45 Figure43.WyomingCountiesConsideredintheTornadoStudy ............................................................47 . Figure44.SchematicofTransmissionLineCorridorforTornadoStudy..................................................48 Figure45.ConditionalProbabilityofaSingleTornadoCausingLineOutages.........................................49 Figure46.SummaryFlowchartforCalculatingaRecommendedRangeofMinimumLineSeparation Distance .................................................................................................................................419 . Figure47.ApproachtoDetermineSeparationDistance(feet)forRepresentative500kVTransmission LinesinWyoming...................................................................................................................420 FigureA1.WyomingCoalFields..............................................................................................................A3 FigureA2.CoalbedNaturalGasDepositsinWyoming............................................................................A5 FigureA3.WyomingWindEnergyProfile...............................................................................................A7
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FigureB1.TornadoOccurrencesbyCountyinWyoming19592009.................................................... 2 B FigureB2.AverageLengthofTornadobyCountyinWyoming19592009........................................... 3 B FigureC1.PossiblePathofaTornadoafteritStrikestheFirstTransmissionLine ..................................C1 . FigureC2.RandomizedTornadoPaths.....................................................................................................C3 FigureD1.RepresentativeTransmissionLineRouteNumber1..............................................................D1 FigureD2.RepresentativeTransmissionLineRouteNumber2..............................................................D2
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ACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
AC ASCE BLM CAISO CCPG DC DOE DOI EHV GHG Hz ICF ISO kV MTBF MW NCDC NERC NESC NOAA NREL NTTG OSHA PBRC PEIS RAS ROD ROW RPS RRO SPG SWAT UHV U.S. VAR WECC WIA alternatingcurrent AmericanSocietyofCivilEngineers BureauofLandManagement CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator ColoradoCoordinatedPlanningGroup directcurrent U.S.DepartmentofEnergy U.S.DepartmentoftheInterior ExtraHighVoltage GreenhouseGas Hertz ICFInternational IndependentSystemOperator kilovolt MeanTimeBetweenFailure megawatts NationalClimateDataCenter NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation NationalElectricalSafetyCode NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration NationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory NorthernTierTransmissionGroup OccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration ProbabilisticBasedReliabilityCriteria ProgrammaticEnvironmentalImpactStatement RemedialActionScheme RecordofDecision Rightofway RenewablesPortfolioStandard RegionalReliabilityOrganization SubregionalPlanningGroups SouthwestAreaTransmission UltraHighVoltage UnitedStates voltamperereactive WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil WyomingInfrastructureAuthority
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viii
ExecutiveSummary
EXECUTIVESUMMARY
TheimportanceofensuringreliableandsufficienttransmissioninWyomingandintheWesternUnited States(U.S.)cannotbeoverstated.Withsevenhighvoltagetransmissionlines(345kilovolts[kV]or higher)currentlyproposedforWyoming,theWyomingInfrastructureAuthority(WIA)contractedwith ICFInternational(ICF)todeveloparecommendedminimumseparationdistancebetweenhighvoltage transmissionlinesintheState.Thisreportdescribesthedevelopmentandapplicationofananalytic frameworkfordeterminingtheminimumseparationdistancenecessarytomaintainpowersystem reliability. AdditionaltransmissioncapacityisneededinWyomingforseveralreasons.First,energydemandinthe nationisexpectedtocontinueitslongtermgrowthtrenddespitethecurrenteconomicdownturn,and suchgrowthwillrequireadditionalelectricityinfrastructureofalltypes.Second,thedemandfor renewableenergyisincreasing,duetomanyfactorsincludingstateRenewablesPortfolioStandards (RPSs)andalsobecauseoftheincentivesforrenewableenergyintheStimulusbill.Third,thepassageof federallegislationregulatinggreenhousegas(GHG)emissionswouldfurtherstimulatethedemandfor renewableenergy. Transmissionandrenewableenergyareinextricablylinked.Sincerenewableenergygenerationisoften distantfromlargeloadcenters,investmentsinrenewableenergywillrequiresubstantialinvestmentin electrictransmissionlines.WesternstatessuchasWyomingarerichinwindpowerandareexperiencing heightenedinterestfromdevelopersofnewtransmissionlines.Wyominghasmorethan50percentof thebestquality(Class6and7)windresourcesinthecontinentalU.S.,aswellassignificantcoaland naturalgasreserves. Wyomingstransmissionsystemalreadysupportssignificantpowertransferstootherloadcentersand significantwindgenerationdevelopmentisplannedorunderwayinthestate.However,thepowergrid inWyominglackssufficientsparecapacitytosupportadditionallargepowertransfers.Therefore,ifthe windpotentialinWyomingistobefullyutilizedforthebenefitofcitizensofWyomingandtheWestern U.S.,newhighvoltagetransmissionlinesareneededtodeliverthisrenewablesourcetodistantload centerstothewestandsouth. MostoftheproposedtransmissionlinesinWyomingwillcrosspubliclandsadministeredbytheBureau ofLandManagement(BLM)orotherfederalagenciesandthereforewillrequirerightofway(ROW) grants.TransmissionlineapplicantsforROWgrantsinWyominghavesuggestedvaryingseparation distances(rangingupto5miles)betweentheirproposedhighvoltagetransmissionlinesandotherlines tominimizetheriskofsimultaneousoutagesonmultiplelines. Chapter2ofthisreportidentifiestheprimaryfactorscausingtransmissionlineoutageswithinthe WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil(WECC)system.WECCisresponsibleformaintainingelectric reliabilityinthewesternU.S.aswellasratingandintegratingnewtransmissionprojectsintotheexisting powersystem.Fromtheperspectiveofsystemreliability,itisdesirabletoplacetransmissionlines fartherapart,sotheyarelesslikelytoexperienceoutagesduetothesameevents(e.g.,stormsorother naturaldisasters);however,astheseparationdistanceincreases,ROWacquisitioncostsandtheimpacts totheenvironmentandlandusealsogenerallyincrease.Thisinherentconflict,demonstrateswhy justifyingtheseparationdistancefornewtransmissionlinesiscriticalforsitingtransmissionlines. Researchconductedforthisreportdidnotidentifyoneseparationdistancethatfitsallsituations.Given thecomplexityofpowersystemreliability,landacquisitionandtransmissioncosts,environmentaland landuseconsiderations,andotherissuesconsideredinsitingtransmissionlinesoverlongdistances,a onesizefitsallseparationdistanceisnotfeasible.Therefore,ICFrecommendsastandardized
ES1
ExecutiveSummary
framework,systematicallyappliedtomultipleregions,todetermineanappropriateminimum separationdistancebetweenlongdistancehighvoltagetransmissionlines.Suchaframeworkis currentlylacking.Thisreportdescribesauniversallyapplicableanalyticframework(Chapter3)that providesthefundamentalmethodologyfordeterminingtheminimumseparationdistancebetweenhigh voltagetransmissionlinesinWyoming.Creatingthisframeworkinvolvedanalyzingvariousfactorsthat impactlineseparationdistance,thenformulatingthelineseparationdistanceproblem,andderivinga processbasedsolution. Thestudydeveloped(Chapter4)specificanalysismethodstodeterminetheminimumseparation distanceforweatherrelatedfactorswhereseparationdistancecouldmitigatetheriskofasimultaneous outageoftwotransmissionlines.Applyingtheanalyticframeworkandanalysismethodstoavailable dataforWyoming,thereportdeterminesthattherecommendedminimumlineseparationdistancefor newtransmissionlinesineasternandsoutheasternWyomingrangesfromabout260feetuptothe longestspanlength(1,500feetinthisstudy)forparallel500kVtransmissionlines.Thelowervalueof therangeisdependentontheheightofthetransmissiontowerandlinesaglength;theuppervalue encompassesthelowervalueandequalsthelongestspanlengthofthetwotransmissionlines.Using theframeworkandapproachdescribedinthisreport,theseandothervaluescanbecalculatedforhigh voltagetransmissionlinesofvariousvoltages,towerheights,andspanlengths.Whilethesevaluesare basedonlogicalmathematicalformulations,robustmethodologies,anddetailedanalysesofavailable data,changesinoneormoreoftheassumptionsorconstraintsidentifiedinthisreportcould substantiallyincreasetheminimumseparationrange. Inaddition,therecommendedminimumrangeoftransmissionlineseparationdistanceinthisreportis onlyoneofseveralfactorsthatshouldbeusedindeterminingtheactualseparationoftransmission linesinWyoming.TheWECCpathratingprocess,costs,environmentalpermitting,landuseconstraints, publicandotherstakeholderinterests,andstate,regional,andnationalinterestsshouldalsobe considered. Agreaterredundancyoftransmissionwillleadtoamorestableenergynetwork.Developingmorethan onebackbonetransmissioncorridorfromthewindresourceareasinWyomingtoloadcenterswould helpensuresystemreliability.Thesebackbonetransmissioncorridorscouldbeseparatedbytensifnot hundredsofmilestoavoidmultiplelineoutagesduetoweatherrelatedfactorsthatcouldcause significantdamageandimpairpowersystemreliability.Eachbackbonetransmissioncorridorcouldhave multiple500kValternatingcurrent(AC)andhighvoltagedirectcurrent(DC)lines,andWyomingcould minimizethelineseparationwithinthesebackbonecorridorsbasedontheapproachesidentifiedinthis study.
ES2
Chapter1Introduction
CHAPTER1INTRODUCTION
Thischapterprovidesbackgroundinformationandanexplanationoftheneedforthisstudy;provides informationaboutthenatureoftheelectricalpowersystem,demand,andgenerationfortheWestern ElectricityCoordinatingCouncil (WECC)systemingeneralandfortheStateofWyominginparticular; describestheneedformultiplelongdistancetransmissionlinesinthesystemtoconnectremote generationcenterswithloadcenters;andbrieflydescribeseachofthecurrentlyproposedhighvoltage interstatetransmissionlinesintheStateofWyoming.
1.1
ProjectBackgroundandNeed
Section368oftheEnergyPolicyActof2005(PublicLaw10958)requiredtheSecretariesof Agriculture,Commerce,Defense,Energy,andtheInteriortodesignate,undertheirrespective authorities,corridorsforoil,gas,andhydrogenpipelinesandelectricitytransmissionanddistribution facilitiesonFederallandinthe11contiguousWesternStatesTheDepartmentoftheInterior(DOI) issuedaRecordofDecision(ROD)inJanuary2009designatingenergycorridorsonBureauofLand Management(BLM)administeredlandsinthe11contiguousWesternStatesofArizona,California, Colorado,Idaho,Montana,Nevada,NewMexico,Oregon,Utah,Washington,andWyoming.TheFinal ProgrammaticEnvironmentalImpactStatement,DesignationofEnergyCorridorsonFederalLandsinthe 11WesternStates(DOE/EIS0386)(referredtohereinafterastheWestwideEnergyCorridorPEIS), identifiedthecorridorlocationsandanalyzedtheeffectsontheenvironmentassociatedwithpotential futureprojectswithinthecorridors(DOEetal.2008).Theaveragewidthofenergycorridorsanalyzedin WyomingfortheWestwideCorridorPEISwasabout1,500feet. TheObamaAdministrationhasacomprehensiveplantoreducetheCountrysdependenceonforeign oil,addressclimatechange,andinvestinalternativeandrenewableenergy.Investmentsinrenewable energy(e.g.,solar,wind,geothermal,biomass)willalsorequireinvestmentinelectrictransmissionlines, especiallyintheWestwherelandscapableofrenewableenergygenerationareoftendistantfromload centers.TheAmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentActof2009(PublicLaw1115)provides supplementalappropriationsforinvestmentininfrastructuretosupportthedevelopmentand transmissionofrenewableenergy.Forexample,PublicLaw1115providestheWesternAreaPower Administration$3.25billionforconstructing,financing,facilitating,planning,operating,maintaining, orstudyingconstructionofneworupgradedelectricpowertransmissionlinesandrelatedfacilities anddeliveringorfacilitatingthedeliveryofpowergeneratedbyrenewableenergyresourcesThese federalinvestments,combinedwithstateRenewablesPortfolioStandards(RPS),servetoincrease interestindevelopmentofelectrictransmissionlines,especiallyinwesternstateslikeWyoming,which arerichinwindpower.Atpresent,atleastsevenmajor(345ormorekilovolts[kV])transmissionlines areunderconsiderationinWyoming,includingthefollowednamedprojects: GatewayWest GatewaySouth HighPlainsExpress OverlandIntertie TransWestExpress WyomingColoradoIntertie Zephyr
MostoftheproposedtransmissionlinesinWyomingwillcrosspubliclandsadministeredbytheBLMor otherfederalagenciesandthereforewillrequirerightofway(ROW)grants.Transmissionline
FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistancesbetweenTransmissionLinesinWyoming 11
applicantsforROWgrantsfromtheBLMinWyominghavesuggestedvaryingseparationdistances (rangingupto5miles)betweentheirproposedtransmissionlinesandotherelectrictransmissionlines tominimizetheriskofsimultaneousoutagesonmultiplelines.Separationdistancebetweenmultiple transmissionlinescanaffectpowersystemreliability,whichcaninturnaffecttheWECCprojectrating processorthemaximumcapacity(power)inmegawatts(MW)thatthelineispermittedtocarry.The WECCisresponsibleformaintainingelectricreliabilityinthewesternUnitedStates(U.S.)andthe projectratingprocessintegratesnewtransmissionprojectsintotheexistingpowersystemwithpower ratingsthatarederivedusingNorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation(NERC)reliabilitystandards andWECCreliabilitycriteria.Thisprocessalsoprotectstransfercapacitiesofexistingfacilities,meaning thatpathratingsongrandfatheredtransmissionlinesareprotectedeveniftheydontmeetcurrent lineseparationrequirements. Powersystemreliabilityimprovesastheseparationdistancebetweenparalleltransmissionlinesina commoncorridorincreasestothepointthatfailureofonelinecannotphysicallyimpacttheadjacent line(SouthwestAreaTransmissionCommonCorridorTaskForce2009).Fromtheperspectiveof improvingpowersystemreliability,itisthereforedesirabletomaximizetheseparationdistance betweenproposedmajortransmissionlinesinWyoming.However,increasingtheseparationdistance betweentransmissionlinesgenerallyincreasesthecosts,andenvironmentalandlanduseimpacts associatedwiththetransmissionlines.Thisinherentconflictpresentsachallengeforthecontinued developmentofpowersysteminfrastructuretotransferpowerfromrenewableenergyrichlocations (likeWyoming)toelectricalloadcenterstothesouthandwest. Withover50percentofthebestquality (Class6and7)windresourcesinthecontinentalU.S.,significantcoalandnaturalgasreserves,andat leastsevenproposedtransmissionlines,Wyomingelectedtoproactivelyaddresstheseparation distanceissue.TheWyomingInfrastructureAuthority(WIA)contractedfortheindependentanalysis describedinthisreporttodeterminetheminimumseparationdistancebetweenhighvoltage transmissionlinesinWyomingnecessarytomaintainpowersystemreliability.
1.2
TransmissionLineSeparationFactorsandStudyApproach
Transmissionlineseparationcriteriadiscussedinthisreportdonotapplytothelastfivespanlengthsof abovegroundtransmissioncircuitsastheyapproachsubstations.Inaddition,undergroundtransmission linesarenotsubjecttothelineseparationcriteriarelatedtoweather.Factorsthatprimarilyinfluence abovegroundtransmissionlineseparationincludepowersystemreliability,costs,andenvironmental andlanduseconsiderations.Indeterminingtheminimumseparationdistancebetweenaboveground transmissionlinesinWyoming,thisstudyanalyzedfactorsaffectingpowersystemreliabilitythatcanbe mitigatedtosomedegreebyseparationdistance(e.g.,weatherrelatedfactors).Factorssuchashuman errorandequipmentfailurealsoaffectpowersystemreliability;however,theyaregenerally independentoftheseparationdistancebetweentransmissionlinesandarethereforenotanalyzedin thisstudy.Costsarealsoaconsiderationintransmissionlineseparation.Ingeneral,lowerseparation distancesbetweentransmissionlines(e.g.,minimumeasementwidth)equatetolowercostsfor permitting,constructing,maintaining,andoperatingthelineswhichinturnequatestolowercostto ratepayers.Inaddition,thecostofenvironmentalcompliancemayincreaseasseparationdistance increases;however,determiningtheleastcostoptionoftransmissionlinesisnotwithinthescopeof thisstudy. Althoughenvironmentalandlanduseconsiderationscaninfluencetransmissionlineseparation distances,eachnewtransmissionlineroutemayencounterdifferentjurisdictions,regulations, environmentalissues,landuseconstraints,andterrain.Therefore,environmentalandlanduse considerations,astheyaffectseparationdistance,areprojectspecificandarenotanalyzedinthisstudy. However,itisgenerallyacceptedthatconsolidatingfacilities,minimizesenvironmentalandlanduse
12 FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistancesbetweenTransmissionLinesinWyoming
impacts.Fortransmissionlines,minimizingtheseparationdistancebetweenparalleltransmissionlines mayminimizeimpactsassociatedwithanewlinebysharingaccessroadstominimizesurface disturbance,avoidingadditionalhabitatfragmentationandvisualimpactsbysharingeasements,and minimizingcumulativeeffectsbyminimizingtheincrementalimpactofthenewline(SouthwestArea TransmissionCommonCorridorTaskForce2009). Thisstudydevelopsaframeworkforanalyzingthosefactorsaffectingsystemreliabilitythatcanbe mitigatedbytheseparationdistancebetweentransmissionlines.Thisanalyticalframeworkisthen appliedtoconditionsinWyomingtodeveloparecommendedrangeofminimumtransmissionline separationdistancesforproposedtransmissionlinesinWyoming. Chapter2describesdataandinformationobtainedthroughaliteraturesurvey,research,andinterviews asthefirststeptoobtainingdataonfactorsthatinfluencetransmissionlineseparation.Chapter3 describesaframeworkdevelopedforanalyzingfactorsthatinfluencelineseparation.Apreliminary problemformulationandsolutionmethodologyfordeterminingadequatetransmissionlineseparation distancesarealsodescribedinChapter3.TheprocessdescribedinChapter3isthenappliedinChapter 4forconditionsintheStateofWyomingtodeterminetherecommendedminimumrangefor transmissionlineseparationdistances.TablesandfiguresdevelopedbyICFforthisreportarenot sourced.
1.3
TheWesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil(WECC)System
TheWECCSystemwasformedonApril18,2002,bythemergeroftheWesternSystemsCoordinating Council,theSouthwestRegionalTransmissionAssociation,andtheWesternRegionalTransmission Association.OneofeightelectricreliabilitycouncilsinNorthAmerica,WECCisresponsiblefor coordinatingthereliabilityofthebulkelectricsystemintheWesternInterconnection.Inadditionto promotingareliableelectricpowersystem,WECCsupportscompetitivepowermarkets,providesfor openandnondiscriminatorytransmissionaccessamongmembers,createsaforumforresolving transmissionaccessdisputes,andprovidesanenvironmentforcoordinatingmembersoperationaland planningactivities. TheWECCsystemincludesageographicareaofabout1.8millionsquaremilesandisthemostdiverse andlargestoftheeightRegionalReliabilityOrganizations(RROs)oftheNERC.TheWECCservicearea extendsfromtheprovincesofAlbertaandBritishColumbiainCanadatothenorthernportionofBaja CaliforniainMexico,andincludesallorportionsofthe14westernstatesbetween(WECC2009). Figure11showsthegeographiccoverageoftheWECCsystem.WECCissubdividedintofoursubregions NorthwestPowerPool,RockyMountainPowerArea,ArizonaNewMexicoSouthernNevadaArea,and CaliforniaMexicoPowerArea.Figure12showsthelocationoftheWECCsubregionsandTable11lists thephysicalareaeachsubregioncovers.TheNorthwestsubregionoccupiesabout70percentofthe physicalareaoftheentireWECCsystem.
Table11.AreaCoveredbytheWECCSubregions
Subregion
ArizonaNewMexicoSouthern NevadaArea RockyMountainPowerArea CaliforniaMexicoPowerArea NorthwestPowerPool WECCTotal
Source:NERC2009a. WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
AreaCovered(squaremiles)
230,100 167,000 156,000 1,214,000 1,767,100
13
Chapter1Introduction Figure11.WECCSystem
Source:WECC2009.
Figure12.WECCSubregions
Source:NERC2009a.
14
Coordinationofthedaytodayinterconnectedsystemoperationandestablishingtheproceduresfor longtermplanningprocessesarechallengingforWECCbecausetheregionislargeanditsresourcesand membersarediverse.TheWECCsystemprovidesreliableelectricalsupplytomorethan71million peopleintheWesternInterconnection. Atpresent,theWECCsystemhastwooperatingIndependentSystemOperators(ISOs)theCalifornia IndependentSystemOperator(CAISO)andtheAlbertaElectricSystemOperator.
1.3.1
DemandandGenerationintheWECCSystem
Becauseofitsgeographicexpanse,theWECCsystemhasdifferentpeakingseasonsbetweenthe subregions.TheNorthwestPowerPoolisawinterpeakingregionandtheRockyMountainPowerArea peakoccurseitherinsummerorwinter.TheArizonaNewMexicoandCaliforniaMexicosubregionsare summerpeaking. Table12showsthe2008and2009demandforecastsfortheWECCsubregions.Thesupplymixisalso quitediverse,withsubstantialhydroelectricandpumpedstorageresourcesinthePacificNorthwest. Morethan60percentoftheNorthwestPowerPoolgenerationsupplyisthroughhydroelectricand pumpedstorageresources.TheRockyMountainPowerAreasubregioniscoaldominatedbecauseof thecoalreservesinWyoming,Idaho,andColorado,whiletheArizonaNewMexicoandCalifornia Mexicosubregionsaredominatedbygasfiredcombinedcycleandcombustionturbines. TheWECCinstalledcapacityasofDecember2007includes69,260MWofhydroelectric(conventional andpumpedstorage)capacity;120,397MWofthermalcapacity;9,552MWofnuclearcapacity;6,574 MWofwindcapacity;and2,885MWofgeothermalcapacity(NERC2008)(seeTable13)foratotal combinedWECCinstalledcapacityof212,277MW.
Table12.20082009DemandForecastforWECCanditsSubregions
SummerPeak
2008Forecast 2008Actual Difference(MW) Difference(%) 2008Actual 2009Forecast Difference(MW) Difference(%) 2008Forecast 2009Forecast Difference(MW) Difference(%)
WECC
162,052 154,327 7,725 4.77 154,327 161,007 6,680 4.33 162,052 161,007 629 0.64
NorthwestPower PoolArea
55,922 56,172 250 0.45
Rocky Mountain PowerArea

12,285 11,579 706 5.75 11,579 11,504 75 0.65 12,285 11,504 781 6.36
ArizonaNew MexicoSouthern NevadaPowerArea

31,551 28,892 2,659 8.43 28,892 30,505 1,613 5.58 31,551 30,505 630 3.32
California/ MexicoPower Area

62,691 57,725 4,966 7.92 57,725 63,352 5,627 9.75 62,691 63,352 661 1.05
56,172 57,811 1,639 2.92 55,922 57,811 1,889 3.38
Source:NERC2008. Note: Allactualandforecastloadsaremonthlynoncoincident. % percent MW megawatts WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
15
Chapter1Introduction Table13.WECCCapacityMix
ExistingResources asof12/31/2007 SummerRatings NonDerated
HydroConventional &Pumped Thermal Nuclear Geothermal InternalCombustion Biomass Solar Wind Other Total PercentofWECCTotal
Northwest PowerPool Area

49,126 33,757 1,150 180 211 639 0 3,243 174 88,480 41.7
Rocky Mountain PowerArea

1,426 11,307 0 0 253 2 8 662 0 13,658 6.4
Arizona NewMexico SouthernNevada PowerArea

4,700 30,990 3,872 450 0 58 49 295 53 40,467 19.1
California Mexico PowerArea

14,008 44,343 4,530 2,255 49 1,120 458 2,374 535 69,672 32.8
WECC Total
69,260 120,397 9,552 2,885 513 1,819 515 6,574 762 212,277 100
Percentof Total
30.2 2.5 17.1 1.4 0.2 0.9 0.2 3.1 0.4 100
Source:NERC2008. WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
1.3.2
TransmissionintheWECCSystem
TransmissionlinesarethebackboneoftheWECCenergysystem,spanninglongdistancesand connectingtheverdantPacificNorthwestwithitsabundanthydroelectricresourcestothearid Southwestwithitslargecoalfiredandnuclearresources.TheverybasisforformingtheRROswasthat theywouldactascustodiansoftheelectricalnetworkandensurereliableoperationofthe interconnectedelectricalsystem. Eachyear,WECCperformsapowersupplyassessmenttoidentifymajorloadzonesandthepossibilityof loadcurtailmentasaresultoftransmissionconstraints.WECCperformsnumerousoperatingstudies, modelingtheregionunderanumberofloadandresourcescenarios,anddevelopsappropriate operatingproceduresthatallowsafeandreliableoperations.Allthemajorpowergridoperatorshave theirowninternalprocessesforidentifyingandaddressinglocalarearesourcelimitations. ThemajorloadcentersintheWesternInterconnectionliealongthePacificbelt;theSouthernCalifornia areaisoneofthosemajorloadcenters.Thisareaimportssignificantamountsofpoweranditis expectedthattransmissionintothisareaandtheotherloadcentersoftheWesternInterconnectionwill beheavilyutilized. Atpresent,WECChaseightbacktobackdirectcurrenttiestotheEasternInterconnection,witha combinedtransfercapabilityofalmost1,500MW;onlyabout490MWofnetcapacityimportswere plannedforthe2008winterperiod.WECChasabout8,100circuitmilesofplanned230to500kV transmissionlineprojectsforthenext10yearplanninghorizon.Transmissionplannersreportthese projectstoWECCforinclusioninitsSignificantAdditionsReport.Table14showstheexistingand plannedcircuitmilesoftransmissionintheWECCsystem.
16
Chapter1Introduction Table14.WECCExistingandPlannedTransmissionLineMileage
ExistingandFutureTransmission(CircuitMiles)
Category Existingasof12/31/2007 PlannedFirstFiveYears PlannedSecondFiveYears Totalasof12/31/2007 ACVoltage(kV) 230 42,839 2,428 171 45,438 345 9,987 434 701 11,122 500 16,170 2,896 974 20,040 TotalAC 68,996 5,758 1,846 76,600 DCVoltage(kV) 250300 106 106 500 1,333 488 1,821 TotalDC 1,439 488 0 1,927 AC&DC Total 70,435 6,246 1,846 78,527
Source:NERC2008. Note: TherearemultiplehighvoltagetransmissionlineadditionsplannedfortheWECCsystem,someofwhichcouldbeonlinebeyond 2017.Thistablemightnotincludethoselines. AC alternatingcurrent DC directcurrent kV Kilovolt WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
Toensureappropriateplanningfortransmissionrelatedissuesandtoensurereliableoperationinavast region,WECCreliesonsixSubregionalPlanningGroups(SPG),listedbelowandshowninFigure13. CaliforniaIndependentSystemOperator(CAISO) ColoradoCoordinatedPlanningGroup(CCPG) ColumbiaGrid NorthernTierTransmissionGroup(NTTG) Sierra SouthwestAreaTransmission(SWAT)
1.3.3
NeedforLongDistanceHighVoltageTransmissionLinesintheWECC System
HistoricallyintheWECCsystem,thesourcesofbaseloadgenerationsuchashydroelectricandcoal wereinremoteareas.LongdistancetransmissionslineswerebuiltsotheloadcentersintheWECC systemcouldaccesstheselessexpensivegenerationsources.Electricpowerhastotravelalongdistance throughhighcapacity,highvoltagetransmissionlinestoloadcentersintheWECCsystem.Forexample, thethreetransmissionlinesthatcomprisethePacificalternatingcurrent(AC)Intertiehaveatotal capacityofabout4,800MWandconnecthydroelectricgenerationplantsinthePacificNorthwestto Californialoadcentershundredsofmilestothesouth.Similarly,intheSouthwest,powergeneratedby thePaloVerdenuclearunits(capacityofabout4,000MW)iscarriedbyinterstatetransmissionlinesfor morethan200milesthroughdesertterrainbeforereachingtheloadcentersinSouthernCalifornia. AnotherexampleistheIntermountaindirectcurrent(DC)line,whichisabout500mileslongand transfers1,900MWofpowerfromtheIntermountaingeneratingplanttoLosAngeles.IntheRocky MountainPowerAreathatincludeseasternandsouthernWyoming,thelocationofthecoalpowered plantnearcoalminesandthesubstantialhighqualitywindresourcesinWyomingcreatetheneedfor longdistancetransmissionlinestosupplylessexpensivepowertoloadcenters.Thereareadditional instancesoflongdistancetransmissionlinesintheWECCsystembecauseoftheconsiderabledistance betweenloadcentersandgenerationsources. ThisfeatureofWECCdifferentiatesitfromotherinterconnectionssuchastheEasternInterconnection andElectricReliabilityCouncilofTexas,whereloadcentersarereasonablydispersedbetween
17
Chapter1Introduction Figure13.WECCSubregionalPlanningGroups(SPG)
Source:WECC2009.
generationsourcesandtransmissionlinesarerelativelyshort.Thepresenceoflongdistance transmissionlinesimpliesrelativelylessredundancyinthesystembecausetheselinesareexpensiveto buildandmaintain.Longdistancetransmissionlinestypicallyare345ormorekVandcarryalarge amountofpower.Lossoftheselinescouldsignificantlyimpactthereliabilityofthepowersystemand couldresultincascadingoutagesandlossofload.Therefore,moresafeguardsagainstoutageofthese linessuchasrobustconstructionandfrequentmaintenance;comprehensiveandfailsafeprotection systems;andoutageimpactmitigationmethods,suchasRemedialActionSchemes(RASs)are designedandimplementedthroughouttheWECCsystem.
1.4
WyomingRegionDescription
SituatedintheRockyMountainregionofthewesternU.S.,WyomingisattheintersectionoftheRocky MountainsandtheGreatPlains.InwesternWyoming,thelandscapeisdominatedbyaseriesofRocky Mountainranges.Thereareseveralintermountainbasins,orvalleys,whicharecharacterizedby relativelyflatrangelandsandasemiaridclimate,interspersedamongthemountainranges.The ContinentalDividecutsthroughtheStatefromthenorthwestcornertothecenterofitssouthern
18
borderwithColorado.TheeasternonethirdoftheStateconsistsprimarilyofavasthighaltitude prairie,thewesternextensionoftheGreatPlainsthatstretchesfromCanadathroughtheU.S.to Mexico. WyomingslocationattheintersectionoftheRockyMountainsandGreatPlains,coupledwithits diversetopography,substantialpubliclandownership,weatherconditions,relativelylowpopulation, andrichnessinconventionalandrenewableenergyresources,contributetoitshistoricroleasanenergy exporter.ThesecharacteristicsalsocontributetothenumberofproposedtransmissionlinesintheState andtheissueofseparationdistancesneededbetweenlinestoaddresspowersystemreliabilityissues. AppendixAprovidesmoreinformationaboutWyomingstopography,landownership,weather,and naturalresources.
1.5
DemandandGenerationinWyoming
Becauseofitsrelativelylowpopulation,Wyominghasalowdomesticelectricitydemandandgenerally hassurplusgenerationcapacityavailableforexport.Wyomingproducesalmost40percentofthe Nationscoal,soitisnotsurprisingthatcoalfuelsthegenerationofmostoftheelectricityinWyoming. Naturalgasandwindaremorerecentadditionstogenerationresources,andgrowthinrenewable energycapacityismostlyfromwindfarms,smallhydroelectricfacilities,andsolarpowerprojects. Utilitiesownmostofthegenerationcapacity. MostofWyomingswindenergyfacilitiesareinthesoutheasternpartoftheState,althoughthelargest windenergyfacilityisinsouthwestWyoming.Table15liststhetotalinstalledgeneratingcapacityin Wyoming,andTable16showsnetgenerationbyenergysourceinWyoming.
Table15.WyomingTotalInstalledGenerationCapacity
StateTotalElectricPowerIndustryNetSummerCapacitybyEnergySource,20032007(MW) EnergySource 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Fossil Coal Petroleum NaturalGas OtherGases Nuclear Renewable PumpedStorage Other Total 5,977 5,792 8 177 585 6,562 5,959 5,792 6 161 588 12 6,558 6,105 5,847 6 160 92 590 12 6,707 6,105 5,847 6 160 92 590 12 6,707 6,065 5,847 7 120 92 590 12 6,667
Source:EIA2009a. Note:Additionalrenewablegenerationhasbeenaddedsince2007andthousandsofMWofwindbasedgenerationare plannedforthefuture. MW megawatts
19
Chapter1Introduction Table16.WyomingNetGenerationbyEnergySource
StateTotalElectricPowerIndustryNetGenerationbyEnergySource,2003 2007(000MWhour)
EnergySource Fossil Coal Petroleum NaturalGas OtherGases Nuclear Renewable PumpedStorage Other Total 2003 42,667 42,341 45 280 960 43,627 2004 43,491 43,346 46 87 13 1210 107 44,808 2005 43,977 43,346 42 325 264 1526 65 45,567 2006 43,749 42,892 46 501 310 1602 49 45,400 2007 44,080 43,127 47 594 312 1484 69 45,633
Source:EIA2009a. Note:Additionalrenewablegenerationhasbeenaddedsince2007andthousandsofMWofwindbasedgenerationare plannedforthefuture. MW megawatts
1.6
ProposedTransmissionLinesinWyoming
Atpresent,therearesevennewinterstatetransmissionlineprojectsproposedinWyomingGateway WestandSouth,HighPlainsExpress,OverlandIntertie,TransWestExpress,WyomingColoradoIntertie, andZephyralmostallofthemenablingthetransferofavailablewindenergyresourcesintheStateto loadcentersinCalifornia,Arizona,orNevadatothewestandsouth. Mostoftheseprojectsinvolvelinesathighervoltages(345andhigherkV)andthecapacitiesofthe projectsarelarge(morethan1,000MWinmultiplecases).Someoftheseprojectsmightfollowthe samepathforhundredsofmilesbeforebranchingofforterminatingatdifferentloadpoints.For example,theGatewaySouthandtheTransWestExpressprojectsmightrunalongsimilarroutesfrom WyominguntiltheyapproachLasVegas,Nevada.Mostoftheproposedtransmissionlineprojectsin WyomingareconcentratedinthesouthernhalfoftheStatetotransmitwindenergyfromthesoutheast quarteroftheStatetoloadcenterstothewestandsouth.TherecentlycompletedWesternRenewable EnergyZonesPhase1Reportidentifiestheapproximatelocationofhighqualityrenewableenergy sourcesinWyomingandotherwesternstatesintheWesternInterconnection(WGAandDOE2009). Figure14showsconceptualpathsforproposedinterstatetransmissionlineprojectsinWyoming.
110
Chapter1Introduction Figure14.ProposedTransmissionLineProjectsinWyoming
Routesshownareforillustrativepurposesonlyandwillbe finalizedfollowingacomprehensivereviewprocess.
Source:WIA2009.
111
112
Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation
CHAPTER2LITERATUREONTRANSMISSIONLINESEPARATION
Asthefirststepinthisanalysis,ICFcollectedandreviewedavailabledataandliteratureontransmission lineseparationintheWECC.Intheliteraturesurvey,ICFplacednospecificrestrictionsonthetypesand sourcesofdatacollected,aslongasthematerialwasrelevanttolineseparationintheWECCsystem. ICFcollecteddatafromthefollowingpublicsources: NERCforreliabilitystandardsandtransmissionoutagedata WECCforlineoutagedataandreliabilitycriteria WesternAreaPowerAdministration(Western)forlineoutagedata UtilitieswithintheWECCsystemforlineseparationcriteria ProponentsofnewtransmissionlinesinWyomingforgeneralinformation TheBLMfortheWestwideEnergyCorridorPEIS MiscellaneousInternetWebsitesfordataonlineseparation
Inaddition,ICFmadeinquiriesofproponentsofnewtransmissionlinesinWyomingandtheWIAfor informationpertainingtolineseparation.
2.1
ImpactofReliabilityRulesonLineSeparation
TheROWandlineseparationdistancesforalltransmissionlines(existingorproposed)intheU.S.should complywithNERCreliabilitystandards.TransmissionlinesintheWECCsystemarealsorequiredto complywithWECCreliabilitycriteria.WECCreliabilitycriteriarecognizetheuniquenatureoftheWECC system,withinwhichthereareseveralinstancesofmultipletransmissionlinesrunningparallelwithina corridorandtransferringpowerfromremotegenerationlocationstodistantloadcenters. TherearefourcategoriesofNERCreliabilitystandardsfortransmissionplanningthataddresslineand othertransmissionequipmentoutagesCategoriesA,B,C,andD.Therulesineachcategoryspecifythe teststobeperformedforeachtransmissionlineandequipmentandtheacceptableimpactofeachtest onthepowersystem.Ofthesecategories,CandDspecifyteststhatinvolvemultiplelineoutagesand theassociatedsystemperformancerequirements.CategoryCspecifiesthatlineoutagescouldresultin plannedloadcurtailmentsorcontrolledcurtailmentoffirmtransfers;however,thelineoutagesarenot allowedtocascade.TheperformancerequirementsforCategoryDarerelativelylessstringentthan CategoryC.Therefore,onlyCategoryCisdiscussedinthisreport.WECC(2002)includesdefinitionsfor NERC/WECCPlanningStandardsandMinimumOperatingReliabilityCriteria.Table21summarizesthe typesofcontingenciesthatshouldbeanalyzedforNERCCategoryC. TheseNERCstandardsdonotspecifycompliancecriteriaforlinesonseparatetransmissiontowersnear oneanother.TheNERCstandardsinCategoryCapplytoanytwocircuitsofamultiplecircuit transmissionline. WECCappliesamorestringentcriterion,whichrequiresalltransmissionlineswithinacommoncorridor tobesubjecttoperformancerequirementsimposedbytheNERCCategoryCreliabilitytestsnotjust linesthatshareatowerorROW.Commoncorridorsaredefinedas:Contiguousrightofwayortwo parallelrightsofwaywithstructurecenterlineseparationlessthanthelongestspanlengthofthetwo transmissioncircuitsatthepointofseparationor500feet,whicheverisgreater,betweenthe transmissioncircuits.Thisseparationrequirementdoesnotapplytothelastfivespansofthe transmissioncircuitsenteringintoasubstation(WECC2008a).Thereforeifthedistancebetweentwo paralleltransmissionlinesislessthanthelongestspanlengthofthelines,theywillbeconsideredtobe
21
withinacommoncorridor.Ifthespanlengthislessthan500feet,thenthelineswillbeconsideredtobe inacommoncorridorunlesstheyareseparatedbymorethan500feet.
Table21.SummaryofContingenciesandSystem LimitsorImpactsforNERCCategoryC
Contingencies Category
InitiatingEvent(s)andContingencyElement(s)
SystemLimitsorImpacts
SystemStableand bothThermaland VoltageLimits withinApplicable Rating1 Yes Yes Yes Lossof Demandor Curtailed Firm Transfers Planned/ Controlled2 Planned/ 2 Controlled Planned/ 2 Controlled
Cascading Outages2
C Event(s)resulting inthelossoftwo ormore (multiple) elements
SLGFaultwithNormalClearing3: 1. BusSection 2. Breaker(failureorinternalfault) SLGor3FaultwithNormalClearing3: 3. CategoryB(B1,B2,B3,orB4)contingency, manualsystemadjustments,followedby anotherCategoryB(B1,B2,B3,orB4) contingency BipolarBlockwithNormalClearing3: 4. Bipolar(dc)LineFault(non3),withNormal 3 Clearing 5. Anytwocircuitsofamultiplecircuit 4 towerline SLGFaultwithDelayedClearing3(stuckbreakeror protectionsystemfailure): 6. Generator 7. 8. 9. Transformer TransmissionCircuit BusSection
No No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Planned/ Controlled2 Planned/ 2 Controlled Planned/ Controlled2 Planned/ Controlled2 Planned/ Controlled2 Planned/ Controlled2
No No No No No No
Source:NERC2009b. NOTE:TablefootnotesfollowletteringinNERC2009bforCategoryC. 1 Applicableratingreferstotheapplicablenormalandemergencyfacilitythermalratingorsystemvoltagelimitasdeterminedandconsistently appliedbythesystemorfacilityowner.Applicableratingscouldincludeemergencyratingsapplicableforshortdurationsasrequiredto permitoperatingstepsnecessarytomaintainsystemcontrol.AllratingsmustbeestablishedconsistentwithapplicableNERCreliability standardsaddressingfacilityratings. 2 Dependingonsystemdesignandexpectedsystemimpacts,thecontrolledinterruptionofelectricsupplytocustomers(loadshedding),the plannedremovalfromserviceofcertaingenerators,and/orthecurtailmentofcontractedfirm(nonrecallablereserved)electricpower transfersmaybenecessarytomaintaintheoverallreliabilityoftheinterconnectedtransmissionsystems. 3 Normalclearingiswhentheprotectionsystemoperatesasdesignedandthefaultisclearedinthetimenormallyexpectedwithproper functioningoftheinstalledprotectionsystems.Delayedclearingofafaultisduetofailureofanyprotectionsystemcomponentsuchasa relay,circuitbreaker,orcurrenttransformer,andnotbecauseofanintentionaldesigndelay. 4 Systemassessmentsmayexcludetheseeventswheremultiplecircuittowersareusedovershortdistances(e.g.,stationentrance,river crossings)inaccordancewithRegionalexemptioncriteria. SLG SingleLineGround
22
TheWECCreliabilitycriteriarequirethatiftransmissionlinesareinacommoncorridor,thelinesshould beanalyzedforthesimultaneousoutageofthelinesduetoasingleevent.Thisisreferredtoasa commonmodecontingencyanalysis.WECCmayallowanexceptiononacasebycasebasisifitis determinedthatthefrequencyoftheinitiatingeventislessthan1in30years.WECCalsohasasafe harborprovisionthatstatesthatthecommonmodecontingencyanalysisrequirementdoesnotapplyto linesthatarenotinacommoncorridor. Specifically,WECCstandardsWRS1.1andWRS1.4describethecommonmodecontingencyanalysis requirementsandrelatedissues(WECC2008a). WRS1.1 TheNERCCategoryC.5initiatingeventofanonthreephasefaultwithnormalclearing shallalsoapplytothecommonmodecontingencyoftwoAdjacentTransmissionCircuits onseparatetowersunlesstheeventfrequencyisdeterminedtobelessthanonein thirtyyears. Forcontingenciesinvolvingexistingorplannedfacilities,theTableW1performance categorycanbeadjustedbasedonactualorexpectedperformance(e.g.eventoutage frequencyandconsiderationofimpact)afterreceivingBoardapprovaltochangethe PerformanceLevelAdjustmentRecord.
WRS1.4
IftheMeanTimeBetweenFailures(MTBF)islessthan30yearsandthelinesshareacorridor,NERC CategoryCtestsshouldbeperformed.Whenconductingacommonmodecontingencyanalysis, particularattentionshouldbegiventoeventsthatcouldleadtocascadingoutages.Theconsequences ofcascadingoutagescanbesevere;theycanresultinislandingofsystems,lossofload,andblackouts.It isthereforeimportanttoanalyzepossibleinitiatingeventsandimplementmitigationmeasures. Ifthecommonmodecontingencyanalysesforaprojectshowsthataneventcouldhavean unacceptableimpactonthesystem,severalmitigatingmeasurescanbeapplied.Theseinclude: 1) Reducingtheratingsoftheproposedlines(undernormalsystemoperations)untiltheanalysis showsatolerableimpacttothesystemundercommonmodecontingencies.Thismethodwould resultinaWECCreducedpathrating.Formerchantpowertransmissioncompanies,thisreduction inpathratingcouldhaveeconomicconsequencessinceitwoulddecreasethefirmpowertransfer capabilitythetransmissionproponentcouldmarkettogenerationandloadcompanies.Forutilities, thiscouldmeanthatbasedonloadgrowthandotherfactors,moretransmissionintheregioncould beneededsoonerthanotherwisenecessarybecauseofthelowerratingofthelines. 2) FormulatinganOperatingProcedureoraRAStomitigatetheimpactofthecommonmode contingency.Thisusuallyrequireschangestogenerationdispatchand/orinstallingadditional transmissionequipmentsuchasvoltamperereactive(VAR)compensators.Thiscouldresultin additionalcoststothetransmissionproponentstomaintaintheinitialpathratingoftheline. 3) Increasingtheseparationdistanceoftheproposedlinefromotherlinessuchthatthedistance equals500feetorthelongestspanlength,whicheverisgreater.Thisactioncouldresultinincreased coststoobtainROWsandforconstructioninfrastructure,becauseeachlinenowwillhavea separateROW,roads,andthelikeforconstructionandmaintenance. WECChasgrantedsomeexceptionstoperformingthecommonmodeoutageanalysiswhenthe separationdistancedidnotmeetthestandard(WECC2001).Theexceptionsarebasedontwo categories1)eventsconsiderednoncredibleand2)credibleeventsforwhichWECCgranted exceptionstothecriteriaforvariousreasons.WECCaddressesexceptionscasebycase.Thecandidates forexceptionsareanalyzedbyWECCusingmultiplefactors.Oneofthefactorsiscompliancewiththe
23
performancerequirementsgiveninTable22below.Otherfactorsincludeapplicabilityofthedefinitions formultipleelementoutages,twocircuitoutagesandRASs,totheexceptioncandidate.
Table22.WECCDisturbancePerformanceTableofAllowableEffectsonOtherSystems
NERCand WECC Categories
A
OutageFrequency Associatedwiththe PerformanceCategory (outage/year)

NotApplicable
TransientVoltageDip Standard
Minimum Transient Frequency Standard
PostTransient Voltage Deviation Standard1
NothinginadditiontoNERC Nottoexceed25%atloadbuses or30%atnonloadbuses. Nottoexceed20%formore than20cyclesatloadbuses. Nottoexceed30%atanybus. Nottoexceed20%formore than40cyclesatloadbuses. Notbelow59.6 Hzfor6cyclesor moreataload bus. Notbelow59.0 Hzfor6cyclesor moreataload bus. Nottoexceed 5%atanybus. Nottoexceed 10%atany bus.
0.33
0.0330.33
<0.033
NothinginadditiontoNERC
Source:WECC2008b. 1 Ifitcanbedemonstratedthatposttransientvoltagedeviationsthatarelessthanthevaluesinthetablewillresultinvoltageinstability,the systeminwhichthedisturbanceoriginatedandtheaffectedsystem(s)shallcooperateinmutuallyresolvingtheproblem. % Percent Hz Hertz NERC NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
Examplesofeventsconsiderednoncrediblefollow. LaramieRiver345kVthreephasefault,lossoftheLaramieRiverAultandLaramieRiverStory345 kVlines. Reason:Thelinesdonotshareacommoncorridorandtherewerenomulticircuitoutagesinthe facilitiesinthelast10years. Malin500kVthreephasefault,lossofbothMalinRoundMountain500kVlineswithfailureof ChiefJosephbrakeinsertionandNorthwestgeneratortrippingremedialactionRASmalfunction. Reason:Thelinesdoshareacommoncorridor.ThefacilityisequippedwithRASs(whichworkedas designed)thatmitigatetheotherwiseadverseimpactofthedisturbances.
ExamplesofcredibleeventsforwhichWECChasgrantedexceptionstothecriteriafollow. PaloVerde500kVthreephasefault,lossoftheDeversPaloVerdeandPaloVerdeNorthGila500 kVlines. Reason:Thelinesdonotshareacommoncorridor.Therewerenomulticircuitoutagesinthe facilityinthe10yearevaluationperiod. Lugo500kVthreephasefault,lossoftheLugoEldoradoandLugoMohave500kVlines. Reason:Thelinesdoshareacommoncorridor.However,oneeventdoesnotconstitutea statisticallysignificantevent;thereforeitisnotusedinthereliabilityperformancedeterminationof afacility.Theimpactoftheeventdidnotresultinacascadingoutage.
InCalifornia,theISOalsohasreliabilitycriteriathataddresstheimpactofmultiplecontingencies. UtilitiesintheISOfootprintarerequiredtofollowthesecriteria.Forexample,Guide4oftheCalifornia ISOPlanningStandardsdoesnotallowmorethan1,400MWofgenerationtrippingasmitigationfora

doublecontingency.Accordingly,ifacasespecificanalysisshowedthatasimultaneousoutageoftwo adjacentcircuitswascredible,andtherequiredmitigationforsuchanoutageinvolvedtrippingmore than1,400MWofgeneration,theplannedadjacenttransmissioncircuitwouldbeinviolationof applicableCaliforniaISOreliabilitycriteria.
2.1.1
IndividualUtilityCriteriaforLineSeparation
UtilitiesintheWECCsystemalsohavelineseparationcriteria.RegionalutilitiesintheWECCsystemtry toavoidthepossibilityofcascadingoutagesbyminimizingthelikelihoodofsimultaneousfailuresof multipletransmissionlines.Theutilitiesbasetheirlineseparationdecisionsonthelikelihoodofcredible eventsthatcouldcausecommonmodeoutageofthemultiplelinesinasinglecorridor. Forexample,intheCaliforniadesertregions,firesarerelativelyfrequent;therefore,decisionsaboutline separationdistancesneedtoconsiderthelikelihoodofafirecausingmultiplelineoutages.A1980 SouthernCaliforniaEdisonarticlementionsdesirablelineseparationforextrahighvoltagelinesat2,000 feettoavoidcommonmodeimpacts(SouthernCaliforniaEdisonCompany1980).Becausefiresaffectall linesinacommoncorridor,insteadofincreasingdistanceofseparation,SouthernCaliforniaEdison recommendstheuseoffirebreaks.ForthetransmissionlinescarryingpowerfromArizonaandNevada intoCalifornia,lightningstrikes,fires,andaircraftcollisionswithlinesareamongthecausesofmulti circuitoutages.InSeptember1973,anairplanebroughtdowntwo500kVcircuits,three230kVcircuits, anda66kVcircuit.VandalismisalsoconsideredtobeariskinOctober1974,vandalsdynamited230 and500kVBonnevillePowerAdministrationsystems.Thearticledoesnotmentionlightningasacause ofasignificantnumberofdoublecircuitoutages. ABonnevillePowerAdministrationdocumentdiscussesthevariousfactorsinfluencinglineseparationin itsserviceterritory,whichincludespartsofWashingtonandOregon(DOEetal.2003).Multiple500kV linescarryinghydroelectricpowerfromBritishColumbia,Washington,andOregontoCaliforniasload centersfrequentlyshareacommoncorridor.Intheseregions,decisionsaboutlineseparationdistances arebasedonthepossibilityofmultiplelineoutagesduetolightningstrikes,snow,ice,fire,andhigh winds.TheCaptainJackOlinda500kVlinewasbuiltwithaseparationofmorethanonespanlength fromtheMalinRoundMountainCircuits1and2500kVlines,whichhadinthepastexperienced numeroustwolineoutageevents,somewithserioussystemconsequences.SincetheCaptainJack Olindalinewasenergizedin1993,therehasnotbeenasinglecaseofsimultaneousoutageofallthree lines,notwithstandinganumberofoutagesofthe95mileMalinRoundMountainCircuits1and2500 kVlines.TheBonnevillePowerAdministrationidentifiescommoncausesofmultiplelineoutagesand possiblemitigationmeasures,aslistedinTable23.
Table23.CommonCausesofMultipleLineOutages andMitigationMeasures
SerialNumber
1 2 3 4 5
RiskElement
Onetowerfallingonother Snaggedshieldwiredraggedonto adjacentline Aircraftflyingintoonecircuit Fire LightningStrike
MitigationMeasure
Increasespacingbetweenlines Increasespacingbetweenlines Increasespacingbetweenlines Increasespacingbetweenlinesand maintenanceofROWcorridors Useofshieldwire/protectiverelaying settings
Source:DOEetal.2003. ROW Rightofway
25
TheBonnevillePowerAdministrationdocumentalsoanalyzedhistoricaloutagedataforparallellinesin thesameROWwithintheirsystemforthepast15years.Figure21summarizesthathistoricaloutage data.
Figure21.OutageCauseforParallelLinesin BonnevillePowerAdministrationData15YearHistory
Source:DOEetal.2003.
TheBonnevillePowerAdministrationdocumentobservesthatbasedontheanalysisofoutagedata,it doesnotseemthatincreasingseparationdistancewouldtranslateintoaloweroutagerateofparallel lines.However,separatinglinesbytheaveragespanlengthormoresignificantlyreducestheprobability ofcommonmodeoutage.ExamplesquotedinthereportincludetheCaptainJackOlinda500kVline, whichisseparatedbyonespanlengthfromtheRoundMountainMalin500kVline.Anotherexampleis constructionofthethird500kVline,LosBanosGates.Thetowersofthetwocircuitsare2,000feet apartbecausetherewasanoccurrencewhena500kVtowerfellonanothertower,leadingtooutageof powerfor5millionpeopleintheWECCsystem. WhilediscussingthereliabilityimpactoftheLosBanosGates500kVline,PacificGas&Electric mentionsthecriteriafollowedforlineseparation(CaliforniaPUC2001).PacificGas&Electricnotesthat asingle500kVtransmissionlineiscapableofcarryingsomuchpowerthattheinterruptionofonlyone suchlinecouldcauseasignificantdisturbancetothestabilityoftheentireregionalelectricsystem.For thebulkhighvoltagetransmissionadditions,theprojectmustbesodefinedthatacrediblethreeline outagecannotoccur.Tominimizethepossibilityofasimultaneousthreelineoutage,PacificGas& Electrichasadoptedaminimumseparationofapproximately2,000feetbetweenthetwoexisting500 kVlinesandthenew500kVline.Inareaswherea2,000footseparationmightnotbepossible,Pacific Gas&Electricsuggestsacasebycaseevaluationwithappropriateimprovements,suchasextra strengtheningoftheneworexistingtowers. A1985reportdescribedthelineseparationrequirementsfortheCaliforniaOregonTransmissionProject (PowerSystemsStudiesCommittee1985).Thereportdescribedhowtheminimumspacingforasingle circuit500kVlinecouldbeaslowas200feetduetomountainsandothergeographicallimitations.The
26
reportdiscussedwind,ice,fire,andstormsaspossibleoutagefactorsforlinessharingthesame corridor. Thereportgaveseveralexamplesofweatherorotherfactorscausingmultiplelineoutages,asfollows: January10,1975WindandicecausedoutageoftheMidwayVincent500kVlineandAntelope toMagunden220kVline(Circuits1and2). December20,1977Highwindstoppledseven500kVtowers,resultingintheoutageofall threecircuitsofthe500kVMidwayVincentline. December22,1982Highwindstoppleda500kVtower1.5milesnorthoftheTeslasubstation, resultingintheoutageofseverallinesconnectingattheTeslasubstation,includingthe500kV TeslaTableMountainline. January1,1976Agasexplosiondestroyedonesinglecircuittower,twodoublecircuittowers, andfive220kVtowersaroundthePardeesubstation.
Thereportconcludedthatconstructingthree500kVlinesinthesamecorridorcouldbeextremely dangerousforthereliabilityoftheWECCsystem.Thereportrecommendedthatforthenewproposed 500kVtransmissionline,aseparateROWbeobtainedatasufficientdistancefromtheexistinglines suchthatathreelineoutagewouldnotbecredible.Thereportalsoobservedthatthiswouldbethe mostpracticalsolution.Othersolutionsincludedderatingthelinetozerotopreventsystemvoltage collapseorstrengtheningtheunderlying230kVnetworkatsignificantcost.Thereportfurther recommendedthatallthree500kVlinesnotterminateatasinglesubstation,butratherutilizedifferent substationstoavoidoutageofallthreelinesduetofailureofcommonterminalequipment.
2.1.2
ExistingSeparationsAmongTransmissionLinesSharingaCorridor
IntheWECCsystem,therearemultipleinstancesoflongdistancetransmissionlinessharingacommon corridor.Tables24and25includeselectexamplesoftransmissionlinesintheWECCsystemthat appeartoshareacommoncorridor. ForTables24and25,ICFusedGoogleEarthtodeterminetheapproximateseparationdistance betweentowersfortwoparallellinesbecauseseparationdatacouldnotobtainpublishedvalues.This methodprovidesonlyaroughapproximationofvalues;however,itdoesgiveageneralsenseofthe rangeofexistingseparationdistancesintheWECCsystem.Basedonthisanalysis,theaverageline separationdistanceisapproximately150feet.Allowingforcalculationerror,itwouldstillappearthat paralleltransmissionlinesidentifiedinTables24and25mightshareacommoncorridorandbe susceptibletocommonmodeoutages.Asmentionedearlier,variousmitigationmeasurescouldsatisfy theNERCstandardsandWECCreliabilitycriteriaforcommonmodeoutagesofmultipletransmission lines.
27
Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table24.WECC500kVTransmissionLinesPotentiallySharingaCommonCorridor
Serial Number Line
VincenttoMidwayCircuit1 1 VincenttoMidwayCircuit2 VincenttoMidwayCircuit3 2 McCulloughtoVictorvilleCircuit1 McCulloughtoVictorvilleCircuit2 TeslatoVacaDixontoTableMountain toRoundMountaintoMalin TeslatoTableMountaintoRound MountaintoMalin GrandCouleetoShultzCircuit1 GrandCouleetoShultzCircuit2 MonroetoClustertoIngledowCircuit2 MonroetoClustertoIngledowCircuit1 GrizzlytoJohnDayCircuit1 GrizzlytoJohnDayCircuit2 GrizzlytoMalin 7 GrizzlytoPonderosatoSummerLaketo Malin LowerMonumenttoLittleGooseto LowerGraniteCircuit1 LowerMonumenttoLittleGooseto LowerGraniteCircuit2 RavertoSchlutzCircuit3 RavertoSchlutzCircuit4 GordonMShrumtoWillistonCircuit1 GordonMShrumtoWillistonCircuit2 WillistontoKellyLakeCircuit1 11 WillistontoKellyLakeCircuit2 WillistontoKellyLakeCircuit3 12 13 14 15 MicatoNicolaCircuit1 MicatoNicolaCircuit2 AshtonCreektoNicolaCircuit1 AshtonCreektoNicolaCircuit2 MoenkopitoYavapaitoWestwing NavajotoWestwing WestwingtoPaloVerdeCircuit1 WestwingtoPaloVerdeCircuit2
kV Level
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500
From
CA CA CA NV NV CA CA WA WA WA WA OR OR OR OR WA WA WA WA BC BC BC BC BC BC BC BC BC AZ AZ AZ AZ
To
CA CA CA CA CA OR OR WA WA BC BC OR OR OR OR WA WA WA WA BC BC BC BC BC BC BC BC BC AZ AZ AZ AZ
Length (miles)
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 72 72 75 63 49 49 54 18 33 33 78 77 278 277 330 330 330 285 285 118 118 N/A N/A N/A N/A Average
Approximate Separation Between Towers1(feet)

140 140 145 145 132 132 158 158 150 150 155 155 130 130 150 150 150 150 150 200 200 165 165 130 130 132 132 149
4 5 6
9 10
Source:WECC2009b;GoogleEarth2009. 1 ApproximatevaluesbetweentransmissiontowersforparalleltransmissionlinescalculatedusingGoogleEarth. kV kilovolt OR Oregon AZ Arizona BC BritishColumbia N/A NotAvailable WA Washington CA California NV Nevada
28
Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table25.WECC345kVLinesPotentiallySharingaCommonCorridor
Serial Number Line kV Level From State To State Length (miles) Approximate Separation Between Towers1(feet)
157 157 142 142 95 95 1001,100 1001,100 146 146 146 143
ChiefJosephtoSnohomish Circuit3 ChiefJosephtoSnohomish Circuit4 EmerytoSigurdCircuit1 EmerytoSigurdCircuit2 MonatoSigurdCircuit1 MonatoSigurdCircuit2 TracytoValmyCircuit1 TracytoValmyCircuit2 ChollatoFourCornersCircuit1 ChollatoFourCornersCircuit2 GreenleetoWinchestertoVail GreenleetoSpringerville MckinleytoSpringerville Circuit1 MckinleytoSpringerville Circuit2 VailtoSpringerville BorahtoJimBridger JimBridgertoKinpointto Midpoint JimBridgertoGoshento Kinpoint GlenCanyontoFlagstaffto PinnaclePeakCircuit1 GlenCanyontoFlagstaffto PinnaclePeakCircuit2
345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345
WA WA UT UT UT UT NV NV AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ ID ID ID AZ AZ
WA WA UT UT UT UT NV NV NM NM AZ AZ AZ AZ AZ WY WY WY AZ AZ
63.7 63.8 N/A N/A N/A N/A 160 162 N/A N/A 87.9 N/A 107 107 110 N/A N/A N/A 238 238 Average
2 3 4 5 6
10
Source:WECC2009b;GoogleEarth2009. 1 ApproximatevaluesbetweentransmissiontowersforparalleltransmissionlinescalculatedusingGoogleEarth. AZ Arizona ID Idaho kV kilovolt N/A NotAvailable NM NewMexico NV Nevada UT Utah WA Washington WY Wyoming
29
2.1.3
LineSeparationAmongProposedTransmissionLinesSharingaCorridor
ThereareafewproposednewlinesintheWECCsystemthatwouldhaveseparationdistanceslessthan onespanlengthandlessthan500feet.OneexampleistheproposedDeversPaloVerdeCircuit2 (HarquahalaDevers).Thislinewillparalleltheexistinglineformostofitsroute.TheROWdiagramsfor theDeversPaloVerdeCircuit2lineshowninFigure22suggestthatthedistancebetweenthetwo towerswouldbeabout130feet.
Figure22.ROWDiagramforDeversPaloVerdeCircuit2Line
Source:CaliforniaPUCandBLM2006.
Figure23showsthetypicaltowerheightfortheDeversPaloVerdeCircuit2line,withtheheight varyingfrom100feetto170feet. SouthernCaliforniaEdisonalreadyhasaROWforCircuit2(grantedin19867),andbecauseCircuit2 wouldpassthroughtriballandsandnationalparks,obtainingadditionalROWcouldbedifficult,costly, andresultindelays.Onesolutionistoplacethetwocircuitsataminimumsafedistanceandadjust towerspaninaccordancewiththetowerheightneededtomaintainasafedistance. SouthernCaliforniaEdisonproposesaSpecialProtectionSchemeasacomponentoftheprojectto protectthetransmissionsystemintheeventofasimultaneouslossofDeversPaloVerdeCircuit1and theproposedline.ThisSpecialProtectionSchemewouldbedesignedtodropapproximately900MWof generationinthePaloVerdeareaandapproximately900MWofSouthernCaliforniaEdisonload.
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Figure23.DiagramofTypicalTower
Source:CaliforniaPUCandBLM2006.
FortheSunrisePowerlinktransmissionproject,SanDiegoGas&ElectricappliedtheNERCstandardsand WECCreliabilitycriteriatodeterminetransmissionlinespacing(SDG&E2006).SanDiegoGas&Electric suggeststhatanewlinecouldbeconstructedonseparatetowersadjacenttotheexisting500kV SouthwestPowerlinkforashortdistancewithoutviolatingapplicablereliabilitycriteriaorrequiringa "planned/controlled"loaddropinacommonmodecontingencyevent.Ifthetwocircuitswereadjacent forlongerdistances,itmightbenecessarytoimplementplanned/controlledloaddroptomitigateany unacceptablethermallineloadingsorvoltagesthatresult,becauseseparationdistanceswouldmake thefacilitiessubjecttocommonmodecontingencyevents.
2.1.4
SummaryofConversationswithProponentsofNewTransmissionLines andotherStakeholders
Forthisstudy,ICFrequestedinputfromtransmissionlineproponentsandotherstakeholdersregarding therationaleforlineseparationdistancesproposedfortheirtransmissionlinesinWyomingandthe generalissueoflineseparation.Thecommentsidentifiedinthissectiondonotnecessarilyreflectthe viewsofICFortheWIA.Theparagraphsbelowsummarizesomeofthekeycommentsproponentsand stakeholdersprovidedduringthesecommunications.Sinceopinionsexpressedbytransmissionline proponentswerenotusedintheanalysisandthereforedidnotinfluencetherecommendationsinthis
211
report,ICFdidnotindependentlyverifytheopinionsexpressedbytransmissionlineproponentsand summarizedbelow.
UniquenessoftheWECC/WyomingSystemandRegionalConsiderations
SometransmissionproponentsopinedthattheexistingWECCcriterionspecifyingaminimum lineseparationofonespanlengthisnotdefensibleatthistime.Theycomparedthewindy regionsintheWECCsystemwherewindspeedscouldreach80milesperhour(NOAA2009)to placessuchasChicagointheEasternInterconnection.IntheEasternInterconnection, transmissionlinesdosharecorridorsandseparationdistancemaybelimitedtotheROWwidth betweenadjacentlines. ThetechnicalimpactofmultiplelineoutagesintheWECCsystemissubstantialandtherefore shouldbemitigatedbyallmeanspossible,includinglineseparation.Multiplelineoutagesina singlecorridorinstateswithrelativelylittleloadandsignificantgenerationcouldleadtoa systemcollapse.ThetransmissionsysteminWyomingisoperatingnearoratitslimit;therefore, therearenotmanymitigationoptionsavailableintheeventofmultiplelineoutagesin Wyoming. ICFsstudyshouldbespecifictoWyomingandaddresslineseparationbasedonthedriving factorsinWyoming.TheimpactoflineoutagesinWyomingmightnotbeassignificantasother linesthathavemuchhigherutilization,suchastheLasVegasLosAngelestransmissionlines. ThisisbecausethepowerthatisexpectedtoflowonthenewtransmissionlinesinWyoming willbemostlywindbased,withacapacityfactorof40to50percent;therefore,thelineswill notbefullyutilizedatalltimes. BecauseWyominghasmoretornadoesthananyotherstateintheWest,significantline separationisnecessary. Lineseparationcriteriashouldalsoberegionspecific.ThePacificACIntertiemightneedmore spacingbasedonweatherconditionsintheNorthwestU.S.;however,linescouldbeplaced closertogetherinplaceslikeArizona,wherethedesertclimatecouldreducetheriskfactorsthat couldleadtocommoncorridoroutages.
TechnicalandEngineeringIssuesandConcerns
ThetechnicalandengineeringanalysisoftheimpactoftheproposedlinesontheexistingWECC systemisadifficultandchallengingissuemoresothantheimplicationsofthelineseparation issue. Atpresent,thesinglelargestcontingencyintheWECCsystemwouldtakeoutabout2,700MW (DeversPaloVerdeoutage)andabout3,100MWintheNorthwest.Therefore,theeffectonthe systemofthelossof3,000ormoreMWoftransmissioncapacitycouldbesubstantial.Asa result,thereshouldbesomeconsiderationaboutlimitationoftotaltransmissioncapacitythat canbebuiltinasinglecorridor.Ifmorethan3,000MWofcapacitywerebuiltinasingle corridor,theeffectsofthelossofthatcorridorcouldsignificantlyaffectthereliabilityofthe system. Theremightbesituationsinmountainvalleysandotherplaceswheretheseparationcouldbe lessthanonespanlengthbecauseofgeographicandlanduselimitations. Insomecases,proponentshavealsoplannedforinstallationofmultipleRASsintheeventofline outages.
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Theremightbesomeconfusionabouttheacceptableseparationdistanceifaproposedline parallelslinesofdifferentvoltage(withdifferentspanlengths)invarioussectionsofthe proposedroute. ThereseemstobenoengineeringrelatedconcernabouthavingadclineclosetoanACline.
WECCCriteriaInterpretationandCompliance
TheWECCcriteriononlineseparationisnotmandatory;however,itisnecessaryto demonstratecomplianceoroutageimpactmitigationtominimizetheriskofreductioninpath rating.Thereisroomforinterpretationofthelineseparationcriterionbasedonvariousfactors, suchasoutagefrequency,landterrain,andotherissues. AlmostallthetransmissionlineproponentsplantocomplywiththeWECCcriterionofonespan lengthseparationfromadjacentlines.TheWECCsafeharborprovisionisamongthemain factorsconsideredfordecisionsaboutlineseparationdistancestopreservetheWECCassigned pathrating.
WECCPlanningCoordinationCommitteeDiscussionandItemsofInterest
IntheWECCPlanningCoordinationCommitteemeetingonJune18,2009,therewasaproposal toinvestigatethepossibilityofeitherremovingorchangingthemorerestrictiveWRS1.1 criterionthatappliesNERCCategoryC5performanceteststoallcircuitswithinacommon corridor.However,thelikelihoodthatNERCwouldagreetochangesinthiscriterionisunknown; ithasalreadybeendemonstratedtoNERCthatWRS1.1isneededbecauseoftheunique characteristicsoftheWECCsystem. TheadvantagesofchangingWRS1.1includepotentiallyhigherratingsonsomeWECCrated pathsortotaltransfercapabilitylimitsforpaths,potentiallyhigherremotegenerationtransfers, andallowingtheplacementofcircuitswithinthecurrentdefinitionofacorridorwithout requirements. PossibledisadvantagesofchangingWRS1.1includeremovingindustryjustificationforhaving thecriteriontokeepseparationandaccommodatingmorecircuitsclosetogether,whichcould resultinadecreaseinreliability. TheWECCReliabilitySubcommitteerecommendedaRequesttoReviseorDevelopaStandard tostartthisprocess. OthersattheWECCPlanningCoordinationCommitteemeetingobservedthatreliabilitymight notnecessarilybeweakenediftheWRS1.1wasremovedorchanged.Changingthiscriterionis neededfordevelopmentoflongdistancetransmissionlineprojectsandrenewableresources. Further,thereliabilityofthesystemcouldbemaintainedorimprovedbyintroducingadditional criteriatocompensateforremovalofWRS1.1thatwillnotrestrictcommoncorridors. Thereisaneedtofindbalancebetweenreliability,landuse,andotherenvironmentalcriteria.
LineSeparationRiskFactorsandPossibleConcerns
Oneofthebiggestconcernsforinvestorsinproposedtransmissionlineswillbethepossibilityof aderatingriskafterthelineisbuilt.Ifacascadingoutageeveroccursafterthelineisinservice (evenwithadequatelineseparation),WECCrulesstatethatmitigationmeasuresshouldbe takentoensurethatsuchacascadingoutageneverhappensagainunlessitcanbeshownthat theMTBFbetweencascadingoutageswillnotbelessthan300yearsadifficulttask.
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TheWECCcriterionofonespanlengthseparationistoolowtoavoidcertainriskfactorsthat couldleadtocommonmodeoutages.Lineseparationby1to5milescouldmaximizetheenergy transfersthroughthesecorridorsandhelpplanthetransmissionsysteminarobustwaysoasto reducethefrequencyofrequisitionsfornewcorridorsinthefuture.Itwouldalsoreducethe riskofderatinglinesinthecorridorforasubstantialperiod. NERCCategoryDtestsreallydonotrequireanyspecificactions,butonlyneedariskassessment forcascadingoutages.Theconcernisthatitwillbetoolatewhencascadingoutagesoccurand thenthelinehastobederated. RASsareviewedasamitigationtooltoavoidtheriskoflinederating.
HistoricalExamplesofLineOutages
Followingarethreeexampleswherecommonmodeoutageshavecausedsignificant disturbancetothereliabilityoftheWECCsystem: o ThePacificACIntertie,wheretherearetwo500kVlineswithinasinglecorridor. o TheBridgergenerationtransmissionsysteminWyoming,whereinthelinesoutoftheJim Bridgerstation(whichareseparatedbyabout120feet)areinacommoncorridor(2,200 MWpathcapacity).Inthepast,commonmodecauses(tornadoes,highwind,etc.)caused outagesofthissystem.MultipleRASsarenowinplacetomitigatethoselineoutages. o PathCIdahoSaltLakeCitytransmissionpathhasbeenderatedfrom1,000MWto600 MWduetoanoutage.Asaresultofthisoutage,thetransmissionoperatorwasrequiredto implementaRAS.Thepathratinghasnowbeenincreasedto800MW.However,duetothe historyofthatoneoutage,thispathcannotregainthe1,000MWinitialrating.
OtherIssues,Concerns,andSuggestions
Transmissionlineproponentsareverysensitivetoenvironmentalissuesandintendtoensure fullcompliancewithallenvironmentalconcerns. Possiblefrequencyofoutagesshouldbestatisticallyanalyzedtodeterminelineseparation. Itisimportanttoconsiderthewholeissueasacapacityinacorridorissue,insteadoftreating itonthebasisofindividuallines.Becauselineseparationcannotbeaonesizefitsall(500feet orthelongestspanlengthcriterionmightbetoocloseforsome,toofarforothers),therehasto beaprocessframeworktoevaluatethemaximumcapacitythatcanbetransferredina designatedcorridor.Therearealsomanyexistingcorridorsthatareoverbuilt,sothereisaneed toconsidergrandfatheringinexistingcorridors.
2.2
2.2.1
InfluenceofOtherFactorsonLineSeparation
LandUseandEnvironmentalConstraints
Someofthemostimportantfactorsapartfrompowersystemreliabilitythatinfluenceline separationdistancesarelanduseandotherenvironmentalconstraints.InWyoming,oneoftheprimary environmentalissuesisthepotentialimpacttosagegrouse.Oneofthemosteffectivewaystoreduce environmentalimpactsoftransmissionlinescanbethroughconsolidationofthefacilitiesorplacement ofthefacilitiesnearoneanother(SWATCommonCorridorTaskForce2009).Asnotedearlier,this approachcouldbeatoddswiththeWECClineseparationcriterionofonespanlength,whichisbasedon maintainingpowersystemreliability. TheFederalGovernmentownsandtheBLMmanagesasignificantportionofthelandinthewestern U.S.TheWesternRegionalCorridorstudyrecognizestheimportanceofcorridorsonpubliclandsto
214
longtermutilityplanning(MichaelClaytonandAssociates1992).TheWestwideEnergyCorridorPEIS identifiedenergycorridorsfor11contiguouswesternstates,whereinapplicantsofproposedenergy transportationprojects(suchasgaspipelinesandtransmissionlines)couldtakeadvantageofan expeditedapplicationandpermittingprocesscomparedtoareasoutsidetheseenergycorridors.The widthoftheseenergycorridorsvariesbasedonenvironmentalcharacteristicsandotherfactors.For example,inWyomingtheaveragewidthofenergycorridorsanalyzedintheWestwideEnergyCorridor PEISisapproximately3,500feet.Forthisexample,uptothreeparallel500kVorlesstransmissionlines (assumingamaximumspanlengthof1,500feetfora500orlesskVtransmissionline),could theoreticallybeaccommodatedina3,500feetenergycorridorandstillmeettheWECCsafeharbor provision.
2.2.2
ConstructionandMaintenanceCostandTime
Placingtransmissionlinesclosertoeachothercouldincreasesharedutilizationofconstructionrelated infrastructuresuchasroadsandequipment.Transmissionlineconstructioncostsareafunctionof variousparameters(linematerials,labor,towerdesign,landprices,andothers).Aslinesaresited fartherapart,separateconstructionandmaintenanceinfrastructuremightneedtobedeveloped,which typicallyincreasesthecostofthelineandthetimerequiredforconstructionandmaintenance.The increaseinconstructioncostsandtimeassociatedwithgreaterseparationdistancesbetweenlinescan becomparedtothefinancialriskofalowerratingduetocloserspacingofthelines. Conversely,otherrequirementsforROWwidthmightpreventsharingofthespacebetween transmissionlines.Theseincludeclearancesrequiredforlinemaintenance.Maintenanceactivities requiringcranesneedtobeconsideredwhiledetermininglineseparationtoallowfortheirsafe operation.Also,livelinemaintenanceproceduresrequireworkingclearancesestablishedbythe NationalElectricalSafetyCode(NESC)andtheOccupationalSafetyandHealthAdministration(OSHA) thatarefunctionsoflinevoltageandtheoperationalrangeoftheequipment(SWATCommonCorridor TaskForce2009).
2.2.3
ElectricalandMagneticFields
Electricalandmagneticfieldsarenaturallyoccurringphenomenaassociatedwithtransmissionlines.The electricalandmagneticfieldsfrommultipletransmissionlineswithinacorridorcaneitheraddor subtractfromeachothertocreatehigherorlowerfieldlevels.Theseparationdistancebetweentwo parallellineswillaffectthemagnitudeoftheresultantelectricalandmagneticfields.TheCommon CorridorTaskForceofSWATcalculatedparametersforelectricalandmagneticfieldsfortwo configurationsofparalleltransmissionlines(SWATCommonCorridorTaskForce2009).Forboth configurations,theresultsshowthatthepeakelectricalfield,bothinsideandoutsidetheROW, decreasesasseparationdistancesincrease.Althoughthechangesasafunctionofseparationdistances canreach30percentinlowervoltagelines,theabsolutemagnitudeofthefieldisverysmalltostart with;therefore,thechangesarenotsignificant.Thetaskforcealsofoundthatthedifferencesinelectric fieldwithseparationarenotsignificantfor500kVlines(SWATCommonCorridorTaskForce2009). Formagneticfields,thetaskforcefoundthatintermsofactualquantities,thedecreasesinmagnetic fieldstrengtharenotsignificantwiththevariationinseparationdistances.Aswiththeelectricalfield, magneticfieldsforlowervoltagelineschangemorewithseparationdistance,buttheamountofchange issmallandthereforenotsignificant(SWATCommonCorridorTaskForce2009).
2.2.4
HistoricalNERC,WECC,andOtherOutageData
Asmentionedearlier,variouseventscancausesimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines.Itisimportantto understandthecausesoflineoutagestoanalyzewhetherchangingtransmissionlineseparation
215
distancecouldresultinavoidingmultipleoutagesinacommoncorridor.Thefirststepwastogather historicaldataonthecausesoftransmissionlineoutagesmultipleorsingle.Thissectionsummarizes publiclyavailableoutagedatafromNERC,WECC,andutilities. Informationonoutagesandtheircausesforindividuallinesisnotreadilyavailableinthepublicdomain. NERCpublishesoutagedataforlinesintheU.S.basedonreportsfromutilitiesandregional organizationssuchasWECC.UponreviewoftheNERCdisturbancedatafortheWECCsystem,ICF observedthatthreeeventscausedmostofthedisturbancesweather,equipmentfailure,orsystem operationissues(NERC19922007).Humanerroralsocausedanumberofdisturbances. Figure24showsthenumberofdisturbancesandtheircausesforeachyearfrom1992through2007. ICFobservesthatthetotalnumberofdisturbancesreportedincreasedovertime.Thiscouldbedueto severalreasons.ThenumberofdisturbancesreportedtoWECCandNERCcouldhaveincreasedover time,theactualnumberofdisturbancesthemselvescouldhaveincreased,ortherulesforreporting disturbancescouldhavechanged,resultinginmoreeventsbeingreportedinthelatteryears.Although thereasonforacontinuousincreaseindisturbancesisnotobvious,ICFobservesthatthedisturbances causedbysystemoperationissueshaveactuallydecreased,indicatingamovetowardanefficientand reliablesystem.Outagescausedbyweatherrelatedeventsovertheyearscannotbeforeseenor plannedfor,andcanbeconsideredunusualoccurrences.Properremedialactionscouldminimize failures/disturbancescausedbyequipmentfailure;adaptingefficientworkplacepracticesandproviding propertrainingandmonitoringcouldminimizehumanerrors.
RockyMountainPowerAreaLineOutageData
SimilartoWECCoutagedata,theRockyMountainPowerAreaalsowitnessedanincreaseinthenumber ofinstancesunderdifferentcategoriesofoutages(seeFigure25).Theprimarycausesforthe disturbanceswereeitherequipmentrelatedorweatherrelated.Becausedetaileddataonthecausesof outagesarenotavailableforeachevent,ICFcannotdetermineifadequatelineseparationcouldhave preventedmultiplelinefailuresduetoweatherrelatedoutages.
WECC2007and2008TransmissionReliabilityDataReports
WECCtransmissionreliabilitydatareportsfor2006(WECC2007a)and2007(WECC2008c)listallthe possibleriskcategoriesfortransmissionlineoutages.WECCgatheredhistoricalinformationonlineand transformeroutagesintheWECCsystemfor500kV,345kV,and230kVsystems.Whilesingleline outageswerethemostcommonformofoutagereported,WECCalsogathereddataformultipleline outages.Table26liststheextentoftheresponsebyindividualutilitiestotheWECClineoutagedata request.
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Figure24.WECCOutagesbyCategoryfrom1992to2007
NumberofOutages
Year
Source:NERC2009c.
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Figure25.TotalNumberofOutagesintheRockyMountainPowerAreaSystem from1992to2007
NumberofOutages
CauseofOutage
Source:NERC2009c.
Table26.TypeofTransmissionLine andTotalOutagesReportedbyRespondingUtilities
TypeofTransmissionLine
Numberof500kVTransmissionLines Numberof345kVTransmissionLines Numberof230kVTransmissionLines TotalNumberof500kVLineOutages TotalNumberof345kVLineOutages TotalNumberof230kVLineOutages TotalMilesof500kVLines TotalMilesof345kVLines TotalMilesof230kVLines Percentof500to600kVLinesDataReceived Percentof300to400kVLinesDataReceived Percentof200to300kVLinesDataReceived TotalPercentofallWECCLinesDataReceived TotalRespondingUtilities
Sources:WECC2007a;WECC2008c. kV kilovolt WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil
2006
232 84 1045 441 261 890 15,911 7,297 30,240 98 73 71 78 29
2007
228 107 1408 344 314 989 15,677 8,864 41,422 97 89 97 96 30
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WECCdoesnotpublishthenameofthelineforeachoutage.Therefore,ICFcannotmakeadirect correlationbetweenlineseparationdataandcorrespondingoutageinformation.However,itispossible tomakecertainnondefinitiveobservationsaboutcommonoutagetypesfromtheinformationinTables 27through29.
Table27.500to600kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode
CauseCode
WeatherExcludingLightning Environmental Fire Contamination ForeignInterference PowerSystemCondition TransmissionElementEquipment TerminalEquipment HumanElement Lightning Vegetation Vandalism,Terrorism,andMalicious LossofSource Unknown UnreportedCause
Sources:WECC2007a;WECC2008c. kV kilovolt
2006 Momentary Sustained

4 6 1 2 1 2 2 27 3 24 0 3 0 28 9 1 6 2 0 2 6 33 7 9 2 5 0 17

4 0 4 6 1 1 1 3 4 40 0 0 0 34 9 0 4 1 1 7 1 27 4 6 3 0 0 24
13
Table28.300to400kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode
CauseCode
2006 Momentary
13 0 1 2 0 2 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 50
Sustained
15 0 7 0 5 0 4 10 6 4 0 0 0 9

13 0 1 2 0 2 0 5 1 5 0 0 0 50 15 0 7 0 5 0 4 10 6 4 0 0 0 9
21
39
21
39
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table29.200to300kVOutages(percent)byCauseCode
CauseCode

14 0 2 3 1 1 6 3 4 22 1 0 0 32 9 0 10 1 4 4 10 18 4 8 3 2 0 8

14 0 2 3 1 1 6 3 4 22 1 0 0 32 9 0 10 1 4 4 10 18 4 8 3 2 0 8
12
21
12
21
ICFobservesthatdirectionally,equipmentfailure,lightningstrikes,andweatherexcludinglightning appeartobemajorcausesoflineoutages.For500kVlines,outagesduetoterminalequipmentfailure aresustained,whereaslightningeffectsaretemporary.For345kVlines,mostoftheoutagecausesfall intotheUnknowncategory,makingitdifficulttoreachaconclusionaboutcommonoutagecauses. Momentaryoutagesarelessthanoneminuteindurationwhilesustainedoutagesexceedoneminute. Commoncorridoroutagesincludetheoutageofmultipleelementsonlinessharingacommoncorridor orcommontower,thatoccurwithin10minutesorless(WECC2008c). In2006therewereapproximately97outagesreportedasbeingcommon.Ofthose,93happenedwithin 10minutesofeachother,withtheremaining4havingtimedifferentialsof5hours(firecaused)and22 hours(transmissionelementandterminalequipmentcaused).Table210assignscausesforthe commonmodeoutages.Mostofthecommonoutagesin2006wereduetoterminalequipmentfailure andfire.Lineseparationcannotusuallymitigateterminalequipmentfailure.Lineseparationmaybe effectiveasamitigationmeasuretopreventsmokefromcausingacommonmodeoutageofother transmissionlinesinthesamecorridor. Therewereanumberofoutagesthatcouldbecalledcommonbasedonthetimingofmultipleelements beingoutofservice(thatis,theoutageofmultipleelementsoccurredwithin10minutesorless). However,in2007WECCcountedonlyoutagesonlinesthatwerelistedassharingacommoncorridoror commontower.Also,toberegardedascommon,twooutagesmustoccurwithin10minutesofeach other.
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table210.CausesandNumbersof CommonModeOutagesin2006

OutageCause
Contamination EnvironmentalEarthquakes,Flood,Fire ForeignInterferenceAirplaneStrikes HumanElement Lightning PowerSystemCondition TransmissionElementEquipment TerminalEquipment Unknown Vegetation Vandalism,Terrorism WeatherExcludingLightning Total
NumberofSustainedOutages 230kV 345kV 500kV

1 10 2 3 2 2 2 17 4 0 0 8 51 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 6 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 12
Basedontheabovecriteria,the2007outagedatashowstherewere13outagesrecordedintheWECC systemthatwereinacommoncorridor(11outagesof2elements,1outageof4elements,and1outage of11elements).Sevenoftheoutageswereinacommoncorridorandsixwererecordedasbeingon commontowers.FailedACsubstationequipmentinitiatedthe11elementcommonoutage;firecaused the4elementoutage.Thenumbersofcommoncorridoroutages(bycause)are: FailedACsubstation(four) Vegetation(two) Fire(two) Unknown(two) Lightning(two) Other(one)
Terminalequipmentfailureseemstobethecauseofmostoftheoutages.Thiscannotbemitigatedby increasinglineseparation.Somecausesthatcouldbemitigatedbyincreasinglineseparationareforeign interference(suchasairplanestrikes)andweathercauses(suchaslightningortornadoes).Table211 liststheoutagesclassifiedbasedoncommonmodeforvariouscauses.Thetableincludescommon corridoroutagesdescribedearlier.
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table211.CausesandNumbersof CommonCorridorOutagesin2007

OutageCause
Contamination EnvironmentalEarthquakes,Flood,Fire ForeignInterferenceAirplaneStrikes HumanElement Lightning PowerSystemCondition TransmissionElementEquipment TerminalEquipment Unknown Vegetation Vandalism,Terrorism WeatherExcludingLightning Total
Source:WECC2008c. kV kilovolt
NumberofSustainedOutages 230kV 345kV 500kV

0 0 9 2 2 1 0 28 3 2 4 3 54 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 4 0 0 1 18
ArizonaPublicServiceLineOutageData
ArizonaPublicServiceperformedaprobabilisticanalysisoflineoutagesinitsserviceterritory(Arizona PublicServiceCompany2006).ArizonaPublicServiceperformedthisanalysisaspartofasevenstep PerformanceCategoryEvaluationprocesstosupporttheperformanceupgraderequestfortheexisting HassayampaNorthGilalineandanewlineproposedtoparalleltheexistingNorthGila500kVlinefor theentirelengthoftheline.Tables212through214listtheparallellinesintheArizonaPublicService territory,thecauseofoutages,andtheprobabilisticanalysisofthoseoutages.
Table212.ArizonaPublicService500kVLinesSharingaCommonCorridor
Line1
NavajotoWestwing NavajotoWestwing NavajotoWestwing NavajotoWestwing PaloVerdetoWestwingCircuit1 PaloVerdetoHassayampaCircuit1 PaloVerdetoHassayampaCircuit2 RedhawktoHassayampaCircuit1
Line2
NavajotoMoenkopi MoenkopitoWestwing YavapaitoWestwing MoenkopitoYavapai PaloVerdetoWestwingCircuit2 PaloVerdetoHassayampaCircuit2 PaloVerdetoHassayampaCircuit3 RedhawktoHassayampaCircuit2
CommonMiles
76 180 101 79 45.1 3 3 1
YearsofData
20 11* 9* 9* 13 4 4 3
Source:ArizonaPublicServiceCompany2006. *Thedataontheselinesrunsfrom19842004.However,inearly1996ArizonaPublicServiceinstalledtheYavapaisubstation,whichsplitthe MoenkopiWestwinglineintotwosegments.So11yearsofthedatacoverthetimewiththelinefromMoenkopiWestwing,andnineyears coverthetimewiththislinesplitintotheMoenkopiYavapai,andtheYavapiWestwinglines. kV kilovolt
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Table213.DatabaseofCommonCorridorLineOutages
Event#
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
LineName
PLVWWG1 PLVWWG2 PLVHAA#1 PLVHAA#2 PLVHAA#2 PLVHAA#3 NAVWWG NAVMKP NAVWWG NAVMKP WWGYAV NAVWWG NAVWWG WWGYAV NAVWWG MKPYAV NAVWWG MKPYAV
OutDate/Time
6/14/20047:41 6/14/20047:41 6/14/20047:41 6/14/20047:41 6/14/20047:41 6/14/20047:41 8/10/199615:48 8/10/199615:48 4/15/19964:32 4/15/19964:37 6/14/20047:40 6/14/20047:41 7/2/200414:58 7/2/2004 14:58 7/2/200415:03 7/2/2004 15:07 7/2/200415:03 7/2/2004 15:25
InDate/Time
6/14/2048:17 6/14/2048:18 6/14/20048:09 6/14/20048:11 6/14/20048:11 6/14/20048:11 8/10/199617:04 8/10/199617:03 4/15/19967:09 4/15/19967:12 6/14/20048:21 6/14/20048:23 7/2/200415:01 7/2/2004 15:00 7/2/200419:52 7/2/2004 15:11 7/2/200419:52 7/2/2004 19:49
Event Category
System System System System Terminal System Line
Overlap (Hour: minute)

00:36 00:28 00:30 01:15 02:35 00:40 00:02
Comment
Substation Related Substation Related Substation Related SystemEvent Substation Related Substation Related Fire
Line
00:03
Fire
Line
04:23
Fire
Source:ArizonaPublicServiceCompany2006.
Table214.SummaryofResults(Corrected)
PT PL Pind PH PB PTotal
EventCause
HistoricalTerminal HistoricalLine Independent Human BF&M Total
OutageFrequency (events/year)
0<PT<0.0250 0<PL<0.0204 0.00035 0<PH<0.00129 5.0E6 0.00036<PTot
MTBF(year) Optimistic
< < 2857 < 200.000 <2778
MTBF(year) Pessimistic
>40 >49 2857 >775 200.000 >21
Source:ArizonaPublicServiceCompany2006. MTBF MeanTimeBetweenFailure BF&M BreakerFailureandMaintenance
ThecorrectedresultsinTable214referstoprobabilitiesrecalculatedafteradjustinghistoricaloutage datawithcharacteristicsofthetestcorridor(inthiscase,theNorthGilaCorridor).Allthreelinerelated outageeventswerefirerelated.Allwerealsoduetosomekindofrelayactionorsettingsandnot relatedtodistanceoflineseparation. ArizonaPublicServiceusedthisanalysisofhistoricaloutagestojustifybuildingthissecondlineinthe proposedcorridorbyupgradingthesefutureparallellinesfromacategoryCperformancelevelunder theWECCProbabilisticBasedReliabilityCriteria(PBRC)toacategoryDperformancelevel.Someofthe conclusionsArizonaPublicServicereachedfromitshistoricaloutageanalysisandthecharacteristicsof theproposedlinewere: 1) Basedonthelimitedhistoricaldata,theestimatedMTBFfortheseparallellinesliessomewherein therangeof21tomorethan2,700years.Thisestimateisbasedonhistoricaloutagestatisticsfor
223
otherparallel500kVlinesinthesystem,withthestatisticsmodifiedtoconsidermitigatingfactors thatdonotapplytothesubjectline. 2) Thelinedesignoftheexistingandproposedfuturelineisrobust;consequently,theactualMTBFis expectedtobetowardthehigherendoftheMTBFrange.Robustdesignfeaturesofthelineinclude staticwireprotectionfromlightning,adequateseparationofthelinesintheROW,andbreakerand ahalfsubstationbusdesign.Robustdesignfactorsnotassociatedwiththelinesincludelowriskof lightning,lowriskofvandalism,andlowriskoffireorothernaturaldisaster. 3) Thelinedesignandcorridorcharacteristicsfortheproposedline(s)areverysimilartothatofthe PaloVerdeWestwing500kVlines,whichqualifiedforCategoryDperformancebasedonrobustness criteria. Thisanalysissuggeststhatbasedonregionaloutagefactorsandotherlinedesigncharacteristics,itis possibletoapplytherelativelylessstringentCategoryDperformancerequirementstoobtainarating forlineseparationdistancesthatarelessthanonespanlength.
WesternAreaPowerAdministrationOutageData
Tables215,216,and217listthecausesofoutagesidentifiedforselectedWesternAreaPower Administration115kV,230kV,and345kVtransmissionlinesinWyomingfrom2007through2009. Weatherandunknowncausesaccountformostoftheoutagesfortheseparticularlinesduringthis period.
Table215.WesternAreaPowerAdministration 115kVTransmissionLineOutageData(20072009)
115kVOutages byCauseCode
Contamination Environmental Earthquakes,Flood,Fire ForeignInterference AirplaneStrikes HumanElement Lightning PowerSystemConditions TransmissionElement Equipment TerminalEquipment Unknown Vegetation Vandalism,Terrorism WeatherExcludingLightning
Source:Western2009. kV kilovolt

1 6 1 1 1 4 2 7 3

2 1 1 4 2 1 12

2 1 1 1 2 7
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Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table216.WesternAreaPowerAdministration 230kVTransmissionLineOutageData(20072009)

230kVOutagesby CauseCode

1 1 3 4 9

3 1 1 6

1 1 3
Table217.WesternAreaPowerAdministration 345kVTransmissionLineOutageData(20072009)
345kVOutagesby CauseCode

1 4 11 1

2 1 2 1 9 2

1 1 5
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2.3
Summary
WECCreliabilitycriterionWRS1.1isaregionalized,morestringentversionoftheNERCCategoryC5 standardthatrequiresthestudyoftheoutageoftwoormorelinessharingacommoncorridor.Two linesaresaidtoshareacommoncorridorifthelineseparationdistancebetweenthemislessthan either500feetorthelongestspanlength,whicheverisgreater.Alltransmissionlinesneedtoshow compliancewiththeWRS1.1criterioneitherby1)ensuringadequatelineseparationtoprevent commoncorridoroutages,2)implementingmitigationmeasuresforacommoncorridoroutage,3) demonstratingthattheMTBFforacommoncorridoroutageismorethan30years,or4)consideringthe possiblecommoncorridoroutagesduringtheWECCratingprocessandacceptingthegrantedpath ratingfortheproposedproject.WECCalsoprovidesnonmandatorycriteriaforthelineseparation distancebetweentwoparalleltransmissionlines.Thisseparationcriterionisintendedtominimizesuch causesforcommoncorridoroutagesasairplanecrashes,lightningstrikes,andwindrelateddamage. WhileutilitiesandotherentitiesseemtomakeeveryefforttocomplywiththeWECCminimumline separationcriterion,thereareotherfactors(suchasavailabilityofROWs,costs,landuseand environmentalconstraints,andgeographicalterrainfeatures)thataffectthelineseparationdistancefor sometransmissionprojects. MostoftheproposedtransmissionlineprojectsaredesignedtofollowtheWECCcriteriaforline separationtoavoidtheriskofderatingtheline.Howeversomeproposedprojectsrecommend separationdistancesgreaterthantheWECCcriterion.Theincrementalbenefitoflineseparation distancesgreaterthantheWECCcriterionshouldbeexamined.Forexample,theSWATCommon CorridorTaskForcewhitepaperoncorridorseparationconcludesthatseparationbeyondthesafety minimummightnotmeasurablyimprovesystemreliabilityoroperationallimits,butmightimpose additionalcostonratepayers(SWATCommonCorridorTaskForce2009).Oneormoretransmissionline proponentsidentifiedthefollowingjustificationforincreasinglineseparationdistancebeyondtheWECC criterion:1)avoidtheriskofreductioninsystemreliabilitythatcouldbecausedbyveryhighcapacity outagesinasinglecorridor,2)avoidtheriskofderatingtheproposedlinesandtheresultantpossible needforadditionaltransmissionlinesinthefuture,and3)ensurefullutilizationoftransmissionline capacity(increasedlineseparationreducestheriskofderatingandlessthanfullutilization).Some transmissionlineproponentsalsosuggesteddevelopinglineseparationcriteriaforeachregionbasedon thatregionsweather,geography,environment,andothercharacteristics.TheWECCReliability SubcommitteeproposestoreviewWRS1.1andinvestigatethepossibilityofchangingorremovingthe criteriontoencouragemorelongdistancetransmissionlinesandassociatedremotegenerationsuchas renewableenergy. Intheliterature,examplesofhistoricalmultiplelineoutagesaregiventodemonstratetheimportanceof sitinglinesfartherawayfromoneanother.However,whatisnotclearfromtheliteratureiswhether evenafewofthosemultiplelineoutageswouldhavebeenavoidedifthelineshadbeensitedfarther apart(atleastonespanlengthseparationorgreater). Anotherwayofstatingtheissueis,Wouldweatherandotherfactorsthatcausedmultiplelineoutages inhistoricalexamplesbeunabletocausemultiplelineoutagesifthelineseparationhadbeenatleast onespanlengthorgreater?Forsomeequipmentfailures,suchasrelaymisoperation,itisunlikelythat separationdistancescouldinfluencethemagnitudeoflineoutages.However,asmentionedinthe SouthernCaliforniaEdisonpaper,someinsulatorfailurescouldbeavoidedwithgreaterseparation distances(SouthernCaliforniaEdisonCompany1980).TheSouthernCaliforniaEdisonpaperalso identifiesoneincidentinvolvingwindandtwoincidentsinvolvingairplanesthatcouldhavebeen avoidedwithonespanlengthlineseparation.However,itshouldbenotedthatthesefailuresoccurred
226
morethan20yearsagoandairplanesecurityregulationsandotherprotectionschemeshaveimproved sincethen. Theimpactofweatherinrelationtolineseparationdependsonweatherseverityandtheterrainin whichthetransmissionlinesarelocated.Therefore,anyweatherrelatedcausesforcommonmode corridoroutagesareregionalandneedtobeanalyzedforeachregioninthepowersystem.For example,iftheprobabilityofweatherandotherfactorssuchasairplanestrikescausingmultipleline outagesisverylowinaparticularregion,thenchangingthelineseparationrequirement(toequalthe towerheightseparationdistanceratherthanthesinglespanlengthrequirement)mightbeappropriate basedonWECCapproval.Forthisexample,environmentalconstraints,lineinstallation,maintenance, andROWacquisitioncostswouldallbeexpectedtobelessthanacomparablesituationwithagreater lineseparationdistance.However,careshouldalsobetakentoensurethatdecreasinglineseparation doesnotreducethereliabilityofthesystem.Ananalyticalframeworkthatconsiderstheeffectsofline separationandregionalcausesoflineoutagesonreliabilitywouldbeuseful.Thisframeworkcanbe appliedtodifferentregionswithintheWECCsystemtodevelopreasonablelineseparation recommendationsthatmaintainorimprovethereliabilityofthepowersystemwhilefacilitatingthe developmentofmoretransmissionandrenewableenergygeneration. Thegoalofperformingtheliteraturesurveydescribedinthischapterwastounderstandthereasonsfor theexistinglineseparationcriterion,rationaleforlineseparationdistancesproposedfortransmission linesinWyoming,andtocollectdataonexistingandproposedlineseparationandcausesforline outages.Thenextstepistousetheresultsofthisliteraturesurveyandthedatacollectedtodevelopa frameworkforanalyzinglineseparationissuesrelatedtoreliability.
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228
Chapter3LineSeparationEvaluationFramework
CHAPTER3LINESEPARATIONEVALUATIONFRAMEWORK
Thischapteroutlinesaframeworkfordeterminingandevaluatingfactorsthatinfluencetransmission lineseparation.Forpurposesofthisreport,lineseparationdistancereferstothehorizontaldistance betweenthecenterlineofonetransmissiontowerandthecenterlineofanadjacenttransmissiontower fortwoparalleltransmissionlines.Inaddition,itisimportanttonotethatlineseparationdistance estimatesandrequirementsasdiscussedinthisreportdonotapplytoundergroundoraboveground linesastheyapproachsubstations.
3.1
Approach
Astheseparationdistancebetweentwoormoretransmissionlinesdecreases,thereisarelative increaseinthepossibilityoftwoormorelinesexperiencingasimultaneousoutageduetoasingleevent. Thesimultaneousoutageoftwoormorelinescouldsignificantlyharmthepowersystemintermsofloss ofload,lossofsystemreliability,andpossibledamagetopowersystemequipment.Forexample,the simultaneousoutageoftwoofthe345kVlinesoriginatingfromtheJimBridgersubstationinWyoming initiatedtheWECCdisturbanceeventsofJuly2and3,1996(NERC2009c).Acombinationoftree flashoverandrelaymisoperationcausedtheseoutages,whichledtocascadingoutagesthatresultedin separationoftheWECCsystemintofiveislandsandcausedsignificantloadshedding. Causesoftransmissionlineoutagesvaryamongregionsintheirdegreeofinfluence.Forexample,while firesandlightningmaybecommoncausesoftransmissionlineoutages,thesefactorsarenotequally probableinallregionsintheWECCsystem.Thegoalinthischapteristocreateananalyticalframework thatappliesregionalreliabilityfactorstoestimateregionspecifictransmissionlineseparationdistances formultipleparallellines. AsdiscussedinChapter2,analystsneedtoconsideranumberoffactorstodeterminetherequired separationdistancebetweentwoormoreparalleltransmissionlines.Ingeneral,increasingseparation distancecouldincreasethereliabilityofthesystembecausetherewouldbearelativereductioninthe numberandfrequencyofprobableweatherrelatedeventsthatcouldcausethesimultaneousoutageof multiplelines.Thisimpliesthattheseparationdistancebetweenparalleltransmissionlinesneedstobe asgreataspossibleformaximumprotectionagainstweatherrelatedsimultaneousmultipleline outages.However,otherfactorscouldfavorplacingtransmissionlinesclosertogether.Theseinclude ROWacquisitioncosts,easeandcostofmaintenance,installationcosts,andlanduseandenvironmental considerations.Therefore,determiningtheappropriateseparationdistancebetweenparallel transmissionlinesofteninvolvesweighingelectricalsystemreliability,landuseandenvironmental considerations,andthecostsofacquiringROWsandinstallingandmaintainingthetransmissionlines. OneoftheobservationsinChapter2istheregionalnatureofsomecauses(suchasweather)of simultaneousmultipletransmissionoutages.Anyapproachtodevelopingaframeworkfordetermining appropriatelineseparationdistancesshouldincludeanevaluationmethodologythatcanbecustomized toaccountforregionalvariability.
31
3.2
KeyIssues
BasedonresultsoftheliteraturesurveydescribedinChapter2,thevariouscausesforsimultaneous multipleoutagesoftransmissionlinescanbegroupedintothreemaincategories,asfollows: 1) Weather a) Highwinds b) Storms(rain/ice/hail/snow) c) Tornadoes d) Lightning e) Fire(firescanbeignitedbylightningandcanbetheresultofsabotage) 2) Powersystem a) Relaymisoperation b) Substationequipmentfailure c) Otherhardware/softwarefailures d) Systemconditions 3) Miscellaneous a) Airplanestrikes b) Humanerror c) Sabotage d) Vegetation e) Animalmanagement(birds,squirrels,etc.) f) Contamination(industrial,mines,etc.) Someofthesefactorsareindependentoflineseparationdistance.Forexample,thepotentialfor transmissionlineoutagesduetopowersystemfactorsisgenerallyindependentoflineseparation distance.Humanerror,sabotage,vegetation,andanimalmanagementalsoaregenerallyindependent oflineseparationdistance.However,lineseparationdistancescouldinfluencethepotentialforoutages causedbyairplanestrikesandallthefactorsintheweathercategory.Thesefactorsarethereforethe focusoftheevaluationframeworkdescribedinthischapterandappliedinChapter4. Theimpactofaweatherrelatedeventonmultipletransmissionlinesisregionalanditdependson weatherseverityandareaaffected.Forexample,iftheaveragedistanceatornadotravelsinaregionis 10miles,thenhavingalineseparationdistanceof1,500feetinsteadof2milesmightnotmatterif tornadoesareamajorcauseoflineoutagesinthatregion.However,iftheaveragedistanceatornado travelsinaregionis1mile,anargumentcouldbemadetoseparatelinesbymorethan1miletoreduce theriskofmultiplelineoutagesduetoasingletornado.Therefore,aframeworkfordetermining recommendedtransmissionlineseparationdistancesshouldconsideravailableweatherinformation. Moreover,analysesofweatherconditionsandassociatedoutagesofmultipletransmissionlinesshould includedataonthefrequencyofspecificweatherconditions.
32
3.3
DeterminingLineSeparationDistanceAnExample
Thissectionusesanexampleoftwoparallel500kVtransmissionlinesfordevelopingananalytical frameworktodeterminetransmissionlineseparationdistances.ICFfirstconsideredexistingsafety clearancecriteriaandthenevaluatedtheregionalinfluenceoffactorssuchasweather,airplanestrikes, andfire. First,ICFcalculatedthehorizontaldistancefromanimaginarylinethatrunsthroughthecenterpointof thetransmissiontowerandparalleltothetransmissionline,totheextremityofthetransmissiontower. Forarepresentative500kVline,thisisapproximately40to60feet(GeneralElectricCompany1987). Forasymmetricaltower,thisisequivalenttohalfthetotalwidthofthetowermeasuredperpendicular tothetransmissionline. Next,ICFincludedclearancesfortransmissionlinesafetyasspecifiedintheNESCorasrequiredbythe OSHAorotherstandardsagencies.Forexample,theNESCrequiresthata500kVlineshouldhavea horizontalclearanceofatleast14feetfromthenearestbuildings(Marne2007).OSHAStandardsPart 1910,MinimumApproachDistance,specifiessafeworkingclearances(dependingonlinevoltage)for maintenancecrewsoncranesorbuckettrucksworkingontheline.Theseclearancesvaryfrom10to20 feet.Inthiscaseiftherearenobuildingsorotherstructuresbetweentwoparalleltransmissionlines, theNESCrequirement(14feet)neednotapplywhendeterminingthelineseparationdistance,butthe OSHAStandardswillstillapply. Usingupperrangevaluesfromtheexampleabove,theinitialminimumlineseparationdistancecanbe estimatedasfollows: Initialminimumlineseparation=2(i.e.,2towers)distancefromcenteroftowertoouterline ofsametower+2(i.e.,2towers)OSHAsafeworkingclearance. Solvingthisequationforarepresentative500kVline,theapproximateinitialminimumlineseparation wouldbe(260)+(220)=160feet. Figure31(nottoscale)showstheinitialapproximateminimumlineseparationdistanceforthe hypotheticalexampleoftwoparallel500kVtransmissionlines.
Figure31.InitialMinimumLineSeparationDistance

160feetline separationdistance
33
Withthisstartingpoint,thenextstepistoincorporateadditionalfactorsthatcouldwarrantincreasing thelineseparationdistance.Forexample,damagetoonetransmissiontowersuchthatitcollapsesonto theadjacenttowerandcausesoutageofboththelines.Toavoidthisscenario,paralleltransmission linesshouldbeseparatedbyadistancegreaterthantheheightofthetallesttransmissiontower.Forthe representative500kVline,thetransmissiontowerheightisapproximately170feetforalltypesof towers(GeneralElectricCompany1987).Toeliminatethepotentialforonetransmissiontowertofall ontotheadjacenttower,thelineseparationdistancemustbeincreasedtoabout260feet,asshownin Figure32.1
Figure32.MinimumLineSeparationDistancetoAvoidMultiple OutagesduetoTransmissionTowerCollapse
260feetline separationdistance
~170feet
~60feet ~170feet ~30feet
Anotherfactortoconsiderinlineseparationcalculationsistheblowoutspace.Blowoutoccurswhen theconductorbetweentwotransmissiontowersswingsduetowindyconditions.Toavoidaswinging conductortouchinganadjacenttoweroraline,thelineseparationdistanceshouldaccountforthe blowoutspace.Foranyline,thetheoreticalmaximumwidthoftheblowoutspacewillbeequaltoits sag.Anillustrativedeterminationofsaglengthforthehypothetical500kVlinefollows(Bascometal. 2006). Assuminga795kcmil26/7ACSSRDrakeconductor: Horizontaltensioncomponent=6,300pounds(20percentoftheratedbreaking strengthof31,500pounds). Bareconductorweightperunitlength=1.094poundsperfoot.
The160feetinitialseparationincludes100feetofseparationbetweenthecenterlineofonetransmissiontowerandtheoutermostedgeof theadjacenttransmissiontower.Therequiredseparationtomitigateforatransmissiontowerfallingontotheadjacenttoweris170+30= 200feet,becausethedistancefromthetowercenterlinetothelegofthetower(approximately30feet)alsoneedstobeaccountedfor. This200feetseparationdistanceismeasuredfromthecenterlineofonetowertotheoutermostedgeoftheadjacenttower.Therefore,the additionalseparationneededis200100=100feet(accountingfortheexisting100feetofseparationasmentionedearlier).Therefore,the totalseparationdistanceis160+100=260feetneededtopreventonetransmissiontowerfromfallingontotheadjacenttower.
34
Compensatedweightperunitlength=2.509poundsperfoot(afterwind,iceloading, creep,andNESCconsiderations). Assume1,500footspanfora500kVline: ThefollowingformulaforsagisfromSWATCommonCorridorTaskForce(2009):
SAG= SPAN*SPAN*Weight/Ft 8*Tension
Usingthevaluesaboveinthisformulagivesasagofabout112feet. Therefore,theinitialminimumlineseparationdistancecouldbeestimatedasfollows: Initialminimumlineseparation=2distancefromcenteroftowertoouterlineofsametower +2OSHAsafeworkingclearance+blowoutspacedistanceoverlapbetweensaglengthand OSHAsafeworkingclearance(becausethelineseparationrequiredtomeetOSHAstandardscan beappliedtowardsatisfyingaportionofthelineseparationrequiredtoaccommodateblowout space). Therefore,fora500kVline,anillustrativeapproximateinitialminimumlineseparationwould be(260)+(220)+112(220)=232feet~=235feet. Inthisillustration,thetwoparallellinesareassumedtosharetheblowoutspacebecausewindcannot swingtwoconductorsinoppositedirectionsatthesametime. Becausethelineseparationdistanceformitigatingthecollapseofatransmissiontowerontothe adjacenttoweris260feet,thisdistancealsofulfillsthelinespacingrequirementtoaccountforblowout space.Therefore,ifthelineseparationdistanceisabout260feet,thereisnoneedforaseparate requirementforblowoutspace.Further,this260feetseparationdistancewillmitigatelineoutagesdue toconductorblowoutandtransmissiontowercollapseforbothparalleltransmissionlineswithadjacent spansandparalleltransmissionlineswithstaggeredspans. ThelineseparationestimatesabovealsorepresenttheROWwidthforeachtransmissionlineinthis example.Thus,asingle500kVlineinthisexamplewouldneedapproximately260feettotalROW,also knownastheeasement(130feetoneithersideofthetowerscenterline).Ifitcouldbeshownthat thereisminimalriskforatransmissiontowertofallontoanadjacenttowerandtherearenohighwinds intheregion(MTBFmorethan30years),thentheeasementwidthcouldbeasnarrowas160feetin thisexample(260+220).BecauseROWacquisitioncostsfortransmissionlinesareproportionalto theamountoflandacquired,reducingtherequiredeasementwidthwouldlowerthecostoftheline. Otherfactorsthatcouldnecessitatelineseparationofmorethanthe260feetderivedaboveinclude airplanestrikesandweatherrelatedevents.Airplanestrikesareprimarilyafactorinregionswherelow flyingaircraftsuchascropdusterscouldinadvertentlysnagatransmissionlineanddragitacrossthe corridorandintocontactwithanotherlinerunninginthesamecorridor,resultinginsimultaneous multipleoutages.Theriskofairplanestrikescausingmultiplelineoutageswouldappeartobegreatest inregionsfrequentedlowflyingaircraft,orinregionswheretransmissionlinesareroutednearamajor airport.Giventherarityofdocumentedcasesofairplanestrikescausingmultipletransmissionline outagesinWyoming,therelativelyfewairplanesinWyominglargeenoughtodragaseveredEHVor UHVlineacrosstocontactanotherline,andtherelativelylownumberofairportsandlowflyingaircraft inWyoming,aseparatecalculationtoaccountforairplanestrikesisnotincludedinthisexample. Fireandassociatedsmokecancausemultipletransmissionlineoutages.Sufficientlyhotfirescanignite transmissionstructuresanddamageconductors.Smokefromfireintroducesconductiveagentstothe
35
transmissionlineselectricalfieldandcanresultinflashover,therebytrippingthetransmissionline.The combinationofterrain,wind,temperature,andhumidityvariablesaffecthowfastwildlandfirescan spread(rateofspread).Dependingonconditions,therateofspreadishighlyvariable;however,Pyneet al.(1996)provideratesofspreadexamplesforthefollowingconditionsandhabitats,whichmightbe similartoconditionsinWyoming: LowsagebrushwithaSantaAnaWind250feetperminute(2.84milesperhour) Dry,shortgrasswithhighwind1,200feetperminute(13.6364milesperhour)
TheNationalInteragencyFireCenter(http://www.nifc.gov/fire_info/fire_stats.htm)providesfire statisticsforWyomingandotherstates(NationalInteragencyCoordinationCenter2009).Wyomingis partoftheRockyMountainInteragencyCoordinationCenter.Therewasonlyonelarge(100,000or moreacres)fireinWyomingduringtheperiod1997through2008(the136,700acreKatesBasinfirein 2000)(NationalInteragencyFireCenter2009).TheKatesBasinFatalityReport(BureauofIndianAffairs 2000)fortheAugust2000fireindicatesthefirewasstartedbylightningandconsistedprimarilyofgrass andscatteredsagebrush.Thereportalsoidentifiestherateofspreadrangedfrom148feet/minuteto 967feet/minute(2to11miles/hour). Methodsofmitigatingtheriskoffireorsmokecausingmultipletransmissionlineoutagesincludes: ROWmaintenancetoserveasfirebreak(e.g.,managingfuelstosloworstopfirespread) Operationalprocedures(e.g.,quicklyidentifyingandreportingfirestofacilitaterapidfire suppressionandreductionofpowertransferlevelstoavoidcascadingoutages) Increasedseparationbetweenparallellinestoallowsufficienttimetoactivatefiresuppression activitiesandreducetransferlevels Separationofparallellinesbytopographicfeatureswhichcansloworstopfirerateofspread (e.g.,rivers,ridgelines,etc.)
Inwindyregions,windgustscouldposeathreattotransmissionlines.TheWesternRegionalClimate Center(2009)describesthewindinWyomingashavingfrequentperiodswhenthewindreaches3040 milesperhourwithguststo50or60.However,theNationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration (NOAA)(2009)identifiesthehighestgustsforWyomingas127milesperhour.Astrongwindgustcould snapalinefromatowerandblowitacrosstocontactwithaparallelline,thuscausingamultipleline outage.NESCcriteriaspecifyloadcasesthatincludeimpactofwindgustsonatransmissiontowerand conductors.Transmissionlinesareconstructedtocomplywiththeloadcasesandwithstandhighwind gusts.However,ifitisdeterminedthattheMTBFforsimultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlines duetowindgustsismorethanoncein30years,thetransmissionlinesshouldbeseparatedbyatleast onespanlength.Therationaleforthisseparationdistanceisthatthemaximumreachofatransmission linebetweentwotransmissiontowerswouldbeequaltothespanlength.Fora500kVline,span lengthsareapproximately1,500feet;therefore,alineseparationdistanceof1,500feet(oronespan length,whicheverisgreater)wouldmitigatethesimultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesdue towindgusts.Itshouldbenotedthatthelineseparationdistanceof1,500feettomitigateoutagesdue tohighwindsisnotadditivetothe260feetseparationestimatedearlier,becauseatotallineseparation distanceof1,500feetwouldmitigateallthefactorsthatwereconsideredtoestimatethe260footline separationdistance. Mitigationmeasuresneedtobeconsideredtoavoidmultiplelineoutagesinregionswhere thunderstormsandicestormsareprobable.Thereareanumberofwaysstormscancausemultipleline outages.Ifstormsareaccompaniedbywindgusts,itispossiblethatalinesnappingfromatowerwill contactanadjacenttransmissionline.Thispossibilitycanbemitigatedbyseparatingparallel
36
transmissionlinesbyatleastonespanlength,asdescribedinthepreviousexampleforwindgusts.Of course,itispossiblethatastrongwindgustcouldsnapaconductorintwoseparatelines simultaneously,causingamultiplelineoutage.Apartfromensuringthattheinsulatorjointsoneach towerarebuilttowithstandstrongwindgusts,mitigatingthiseventbyincreasinglineseparation distanceisnotreasonable,becausestormimpactareasarenotpredictableandcoulddifferforeach event. Mitigatingmultiplelineoutagesduetolightningstrikesinvolvestheseparationoftwolinesbyatleast onespanlength(1,500feetintheexample)toavoidmultiplelineoutagesduetoacombinationof lightningandwindgusts.Toreducetheprobabilityofeithersingleormultiplelinesbeingtakendown duetolightningstrikes,shieldwiresand/orlightningarrestorscanbeinstalledonthetransmission towers. Inregionswheremoresevereweatherconditionsarepossible,transmissionlinesmightneedtobe separatedmorethanonespanlength.Forexample,inregionswithfrequenttornadoes,lineseparation distancesmightneedtobemeasuredinmilestoavoidmultiplelineoutagesduetoasingletornado bringingdowntwoparallellines.Inthiscase,ananalysisisnecessarytounderstandtornado characteristics,suchasdistancetraveled,windspeeds,etc.Theappropriatelineseparationdistancecan becalculatedbasedonthisanalysis. IftheMTBFofsimultaneouslineoutagesduetotheweathereventsdescribedaboveismorethanonce in30years,thenthenecessaryNERCCategoryCperformancetestsarerequiredandpotentialimpacts tothesystemanalyzed.Ifthesystemmeetsallspecifiedperformancerequirements,suchasno cascadingoutages,thenlineseparationof1,500feetfortheexampleisadequate(NERC2009b). However,iftheCategoryCtestsindicateaviolationofsystemperformancerequirementsunderthe multiplelineoutagecase,thensystemimpactsneedtobemitigated,eitherbyincreasinglineseparation distance,acceptingalowerratingfortheline,orimplementinganRAS. Itshouldbenotedthatoncethelinesareconstructed,itisverydifficultifnotimpossibletochangeline separationdistances.Therefore,acomprehensivetradeoffanalysisisnecessarytounderstandtherisks tosystemreliability,financialinvestment,environment,landuse,lineratings,andotherfactorsbefore determiningaspecificvalueforlineseparationdistance.
3.4
FrameworkDevelopment
TheexampleusedinSection3.3toillustratethevariousfactorsconsideredfordeterminingline separationdistancesimpliesthatsomecausesforsimultaneousmultiplelineoutagescouldbemitigated byincreasinglineseparationdistances.Forthe500kVlineexample NESC+OSHA+transmissiontowercontactseparation~=160feetseparationdistance. Mitigateconductorblowoutand/ortowercollapse~=260feetseparationdistance. Mitigatewindgusts~=1,500feetseparationdistance.(Alsomitigatesimpactoflightningand rain/hail/snow/icestorms.) Additionalmitigationforimpactoflightning=installshieldwiresand/orlightningarrestors. Mitigateimpactoftornadoes~=possiblymultiplemilesofseparationdistanceifnoother mitigationmeasuresareavailable. Mitigateimpactoffire=ROWmaintenance,operationalprocedures,andpossiblymultiplemiles ofseparationdistance.
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3.5
FactorsthatInfluenceLineSeparationDistance
Factorsinfluencinglineseparationdistancebeyondtheinitialminimumrequiredforsafetyclearance, blowout,andonetowerfallingonanothertowerinanadjacentlineincludeweatherconditions,ROW acquisitioncosts,andlanduseandenvironmentalconsiderations.Forexample,ROWacquisitioncosts andenvironmentalconstraintscouldjustifyplacingtransmissionlinesclosertogetherifpowersystem reliabilitywouldbemaintainedthroughlinederatingorimplementinganRASthatmitigatestheimpact ofmultiplelineoutages.Thus,NERCstandardsandWECCreliabilitycriteriawouldbemet.However,de ratingparallellinesclosetooneanothercouldnecessitateadditionaltransmissionlinestomeetload centerandotherdemands. Becausetheeffectofincreasinglineseparationdistanceistomitigatecausesformultiplelineoutages, onecanpostulatethatsystemreliabilityincreasesandtheriskoflinederatingdecreasesaslinesare spacedfartherapart.However,increasinglineseparationdistancesalsoincreasesinstallationand maintenancecostsandcouldresultindelaysinenvironmentalpermitting,asshowninFigure33.
Figure33.OptimalLineSeparationDistance(conceptual)

Installation& MaintenanceCost andTime Environmental PermittingDelays Publicopposition
Linederatingrisk Futureneedfornew transmissionlines NeedforRAS
Visualimpact Easeofadherenceto environmentalregulations concerns andlanduseconstraints
TheoreticalOptimal LineSeparationDistance
LineSeparation Di
Figure33isaconceptualformulationofthelineseparationproblem.Inreality,itisnotlikelythata singleoptimallineseparationdistancecouldbederived,becausetherearesignificantvariationsaround thederatingrisk,theneedfornewtransmissionlinesandconstructioncostsbasedontheregion, powersystemtopology,regionaleconomy,laborandmaterialsmarkets,etc.Figure34providesamore practicaldepictionoftheimpactoflineseparationdistance. TheellipticalbandsinFigure34conceptuallydepicttherangeofvariationsurroundingvariousfactors thatchangesinlineseparationdistanceinfluence.Figure34showstheshapeofthebandsasanellipse forillustrationpurposesonly.
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Chapter3LineSeparationEvaluationFramework Figure34.RangeofVariationforOptimalLineSeparationDistance

Linederatingrisk Futureneedfornew transmissionlines NeedforRAS Easeofadherenceto environmentalregulations andlanduseconstraints Installation&Maintenance CostandTime Environmental PermittingDelays Publicopposition Visualimpactconcern
Variation bands
OptimalRangeforLine SeparationDistance LineSeparationDistance
3.6
ProblemFormulation
Theconceptsoutlinedinprevioussectionscannowberepresentedasanillustrativeequationthat describesthelineseparationproblem,asfollowsasEquation(1): OptimizeSD=f{is,psr,er,luc,sf,psf} Where SD=lineseparationdistance. is=industrystandards(NESC,OSHA)andbasiccharacteristicsofthetransmissionlinedesign. psr=powersystemreliabilitycriteria,analysesandregionalpowersystemcondition. er=environmentalregulations. luc=landuseconstraints. sf=socialfactors(visualimpact,publicopposition). psf=projectspecificfactors. ItisimportanttonotethatEquation(1)presentsaconsolidatedrepresentationoftheparameters involvedindetermininglineseparationdistance.Obviously,thereisnoclosedformsolutionpossiblefor thisequation(anddevelopmentofoneisnotlikely)becausetherearenodeterministicfunctionsthat relatetheseparationdistancetoallthevariousparametersintheequation. Equation(1)doesnotincludeweatherrelatedfactorsbecause,asopposedtodirectfactorssuchas powersystemreliabilityperformancerequirements,weatherbyitselfisanindirectfactor. Oncelineseparationdistanceisdetermined,thefollowingparameterscanbeestimatedasafunctionof theseparationdistanceandotherfactors:
39
Equation Number (2) Linederatingld=f1{SD,psr,psf}. (3) Futureneedfornewtransmissionfnnt=f2 {SD,psr,ld}. (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Impactofmitigationmeasuresimm=f3 {psr,SD,RAScost,RASexistence}. Financialimpactoflinederatingfild=f4 {ld,psf}. Installationandmaintenancecosts=f5 {SD,psf}. Installationandmaintenancetime=f6 {SD,psf}. Environmentalpermittingdelays=f7 {SD,er,luc,sf}.
SimilartoEquation(1),thefunctionsf1tof7donotexistasexactequationsbutratherasheuristicrules, someofwhichwillvarycasebycaseforeachproposedtransmissionline.Theparametersinthese equationscanbeestimatedusingtheserulesandavailableempiricaldata.Equations(2)through(8)also formpartofthefeedbackloopwherein,basedonthesuitabilityoftheresultsdeterminedforthe variousparameterssuchaslinederatingrisk,financialimpactoflinederating,etc.,thelineseparation distancecanbeadjustedappropriately. Usingtheconceptualproblemformulationgivenabove,itispossibletoobtainarangeofseparation distancesbasedonacceptablevariationsforparameterssuchaslinederatingrisktolerance,installation andmaintenancecosts,etc.Thestartingpointforthisprocessistofirstdeterminetheabsolute minimumrequiredvalueasdescribedearlierintheexamplederivationoflineseparationdistancefora hypothetical500kVline,andthenbuildonitwithallowancesforvariousfactorssuchasweather relatedevents.
3.7

SolutionProcess
Lineseparationdistanceasformulatedintheprevioussectioncouldbesplitintothreecomponents,as follows: ABMINTheabsoluteminimumneeded CASEMINChangetoABMINneededcasebycase(incrementalordecremental) REGMINChangetoABMINduetoregionalfactors(incrementalordecremental)
Therefore,therangeofminimumlineseparationdistanceneededcouldvaryfromABMINtothesumof ABMIN,CASEMIN,andREGMINbasedonspecificmitigationmeasuressuchaslinederatingorrobust transmissionlineconstruction. Thus,therangeofminimumlineseparationdistance[Equation(9)]wouldbe SD=[SDAMIN,SDACRMIN] Where SD=lineseparationdistance. SDAMIN=ABMIN. SDACRMIN=ABMIN+CASEMIN+REGMIN. TheABMINlineseparationdistanceisindependentofregionsanddependsonlyonindustrycodesand thetypesandcharacteristicsofthetransmissionlines,whicharerelativelystandard.Therefore,this valuecouldbeestimatedwithoutperforminganyregionspecificanalysis.Inthisstudy,componentsof
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theABMINlineseparationdistancealsoincludeseparationrequiredtomitigateonetransmissiontower fallingontotheadjacenttowerandoutagescausedduetoconductorblowout. TheCASEMINlineseparationdistancedependsonthecircumstancessurroundingindividual transmissionlineprojects.Specialcases,suchasacombinationofACandDClinesonasingletowerorin acommoncorridor,landtopology,lineswithdifferingvoltagelevelsinparallel,and/orother considerations,needtobeevaluatedfordeterminingCASEMINseparationdistance. TheREGMINlineseparationdistancedependsonregionalfactorssuchasweatherrelatedlineoutage causes,existingreliabilityofthepowersystem,RASavailabilities,possibilityofairplanestrikes,fire,etc. Thischangeindistancerequirementshouldbeestimatedregionbyregionbycollectingpertinentdata ontheweatherandothercausesandperformingtheappropriatesteadystateanddynamicACload flowanalyses(includingthetestsgiveninNERCreliabilitycriteria)todeterminepotentialimpactstothe powersystem.Variousoptions,suchaslinederating,developingRASs,andchangingseparation distances,shouldbeconsideredtheleastcostoptionchosenforcompliancewithNERCandregional performancerequirements. UsingtheparametersoutlinedinEquation(1),thethreecomponentsoflineseparationdistancecould bewritten: ABMIN=fA{is}. CASEMIN=fC{psf}. REGMIN=fR{psr,er,luc,sf}. Therefore, SDAMIN=ABMIN=fA{is}. SDACRMIN=ABMIN+CASEMIN+REGMIN=fA{is}+fC{psf}+fR{psr,er,luc,sf}. Hence,Equation(9)becomes SD=[fA{is},(fA{is}+fC{psf}+fR{psr,er,luc,sf})]Equation(10) Figure35providesaprocessflowchartfordetermininglineseparationdistancebasedonthe frameworkdescribedearlier.ThefigurealsoprovidesprocessflowchartsfordeterminingtheABMIN andCASEMINcomponentsoflineseparationdistance.TheflowchartinFigure36depictstheprocess todetermineREGMINcomponentoflineseparationdistance.Figure37illustratestheframework approachtodeterminetheminimumseparationdistance.
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Chapter3LineSeparationEvaluationFramework Figure35.ProcessFlowchartforDeterminingLineSeparationDistanceComponents
Figure36.FlowchartforDeterminingtheREGMIN ComponentofLineSeparationDistance
START
SD = AB-MIN + CASE-MIN; REG-MIN = 0
B
SD = AB-MIN + CASE-MIN + REG-MIN
Perform NERC reliability tests
YES
Performance requirements satisfied ?
NO
Analysis of outage causes 1 MTBF > 30 years?
Determine REG-MIN and associated costs; f5 {SD,psf },f6 {SD,psf },f7 {SD,er,luc} Determine amount of line de-rating and Its financial impact f4 {ld,psf} Determine mitigation scheme and cost f3 {psr,SD,RAScost,RASexistence}
YES
YES
NO
Changing SD is the min cost option ?
NO
REG-MIN = 0
WECCmustconcurwiththeanalysisthatMTBFismorethan30years.
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Chapter3LineSeparationEvaluationFramework Figure37.ApproachtoDetermineMinimumSeparationDistance
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Chapter4EstimatingLineSeparationDistancesinWyoming
CHAPTER4ESTIMATINGLINESEPARATIONDISTANCESINWYOMING
TheStateofWyomingisrichinenergyresourcessuchascoal,naturalgasandwind.Asdescribedin Chapter1,WyominghashistoricallybeenanenergyexportertotherestoftheNation.The developmentofWyomingswindpotentialcouldaddsubstantialrenewablebasedelectricitytothe StatesenergyexportsandtotheWECCsystem.Atleastsevenhighvoltagetransmissionlinesare currentlyproposedtotransferwindbasedpowerfromWyomingtodistantloadcenters.Severalofthe proposedtransmissionlinesareconceptuallyplannedtofollowsimilarpathsforatleastpartoftheir routes,raisingissuesofpowersystemreliability,landuseandenvironmentalconstraints,andthe separationdistancebetweenmultiplelinessharingthesamepath.Mosttransmissionlinesproposedin WyomingfollowarouteoriginatingineasternWyomingandtraversingsouthand/orwest,asshownin Figure41.
Figure41.ProposedTransmissionLineProjectsinWyoming
Routesshownareforillustrativepurposesonlyandwillbefinalized followingacomprehensivereviewprocess.
Source:WIA2009.
ThischapterappliestheframeworkdevelopedinChapter3toestimatetheminimumseparation distancebetweentwotransmissionlinesfollowingthesamerouteinWyoming.Becausemostofthe windgenerationandnewtransmissionlineprojectsareproposedineasternandsouthernWyoming, thisanalysisappliestheframeworkonlytocountiesineasternandsouthernWyoming.Lineseparation distancesforothercountiesandotherstatescouldbedeterminedbyapplyingthesameframeworkto thoseareas.
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4.1
ComponentsofLineSeparationDistance
SD=[SDAMIN,SDACRMIN], where SD=minimumlineseparationdistance; SDAMIN=ABMIN; SDACRMIN=ABMIN+CASEMIN+REGMIN; and ABMIN=Absoluteminimumrequiredseparationdistance; CASEMIN=changeinseparationdistanceduetoprojectspecificcasebycasefactors; REGMIN=changeinseparationdistanceduetoregionalfactors.
FromEquation(9)inChapter3,therangeoflineseparationdistancesisgivenby:
TheprocessofdeterminingminimumlineseparationdistancesforWyomingstartswithestimatingeach ofthesecomponentsseparately.ItisimportanttonotethatCASEMINandREGMINcanbeeither negativeorpositiveinvaluebasedonthespecificsituation.
4.1.1
AbsoluteMinimumLineSeparationDistance
ABMINshouldbetheabsoluteminimumseparationdistancebetweentwolines,irrespectiveoftheir regionallocationorothercharacteristicsexceptforthedesignofthetransmissiontowerandother componentsandthelinevoltage.TheestimationofABMINisindependentofregionalorproject specificfactors. AsstatedinChapter3,ICFcalculatedtheABMINdistancefora500kVlinetobeabout260feet,based onNESCandOSHAindustrystandardsandtransmissiontowerandconductorcharacteristicsforatypical 500kVline.Theestimateof260feetforABMINalsoincludesmitigationforsimultaneouslineoutages duetoconductorblowoutandtransmissiontowercollapseand,couldbeincreasedordecreasedifthe towerheightandotherfactorsdifferfromvaluesassumedintheexample.However,becauseABMINis fairlyindependentofregionalcharacteristics,anestimateofapproximately260feetfortheabsolute minimumlineseparationdistanceisareasonablestartingpointforcalculatingtransmissionline separationdistancesinWyoming.
4.1.2
CaseSpecificIncrementalMinimumLineSeparationDistance
Thecasespecificcomponentoftheminimumlineseparationdistancecalculationisbasedon characteristicsspecifictoeachtransmissionproject.Casespecificcharacteristicsaregenerally independentofthetypesoftransmissiontowers,kVlevel,etc.,usedfortheproject;theselatter featuresdeterminetheABMINvalue.Instead,projectspecificfactorstoconsiderindeterminingCASE MINcouldincludeportionsofaprojectroute,suchaspassingthroughavalleybetweenmountains, wherelineseparationdistancesmightneedtobereducedduetotopographicalrestrictions.Inthis example,CASEMINwouldhaveanegativevalue.Forasituationwheretwolinesmightbeseparatedby aridgetomitigatetheimpactoffire,CASEMINwouldhaveapositivevalue. Aconstructabilityadderto addressroughterrainisanotherexamplewhereCASEMINwouldtypicallyhaveapositivevalue. Thisstudyanalyzestherequiredlineseparationdistancesfromageneralperspectiveandisnot intendedtorecommendseparationdistancesforspecificprojects.Therefore,forthisanalysisICF assumedCASEMINtobezero.UsingtheframeworkdevelopedintheChapter3,transmissionline proponentscouldcalculatetheimpactsofprojectspecificcharacteristicsonlineseparationdistances.
4.1.3
IncrementalRegionalMinimumLineSeparationDistance
REGMINistheincremental(ordecremental)valueforminimumlineseparationdistancebasedon factorsthatvarybyregion,suchastheweather.TheprocessflowchartinFigure36liststhestepsfor estimatingREGMIN. ToestimateREGMIN,itisnecessarytounderstandthecausesofsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines inWyomingandtoinvestigatetheprobabilityoftheseoutagesoccurring.IftheNERCCategoryC reliabilityperformancerequirementsarenotmetandifitcannotbeshownthattheMTBFforthe simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelinesislessthan1in30years,thentheoptionsare1)increaseline separationdistance,2)acceptareducedlinerating,or3)developandimplementanRAS. Theseoptionscanberankedbasedonleastcostanalysisandchosenaccordingly.Further,involvement ofWECCinthisprocessandWECCsapprovaloftheoptionchosenareessentialforalltransmission projectstoproceedsuccessfully. TodeterminetheMTBFforthesimultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesinWyoming,the causesforlineoutagesintheStateneedtobeunderstood.Whiledataregardingcausesforindividual lineoutagesinWyomingwerenotavailableforthisstudy,WECCtransmissionoutagereports(WECC 2007a,WECC2008b)identifythemostcommoncausesforsustainedtransmissionlineoutages(for500 600kVlines)withintheWECCsystemasterminalequipment,unknown,andweatherexcludinglightning (seeTable27).Fire,lightning,humanerror,andvandalismalsocontributedto5percentormoreof sustainedoutagesof500600kVlinesin2006or2007(seeTable27).Equipmentfailure,unknown factors,andhumanerror,typicallycannotbemitigatedbyincreasingthelineseparationdistance.Given thepercentageofoutages(seeTable27)attributedtothesefactors,theyareobviouslyimportantto powersystemreliability;however,analysisofthesefactorsisoutsidethescopeofthisseparationstudy. Dependingonthesituation,vandalism(alsoincludessabotageandterrorism)mayormaynotbe mitigatedbyseparationdistance;however,thiscomplexfactorisdeemedoutsidethescopeofthis studyandisthereforenotincludedintheanalysis. Weatherrelatedoutagefactors(fire,lightning,andweatherexcludinglightning)accountedforabout24 (2006)and19(2007)percentofsustainedlineoutagesintheWECCsystem(WECC2007a,2008b).This chapteranalyzesweatherrelatedriskfactors,whichcantosomedegreebemitigatedbyensuring appropriatelineseparationdistance.Forthepurposesofthisreport,fireiscategorizedasweather related.Lightningisacommonignitionsourceofwildlandfiresinthewest. GivenWyomingsclimateandtopography,thefiveprimaryweatherrelatedcausesoflineoutagesare highwinds,storms(rain,ice,snow,andhail),tornadoes,lightning,andfires.Dataareavailablefromthe NationalClimateDataCenter(NCDC)forhistoricaloccurrencesofweathereventsinWyoming(NOAA 2009).However,thereismorehistoricaldataforsomecauses,suchastornadoes,thanisavailablefor lightning.Basedonavailabledata,ICFanalyzedthefiveprimaryweatherrelatedcausesoflineoutages todeterminetheprobabilityofsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelinesinWyoming.Theanalysis determinedthevalueofREGMINnecessarytomitigatetheprobabilityoflineoutagesfromthese causes.Themathematicalrigoremployedindeterminingthelikelihoodofoutagesofmultiple transmissionlinesoutagesduetoanyofthesecausesdependedonthequantityandqualityofavailable historicaldataontheoccurrenceandcharacteristicsofthatcause.
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TocalculateREGMIN: REGMIN=max(REGMINW,REGMINSTORM,REGMINT,REGMINL,REGMINFIRE,REGMINOTHER). Where incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityofhighwindscausing REGMINW= simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. REGMINSTORM= incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityofice/snow/rain/hail stormscausingsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. REGMINT= incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityoftornadoescausing simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. REGMINL= incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityoflightningcausing simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. REGMINFIRE= incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityoffirescausing simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. REGMINOTHER= incrementallineseparationtomitigateprobabilityofotherregionalfactors causingsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. Thus,theprocessisto1)determinetheindividualincrementallineseparationdistancetomitigatethe impactofhighwinds,storms,tornadoes,lightning,andfiresand2)selectthelargestofthesefivevalues forREGMIN.Theseparationdistancescalculatedforthesefivefactorsarenotadditive.Anincremental separationdistanceequaltothelargestvaluewouldmitigatetheimpactoftheotherfourfactors.A sixthcause(other)isincludedintheformulaforREGMINtoaccountforotherregionalfactorswhich maybemitigatedbylineseparationdistance.WhileREGMINOTHERisnotusedinthefollowing applicationoftheframeworktoWyoming,itmaybenecessaryforapplicationsofthisframeworkto otherregions.
HighWinds
EasternandsoutheasternWyomingcountiesexperiencebothwindspeedburstsandsustainedhigh windspeeds.Figure42showsstatisticsregardingmaximumwindspeedsinWyomingduring thunderstormsandhighwindconditions. Forthehypothetical500kVline,thetotalABMINlineseparationdistanceincludescomponentsfor mitigationforlineoutagesduetoconductorblowoutortransmissiontowercollapseduetohighwinds (seeChapter3). Thenextstepinthisexampleistodeterminewhetherincrementallineseparationdistanceisneededto mitigatetheprobabilityofsustainedhighwindscausinglineoutages.Sustainedhighwindscouldcausea transmissionconductortobreakfreeofthetransmissiontowerandmakecontactwithanadjacent transmissionlinethatiscloserthanonespanlengthofthetransmissionlinewiththebrokenconductor. Thispossibilitymustbeanalyzedandmitigated,especiallyinWyoming,becauseofitshighsustained windspeeds.Therearetwowaystomitigatetheprobabilityofaconductorsnappingfromthetower andalinecontactingtheadjacenttransmissionline: 1) 2) Ensurethatthelineseparationdistancebetweentwoadjacenttransmissionlinesismorethan onespanlengthofthelinewiththelongestspan. Conclusivelydemonstratethatthetransmissionline,especiallythejointsinthetransmission towersthatsupporttheconductors,willwithstandsustainedandmomentaryextremewind gustswithouttheconductorsbreakingfreeofthetransmissiontower.Astartingpointforthis demonstrationistoensurecompliancewiththeNESCextremewindloadingscenariosand
44
applicableAmericanSocietyofCivilEngineers(ASCE)guidanceondesigningtransmissionlines forhighwindconditions.ASCEStandardNo.7providesthesourcedataforreliabilitybased loadsestablishedinNESCRule250C,ExtremeWind.Anadditionalmitigationmeasureistoadd spacersanddamperstolimittheswingingofconductorsduetohighwinds.Thiswillreduce stressontheinsulatorconductorjointsandreducetheprobabilityofaconductorbreakingfree fromtheinsulators.
Figure42.MaximumWindSpeed(miles/hour)inWyomingfrom19592008
140
120
100
Averagewindspeed:66miles/hr
Wind Speed (mph)
80
60
40
20
1 32 63 94 125 156 187 218 249 280 311 342 373 404 435 466 497 528 559 590 621 652 683 714 745 776 807 838 869 900 931 962 993 1024 1055 1086 1117 1148 1179 1210 1241 1272 1303 1334 1365 1396
NumberofOccurrences SerialNumberofMaximumWindSpeedOccurrence Source:DataderivedfromNOAA2009.
BasedonwindspeeddataforWyomingbetween1959and2008,theaveragemaximumwindspeedis about66milesperhour(NOAA2009).Assuminganywindspeedoverthedesignlimitofatransmission willcauseoutageofthatline,thenbasedonavailablewindspeeddata,designingatransmissionlineto withstand66milesperhouraveragewindspeedwillpreventtransmissionlineoutagesonlyabout60 percentofthetime.Topreventhighwindsfromcausingtransmissionlineoutagesmorethanoncein30 years(or0.0333timesperyear)(correspondingtoaMTBFoflessthan1in30years),basedonavailable data,transmissionlinesneedtobedesignedtowithstandmaximumwindspeedsofuptoapproximately 101milesperhourinWyoming.Thisestimateconsiderswindgustsonlyinsouthernandeastern Wyomingbecausealloftheproposedtransmissionlinesareexpectedtopassthroughthoseareas.Ifthe transmissionlinesinWyoming(towers,conductors,andjoints)canwithstandwindspeedsofupto101 milesperhour,thentheprobabilityoftransmissionlineoutagescausedbyhighwindswillbelessthan3 percentperyear,whichwouldsatisfytheMTBFcriteriatoavoidCategoryCtestsforNERCandWECC compliance.Thisisconservativeinthatitassumeshighwindsofmorethan101milesperhourspeed wouldhavea100percentprobabilityofcausingthesimultaneousoutageoftwolines. Itisexpectedthattransmissionlinesdesignedtowithstandatleast101milesperhourwindspeedswill withstandsustainedperiodsofhighwindssuchasthoseexperiencedinWyomingwithoutoutages. However,becauseWyomingisknownforsustainedhighwindspeedsandhighwindgusts,anextralayer ofprotectionshouldbeaddedtomitigatetheprobabilityofhighwindscausingoutageofoneoutofthe
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twolines.Thismitigationistopreventaconductorfromcontactinganadjacenttransmissionlineifit breaksawayfrominsulators.Maintainingatleastonespanlength(equaltothelongestspanlengthin eitherline)separationdistancebetweentwoadjacentlinesistherecommendedmitigation.Forthis example,thelongestspanlengthfora500kVlineisassumedtobe1,500feet,resultinginaREGMINW valueofabout1,240feet(1,500feetminus260feet),because260feetoutofthe1,500feetseparation distanceisalreadyaccountedforintheestimateforABMIN.
Storms(Rain,Ice,Snow,andHail)
Wyomingisalsosusceptibletorain,ice,snowandhailstormsaccompaniedbywindgusts.All transmissionlineprojectsinWyoming(andelsewhereintheU.S.)mustbedesignedbasedonNESC standardstowithstandiceandsnowbuilduponlinesandtowers.Highwindgustsduringstorms, coupledwiththeweightoficeorsnowonthetransmissiontowers,couldcausethetowerstocollapse ontoadjacenttowersortransmissionlines.Windgustsduringicestormsalsoraisethepossibilityofan iceladentransmissionlinesnappingfreeofthetowerandbeingblownaboutbyhighwinds,similarto thepreviouscasewithhighwinds. Asforthehypothetical500kVlineinChapter3,theABMINseparationdistanceof260feetmitigates simultaneousmultiplelineoutagesduetotheimpactofonetransmissiontowerfallingontheadjacent towerorlineaswellasconductorblowout.Toavoidmultiplelineoutagesduetoatransmissionline breakingfreeofthetowerandcontactinganadjacentline,themitigationmeasures(i.e.,lineseparation bythelongestspanlength)adoptedintheearlierhighwindsscenariowillalsosufficeforthiscase, assumingthewindspeedsthatcauselineoutagesinastormaresimilartothoseinthehighwinds scenario.Inadditiontothelineseparationmitigation,itisnecessarytodesigntransmissiontowers, joints,andconductorstowithstandbothtypicalandextremeiceandwindloadingconditionswithout theconductorbreakingfreeofthetower.Asdescribedearlier,basedonhistoricalWyomingweather data,designingtransmissiontowers,conductors,joints,andothercomponentstowithstandawind speedofatleast101milesperhourwillpreventlineoutagesduetoiceandwindmorethan0.0333 timesperyear.Thus,theestimatedvalueofREGMINWdeterminedpreviously(1,240feet)willalso mitigatelineoutagesduetostorms.Therefore,anonzerovalueforREGMINSTORMinthiscaseis redundant. Forstormsandthehighwindcase,itisrecommendedtransmissiontowersandconductorsbedesigned toavoidlineoutagesduringextremeweatherconditions.Forexample,toensurecompliancewiththe NESCextremewindandiceloadingscenarios,ASCEStandardNo.7providesthesourcedatafor reliabilitybasedloadsestablishedinNESCRule250D,ExtremeWindandIce.
Tornadoes
AvailableNCDCdataoneventssuchastornadoesismoreextensivethandataregardingotherweather eventssuchasstormsandlightningstrikes.However,therearenocommonmitigationmeasuresto preventlineoutagescausedbyalltornadoes,whereastherearecommonmeasurestomitigateline outagescausedbylightning.Therefore,arelativelymoredetailedquantitativeanalysisisnecessaryto calculateseparationdistancetoreducetheprobabilityofmultiplelineoutagescausedbytornadoes. EasternandsoutheasternWyominghaveahistoryoftornadoes.Toanalyzetheeffectoftornadoeson lineoutages,ICFobtainedhistoricalweatherdatafromNCDCforthe50yearperiod1959through2008 (NOAA2009).ThisdataincludedinformationontornadoesinWyominglistedbyyear,countyoforigin, andtornadocharacteristics(class,lengthandwidth).
46
Thekeyvariableinanalyzingthisdataistheexpectednumberoftornadoesthatcouldcause simultaneousoutagesofmultiplelinesinasingleyear.Toaidinformulatingamethodologyforthis analysis,ICFdevelopedthefollowinginitialassumptions: 1) 2) 3) 4) 5) Consideronlytwo500kVlinespertransmissioncorridor ConsideronlyonecorridorpercountyinWyoming Asinglethunderstormspawnsonlyonetornado TheanalysisoftornadoesisperformedonacountybycountybasiswithinWyoming ThisanalysisdoesnotincludethecentralandnorthwesterncountiesofWyomingbecausethe numberofproposedtransmissionlineroutesandtornadopotentialarerelativelyless substantialinthosecounties.
Figure43isamapofWyomingshowingallthecountiesandthoseselectedforthisanalysis.
Figure43.WyomingCountiesConsideredintheTornadoAnalysis
Source:Digitaltopomaps.com2005. Note:Countiesnotconsideredintornadoanalysisareshaded.
ThemethodologycouldbeextendedtoothercountiesinWyoming,otherstates,additionalcorridors withinacounty,orformorethantwolineswithinacorridor;however,suchadditionalanalysesare outsidethescopeofthisstudy.Notethatforthesamelineseparationdistance,morelineswithina county(whetherinsingleormultiplecorridors)couldincreasetheprobabilityoflineoutages.The methodologyalsocouldbeappliedtoacaseinwhichathunderstormspawnsmorethanonetornado.
47
Theexpectednumberofsimultaneousoutagesofmultipletransmissionlinesduetoatornadoina singleyearisaproductofthreeseparatecomponents,asfollows: 1) Averagenumberoftornadoesperyearinacounty(P1). 2) Probabilityatornadowilloriginateatalocationwithinacountysuchthatitcouldcontacttwo transmissionlines(P2). 3) ConditionalprobabilitythatthetornadoafteroriginatingatthelocationasdefinedbyP2,will contacttwotransmissionlines(P3). IftheproductofP1,P2,andP3islessthan0.0333,thatimpliesthattheexpectednumberoftornadoes causingsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelinesislessthanonein30years;therefore,theNERCCategory Canalysesneednotbeperformedforsimultaneousoutageofbothlines. P1canbedeterminedbycalculatingtheaveragenumberoftornadoesperyearutilizingdataNCDC collectedovera50yearperiod(NOAA2009).Thisnumberrangesfrom0.006inUintaCountyto1.96in LaramieCounty. P2istheprobabilitythatthetornadowilloriginateatalocationwithinacountysuchthatitcould contacttwotransmissionlines.Thelocusoftheselocationswithinacountywillbereferredtoasa transmissioncorridor.TheprobabilityP2canbedeterminedfromtheratiooftheareaoccupiedbya transmissioncorridortothetotalareaofthecounty.Thelengthofatransmissioncorridorinacountyis assumedtobethelengthofthecounty.Thesizeofthecorridordependsontheseparationdistance betweenthelinesandtheaveragetornadopathlengthinthecounty.AppendixBprovidestheareaof eachcountyandtheaveragenumberandlengthoftornadoesineachcountyinsouthernandeastern Wyoming. Figure44isaschematicofthetransmissioncorridor.Forpurposesofthisanalysis,itisassumedthis corridorextendsinastraightlinethroughthemiddlelengthofthecounty,thepathofatornadois alwaysastraightline,andatornadowillnotchangedirection.Thismethodologycanalsobeappliedto differenttransmissioncorridorlengths.
Figure44.SchematicofTransmissionLineCorridor forTornadoStudy
InFigure44,T1andT2aretwoparalleltransmissionlines.Rrepresentsthedistanceatornadotravels (whichinthisanalysisisassumedtobeequaltothehistoricalaveragedistancetraveledbyalltornadoes
SD R L R A T1 T2 B
48
inthecounty).SDisthelineseparationdistancebetweenT1andT2,andListhelengthofthecounty. Thefollowingobservationscanbemadefromthisfigure: 1) AtornadothatoriginatesintheshadedareaswillnotcauselineoutagesofT1andT2because thedistancethetornadotravels(R)willbelessthanthatrequiredtocausebothlineoutages. 2) IfthetornadooriginatesatanypointbetweenAandT1,thereisapossibilitythetornadocould causelineoutagesofbothT1andT2.SimilarlogicholdsfortornadoesthatoriginatebetweenB andT2. 3) TornadoesthatoriginatebetweenT1andT2andmoveinastraightlinewillnotcausemultiple lineoutagesbecausethetornadowillmovetowardonelineandawayfromtheother. P2istheprobabilitythatthetornadowilloriginateeitherbetweenAandT1orbetweenBandT2.For eachcounty,thisprobabilityisgivenbytheratiooftheareaofthetransmissioncorridortothetotal areaofthecounty,asfollows:
P2 =
2 (R SD ) L Total County Area
Theconditionalprobability(P3)ofthesingletornadocausinglineoutagesofbothT1orT2isdetermined asshowninFigure45.
Figure45.ConditionalProbabilityofa SingleTornadoCausingLineOutages
TheprobabilityP3dependsontwofactors,asfollows: 1) Theoriginofthetornadoinrelationtothetwotransmissionlines. 2) Thetornadodirectionoftravel. Figure45showstwoexamples.Tornado1willcauselineoutagesofbothT1andT2onlyifittravelsina horizontalstraightline(theshortestdistancebetweenAandT1),theprobabilityofwhichiscloseto zero.However,Tornado2cancausemultiplelineoutageswithanonzeroprobability.Thus,the probabilityofatornadooriginatingwithintheshadedareasinthefigureandcausingmultipleline outagesincreasesasthepointoforiginofthetornadogetsclosertoeithertransmissionline.
Tornado 1 Tornado 2 R A T1 T2 B
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AppendixCprovidesasolutiontodetermineP3andtheresultingoptimallineseparationdistance assumingafixedpointoforiginforatornado.Extendingthismethodtoincludearangeofpointsof originofthetornadocanbeaccomplishedeitherbyusingaclosedformintegralequation(givenbelow) orbyusingaMonteCarlosimulationmethod,asdescribedinAppendixC(C.2).Inthisstudy,both methodsyieldedsimilarresults.
TornadoPathCalculationsusingIntegralClosedFormSolution
AtornadooriginatingwithinadistancexfromT1orT2willhaveanonzeroprobabilityofcrossingboth T1andT2if 0 x R SD ,whereRisthelengthofthetornadopathandSDistheseparation distanceoflinesT1andT2.Theprobabilityofthetornadocrossingbothlinesafteroriginatingatxis definedasPx.TocalculateP3,whichistheaveragevalueofPxovertheregion 0 x R SD ,first calculateanangularspreadfromthehorizontaloverwhichthedirectionoftravelcouldoccurand resultinthetornadocrossingbothT1andT2,asfollows:
x + SD R x + SD = Cos 1 R Cos ( ) =
Theangularspreadissymmetricaboutthehorizontal;therefore,thetotalangularspreadis2.The probabilityofthetornadocrossingbothlinesiscalculatedasthepercentageofalldirections(2 radians)madeupbythetotalangularspread,asfollows:
Px =
2 2
P3,theaveragevalueofPxovertherange 0 x R SD ,iscalculatedbyintegration(solution providedbyWolframMathematicaOnlineIntegrator),asfollows:
P3 =
1 R SD
R SD
P dx
0
1 P3 = (R SD )
R SD
R SD
x + SD Cos 1 dx R
P3 =
1 (R SD )
P3 =
x + SD x Cos 1 x + SD R 2 ( x + SD )2 s Tan 1 2 2 R R ( x + SD ) 0
SD 1 SD + R 2 SD 2 + SD Tan 1 2 2 2 ( R SD) R SD
wherexisanypointonthegridbetweenT1toAorbetweenT2toB. OnceP3iscalculated,theseparationdistancethatwillsatisfytheequationP1*P2*P3=0.0333(foran MTBFoflessthanoncein30years)canbedetermined. Usingthisformulation,ICFcalculatedthelineseparationdistanceforeachcountyineasternand southernWyoming(seeTable41).
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Chapter4EstimatingLineSeparationDistancesinWyoming Table41.CalculatedSeparationDistanceBetweenTwoTransmissionLinesToAvoid MultipleLineOutagesCausedbyaSingleTornado

Probabilitya singletornado Averageno. willoriginatein oftornadoes1 thetransmission peryear(P1) corridor(P2) (percent)
0.32 1.66 0.3 0.78 0.56 0.32 1.24 1.96 0.12 0.66 0.6 0.7 0.06 0.42 0.06 0.42 3 9 3 4 9 4 10 7 5 10 6 17 3 1 9 20
County
Conditional probabilityofthe tornadocausing multipleline outages(P3) (percent)

32 23 32 32 32 32 25 25 32 32 32 28 32 32 32 32
Expectednumber ofmultipleline outagescausedby asingletornado peryear (P1*P2*P3)

0.0029 0.0325 0.0030 0.0105 0.0155 0.0038 0.0322 0.0323 0.0020 0.0209 0.0121 0.0329 0.0005 0.0015 0.0018 0.0269
Separation Distance (feet)

0 7,100 0 0 0 0 3,500 3,400 0 0 0 2,400 0 0 0 0
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Crook Fremont Goshen Laramie Lincoln Natrona Niobrara Platte Sublette Sweetwater Uinta Weston
1
Dataincludetornadotravellength. % percent
InTable41,zeroSDvalueforacountyimpliesthatbecausetheexpectednumberoftornadoescausing multipleoutagesisfewerthanonein30yearsbasedonhistoricaldata,methodofproblemformulation, andsolutionusedinthisstudy,thereisnoneedtomitigatetheimpactofthiseventforthatcounty.It canalsobeobservedthatLaramieCounty,whichhasthehighestaveragenumberoftornadoesperyear, hasalesserseparationdistancerequirementthanCampbellCounty,whichhasaloweraveragenumber oftornadoesperyear.Thereasonforthisapparentdiscrepancyisthattheseparationdistance estimationconsiderstheaveragelengthofatornadopathineachcountyinadditiontotheaverage numberoftornadoesperyear.TheaveragelengthofatornadopathinCampbellCountyisgreaterthan thatinLaramieCountywhichresultsinalargerseparationdistancerequirementfortheformer comparedtothelatter.
AnalyticalAssumptions
Thereareseveralimportantanalyticalassumptionsinthetornadoanalysis,asfollows: 1) Atornadowillcauseanoutageofatransmissionlinewith100percentprobabilitywhenit contactstheline.Thereasonforthisconservativeassumptionisthelackofavailabledatafor causesofoutagesforspecificlinesinWyoming.Additionaldataregardingtheimpactof tornadoesontransmissionlinesinWyomingmightrelaxthisconservativeassumptionandresult inarevisedestimateofseparationdistance.
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2) Asingletornadomovesataspeedsufficienttocausethesimultaneousoutageofbothlines.Ifit isshowntomoveslower,thenoutagesmightnotbesimultaneousbecausetheremaybe enoughtimeaftertheoutageofthefirsttoimplementRASsandoperatingguidestoavoid possiblecascadinglineoutagesduetothelineoutageofthesecondline. 3) Tornadoeshitallpartsofacountywithequalprobability.Inotherwords,eachsquareunitof thecountyhasanequalchanceofbeinghitbyatornado.Ifhalfthecountywereathigher elevationorhadtopographythataffectedtheabilityoftornadoestoformorsustainintegrity, thiswouldchangetheprobabilities. 4) Thisanalysisdoesnotconsiderchangesinthetornadoclass1fromitsformationtodemise.The maximumclassattainedbyatornadoalongitspathisassumedtodenotetheclassofthat tornado.Thatis,ifatornadoisdesignatedasF1inthehistoricalweatherdata,itisassumedthat itwillnotincreaseabovethatcategoryanytimealongitspath. 5) Therearenoknownmethodstocompletelymitigatetheimpactsofatornadothroughtower andlinedesignandconstruction.Ifitcanbeshownthattransmissionlinescanwithstand,for example,uptoaclassF1tornado,theprobabilityofatransmissionlineoutageduetoatornado canbereducedandtheseparationdistancecouldbelessthanrecommendedinthisreport. Table42showsthat55percentofthetornadoesinWyomingwereobservedtobeclassF0tornadoes, animportantconsiderationwhenanalyzingtheimpactoftornadoes.
Table42.TornadoClassand FrequencyinWyoming
TornadoClass
F F0 F1 F2 F3 F4 Total
Source:NOAA2009.
Frequency
42 322 164 46 8 1 583
IftransmissiontowersandconductorsarebuilttowithstandatleastclassF0tornadoes,thenmorethan 55percentofthelineoutagescausedbytornadoescouldbemitigatedoutright.Thismitigationwould changeassumptionnumber1from100percenttoonlyabout20percent.Thatis,theprobabilitythata tornadowillcauseanoutageofasinglelinewillbe45percent,andtheprobabilityofadoubleline outagewillbe0.45x0.45orapproximately20percent.Therefore,theexpectednumberoftwoline outagesduetoaclassF1orhighertornadocouldbemuchlessthan1in30years.Ifitisdemonstrated thattransmissionlinescouldwithstandatleastaclassF0tornado,thentheseparationdistances calculatedinthepreviousexamplecouldbereduced.Thus,aprocessformitigationoflineoutagesdue totornadoescouldconsistofacombinationofrobusttransmissionlineconstructionandestablishing recommendedseparationdistances.
TornadoesareclassifiedundertheFujitaTornadoIntensityscale(F0toF6)basedonthedamagetheycaused.F0hasaspeedof40to72
milesperhour;F173to112milesperhour;F2113to157milesperhour;F3158to206milesperhour;andF4207to260milesper hour.
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ThedraftmanualfromASCEonguidelinesforelectricaltransmissionlinestructuralloading(ASCE ManualNo.74)providesguidanceondesigningtransmissionlinestowithstanduptoclassF2tornadoes (ASCE2006).Thisdraftmanualalsopointstovariousresearchperformedonthecostsofmakingthe transmissionlinerobustenoughtowithstandclassF2tornadoesandnotesthatthecostadditionsare relativelylow.ThefollowinganalysisassumesthatfollowingthedesignguidelinesfromASCE2006will resultinmitigationoflineoutages(singleormultiple)duetoatleastaclassF0tornado. IftransmissionlinesaredesignedtowithstandatleastaclassF0tornado,theseparationdistanceto mitigatedoublelineoutagesduetoatornadocanberecalculatedassumingthattheprobabilitythata classF1orhighertornadowillcausetheoutageoftwolinesis20percent. Table43showsthatifthetransmissionlinesinWyomingarebuilttowithstandclassF0tornadoes,the incrementalseparationdistancerequiredtomitigatetwolineoutagesduetotornadoesiszeroforeach southernandeasterncountyinWyoming.
Table43.ProbabilityofOutageofTwoLinesHitbyaSingleTornadoat DifferentSeparationDistances
SeparationDistancefor100 percentprobabilityofoutage oftwolineshitbyasingle tornado (feet)
0 7,100 0 0 0 0 3,500 3,400 0 0 0 2,400 0 0 0 0
County
SeparationDistancefor20 percentprobabilityofoutage oftwolineshitbyasingle tornado;equivalentto45 percentprobabilityofasingle lineoutage (feet)

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Crook Fremont Goshen Laramie Lincoln Natrona Niobrara Platte Sublette Sweetwater Uinta Weston
ThisanalysisderivesseparationdistancesforeachcountyinWyomingtomitigatelineoutagescaused bytornadoes.Thisassumesthatthetransmissionlinesstartandendinasinglecounty.Becausethe proposedtransmissionlinesinWyomingtraversemultiplecounties,anoverallprobabilityofatornado causingthesimultaneousoutageoftwolinestraversingmultiplecountiesandtheresultingrequired separationdistanceformitigatingthetwolineoutageshouldbedetermined.Whenalinetraverses morethanonecounty,itslengthincreases,asdoestheprobabilitythatatornadowillmakecontactwith theline.Therefore,tocontaintheoverallexpectednumber(sumofindividualcountyprobabilities)of
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multiplelineoutagestolessthanoneoutagein30years(lessthan0.0333outagesperyear),the separationdistancetomitigatetheprobabilityofsimultaneousoutagesoftwotransmissionlinesmight varybycounty.Dependingonthemethodusedtosolvethisproblem,therequiredchangesmight increaselineseparationdistanceinsomecounties.Theseparationdistanceforatransmissionline traversingmultiplecountiescanbedeterminedusingtwomethods.Onemethodwouldcalculatea singlevaluefortheentirelengthofthetransmissionlineinWyomingandtheothermethodwould calculateindividualvaluesforeachcountythroughwhichthetransmissionlinewillpass.Moredetails aboutbothmethodsaregiveninAppendixD. Tounderstandtheimpactofthelengthoftransmissionlinesonrequiredseparationdistance,ICF consideredtwoillustrativeroutesforrepresentativetransmissionlinesanddeterminedtherequired separationdistanceforeachroute(seeAppendixD)asasinglevaluefortheentirelengthoftheline. TheseresultsaresummarizedinTable44.Thistablegivestheseparationdistancebetweentwolines for100percentoutageprobabilityandundertheclassF0tornadooutagemitigationassumption(20 percentprobability).Theseparationdistancescalculatedbycountyusingthealternatemethodisgiven inAppendixDforoneofthetworoutesasanexample.
Table44.ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses
Route
Route1 Route1 Route2 Route2
SingleLineOutage Probability(percent)
100 45 100 45
DoubleOutage Probability(percent)
100 20 100 20
RequiredSeparation Distance(feet)
8,400 0 6,900 0
Table44showsthattheincrementalseparationdistancerequiredtomitigateforclassF1orstronger tornadoesiszeroforaMTBFoflessthan1in30years.Therefore,theresultsofthisanalysisindicate thatREGMINTequalszero,assumingtransmissionlinesinWyomingareconstructedtowithstandat leastclassF0tornadoes.FortransmissionlinesinWyomingthatcannotbeconstructedtowithstandat leastF0tornadoes,therequiredseparationdistancesareshowninTable44forRoutes1and2with100 percentoutageprobability.
Lightning
AsobservedintheoverallWECClineoutagedata(WECC2007a;WECC2008b),lightningisthemost commonweatherrelatedcauseforlineoutagesintheWECCsystem.Therefore,itisimportantto analyzethepossibilityofmultiplelineoutagesinWyomingthatcouldbecausedbylightning.Table45 summarizesavailableNCDCdataregardinglightningstrikesintheWyomingcountiesconsideredinthis study. TheaveragenumberoflightningstrikesperyearinanyoneoftheeasternandsoutheasternWyoming countiesisabouttwo.TheNCDCdataregardinglightningstrikesissparse.Nevertheless,acombination ofquantitativeandqualitativeassessmentscanbeperformedtodeterminethelineseparationdistance necessarytoavoidlightninginducedmultiplelineoutages.
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Chapter4EstimatingLineSeparationDistancesinWyoming Table45.LightningStrikesin WyomingCountiesConsideredin thisStudy(19942008)

County
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Crook Fremont Goshen Johnson Laramie Lincoln Natrona Niobrara Platte Sublette Sweetwater Weston Total
Source:NOAA2009.
Number ofLightning Strikes

4 2 4 1 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 3 27
Thefollowingparagraphsdescribetwowayslightningcancausemultiplelineoutagesandprovide recommendedmitigationmeasures. Twoseparate,directlightningstrikesfromasinglethunderstormcausesimultaneousoutageof twotransmissionlines. AnalysisandMitigation:UsingasimilarmethodologyasdescribedinAppendixCfordetermining theprobabilityofasingletornadocausingasinglelineoutage,theprobabilityoftwolightning strikesontwotransmissionlinescausingasimultaneousoutageofthelinescanbeshowntobe verysmall(suchthattheexpectednumberofmultiplelineoutageswillbelessthanonein30 years).ThereforeREGMINLdoesnotneedtohaveanonzerovalue. Nevertheless,mitigationtoavoidlineoutagesduetodirectlightningstrikesshouldbeaddedin theformofeithershieldwiresortransmissionlinearresters.Addingshieldwireisarelatively commonmeasuretomitigatetheimpactoflightningstrikes.Thesemeasuresdoaddtothecost oftransmissionlineconstruction,whichmustbecomparedtothecostofincreasingline separation,acceptingalinederating,orimplementingRASs.ThisprocessisshowninFigure36 inthepreviouschapter. Asinglelightningstrikecausesatransmissionlinetosnapofffromthetransmissiontower causingthelooseconductortoblowaboutintheaccompanyingstrongwindsandcontactan adjacenttransmissionline,thuscausingamultiplelineoutage. AnalysisandMitigation:TheanalysisofavailablehistoricaldataforWyomingonwindspeeds indicatedthatatransmissionlineshouldbedesignedtowithstandatleast101mileperhour windstoavoidtransmissionconductorsblowingaboutafterbreakingofffromthetower.This designrequirementwillalsosufficeforamultiplelineoutagethatcouldbecausedbya
415
combinationoflightningandhighwinds.Thelineseparationdistancebetweentwoadjacent transmissionlinesshouldbeequaltoatleastthelongestspanlength(approximately1,500feet inthecaseofa500kVline)toavoidaconductorfromblowinginthewindandcontactingthe adjacenttransmissionlinewhichisthesameasREGMINW.ThereforeREGMINLneednothavea nonzerovalue.Thelineseparationdistanceestimatedforhighwindswillalsomitigatemultiple lineoutagesthatcouldbecausedbyacombinationoflightningandwindyconditions.Also,as mentionedearlier,mitigationoflineoutagesduetodirectlightningstrikesshouldbeaddedin theformofeithershieldwiresortransmissionlinearresters.
Fires
Firesareanothercauseoflineoutagesandmayormaynotbeweatherrelated.Itisnotuncommonin thewestforlightningtobetheignitionsourceofwildlandfires.Firesandassociatedsmokecancovera wideenoughareatocausemultiplelineoutages.Sufficientlyhotfirescanignitetransmissionstructures anddamageconductors.Thethicksmokefromfireintroducesconductiveagentsintothetransmission lineelectricalfieldandcausesflashoverbetweenconductors,trippingthelineandresultinginline outages.Thecombinationofterrain,wind,temperature,andhumidityaffecthowfast(rateofspread) wildlandfirestravel.AvailablehistoricaldatafromNCDCregardingfiresinWyomingindicatesthatmost firesareconcentratedinthenorthernandwesterncounties,asshowninTable46.
Table46.NumberofFireOccurrences InWyomingCounties(19972008)
County
BigHorn Campbell Crook Fremont HotSprings Johnson Lincoln Natrona Park Sheridan Sublette Sweetwater Teton Weston Total
Source:NOAA2009.
Number ofFire Occurrences

3 2 3 11 4 2 7 6 16 1 1 5 9 1 71
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ThedatainTable46areforthe12yearsfrom1997through2008,andalthoughsomefiresoccurin southernandeasternWyomingcounties,thefrequencyoffiresinthesecountiesisrelativelylow(atotal of20outof71),withanaverageofabouttwofiresperyear.Fromthedescriptionofcausesofthefires providedbyNCDC,lightningappearstobethemostfrequentcauseintheeasternandsouthern counties,especiallyinCrookCounty.Mitigatingtheriskoffireorsmokecausingoutageofmultiple transmissionlinesincludesthefollowing: ROWmaintenancetoserveasfirebreak(e.g.,managingfuelstosloworstopfirespread). Operationalprocedures(e.g.,quicklyidentifyingandreportingfirestofacilitaterapidfire suppressionandreductionofpowertransferlevelstoavoidcascadingoutages). Increasedseparationbetweenadjacenttransmissionlinestoallowsufficienttimetoactivate firesuppressionactivitiesandreducetransferlevels. Separationofparalleltransmissionlinesbylandscapefeatureswhichcansloworstopthefire rateofspread(e.g.,rivers,ridgelines,etc.).
Keyissuestoconsiderinanalyzingmeasuretomitigatefirerelatedoutagesincludethearea,rate,and directionofspreadofsmokerelatedtothefire.Predictingthedirectionofsmokeandthepossibilityof smokecausingoutagesofmultiplelinesisdifficultwithlimiteddata,thereforethepreferredmitigation measuresincludeinstallingsufficientfirebreaksandearlydetection(e.g.,electronicormanual monitoring).CostsformitigatingfirerelatedlineoutagesincludethecostofadditionalROWand/or ROWmaintenancetoserveasfirebreaksandthecostofinstallingandmaintainingsystemstodetect firesearly.Basedontheprobabilityoffiresintheterrainthetransmissionlinewilltraverse,theneedfor thesemitigationmeasurescanbeevaluated. Asanillustrationofthemethodologytodeterminelineseparationdistancestomitigateoutagesof multiplelinesduetofires,considerthefollowingexample: Givena1,200feetperminuterateofspreadforafireoverdry,shortgrasswithhighwinds(Pyneetal. 1996),thelineseparationdistancetoavoidtwosinglelineoutageswithin10minutescanbecalculated as 1,20010minutes=12,000feet(assumingadoublelineoutagecausedbythesameeventwithin 10minutescanbeclassifiedasasimultaneousmultiplelineoutage). Thiscalculationassumesthefollowing: 1) Thereisa100percentprobabilityofafire(orsmokefromafire)tocausemorethanoneline outagewithin10minutes. 2) Smokefromthefiretravelsataconstantrateof1,200feetperminuteinadirectionthatwill causemultiplelineoutages. 3) Thereisenoughsmokefromthefireforbothlinestoexperienceoutagesduetoarcing. Changingtheseassumptionswilllikelychangetheseparationdistancerequirement.Historicalfiredata issparseespeciallycharacteristicsofsmokeduetofires.Becauseoftheuncertainnatureoffiresand theuncertaintyofthedirectionandquantityofsmokefromthefire,developingarobustand defendablemathematicalmodeltoestimaterequiredlineseparationdistancesformitigatingoutagesof linescausedbyfiresisnotpracticalforthisstudy.Therefore,whiletheseparationdistanceof12,000 feetdeterminedaboveisintendedasaconservativeexample,itisnotdefendablegiventhesparse amountofhistoricalinformationonfiresinWyoming.Amorepracticalalternativetocalculatinga defendableseparationdistanceformitigatingthepossibilityofoutagesofmultiplelinesduetofires mightbetoinstallfirebreaksandasystemtodetectfiresearly,usenaturaltopographicfeaturesas
417
naturalfirebreakswhenroutingadjacentproposedtransmissionlines,andimplementappropriate operatingguidelines,suchasderatingoflineswhenafireisobservedtoavoidcascadinglineoutages. Forpurposesofthisanalysis,ICFassumedthatfirebreaksandearlydetectionareinstalled(inregions wheretheprobabilityoffiresishigh)andoperatingguidelinesareimplementedasneededtoprevent fireandsmokefromcausingoutagesofmultiplelines.Thisassumedmitigationnegatestheneedto increasethelineseparationdistancetoavoidfirerelatedlineoutages.ThereforeREGMINFIREwillbe zerointhisexample.
4.2
RecommendedRangeforMinimumLineSeparationDistance
BasedontheanalysesoftheimpactofvariousweatherrelatedcausesforlineoutagesinWyoming,the followingconclusionswerereachedregardingtheincrementalseparationdistancesneededtomitigate forthesecauses. Recall, REGMIN=Max(REGMINW,REGMINSTORM,REGMINT,REGMINL,REGMINFIRE,REGMINOTHER) Fromtheanalyses, REGMINW=1,240feet(inthisexample,or(onespanlength260feet)ingeneral). REGMINSTORM=0. REGMINT=0. REGMINL=0. REGMINFIRE=0. REGMINOTHER=0. Therefore, REGMIN=Max(1240,0,0,0,0,0)=1,240feet. Figure46summarizestheresultsforWyomingfromtheanalysesintheprevioussections.
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Chapter4EstimatingLineSeparationDistancesinWyoming Figure46.SummaryFlowchartforCalculating aRecommendedRangeofMinimumLineSeparationDistance
Thus,therangeofminimumrecommendedlineseparationdistancebetweentwo500kVlinesin easternandsoutheasternWyomingis: SD=[SDAMIN,SDACRMIN]~=[260,1,500]feet TheseparationdistanceICFrecommendsinthisChaptertopreventoutagesofmultiplelinesduetohigh windsismorethanthatrequiredforF1orhigherclasstornadoesbasedonanalysisperformedand availabledata.Therefore,nospecificlineseparationdistancecomponentisrequiredtomitigateoutages oflinessolelyduetotornadoes.Similarlogicappliesforotherpossiblecausesofoutagesofmultiple lines,suchaslightning,storms,andfires.Figure47depictstheminimumrecommendedlineseparation distancefortworepresentative500kVtransmissionlinesbasedontheapplicationoftheframework developedinChapter3toWyomingconditions.
419
Chapter4EstimatingLineSeparationDistancesinWyoming Figure47.MinimumSeparationDistance(feet) forRepresentative500kVTransmissionLinesinWyoming
4.3
ConclusionsandRecommendations
Basedonaseriesofassumptions,availabledata,andananalyticframeworkdevelopedinthisreport, ICFrecommendsthattheminimumlineseparationdistanceforrepresentativenew500kVtransmission linesinWyomingrangefromabout260feetuptoabout1,500feet.Theseparationdistancesreferto theminimumseparationbetweenthecenterlineofonetransmissiontowerandthecenterlineofan adjacenttransmissiontowerwheremultipletransmissionlinesfollowparallelroutesandarealigned towertotower.Thelowervalueoftherangeisdependentontheheightofthetransmissiontowerand linesaglength;theuppervalueencompassesthelowervalueandequalsthelongestspanlengthofthe twotransmissionlines.Usingtheframeworkandapproachdescribedinthisreport,theseandother valuescanbecalculatedforhighvoltagetransmissionlinesofvariousvoltages,towerheights,andspan lengths. Theapproachdescribedinthisreportconsiderstheprobabilityofanoutageofmultiplelinesdegrading regionalpowersystemreliabilityandprovidesanapproachcompliantwithNERCreliabilitystandards andWECCreliabilitycriteria.Whilethisstudyfocusedonweatherrelatedreliabilityfactors,theseverity ofimpacttothepowersystemduetooutagesofmultiplelinesisgenerallyindependentofthecauseof theoutages.Forexample,evenwiththelineseparationdistancesrecommendedinthisreport,an extremeweatherevent(probabilitylessthanonein30years)orotherfactor(e.g.,equipment malfunction)couldcauseasimultaneousoutageofmultiplelinesandsignificantlyimpactthepower system.Therefore,evenifthepowersystemisdesignedtowithstandextremeweathereventsand othereventsoflowprobability,itisstillgoodpracticetodesignandimplementRASsforlineoutages thatcouldbecausedbyextremeeventswithaprobabilityoflessthan1in30years. Further,itisprudentpracticeintransmissionlineplanningtobuildmultipleregionalbackbonesystems toplanforoutagesofmultiplelines.InthecaseofWyoming,morethanonebackbonetransmission corridorfromthewindresourceareastoloadcenterscouldbeplannedtoensurereliabilitydespite outagesofmultiplelines.Eachbackbonetransmissioncorridorcouldhavemultiple500kVACandhigh
420
voltageDClinesandeachcorridorcouldbeseparatedbytensifnothundredsofmilestoavoidoutages ofmultipletransmissionlinesduetowidespreadweatherrelatedfactorsthatcouldcausesignificant damageandimpairpowersystemreliability.Lineseparationwithinthebackbonecorridorscouldbe minimizedbasedontheapproachesidentifiedinthisstudy. LimitationsandAssumptions Whiletherecommendedvaluesforminimumlineseparationdistancearebasedonlogicalmathematical formulations,robustmethodologiesanddetailedanalysesofavailabledata,thesevaluesshouldonlybe usedinthecontextoftheframework,limitations,andassumptionsdescribedinthisreportand summarizedhere.Moreover,severalfactorscouldalterICFsconclusionsandrecommendations.First, althoughrequested,sensitivehistoricaloutagedataforspecifictransmissionlinesinWyomingwerenot availableandthuslimitedICFsanalysis.Second,theprobabilityofatornadocausinganoutageupon contactwithatransmissionlineisunknown,asisthecertaintywithwhichtransmissionlinescanbe designedtowithstandcertainclassesoftornadoes.Third,thelackofhistoricalquantitativedata regardingthecharacteristicsoffiresandassociatedsmokeinWyomingpreventedarigorousanalysisof theprobabilityoffire/smokecausingsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines. ICFperformedrigorousmathematicalmodelingtodeterminethelineseparationdistancerequiredto mitigatetheimpactoftornadoesontransmissionlines.Thisanalysisassumedlineseparationwasthe onlymitigationavailabletoavoidtornadoescausingoutagesofmultipletransmissionlines.However, duringthecourseofthisstudy,ICFreviewedthedraftASCEManual#74(ASCE2006)designcriteriato addresstornadoesandspokewithtransmissionengineersexperiencedwithtornadoes.IfthedraftASCE Manual#74designcriteriaremainintactwhenitbecomesfinal,weassumetheywillprovidean additionalmitigationmeasurefortornadoes. TherelativelyrichhistoricaldataregardingtornadocharacteristicsinWyomingaffordedarigorous mathematicaltreatmentoftheprobabilityofatornadocausinganoutageofmultiplelines.Thelackof comparabledataforotheroutagecausessuchaslightningandfires,precludedcomparable mathematicalanalyses. Anotherlimitationtotheminimumseparationdistancesestimatedinthisstudyarethattheydonot applytoundergroundtransmissionlines,becauseweatherconditionsthatcouldcauseabovegroundline outagesdonotusuallycauseundergroundlineoutages.Moreover,lineseparationdistance requirementstypicallydonotapplytothefivespansofatransmissionlineproximatetoasubstation. Mitigation Therecommendedvaluesforminimumlineseparationassumemitigationtoreducetheprobabilityof thefollowingfactorscausingsimultaneousoutagesofmultiplelines: Installingeitherashieldwireortransmissionlinearresterstomitigatelightningstrikes Maintainingfirebreaks,installinganearlyfiredetectionsystem,andimplementingoperational procedurestoavoidcascadingoutagesduetofire/smoke Designingtransmissionlinestowithstandwindspeedsofatleast101milesperhour DesigningtransmissionlinestowithstandatleastF0classtornadoes DesigningtransmissionlinestocomplywithapplicableNESCandAESCextremewindandice loadingconditions
Iftransmissionlinescannotbebuiltwiththemitigationidentifiedinthisreport,then,dependingon regionalandprojectspecificconditions,theseparationdistancesrecommendedinthisreporttoavoid outagesofmultiplelinesmayincreaseandinsomecases,couldbemeasuredinthousandsoffeetor multiplemiles.
421
ReliabilityStandardsandCriteria TheNERCandWECCaretheresponsibleauthoritiesforregulatingtransfercapacityandreliabilityof highvoltagetransmissionlinesinWyomingandotherwesternstateswithintheWECCsystem.The recommendedvaluesinthisreportdonotabsolvetransmissiondevelopersfromcomplyingwithNERC reliabilitystandardsandWECCspathratingprocessandassociatedreliabilitycriteria.Moreover,the recommendedseparationdistancesandframeworkdescribedinthisreportdonotassuretransmission developersofaparticularpathrating.Instead,thisstudypresentsapossibleapproachand recommendationsforachievingcompliancewithNERCandWECCreliabilityrequirementswhile minimizingseparationdistancebetweentransmissionlines. QuestionsandConsiderationsOutsidetheScopeofThisStudy Therecommendedminimumrangeoftransmissionlineseparationdistancesinthisreportisonlyone componentoftheequationfordeterminingseparationdistancebetweentransmissionlinesin Wyoming.Oncetheminimumrangeoflineseparationdistancestomeetpowersystemreliability criteriaisestimated,theissueofmaximumseparationdistancebetweentwotransmissionlines becomesafunctionofcost,landuseandenvironmentalconsiderations,andfutureneedforadditional transmissionlines.Theframeworkdevelopedinthisreportcanserveasabasisforfurtherdiscussion andanalysisoftheseothercomponents. Quantifyingtheadditionalcosttofortifytransmissionlinestowithstandtornadoesandotherfactors, whileoutsidethescopeofthisstudy,shouldbeperformedandcomparedtothecostsofalternatives suchasincreasingtheseparationdistanceoracceptingareducedlineratingfromWECC.Other alternativestoconsideraretheeffectsofincreasingordecreasingseparationdistanceoncosts, potentialenvironmentalandlanduseimpacts,linerating,andtimerequiredtopermitandbuildthe line.AprocessfordeterminingtheleastcostalternativeisdepictedinFigure36andispartofthe overallframeworkfordeterminingtheappropriatelineseparationdistance. Thisstudydoesnotattempttoevaluatetheconsequencesofanoutageofmultipletransmissionlines; however,thestudydoesassume,inestimatinglineseparationdistance,thatanoutageofmultiplelines willresultinsystemconsequencesthatwillviolateNERCreliabilitystandardsandWECCreliability criteria.OnecouldpostulatethatbecausetheproposedtransmissionlinesinWyomingarelikelyto transferwindpowertoalargeextent,utilizationoftheselineswillgenerallybeinverselyproportionalto thesystempeakdemand;therefore,theconsequencesofanoutageofmultiplelinesduringoffpeak hours(forexample,duringnighttimewhentheutilizationwouldbehigh)maynotcauseasufficiently adverseimpactonthesystemtoviolateNERCreliabilitystandardsorWECCreliabilitycriteria.However, thisargumentcannotbesupportedordismissedwithoutdetailedpowersystemreliabilityanalysesthat areoutsidethescopeofthisstudy. Therearemultipleoptionsforextendingthisstudyeffort.Oneoptionistoweightheeffectsofdifferent futureenergysupplyscenariosonlineseparationdistancesandthesocietalconsiderationsinvolved. Anotherquestioniswhethertheimpactofcomplyingwithreliabilityrules,althoughnecessary,areat oddswiththedevelopmentofrenewableenergyinWyoming,andmorebroadly,whethertheyare compatiblewithagoalofmeetingafederallymandatedRenewableEnergyStandardatanationallevel. Alternatively,shouldenvironmentalregulationsberelaxedand/orshouldSection368energycorridors bebroadened(intheirextentandtoincludenonfederalland)toprovideformaximumreliability(in termsoflineseparation)andmeetafederalRenewableEnergyStandard?Yetanotherextensiontothis studywouldbetodeterminethemaximumrangeoflineseparationdistancesconsidering environmentalandlandusefactors.Consideringtheregional,andpotentiallynational,importanceof Wyomingswindgenerationcapacity,ICFrecommendstheseandotherquestionsonlineseparation issuesbeaddressedinfollowonstudyefforts.
422
Chapter5References
CHAPTER5REFERENCES
AmericanSocietyofCivilEngineers(ASCE).2006.ASCEManualNo.74,GuidelinesforElectrical TransmissionLineStructuralLoading.PeerReviewDraft,July14,2006. ArizonaPublicServiceCompany.2006.PerformanceCategoryUpgradeRequestforPaloVerdeHubto NorthGilaLines,SevenStepProcessDocument,August2,2006. Bailey,R.G.1995.DescriptionsoftheecoregionsoftheUnitedStates.(2nded.rev.andexpanded). USDAForestService,Washington,DC.Misc.Publ.No.1391. Bascom,E.C.,III,Daconti,J.R.,Douglass,D.A.,DioGioia,A.M.,Grant,I.S.,Mozer,J.D.,Stewart,J.R., Williams,J.A.2006.Section14,TransmissionSystems.StandardsHandbookforElectrical Engineers.TheMcGrawHillCompanies.Availableonline: http://www.scribd.com/doc/7221453/0071490191ar014. BureauofIndianAffairs.2000.KatesBasinFatalityReportAugust11,2000.Appendix3FireBehavior Analysis. BureauofLandManagement.2009.MineralOccurrenceandDevelopmentPotentialReportforthe BuffaloFieldOffice.DepartmentoftheInterior.Availableonline: http://www.blm.gov/wy/st/en/programs/Planning/rmps/buffalo/docs.html. CaliforniaPublicUtilitiesCommission(PUC).2001.SupplementalEnvironmentalImpactReport,Los BanostoGatesTransmissionProject,SectionBDescriptionofProposedProjectand Alternatives,October2001.Availableonline: http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Environment/info/aspen/path15/Draft%20SEIR.html. CaliforniaPUCandBureauofLandManagement.2006.DeversPaloVerdeNo.2TransmissionLine ProjectDraftEIR/EIS,PageB44DescriptionoftheProposedProject.Availableonline: http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/Environment/info/aspen/dpv2/tocdeir.htm. DepartmentofEnergy(DOE),DepartmentoftheInterior,andDepartmentofDefense.2003.Schultz HanfordAreaTransmissionLineProject,FinalEnvironmentalImpactStatement.DOE/EIS0325. Availableonline: http://www.efw.bpa.gov/environmental_services/Document_Library/Schultz_Hanford. DOE,DepartmentoftheInteriorBureauofLandManagement,DepartmentofAgriculture,Forest Service,DepartmentofDefense,andDepartmentoftheInteriorFishandWildlifeService.2008. FinalProgrammaticEnvironmentalImpactStatement,DesignationofEnergyCorridorson FederalLandsinthe11WesternStates(DOE/EIS0386).November2008. DigitalTopoMaps.com.2005.WyomingCountyMap.Availableonline:http://countymap.digital topomaps.com/wyoming.shtml.AccessedAugust21,2009. EnergyInformationAdministration(EIA).2008a.AnnualCoalReportfor2007:UnitedStatesDepartment ofEnergy.Availableonline:http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/acr/acr_sum.html. EIA.2008b.U.S.CrudeOil,NaturalGas,andNaturalGasLiquidsReserves,2007AnnualReport.Available online:http://www.eia.doe.gov/oil_gas/natural_gas/data_publications/crude_oil_natural_gas_ reserves/cr.html. EIA.2009a.StateRenewableElectricityProfiles2008,ReleasedJune2009.Availableonline: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/state_profiles/wyoming.pdf.
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EIA.2009b.AnnualWyomingCrudeOilProvenReserves.Availableonline: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/hist/rcrr01swy_1a.htm. EIA.2009c.Wyoming,StateEnergyProfiles.Availableonline: http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/state/state_energy_profiles.cfm?sid=WY. ENSRCorporationandSammons/Dutton,LLC.2005.Task3CReportforthePowderRiverBasinCoal ReviewCumulativeSocialandEconomicEffects:Casper,Wyo.PreparedforBureauofLand Management,CasperFieldOffice. Freme,Fred.2007.U.S.CoalSupplyandDemand2007Review:UnitedStatesEnergyInformation Administration.Availableonline: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/coal/page/special/feature07.pdf. GeneralElectricCompany.1987.TransmissionLineReferenceBook,345kVandAbove,2ndRevised Edition.PaloAlto:ElectricPowerResearchInstitute. GoogleEarth.2009.ICFInternationalSeparationDistanceApproximationsforWECC500kV TransmissionLinesusingGoogleEarthandWECCPowerflowData.July2009. Marne,DavidJ.2007.NationalElectricalSafetyCode2007.NewYork:McGrawHill.p.293. MichaelClaytonandAssociates.1992.WesternRegionalCorridorStudy.PreparedforWesternUtility Group.Copyright1992SierraPacificPowerCompany. NationalInteragencyCoordinationCenter.2009.WildlandFireSummaryandStatistics2008. NationalInteragencyFireCenter.2009.Availableonline:http://www.nifc.gov/fire_info/fire_stats.htm. AccessedAugust15,2009. NationalOceanicandAtmosphericAdministration(NOAA).2009.WeatherData.Availableonline: http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov. NorthAmericanElectricReliabilityCorporation(NERC).2008.LongTermReliabilityAssessment2008 2017.October2008.Princeton,NJ.www.nerc.com. NERC.2009a.2009SummerReliabilityAssessment.May2009.Princeton,NJ.www.nerc.com. NERC.2009b.ReliabilityStandardsfortheBulkElectricSystemsofNorthAmerica.May2009.Available online:http://www.nerc.com/files/Reliability_Standards_Complete_Set_2009May20.pdf. Princeton,NJ.www.nerc.com. NERC.2009c.SystemDisturbanceReportsfor19922007.19922007.Availableonline: http://www.nerc.com/page.php?cid=5%7C66.www.nerc.com. NREL.2002.WyomingWindPowerResourceEstimatesMap.Availableonline: http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/maps_template.asp?stateab=wy. OfficeoftheGovernorofWyoming.2009.EPAAdministratorWrapsupTwoDayTourofWyoming EnergyProductionSites.Availableonline:http://governor.wy.gov/pressreleases/epa administratorwrapsuptwodaytourofwyomingenergyproductionsites.html.AccessedJuly 24,2009. PowerSystemsStudiesCommittee.1985.CorridorseparationfortheCaliforniaOregonTransmission Project.October1985. Pyne,S.J.,P.L.Anderson,andR.D.Laven.1996.IntroductiontoWildlandFire,2ndEdition.808Pages.
Chapter5References
SanDiegoGas&Electric(SDG&E).2006.ResponsetoDataRequestNumber1onSunrisePowerLink Project(A.0608010),Submittal2of3,October31,2006. SouthernCaliforniaEdisonCompany.1980.StatementonseparationofEHVTransmissionCircuits, March1980. SoutwestAreaTransmission(SWAT)CommonCorridorTaskForce.2009.WhitePaperonStructure SeparationforTransmissionLinesinCommonCorridors.FinalMay2009. WesternAreaPowerAdministration(Western).2009.UnpublishedoutagedataforselectWestern transmissionlines(115kV,230kV,and345kV)inWyoming,20072009. WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil(WECC).2001.ReliabilityPerformanceEvaluationWorkGroup PhaseIProbabilisticBasedReliabilityCriteriaEvaluationofExceptionsListFacilities,February2, 2001. WECC.2002.NERC/WECCPlanningStandardsandMinimumOperatingReliabilityCriteria.Definitions. RevisedAugust9,2002. WECC.2007a.ReliabilityPerformanceEvaluationWorkGroup.FirstAnnualTransmissionReliabilityData Report,October15,2007. WECC.2007b.TransmissionReliabilityDatabaseTaskForce.GeneralCauseCodesforOutages. WECC.2008a.TPL(001thru004)WECC1CRSystemPerformanceCriteria.Effectivedate:April 18,2008. WECC.2008b.WECCLineSitingandRatingSupportingDocuments.TPL(001thru004)WECC1CR SystemPerformanceCriteria,TableW1,Page50. WECC.2008c.ReliabilityPerformanceEvaluationWorkGroup.SecondAnnualWECCTransmission ReliabilityDataReport,October15,2008. WECC.2009a.AboutWECC.Availableonline:http://www.wecc.biz/about/Pages/default.aspx. AccessedAugust10,2009. WECC.2009b.WECCPowerflowdata. WesternGovernorsAssociationandU.S.DepartmentofEnergy(DOE).2009.WesternRenewable EnergyZonesPhase1Report.MappingConcentrated,HighQualityResourcestomeetdemand inWesternInterconnectionsDistantMarkets. http://www.westgov.org/wga/publicat/WREZ09.pdfJune2009. WesternRegionalClimateCenter.2009.ClimateofWyoming.Availableonline: http://www.wrcc.dri.edu/narratives/WYOMING.htm. WolframMathematicOnlineIntegrator.2009.Solutionfortheintegralproblem.Availableonline: http://integrals.wolfram.com/. WyomingStateGeologicalSurvey(WSGS).2009a.WyomingCoalFields.Availableonline: http://www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/coalweb/WyomingCoal/wyomingFields.aspx.AccessedJuly24, 2009. WSGS.2009b.LocationMapforCoalbedMethaneTargets.Availableonline: http://www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/Topics/CBM/.AccessedJuly24,2009.
53
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WSGSCoalbedNaturalGas(CBNG)Group.2009.WyomingCoalbedNaturalGas.Availableonline: http://www.wsgs.uwyo.edu/WSGSgroups/CoalbedNaturalGas/Default.aspx.AccessedJuly24, 2009. WyomingInfrastructureAuthority(WIA).2009.MapoftheCurrentProjectsUnderDevelopment. http://wyia.org/projects/August8,2009.
54

FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistancesbetween TransmissionLinesinWyoming
AppendixA
WyomingGeneralBackgroundInformation

AppendixAWyomingGeneralBackgroundInformation
APPENDIXA A.1 Topography
Wyomingispartoffourecoregions,includingtheGreatPlains,IntermountainSemidesert,Southern RockyMountains,andtheBlackHills(Bailey1995).AsBailey(1995)describes,theGreatPlainsregion encompassesmostoftheeasternonethirdofWyomingandischaracterizedbyshortgrass/mixedgrass prairie.Elevationinthisregionrangesfrom3,200feetnearthenortheasternborderto6,000feetatthe footoftheFrontRangeoftheRockyMountains.TheIntermountainSemidesertregionincludesvalleys thatrangeinelevationfrom6,000to8,000feet.Evaporationratesinthisregionarehighandwindisa nearlyconstantelement.TheSouthernRockyMountainregioniscomposedofthemajorrangesofthe WyomingportionoftheRockyMountains.Morethansurroundingstates,therangesofthisprovinceare widelyseparatedbylargeintermountainbasins.Valleysaretypicallysemiarid,whileannual precipitationinhighermountainrangesoftenexceeds40inches.TheBlackHillsregioninnortheast Wyomingconsistsofrelativelylowmountainsrangingfrom3,000to7,000feetinelevationandreceives 15to26inchesofannualprecipitation.ThisregionissplitalongtheWyomingandSouthDakotastate line. WyominghasthesecondhighestmeanelevationintheU.S.at6,700feetabovesealevel.Elevation rangesfrom13,804feetonthesummitofGannettPeakintheWindRiverMountainRange,to3,125 feetintheBelleFourcheRivervalley. ThereareseveralmountainrangesinWyoming,includingtheAbsaroka,OwlCreek,GrosVentre,Wind RiverandTetonrangesinthenorthwest.TheBigHornMountainsinthenorthcentralpartoftheState aresomewhatisolatedfromthewesternandsouthernmountainranges;theBlackHills,whichextend downfromSouthDakotaareinthenortheastpartoftheState;theLaramie,Snowy,andSierraMadre rangesareinthesouthernpartofWyoming. TheContinentalDividerunsthroughWyomingfromthenorthwestcornertothesouthcentralborderof theState.MostofthedrainagesfallalongtheeasternsideoftheDivide.TheNorthPlatte,Wind,Big Horn,Powder,andYellowstoneRiversalldrainintotheMissouriRiverBasinandeventuallyintotheGulf ofMexico.TheSnakeRiveranditstributariesdrainintotheColumbiaRiverandeventuallyintothe PacificOcean.TheGreenRiverjoinstheColoradoRiverbeforealsodrainingintothePacificOcean.The GreatDivideBasininthesouthcentralportionofthestatehasnodrainages;allprecipitationthatfalls withintheGreatDivideBasinevaporatesorpercolatesintotheground.
A.2
LandOwnership
Withanareaof97,818squaremiles,Wyomingisthetenthlargeststatebyarea.TheFederal Governmentownsapproximately48percentofthelandinWyoming;theStateofWyomingowns6 percent;approximately3percentisNativeAmericanTrustland;and42percentisprivatelyowned. TheBLMandU.S.ForestServicemanagemostofthefederallandinWyoming.TheBLMadministersthe mostfederallandinWyoming,about18.4millionsurfaceacres,primarilyinthewesterntwothirdsof theState.Inadditiontosurfacemanagement,theBLMalsomanages41.6millionacresofsubsurface mineralestate.TheNationalParkServicealsoadministerslandinWyoming,includingwellknown attractionssuchasYellowstoneNationalPark,GrandTetonNationalPark,BighornCanyonNational RecreationArea,andDevilsTowerNationalMonument.Duetolandownershippatterns,transmission lineprojectsinsouthernandwesternWyomingaremorelikelytocrossfederallandalongtheirroutes.
A1
A.3
Weather
Toalargeextent,topographyinfluencestheclimateinWyoming.Ingeneral,theclimateissemiarid continental,whichisdrierandwindierthaninotherstatesintheregionandthereforecreating significantpotentialforgenerationofwindpower.TheStatealsoexperienceslargetemperature fluctuations;atlowerelevations,summeristypifiedbyhighdaytimetemperaturesfollowedbyarapid cooldown.Asaltitudeincreases,temperaturesfall.WintersinWyomingaretypicallycold,although intermittentperiodsofextremecoldandmildtemperaturesarenotuncommon.Insomepartsofthe State,Chinookwindscauseunusuallywarmtemperaturesinwinter. Wyomingsclimateissemiarid,butbecauseofitstopographicaldiversity,itisalsovaried.Annual precipitationvariesfromasfewas5inchestoasmanyas45inchesperyear.MuchoftheStatereceives fewerthan10inchesofprecipitationperyear.PortionsoftheBighornBasininthenorthwestregionof Wyomingreceiveasfewas5to8inchesofprecipitationperyear.TheBighornBasinisastriking exampleoftheeffectoftopographyonWyomingsregionalclimates(WesternRegionalClimateCenter 2009).Mountainrangestotheeast,west,andsouthoftheBighornBasinblocktheflowofmoisture ladenairfromreachingthebasin. Overall,Wyomingexperiencesvariedairflowpatterns,temperature,andprecipitationandhumidity, primarilyowingtoitslatitude,altitude,andlocaltopography,whichinfluencetheweathersystemsthat migrateeastward.Inwinter,WyomingistypifiedbyfrequentstrongwindsandblastsofArcticair. Wyominggenerallyreceivesmoreprecipitationduringwinterduetothepathofthejetstreamduring thesemonths.Duringsummer,thejetstreamretreatsnorthwardtoCanada,leavingtheState'sweather arid,mild,andpleasant. ThunderstormfrequencyvariesacrosstheState,withitssoutheasternplainstypicallyexperiencingthe mostthunderstormactivity.Thunderstormactivityishighestduringlatespringandearlysummer.The southeasterncorneroftheStateisthemostvulnerabletotornadoactivity.
A.4
Coal
NaturalResources
Since1988,WyominghasbeenthelargestcoalproducingstateintheU.S.In2007,Wyomingproduced 453.6milliontonsofcoal(EIA2008a).In2008,Wyomingproducedalmost39percentoftheNations coal,467.64milliontons.CoalproductioninWyomingoccursinfourareas,includingthePowderRiver BasininnortheastWyoming,whichisthemostproductivecoalregionintheU.S.CoalfromthePowder RiverBasinaccountsforalmost97percentofallcoalminedinWyoming.ThePowderRiverBasinhas someoftheworldsthickestcoaldeposits.ThethicknessandrelativelyshallowsurfacedepthofPowder RiverBasincoalbedsfacilitatelargesurfaceminingoperations(thePowderRiverBasinboaststhe10 largestcoalminesintheU.S.[EIA2008a]),makingextractionefficientandrelativelyinexpensive. ThecompositionofPowderRiverBasincoalishighlydesirable.Onaverage,itcontains6percentashand lessthan0.5percentsulfur.MostofthecoalminedinthePowderRiverBasinispartoftheFortUnion Formation(Paleocene). CoalproductionintheU.S.increased11percentfrom1990to2007,from1,029.1milliontonsto1,145.6 milliontons(Freme2007,p.1).Wyomingcoalproductionincreasedfrom184milliontonsin1990to 453.6milliontonsin2007,anincreaseof147percent(Freme2007,p.6).Wyomingsdomesticdemand forcoalisrelativelylowandmostofthecoalproducedisshippedbyrailtomorethan30statesinthe U.S.Wyomingsinternalconsumptionofcoalisprimarilyforitscoalfiredpowerplants,whichprovide
A2
formostoftheelectricitygenerationinWyoming.IntheU.S.,coalgeneratesabout50percentofthe Nationselectricity,ofwhichWyomingcoalaccountsfor30percentofthetotal. WyominghasthelargestfederalcoalprogramintheU.S.TheBLMadministersthemineralestatefor mostofthecoalproducingregionsinWyoming.CoalleasingisexpectedtocontinueintheWyoming portionofthePowderRiverBasinasexistingreservesaredepleted(BLM2009).Coalproductionin Wyomingispredictedtocontinuetogrow.Anticipatedlowerandupperproductionscenariosforthe PowderRiverBasinin2020are508milliontonsand591milliontons,respectively(ENSRCorporation andSammons/Dutton,LimitedLiabilityCompany2005,p.ES1). FigureA1showsthecoalfieldsintheStateofWyomingandTableA1showsthe2007productionof topcoalminesinWyoming.
FigureA1.WyomingCoalFields
Source:WSGS2009a.
A3
AppendixAWyomingGeneralBackgroundInformation TableA1.2007WyomingCoalProductionbyMine
Rank
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 15 38 39 42
MineNames/Company
NorthAntelopeRochelleMine/PowderRiverCoal,LLC BlackThunder/ThunderBasinCoalCompany,LLC CorderoMine/CorderoMiningCompany JacobsRanchMine/JacobsRanchCoalCompany AntelopeCoalMine/AntelopeCoalCompany CaballoMine/CaballoCoalCompany BelleAyrMine/TritonCoalCompany BuckskinMine/TritonCoalCompany EagleButteMine/FoundationCoalWestIncorporated RawhideMine/CaballoCoalCompany CoalCreekMine/ThunderBasinCoalCompany,LLC DryForkMine/WesternFuelsWyomingInc. KemmererMine/ChevronMiningInc. Wyodak/WyodakResourcesDevelopmentCompany
2007Production (shorttons)
91,523,280 86,196,275 40,467,627 38,101,560 34,474,682 31,172,396 25,268,145 25,268,145 24,985,991 17,144,361 10,216,194 5,303,516 5,190,147 5,049,231
Source:EIA2008a.
NaturalGas
WyomingisoneofthetopnaturalgasproducingstatesintheU.S.,andonaverageaccountsforalmost onetenthoftotalU.S.naturalgasproduction.DrillingactivitiestakeplacethroughouttheState,but mostofWyomingsproductioncomesfromfieldsintheGreaterGreenRiverBasin. TherearenaturaldepositsofcoalbednaturalgasinWyoming.Atpresent,Wyomingisthenumber threeproducerofcoalbednaturalgasafterNewMexicoandColorado.FigureA2showstheareasin Wyomingthatcontaincoalbednaturalgasdeposits. In2007,Wyomingproducedarecordsetting436.3billionstandardfeetofgas(WSGSCBNGGroup 2009).BecauseWyomingdoesnotconsumemuchnaturalgas,itsuppliesgastomarketsintheMidwest andCaliforniathroughmajorgaspipelines. ThePowderRiverBasincoalfieldhasthelargestcoalbednaturalgasdepositintheStateandoneofthe largestintheCountry.Thecoalbednaturalgasproducedfromthisfieldconsistsalmostentirelyof methane,withaminoramountofcarbondioxide.Lackofadequateinfrastructureisoneofthekey issuesinharnessingthefullpotentialofthecoalbednaturalgasdepositinthePowderRiverBasin. Resourceshavenotbeentappedduetolimitedpipelineinthebasinandruggedterrain.Naturalgas producershaveproposednewpipelines,whichwouldeasetransmissionconstraintsandhelpmove WyomingsincreasingoutputtotheMidwestandothermarkets. OtherproductiveareasincludeJonahFieldinthesouthwestportionoftheState,whichisWyomings singlelargestdevelopedunconventionalnaturalgasfieldandincludesreservesestimatedat10.5trillion cubicfeetofnaturalgashelddeepundergroundintightsandformations(OfficeoftheGovernorof Wyoming2009).Productioninotherregionshasalsogrownrapidly;theAtlanticRiminsouthcentral Wyomingsupportsalmost500wells,aboutaquarterofwhichareproducingnaturalgas.
A4
FigureA2.CoalbedNaturalGasDepositsinWyoming
Coalbedmethanetargetslessthan5000feetdeep Areaswithcoalbedsgreaterthan5000feetdeep Coalareaswithunknowncoalbedmethanepotential
0 0 60
50 Miles Kilometers
Source:WSGS2009b.
Oil
ThegeographiclocationofWyomingmakesitatransportationhighwayforCanadiancrudeoilimports andprovidesastrategicadvantagefortransportingdomesticoiltotheU.S.MidwestandMountain markets.AlthoughWyomingsprovencrudeoilreservesaccountforonlyabout3percentoftheU.S. total,itranksseventhamongallstatesintheproductionofoil.Wyomingalsohasverylargedepositsof oilshalerock,alsoknownasmarlstone,whichcouldbeusedtoproducecrudeoil. TheGreenRiverFormation,acollectionofbasinsinColorado,Wyoming,andUtah,potentiallycontains thelargestdepositsofoilshaleintheworld.Wyomingsoilshaledepositsareconcentratedinthe GreenRiverandWashakieBasinsinthesouthwesternpartoftheStateandpotentiallycontainan estimated300billionbarrelsofoil,equaltoaboutonefourthoftheworldsprovenoilreserves(EIA 2009c). TwentyofWyomings23countiesproduceoil,andin2007morethan38,000wellsproduced52.9 millionbarrelsofoilintheState(EIA2008b).Oilshaledevelopmentremainsspeculativeandfaces severalmajorobstaclesinvolvingtechnologicalfeasibility,economicviability,resourceownership,and environmentalconsiderations.Wyomingsoilshaledepositsarelessfavorableforcommercial extractionthanthoseinUtahandColoradobecausetheyaregenerallysituatedinthinner,less continuouslayers.TableA2liststheoilreservesinWyoming.
A5
AppendixAWyomingGeneralBackgroundInformation TableA2.WyomingCrudeOilProvedReserves(millionbarrels)
Decade
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Source:EIA2009b.
Year0
928 794 561
Year1
840 757 489
Year2
856 689 524
Year3
957 624 517
Year4
954 565 628
Year5
951 605 704
Year6
849 603 706
Year7
851 854 627 690
Year8
845 815 547
Year9
841 825 590
WindEnergy
WyominghasbeenrecognizedasoneofthepremiumwindenergysitesinU.S.andisalsohometoone oftheoldestdevelopedwindenergysitesintheregion.ThefirstwindfarminWyoming,builtin MedicineBowin1982withsupportfromtheDepartmentofEnergy(DOE),wasbuiltforresearchof windenergyproduction,particularlyfromlargeturbines. AlmostallofthewindenergyproducedbyWyomingswindfarmsissoldtootherstates,andasthe needandthedemandforwindpowerintheNorthwestcontinuestogrow,therewillbeopportunitiesto expandexistingsitesandinstallnewsites.FigureA3showsthewindenergyresourcesestimatesfor Wyoming. TheDOEWindProgramandtheNationalRenewableEnergyLaboratory(NREL)publishedtheWind PowerResourceEstimatesmapshowninFigureA3.Thisresourcemapshowswindspeedestimatesat about50meters(164feet)abovethegroundanddepictstheresourcethatcouldbeusedforutility scalewinddevelopment.Futureplansaretoprovidewindspeedestimatesatabout30meters(98feet), whichareusefulforidentifyingopportunitiesforsmallwindturbines. Asarenewableresource,windisclassifiedaccordingtowindpowerclasses,whicharebasedontypical windspeeds.Theseclassesrangefrom1(thelowest)to7(thehighest).Ingeneral,at50meters,wind powerClass4orhighercanbeusefulforgeneratingwindpowerwithlargeturbines.Particularlocations inClass3areascouldhavehigherwindpowerclassvaluesatabout80meters(263feet)thanshownon the50metermapbecauseofpossiblehighwindshear.Giventheadvancesintechnology,anumberof locationsinClass3areasmightbesuitableforutilityscalewindenergydevelopment.AccordingtoNREL data,WyomingishometomorethantwothirdsoftheClass7developablewindresourceintheU.S. andmorethanonehalfofthedevelopableClass6windresource.WyominghasmoredevelopableClass 5,6,and7windresourcesthanalltheotherwesternstatescombined.Thesepotentialresourceshavea capacityfactorinexcessof40percent. FigureA3indicatesthatWyominghaswindresourcesconsistentwithutilityscaleproduction.Thereisa largeareaofexcellenttosuperbresourcesinthesoutheasternpartoftheStatenorthofCheyenne. ThereareotheroutstandingresourceareasinsouthcentralWyomingfromtheColoradobordernorth towardCasper.ThereareadditionalregionswithgoodtoexcellentresourcesbetweenCasperand GilletteinnortheasternWyomingandonridgecreststhroughouttheState.
A6
AppendixA FigureA3.WyomingWindEnergyProfile
Source:NREL2002.
A7
TheWesternRenewableEnergyZonesPhase1Report(WesternGovernorsAssociationand DOE2009)notesthatMorethan50%ofthebestclass57windsintheWesternU.S.occurin southernWyoming,makingitatrulyprolificresourcebase.TablesA3andA4listthewind energygeneratingcapacityinWyomingcomparedtoneighboringstatesandtheinstalled capacityofrenewableenergyresourcesinWyoming.Formoreinformationregardingrenewable resourcepotentialintheWesternInterconnection,seetheWesternRenewableEnergyZone InitiativeHubMap(WesternGovernorsAssociationandDOE2009).
TableA3.TotalWindEnergyGenerating Capacity
States
Wyoming Colorado NewMexico Arizona
Source:WGAandDOE2009. MW megawatt
WindEnergyGeneratingCapacityin MW(Class5)
14,239 330 1,989 59
TableA4.WyomingTotalRenewableCapacity
StateRenewableElectricPowerIndustryNetSummerCapacitybyEnergySource,20032008(MW)
EnergySource Geothermal HydroConventional Solar Wind Wood/WoodWaste MSW/LandfillGas OtherBiomass Total
Source:EIA2009a. MW megawatt
2003 300 285 585
2004 303 285 588
2005 303 287 590
2006 303 287 590
2007 303 287 590
2008 303 626 929
A8
AppendixB
SummaryofHistoricalDataonTornadoesinWyoming
AppendixBSummaryofHistoricalDataonTornadoesinWyoming
APPENDIXB
ThisappendixprovidesasummaryofthehistoricaldataontornadoesinWyomingusedinthisreport. TableB1presentstheareaandtornadocharacteristicsforsouthernandeasternWyomingcounties obtainedfromNCDChistoricaltornadoesdata(NOAA2009).FigureB1displaystornadooccurrencesby countyinWyomingfrom1959through2009,whileFigureB2displaystheaveragelengthoftornadoes bycountyinWyomingfrom1959through2009.
TableB1.AreaandTornadoCharacteristics forSouthernandEasternWyomingCounties
County
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Crook Fremont Goshen Laramie Lincoln Natrona Niobrara Platte Sublette Sweetwater Weston
Source:NOAA2009.
TotalArea (squaremiles)
4,309 4,802 7,964 4,265 2,871 9,183 2,232 2,688 4,089 5,340 2,628 2,111 4,882 10,491 2,400
AverageLengthofa tornado(miles)
1.00 3.18 1.40 1.28 2.00 1.92 1.92 1.88 1.60 3.79 1.18 2.19 1.00 1.50 4.00
Numberoftornadoes recordedinthepast 50years

16 83 15 39 28 16 62 98 6 33 30 35 3 3 21
B1
AppendixBSummaryofHistoricalDataonTornadoesinWyoming FigureB1.TornadoOccurrencesbyCountyinWyoming19592009
60
50
NumberofOccurences
40
30
20
10
County
F F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
B2
AppendixBSummaryofHistoricalDataonTornadoesinWyoming FigureB2.AverageLengthofTornadobyCountyinWyoming19592009
30.0
25.0
LengthofTornado LengthOfTornado
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
County
F F0 F1 F2 F3 F4
B3
AppendixBSummaryofHistoricalDataonTornadoesinWyoming
B4
AppendixC
DeterminingProbabilityofaTornadoMakingContactwith TwoTransmissionLines
AppendixCDeterminingProbability
APPENDIXC
C.1
Determiningtheprobabilityofatornadostrikingtwolinesand theassociatedoptimalseparationdistanceassumingafixed pointoforigin
Thisprobabilitycanbedeterminedbymodelingthepossiblepathofatornadoafteritstrikesthefirst transmissionline,asasemicirclewithradiusequaltotheaverageestimatedlengthofthetornado,as showninFigureC1:
FigureC1.PossiblePathofaTornadoafteritStrikestheFirstTransmissionLine
Inthisfigure,thetornadostrikestransmissionlineT1atpointa.Frompointathetornadocanmovein anydirection.Sothemaximumpossiblenumberofdegreesofmovementbythetornadois360.Assume thattransmissionlineT2isplacedatdistanceequaltotheaveragelengthtraveledbyatornado(R)in thatcounty.Then,anaveragetornadoshownatpointainthefigurecanalsostrikeT2onlyifitmovesin astraightlineandcoversthedistanceR,theprobabilityofwhichisextremelylow(approachingzero). However,thisrequiresthatT2beseparatedfromT1byadistanceequaltotheaveragelengthofthe tornadopath. Itispossibletofindtheoptimumlineseparation(L)betweenT1andT2thatresultsintheproductofthe threeprobabilities(P1,P2,P3)equalto0.0333.ProbabilityP3isequaltotheratiooftwicetheangle and360degrees.ThevalueoftheangleandthecorrespondingoptimalseparationdistanceLcanbe foundbyequatingtheproductofP1,P2&P3to0.0333andmathematicallysolvingtheequationby substitutingthegeometricalexpressionfordeterminingtheangle.
Transmission Line 1 T1 Transmission Line 2 Position 2 T2-2 at which P1*P2*P3 = 0.0333 Transmission Line 2 Position 1 T2-1
L
a
Tornado
C1
Thus, (C1) P1*P2*P3=0.0333 (C2) P3=2/360 P1andP2areknown. LetA=P1*P2 Therefore,from(A1)and(A2),
(C3) = 180*0.0333/(2*A) Fromthefigure, COS=L/R herefore,L=RCOS Using(A3),
(C4) L=RCOS(3600*0.0333/(2*A)) BecauseAandRareknown,Lcanbecalculated. OnceLisknown,thenandhencetheprobabilityofasingletornadostrikingtwolinescanbe determined.
C.2
TornadoPathCalculationsusingMonteCarloMethod
ICFalsoapproximatedthetheoreticalcalculationfortheprobabilityP2*P3usingaMonteCarlo simulation,whichyieldedsimilarresults. ICFperformedtheMonteCarlosimulationbydefiningcountydimensionsandlocationsfortransmission linesT1andT2,andusingarandomnumbergeneratortocreatesetsoftornadoparameters.Atornado parametersetincludedarandomoriginationlocationwithinthecountyandarandomdirectionof travel.Thetornadoswereassumedtotravelinastraightlineoveradistanceequaltotheaverage tornadopathlengthforthecounty.Foreachsimulatedtornado,ICFdeterminedwhetherthepathof thetornadocrossedbothT1andT2. FigureC2isanillustrationofrandomtornadopathsbeingdrawnwithintheboundariesofacounty.As shown,twoofthetornadopathscrossbothtransmissionlines.
C2
AppendixCDeterminingProbability FigureC2.Randomized TornadoPaths

T1 T2 SD
ICF created tornado parameter sets for 100,000 tornados in several counties. For all of the counties simulated,theapproximatedprobabilityP2*P3fellwithinareasonablestatisticalmarginoferrorofthe theoreticalcalculations,giventhenumberoftornadosmodeled.TableC1providesexamplesoftheset ofvaluesfromtheMonteCarloanalysis.
TableC1.ResultsofMonteCarloAnalysis
Tornado Number
1 2 3 4
X1 (Miles)
23.6 23.7 42.6 31.1
Y1 (Miles)
36.0 43.2 21.6 20.1
Direction (Degrees)
64.4 53.8 53.7 15.8
X2 (Miles)
24.9 25.5 44.4 34.0
Y2 (Miles)
38.7 45.6 24.0 20.9
Crossedboth T1andT2
FALSE TRUE FALSE FALSE
C3
C4
FrameworkforAnalyzingSeparationDistances BetweenTransmissionLinesinWyoming
AppendixD
DeterminingLineSeparationDistancesforTwoRepresentative TransmissionLineRoutesinWyoming
AppendixDDeterminingLineSeparationDistances
APPENDIXD D.1 Route1

FigureD1showsrepresentativetransmissionlineroutenumber1.Basedonthisroute,TablesD1and D2showtheresultingseparationdistanceforthetransmissionlinesandthecountylevelprobabilities formultiplelineoutages,foranoverallprobabilityoflessthanoncein30years.TableD1showsthat basedona100%probabilitythatbothtransmissionlinesaretakenoutbyatornado,therequired separationdistancetoavoidasimultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesis8,400feet.TableD 2showsthatbasedona20%probabilitythatbothtransmissionlinesaretakenoutbyatornado (probabilitythatasinglelineistakenout:45%),therequiredseparationdistancetoavoida simultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesis0feet.
FigureD1.RepresentativeTransmissionLineRouteNumber11
The route shown is illustrative and does not intentionally include or exclude individual counties or potential wind resources. The framework described in Chapter 3 can be applied to routes encompassinganyWyomingcounties.
TableD1.RouteNumber1ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof8,400feet andExpectedOutagesperYear
County
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Lincoln Platte Sweetwater Uinta
Average Tornadoes PerYear

0.32 1.66 0.30 0.78 0.12 0.70 0.42 0.06
County Length(mile)
60 112 90 70 65 103 144 65
CountyArea (squaremile)
4,309 4,802 7,964 4,265 4,089 2,111 10,491 2,088
TornadoPath Length(mile)
1.00 3.18 1.40 1.28 1.60 2.19 0.40 1.50
Discount Factor(P3)
0.0000 0.2179 0.0000 0.0000 0.0226 0.1592 0.0000 0.0000 TOTAL
Expected DoubleOutages PerYear

0.0000 0.0268 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0065 0.0000 0.0000 0.0333
D1
AppendixDDeterminingLineSeparationDistances TableD2.RouteNumber1ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof0feet andExpectedOutagesPerYear

County
Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Lincoln Platte Sweetwater Uinta

0.32 1.66 0.30 0.78 0.12 0.70 0.42 0.06
County Length(mile)
60 112 90 70 65 103 144 65
4,309 4,802 7,964 4,265 4,089 2,111 10,491 2,088
1.00 3.18 1.40 1.28 1.60 2.19 0.40 1.50
Discount Factor(P3)
0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 TOTAL
Expected Double OutagesPer Year

0.0006 0.0157 0.0006 0.0021 0.0004 0.0095 0.0003 0.0004 0.0295
D.2
Route2
FigureD2showsrepresentativetransmissionlineroutenumber2.Basedonthisroute,TablesD3and D4showtheresultingseparationdistanceforthetransmissionlinesandthecountylevelprobabilities formultiplelineoutages,foranoverallprobabilityoflessthanoncein30years.TableD3showsthat basedona100%probabilitythatbothtransmissionlinesaretakenoutbyatornado,therequired separationdistancetoavoidasimultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesis6,900feet.TableD 4showsthatbasedona20%probabilitythatbothtransmissionlinesaretakenoutbyatornado (probabilitythatasinglelineistakenout:45%),therequiredseparationdistancetoavoida simultaneousoutageofmultipletransmissionlinesis0feet.
FigureD2.RepresentativeTransmissionLineRouteNumber22
Therouteshownisillustrativeanddoesnotintentionallyincludeorexcludeindividualcountiesorpotentialwind resources.TheframeworkdescribedinChapter3canbeappliedtoroutesencompassinganyWyomingcounties.
D2
AppendixDDeterminingLineSeparationDistances TableD3.RouteNumber2ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof6,900Feet andExpectedOutagesperYear

County
Crook Goshen Laramie Niobrara Weston

0.56 1.24 1.96 0.60 0.42
County Length(mile)
62 93 50 70 50
2,871 2,232 2,688 2,628 2,400
2.00 1.92 1.88 1.18 4.00
Discount Factor(P3)
0.1799 0.1725 0.1684 0 0.2556 TOTAL

0.0030 0.0109 0.0070 0 0.0120 0.0330
TableD4.RouteNumber2ResultingLineSeparationDistanceof0Feet andExpectedOutagesperYear
County
Crook Goshen Laramie Niobrara Weston

0.56 1.24 1.96 0.60 0.42
County Length(mile)
62 93 50 70 50
CountyArea TornadoPath (squaremile) Length(mile)

2,871 2,232 2,688 2,628 2,400 2.00 1.92 1.88 1.18 4.00
Discount Factor(P3)
0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 0.3183 TOTAL

0.0031 0.0126 0.0087 0.0024 0.0045 0.0313
D.3
ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses
TableD5.ResultsofRepresentativeRouteAnalyses
Route
Route1 Route1 Route2 Route2
% percent
TableD5summarizestheresultsoftheanalysesforrepresentativeroutes1and2.
SingleOutage Probability(percent)
100 45 100 45
DoubleOutage Probability(percent)
100 20 100 20
RequiredSeparation Distance(feet)
8,400 0 6,900 0
D3
AppendixDDeterminingLineSeparationDistances
D.4
Route1AlternativeMethod
ICFalsoperformedananalysisofRouteNumber1inwhichthelineseparationdistancewasallowedto varybycounty.ThetotalareabetweenthelinesoverthelengthofRouteNumber1wasminimizedas follows: Given: N Numberofcountiesonroute Ln Lengthofnthcounty SDn Lineseparationdistanceinnthcounty Minimize: Subjectto:
A = Ln SDn
n =1
Expecteddoubleoutagesperyear<0.0333
TheresultingseparationdistancesareshowninTableD6.Fortheconditionthattheexpecteddouble outagesbelessthan1in30years,thetotalareaAbetweenthetransmissionlineswasminimizedwhen fiveoftheeightcountiesuseaseparationdistanceofzero.Theotherthreecountiesuseunique separationdistancesasshown.Thetotalareabetweenthetransmissionlinescanbecalculatedas455 squaremiles,foranaverageseparationdistanceof3,400feetalongRouteNumber1.
TableD6.RouteNumber1AlternativeMethodResultingLineSeparation VaryingbyCounty(ProbabilitythatBothLinesareTakenoutbyaTornado:100%)
County Albany Campbell Carbon Converse Lincoln Platte Sweetwater Uinta Average Tornados PerYear 0.32 1.66 0.30 0.78 0.12 0.70 0.42 0.06 County Length (miles) 60 112 90 70 65 103 144 65 County Area (squaremiles) 4,309 4,802 7,964 4,265 4,089 2,111 10,491 2,088 Tornado Path Length (miles) 1.00 3.18 1.40 1.28 1.60 2.19 0.40 1.50 Line Separation Distance (feet) 0 12,700 0 1,500 0 8,500 0 0 Discount Factor(P3) 0.3183 0.1500 0.3183 0.2766 0.3183 0.1566 0.3183 0.3183 Total: Expected Double OutagesPer Year 0.0028 0.0090 0.0030 0.0071 0.0019 0.0062 0.0015 0.0018 0.0333
Foradoublelineoutageprobabilityof20%varyingtheseparationdistancesbycountyyieldedresults similartothepreviousanalysisforRoute1withtherequiredseparationdistancedecreasingtozero. ApplyingthesamemethodologytoRoute2willresultinsimilarresultsasbeforewithrequired separationdistanceinthe20%lineoutageprobabilitycasedecreasingtozero.
D4

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Framework for Analyzing Separation Distances between Transmission Lines in Wyoming

2009ICFInternationalAllRightsReserved ThisreportwasproducedbyICFResources,LLC(anICFInternationalcompanyhereafterreferredto asICF)inaccordancewithanagreementwiththeWyomingInfrastructureAuthority(Client). Clientsuseofthisreportissubjecttothetermsofthatagreement.

CHAPTER5REFERENCES...........................................................................................................51 APPENDIXAWYOMINGGENERALBACKGROUNDINFORMATION ..........................................A1 .

TableofContents APPENDIXCDETERMININGPROBABILITYOFATORNADOMAKINGCONTACTWITHTWO TRANSMISSIONLINES...................................................................................................C1

Rocky Mountain PowerArea

ArizonaNew MexicoSouthern NevadaPowerArea

California/ MexicoPower Area

56,172 57,811 1,639 2.92 55,922 57,811 1,889 3.38

Source:NERC2008. Note: Allactualandforecastloadsaremonthlynoncoincident. % percent MW megawatts WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil

Northwest PowerPool Area

Rocky Mountain PowerArea

Arizona NewMexico SouthernNevada PowerArea

California Mexico PowerArea

Source:NERC2008. WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil

Source:NERC2008. Note: TherearemultiplehighvoltagetransmissionlineadditionsplannedfortheWECCsystem,someofwhichcouldbeonlinebeyond 2017.Thistablemightnotincludethoselines. AC alternatingcurrent DC directcurrent kV Kilovolt WECC WesternElectricityCoordinatingCouncil

Source:EIA2009a. Note:Additionalrenewablegenerationhasbeenaddedsince2007andthousandsofMWofwindbasedgenerationare plannedforthefuture. MW megawatts

Source:EIA2009a. Note:Additionalrenewablegenerationhasbeenaddedsince2007andthousandsofMWofwindbasedgenerationare plannedforthefuture. MW megawatts

C Event(s)resulting inthelossoftwo ormore (multiple) elements

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

OutageFrequency Associatedwiththe PerformanceCategory (outage/year)

Minimum Transient Frequency Standard

PostTransient Voltage Deviation Standard1

InCalifornia,theISOalsohasreliabilitycriteriathataddresstheimpactofmultiplecontingencies. UtilitiesintheISOfootprintarerequiredtofollowthesecriteria.Forexample,Guide4oftheCalifornia ISOPlanningStandardsdoesnotallowmorethan1,400MWofgenerationtrippingasmitigationfora

Source:DOEetal.2003. ROW Rightofway

Approximate Separation Between Towers1(feet)

Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Figure25.TotalNumberofOutagesintheRockyMountainPowerAreaSystem from1992to2007

2006 Momentary Sustained

2007 Momentary Sustained

2007 Momentary Sustained

2006 Momentary Sustained

2007 Momentary Sustained

Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table210.CausesandNumbersof CommonModeOutagesin2006

NumberofSustainedOutages 230kV 345kV 500kV

Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table211.CausesandNumbersof CommonCorridorOutagesin2007

NumberofSustainedOutages 230kV 345kV 500kV

Overlap (Hour: minute)

Source:ArizonaPublicServiceCompany2006. MTBF MeanTimeBetweenFailure BF&M BreakerFailureandMaintenance

2007 Momentary Sustained

2008 Momentary Sustained

2009 Momentary Sustained

Chapter2LiteratureonTransmissionLineSeparation Table216.WesternAreaPowerAdministration 230kVTransmissionLineOutageData(20072009)

2007 Momentary Sustained

2008 Momentary Sustained

2009 Momentary Sustained

2007 Momentary Sustained

2008 Momentary Sustained

2009 Momentary Sustained

~60feet ~170feet ~30feet

SAG= SPAN*SPAN*Weight/Ft 8*Tension

Linederatingrisk Futureneedfornew transmissionlines NeedforRAS

Visualimpact Easeofadherenceto environmentalregulations concerns andlanduseconstraints

OptimalRangeforLine SeparationDistance LineSeparationDistance

Lineseparationdistanceasformulatedintheprevioussectioncouldbesplitintothreecomponents,as follows: ABMINTheabsoluteminimumneeded CASEMINChangetoABMINneededcasebycase(incrementalordecremental) REGMINChangetoABMINduetoregionalfactors(incrementalordecremental)

SD = AB-MIN + CASE-MIN; REG-MIN = 0

Perform NERC reliability tests

Performance requirements satisfied ?

Changing SD is the min cost option ?

TheprocessofdeterminingminimumlineseparationdistancesforWyomingstartswithestimatingeach ofthesecomponentsseparately.ItisimportanttonotethatCASEMINandREGMINcanbeeither negativeorpositiveinvaluebasedonthespecificsituation.

Wind Speed (mph)

NumberofOccurrences SerialNumberofMaximumWindSpeedOccurrence Source:DataderivedfromNOAA2009.

2 (R SD ) L Total County Area

P3,theaveragevalueofPxovertherange 0 x R SD ,iscalculatedbyintegration(solution providedbyWolframMathematicaOnlineIntegrator),asfollows:

wherexisanypointonthegridbetweenT1toAorbetweenT2toB. OnceP3iscalculated,theseparationdistancethatwillsatisfytheequationP1*P2*P3=0.0333(foran MTBFoflessthanoncein30years)canbedetermined. Usingthisformulation,ICFcalculatedthelineseparationdistanceforeachcountyineasternand southernWyoming(seeTable41).

SAG= SPANSPANWeight/Ft 8*Tension

wherexisanypointonthegridbetweenT1toAorbetweenT2toB. OnceP3iscalculated,theseparationdistancethatwillsatisfytheequationP1P2P3=0.0333(foran MTBFoflessthanoncein30years)canbedetermined. Usingthisformulation,ICFcalculatedthelineseparationdistanceforeachcountyineasternand southernWyoming(seeTable41).

Expectednumber ofmultipleline outagescausedby asingletornado peryear (P1P2P3)

(C3) = 1800.0333/(2A) Fromthefigure, COS=L/R herefore,L=RCOS Using(A3),

(C4) L=RCOS(36000.0333/(2A)) BecauseAandRareknown,Lcanbecalculated. OnceLisknown,thenandhencetheprobabilityofasingletornadostrikingtwolinescanbe determined.