TCAS Recommendations

Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire Aircraft
2004
TCAS Recommendations
Customer Services
Contents
Introduction TCAS Presentation Resolution Advisory Review of TCAS Events Recurrent TCAS Questions
AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
Future TCAS Developments Conclusion

TCAS - Recommendations
Page 2
Introduction
Each year, numerous reports reveal that mid-air collisions are
avoided by a whisker.
Air Traffic Controllers (on ground) strive to avoid such events. The onboard Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)
was developed to prevent mid-air collision, particularly in case Air Traffic Controller guidance is incorrect.
TCAS II has become mandatory:

4Since
1986, in the US 4Since 2000, in Europe
TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

Page 3
Contents

Page 4
TCAS Presentation
Basic TCAS Principles
TCAS:
Detects any nearby aircraft that is equipped with an

ATC Transponder.
Displays potential collision targets.

Triggers vertical orders to avoid conflict.
Page 5
TCAS Presentation
Interrogation TCAS II Reply Mode S Address - Altitude

MODE S XPDR
Interrogation MODE S XPDR TCAS II Reply Mode S Address - Altitude

Page 6
TCAS Presentation
TCAS calculates the:
Bearing (based on the direction of the received signal) Range (based on the time that the signal was received) Trajectory and speed (based on intruder position evolution)
Relative Altitude (based on the signal received)
Page 7
TCAS Presentation
OTHER VOLUME PA VOLUME
TA VOLUME RA VOLUME
Page 8
TCAS Presentation
TCAS Display
RA located 300 feet above and descending

-5
+3
TA located 500 feet below and climbing

+12
PROXIMATE located 1200 feet above and descending OTHER located 1500 feet below and climbing
-15
Page 9
Contents

Page 10
Resolution Advisory
Background
Amidst all the TCAS information, the

most important involves Resolution Advisories.
TCAS calculates two types of

Resolution Advisories (RA):
4Preventive
Advisory ( MAINTAIN
VERTICAL SPEED MAINTAIN): Red sector appears on V/S scale, the V/S needle is in the grey area. The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display. No pilot action on the sidestick (maintain the current vertical speed).
Page 11
Resolution Advisory
Background
4Corrective
Advisory:
The vertical speed needle is in the red area. The red square is displayed on the Navigation Display
4Follow 4Follow
aural warnings.
vertical speed green sector on the PFD.
Page 12
Resolution Advisory
Background
4Corrective
Advisory (e.g. ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED,
ADJUST):
TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:
Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with

0.25g in climb or descent until +/-1500 ft/min is reached V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within 5 seconds
Page 13
Resolution Advisory
Background
4Corrective
Advisory
TAU TAU
Vertical miss distance ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST CPA (Closest Point of Approach)
Generally: Deviation caused by a RA maneuver is between 300 and 500 ft Vertical miss distance at the Closest Point of Approach is around 400 ft
Page 14
Resolution Advisory
Background
4Corrective
Advisory
TAU TAU
Relative altitude ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST CPA (Closest Point of Approach)
Do not overreact Do not disregard a weakening RA It could create another conflict with another aircraft
Page 15
Resolution Advisory
Background
4Additional
Corrective Advisory (E.g.: INCREASE DESCENT)
TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:
Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with

0.35g in climb or descent until +/-2500 ft/min is reached V/S must be maintained until clear of conflict.
Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds
Page 16
Resolution Advisory
Evolution of RA Alerts
The following diagram illustrates the number and

evolution of RA alerts since 1999 ( Based on Eurocontrol source) :
3500 3000 2500 2000
1500 1000 500 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

RAs alerts
Page 17
Resolution Advisory
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)

35 30 25 20
15 10 5 0
Takeoff Climb Cruise Descent HLD Approach Final Approach
RAs repartition
Page 18
Resolution Advisory
Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)

4Pilots
followed RA in 95% of reported cases 4Decision not to follow an RA was based on additional information: Intruder visually acquired Traffic information and/or ATC avoidance being issued by ATC.
Page 19
Resolution Advisory
2003 results are incomplete: 4Still missing information from some countries
Globally, however, the number of alerts is decreasing:

4Less
reports from pilots 4The introduction of TCAS Change 7 reduces the number of RAs by a factor of 2.
However, since there are still a significant number of RAs:

Pilots must be well-trained and informed on how to react when faced with an RA TCAS order.
Page 20
Contents

Page 21
Review of TCAS Events

Background
The previously-shown TCAS figures, includes cases where TCAS RA orders were not always followed.
Some such cases have been reported, and include:

4Various
missed mid-air collisions. 4The tragic Constance Lake event of July 1st 2003.
Always follow TCAS RA orders, even if not in accordance with ATC orders.
Page 22

Event N 1
Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 were both at FL 70. Aircraft 2 was instructed, late, to descend to FL60.
The distance between Aircraft 1 and Aircraft 2 is 5 NM
The TCAS triggered coordinated RAs:

4DESCEND, DESCEND RA order for Aircraft 4CLIMB, CLIMB RA order for Aircraft 2
Aircraft 2
4Followed the ATC order (Descend 4But, NOT the TCAS order.
to FL 60)
Aircraft 1
4Followed
the INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT TCAS order.
This induced a new TCAS conflict with Aircraft 3 at FL 50 .

Page 23

Event N 1
FL 70 AIRCRAFT 1
DESCEND, DESCEND RA CLIMB, CLIMB RA
AIRCRAFT 2
INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT RA
FL 50
AIRCRAFT 3
AIRCRAFT 2 descend FL 60.
Simultaneous vertical and horizontal crossing at less than 1 NM

Page 24

FCOM Update
The FCOM has been slightly revised to further emphasize

the fact that pilots must follow the TCAS order:
The previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:
New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):
Page 25

Event N2
Aircraft 1: Was approaching FL 260 Aircraft 2: Was cruising at FL 270 Aircraft 1:

4Received
an ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA. 4Reacted by increasing, rather than decreasing, the vertical speed. 4Reached FL 271, before returning to FL 260
Aircraft 2:
4Received
and followed a CLIMB, CLIMB RA.

Page 26

Event N2
CLIMB, CLIMB RA
FL 270
AIRCRAFT 2 AIRCRAFT 1
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA
FL 260
Minimum crossing margin: 300 feet, 0.8 NM!!!

Page 27

FCOM Update
Following this event, the FCOM was revised to further clarify the
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA:
Previous FCOM 1.34.80 page:
New FCOM 1.34.80 page (March Revision):
Page 28

Event N3
Aircraft 1: Was cleared to FL 370. Aircraft 2: Was also cleared to FL 370 by mistake. Controller discovered the mistake and instructed
Aircraft 2 to descend to FL 350.
Aircraft 1:
4Incorrectly
interpreted the clearance which was not applicable to its aircraft 4Started to descend. 4TCAS issued a CLIMB, CLIMB RA. 4Did not follow the CLIMB, CLIMB RA, as it had visual acquisition of Aircraft 2.
Page 29

Event N3
Aircraft 2:
4Received
a coordinated DESCEND, DESCEND RA 4Followed the RA 4Stopped descending, when it noticed that Aircraft 1 was also descending.
At the very last moment, Aircraft 1:

Performed a sudden and violent escape maneuver, that resulted in injury to flight attendants and passengers.
Page 30

Event N3
FL 370
CLIMB, CLIMB RA DESCEND, DESCEND RA
AIRCRAFT 2
Order incorrectly interpreted by AIRCRAFT 1
AIRCRAFT 1
AIRCRAFT 2 Descend to FL 350.
AIRCRAFT 1 passes slightly below AIRCRAFT 2, with no lateral separation !!!

Page 31

FCOM Update
For TCAS RA orders, the FCOM 3.04.34 was revised to delete the visual acquisition of the intruder line. Previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:
New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):

For RA Alerts, the FCOM 3.02.34 and QRH TCAS

procedures were also revised by deleting the Attempt to see reported traffic line.
Page 32
Previous FCOM 3.02.34 page

New FCOM 3.02.34 page

Page 33

Additional information
ATC versus TCAS information:
ATC Radar:
4An
update rate of several seconds (from 4 to 10). 4Altitude data in 100-foot increments. 4Sudden vertical maneuvers are not immediately displayed.
TCAS:
4Interrogates
all surrounded transponders every second. 4Mode S-equipped aircraft provide TCAS information in 25-foot increments.
TCAS Information is: - Updated 4 to 10 times faster - 4 times more accurate
Page 34

Additional information
Visual acquisition limitations:
At high altitudes, it is difficult to assess:

4The
range 4The heading 4The relative height
At low altitudes, it is difficult to assess :

4Whether
the aircraft is climbing or descending.
The traffic in contact MAY NOT BE the one that causes

the RA to trigger.
Page 35

Conclusions
Other, more or less, serious events have occurred due to

the fact that the crew did not follow TCAS orders.
All such events emphasize the importance of the following:

- Always follow TCAS RA orders.
- Do not try to visually acquire intruders, in case of RA orders.
Page 36
Contents

Page 37
Recurrent TCAS Questions

Background
As of today, the following cases require TA mode selection:

4Engine
failure 4Dispatch with landing gear down 4Known nearby traffic, which is in visual contact 4Closely-spaced runways, converging runways, low terrain along the final approach
Recurring questions concerning TA mode selection:

4Emergency
descent 4Engine failure 4Aircraft at its maximum ceiling altitude
Page 38

Emergency Descent
Most often due to rapid decompression. Performing an emergency descent in a busy airspace
increases the risk of generating traffic conflict.
A CLIMB, CLIMB RA order is not always requested:

4An
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST RA can be triggered (decrease the V/S).
Page 39
Emergency Descent
Page 40

Emergency Descent
ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED, ADJUST
DESCEND, DESCEND
Page 41

Emergency Descent
In case of an emergency descent, Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode.
Page 42

Engine Failure
In case one engine fails, the TCAS must be set to TA mode to comply
with AC 20-131:
After an engine failure, aircraft performance is degraded. When TA is selected:

4Affected
aircraft not requested to perform an RA maneuver. 4No additional stress generated by a TCAS alarm in a stressful environment.
Page 43

Engine Failure
Airlines often complain that TA mode is sometimes too

restrictive, in particular for the A340-500/600, which is a:
4 Powerful aircraft
4
Fly-by-wire aircraft, not subject to stall in normal law.
For the following reasons, it is not recommended to

maintain TA/RA, in case of an engine failure:
4To
have a common procedure for all aircraft 4If the intruder is TCAS-equipped: They will see that you are in TA mode. They will perform an RA maneuver.
Page 44

Engine Failure
In addition:
4The
ECAMs ENG SHUT DOWN Procedure requests the crew to select TA TCAS mode.
4Airworthiness
Authorities have approved this TA mode selection, in case of an engine failure.

Airbus recommends the selection of TA mode, in case of an engine failure.
Page 45

Aircraft at its Maximum Ceiling Altitude
AC 20-131A defines the maneuvers that the

aircraft must be able to perform.
In particular, the aircraft must prove that it can

respond to a TCAS RA CLIMB order, even when it is at its maximum altitude.
Page 46

Speed (knots)
Time (s) V/S (feet/minute)

Time (s)
Page 47

These graphs show that the aircraft can follow:

4A
CLIMB, CLIMB TCAS RA order (1500 feet/minute) 4An INCREASE CLIMB, INCREASE CLIMB TCAS RA order (2500 feet/minute).
Always below VMO/MMO and above VLS:

4A330
aircraft, at 41000 feet, initial speed is M 0.82 (243 knots) The maximum weight is 177 tons. 4The Final Speed is 228 knots (Buffet Speed is 212 knots at 42000 feet)
RA climb orders can be followed. Airbus does not recommend selecting TA mode, when the aircraft is at its maximum ceiling altitude.
Page 48
Contents

Page 49
Future TCAS Developments

Background
Most vertical deviations for each aircraft (following a

TCAS RA order) are often greater than 300 feet.
Very large altitude changes often lead to conflict

with other aircraft in a busy airspace.
Due to excessive pilot reaction, uncomfortable

load factors are reached.
Page 50

Background
1000 feet
REAL PATH IDEAL PATH
0
10
3500
20
30
3800
40
50
2000
60 seconds
5
-700
1
CLIMB, CLIMB
2
CLIMB, CLIMB
4
CLEAR OF CONFLICT
Page 51
MONITOR MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED VERTICAL SPEED

Background
In addition, some operators have reported difficulty in

distinguishing the V/S needle, when it is red and in the red vertical speed sector (mainly on EIS1 screens).
Improvements are anticipated in this area to help apply a TCAS RA order.

Page 52

Planned Improvements
To facilitate QUICK RESPONSE to TCAS RA orders. To help AVOID OVERREACTION. To develop an awareness to maneuver only to the extent
necessary to avoid intruder aircraft.
Improvements are currently being reviewed and developed. Will provide pilots with pitch attitude information. For long range aircraft, improvement is anticipated for 2006.
Page 53
Contents

Page 54
Conclusion
4Even
if the number of TCAS alerts decreases, there are still missed mid-air collisions each year. Pilots must always follow TCAS RA orders.
4Some
improvements are envisaged and are being developed to further assist pilots in effectively responding to TCAS warnings.
Page 55
This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AN EADS JOINT COMPANY WITH BAE SYSTEMS
Page 56

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Operational Liaison Meeting Fly-By-Wire Aircraft

Future TCAS Developments Conclusion

TCAS II has become mandatory:

1986, in the US 4Since 2000, in Europe

TCAS II has a worldwide ICAO mandate as January 1st, 2003.

Future TCAS Developments Conclusion

Detects any nearby aircraft that is equipped with an

Displays potential collision targets.

Triggers vertical orders to avoid conflict.

Interrogation TCAS II Reply Mode S Address - Altitude

Interrogation MODE S XPDR TCAS II Reply Mode S Address - Altitude

Relative Altitude (based on the signal received)

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

RA located 300 feet above and descending

TA located 500 feet below and climbing

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Future TCAS Developments Conclusion

Amidst all the TCAS information, the

TCAS calculates two types of

vertical speed green sector on the PFD.

Advisory (e.g. ADJUST VERTICAL SPEED,

Assumes pilots reaction within 5 seconds and accelerates with

Smoothly and firmly follow green sector within 5 seconds

Corrective Advisory (E.g.: INCREASE DESCENT)

TCAS computes the best avoidance maneuver according to a model:

Assumes pilots reaction within 2.5 seconds and accelerates with

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Firmly follow green sector within 2.5 seconds

The following diagram illustrates the number and

1500 1000 500 0 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)

Statistics in Europe for 2000 ( Based on Eurocontrol source)

Globally, however, the number of alerts is decreasing:

However, since there are still a significant number of RAs:

Future TCAS Developments Conclusion

Review of TCAS Events

Some such cases have been reported, and include:

Review of TCAS Events

The TCAS triggered coordinated RAs:

the INCREASE DESCENT, INCREASE DESCENT TCAS order.

This induced a new TCAS conflict with Aircraft 3 at FL 50 .

Review of TCAS Events

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

Simultaneous vertical and horizontal crossing at less than 1 NM

Review of TCAS Events

The FCOM has been slightly revised to further emphasize

The previous FCOM 3.04.34 page:

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

New FCOM 3.04.34 page (January Revision):

Review of TCAS Events

Aircraft 1: Was approaching FL 260 Aircraft 2: Was cruising at FL 270 Aircraft 1:

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

and followed a CLIMB, CLIMB RA.

Review of TCAS Events

Minimum crossing margin: 300 feet, 0.8 NM!!!

Review of TCAS Events

Previous FCOM 1.34.80 page:

AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.

New FCOM 1.34.80 page (March Revision):

Review of TCAS Events

Review of TCAS Events

At the very last moment, Aircraft 1:

Review of TCAS Events