THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD IN HOBBESS MORAL PHILOSOPHY According to Sidgwick, what distinguishes modern ethical philosophy

from ancient Greek ethics and pre-modern thought deriving from it was that though the ancients recognized but one regulative and governing faculty . . . under the name of Reason, in the modern ethical view, when it has worked itself clear, there are found to be two, . . . Conscience and Self-love (Sidgwick 1964: 198). Sidgwick also put this contrast in terms of Universal and Egoistic Reason. This resonates with Sidgwicks own famous dualism of practical reason, but it fails to capture an essential feature that he stresses elsewhere, namely, that conscience in modern ethical thought is essentially conceived in relation to quasi-jural notions of obligation, duty, and right (Sidgwick 1967: 105).1 We might, therefore, put Sidgwicks point this way: Whereas ancient ethics recognized a single fundamental ethical concept and source of normative reasons, the good, modern ethics came to recognize two, the right as well as the good. Sidgwicks central thought, I would say his central insight, is that, for the Greeks, Virtue or Right action [for example, Aristotles idea of an actions being noble and choiceworthy in itself (1980: II.3-4)] is commonly regarded as only a species of the Good (Sidgwick 1967: 105). In modern thought, by contrast, we find a distinctive ethical conception, that of moralityincluding moral obligation and rights which purports to provide reasons for action that are very different from and that can trump considerations of the good, whether the agents own good, or even good impersonally conceived.2 This is the idea Butler gives voice to when he says that authority, indeed supreme authority, is part of the very idea of conscience (e.g., 1983, 3.2),3 and what Kant expresses in his doctrine of the moral law as a categorical imperative. Let us call this the authority of right, that is, the thesis that considerations of moral right, wrong, duty, and obligation have an independent normative force that neither reduces to nor can be derived solely from that of the good (though it may partly depend upon it). It is consistent with the authority of right, so formulated, that we might have but the single moral duty of promoting the good, or even of promoting our own good. The authority of right would still claim that any such duty could not follow directly from
1 Ethical principles, however universal or impersonal, need not take a juridical form. 2 In other words, there is a conceptual difference, for the moderns, between the thought that an action will advance either the agents good or overall good, on the one hand, and the thought that, perhaps because of that, the action is morally obligatory, a duty, or wrong not to do, on the other. 3 Also: you cannot form a notion of this faculty, conscience, without taking in judgment, direction, superintendency. This is a constituent part of the idea, that is, of the faculty itself (1983: 2.14).

any facts about the good taken by themselves. By speaking of the authority of the right I mean to echo Sidgwicks thought that the modern conception of right is a quasi-jural notion, that is, that it is conceptually tied to the idea of legitimate or de jure authority.4 I shall interpret Sidgwicks to entail that the authority of right, so understood, is a distinctively modern thesis. In this paper, I wish to discuss Hobbess moral philosophy in relation to authority of right. The dominant scholarly opinion, including my own until recently, has been that Hobbes denies this thesis since he holds that all obligations and duties derive their normative force from their relation to the good, in particular, to the agents own good, or even more specifically, the agents self-preservation. Now, however, I am not so sure. In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that the concepts of moral right, wrong, and rights, which we inherit from modern ethics, are irreducibly second personal. They operate within a conceptual network that essentially includes the idea of a distinctive kind of reason for acting, what I call a second-personal reason, that is conceptually related to legitimate claims or demands that someone has the authority to address to the agent (or that the agent has, at least under a certain guise, the authority to address to herself). It is the element of address that brings in the grammatical second person. Claims and demands necessarily have addressees, whether individuals, groups, or the public at large. In this way, I argue, the ideas of moral obligation, right, wrong, and rights, are conceptually tied to that of responsibility to someone in the sense of accountability or answerability. Moral obligations are what we are answerable for doing. But answerable to whom? Who has the authority to hold us accountable? According to early modern theological voluntarists like Pufendorf and Locke, we are accountable to God, who has authority over all his creatures. More defensibly, I argue, we are accountable to one another (and indeed to ourselves) as representative persons or members of the moral community. What we are morally obligated to do is what we have the authority, as representative persons, to demand of each other and ourselves that we do. I argue that the seeds of this more adequate view can be found in the voluntarists themselves, like Pufendorf, who holds that to see oneself as subject to obligation, one must be able to hold oneself responsible through blame. This presupposes, I argue, not just anyones individual authority, not even Gods, but both Gods and our representative authority, as representative persons. To hold oneself responsible and 4 Of course, Anscombe used this element to criticize modern moral philosophy as
requiring theological voluntarist foundations it no longer accepted (Anscombe 1958).

blame oneself, one must be able to see oneself as being to blame, that is, blameworthy; and this judgment must be able to be made not from any individuals perspective, not even Gods, but from an essentially shareable standpoint available to any moral agent. Moral rights, on the other hand, are conceptually tied to individual authority rather than representative authority. A claim right, for example, entails a right holders individual authority to insist on certain conduct, to waive her right, to consent to what would otherwise be a violation, to hold others accountable for violations (or to choose not to at her discretion), and so on. It follows that so-called directed or bipolar obligations to others that are the conceptual correlates of claim rights also implicate this individual authority. If you have a right against me that I not step on your feet, then I am obligated to you not to do so, and you consequently have the authority to demand this of me and hold me accountable for it.5 Of course, if I have a moral obligation to you not to do this, we can (and typically do) also think, that I have a moral obligation period not to do so as well. It is a reflection of this that in cases that are sufficiently serious to warrant a criminal law, we think that the question of whether to prosecute and how to hold someone accountable for violations is not distinctively up to the victim, but is properly decided by the people and their representatives. As I said, my aim is to discuss Hobbess moral philosophy in relation to the authority of right. Hobbes is, by anyones accounting, a modern moral philosopher. Partly what we have in mind in so categorizing him, of course, is Hobbess respect for the emerging empirical sciences, his metaphysical naturalism or materialism, or perhaps his search for something like Cartesian foundations and certainty. But it is also widely agreed that Hobbes can be placed within a modern natural law tradition that is attempting to theorize the concept of morality along something like the lines I have just been sketching. At the same time, however, the preponderant view among Hobbes scholars is that Hobbes does not accept, nor is there anything in his philosophy that should lead him to accept, the authority of right as we have defined it. Even when interpreters are agreed that Hobbes distinguishes moral obligation and the requirements of the law of nature from considerations of the (agents own) good, as for example in Hobbess reply to the fool in Leviathan (L: 15.4-5), the predominant view has been that Hobbes nonetheless derives the normative force of laws of nature from that of the agents own good, the good of selfpreservation or peace, or something similar.6 So understood, the right
5 In a just society, not by taking the law into ones own hands, but through civil procedures. 6 See, e.g., Darwall 1995, 1997, and 2000, Gauthier 1979, Irwin 2008: 159-178, and

has no fundamental independent authority. On what seems to be the most common interpretation, Hobbess view is some kind of rule- or indirect egoism (Gauthier 1979, Kavka 1985, 1995, Irwin 2008). Although considerations of moral right do not themselves reduce to those of the agents own good, the rights normative force nonetheless derives from these. According to Hobbes, it is only because anyone will do better, because he will be likelier to survive and enjoy the benefits of peace, if his deliberative practical reasoning is not egoistic but gives independent and even overriding weight to considerations of moral right (when these properly bind, e.g., with the sovereigns backing), that these latter considerations have any normative force at all. Nonetheless, because these benefits can arise only when they are pursued indirectly, by directly following the laws of nature, considerations of right do have a normative force that is distinct from that of the good, however derivative it may be. Indeed, if it is beneficial for agents to give the right supreme normative authority, that is, as overriding the good, then, according to an indirect egoist (or more, generally, indirect consequentialist) interpretation, considerations of the right will then really have this normative authority, albeit derivatively. I used myself to accept some version of this interpretation (Darwall 1995, 1997, and 2000). Although Hobbes employs a concept of obligation that he explicitly defines independently of the good in terms of the right (roughly, the state one comes to be in when one lays down or transfers a right (L: 14.7)), it nonetheless seemed to me that any normative force this defined notion could have within Hobbess moral philosophy would have to be inherited from that of the good, along something like the indirect egoist or consequentialist lines I just sketched. More recently, however, I have come to believe that this is not right. In what follows, I want to lay out aspects of Hobbess views that lead in the direction of the authority of right, that is, fairly central elements of his thought that require that obligation and right not simply not reduce to, but also that they not solely derive their normative force entirely from, that of the good. I shall argue, moreover, that these elements require the authority of right precisely because they are second personal in the way I mentioned abovethey concern a fundamental form of accountability to one another. I do not claim, I should make clear, that Hobbes himself accepted the authority of right, or even that he would have on reflection. I am claiming, rather, that there are important aspects of his thought that lead in this direction. And I shall also claim that at least some elements that seem decisively to lead away from the authority of right, in fact do not. In this, I shall be agreeing with much of Sharon Lloyds recent
Kavka 1986 and 1995.

interpretation of the laws of nature as articulating a conception of reciprocity, or, as I shall argue, mutual accountability, that cannot, by its very nature, be derived from the good (Lloyd 2009).7 I will proceed as follows. Before turning to Hobbes, I shall begin, in Section I, by exhibiting how second-personal elements of the modern conception of morality are present right from the start in what is frequently regarded as modern moral theorys originating work: Grotiuss Rights of War and Peace. Then, in Section II, I shall present what I take to be the best case for attributing to Hobbes a rejection of the authority of right and the view that practical normative force must ultimately derive from the agents own ends (via instrumental practical reason), or the agents own good, or the good period (whether personal or impersonal). In Section III, I shall discuss a basic obstacle that is faced by any attempt to derive the rights normative force from that of the good, namely, that no such account can explain the rights secondpersonal character. Then in Section IV, I shall exhibit how Hobbess own claims about the right presuppose this second-personal element and how aspects of his view that may seem decisively to be odds with it are not in fact. Finally, in Section V, I explain how Hobbes might accept the authority of right, and so more adequately capture its second-personal character, consistently with his deepest philosophical commitments. To anticipate, the main idea will be as follows. Strawson pointed out in Freedom and Resentment that any attempt to derive attributions of blameworthiness (and so implicitly, moral obligation and right) from considerations of the good, for example, from the good consequences of holding someone responsible and blaming him, will give a reason of the wrong kind to support the attribution (Strawson 1968).8 The reason why this is so is that the good is as a conceptual matter normative for desire, whereas obligation, right, and blameworthiness, are normative for the attitudes through which we hold people responsible and blame themwhat Strawson dubbed reactive attitudes, like resentment, indignation, and guilt. It is a conceptual truth that if something is morally wrong, then it is an action of a kind that would be blameworthy, were it done without adequate excuse. Now on the orthodox view, Hobbes is a value subjectivist; he holds that claims about the good are reducible to claims about desire satisfaction. I have argued, however, that this is not right (Darwall 2000). When Hobbes says that whatsoever is the object of any man's
7 Lloyd follows Rawls (e.g., Rawls 2006) in interpreting the laws of nature in terms of the reasonable. Unlike Rawls, she does not see Hobbes as trying (impossibly) to derive the reasonable from the rational. 8 [E]fficacy . . . in regulating behaviour in socially desirable ways is not, Strawson says, a reason of the right sort for practices of moral responsibility as we understand them (1968: 72,74).

appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good (L: 6.7), Hobbes is saying not that when we call something good we assert that we desire it. He is saying that when we desire something, we call it good. The right way to read Hobbess metaethics of the good, therefore, is as expressivism or projectivism rather than subjectivism. This is also supported by Hobbess acceptance of a Galilean projectivist view of color, which he explicitly analogizes to value (Darwall 2000). I shall argue by analogy that the most philosophically satisfactory way for Hobbes to develop aspects of his view that tend toward the authority of right would be for him to hold a projectivism about the right. What we project, when we make judgments about blameworthiness and the right are not our desires, but reactive attitudes through which we make and hold one another to (legitimate) demands. Of course, Hobbes might do better by both the good and the right were he to accept some kind of norm expressivism like Gibbards, which holds that these respective normative judgments express our acceptance of norms that warrant their respective attitudes, but that is another matter (Gibbard 1990). In The Elements of Law, Hobbes contrasts human beings with other living creatures who have no conception of right and wrong (EL: I.19.5). Such creatures, Hobbes says, experience pleasure and pain and so have desires and aversions.9 What they lack is any attitude of censure of one another (EL:I.19.5). If Hobbes were to accept a projectivist metaethics of right according to which judgments of right and their conceptual correlates express reactive attitudes like indignation, blame, and censure, he could then explain why in lacking these attitudes, other creatures lack a conception of right and wrong, though they are capable of desire, deliberation, and will (according to Hobbes, the last appetite) (L: 6.1,11). Such a position, moreover, would enable Hobbes to capture more adequately the second-personal aspects of obligation and right that I shall argue he accepts. Were he to accept it, moreover, he could accept the authority of right. First, however, we should see how the second-personal character of obligation and right were prominent already in Grotius. I. GROTIUS AND THE SECOND-PERSONAL CHARACTER OF RIGHT Hugo Grotiuss [Law or] Rights of War and Peace (1625) was seen by many of his contemporaries as marking a significant break with prior moral and political theory, and it has been viewed similarly by most commentators ever since.10 Barbeyrac, an early eighteenth-century translator of Pufendorf, said that Grotius was the first who broke the
9 In Leviathan, Hobbes calls pleasure and pain the appearance[s] of delight and aversion, respectively (1994: 6.10). 10 See, e.g., Schneewind 1998. A prominent exception is Irwin 2008.

ice of the Scholastic Philosophy; which [had] spread itself all over Europe (1749: 67, 66). We can begin with an element of Grotiuss view that has no direct analogue in Hobbes, namely, Grotiuss idea that human moral agents have certain basic moral claim rights. For Hobbes, the basic right of nature is no standing to claim specific conduct from others, but rather a moral liberty that entails the absence of any moral duty to forbear whatever one thinks necessary to preserve ones own nature and life (1994: 14.1). A claim right, unlike a moral liberty, concerns what individuals are in a position to demand, as Grotiuss own analysis will make clear. Nonetheless, the idea of a moral liberty also involves the idea of legitimate demands, albeit by exclusion. The moral liberty in which Hobbess right of nature consists entails that no one can demand forbearance of anything judged necessary for self-preservation, hence that any such demand would be unreasonable or illegitimate. Most obviously, no one has the individual authority to demand forbearance, that is, a claim right to do so. But the right of nature is also, Hobbes says, a blameless liberty (EL: I.14.6).11 So no one can demand this as a representative person either, and it would be illegitimate or unreasonable to do so. Grotius brings the individual authority to demand explicitly into his concept of claim rights, which he dubs perfect rights. Right or ius can refer, Grotius says, to a moral Quality annexed to the Person, enabling him to have, or do, something justly (RWP: I.138). This quality or right, can be perfect or imperfect. A perfect right is a Faculty of the person that includes, Grotius says, the authority to deman[d] what is due. What we have natural rights to claim, according to Grotius, is Liberty, or power over ourselves and property (RWP: I.138-139). Grotius adds that such a faculty answers the Obligation of rendering what is owing (RWP:I.139). Perfect rights are thus claim rights that entail correlative obligations. An imperfect right, on the other hand, is not a Faculty but an Aptitude. Under this heading, Grotius includes considerations of Worth and Merit that can recommend actions as more or less worthy or meritorious, but which no one has standing to demand (RWP:I.141). Thus Prudent management in the gratuitous Distribution of Things to which no individuals or society has a valid claim may nonetheless recommend giving preference to one of greater before one of less Merit, a Relation before a Stranger, a poor Man before one that is rich (RWP:I.88). But while Ancients like Aristotle, and even Moderns who
11 I take Hobbes to mean a genuine moral permission, not simply the denial of a moral duty, as might be true if neither the idea of duty nor that of permission had application.

follow him, may take such considerations to fall within what they call justice and therefore to concern right or ius (for example, Aristotles distributive justice,)12 nonetheless, Grotius says, Right, properly speaking, has a quite different Nature, namely, doing for [others] what in Strictness they may demand (I, 88-89). Grotius defines law as a Rule of Moral Actions, obliging us, and he adds that such obligations differ from Counsels, and such other Precepts, which however honest and reasonable they be, lay us under no Obligation, and so come not under this Notion of Law, or Right (RWP.I.147-148). Hobbes makes a similar distinction between command and counsel, and he similarly defines law as not counsel, but command . . . of him, whose command is addressed to one formerly obliged to obey him. (L:26. ) (Formerly here refers to the covenant through subjects authorize and promise to obey the sovereign.) Finally, Grotius holds not just that victims have the individual authority to make and hold others to demands in the case of perfect natural rights, but also that any person has a kind of representative authority to hold people to the natural law quite generally. Is the power to punish essentially a power that pertains to the state [respublica]? Not at all? On the contrary, just as every right of the magistrate comes to him from the state, so has the right come to the state from private individuals; and similarly, the power of the state is the result of collective agreement . . . . Therefore, since no one is able to transfer a thing that he never possessed, it is evident that the right of chastisement was held by private persons before it was held by the state (Grotius 1950: 91) As further evidence, Grotius adds an argument that will later be picked up by Locke in The Second Treatise in support of his view that individuals in the state nature have a right to punish that is additional to their right to seek reparation for violation of their own rights (Locke 1988: 272 (II.9)). This is that states normally claim the right to punish wrongs against not only their own citizens, but also against foreigners, yet it derives no power over the latter from civil law, which is binding upon citizens only because they have given their own consent (Grotius 1950: 91-92). II. WHY IT CAN BE NATURAL TO THINK THAT HOBBES DENIES, AND MUST DENY, THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHT We can return now to Hobbes. In this section, we shall briefly
12 On the curious difference between this traditional and our contemporary notion of distributive justice, see Fleischacker 2004: 17-28.

consider why it is so natural to think that Hobbes must deny the authority of right consistently with his deepest philosophical commitments. Perhaps the most obvious reason is that Hobbes himself says that the laws of nature are but improperly called laws since they are are but conclusions or theorems concerning what conduceth to the conservation and defense of themselves (L: 15.41). Taken somewhat literally, this passage seems to say that Hobbess considered view is that Leviathans laws of nature are something like natural laws in an empirical sense, that is law-like generalizations about what kinds of conduct are necessary for self-preservation. An obvious philosophical, though not necessarily an interpretative, problem with so understanding Hobbes is that this interpretation makes it puzzling not just how Hobbes could regard the laws of nature as having any moral normative forcethat is, as binding, as Hobbes says in De Cive in the court of conscience (DC: 3.27but how he could think of them as having any intrinsic normative force at all. Interpreting them as generalizations about what will promote peace and self-preservation makes the laws of nature into iss rather than oughts. Of course, peace and self-preservation are not just any old end state; they are, Hobbes believes, what all human beings strongly desire, perhaps desire most strongly. A natural thought, then, is that Hobbes is saying that the laws of nature lay out conduct that is instrumentally rational in promoting our desired ends. Thoughts, Hobbes says, are to the desires, as scouts, and spies, to range abroad, and find the way to the things desired (L: 8.14). To an agent with a desire for self-preservation or peace, the thought that conduct is necessary to achieve these ends can have an obvious practical and so, one might think, normative significance. Even if, however, we add in the proposition that we desire self-preservation or peace to the thought that certain conduct is necessary for these, it nonetheless remains hard to see how the content of these propositions even taken together is itself normative. So the problem seems to remain: How can a law of nature as Hobbes understands it, a precept that can dictate or forbid (L. 14.3, 15.41)? It is at this point that the subjectivist interpretation of Hobbess metaethics of good enters (Gauthier 1967 1979; Hampton 1986; Kavka 1986). If we read Hobbes as holding that good just means something like desired by me or desired by the agent or something similar, then from the premises provided by any law of nature, interpreted as the claim that a specific kind of action will promote self-preservation or peace, Hobbes will be able to conclude something he will be able to express by some sentence such as conduct of such-and-such kind is good. And isnt good a paradigmatically normative term? So wont

that make the laws of nature normative claims, at least as Hobbes understands them? Well, not necessarily. Since being desired by the agent or promoting what the agent desires are not normative terms, it would seem that any attempt to define good in terms of them will not be able to render it or claims expressed by it normative either. Suppose someone were to define good as twelve inches long. He wouldnt thereby have rendered the statement the standard ruler is twelve inches (or is good) as a normative claim. So if we think that good is a normative term, there will be a strong philosophical reason to resist any such subjectivist definition. We can see the same thing from the other direction by noting the familiar point that the object of any actual desire we can always ask whether it is desirable, that is whether it is worth desiring or warrants desire, whether there is any normative reason to desire it. When we distinguish between the claims that conduct promotes the satisfaction of the agents actual desires, even her strongest desires, and that it promotes what there is reason for her to desire (or what warrants or is worth her desiring), it is surely the second that is the normative claim, not the first. These are only some of the philosophical issues confronting a metaethical subjectivism about the good.13 So we should avoid attributing the view to Hobbes if we can find a better alternative supported in the text. As I said earlier, a major reason for attributing the view to Hobbes is his saying that what we desire, we call good, and that what we are averse to or hate, we call evil (L: 6.7). But this no more supports subjectivism than would a comparable statement about belief: Whatsoever is the object of a mans belief, that is it which he for his part calleth true. No one would think to interpret that as saying that when we say that something is true, we are saying that we believe it. That would overrun a distinction between expressing and self-attributing a belief, just as the subjectivist interpretation of Hobbess text overruns a distinction between expressing and self-attributing a desire. It is more charitable, both philosophically and interpretatively, therefore, to interpret Hobbes as some kind of expressivist or projectivist rather than subjectivist. Additional support is provided by the fact that Hobbes clearly accepts a Galilean projectivist theory of color according to which the real and very object seem invested with the [color] fancy it begets in us (L: 1.4). Moreover, Hobbes explicitly
13 Another is that subjectivism has difficulty explaining genuine evaluative disagreement. This is relevant to interpreting Hobbes since he holds that evaluative controversies are a cause of war (L. 15.40). See Darwall 2000: 329.

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analogizes the case of value to that of color. Though there is nothing more to color metaphysically, Hobbes says, than motion caused by the action of external objects, this is nonetheless to the sight as light and colour. So similarly, although there is really nothing more than appetites and aversions, these nonetheless also involve their respective appearances, which are of good and of evil, respectively (L: 6.1011). The analogous metaethics of good is thus expressivist or projectivist, not subjectivist. When people say something is good or judge it good, they are projecting their desires, and contrariwise for evil and aversion. This interpretation also helps explain another text that is sometimes cited in favor of reading Hobbes as a subjectivist: Good and evil are names that signify our appetites and aversions (L: 15.40). Metaphysically, as with color, all that exists, standing behind, that can enter into an account for value, are material motions, in this case, desires and aversions (L: 4.15). But when we judge objects to be colored or good we do not judge or see them as causing these material motions, we see them as though they had an intrinsic property they do not actually have, in one case a phenomenal property, in the other, an evaluative or normative one. This interpretation also helps us see how Hobbesian laws of nature, even interpreted as generalizations about what promotes defense, can have genuinely normative implications for human beings who contemplate them. According to Hobbes, anyone desiring selfpreservation and peace, will accept the premise that these are good, and when we add this to any theorem about which acts promote these ends, that person will be then be able to conclude that there is reason to perform these acts because they will bring about something good, maybe something whose value has the highest priority. This goes some way to accounting for the laws of natures normativity, or at least, for why Hobbess readers would judge them normative, but only some way. Most obviously, it doesnt yet say anything about why, laws of nature, as Hobbes understands them would have any moral normativitywhy they would bind in conscience. But neither does it show why someone should follow a natural law on those occasions when it does not promote the end the reader judges good, and when some other action would do so better. This latter, of course, is precisely the question that is posed by Hobbess fool when he challenges whether there is reason to follow the third law of nature and keep covenants on occasions when violating them would better promote ends he judges good (L. 15.4-5). Hobbes admits that such occasions can arise and so implicitly concedes that this law is not an exceptionless theorem, but he argues that from the fact that the fools violation of

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covenant might turn out well, it does not follow that it was reasonably or wisely done (L. 15.5). And this has led commentators to a rule- or indirect egoist interpretation. Agents should follow laws of nature because they articulate rules such that if the agent follows them, she will do better than if she were to follow any other rule, including the rule of doing only what promotes what she judges good (Kavka 1986, 1995; Irwin 2008). Below I shall want to question this as an interpretation of Hobbess reply, but we should note that even if it were interpretatively correct, it would give Hobbes a view that would be saddled with the problems that confront indirect consequentialisms, whether egoistic or not, face quite generally, namely the charge of irrational rule worship (Hampton 1986: 93). If it is the good of, say, self-preservation, that justifies any interest whatsoever in the rule, then why should one follow it when one has impeccable evidence that some other action would better promote that end.14 For our purposes, however, we can simply set this problem aside. The issue we shall be concerned with is how the moral normativity of Hobbesian laws of nature can be accounted forhow, again, they can bind in conscience and impose moral duties, albeit ones that only bind in foro interno without the backing of the sovereigns sanctions.

III. WHY THE RIGHT CANT BE DERIVED SOLELY FROM THE GOOD In the next section, I will exhibit a variety of ways in which Hobbes treats the laws of nature as having genuine moral force, including by supporting censure and other second-personal attitudes through which we hold one another responsible. In this section, I describe P. F. Strawsons analysis of why this aspect of moral obligation and right makes it impossible for the right to derive solely from the good, whether the agents own good or good impersonally conceived. Strawsons targets in Freedom and Resentment are consequentialist accounts of responsibility employed to defuse the problem of freedom of the will. To any such account, whether egoistic or impersonal, Strawson poses a quite general objection: desirability is not a reason of the right sort for holding people responsible or for our practices of moral responsibility as we understand them. (1968:72, 74) When we seek to hold people accountable, what matters is not whether doing so is desirable, either in a particular case or in general,
14 Cf. Parfit on indirectly self-defeating ethical theories in Parfit (1986).

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but whether the persons conduct is culpable and we have the authority to bring him to account. Desirability is a reason of the wrong kind to warrant the attitudes and actions in which holding someone responsible consists in their own terms. Strawsons point is a specific instance of the wrong kind of reason problem. Different attitudes have their respective distinctive normative reasons, so it is important always to be clear for what attitude (including intention and choice in the case of action) a putative reason is being considered. A corollary is that different normative concepts, such as the desirable, the credible, the estimable, the beautiful, the culpable, the morally right or obligatory, and so on, are conceptually related to the distinctive attitudes they implicate. So reasons that can support the proposition that something is F-able must come, quite generally, from reasons that are distinctively relevant to an attitude of kind F. To take some obvious examples, that there are instrumental reasons for believing p, say that one will win a prize if one believes p, do not tend to show that p is credible. That there will be good consequences if one intends or chooses to do A will not support the proposition that A is choiceworthy, or, at best, it will do so only if that is because A itself has good consequences and therefore the intention or choice of doing A does also. Similarly, that holding someone responsible and blaming her would have good consequences does not provide one scintilla of support to the claim that her action is culpable. Whether someones action is blameworthy or not cannot depend in any way on the good consequences of blaming him. The only thing any such proposition about the good can support is the desirability of blaming him. But this is not a reason of the right kind for blaming him, only a reason to wish one could. Whether an action is blameworthy concerns reasons of the right kind not for desire, but for the reactive attitudes, like indignation, resentment, guilt, and moral blame, through which we hold people responsible What about more indirect consequentialist derivations? Can the good consequences of having a practice of holding people responsible and blaming them under certain conditions tend to show that someone under those conditions really is worthy of blame? Someone who puts forward such a suggestion either means by blame a Strawsonian reactive attitude or he means certain kinds of actions, like sanctioning the behavior in some way or other. If the former, then Strawsons point still clearly applies. If the latter, then it seems reasonable that the practice in question involves something more like penalties in a game than blame as an attribution of moral responsibility as we normally

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understand it. Strawsons point has important implications also for any concepts that are analytically related to blameworthiness or other concepts that similarly implicate reactive attitudes.15 In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that the concepts of moral obligation, rights, and right are thus analytically related. It is a conceptual truth that violations of moral obligation, that is, acts that are morally wrong, are blameworthy if they are done without adequate excuse. What is morally obligatory is thus, as a conceptual matter, what we demand of and hold one another and ourselves to with reactive attitudes, as I see it, as representative persons or members of the moral community. It follows that no proposition of moral obligation, right, or rights can derive solely from propositions concerning the good. Of course, someone might take this as support for the hypothesis that Hobbes sees not only the state, but also morality itself as entirely artificial, a kind of pretense we engage in for mutual advantage. In the next section, I will exhibit a number of reasons for thinking that this is not Hobbess view. What we have seen in this section is that interpretative charity recommends not interpreting Hobbes as holding that the right can be derived solely from the good or that morality is conventional all the way down. The concept of moral right is analytically tied to that of warrant for familiar reactive attitudes that are no less a part of human psychology than are desires and aversions. As Hobbes himself says, the human capacity for a conception of right and wrong is tied to censure ((EL: I.19.5). IV. ELEMENTS IN HOBBES LEADING TOWARD THE AUTHORITY OF RIGHT One way of seeing our way into aspects of Hobbess view that tend toward the authority of right is to consider what leads him to a general golden-rule-like formulation of the laws of nature. Both Hobbess reasons for thinking that duty-imposing natural laws must be undergirded by a general principle that is available in ordinary consciousness and the various different ways in which he formulates this principle illustrate second-personal aspects of the right that were on display in the last section. Consider how Hobbes introduces the principle towards the end of Chapter 15 of Leviathan: to leave all men inexcusable, they [the laws of nature] have been contracted into one easy sum, intelligible, even
15 I believe it is the same point that underlies Prichards Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? (Prichard 2002).

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to the meanest capacity; and that is, Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to thyself (L: 15.35). Hobbes tells us here both why there must be such a general principle, and what it is.16 The reason why natural laws must be able to be sum[med into something that is intelligible, even to the meanest capacity, is that otherwise violations might be widely excusable, that is, nothing that could be reasonably expected or demanded of people and that they could properly, or perhaps even fully intelligibly, be held answerable for complying with. But for Hobbes to say this, he must be assuming that in order for actions to violate laws of nature and be therefore wrong, they must warrant censure or blame, unless, that is, the person doing them has some more specific excuse. In The Second-Person Standpoint, I argue that the presupposition that those subject to moral obligations must be capable of knowing and acting on their obligations is rooted in obligations conceptual connection to answerability. I follow Strawson and a number of other recent philosophers in holding that when we hold one another and ourselves to moral obligations and blame wrongdoers when they fail to discharge their obligations without excuse, we implicitly address demands to them.17 As Gary Watson puts it, that ordinary moral agents have the relevant moral knowledge and capacity is a constraint of moral address18or, as I put it, it is a normative felicity condition (Darwall 2006: 3-5). Consider now Hobbess formulation: Do not that to another, which thou wouldest not have done to oneself. How should we understand: wouldest not have done to oneself? A moments reflection shows that Hobbes cannot plausibly be interpreted to mean would prefer not to have done to oneself. Someone might prefer a world in which others peel grapes for him to a world in which they dont, and in this sense would not have others forbear this. But clearly a person with such preferences would not thereby have any duty to peel grapes for others or any reason to accept such a duty. Suppose, however, that he expects others to peel him grapes, that he holds them to this, feels indignant and resents it when they dont, and so on. Such a person makes a claim on or demand of others that he
16 I am tempted to say, and why it must be formulated in some such way. For further argument, see Darwall 2006. 17 Thus Strawson: the making of the demand is the proneness to such attitudes (1968: 92-93). And Wallace: there is an essential connection between the reactive attitudes and a distinctive form of evaluation . . . that I refer to as holding a person to an expectation (or demand) (Wallace 1994: 19). 18 Demanding requires understanding on the part of the object of the demand (Watson 1987: 264).

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implicitly addresses to them, if only in imagination. This is, I take it, the sense of wouldest have done to oneself that Hobbes has in mind. The sum of the laws of nature is that one should not act towards others in ways that one would expect or demand of others that they not act toward one and would blame them for doing, were they to do it without excuse. This fits perfectly with the second-personal analysis of moral obligation I presented earlier. If moral obligations are what we warrantedly demand of one another and blame people for failing to meet these demands without excuse, then the law of nature is something like a formal principle of right: Dont do to others what you would regard as wrong for them to do to you. This reading is confirmed by other formulations that Hobbes gives of the same idea. Thus Hobbes also says that one should not act in ways that one would not approve in another or that one thinkest unreasonable for others to do to one (L: 27.4, 26.13).19 What one would disapprove or think unreasonable of others in the requisite sense is not just anything one might criticize, even as against reason in a sufficiently broad sense. It is what one would blame someone for and implicitly demand he not do. In this way, moral demands, as Hobbes must be thinking of them, are on the command side of the command vs. counsel divide (as Grotius claimed). They are not simply advice, but concern things we are authoritatively demanded not to do. As Hobbes also puts it: whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that do ye to them (L: 14.5, emphasis added). This may seem to create something of a puzzle, however. If all that the laws of nature are really saying at bottom is that it is wrong to act in ways one thinks wrong, we seem to have no more that a principle of moral consistency, or perhaps integrity or non-hypocrisy. How could Hobbes have thought that such a formal principle could possible sum up or help one understand or accept the almost twenty quite specific laws of nature that Hobbes details in Chapters 14 and 15 of Leviathan? Here again, it seems to me that the only sensible answer confirms the second-personal analysis of moral obligation and right to which I have been referring. Hobbes must be assuming that there is something more to thinking someones action wrong than simply thinking that the person is making some kind of error, even error of reason. It is implicitly to make a claim on or demand of the other and, thereby, to direct the others will (to require it of the other), albeit it via the others reasoning through his acceptance of ones legitimate claim or demand.
19 The latter supports Hobbess identification between acting wrongly and acting against right reason. But that which is not contrary to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right (DC. 1.7). For a general argument that the laws of nature should be interpreted as theorizing the idea of the reasonable as opposed to the rational la Rawls and Scanlon, see Lloyd 2009. See also Rawls 2007.

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Indeed, Hobbes tells us how his golden rule can be used with this assumption to help us work out our obligations more specifically: he has no more to do in learning the laws of nature, but, when weighing the actions of other men with his own, they seem too heavy, to put them into the other part of the balance, and his own into their place, that his own passions, and self-love, may add nothing to the weight; and then there is none of these laws of nature that will not appear unto him very reasonable (L: 15.35) To work out whether our demands of others are reasonable or not, we must consider whether we can accept others making the very same demands of us in similar situations. Similarly, we should permit ourselves to do things to others only if we are prepared to permit others to do the very same thing to us in similar conditions. And so on. Legitimate demands are those we can accept from the standpoint of a representative person. Understood in this way, Hobbess principle is not simply a principle of moral consistency or integrity. It can be of use, Hobbes says, in learning the laws of nature themselves. So far, this is all evidence that Hobbes understands the laws of nature as norms of right and wrong that people are appropriately held to and that bind in conscience, as he says in De Cive. Because this is so, there are weighty philosophical reasons, as we saw in Section III, for Hobbes to hold that such norms cannot be derived solely from the good and, consequently, to accept the authority of right. In the final section, I shall argue that there is a way for Hobbes to do this consistently with his metaethics. To conclude this section, however, I want briefly to consider what would seem to be two obstacles to Hobbess accepting the authority of righthis reply to the fool and his doctrine that the laws of nature do not bind in foro externo and are not genuine laws without the backing of the sovereign. Far from precluding the authority of the right, I shall suggest that, properly understood, both are actually quite compatible the authority of the right. Regarding the fool, we should recall the philosophical problems that afflict the familiar indirect egoist interpretation. In addition to issues about rule worship that indirect consequentialisms face quite generally, there is simply no way to derive propositions about what people can legitimately be held answerable for from propositions about the good alone, whether personal or impersonal good. We have seen strong evidence in this section that this is indeed how Hobbes envisions the laws of nature. Moreover, when we turn to the passages in which Hobbes replies to the challenged posed by fool, there is nothing that requires the orthodox interpretation; indeed, the text can be read in ways that support the authority of right.20
20 Sharon Lloyd argues against the orthodox interpretation of Hobbess reply to fool at

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The fool questions whether there is reason to keep covenant when it is against ones interest and, by implication whether there is any reason not to make advantageous that one has no intention of keeping. It is widely agreed that Hobbes concedes that specific violations of the third law of naturethat men perform their covenants made (L: 151) can turn out to an agents benefit. The issue, Hobbes says, is whether such acts are reasonably or wisely done. According to the orthodox interpretation, Hobbes implicitly claims that that is determined by which rule an agent reasons by, with the right rule being whichever it would benefit the agent most to use. Agents who try to promote their own interest directly, accept and act on an egoistic rule. But if others discover this, they will be unlikely to make covenants with them. Under such conditions, egoistic agents will likely lose the benefit of covenanting, so they will neither be able to exit the state of nature nor combine with confederates within it for self-defense. Such an agent will be unable to be received into any society, that unite themselves for peace and defence, but by the error of them that receive him (L: 15.5). Now the first thing to notice is that even if Hobbess reply is that fools would do better were they to pursue their interests indirectly and reason by the third law of nature, this would not commit Hobbes to thinking that the authority of natural laws derives from this fact. So far as the dialectic goes, this reply could simply be one that proceeds from premises that are closer to those the fool himself accepts. On reflection, in fact, it is somewhat puzzling that interpreters have given so much weight to this passage as evidence for Hobbess most fundamental normative justificatory views. So far as the text goes, the situation could be much the same as Butlers famous cool hour passage, in which Butler accepts arguendo something he actually denies, namely, that the authority of conscience depends on support from self-interest.21 Moreover, there are ways of interpreting Hobbess reply that are closer to the authority of right. Hobbes says that the fool declares he thinks it reason to deceive those that help him; and again: he declareth that he thinks he may with reason do so (L: 15.5, emphasis added). Why does Hobbes represent the fool as declaring these things?22 If what were in question were simply how one might most sensibly promote ones interest, whether directly or indirectly, why would Hobbes be talking about the fools declarations? Surely the fool would try to cover his tracks and be more or less successful in doing that. If, however, what is
Lloyd 2009: 302-317. 21 For discussion, see Darwall 1995: 265n-266n. 22 For a different explanation see Hoekstra 1997. See also Lloyd 2009: 310-312 for a criticism of Hoekstra that is closer to the view presented here.

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in question is a principle of right, of what one may legitimately demand of people and what one may not, of what people may and may not do, then this is indeed properly determined by what the fool is prepared to declare and endorse publicly. Because they concern mutual accountability, principles of right are subject to a test of public endorsability by their very nature. Thus far, anyway, Hobbess reply to the fool is thoroughly within the authority of right. Note next that what Hobbes then says is that a fool who declares the view that covenants may be breached or falsely entered into can be accepted into society through covenant only by the error of them that receive him (L: 15.5). The orthodox interpretation is that someone who reasons egoistically rather than by the third law of nature will be received into society only by others mistaking his real intentions. An alternative interpretation that is actually closer to the text, however, is that someone who puts forward what the fool declares as a proposition of right cannot be so received, except by a mistake not regarding the fools intentions, but about the obligation to keep covenants and so about the right itself. So understood, the mistake that both the fool and his potential covenanters make is not a strategic error in advancing their respective interests; both make a mistake of right. A covenant, by its very nature, is something that transfers a right; but no such transfer is possible if both parties know that one of them has no intention of following through. Even reasonable suspicion of nonperformance is enough, Hobbes says, to render a covenant void (L: 14.18). In other words, the view that covenants may be broken or entered into falsely for reasons of self-interest is itself mistaken. And anyone who attempts to covenant with someone who declares such a view must mistake the nature of covenants, since covenants are void on any reasonable suspicion of nonperformance. What then, about Hobbess view that the laws of nature bind to external conduct but rarely in the state of nature and require the sovereigns sanctions to provide genuinely obligating law? Here again, it might seem that Hobbes is saying that the normative force of any duty or obligation to follow natural law must derive from reasons of selfinterest coming from the sovereigns sanctions. But here again such appearances can be deceiving, although I shall have to be brief in saying exactly how they are in this case. First, although Hobbes clearly does say that it takes the sovereigns commands to create genuine law, even to make the improperly called laws of nature laws properly so-called, it is nonetheless of great importance to him that subjects see themselves as obligated to follow the sovereigns commands and not just as having reasons of self-interest for doing so (DC: 2.10; L: 13.13, 26.passim).

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Sovereigns are established, as it were, either from below, by subjects covenanting with one another to authorize and follow a sovereign (L: 17), or from above, by conquest. An obligation to follow the sovereigns commands follows directly from the covenant authorizing him. But even in conquest, Hobbes is clear that it is not . . . victory that giveth the right of dominion, but his own covenant, which the vanquished enter into when they submit to the conqueror and promise to obey as the price of survival (L: 20.11). Hobbes distinguishes between the condition of a slave who is kept in thrall by chains and threats of reprisals, on the one hand, and a servant who upon promise not to run away, nor to do violence to his master, is trusted by him (L: 20.10), on the other. And he explicitly analogizes the case of servants to that of submitting subjects. If masters and sovereigns thus trust their servants and subjects, respectively, they must think that believing oneself to be obligated can make a difference in conduct that cannot fully be explained by motives of self-interest. And this is far from the only place in which Hobbes relies on this difference between motivation by self-interest and motivation by a sense of right. The most central, of course, is in the making of the covenant itself. Since a covenant involves a transfer of rights by its very nature, it is only possible if the covenanting parties see themselves as giving themselves and one another a reason to comply that is not reducible to self-interest. Or to put the point the other way around, individuals who recognize and know themselves to recognize only reasons of self-interest cannot covenant. But there are many other places also where Hobbes recognizes the possibility of conscientious conduct. Some particularly important examples for his political philosophy are instances in which sovereigns commands conflict with subjects consciences or, contrariwise, when a proposed act of sedition would violate conscience. Thus, Hobbes says that subjects will hardly be drawn into the field and fight with courage against their consciences (Behemoth. 185). And that though a man be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause of stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor any pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will never show it (EL: 2.8). However, this still leaves a large question hanging. If it takes the sovereigns command to make genuine law, including of the laws of nature, how then can Hobbes accept the authority of right? But Hobbes cannot possibly think, and does not think, that it takes the sovereigns command to obligate, since the sovereign can himself exist, only if a covenant that establishes him and authority obligates independently of his command. Moreover, there are reasons of right why, at least in Hobbess view, it takes the sovereigns command to create genuine law. These reasons fit, briefly, under two main headings: publicity and

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assurance. Genuine law requires genuine publicitypublic practices and institutionsand those are unavailable in the state of nature by definition. Second, like any covenant, the covenant establishing the sovereign requires joint performance and is void under reasonable suspicion of nonperformance. Covenanters will need assurance, therefore, not just that there will be reasons of right to comply, but that less conscientious individuals will have reasons to comply beyond their being obligated to. The crucial point is not that the covenanters might have a strategic, self-interested reason for this assurance; they have reasons for assurance that are grounded in the authority of right itself. Perfectly conscientious beings who know one another to be so might not need the assurance provided by the sovereigns sanctions, but ordinary human beings, knowing one another to be guided both by conscience and by self-interest, do. Since reasonable suspicion of nonperformance voids contract, even conscientious subjects have reasons of right for wanting there to be reasons of self-interest for compliance also. But this does not mean that the reasons of right derive their authority from selfinterest in any way. It just means that they would not bind to performance in foro externo unless sanction-creating reasons of selfinterest were in play also. V. PROJECTIVISM ABOUT THE RIGHT In this last section, I want to close with some remarks about how Hobbes might accommodate the elements of his thought that tend in the direction of the authority of right by holding a projectivism about the right that is analogous to his projectivism about the good. The idea, in a nutshell, is that there is no less philosophical motivation for holding that judgments of praiseworthiness, moral obligation, and moral right express or project reactive attitudes through which we hold one another responsible than there is for thinking that judgments of good and evil express or project desires and aversions. We have seen that Hobbes regards the concepts of moral right and wrong as intrinsically related to moral responsibility, blame, and excuse. And Strawsonian reactive attitudes find their way into his moral psychology also. For example, Hobbes says that indignation is anger for great hurt done to another, when we conceive the same to be done injury (L: 6.21). Of course, if Hobbes were to think that indignation is a reaction to a prior belief about injury and wrong, he could not then say that these beliefs about right project the reactive attitude. But there is no philosophical reason for Hobbes to be a judgmentalist about reactive attitudes that would not apply also to being a judgmentalist about desire.23 Neither 23 For arguments against judgmentalist theories of emotion, see DArms and
Jacobson 2000 and Nye 2009.

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view, moreover, seems to fit with Hobbess fundamental philosophical orientations. How, then, would a projectivism about the right fit with a projectivism about the good? Hobbes believes that deliberation is but the succession of appetites and aversions and that the will is simply the last appetite before action. There is no doubt that such a stripped-down view of deliberation and the will fits less comfortably with a doctrine of the authority of right than a moral psychology and philosophy of action that connects these more tightly to autonomous agency. Only the latter, it would seem, can best fit with a moral and political philosophy that give authority and consent fundamental roles. Nonetheless, there is nothing that is flatly inconsistent between Hobbesian deliberation and the authority of right. Just as a Kantian ethics and moral psychology can be fit within a sufficiently formal Humean theory of motivation (for example, by making Rawlss distinction between object-dependent and principle-dependent desires), so also might a projectivism about the right be fit with a Hobbesian projectivism about the good (Rawls 2000). Thus we might regard one of the subjects Hobbes discusses in the passage quoted above who forbears self-interested rebellion because he lacks just cause, as having his desires affected by his reactive attitudes in ways that make his judgments of good influenced by his judgments of right. Realizing that such rebellion would be blameworthy by imaginatively placing himself in an impartial position and blaming rebellion from that perspective, he desires not to rebel, which he expresses with the judgment that that would be bad to do (and good to forbear doing) because it would be wrong. I should reiterate, in conclusion, that I have not been trying to convince you that Hobbes actually accepted the authority of right. My point has rather been to show that there are elements of his thought that definitely point in that direction and that other elements that are widely thought to rule it out, definitely do not. Once we have cleared the latter away, Hobbes could accept the doctrine without compromising anything fundamental to his view. Stephen Darwall Yale University

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1958). Modern Moral Philosophy, Philosophy, 33: 1-19. Aristotle (1980). The Nicomachean Ethics, ed. David Ross. New York: 22

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Strawson, P. F. (1968). Freedom and Resentment, in Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action. London: Oxford University Press. Wallace, R. Jay (1994). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Watson, Gary (1987). Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme, in Responsibility, Character, and the Emotions: New Essays in Moral Psychology, ed. F. D. Schoeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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