APRIL 1941 487

vigorously aerial warfare in the Mediterranean, especially against

English transports by sea. He was very glad about the letter of the

Duce and believed that the Duce and he (the Fuhrer) would do

their jobs well.

Alfieri who noted down the Fiihrer's statements in part thanked

the Fuhrer in his concluding remarks and emphasized especially the

efforts which Yugoslavia had undertaken in the last few days in

order to gain time.

SCHMIDT

No. 291

833/280709

Unsigned Memorandum

[APRIL 6, 1941.]1

Enclosure 2 of OKW/WFSt/L IV Qu No. 44434/41 g. K. Chefs 2

GENERAL PLANS FOR THE LATER ORGANIZATION OF THE

ADMINISTRATION IN THE YUGOSLAVIA AREA

The Fuhrer has given the following guiding principles for the

later organization of the administration of the Yugoslav area:

1. The parts which were formerly Austrian and which border on

the Gaue of Carinthia and Styria to the south, will to an extent still

to be determined be annexed to these Gaue and thus to the territory

of the German Reich.

2. Croatia will become an autonomous state, probably under Hun-

garian influence.

3. The coastal area in northwestern Yugoslavia, Dalmatia, and

Montenegro, will fall to Italy.

4. Macedonia is to fall to Bulgaria.

5. The part (up to the Danube), formerly Hungarian, which bor-

ders on Hungary, will fall to Hungary.

6. Only Old Serbia (without Macedonia) is for the time being to

be made an area under German military administration.8

1 This document is without date. It was initialed by Bitter and Woermami

on Apr. 6.

Not found.

'Cf. Hitler's directives for the partition of Yugoslavia transmitted in a di-

rective of Apr. 12 signed by Keltel which is published in Trial of the Major

War Criminal*, vol. xrvn, document No. 1195-PS (O.B. Exhibit 144), pp. 60-62.

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APRIL 1941 555

No. 347

274/177879

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIN RAM, April 14, 194112: 00 midnight.

No. 220 of April 14 from

the Special Train Received Berlin, April 1512:30 a. m.

No. 525 from the Foreign Ministry Sent April 1512:45 a, m.

zu Pol. IV 1652 g.1

For Benzler.

With reference to your telegram No. 407 of April II.2

The fate of the various regions belonging to Yugoslavia will not

be settled definitively until later, at the conclusion of peace. At pres-

ent, therefore, no statements can be made concerning political goals

and future boundaries with respect to the area of Macedonia. For

the propaganda directed at the Bulgarian population in Yugoslav

Macedonia, the watchword would have to be: "Away from Belgrade"

[Los von Belgrad]. Regarding the extent of the area for such prop-

aganda, it must be taken into account, however, that Italian claims

to the Yugoslav areas inhabited by Albanians are to be expected,

and that a settlement with regard to the Macedonians living in Greek

territory can likewise not be made until later.

RIBBENTROP

1 Pol. IV 1652 g.: Not found.

This telegram (274/177863-64) reported the growing Importance of the

Macedonian question In Bulgaria and requested Instructions for guidance In

conversations.

No. 348

2281/482245-47

Memorandum by the Ambassador in Italy

ROME, April 15, 1941.

Following the telephone conversation at 9:45 p. m. which I had from

the villa with Minister von Rintelen, in the presence of the Marchese

de Ferrariis,11 received another call from the former at 11:10 p.m., in

which he informed me that, according to reports from Zagreb, the

original of the telegram from Pavelic to the Duce, which I had handed

to the Duce this afternoon [sic],4 had meanwhile been delivered to

Chef de Cabinet Anfuso in Zagreb, and would be delivered by him to

the Duce. The text coincided with the one transmitted by me, but con-

tained as a result of Anfuso's consultation with Pavelid, a supplement

1 See document No. 346 and footnote 1.

1 See document No. 345.

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566 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

havior of the Dalmatian population toward Italy. Kvaternik, too,

is doing his best in this respect.

Concern about Hungary with regard to the Medjumurje is reced-

ing into the background compared with the spirit of Dalmatia

[trete gegen den Geist Dalmatiens zumiclc].

Early determination of the boundaries would greatly help in fur-

ther consolidating matters.

Veesenmayer

Freundt

No. 357

274/177885-86

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT SOFIA, April 16, 1941.

No. 424 of April 16 Keceived Berlin, April 164:50 p. m.1

For the Foreign Minister.

Secret for officer in charge.

With reference to our telegram No. 423 of April 16.2

For some days now, uneasiness has been noticeable in leading cir-

cles, as well as in large sections of the population in Bulgaria. The

impression exists here that Germany is procrastinating regarding

the employment of the divisions requested by us for the occupation

of southern Serbia,3 and which are now ready to march. An ex-

planation is being sought, and Italian influence is believed to be

behind this. The Italian announcement that the Italian troops have

occupied Ohrid, which is regarded as a Bulgarian national shrine,

burst like a bomb-shell here. The public is beginning again to

blame the King and Government for not pressing Bulgaria's claims

with sufficient energy.

The Bulgarian occupation of Serbian Macedonia would give the

crowning touch to the feeling, now at its height, of gratitude for

Germany and the Fuhrer, and which particularly at Easter time

found its expression among the entire population in forms which

were often touching. It would strengthen the position of the King

1 Marginal note: "Forwarded as No. 1208 to the Special Train, Apr. 16, 5: 15

p.m."

"In this telegram (274/177891) Richthofen reported the words of the Bul-

garian Foreign Minister that the King had been told by Hitler at the Berghof

that the Fuhrer would receive him for a personal discussion whenever the

King felt the need for such. The King would now wish a time set for a

discussion which, Richthofen suggested, would be about Macedonia.

' See document No. 312 and footnote 1.

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APRIL 1941 567

and the Government, in whose maintenance, at least, as seen from

here, we have an interest, because otherwise, with the situation as it

now is, only chauvinistic elements among the Bulgarians and Mace-

donians here would receive encouragement, and neither the King nor

the Government could permanently withstand them. A situation

could arise similar to that of 1917, when extremist demands for the

possession of all of the Dobruja were subsequently made, which the

Government could not ignore; disregarding them, however, caused

sentiment to become embittered and did much to shake the Bulgarian

internal and military front. An assignment of Ohrid to Italy would

have incalculable consequences. It is realized by all sensible Bul-

garians that no decision can be reached concerning the future of

Greek Macedonia west of the Struma.

ElCHTHOFEN

No. 358

116/66765-66

The Foreign Minister to the Legations in Hungary and Bulgaria1

Telegram

No. 637 to Budapest VIENNA, April 16, 19416:00 p. m.

No. 533 to Sofia

RAM 118/R

The German Consulate in Zagreb is receiving the following tele-

graphic instruction:2

"Please have the Croatian Government now inform also the Hun-

garian, Bulgarian, and Rumanian Governments by wire at once of

the establishment of an Independent Croatian State with the request

for recognition, so that these Governments, too, may thereupon grant

recognition."

Please inform the Government at your post of this matter and,

in so doing, state that we would appreciate it if the telegrams of the

Croatian Government were given a positive reply, at once, if pos-

sible.

RlBBENTROP

'This telegram was originally also addressed to the Legation in Rumania.

The address of the latter and a special addendum for Bucharest were deleted

before the telegram was dispatched.

1 Sent by Ribbentrop In telegram No. 116 of Apr. 16 to Zagreb (116/66764).

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APRIL 1941 577

dependently of the fact that the Fiihrer had already decided in

favor of Hungary. This decision had indeed been so clear that, in

his letter of reply to the Fiihrer, the Regent had deliberately re-

frained from bringing it up once more.

Finally, Szt6jay also asserted that Rumania was preparing to oc-

cupy parts of the Banat in the coming week.

I promised the Minister that I would transmit his wishes to the

Foreign Minister. Sztojay also offered to appear in person before

the Foreign Minister in order to explain and confirm what he had

told me.

WEIZSACKER

No. 367

274/177896

The Foreign Minister to the Legation in Bulgaria

Telegram

SPECIAL TRAIX, April 17,194111:50 p. m.

No. 244 of April 17 from the

Special Train Received Berlin, April 17 [18}12:25 a. m.

No. 547 from the

Foreign Ministry Sent April 182:00 a. m.

I. The Bulgarian Army has now been permitted to occupy:

1) Greek Thrace, bounded in the east by the demarcation line

Svilengrad-Alexandroupolis; in the west by the Strymon line.

2) Macedonia, but for the present no farther than to the Pirot-

Vranje-Skoplje line, and, from there, following the course of the

Vardar, to the Greek frontier.1

II. The German military authorities concerned have already re-

ceived instructions from the High Command of the Wehrmacht.2

Please, however, inform the Bulgarian Government also and add

that the occupation line indicated for Macedonia is provisional

only. It is intended at a suitable, early date to enter into discussions

with the Bulgarian Government concerning a provisional settle-

ment of territorial questions arising for Bulgaria from the collapse

of the Yugoslav State. There will be further communications re-

garding the date.

REBBENTROP

1 In telegram No. 332 from the Special Train, forwarded to Sofia as No. 603

of Apr. 26 (274/177929), Bitter sent the instruction that the Bulgarian Govern-

ment was to be informed that the Bulgarian Army was permitted to occupy the

area west of this line and up to a line running from Bujanovac to north of Mt.

Ljuboten and from there through Brod to Bitolj. The area of Ohrid was not

to be occupied until the Italians had evacuated it.

In telegram No. 382 of May 15 (274/177966) Rintelen notified Ritter that

Bulgarian troops were free to enter Ohrid.

'The Kramarz memorandum of Apr. 18 (230/153121) records the transmission

of Hitler's decision In this matter to the Foreign Ministry.

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578 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

No. 368

230/153119-20

The Foreign Minister to the Embassy in Italy

Telegram

most urgent Special Train, April 18,19412: 25 a. m.

No. 252 of April 17

from Vienna Received Berlin, April 183: 00 a. m.

No. 862 of April 18

from the Foreign Ministry Sent April 186: 24 a. m.

RAM 129

Secret for officer in charge.

For the Ambassador personally.

Please inform Count Ciano, if he is already in Rome, otherwise

inform Anfuso first of all, that I am happy about the quick accept-

ance of my invitation to Count Ciano1 and would be glad to see the

Italian Foreign Minister again in Vienna on Sunday.2 In view of

the Fiihrer's birthday, which falls on the same day and the demands

this will make on my time during the noon hours of Sunday, I should

be very glad if Count Ciano would arrive in Vienna Sunday morn-

ing, by 10:00 o'clock at the latest, since I wish to greet him per-

sonally at the railroad station, which would not be possible for me

after 10: 00 o'clock. It is planned that Count Ciano will be received

by the Fuhrer during the afternoon in the vicinity of Vienna, and

that I will be able to confer with him in Vienna in the evening and

on Monday. Furthermore, please make also the following communi-

cations at your end:

We naturally did not expect Count Ciano to come here with a

detailed program but we would appreciate it if the Duce would

inform us through Count Ciano in broad outline of his ideas con-

cerning the subject of the conversations. We are in agreement with

the intention expressed to you by the Duce of letting the remainder

of Slovenia go to Italy. With respect to the Dalmatian question,

we were, of course, thinking of a solution in accordance with Italian

interests. I intended, moreover, to speak with Count Ciano about

the future destiny of the former Montenegro, as well as the con-

siderable enlargement of Albania presumably desired by Italy. Simi-

larly, I intended to present to him my views as to how the frontiers

of the newly created Croatian State should be denned, and what por-

tions of the former Yugoslavia should, in our opinion, fall to Hun-

gary and to Bulgaria. As far as the latter point was concerned, we

1 See document No. 363 and footnote 4.

1 Apr. 20.

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APRIL 1941 579

believed we already were sure of Italy's consent to a solution of the

Macedonian question in accordance with Bulgarian interests, so that

the entire territory in question down to the city of Ohrid on Lake

Okhrida, claimed by the Bulgarians as a national shrine, would

come under the sovereignty of Bulgaria. I should be greatly inter-

ested in learning Italy's views on these points, as well as on Italy's

intentions with respect to Greece.

For your personal information only, I should like also to remark

that it would appear to us undesirable if Count Ciano came here

already largely bound by specific instructions. The purpose of your

statements, as outlined above, is merely to acquaint the Italian Gov-

ernment to some extent with our ideas, but by no means to bring

about adoption of an exactly defined Italian position even before

the departure from Rome. As I have already told you by telephone,31

shall expect you in Vienna at the same time as Count Ciano.

Ribbentrop

* Mackensen's memorandum (4849/E247274) records a telephone conversation

with Ribbentrop on Apr. 17, at 9: 45 a.m. about the forthcoming meeting in

Vienna.

No. 369

104/113391

German-Soviet Protocol

Protocol on the Outcome of the Conference Between the

Plenipotentiaries of the Government of the German Reich

and the Government of the Union of the Soviet Socialist

Republics to Inquire Into the Observance of the Economic

Agreement Between Germany and the Union of Soviet Social-

ist Republics of February 11, 19401

Ha. Pol. V a 925.

The Plenipotentiaries of the Government of the German Reich

and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

acting in pursuance of article 10 of the Economic Agreement between

Germany and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics of Febru-

ary 11, 1940, have, on the basis of their inquiry into the observance

of the above-mentioned agreement as of February 11, 1941, agreed

as follows:

According to Soviet calculations, the Soviet deliveries on February

11, 1941, amounted to 310.3 million reichsmarks. The Germans

' For text, see vol. vui of this series, document No. 607.

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596 DOCUMENTS OX GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Germany had already sent a Minister to Zagreb.4 In this context

the Keich Foreign Minister also mentioned the mission of General

Glaise-Horstenau as liaison between the occupying troops and the

Croatian Government.0

Following this, the Reich Foreign Minister in turn outlined the

German view of the reorganization of the former Yugoslav territory,

vising a map also, which was handed to Count Ciano at the close of

the conversation.8 He called attention to the definitive change in

the northern boundary of Croatia, already ordered by the Fuhrer.7

At an appropriate time Germany would make a boundary treaty

with the Croatian Government.

The Reich Foreign Minister then added that Hungary had claimed,

and been accorded by the Fiihrer, the Backa and Banat regions, be-

cause they were situated within the old boundaries of Hungary.

The Banat was still occupied by German troops in order to avert

possible clashes between Hungary and Rumania in that area. For

Rumania on her part had also pointed to the existence of a Rumanian

minority in the Banat. Germany, to be sure, held that such a claim

which, incidentally, had so far not been raisedhad little justification,

but she did not ignore the fact that Rumania would have to be

offered something in compensation; at the present moment it was

hard to say what this would be, but the possibility would have to be

studied later in greater detail.

No decision had yet been made as to the future regime of Serbia.

It might not be a bad idea to bring Prince Paul back to Serbia.

Following this the Reich Foreign Minister referred once more

to the Bulgarian claims advanced by King Boris, which were re-

garded as reasonable from the German viewpoint and concerning

which the Fiihrer had expressed sympathy. The only reservation

he had made in this connection was that he would want to have an

exchange of views on these subjects with the Italian ally.

Count Ciano repeated his arguments on the necessity of advancing

the border. He cited the economic and especially military con-

siderations prompting Italy to take this position, and proposed that

the Italian experts be given a hearing on that point. The Italian

military representatives were called in, but they were not able to

furnish very illuminating information, in response to the detailed

questions by the Reich Foreign Minister, on the military reasons

4 On Apr. 16 Rintelen recorded that Hitler had Indicated to Hewel the wish

that a German Legation be established in Zagreb without delay, whereupon

Ribbentrop had suggested to Hitler the appointment of SA-Obergruppenfiihrer

Siegfried Easche as German Minister (116/66768). Hitler notified Pavelld of

Kasche's appointment In a letter of Apr. 19 (116/66779-80) which Kane-he

handed to Pavelld on Apr. 21.

' See document No. 356.

* Not found.

' See document No. 363. J

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APRIL 1941 597

underlying the proposal for the border in Macedonia. General di

Castiglione merely stated that he did not want to have a zig-zag

boundary, adding significantly that if the borders were left as they

were now Albania would be too narrow and the withdrawal zone to

the sea too small. Count Ciano supplemented these statements by

saying that Italy wanted a double range of mountains as the border

of Albania and wanted to have possession of certain railroad lines

in Macedonia. There followed an exchange of views on the ethnic

composition of the population in the area in dispute, based on

ethnographic maps, but no uniform view emerged from these dis-

cussions.

Count Ciano merely stated that he, for his person, was prepared

to draw the boundary at Lake Okhrida in such a way that the Bul-

garian shrines would be included in Bulgarian territory.

He next asked the Reich Foreign Minister a question which he fre-

quently repeated in the further course of the conversation: namely,

whether Germany had any objections to a personal union between

Italy and Croatia.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he would ask the Fuhrer

for his opinion in the matter, and inquired whether the Croats had

actually made any proposals to Italy about a personal union. Ciano

replied that Pavelic", whom he had known for a long time, had often

talked about a personal union in former days, when a new settle-

ment concerning these matters seemed to be far off in a nebulous

future. Ciano, however, had to admit in response to a question by

the Reich Foreign Minister that he had not talked to Pavelic very

recently.

The Reich Foreign Minister then elaborated the position o"f the

Fuhrer, who held that the shaping of Croatia's future system of

government should be left entirely to the Croats themselves. Ger-

many did not think it wise to force anything upon them. Moreover,

Germany had not talked with the Croats so far, but had merely

heard of certain demands raised among the Croatian people. The

Reich Foreign Minister explained these demands to Count Ciano,

referring to the German map, and reiterated that Germany and

Italy had recognized Croatia's independence and that Germany had

already sent a Minister to Zagreb. When the Reich Foreign Min-

ister also mentioned in this connection Germany's desire to withdraw

her troops from Croatia as soon as possible, Count Ciano took ad-

vantage of this to state that Italy was prepared to send troops for

the occupation immediately.

The Reich Foreign Minister then came to speak of Hungary's

wish for a free port on the coast of the Adriatic. Count Ciano

replied that there were no obstacles in the way of an economic ar-

rangement of this type.

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APRIL 1941 609

In the further course of the conversation the Reich Foreign Min-

ister also turned to the wish expressed to the Fiihrer by King Boris

regarding the cession of Salonika to Bulgaria. Ciano replied at this

point with a certain vigor that he could not say anything on this mat-

ter. The Reich Foreign Minister replied that the Fuhrer had not

made any definite promises to King Boris. lie had told him that

decisions on these questions could not be taken until the end of the

war. Here the Fuhrer shared the Duce's view as presented by Count

Ciano, that the whole complex of questions relating to Greece should

not be settled by the Fuhrer and the Duce until the end of the war.

King Boris probably had been prompted to put forward his de-

mand when he learned that the cession of Salonika had been promised

to Yugoslavia.* Moreover, he had very strongly pressed for the in-

clusion of Salonika in Macedonia, stressing that the Salonika area

and Macedonia formed a natural entity and that the one could prac-

tically not exist without the other. The Reich Foreign Minister

added that he personally thought that the Fuhrer was not unsym-

pathetic to King Boris' wish, although he had told him that this

question could not be settled until later. The Reich Foreign Minister

asked Count Ciano to report to the Duce that the Reich Foreign Min-

ister had the impression that the Fuhrer sympathized with the Bul-

garian request.

These statements apparently convinced Count Ciano, for in con-

trast to the doubts he had voiced before, he characterized the new

boundary resulting from Salonika's inclusion in Macedonia as en-

tirely "logical." He added that this logic, to be sure, would also have

to be applied to Greece, making a gesture as if he were taking pos-

session of Greece.

Subsequently he asked the Reich Foreign Minister by what act

Italy should determine the Dalmatian boundary. He thought that

the boundary could be established by a law, just as Germany had

determined her own boundary with Croatia. When the Reich For-

eign Minister asked whether the ethnographic basis for such a

method of determining the boundary was similar to that present in

those parts of Croatia which were inhabited by Germans and had been

incorporated into the Reich, Count Ciano answered that Dalmatia

belonged to Italy by virtue of her history, culture, and language.

The towns were Italian, to be sure, but the countryside was entirely

Croatian. Hence the annexation of Dalmatia could not be justified

on ethnographic grounds. In support of her demand, Italy therefore

asserted the argument of Lebensraum and reasons of political and

4 See document No. 206.

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APRIL 1941 623

hand grenades in their houses in Genen Kula row. Please bring this

to the attention of the Hungarian Government at once.7

KIBBEKTROP

'In telegram No. 771 of May 3 (93/103611) Ribbentrop instructed Erdmanns-

dorff again to inquire regarding the investigation of the Hungarian excesses

against Volksdeutsche.

In telegram No. 497 of May 5 (93/103615) Erdmannsdorff reported on the

steps which he had taken.

In telegram No. 512 of May 17 (93/103630-32) he forwarded the text of a

Hungarian memorandum which admitted that Volksdeutsche had accidentally

been killed but only as the "unavoidable result of shooting caused by the

activity of Serbian snipers," but insisted that it was "inconceivable" that any

Hungarian officer or soldier would act with hostility or malicious intent toward

members of the German minority.

No. 393

274/177919-20

The Legation in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

MOST URGENT SOFIA, April 24, 1941.

No. 454 of April 24 Beceived April 248:05 a. m.1

For the Foreign Minister.

I talked with King Boris this evening,2 immediately on arrival.

Bulgaria agrees to Germany's acquiring ownership of all chromium

ore deposits northwest and northeast of Skoplje, in accordance with

the understandings previously reached between the two countries

regarding exploitation of deposits of raw materials. Accord on

this subject was reached in an amicable manner, and the King was

not given the impression that we were attempting in some manner

to exploit the situation or exert pressure. The King seems to have

grasped immediately the significance of the question of ownership,

especially in the region of Skoplje. He mentioned that the Fiihrer

had himself mentioned to him that he attached importance to having

the region around Mount Ljuboten become Bulgarian.

Following this I had a conference with the Foreign Minister dur-

ing which I brought up besides the question of ownership of the

chromium ore mines around Skoplje our other economic and finan-

cial wishes. This talk indicated that it will presumably be possible

to settle all these questions soon in a satisfactory manner, as was to

be expected. Tomorrow I shall draw up the text of a written agree-

ment with the Foreign Minister. I am of the opinion that it would

be better for the present to avoid concluding an official agreement

"Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1368 to the Special Train, Apr. 24,

8:40 a.m."

"This obviously refers to the evening of Apr. 23. The telegram was pre-

sumably drafted in the late evening of Apr. 23 and dispatched in the early

morning hours of Apr. 24.

58847162 45

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624 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

and therefore propose to exchange merely initialed memoranda with

the Foreign Minister.3

In a conversation lasting 2 hours the King very candidly pre-

sented his position regarding all political and territorial questions

arising from the collapse of Yugoslavia. I assume that the Bang's

statements substantially coincide with what he had said in Vienna,*

and that it would therefore not be necessary to report by telegraph.

I would like to emphasize merely that the King is primarily con-

cerned with the question of determining the frontier between Albania

and Bulgarian Macedonia. He is very anxious that Ohrid, Stniga,

Gostivar, and above all Tetovo should go to Bulgaria for ethno-

graphic and geographic reasons.

CLODIUS

RlCHTHOFEN

'In telegram No. 463 of Apr. 24 (274/177921-22) Clodius reported that

following acceptance of all his proposals by the Bulgarian Council of Ministers,

the Foreign Minister and he signed the text of the agreement without further

discussion.

See document No. 362, footnote 2.

No. 394

116/66786-93

Unsigned Memorandum1

VIENNA, April 24, 1941.

For the Fuhrer's decision:

At noon today Ambassador Alfieri brought up the following two

points with State Secretary von Weizsacker for discussion:

1. In the conversations in Vienna2 the Reich Foreign Minister

had promised Count Ciano that he would send the Leader of the

Croatian State, Pavelic, before the latter's negotiations with the

Italians, a general communication to the effect that Germany would

agree to the arrangements that he, Pavelic, would make with the

Italian Government. According to Ambassador Alfieri's statements,

Pavelic will be in Rome as early as tomorrow, Friday noon. For this

reason Count Ciano requested that the Reich Foreign Minister carry

out the promise made to him as soon as possible.

About an hour later Ambassador Alfieri, on the basis of a tele-

phone conversation with Count Ciano, made the supplementary state-

ment to State Secretary von Weizsacker that Count Ciano asked

that Ambassador Alfieri's step be considered not as an official

1 Marginal notes:

"Shown to the Fiihrer. Hew [el], Apr. 24."

"Recorded Apr. 24, 6:15 p.m."

* See documents Nos. 378 and 385.

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830 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

No. 524

4671/E221653

The Minister in Bulgaria to the Foreign Ministry

Telegram

most urgent Sofia, May 6 [162, 1941.

secret Received May 1710: 55 a. m.1

No. 534 Kult. A 2558 g.

With reference to your telegram No. 701 of May 14.2

The new areas falling to Bulgaria confront the Government with

very difficult tasks, a fact which governmental circles do not conceal.

Thrace presents them with a large Greek minority because of the

compulsory removal of Bulgarian elements after the World War

and the settlement of Greeks from Asia Minor. Macedonia contains,

besides a large Bulgarian population, not inconsiderable portions of

Kutzo-Walachians and Albanians. Rumania is already making at-

tempts to intervene on behalf of the Kutzo-Walachians. The Ital-

ians, as I gather from remarks of the Albanian Special Attache1 with

the local Italian Legation, have not yet stopped using Albanian

elements in Macedonia for more far-reaching Balkan plans. New

settlements of Slovenes in Macedonia would perhaps render per-

manently impossible any chance of a pacification and economic devel-

opment of Macedonia.8

Richthofex

1 Marginal note: "Transmitted as No. 1556 to Fnschl, May 17."

' See document No. 465, footnote 3.

'Marginal note: "No Instruction has been issued as yet. To be submitted

again in 4 weeks. Goe[ken], June 10."

An attached sheet (4671/E221554) has the further notation: "The snggestion

has not been followed up. To the flies. Goe[ken], July 11."

No. 525

116/668B2-C8

Note by the Foreign Minister for the Fuhrer

Fuschl, May 16, 1941.

According to a telegram from Minister Kasche in Zagreb,1 the

Croatian Government would if necessary be willing to receive in

Croatia the 220,000 to 260,000 Slovenes to be evacuated from Lower

Styria, or part of them, if it could deport the same number of Serbs

to Old Serbia.

According to a directive of the Fiihrer's there actually should be

no deportation of Slovenes to Croatia. However, since the Croatian

'Telegram No. 220 of May 13 (116/66849).

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840

DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

No. 504

F9/0163-67;

F1/OO02-06

Memorandum by the Dirigent of the Political Department

Record of the Reception of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister Popov

by the Foreign Minister in Berlin on November 26, 1941, From

8:40 to 9:15 p.m.

By way of introduction M. Popov transmitted to the Reich Foreign

Minister the greetings of the Bulgarian King as well as of the Bul-

garian Minister President, and remarked concerning Bulgaria's gen-

eral policy that it was of course, as in the past, a policy on Germany's

side; and in all the more important questions which arose Bulgarian

policy in the future, too, would always request German advice. He

hardly needed to talk about that. Rather he was interested in bringing

up at this opportunity a few minor questions regarding which the

Bulgarian Government wanted to express special wishes.

At the first of these questions M. Popov cited the resumption of

operations of the railroad line Pythion-Dede Agach.1 The French

Military Attache" in Sofia2 had recently brought up this question

and had stated that the French-Greek company which owned this

line would open it again in the near future. This did not appear

expedient to the Bulgarian Government. Rather, it requested that

this line either be turned over to the Bulgarian railroad administra-

tion or, if it should be put into operation by the German military, that

Bulgarian personnel be used. It did not appear expedient to the Bul-

garian Government for Greek personnel to be employed again in

operating this line. This matter was of no great importance; never-

theless, the way in which it was settled did have a certain psychological

significance for Bulgarian public opinion.

The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov to examine this question.'

He then for his part broached the question whether Bulgaria was in

1 A Bulgarian request that this railroad line which ran through the German-

occupied part of Greek Thrace be put into operation under German administra-

tion and with Bulgarian personnel was first reported in Sofia telegram No. 1334

of Oct. 29 (2233/476023-24). The same matter was ofilcially raised by Minister

Draganov with Weizs&cker who recorded this conversation in a memorandum of

Oct. 31 (278/178973).

'C. de Robien.

Memoranda of Nov. 27 by Weizsiicker (278/179025) and Woermann (278/

178997-99) indicate that the Bulgarian Foreign Minister brought up the question

of the Pythion-Dede Agach railroad in separate conversations which he had with

them on Nov. 27. In the course of his visit with Weizsacker, Popov presented a

memorandum explaining the background of the Bulgarian wishes in this matter

(278/179026-28).

RAM 56 g. Rs.

Berlin, November 27, 1941.

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NOVEMBER 1941

841

a position to deliver grain to Germany.4 One could not simply treat

this question from the standpoint of a transaction involving deliveries,

but as a matter of principle one had to proceed from the fact that

Germany was today carrying on a struggle for freedom for all of

Europe, in which the German people were indeed making the greatest

sacrifices. In this struggle it was surely of a certain significance that

the countries friendly to Germany, each to the extent of its abilities,

contributed to Germany's receiving the necessary deliveries.

M. Popov replied that he knew this and was aware of these necessi-

ties. Unfortunately, however, the situation for Bulgaria herself was

rather difficult. Owing to the excess of rain the harvest had been very

bad, and the Bulgarian estimates indicated that there would hardly

be enough of a surplus to satisfy fully the needs of the Bulgarian

Army and the larger Bulgarian cities.

The Foreign Minister replied to this that he did not want to ask

anything that went beyond the Bulgarian capabilities. However, he

had believed that it would be possible to put through the delivery of

some 10,000 tons of grain.

With regard to this M. Popov said that he hardly believed that the

delivery of grain would be possible; perhaps maize deliveries could

be made. He furthermore stated that the Bulgarian Minister of Trade,

too, would discuss these matters with the German Government and

that one could then see what might be done.

In conclusion the Foreign Minister remarked on this subject that

he asked only that as much as possible be done, and no more. However,

every Bulgarian delivery would be very welcome to us. Whatever

Bulgaria did for us in this connection she would actually be doing for

herself. One should not forget what fate the Bolshevists had intended

for Bulgaria. Here in Berlin M. Molotov had stated only a year

ago that the Russians wanted a pact of assistance with Bulgaria

under which they would be provided with bases in that country; in

which connection he had added condescendingly that one could easily

let the Bulgarian King remain in the country. One knew indeed the

significance of these wishes from the experience with the pacts of

assistance between Eussia and the Baltic countries. Now this danger

was past. However, Germany had to continue her efforts in order

to secure the victory for the whole future. She was pleased with all

her friends that would help her in this.

*In a memorandum of Nov. 23 (4703/E227414-15) which was to serve as a

basis for Ribbentrop's discussion of this matter with Popov, Clodius expressed

the opinion that Bulgaria was capable of supplying Germany with at least 20,000

tons of bread grain and a considerably larger amount of maize. Clodius recom-

mended that the German Government insist on Bulgaria's supplying Germany

with grain and maize "to the limit of her possibilities and accompanied by a

drastic curtailment of her domestic consumption."

'See vol. xi of this series, document No. 328.

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842 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY

Foreign Minister Popov repeated again that Bulgaria would do

everything possible, for she had not forgotten what Germany had

done for Bulgaria. Bulgaria felt allied with Germany to the bitter

end.

As a further point of the conversation the Bulgarian Foreign

Minister then turned to the uprising in Thrace that occurred some

time ago in the vicinity of Drama, in which 32 Bulgarian officials and

soldiers had been killed or badly wounded. Of course the Bulgarian

authorities had been compelled to take vigorous action against this

uprising, which had been caused by Communist agitation. Now the

Greeks were starting to complain about it and to address written

complaints to the German Government.6 The Bulgarian Government

would be grateful if it could have this material. It wanted to settle

this matter at once conclusively and not defer it for the future. M.

Popov asked us to believe that nothing had been done by the Bulgarians

that was not necessary for quelling the uprising. If mistakes had

nevertheless been made in individual cases, then they could best be

remedied on the basis of the Greek complaints.

Regarding this the Foreign Minister remarked that such material

had not been submitted to him.7 He would have the matter investi-

gated.

M. Popov then brought up the matter of the area of Fiorina in west-

ern Macedonia as another point. The Greek administrative authori-

ties there were indulging in anti-Bulgarian agitation. The area was

under German military administration, but there was only a limited

number of German commanders in the cities there and they could not

control everything that occurred in their area. He requested that the

Bulgarians in this area be granted somewhat greater protection.

The German command posts in Salonika seemed to be too skeptical in

regard to the complaints of the Bulgarians from this area, probably

because the complaints that had reached them had been exaggerated

and had not been fully confirmed upon investigation. However, that

did not change the fact that there were too few German supervisory

organs on the spot and the Bulgarian population did not enjoy ade-

quate protection. The Greeks simply wanted to oppress the Bul-

5 See document No. 435.

'In a memorandum of Nov. 27 (278/179022-24) WeizsScker recorded having

told the Bulgarian Foreign Minister that day that he would be glad to show

Minister Draganov the material relating to accusations against Bulgaria on

account of extremely severe Bulgarian measures taken against Greek Insurgents.

The Bulgarian Foreign Minister was anxious to refute these accusations and

for his part left a memorandum, which is appended to WeizsRcker's record of the

conversation.

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NOVEMBER 1041

843

garians there, as they had always wanted to do in the course of

history. One should not forget that Bulgaria had been forced to as-

sert her intellectual fredom from Greece in the same way as she had

been forced to fight for her political freedom against the Turks.

The Foreign Minister promised M. Popov that he would have this

question investigated, too, and would see what could be done in this

regard.

M. Popov finally brought up the difficulties which the Bulgarian

Government encountered in carrying out the laws directed against the

Jews. Quite a number of the Jews living in Bulgaria were not citi-

zens of Bulgaria but of Hungary, Kumania, Spain, and other coun-

tries. These countries, however, claimed the same rights for their

Jewish citizens as for their other citizens, and did not tolerate their

receiving the special treatment provided for in the Jewish legislation.

This was after all a question that had to be settled jointly among

the European countries.

The Reich Foreign Minister replied that he found this question

which M. Popov had brought up to be not without interest. Even at

tins time, he could tell him one thing: at the end of the war all Jews

would have to leave Europe. This was an irrevocable decision of the

Fiihrer's, and was also the only way to master this question, because it

could only be solved on a global basis and because individual measures

were of little use. Incidentally, one should not attach too much im-

portance to the protests regarding Jews who were alien nationals. At

any rate we no longer paid attention to such protests from American

quarters. Hethe Reich Foreign Ministerwould have the problem

brought up by M. Popov examined in the Foreign Ministry.

M. Popov then turned to the Bulgarian wish that, as part of the

great program of opening up new transportation routes which the

Todt Organization was carrying out, provision be also made for a

bridge across the Danube between Bulgaria and Rumania. The lack

of such a bridge had been felt for some time. That it should be built

was of the greatest significance to Bulgaria.

The Foreign Minister termed this wish interesting and worth look-

ing into, too, and in conclusion asked M. Popov to transmit his respects

and regards to the King and also to Minister President Filov.8

Rintelex

'In a minute of Nov. 28 (278/179035) Rlntelen forwarded to Weizsacker the

Foreign Minister's request that action be taken with regard to examining the

individual questions raised by Popov. Welzsttcker routed this request to the

officials concerned on Nov. 30.

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