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Digest for Final Paper: Kua Topic: Immovable Properties

BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, CITY ASSESSOR and CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY Petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondent.
FACTS: Act no. 484, enacted by the Philippine Commission, authorizes the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchise to construct, maintain and operate an electric street railway and light, heat and power system in Manila, depending on the person or persons making the most favorable bid. Charles M Swift was the one awarded with the franchise on March 1903, the terms and conditions of which were embodied in Ordinance number 44 approved on March 24, 1903. Respondent Manila Electric Co. (Meralco) became the transferee and owner of the franchise. Meralco has constructed 40 steel towers in which the electric transmission wires are attached, on a land belonging to it in QC. On November 15, 1955, Petitioner Assessor of QC declared the aforesaid steel towers for real property under tax declaration numbers 31992 and 15549 and required Meralco to pay for P11, 651.86 as real property tax. Meralco paid in protest and filed a petition for review in the CTA which rendered a decision to cancel the said tax declaration and to refund the payment made by Meralco. ISSUE: Whether or not the poles constructed by Meralco constitute Real Properties that they may be subject to tax as described in Art 415 of the Civil Code. DECISION: Steel towers do not come within the objects mentioned in paragraph 1 because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. The towers mentioned in this case, are removable and are merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts which may be unscrewed easily. As for par 3, they are also not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, these towers may be separated without deterioration of the object to which they are attached. And for Paragraph 5, the towers are not machineries, receptacles, and instruments which engage in the works or the industry.

Digest for Final Paper: Kua

Juan Gargantos v Tan Yanon and CA Topic: Light and View (easement) Facts: Francisco Sanz was the owner of an 888 sq m land in Romblon, with buildings and improvements thereon. He subdivided the lot into 3 and sold them. 1 was sold to Guillermo Tengtio who sold it to Vicente Uy Veza; the 2nd was to Tan Yanon (Respondent) with doors and windows overlooking the 3rd side; and 3rd to Juan Gargantos, which has a camarin and small building included therin. Gargantos applied for 2 Municipal Mayors permits, 1 was to demolish the roof of old camarin, the other one was for him to construct a combined residential house and warehouse on his lot, which Tan Yanon is now opposing. The construction of such building would prevent Tan Yanon from receiving light and view through the window of his house, unless the building be erected at a distance not less than 3 meters from the boundary line between the lots of plaintiff and defendant, and to enjoin the members of the municipal council of Romblon from issuing the corresponding building permit in conformity with Art 673 on the New Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the property of Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against the property of petitioner Gargantos? Decision Respondent Tan Yanon has an easement of light and view against Gargantos property. Ratio: Although petitioner Gargantos claims that the respondent never acquired of any easement (by title or presicription), since there should be a deed representing it by virtue of Article 621 of the New Civil Code. This is not applicable in this case, as the land and houses were formerly owned by just one person, without the need for easements. Art 624 provides that the existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates, established by the proprietor of both, shall be considered, if one of them is alienated, as a title so that the easement will continue actively and passively, unless

Digest for Final Paper: Kua at the time the ownership of the two estate is divided, the contrary is stated in the deed of alienation of either of them, or the sign is made to disappear before the instrument is executed.. The existence of the doors and windows on the northeastern side of the aforementioned house, is equivalent to a title, for the visible and permanent sign of an easement is the title that characterizes its existence. It should be noted, however, that while the law declares that the easement is to "continue" the easement actually arises for the first time only upon alienation of either estate, inasmuch as before that time there is no easement to speak of, there being but one owner of both estates.

SARMIENTO V. AGANA 129 SCRA 122


FACTS: A lot in Paranaque was offered to Ernesto Valentino and Rebecca Lorenzo where they could build their house on. 1967 around PhP8,000-10,000 was spent by the couple for the house assuming that someday the lot would be transferred to their name. Apparently, the lot was owned by the Spouses Santos who , eventually, sold the same to Leonila Sarmiento in 1974. A year later, Sarmiento ordered the Valentinos to vacate their lot, and filed an Ejection Suit against them. The lower court ruled in Sarmientos favor and ordered her to pay 20,000 as the value of the house. The case was elevated to the CFI of Pasay (Agana being the judge); pursuant to Art.448 of the Civil Code (March 1979), the Court ordered Sarmiento to exercise the option in 60 days to pay Ernesto 40,000 as the value of the house or to let them purchase the land for 25,000. Sarmiento was not able to exercise this option, and the CFI allowed Ernesto to deposit the 25,000 purchase price with the Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either option: to buy the building or to sell the land? HELD: Ernesto and his wife were clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebeccas mother has the capacity to eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line with this, Sarmiento should have been given the option to exercise either one of the following: 1.) To purchase the house or 2.) to sell the land to them. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted period, and based on Art. 448, the Land Owner is compelled by law to choose, not doing so would be a violation of the forementioned provision in the Civil Code.

Digest for Final Paper: Kua

G.R. No. 2684

March 15, 1907

THE FIDELITY AND DEPOSIT COMPANY OF MARYLAND, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WILLIAM A. WILSON, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Facts:

Wilson, is a disbursing officer in the Philippines, he took money, sureties, and funds, then fled to Canada. When he was caught, several lawsuits were filed against him intercorrelating each complaint. The American Company of New York became sureties on the official bond of Wilson for the sum of USD 15,000. Wilson defaulted USD 8,931.80, so the surety companies paid half from each of them to the Government. His funds were placed in a depositary named by the court to take care of the money. A little earlier before the complaint was filled, Wilson transferred the funds to Terrell, in payment of his debt for the professional services already rendered. Since the funds were under the possession of the Treasurer entrusted with the depository, the transfer could not have been made since, , it would have been necessary that the delivery of the funds had been made directly Terrell, which fact has not been proved at any time. But Terrell never claimed that the delivery was ever made, he only claims that the ownership thereof should be derived to him, not thru the fact of delivery but thru the very fact of the transfer and of his subsequent notification to Treasurer Baranagan, although, it is very clear that such notification does

not constitute, in any manner, the fact of delivery as established by articles 1462, 1463, and 1464 of the Civil Code, all of which cover, in full this subject-matter.
Issue: Should Terrell and The Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, claim ownership of the funds in accordance to Art 609 of the Civil Code? Decision:

Digest for Final Paper: Kua

." In conformity with said doctrine as established in paragraph 2 of article 609 of said code, that "the ownership and other property rights are acquired and transmitted by law, by gift, by testate or intestate succession, and, in consequence of certain contracts, by tradition." And as the logical application of this disposition article 1095 prescribes the following: "A creditor has the rights to the fruits of a thing from the time the obligation to deliver it arises. However, he shall not acquire a real right." (and the ownership is surely such) "until the property has been delivered to him." In accordance with such disposition and provisions the delivery of a thing constitutes a necessary and indispensable requisite for the purpose of acquiring the ownership of the same by virtue for a contract. With this, it can therefore be concluded that: "The transfer of the ownership in the contract of such transfer, does not produce the effect by the fact of the mere consent, but is acquired by tradition and in the due observance of general precepts." Therefore, by reason of the non-delivery Terrell did not acquire the ownership of the property transferred to him by Wilson. The court therefore finds that neither of the two creditors should enjoy preference with regard to the other. Preference is determined by the nature of the credit in some cases and by the priority of date in others. The first, when it deals with privileged credits, which different kinds of privileged credits are enumerated in articles 1922, 1923, and 1924 of the Civil Code; and the second, when such credits are without special privilege, but are set forth in a public document or a final judgment. (Par. 3, article 1924.) In neither of these two classes do we find the credit of the appellant or that of the appellee. The credit of the appellee is only shown in a private document, and the right, or credit, of the appellant is that derived by reason of the payment made by appellant to the Government as a surety on the bond of Wilson, and nothing more than this appears in the allegations and admissions of the parties during the trial of the case. It does not appear by the bill of exceptions in this case that any document was ever presented in justification of such payment. Neither does the decision refer to any document as showing, as proven, said payment. These two credits not coming under any of the articles herein cited, the same pertain to a general class, and therefore do not enjoy any preference, in accordance with provisions of article 1925 of the Civil Code. This being so, the two creditors should be paid of pro rata from the funds in question and without consideration of the dates. (Rule 3, of article 1929.)

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