0

Hedge Funds and Chapter 11

WEI JIANG, KAI LI, and WEI WANG
*






ABSTRACT
This paper studies the presence of hedge funds in the Chapter 11 process and their effects on bankruptcy
outcomes. Hedge funds strategically choose positions in the capital structure where their actions could have a
bigger impact on value. Their presence, especially as unsecured creditors, helps balance power between the
debtor and secured creditors. Their effect on the debtor manifests in higher probabilities of the latters loss of
exclusive rights to file reorganization plans, CEO turnover, and adoptions of KERP, while their effect on secured
creditors manifests in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims.

Keywords: Hedge funds; Chapter 11; Loan-to-own; APR deviation; Creditor rights.
JEL classification: G23; G30; G33


*
Jiang is with Columbia University, Li is with University of British Columbia, and Wang is with Queens University. We
thank our team of dedicated research assistants Gregory Duggan, Sam Guo, Bobby Huang, and Greg Klochkoff. We also
thank Lynn LoPucki at UCLA and Ben Schlafman at New Generation Research for their help on data collection, an
anonymous referee, an Associate Editor, Cam Harvey (editor), Susan Christoffersen, Michael Halling, Jay Hartzell, Robert
Kieschnick, George Lee, Adam Levitin, Yinghua Li, Michael Meloche, Jeff Pontiff, Michael Schill, David Skeel, Keke Song,
Johan Sulaeman, David Thesmar, Albert Wang, and seminar and conference participants at Queens University, Southern
Methodist University, University of British Columbia, University of California at San Diego, University of Texas at Dallas,
the 2009 International Conference on Corporate Finance and Governance in Emerging Markets, the 7
th
Financial
Management Napa Conference on Financial Markets Research, the Second Paris Spring Corporate Finance Conference, the
Financial Intermediation Research Society Conference, the 2010 China International Conference in Finance, the Research
Conference at University of Oregon, the 2010 Northern Finance Association Meetings, the 2010 AIM Center Conference at
University of Texas at Austin, and the 2011 Western Finance Association Meetings for helpful comments. All authors
acknowledge financial support of the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC). Li further
acknowledges financial support from the Sauder School SSHR Research Grant and the Bureau of Asset Management
Research Grant, and Wang further acknowledges the financial support from the Queens School of Business. All remaining
errors are our own.
0


This paper examines the roles of hedge funds in Chapter 11 and the effects of their presence on the nature and
outcome of the bankruptcy process. Hedge funds participation in the bankruptcy process takes a variety of forms,
including investing in debt claims, buying equity stakes, serving on the unsecured creditors or equity committee,
and pursuing a loan-to-own strategy, whereby a hedge fund acquires the debt of a distressed borrower with the
intention of converting the acquired position into a controlling equity stake upon the firms emergence from
Chapter 11.
Using a comprehensive sample of 474 Chapter 11 cases from 1996 to 2007 formed by merging a variety
of data sources, we show that hedge fund presence has been prevalent in the Chapter 11 processclose to 90% of
the sample cases have publicly observable involvement by hedge funds. This result is consistent with
practitioners observation that hedge funds have become the most active investors in the distressed debt market,
generating approximately half of the annual trading volume in distressed debt, one-third of the trading volume in
leveraged loans, and one-quarter of the trading volume in high-yield bonds during 2005 to 2006.
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Yes despite
anecdotal evidence on hedge fund vultures in the media and case studies by law scholars on various strategies
favored by hedge funds, to date no study has systematically examined hedge fund involvement in Chapter 11 over
the past decade or so. Our paper aims to fill this void.
In addition to updating earlier studies on bankruptcy, our paper provides new insights on hedge funds as
an emerging force in the Chapter 11 process. First and foremost, we find that, as large unsecured creditors, hedge
funds balance the power between the debtor and secured creditors. This effect manifests in higher probabilities of
the debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan, CEO turnover, and adoptions of key employee
retention plans (KERP), and in higher probabilities of emergence and payoffs to junior claims. While the
bankruptcy process was traditionally classified as either management driven (Franks and Torous (1994) and
Berkovitch, Isreal, and Zender (1998)) or senior creditor driven (Welch (1997) and Baird and Rasmussen
(2003)), hedge funds have driven the transformation of the restructuring process into one that is best characterized
as management neutral (Skeel (2003) and Harner (2008a)), where managers facilitate and implement the
distressed firms restructuring plans but do not control the restructuring process.
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Second, we find that hedge funds choice of distressed targets and positions in the capital structure reflect
both their firm-picking skills as well as their desire to have a larger impact on the reorganization process.
Unsecured debt is the most popular entry point for hedge funds because of its fulcrum nature and option-like
payoffs, that is, unsecured debt is the most likely layer in the capital structure where the enterprise value first fails
to fully cover outstanding claims. Moreover, hedge funds prefer companies in which secured debt is more likely
to be overcollateralized, leaving room for unsecured creditors to take a more active role. When investing in
equity, hedge funds prefer firms with relatively strong operating performance and secured creditors with a weak
liquidation bias.
We further find that hedge funds are effective in achieving their desired outcomes for the claims they
invest in. Hedge fund presence increases the likelihood of a successful reorganization, which is usually
associated with a higher recovery of junior claims (unsecured debt and equity) and an increased likelihood of their
being converted into new equity. Moreover, hedge fund presence on the unsecured creditors or equity committee
is associated with more favorable distributions to that class of claims, and hedge funds pursuance of a loan-to-
own strategy is associated with more favorable distributions to both types of junior claims.
Importantly, our evidence is more supportive of efficiency gains brought by hedge funds than of value
extraction from other claims. The presence of hedge fund unsecured creditors is associated with both higher total
debt (including secured and unsecured) recovery and a more positive stock market response at the time of a
bankruptcy filing, suggesting a positive effect of hedge fund creditors on the firms total value. Such value
creation may come from overcoming secured creditors liquidation bias (i.e., a higher probability of emergence),
confronting underperforming CEOs (i.e., a higher CEO turnover rate), retaining key personnel (i.e., more frequent
adoptions of KERP), and relaxing financial constraints (i.e., the loan-to-own strategy). Similarly, we show that
hedge funds participating in bankruptcy do not have as short a horizon as their counterparts specialized in pure
trading. These hedge funds benefit more from companies emergence, where the long-term prospects of the firm
are important.
This paper adds to our understanding of the major forces underlying the patterns of and changes in the
Chapter 11 process in the U.S. over the past decade, and contributes to the growing research on hedge fund
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activism in corporate decisions. By analyzing the same hedge fund holding different types of stakes (e.g., debt,
equity, or both) in a distressed firm over the course of Chapter 11 restructuring, our work may stimulate new
theoretical research on bankruptcy that allows for complex and dynamic interactions among various stakeholders.
Prior work most related to our study is Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997), who examine the role of vulture
investors (predecessors to hedge funds specialized in distress investing
2
) in distressed firms. We update the
Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997) analysis of distress investing with new developments from the past decade. We
also expand the scope of analysis by investigating the different roles that hedge funds take on the debt side, the
equity side, or both, and the effects of their involvement on a broad category of bankruptcy outcomes.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section I provides a brief review of the institutional background
and outlines the main hypotheses that motivate our empirical tests. Section II describes the data collection process
and presents an overview of hedge funds participation in Chapter 11. Section III examines the determinants of
hedge funds participation on the debt and equity sides. Section IV analyzes the effects of hedge funds
involvement in Chapter 11 on the final outcomes. Finally, Section V concludes.

I. Institutional Background and Empirical Motivations
The bankruptcy of utility company Northwestern Corporation illustrates hedge fund involvement in the
restructuring process. The company filed a voluntary petition under Chapter 11 on September 14, 2003. Hedge
funds (AG Capital Funding Partners, Avenue Capital Management, Magten Offshore Partners, and Oaktree
Capital Management) owned debt claims against the company and served on the unsecured creditors committee.
Northwesterns Restated Plan of Reorganization was confirmed by the court on October 8, 2004. Under the plan,
existing shareholders received no distribution. Holders of senior unsecured notes and some general unsecured
notes would receive 92% of newly issued common stock. On its first day of trading, the stock price of the
reorganized Northwestern was $24.95, implying a recovery rate of 90% for the senior unsecured creditors. The
hedge funds emerged as major shareholders in the restructured company.
The example above highlights several features of hedge funds distress investing strategies. First, unlike
traditional creditors (such as banks and insurance companies) that strive to contain damages on their existing
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investment at the bankruptcy bargaining table, hedge funds seek out distressed claims for profitable investment.
Second, hedge funds typically initiate their investment on the debt side, with the strategic goal of influencing the
restructuring process; in many cases, they end up with a controlling stake in the company upon emergence.
Finally, the presence of hedge funds specialized in distress investing could be behind some secular trends in the
U.S. Chapter 11 process, notably, the strengthening of creditors rights (Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner
(2007) and Ayotte and Morrison (2009)).
Exponential growth in the hedge fund sector, a more liquid debt market, and an increasingly activist
stance among some hedge funds have all contributed to the increased presence of hedge funds among claimants of
distressed companies over the last decade. The presence of hedge funds in turn promotes the development of an
active secondary market for distressed claims, which changes the nature of in-bankruptcy governance and voting
dynamics (Stromberg (2000), Thorburn (2000), Baird and Rasmussen (2003), and Eckbo and Thorburn (2009)).
Hedge funds are uniquely suited to pursuing activist strategiesthat is, investing with the intention to
intervene in distressed firmsfor two reasons. First, compared to other institutional investors (such as banks,
mutual funds, and pension funds), hedge funds have more incentives to pursue high returns and are less subject to
conflicts of interest due to a lack of other business relationships with the portfolio firms.
Second, hedge funds are better able to hold highly concentrated, illiquid positions that strengthen their
influence at the negotiation table. In contrast, mutual funds and pension funds are required by law to maintain
diversified and prudent portfolios. Pension funds usually shun bankrupt firms because of the prudent man rule
and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), which discourage risk taking at the
individual security level. Mutual funds have limited capacity to invest in illiquid and especially nontraded
securities due to their need to maintain an open-ended structure. Banks and mutual funds are also subject to
regulatory restrictions that constrain their capacity in taking on legal liabilities
3
and getting involved in the
management of their portfolio firms. In comparison, the combination of lock-up provisions with their own
investors, the ability to use derivatives, and minimal disclosure requirements affords hedge funds greater
flexibility in investing in distressed firms and in influencing the restructuring process.
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Being relatively new players in Chapter 11, hedge funds strategies and impacts have not been
systematically studied by the prior literature. The key goal of our research is to inform the debate on whether
hedge fund participation improves the efficiency of the bankruptcy process. Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1992)
succinctly summarize the two goals of an efficient bankruptcy procedure: (1) it maximizes the ex post value of
the firm (with an appropriate distribution of this value across claimants); (2) it preserves the (ex ante) bonding
role of debt by penalizing management adequately in bankruptcy states. Following their benchmark, our
analyses focus on the following aspects of hedge fund incentives and their potential impact on the Chapter 11
process.
First, we examine whether hedge fund participation as creditors or shareholders impacts the outcomes of
bankruptcies that favor the payoff to the claims they hold. As sophisticated investors striving for high investment
returns, hedge funds are expected to select firms and positions in the capital structure that offer the best prospects.
Outcome variables considered include the likelihood of firm emergence from Chapter 11 (which is usually
considered an outcome favorable to junior claimsunsecured creditors and shareholdersas opposed to being
liquidated or acquired), debt recovery rate, and stock returns. Furthermore, we try to identify the causal effects of
hedge funds participation in bankruptcy. A comparison of the treatment effects and the total effects allows us to
comment on hedge funds ability to select firms based on unobserved characteristics.
Second, we test whether hedge funds help push the Chapter 11 process more in the direction of a senior
creditor-driven process (with a pro-liquidation bias) or a management-driven process (with inadequate penalties
for management), or if they manage to balance the power between the two parties and create a process somewhere
in between these two extremes. Outcome variables considered for analyzing hedge funds impact on senior
secured creditors power include the likelihood of emergence, given the latters bias for liquidation, and APR
deviation from secured to unsecured creditors; those considered for analyzing hedge funds impact on managerial
power include the probability of the debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan, CEO turnover,
and adoptions of KERP.
Finally and most importantly, we address the question of whether hedge funds bring efficiency gains to
the Chapter 11 process by enhancing the total value of all claims, or merely engage in value extraction from other
5

parties. While hedge funds concentrated holdings reduce the free-riding problem in bankruptcy (Kahan and
Rock (2009) and von Thadden, Berglf, and Roland (2010)), they might also give rise to wasteful bargaining
activities (Bris and Welch (2005)) or a hold-out problem whereby hedge funds block the approval of a bankruptcy
plan by accumulating large positions in a class of claims, which could prolong the process or add to the cost of
restructuring (Rosenberg (2000)). With anecdotal evidence supporting either view, the issue has been heatedly
debatedmostly among legal scholars (Goldschmid (2005) and Baird and Rasmussen (2008))without the
support of large-sample empirical evidence. To this end we examine the impact of hedge funds as creditors on
both debt recovery and stock returns, and also follow up on post-Chapter 11 firm financial and operating
performance.

II. Sample and Data
A. Sample Formation
This study builds on one of the most comprehensive data sets used in the literature on U.S. bankruptcies.
Our sample spans all major Chapter 11 filings over the period 1996 to 2007, combining information from a
variety of data sourcessome of which requires intensive manual collection efforts. The status of cases is
updated to the end of 2008. A comparison of our sample and those used in previous studies published in the
recent decade
4
is provided in the Internet Appendix.
5

A.1. The Sample of U.S. Chapter 11 Firms
The Lynn M. LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database is our starting point to form a sample of large U.S.
firms that filed for Chapter 11 during the period 1996 to 2007. For a firm to be included in our sample, we
require that the firm have assets worth at least $100 million (measured in 1980 constant dollars using the CPI
deflator) at the time of a bankruptcy filing, and that it file form 10Ks with the SEC within three years of its
Chapter 11 filing. We obtain 500 such cases for the sample period, which we cross check with New Generation
Researchs BankruptcyData.com to verify their Chapter 11 status and to obtain information on the final outcomes.
Following this process, three cases drop out of our sample because one was in fact a Chapter 7 filing and two
were duplicates of or affiliated with other cases. We drop another 23 cases from our sample because they were
6

pending (12 cases) or dismissed by court (11 cases) as of December 31, 2008. Our final sample consists of 474
unique cases of Chapter 11 filings. The following industries have the highest representation in the sample:
communications (69 cases), financial (37 cases), and business services (26 cases).
The Bankruptcy Research Database provides basic information about the cases, including the date of
filing,
6
major operational information (such as industry, sales, and assets), the type of filing (such as prepackaged,
and pre-negotiated), and the outcomes and duration of the Chapter 11 process. Such information is cross-checked
with BankruptcyData.com whenever possible. In case of an inconsistency, we resort to firms 10K filings prior to
their Chapter 11 filings to resolve the difference. Unless otherwise specified, all SEC filings are retrieved from
the EDGAR website.
A.2. Details about the Bankruptcy Process, Outcomes, and Key Stakeholders
Before final outcomes such as emergence, acquisition, or liquidation, a Chapter 11 case may reach certain
milestones or intermediate outcomes such as the extension of the exclusivity period, debtor-in-possession (DIP)
financing, approval of KERP, and top management turnover. We obtain such information mainly from
BankruptcyData.com, and supplement it with New Generation Researchs Bankruptcy DataSource database,
Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), and news searches in Factiva and LexisNexis.
BankruptcyData.com keeps bankruptcy reorganization and liquidation plans, and provides the following
information for most of the cases: classes of claims, dollar amount of allowed claims, recovery, and whether a
cash or security distribution is made to each class of claimant. For four cases the reorganization plans are not
available, we purchased their plans directly from the U.S. bankruptcy courts. Combining all the above sources
with firms 8K filings, we are able to code the key aspects of our 474 cases Chapter 11 processes from the date of
a Chapter 11 filing all the way up to the date of case resolution.
In addition, BankruptcyData.com provides names of the major stakeholders including the largest
shareholders, the largest holders of unsecured debt claims, members of the unsecured creditors committee,
members of the equity committee, and providers of DIP financing during the restructuring process. We
supplement and complete the above information using the Bankruptcy DataSource database, 8K and 10K filings,
proxy statements, DealScan, the SDC Syndicated Loan Database, and news searches in NexisLexis and Factiva.
7

A.3. Identifying Hedge Funds among Key Stakeholders
To track the various roles that hedge funds play at different stages of a bankruptcy and in different parts
of the bankrupt firms capital structure, we start with a master list of all key stakeholders, collected from the
sources described in Section II.A2, and then identify hedge funds from this list. It is worth noting that there is no
official definition for hedge funds. For the purpose of our research, we classify them as incentivized
professional money managers whose pooled investment vehicles are not directly accessible to the general public.
Due to these broad criteria, our list of hedge funds includes managers of alternative investment vehicles which
are sometimes not considered hedge funds in the narrow traditional sense. For example, Cerberus Capital
Management, a top player in our sample, markets itself as an investment firm that manages both hedge funds and
private equity funds.
We identify hedge fund players at the management company level (which could manage multiple
funds/portfolios) as this is the relevant unit of activist involvement in the target firms. All stakeholders in our
master list (which consists of more than 5,000 entities) are manually checked for their business scopes. A
stakeholder is classified as a hedge fund if it is reported by specialized publications (such as Barrons, Alpha
Magazine, and Institutional Investors) as such, or if the companys own website lists hedge fund management or
alternative investment management for pooled vehicles as part of its major business. Using this top-down
approach, we identify 484 unique hedge fund companies in our sample.
Due to the nature of bankruptcy (which is usually triggered by a firms failure to fulfill its obligations to
its creditors), this list provides more detailed investor information on the debt side than on the equity side. To
supplement information on the latter, we compile a list of institutions that make significant equity investments in
the distressed firmsboth before and during the Chapter 11 processfrom two SEC filings: Schedule 13D and
Form 13F. The Schedule 13D filing is a mandatory filing under Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act that
requires investors to disclose within 10 days of acquisition of, or conversion into, more than 5% of any class of
securities of a publicly traded company if they have an interest in influencing the management of the company
(including the reorganization of the company). Form 13F filings (from the Thomson Reuters Ownership
Database) require all institutions that have investment discretion over a minimum of $100 million in Section 13(f)
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securities (mostly publicly traded equity) to disclose their quarter-end holdings in these securities. The window to
collect equity ownership information from both sources spans from one year before a Chapter 11 filing to one
year after the confirmation of the plan. For ownership disclosed in the Form 13F, we impose a threshold of 2% of
the shares outstanding for significant equity ownership, as smaller stakes are unlikely to be effective in
influencing the reorganization process.
A.4. Firm-Level Financial Information and Security Prices
We merge our sample of Chapter 11 filers with the CRSP/Compustat (available through WRDS) and
Capital IQ databases to retrieve additional firm-level financial information. While Compustat provides standard
information from firms income statements and balance sheets, Capital IQ provides more detailed information
about capital structure, and in particular the ratio of secured debt to total assets. When such information is missing
from Capital IQ, we use data from BankruptcyData.com. We primarily rely on CRSP to retrieve stock price
information for our sample firms, and turn to pink sheets available through Bloomberg and Datastream when
there is no CRSP coverage.
Finally, we code two key outcome variables that characterize distribution to junior claims (unsecured debt
and equity), possibly as a result of APR deviations (Eberhart, Moore, and Roenfeldt (1990), Betker (1995), and
Eberhart and Weiss (1998)), using information from bankruptcy plans and supplemented by BankruptcyData.com
and Datastream. The first variable, APRCreditor, measures the APR deviations for secured creditors (Capkun and
Weiss (2008)).
7
It is an indicator variable that is equal to one if unsecured creditors recovery is greater than zero
while secured creditors recovery is less than 100%. The second variable, DistEquity, is an indicator variable that
is equal to one if there is any distribution to existing equity holders.
Table I defines all the major variables used in this paper and provides their data sources.
[Insert Table I here.]

B. Sample Overview
Table II Panel A reports Chapter 11 outcomes by year. Several patterns emerge from the table. First,
bankruptcy filings are highly cyclical. The burst of the Dot-com bubble in 2000 and subsequent recession is
9

associated with a large number of Chapter 11 filings, while the boom prior to the 2008 financial crisis is
associated with much fewer filings. Second, the adoption of KERP has been on the rise over the sample period, a
trend also noted by Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007). Third, APR deviations (as captured by
APRCreditor) are not commonplace in our sample, occurring in about 15% of the cases, which is much smaller
than in the 1980s and early 1990s when APR deviations were the norm rather than the exception (see, for
example, Weiss (1990) and Adler, Capkun, and Weiss (2007)).
8
Finally, the average duration of bankruptcy has
been substantially shortened, from 21 months at the beginning of our sample period to 12 months in 2004 to2006.
9

In comparison, the average duration in Franks and Torous (1994) sample over the period 1983 to1988 is close to
30 months and the average in Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werners (2007) sample over the period 1979 to2005
is 18 months.
[Insert Table II here.]
Panel B of Table II presents summary statistics of firm and Chapter 11 case characteristics. All firm-level
variables are recorded at the fiscal year-end prior to bankruptcy filing date. To mitigate the influence of outliers,
we winsorize all potentially unbounded variables at the 1
st
and 99
th
percentiles. The median size of our sample
firms, measured by total assets (Assets), is $706 million in 2008 constant dollars, putting the typical sample firm
between the 6
th
and 7
th
size decile of the Compustat universe during the same period. Both the mean and median
ratios of book leverage to total assets (Leverage) are close to one, much higher than the mean (median) leverage
ratio of 68% (59%) for the Compustat universea direct sign of financial distress. Our sample firms also tend to
have lower return on assets and lower institutional ownership relative to the Compustat universe. The Internet
Appendix reports the pairwise correlation coefficients among key firm/case characteristics and hedge fund
participation variables.

III. Hedge Fund Presence in Chapter 11: Overview and Determinants
A. Overview of Hedge Fund Involvement
Table III presents an overview of hedge fund involvement during the Chapter 11 process, where statistics
are grouped by year and by the timing of hedge fund presence. The table lists a set of indicator variables to
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capture the specific roles that hedge funds take on in Chapter 11 as creditors, equity holders, and loan-to-own
players. While our formal analyses focus on hedge fund impact using the default measure in each category,
sensitivity analyses using alternative measures are reported in the Internet Appendix.
[Insert Table III here.]
Our default measure for hedge fund involvement as creditors is HFCreditorsCommittee, which refers to
cases in which a hedge fund sits on the unsecured creditors committee.
10
The alternative measure,
HFLargestCreditor, refers to cases in which a hedge fund is one of the creditors holding the 20 (and in some
cases information is available for 50) largest unsecured claims according to the Chapter 11 petition forms.
Our default measure for hedge fund participation on the equity side is HFEquityCommittee, which refers
to cases in which a hedge fund serves on the equity committee. The alternative measure is HFJoint5%, an
indicator variable for hedge funds that jointly hold more than 5% of the outstanding shares based on their
Schedule 13D and Form 13F filings, or information from BankrutpcyData.com, 10K filings, and proxy
statements.
A hybrid role between creditors and shareholders that hedge funds take on in the Chapter 11 process
arises when they adopt a loan-to-own (LTO) strategy, whereby a hedge fund enters the restructuring process as
a major creditor with the intention to emerge from the process as a significant shareholder. Our default measure
for hedge funds playing the LTO strategy, HFLTO, takes a value of one if any of the following situations
applies:
11
(i) hedge fund identified from a list of the largest unsecured creditors or the unsecured creditors
committee members is matched to major shareholders from 13D and 13F filings within one year after bankruptcy,
or (ii) bankruptcy reorganization plans confirmed by the court show that the classes of claims held by a hedge
fund receive equity distribution. In recent years, DIP financing has become creditors new power tool of
corporate governance in Chapter 11 (Skeel (2003)) because DIP lenders are able to take control of the bankrupt
firm by bargaining for seats on the board of directors and receiving shares in the newly reorganized company. As
a result, our alternative measure, HFLTO_DIP, takes a value of one if conditions (i) or (ii) above, or (iii) a hedge
fund is the provider of DIP financing, holds. DIP loans often turn into equity ownership because they have trigger
11

clauses that replace the DIP debt with preferred or common equity to avoid default or that replace exit financing
with debt-for-equity swaps.
12

The most salient pattern emerging from Table III is that hedge funds participation in Chapter 11
bankruptcies is commonplace: 87% of the cases have publicly observable hedge fund involvement in some form.
In 61% (53%) of the cases, hedge funds are present on the debt (equity) side. Moreover, the industry
representation of our full sample is preserved in the subsamples of firms with various forms of hedge fund
presence.
A few additional patterns are summarized as follows. First, despite the absence of an obvious time trend,
hedge funds participation on the debt side exhibits significant cyclicality: hedge fund presence on the unsecured
creditors committee or just among the largest unsecured creditors is relatively low in 1997, 2001, and 2007, years
with tightened credit conditions. On the other hand, hedge fund provision of DIP financing rises steadily over our
sample period, coinciding with the overall increasing trend of DIP financing since 1990 (Dahiya et al. (2003) and
Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007)). While the majority providers of DIP financing in the 1990s and
early 2000s were banks and financial institutions that had prior lending relationships with the borrower, we show
that hedge funds have become a new force in providing DIP financing since 2003.
Second, hedge funds overall involvement on the equity side is smaller than their presence on the debt
side. In about half of the cases hedge funds are among the largest shareholders at the bankruptcy filing. In about
6% of the cases hedge funds serve on the equity committee, but the percentage increases to double digits in recent
years. This increase could be attributed to the fact that more equity committees have been formed in recent
years.
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Conditional on having an equity committee, hedge funds have representation in more than half of the
cases, and in all cases during the 2005 to 2007 period. Therefore, it seems that hedge fund shareholders have
strong incentives to represent other shareholders by forming and joining the equity committee.
Finally, based on our definitions of the loan-to-own strategy, hedge funds are creditors-turned-
shareholders in 28% of the cases if DIP financing is not considered, and in 34% of the cases if it is. These
numbers are remarkably close to the survey evidence in Harner (2008b).
14
Hedge funds loan-to-own strategies
are clearly cyclical. In the years of tightened credit conditions, the percentage of cases in which hedge funds
12

engaged in the loan-to-own strategy ranges from 0% to 19%, which is considerably lower than the sample
average.
In addition to the overall pattern of hedge funds participation at the event level, in the Appendix we list
the five most active hedge funds by the particular roles they assume in Chapter 11. It is not surprising that
Oaktree Capital Management, one of the worlds largest distressed debt investors with $25 billion assets under
management (Goldschmid (2005)), is ranked at the top in the largest unsecured creditors and unsecured creditors
committee categories. Oaktree also appears on the lists of most active providers of DIP financing and largest
shareholders. Cerberus Capital Management is the most active provider of DIP financing, but also holds large
unsecured claims and often serves on the unsecured creditors committee.

B. Determinants of Hedge Fund Participation
Hedge funds make calculated choices in their involvement in the distressed firm, especially with regard to
the type of securities they purchase (e.g., debt versus equity). To analyze such choices, we start with predictive
regressions that relate hedge fund investment strategies to firm and case characteristics. The dependent variables
are the measures for hedge fund involvement as creditors, equity holders, and loan-to-own players, as defined in
Section III.A. The set of explanatory variables, described in Section II, is chosen following prior literature on
bankruptcy.
15
Table IV reports the predictive regressions.
[Insert Table IV here.]
Our discussion of Table IV focuses on the default measures for hedge fund participation. We find that
overall hedge fund participation on the debt side is positively correlated with firm size. Not surprisingly, hedge
funds appear as major creditors (measured by HFCreditorsCommittee) when the distressed firm has more cash
and liquid assets on its balance sheet, which helps debt recovery. Interestingly, hedge funds prefer to invest in
unsecured distressed debt when the ratio of secured debt to assets (SecuredDebt) is lower (significant at the 5%
level). A low ratio of secured debt to total assets implies that the senior debt is more likely to be
overcollateralized, which leaves room for a more active role for the unsecured creditors. Needless to say, the
secured debt ratio and the leverage ratio are positively correlated (the correlation is 0.23). We confirm that the
13

significance of the coefficient on SecuredDebt comes more from the amount of secured debt than from the
amount of total debt because the coefficient remains significant regardless of whether we control for Leverage,
while the latter becomes insignificant in the presence of SecuredDebt.
In contrast, hedge fund shareholders (as measured by HFEquityCommittee) prefer firms with lower
leverage (significant at the 5% level) and are not averse to high levels of secured debt. One possible explanation is
that the secured creditor-driven fire-sale bias is weakened (Ayotte and Morrison (2009)) in firms where the senior
debt is undercollateralized. In such cases shareholders enjoy more upside potential. Not surprisingly, hedge fund
presence on the equity side is positively associated with institutional equity ownership (excluding the investing
hedge funds) before bankruptcy (significant at the 1% level). Such stocks may possess characteristics that are
appealing to institutional investors (which include hedge funds) in the first place, more importantly, hedge funds
prefer to work with other institutional rather than individual investors when they intend to influence corporate
policy and control, a phenomenon documented by Brav et al. (2008) and Bradley et al. (2010) among hedge funds
that pursue activist agendas in underperforming companies and in discounted closed-end funds, respectively.
Certain firm and case attributes predict hedge funds adopting loan-to-own strategies. In addition to firm
size, we find that leverage, the number of claim classes, and prepackaged Chapter 11 cases are positively
associated with adoption of the strategy (significant at the 10% level or better), while secured debt ratios are
negatively associated with hedge funds loan-to-own strategies (significant at the 5% level). The combination of
high leverage and low secured debt indicates a high probability that unsecured debt will be converted into equity
upon reorganizationa natural route for loan-to-own. The mean (median) number of claim classes
16

(NumClasses) in our sample is nine. A larger number of claim classes is usually associated with greater difficulty
in reaching agreement among different groups of investors (Franks and Torous (1994), and Betker (1995)).
However, the involvement of hedge funds in different parts of the capital structure through the loan-to-own
strategy should help internalize such costs.
Prepackaged bankruptcies, constituting close to a third of the cases, are usually available to better
performing firms that are easier to reorganize. Tashjian, Lease, and McConnell (1996) find that unsecured
creditors prefer prepackaged bankruptcies to traditional Chapter 11 reorganizations because the priority for
14

secured creditors is less likely to be upheld in the former case. Their results are consistent with our evidence that
hedge funds start their loan-to-own strategies by first investing in unsecured debt, which tends to enjoy higher
recovery rates under prepackaged bankruptcies. Our main analyses include an indicator variable for prepackaged
Chapter 11 as a control variable in all regressions to be consistent with the general practice in the literature.
Sensitivity analyses excluding prepackaged cases are reported in Section IV.B6.
Table IV, complemented by evidence from Tables II and III, reveals hedge funds strategic choice in
seeking an entry point in the capital structure of the distressed firm that allows them to have a strong impact on
reorganization. In general, hedge funds are more likely to approach distressed firms from the debt side than from
the equity side, though a higher percentage of them become equity holders ex post. Within the debt category, the
most popular entry point for hedge funds is unsecured debt (Baird and Rasmussen (2008) and Harner (2008a)).
This preference is consistent with the argument put forth by recent legal studies
17
that hedge funds have a strong
preference for so-called fulcrum securities in the capital structure, which is the point in the capital structure
where the enterprise value first fails to fully cover the claims. Secured debt is rarely fulcrum. Unsecured debt is
thus appealing to hedge funds because of the potential upside gain due to their option-like features and, more
importantly, the sensitivity of the securities value to their actions.
Moreover, firms with high levels of secured debt are more likely to have undercollateralized secured debt,
providing less room for unsecured creditors and hence less appeal for hedge funds to influence the process
through the unsecured creditors committee. In contrast, given senior creditors weaker incentive to push for
liquidation, the potential for reorganization and emergence gives shareholders more upside potential and thus
attracts more hedge funds to the equity side.

IV. Hedge Fund Presence and Bankruptcy Outcomes
A. Model Specification
This section examines the relation between hedge fund involvement and bankruptcy outcomes as
measured by the following nine variables: (i) Emerge, which measures the emergence of the firm from
bankruptcy (as opposed to being liquidated or acquired); (ii) Duration, which measures the number of months
15

(measured in log) spent in bankruptcy until resolution (which includes emergence, liquidation, or acquisition);
(iii) LossExclusivity, which measures the debtors loss of its exclusive right to file a plan of reorganization after
180 days in bankruptcy; (iv) APRCreditor, defined in Section II.A4, which measures the occurrence of
distributions to unsecured creditors before secured creditors are paid in full; (v) DistEquity, which measures
distributions made to existing shareholders; (vi) DebtRecovery, which measures the average recovery of all
corporate debt (including secured and unsecured debt) at plan confirmation; (vii) CEOTurnover, which measures
CEO turnover during the reorganization process; (viii) KERP, which meaures the existence of a key employee
retention plan approved by the court; and (ix) StkRet, which measures the standardized abnormal return from
Chapter 11 filing to plan confirmation. The variables (ii), (vi), and (ix) are continuous, while the rest are binary
variables. The variables (iv) and (v) characterize distributions to junior claims a result of APR deviation, and the
variables (vii) and (viii) capture the incentives and stability of senior management during the Chapter 11 process.
Each table presented below includes a subset of these nine outcome variables as relevant for the particular role
that hedge funds assume.
Any relation between hedge fund presence and bankruptcy outcomes could result from two effects: (i) a
pure selection effect, whereby informed hedge funds pick the targets that offer the best expected payoff,
18
and the
value of the underlying assets is exogenous to hedge funds action, and (ii) a pure treatment effect, whereby hedge
funds change the outcome and hence the value of the underlying assets even if they were randomly assigned to
distressed firms. This is the average treatment effect of the full sample.
A priori a combination of these two effects is likely at work. Hedge funds are sophisticated investors that
could potentially profit from their company-picking skills even if they remain passive stakeholders, and at the
same time hedge funds are likely to choose cases in which they can more effectively influence the outcome in
their favor. It is worth noting that our default measures for hedge fund participation (HFCreditorsCommittee and
HFEquityCommittee) embed their activist roles. If hedge funds can achieve the desired outcome just by picking
the right companies without exerting influence during the Chapter 11 process, they could remain passive large
stakeholders without the costly voluntary effort of forming and serving on those committees.
16

As a large unsecured creditor, a hedge fund can accept or decline the invitation from the U.S. Trustees
Office to join the unsecured creditors committee; as a large shareholder, a hedge fund needs to submit motions to
the court to form an equity committee. The duties of committee members range from reviewing the debtors
books to monitoring the debtors business and legal activities and to recommending a course of action to the
holders of the claims they represent. However, their presence on such committees may infringe on their flexibility
in trading claims due to their access to nonpublic material information. According to Ayotte and Morrison
(2009), the unsecured creditors committee often objects to key plan terms, such as the appointment of
professionals, DIP loan terms, asset sales, and exclusivity extensions. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that hedge
funds would put in such effort and incur the related costs if they did not intend to actively influence the Chapter
11 process.
Despite a lack of systematic public data sources that describe hedge funds actual actions in court or in
boardrooms, our search of news articles yields anecdotal evidence suggesting that they do actively engage in the
process. In addition to the examples referred to in Section I, two hedge funds (D.E. Shaw and Eton Park Master
Fund) in the Allied Holdings case were on the unsecured creditors committee that filed objections to exclusivity
extensions. Also, in both the KCS Energy case (where DDJ Capital Management and Turnberry Capital
Management were involved) and the Sunbeam case (where Oaktree Capital Management, HBK Investment, and
KS Capital Partners were involved), hedge funds on the unsecured creditors committees proposed alternative
reorganization plans.
19

To accommodate both the selection and the treatment effects, we use the following model:

*
*
,
1 if 0; and 0 if otherwise,
.
i i i
i i i
i i i i
HFPart X
HFPart HFPart HFPart
Outcome Z HFPart
| c
q
= +
= > =
= + +
(1)
In the above system, HFPart is an indicator variable for hedge funds participation in various ways as analyzed in
Table IV, and Outcome is one of the outcome variables defined earlier in this section. Econometrically a selection
problem amounts to a nonzero correlation between the error disturbances of the two equations in (1), that is,
17

( , ) 0
i i
corr c q = . Consequently, the estimated is upward (downward) biased if ( , )
i i
corr c q is positive
(negative).
For the purpose of identification, we need instrumental variables that effectively predict hedge funds
participation but do not affect outcome variables other than through hedge funds. That is, the vector of X in
equation (1) must contain variables in addition to a full overlap with the vector of Z. We acknowledge that no
firm-level variable is likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction because it is difficult to rule out a firm
characteristic that attracts hedge fund participation as a simultaneous determinant of the outcome. Instead, we
settle on the following two instrumental variables, both of which capture the capital supply conditions of hedge
fund distress-investing.
The first variable is DistressHFRet, which is the lagged return on an index of distress-investing hedge
funds using data from CISDM (a hedge fund database available through WRDS). More specifically, we use the
monthly average return over the three-month period (before the Chapter 11 filing) and find that our results are not
sensitive to the particular estimation window chosen. This variable has explanatory power for hedge fund
participation as creditors and shareholders. The second variable is SP500Ret, which is the lagged monthly return
on the S&P 500 index. To avoid collinearity, we use the residual from regressing the raw SP500Ret on
DistressHFRet. Again, the three-month period (before the Chapter 11 filing) serves as our estimation window to
form the lagged return variable. This variable has explanatory power for hedge fund participation as shareholders.
In general, a distressed firm is more likely to have hedge fund involvement if distress-investing hedge
funds have been doing well, or if the overall stock market has been doing well, in the recent past before a
particular firms Chapter 11 filing. Because the two variables are recorded at a monthly frequency, they are able
to generate cross-sectional variation despite being time-series variables. This is because the average (median)
number of firms filing for bankruptcy in the same month during our sample period is only four (three) firms.
Most importantly, these two variables are unlikely to directly impact the outcome of an individual bankruptcy
case due to both the exogeneity of market-wide returns to an individual firm and the lack of autocorrelation in
returns. Even if the market returns close to the confirmation date of a Chapter 11 case may affect its outcome,
18

these returns are virtually uncorrelated with the earlier returns leading to the particular Chapter 11 filing that
occurred, on average, 17 months ago.
When the outcome variable is binary (as in most cases), we adopt the estimation method for a binary
outcome model with a binary endogenous explanatory variable as prescribed in Wooldridge (2002, Chapter
15.7.3). When the outcome variables are continuous (for example, Duration and DebtRecovery), we resort to the
treatment regression method as prescribed in Maddala (1983, Chapter 5.7). Both models encompass a binary and
endogenous key independent variable HFPart (measured by HFCreditorCommittee, HFEquityCommittee, and
HFLTO), and both are estimated with the Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) method. Results are presented
in Tables V to VII. In addition to reporting the coefficients, we provide the sign of the estimated ( , ) corr c q =
(i.e., the correlation of the residuals from the selection equation and the outcome equation) as well as the
2

statistic and associated p-value from a likelihood ratio test for the null H
0
: = 0. The test is equivalent to testing
the exogeneity of hedge fund participation with regard to bankruptcy outcomes because a nonzero is the source
of endogeneity (see equation (1)).
We present results both from the simple probit or OLS regression models (without instrumentation for
HFPart) and from the instrumented regressions. While our emphasis is on the latter tables, especially when the
exogeneity of hedge fund participation is rejected, we reference the un-instrumented results in discussing the
nature of the selection effect due to hedge funds strategic targeting. Comparison of the treatment effects and the
total effects (without instrumentation) allows us to comment on the hedge funds ability to select firms based on
unobserved characteristics.

B. Relating Bankruptcy Outcomes to Hedge Fund Presence
B.1. Hedge Fund Presence on the Unsecured Creditors Committee
Table V Panel A shows that hedge fund presence on the unsecured creditors committee is positively
associated with all seven outcome variables, and the effects are significant (at the 5% level) for emergence,
duration, APR deviations for the secured creditors, and the adoption of a KERP. Once the selection effect is
taken into account, the coefficient on HFCreditorsCommittee in Panel B becomes significant in the outcome
19

equations for the debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a plan, debt recovery, and CEO turnover, but loses
significance in other outcome equations.
[Insert Table V here.]
The two panels of Table V indicate an interesting combination of investment selection abilities possessed
by hedge fund creditors, as well as the activist roles they play. As skilled investors, hedge funds invest in the
unsecured debt of distressed firms that are more likely to offer desirable outcomes for that class of claim holders,
including emergence (as opposed to liquidation, which tends to favor secured creditors), more frequent APR
deviations for secured creditors in favor of unsecured creditors, and retention of key employees (to ensure
continuity of the going concern and to instill the incentive for recovery
20
). However, in these equations the
likelihood ratio test cannot reject the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of hedge fund participation (i.e.,
0
: 0 H = ) at conventional significance levels.
On the other hand, the debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan after 180 days and
higher CEO turnover rates appear to be caused by hedge fund actions. The magnitude as well as significance of
HFCreditorsCommittee in these two outcome equations is much strengthened in the model where we control for
the selection effect. Moreover, the likelihood ratio test rejects (at the 10% level or lower) the exogeneity of hedge
funds participation in favor of a negative selection (i.e., : 0
a
H < ) for both outcomes. That is, hedge funds
select firms in which, a priori, management has strong power over the creditors. As a result, hedge fund impact is
strengthened after the selection effect is taken into account.
Such a contrast is intuitive given the confrontational nature of the two outcomes against management.
The incumbent top management of the debtor would likely resist the loss of exclusivity or their jobs. It is,
therefore, implausible that such outcomes would take place on their own were it not for the hedge funds
persistence. The strong relation between hedge fund presence and debt recovery suggests an overall efficiency
gain, which could only be accomplished by hedge funds ability to counter the power of the debtor.
The mean (median) duration is 17 (13) months. The positive association between hedge fund presence on
the unsecured creditors committee and case duration has two potential explanations. First, unsecured creditors
20

committees are usually formed in more complex bankruptcies that take a longer time to resolve. For example,
such committees are not usually formed in prepackaged cases. If we include in the regression both hedge fund
presence on the unsecured creditors committee and the existence of such a committee, we find that the latter
variable overwhelms the former (results are reported in the Internet Appendix). That is, hedge funds do not
lengthen the Chapter 11 process conditional on the formation of an unsecured creditors committee. On the other
hand, hedge fund presence on the unsecured creditors committee remains significant in the regressions examining
the likelihood of emergence, even when the existence of an unsecured creditors committee is taken into account.
The combination of the results from both emergence and duration indicate that while unsecured creditors
committees are more likely to be formed in more complex cases, hedge fund presence on such committees favors
the emergence outcome (which takes a longer time to materialize compared to straight liquidation).
Second, hedge funds stake in unsecured debt is likely to be a fulcrum security that enjoys a lot of option
value, especially when hedge funds participate in cases in which the unsecured debt is large relative to the secured
(see Table IV). Given that the option value increases with duration, hedge funds may have an incentive to
prolong the process.
B.2. Hedge Fund Presence on the Equity Committee
As we discuss earlier, equity committees are less common than the committees for unsecured creditors.
While 85% of our sample firms form unsecured creditors committees during the restructuring process, the court
appoints equity committees in only 11% of the cases. Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007), while
reporting an almost identical overall frequency, document a dwindling trend in the formation of equity
committees after 1990. The declining role of shareholders in the Chapter 11 process is apparently matched by the
rising importance of creditors in the process (Skeel (2003) and Ayotte and Morrison (2009)). However, we note
that during the most recent years (2005 to 2007), hedge funds are present on all equity committees when there is
one.
The effects of hedge fund presence on the equity committee, reported in Table VI, share similarities to as
well as exhibit differences from those related to their presence on unsecured creditors committee. Similar to their
creditor counterparts, hedge fund equity holders are just as vigilant in pushing out failed CEOs. The effect is
21

significant in both the simple probit model and the instrumented model, indicating that hedge funds constitute a
strong force ousting CEOs of underperforming companies. Moreover, as in the case for hedge fund creditors, the
exogeneity of hedge fund presence on the equity committee is rejected at the 1% level in favor of a negative
selection ( 0 < ), that is, hedge fund shareholders target companies with more entrenched management. This
evidence is consistent with the findings of Brav et al. (2008), who show that managerial entrenchment invites
activism and that the CEO turnover rate among firms targeted by activist hedge funds doubles the normal level.
Equity holders in bankrupt firms seldom receive payoffs if the firm is liquidated. Hence, hedge fund
equity holders should target firms that are more likely to survive and should exert their influence to favor
emergence. The evidence from Table IV that hedge funds are more likely to have a presence on the equity
committee in firms with lower leverage and higher profitability speaks to the selection. Table VI confirms that
the coefficient on HFEquityCommittee is indeed positive in the outcome equation for Emerge. Importantly, the
coefficient is significant (at the 10% level) in the instrumented model, which is also supportive of a causal
relation.
[Insert Table VI here.]
The ultimate payoff to hedge fund equity holders can be summarized by the variable DistEquity, which
indicates the occurrence of a distribution to existing shareholders and happens in 21% of the cases. Hedge fund
presence on the equity committee is associated with a 43 percentage point increase in the probability of a positive
distribution to existing equity holders, controlling for firm and case characteristics. The effect is rendered
insignificant when the instrumented model is employed. Similarly, the log-likelihood ratio test rejects the
exogeneity of hedge fund participation at the 5% level in favor of a positive selection. Together these results offer
strong evidence in support of hedge funds ability to pick stocks of distressed firms with better prospects for
existing shareholders, but offer less evidence for hedge funds activist role in making the distribution happen.
We next make two refinements to the analysis on emergence and distribution to equity holders. First, we
collect information on the stated purpose in Item 4 of Schedule 13D filings by hedge funds in the bankrupt firms.
It turns out that in 21 of the 50 Schedule 13D filings both before and during Chapter 11, hedge funds state that
22

influencing the restructuring process is their goal, suggesting a strong activist bias in hedge funds investment in
distressed firms. When we include an indicator variable for the stated goal in the probit regression to explain
emergence (results are reported in the Internet Appendix), the new variable is positively associated with the
likelihood of emergence (significant at the 10% level). Moreover, the marginal effect associated with this new
indicator variable is close to 20 percentage points, which is economically significant as compared to the sample
average emergence frequency of 60%.
Second, we find that in contrast to HFEquityCommittee, HFJoint5%, does not bear a significant relation
with DistEquity (results are reported in the Internet Appendix). Such a difference points to the importance of
hedge fund actions (through their committee involvement) beyond their being mere investors. We also refine the
finding of Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007) that the formation of an equity committee is positively
associated with APR deviations by clarifying that hedge fund presence on the committee has its own effect.
Indeed, the coefficient on HFEquityCommittee retains its significance even if the existence of an equity
committee is controlled for.
A subset of the sample in which we observe stock returns during the Chapter 11 process should directly
indicate how hedge funds presence as major equity holders is related to the returns to existing shareholders. For
this purpose, the outcome variable is the abnormal holding period returns from the last trading day prior to the
Chapter 11 filing to the date of plan confirmation (or case resolution). We have stock trading prices from before
the filing to the plan confirmation date (the holding period) for 298 cases from both CRSP and the OTC/pink-
sheet markets. We supplement the calculation of stock returns using information about distributions to common
shareholders for another 43 cases. Therefore, we are able to calculate the standardized abnormal monthly return
by subtracting the contemporaneous holding period return of the CRSP equal-weighted indexa benchmark
commonly adopted in the bankruptcy literature (Dawkins, Bhattacharya, and Bamber (2007))and then
normalizing by the number of months in the Chapter 11 process for a total of 341 cases (StkRet).
Table VI shows that the coefficients on HFEquityCommittee are statistically significant (at the 5% level
orbetter) and economically large (between 14 to 16 percentage points), regardless of whether the selection effect
is taken into account. These numbers are not necessarily proportional to the returns that hedge funds obtain from
23

their own equity investment because they could buy into the equity at different times during the bankruptcy
process. What we show here is that hedge fund participation is associated with more favorable returns to existing
shareholders of the bankrupt firms.
B.3. Hedge Fund Pursuance of Loan-to-Own
Table VII examines the relation between hedge fund pursuance of a loan-to-own strategy and Chapter 11
outcomes. The results appear to be a natural blend of those in Tables V and VI, consistent with the hedge funds
dual rolesfirst as creditors and then as new shareholders. We do not examine emergence in this table because
the coding of HFLTO favors emergence cases due to the requirement that hedge fund creditors become
shareholders ex post.
[Insert Table VII here.]
Overall, hedge funds aiming at loan-to-own are pro-KERP (significant at the 10% level), and are
associated with more distributions to both unsecured creditors (significant at the 1% level) and shareholders
(significant at the 5% level). As in Table V, the effects are significant (at the 1% level) on the debtors loss of
exclusivity, debt recovery, and CEO turnover in the instrumented model, and the test for the exogeneity of hedge
fund participation rejects the null in favor of a significant negative selection. All these relations indicate that the
loan-to-own players act like unsecured creditors in exerting their influence over management. At the same time,
they value continuity by retaining companies key employees given that they have a relatively long investment
horizon in firms that emerge from Chapter 11.
B.4. Relations among Hedge Funds Different Roles
Tables V to VII demonstrate that hedge funds appear to be effective in achieving their intended goals for
the role they assume. Given that hedge funds could take different sides as unsecured creditors or shareholders, a
natural question that arises is whether hedge funds influence from one position works against the interests of
another class of claim holders. Given the lack of shareholder power in bankruptcy relative to creditors, it is
especially important to analyze the relation between hedge fund presence as creditors and the value implications
for existing equity holders. To address this question, we relate changes in stock prices around the bankruptcy
filing to hedge fund involvement on the debt side that is observable at the time. To the extent that equity prices
24

are forward looking, they should incorporate information that is predictive of the effect of hedge funds on future
outcomes.
In 277 of our sample cases information is available for both hedge fund presence and stock returns. We
separate this event sample into two groups: 75 cases in which hedge funds are listed among the largest unsecured
creditors on the petition forms on the day of bankruptcy filing, and 202 cases that have no publicly known hedge
fund involvement on the debt side. Figure 1 plots the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, using the CRSP equal-
weighted return as the benchmark) of both groups for the [-10, +10] window, where day 0 is the date of the
Chapter 11 filing. Though the stock market reacts negatively to bankruptcy filings in general, cases with hedge
funds on the debt side fare much better. Immediately after the petition, the group with hedge funds among the
largest unsecured creditors experiences price increases, while the group without hedge fund presence continues to
experience price declines.
[Insert Figure 1 here.]
Table VIII presents the same result using univariate and multivariate regressions where the dependent
variables are CARs over two event windows: [-10, +10] and [-5, +5]. The key independent variable of interest is
hedge funds presence as largest unsecured creditors (HFLargestCreditor), which is the only debt-side
participation variable that is known at the time of a bankruptcy filing. The univariate results confirm the message
of Figure 1 (a 15 to 20 percentage point difference). Motivated by Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), we include the
following control variables: the difference between Compustat-reported book assets at the last fiscal year-end and
the value at the time of bankruptcy filing, scaled by the former; the presence of banks among the secured
creditors; the number of claim classes; an indicator variable for prepackaged Chapter 11; an indicator variable for
filing in Delaware; and firm size (log book assets). Except for the conventional size control, most covariates
represent new information revealed upon the bankruptcy filing that could potentially impact the returns over the
announcement window.
[Insert Table VIII here.]
We find that the coefficient on HFLargestCreditors remains significant, and becomes even bigger in
magnitude (20 to 30 percentage points) in the presence of control variables, suggesting that the market perceives
25

hedge funds to be the largest unsecured creditors favorable to the shareholders of Chapter 11 firms. As expected,
the change in assets from the last annual filing to the SEC to Chapter 11 filing is positively related to
announcement returns (significant at the 5% level using the [-5, +5] window). Prepackaged Chapter 11 is also
greeted favorably by the stock market, though the effect (about 7 to 8 percentage points), while economically
meaningful, is statistically insignificant. Finally, commercial banks being among the secured creditors and the
Delaware venue choice do not have a meaningful return effect.
Results in Table VIII are closely related to our analysis on emergence. Emergence from Chapter 11 is
generally good news to equity holders because the APR is most likely upheld in liquidation while the firm as a
going-concern leaves some upside potential for shareholders. Given the positive relation between hedge fund
creditors and firm emergence, the favorable stock market reaction to hedge fund presence is expected.
B.5. Effects of Other Firm and Case Characteristics
In addition to the effects of hedge fund involvement on bankruptcy outcomes, Tables V to VII also relate
other firm and case characteristics to outcomes. Given that these relations are not central to our analysis and that
most of our results are consistent with the prior literature (Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), Bharath, Panchapegesan,
and Werner (2007), and Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009)), we only briefly summarize some interesting results
below.
First, high leverage is associated with a higher likelihood of emergence, and high leverage and high return
on assets are associated with more frequent adoptions of KERP. These relations indicate that firms with strong
fundamentals but that suffer from financial distress are more likely to emerge from Chapter 11 and to retain their
key employees in the future. Both relations are indicative of the overall efficiency of the Chapter 11 process, as
shown in Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjian (2009). Second, higher levels of both cash holdings and secured debt are
associated with shorter duration in bankruptcy. While cash provides liquidity, the latter effect might be due to the
fact that secured creditors tend to be more concentrated, which leads to fewer conflicts among themselves, and in
turn faster resolution.
Third, cases with many classes of claims favor reorganization. This result might seem counterintuitive, in
that having more claim classes tends to make negotiations more difficult. Bolton and Scharfsteins (1996) model
26

illustrates inefficient renegotiation following a default with multiple creditors. Welch (1997) provides a rationale
for concentrated bank debt to be senior and dispersed public debt to be junior in reducing rent-seeking and
avoiding deadweight loss in the bankruptcy process. On the other hand, our finding is consistent with the general
goal of bankruptcy courts, which is to facilitate an outcome that creates the greatest economic gains rather than
simply protecting the most senior parties (Harner (2008a)). In cases with a large number of claim classes,
liquidation will result in zero distributions to many classes in order to provide payments to the most senior
classes. As a result, courts are more likely to lean toward reorganization.
B.6. Sensitivity Analyses
We conduct several sensitivity analyses to supplement our main results. First, we examine the relation
between hedge fund presence and the likelihood of a company re-entering Chapter 11 after emergence (i.e.,
Chapter 22), which happens in 52 of the 286 emergence cases in our sample. Tables V and VI indicate that
hedge funds favor emergence over liquidation (or acquisition). If their preference leads to underliquidation, in
that firms with weak prospects are saved when liquidation would lock in a higher value, then we should observe a
positive association between hedge fund presence and the incidence of Chapter 22. An ordered probit analysis,
reported in Table IX, indicates that this is not the case.
[Insert Table IX here.]
In the ordered probit analysis, the outcome of emergence and no re-filing is coded as the high outcome (=
3), emergence with later re-filing is coded as the medium outcome (= 2), and liquidation (or acquisition) in the
first round is coded as the low outcome (= 1). The coefficients on all three measures of hedge fund participation
(HFCreditorsCommittee, HFEquityCommittee, and HFLTO) are positive, two of which are significant (at the 1%
level). The results support a positive relation between hedge funds involvement and eventual survival rather than
a hedge fund bias toward underliquidati ex post unviable companies.
Second, we are able to replicate our main results on the subsample excluding pre-packs. Results are
presented in the Internet Appendix. Pre-packs are potentially very different from regular Chapter 11 cases. In the
Internet Appendix we relate hedge fund presence as the largest unsecured creditors
21
to the choice of pre-pack,
and show that hedge funds do not exhibit any significant preference for pre-pack versus fighting in court.
27

Therefore, using pre-pack as a control variable should not interfere with the effect of hedge funds. In the Internet
Appendix we also examine the relation between hedge fund presence as the largest unsecured creditors and the
likelihood of an involuntary filing (occurring less than 5% of the time). Again we find no significant hedge fund
effect.
Finally, to ensure that our results are not driven by the credit boom years of 2005 to early 2007 or
affected by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) in effect since 2005,
22
in
the Internet Appendix we replicate Tables V to VII by restricting attention to the subsample spanning 1996 to
2004. Again, results are qualitatively similar.

C. Summary of Hedge Funds Roles in Bankruptcy
To summarize Tables V to VIII, we find that hedge funds favor emergence over the alternatives of
liquidation or acquisition, even though they tend to participate in more complex cases that take longer to resolve.
Our study indicates that hedge funds playing activist roles in distressed companies do not necessarily have as
short an investment horizon as the typical hedge fund, which tends to have significantly quicker portfolio turnover
than other institutional investors (Agarwal, Fos, and Jiang (2011)). These hedge funds benefit more from
companies emergence where the long-term company prospects are important, and the increasingly popular loan-
to-own strategy necessitates their transition to holding long-term stakes in the underlying firm.
Though hedge funds are often perceived as anti-management, our study reveals a more subtle picture
whereby hedge funds could be better described as transforming the traditional management-driven restructuring
process to a management neutral (rather than senior creditor control) process, a trend articulated by Skeel
(2003), Harner (2008a), and Ayotte and Morrison (2009). Despite the high average CEO turnover rate of 27% in
our sample, this number is lower than the 33% to 75% range reported in earlier studies (see Gilson (1989), Gilson
and Vetsuypens (1993), Betker (1995), and Hotchkiss (1995)). Though hedge fund presence is associated with
high CEO turnover, hedge funds are equally eager to retain key employees through KERP. KERP rose from
about a quarter of the filings in 1996 to about half towards the end of our sample period in 2007. The correlation
between the adoption of a KERP and CEO turnover among bankrupt firms in our sample is positive (0.15). While
28

it seems counterintuitive, the positive correlation indicates a common practice of replacing the former leader of a
bankrupt company while striving to retain key employees at the same time. The WorldCom case provides such an
example. While the companys CEO (Bernard Ebbers) and CFO (Scott Sullivan) were both forced out, a KERP
was approved in order to retain 329 key employees.
23
Hedge funds (including Blue River Capital and Cerberus
Capital), which were among the largest unsecured creditors and were also members of the unsecured creditors
committee, played an active role in selecting the new CEO of WorldCom and worked with the company
management to develop long-term strategic plans.
Several of our findings are strongly suggestive of a favorable effect of hedge funds on firm value. The
event study presented in Table VIII shows that hedge funds influence as creditors does not come at the expense
of shareholders. The fact that their presence greatly benefits the current shareholders is a strong indication that
they successfully offset the power of secured creditors, which benefits all junior claim holders. Moreover, among
a subset of sample firms in which secured debt is minimal (i.e., below 5% or 10% of assets), the positive relation
between stock price reaction and hedge funds presence as the largest unsecured creditors remains. Such evidence
combined with the positive relation between hedge fund presence and debt recovery (as shown in Table V)
supports the hypothesis that hedge funds enhance the overall value of firms in Chapter 11. They apparently
achieve this by alleviating financial constraints, reducing the frequency of inefficient liquidation, and mitigating
conflicts among different classes of claims. Our result is consistent with Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1997), who
show a positive stock price reaction to purchases of public debt by vulture investors, and supports the conclusion
by Goldschmid (2005) that distressed debt investors are more like phoenix than vulture as they add value to the
restructuring process.
Examining the role of hedge funds in post-emergence firm performance, we find that hedge fund presence
in Chapter 11 is positively associated with reduced leverage (measured as the change in leverage between the time
of bankruptcy filing and one year after emergence), but do not find a significant relation with respect to ex post
operating performance (such as industry-adjusted return on assets); results are reported in the Internet Appendix.
Combined with results from Table IX regarding the likelihood of re-filing, this suggests that hedge fund
involvement is most conducive to reducing financial constraints faced by distressed firms. Such a pattern is
29

consistent with practitioners view about hedge funds picking firms with good fundamentals but bad balance
sheets, and echoes the results in Table V which shows that firms that emerge tend to be those suffering from
financial distress but that have strong operating performance.

V. Conclusion
Using a comprehensive sample of Chapter 11 firms from 1996 to 2007, this study documents the
prevalence of hedge funds in the restructuring process, and demonstrates their activist role in shaping bankruptcy
outcomes. We find that hedge fund presence is associated with a higher probability of the debtors loss of
exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan, a higher probability of emergence, more favorable distributions to
the claims they invest in, more CEO turnover, and more frequent adoptions of KERP. We further establish the
causal effects of hedge funds, especially in their role as creditors, through instrumentation for hedge fund
participation. Finally, we show that the favorable outcomes for claims in which hedge funds invest do not come
at the expense of other claimholdersthey are more likely to result from value creation by alleviating financial
constraints and mitigating conflicts among different classes of claims.
30

Appendix: Top Hedge Fund Players in Chapter 11 by Categories

Rank Largest unsecured creditors Unsecured creditors committee DIP financing
1 Oaktree Capital Management, LLC Oaktree Capital Management, LLC Cerberus Capital Management
2 Appaloosa Management, LP PPM America Special Investments Fund Silver Point Capital Group, LP
3 Apollo Advisors, LP Cerberus Capital Management Black Diamond Capital Management, LLC
4 Cerberus Capital Management Appaloosa Management, LP DDJ Capital Management, LLC
5 Loomis Sayles & Co., LP Loomis Sayles & Co., LP Oaktree Capital Management, LLC


Rank Largest shareholders/ 13D filing before
bankruptcy
Equity committee/ 13D filing during
bankruptcy
Overall Ranking
1 Bain Capital Funds Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund Oaktree Capital Management LLC
2 Loomis Sayles & Co., LP Xerion Capital Partners, LLC Cerberus Capital Management
3 Oaktree Capital Management, LLC Lonestar Partners, LP Loomis Sayles & Co., LP
4 Rutabaga Capital Management, LLC Appaloosa Management, LP Appaloosa Management, LP
5 Warburg, Pincus Ventures, LP Prescott Group Capital Mgmt PPM America Special Investments Fund

31

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37


38

Figure 1
Event study around Chapter 11 filing

This figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, adjusted by the CRSP equal-weighted return) from the 10 days before to
the 10 days after a Chapter 11 filing. The solid line represents CARs for 75 cases with at least one hedge fund listed as the largest
unsecured creditor. The dashed line represents CARs for 202 cases without any hedge fund listed as the largest unsecured creditor.
-
.
4
-
.
3
-
.
2
-
.
1
0
C
u
m
u
l
a
t
i
v
e

a
b
n
o
r
m
a
l

r
e
t
u
r
n
-10 -5 0 5 10
Days relative to Chapter 11 filing
HFLargestCreditors=Yes HFLargestCreditors=No
39

Table I
Variable Definitions
This table provides the definition of variables used in the study and their data sources.
Variable Definition Data Source
Firm Characteristics
Assets Book assets measured in 2008 dollars. Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com, Compustat
AssetsChange The change in book assets between the last fiscal year-end and the time of filing Chapter 11,
scaled by the former.
Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com, Compustat
Sales Sales measured in 2008 dollars. Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com, Compustat
Leverage The ratio of total liabilities to book assets. Compustat, EDGAR (10Ks), BankruptcyData.com
Cash The ratio of cash and short-term investments to book assets. Compustat, EDGAR (10Ks), BankruptcyData.com
Tangibility The ratio of net PP&E to book assets. Compustat, EDGAR (10Ks), BankruptcyData.com
ROA The ratio of EBITDA to book assets. Compustat, EDGAR (10Ks), BankruptcyData.com
SecuredDebt The ratio of secured debt to book assets. Capital IQ, BankrutpcyData.com, Compustat
Institution Percentage of institutional ownership. Thomson Reuters Ownership Database (13Fs)
NumClasses Number of claim classes. Bankruptcy Plans
CBLenders An indicator variable takes a value of one if at least one commercial bank is among the secured
lenders.
BankruptcyData.com, DealScan, and SDC Syndicated Loan
Database

Bankruptcy Case Characteristics
Prepack An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a bankruptcy is prepackaged or prenegotiated.
According to the definition by LoPucki, a case is prepackaged if the debtor drafted the plan,
submitted to a vote of the impaired classes, and claimed to have obtained the acceptance
necessary for consensual confirmation before filing. On the other hand, if the debtor negotiates
the plan with less than all groups or obtains the acceptance of less than all groups necessary to
confirm before the bankruptcy case is filed, then the case is regarded as prenegotiated.
Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy
Plans
Delaware An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a bankruptcy case is filed in the state of
Delaware.
Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com
LossExclusivity An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the debtor loses its exclusive right to file a plan
of reorganization after 180 days in bankruptcy.
Bankrutpcydata.com and Factiva
DIP An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bankrupt firm receives court approval of
debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing.
BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy DataSource, Bankruptcy Plans,
LexisNexis, Factiva
KERP An indicator variable that takes a value of one if a key employee retention plan is approved by the
court.
BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy DataSource, Bankruptcy Plans,
LexisNexis, Factiva
CreditorsCommittee An indicator variable that takes a value of one if an unsecured creditors committee is appointed by
the court.
BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva
EquityCommittee An indicator variable that takes a value of one if an equity committee is appointed by the court. BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva
CEOTurnover An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the CEO of a bankrupt firm is replaced during
the Chapter 11 restructuring.
BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva, EDGAR (Proxy
Statements and 10Ks)
40

Variable Definition Data Source
Emerge An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bankrupt firm emerges from bankruptcy. Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com
Liquidated An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bankrupt firm is liquidated (liquidation in
Chapter 11 or conversion to Chapter 7).
Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com
Duration Number of months in bankruptcy, from the date of filing to the date of plan confirmation. Bankruptcy Research Database, BankruptcyData.com
APRCreditor An indicator variable that takes a value of one if there is an APR deviation for secured creditors,
which occurs when unsecured debt holders receive a distribution before secured lenders are paid
in full.
BankruptcyData.com, EDGAR (8K), Bankruptcy Courts
DistEquity An indicator variable that takes a value of one if equity holders receive payoffs either through
APR deviation or retaining pre-Chapter 11 shares.
BankruptcyData.com, EDGAR (8K), Bankruptcy Courts
DebtRecovery Average recovery of all corporate debt (including both secure and unsecured debt) at plan
confirmation.
BankruptcyData.com, EDGAR (8K), Bankruptcy Courts, CRSP,
Bloomberg, Datastream
StkRet Standardized abnormal monthly return, constructed by subtracting the contemporaneous holding
period return of the CRSP equal-weighted index from the holding period return for Chapter 11
stocks from two days before filing to plan confirmation, normalized by the number of months in
the Chapter 11 process.
CRSP, Bloomberg, Datastream
CAR[a,b] CRSP equal-weighted index-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns from a days before bankruptcy
filing to b days after filing.
CRSP, Bloomberg, Datastream

Hedge Fund Presence
HFCreditorsCommittee An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one hedge fund is on the unsecured
creditors committee.
BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva
HFLargestCreditors An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one hedge fund is one of the largest
unsecured creditors as listed on the Chapter 11 petition forms.
BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva
HFEquityCommittee An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one hedge fund is on the equity
committee.
BankruptcyData.com, LexisNexis, Factiva
HFJoint5% An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the total equity ownership by all hedge funds is
at least 5%.
Thomson Reuters Ownership Database (13Fs), EDGAR (13Ds,
Proxy Statements, 10Ks)
HFLTO An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one hedge fund appears to be a loan-to-
own (LTO) player. A hedge fund is a LTO player if hedge funds are identified from a list of the
largest unsecured creditors and unsecured creditors committee and they are matched to 13D and
13F filings within one year after bankruptcy, or bankruptcy reorganization plans confirmed by the
court show that the classes of claims held by hedge funds receive equity distribution.
BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy DataSource, Bankruptcy Plans,
LexisNexis, Factiva, Thomson Reuters Ownership Database
(13Fs), EDGAR (13Ds, Proxy Statements, 10Ks)
HFLTO_DIP An indicator variable that takes a value of one if at least one hedge fund appears to be a loan-to-
own (LTO) player or at least one hedge fund is among the providers of DIP financing.
BankruptcyData.com, Bankruptcy DataSource, Bankruptcy Plans,
LexisNexis, Factiva, Thomson Reuters Ownership Database
(13Fs), EDGAR (13Ds, Proxy Statements, 10Ks)

41

Table II
Summary of Chapter 11 Cases
The sample includes 474 large U.S. Chapter 11 filings from 1996 to 2007. This table presents summary statistics of key bankruptcy case and firm characteristics. Varaibles
definitions are provided in Table I. Panel A presents summary statistics of key case characteristics by year. Numbers presented are in percentages except for Duration. The
variable N in Column (1) is the number of Chapter 11 filings in a given year (N). Panel B presents summary statistics of key firm characteristics.

Panel A: Bankruptcy Case Characteristics by Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Filing
Year
N
Loss
Exclusivity
DIP KERP
Creditors
Committee
Equity
Committee
CEO
Turnover
Emerge Liquidated
Duration
(months)
APR
Creditor
Dist
Equity
Debt
Recovery
1996 15 13.3 73.3 26.7 73.3 6.7 60.0 40.0 46.7 20.5 13.3 33.3 56.8
1997 17 11.8 70.6 29.4 70.6 5.9 29.4 76.5 11.8 21.0 0.0 17.6 70.4
1998 31 16.1 64.5 29.0 90.3 16.1 30.0 71.0 22.6 17.0 9.7 19.4 49.4
1999 42 19.1 69.0 40.5 81.0 14.3 39.0 54.8 31.0 19.0 14.3 33.3 64.8
2000 77 19.5 62.3 28.6 88.3 6.5 23.4 55.8 32.5 20.6 20.8 14.3 48.6
2001 88 17.0 54.5 38.6 81.8 8.0 18.1 47.7 42.0 17.6 19.3 18.2 41.8
2002 80 21.3 57.5 40.0 83.8 8.8 18.3 58.8 25.0 14.1 21.3 20.0 46.8
2003 50 26.0 64.0 54.0 100.0 14.0 30.0 68.0 24.0 15.9 10.0 20.0 52.3
2004 28 35.7 82.1 57.1 82.1 17.9 21.4 85.7 14.3 11.6 3.6 28.6 58.0
2005 23 26.1 78.3 60.9 91.3 13.0 50.0 69.6 21.7 14.7 4.3 13.0 56.6
2006 13 7.7 84.6 46.2 84.6 38.5 23.1 84.6 15.4 11.4 15.4 38.5 65.1
2007 10 0.0 70.0 50.0 70.0 10.0 20.0 50.0 50.0 8.4 0.0 20.0 43.9
All 474 19.8 64.3 40.3 85.2 11.2 26.7 60.3 29.3 16.8 14.8 20.9 51.5


42

Panel B: Summary Statistics of Key Firm and Case Characteristics
Firm/Case
Characteristics
N Mean
Standard
Deviation
Min 25th Median 75th Max
Assets 474 2718 8975 220 424 706 1686 124363
Sales 474 1901 6914 0 323 615 1324 122787
Leverage 474 0.997 0.390 0.254 0.767 0.919 1.129 2.707
Cash 473 0.068 0.097 0.000 0.011 0.030 0.082 0.513
Tangibility 474 0.358 0.240 0.000 0.150 0.339 0.527 0.896
ROA 473 0.010 0.164 -1.073 -0.026 0.043 0.093 0.297
SecuredDebt 466 0.280 0.287 0.000 0.034 0.226 0.430 1.499
Institution 474 0.278 0.254 0.000 0.018 0.239 0.435 1.000
NumClasses 414 8.995 3.112 3 7 9 10 27
Prepack 474 0.293 0.456 0 0 0 1 1
Delaware 474 0.430 0.496 0 0 0 1 1


43

Table III
Hedge Fund Presence in Chapter 11 by Year and Timing
The sample includes 474 large U.S. Chapter 11 filings from 1996 to 2007. This table presents an overview of hedge fund presence during the Chapter 11 process. Statistics are
grouped by year and by the timing of hedge fund presence. N is the number of Chapter 11 filings in a given year. All numbers in Columns (1) to (12) are in percentages and track
the presence of at least one hedge fund in the following roles: (1) among the 20 or 50 largest unsecured creditors as listed on the Chapter 11 petition forms (Largest creditors); (2)
among the top shareholders at the time of filing (Largest shareholders); (3) filing Schedule 13D within one year before Chapter 11 filing (13D filing); (4) on the unsecured
creditors committee (Unsecured creditors committee); (5) among the providers of debtor-in-possession financing (DIP financing); (6) filing Schedule 13D during the
reorganization process (13D filing); (7) on the equity committee (Equity committee); (8) adopting a loan-to-own strategy (Loan-to-own); (9) adopting a loan-to-own strategy or
providing debtor-in-possession financing (Loan-to-own_DIP); (10) being on the debt side including largest creditors, unsecured creditors committee, and DIP financing (Debt
side); (11) being on the equity side including largest shareholders, 13D filing both before and during bankruptcy, and equity committee (Equity side); and (12) the overall
involvement by hedge funds (Overall).

HF Presence Before Bankruptcy HF Presence During Bankruptcy Both Before and During Bankruptcy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Filing
Year
N
Largest
creditors
Largest
shareholders
13D
filing

Unsecured
creditors
committee
DIP
financing
13D
filing
Equity
committee

Loan-to-
own
Loan-to-
own_DIP
Debt
side
Equity
side
Overall
1996 15 16.7 27.3 0.0 30.8 0.0 6.7 6.7 28.6 28.6 46.2 36.4 72.7
1997 17 7.7 42.9 17.6 40.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 17.6 29.4 66.7 42.9 78.6
1998 31 32.0 48.4 9.7 40.7 0.0 3.2 9.7 20.0 20.0 60.0 58.1 92.9
1999 42 39.5 50.0 4.8 50.0 4.8 0.0 2.4 35.6 39.0 64.9 52.5 83.8
2000 77 33.3 55.4 5.2 30.9 5.2 3.9 0.0 24.6 29.0 58.5 56.0 89.2
2001 88 11.3 44.7 5.7 29.4 3.4 2.3 3.5 18.5 23.1 51.2 48.2 88.3
2002 80 28.3 47.4 2.5 43.5 8.7 3.8 3.8 33.3 37.9 64.2 50.0 86.9
2003 50 20.9 50.0 8.0 47.6 14.0 2.0 10.2 34.0 44.7 66.7 59.2 89.1
2004 28 29.6 25.0 14.3 48.1 21.4 7.1 7.4 42.9 50.0 67.9 35.7 85.7
2005 23 21.7 59.1 13.0 40.9 21.7 17.4 13.0 30.4 47.8 59.1 73.9 91.3
2006 13 30.8 61.5 7.7 38.5 38.5 30.8 38.5 23.1 53.8 76.9 69.2 84.6
2007 10 0.0 80.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 20.0 30.0 80.0 90.0
All 474 25.1 48.5 7.0 39.5 9.1 4.4 5.8 27.7 34.5 60.7 53.4 87.4

44

Table IV
Predicting Hedge Fund Presence in Chapter 11
This table presents the probit regression results examining the determinants of hedge fund participation in Chapter 11. Columns (1) and (2) and Columns (3) and (4) examine the
determinants of hedge fund participation on the debt side and the equity side, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) examine hedge funds adopting a loan-to-own strategy. Definitions
of variables are provided in Table I. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. Superscripts ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.



Hedge Funds on Debt Side Hedge Funds on Equity Side Hedge Funds Loan-to-Own
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variable HFCreditorsCommittee HFLargestCreditors HFEquityCommittee HFJoint5% HFLTO HFLTO_DIP
Ln(Assets) 0.163** -0.083 0.104 -0.074 0.168*** 0.105**
[0.064] [0.067] [0.084] [0.060] [0.064] [0.062]
Leverage 0.242 -0.257 -0.857** -0.039 0.361* 0.429**
[0.210] [0.219] [0.439] [0.178] [0.204] [0.196]
Cash 1.538** 0.412 -1.851 1.518** -0.909 -0.570
[0.784] [0.774] [1.609] [0.699] [0.864] [0.777]
Tangibility 0.286 0.087 -0.486 0.020 0.475 0.282
[0.294] [0.304] [0.452] [0.267] [0.295] [0.283]
ROA 0.828 0.063 0.539 0.759* 0.113 0.301
[0.593] [0.621] [0.978] [0.455] [0.585] [0.556]
SecuredDebt -0.670** -0.071 0.311 0.578** -0.526** -0.434*
[0.288] [0.290] [0.428] [0.235] [0.272] [0.260]
Institution -0.197 0.115 1.474*** 1.103*** -0.106 0.312
[0.282] [0.296] [0.413] [0.264] [0.288] [0.273]
NumClasses 0.012 0.036 0.013 -0.042* 0.082*** 0.075***
[0.024] [0.025] [0.036] [0.023] [0.025] [0.025]
Prepack -0.201 0.219 0.217 0.152 0.375** 0.281**
[0.154] [0.164] [0.240] [0.139] [0.151] [0.146]
Delaware -0.169 0.129 -0.154 0.194 0.037 0.138
[0.138] [0.147] [0.218] [0.125] [0.139] [0.133]
Constant -1.590*** -0.371 -2.020*** 0.196 -2.957*** -2.424***
[0.503] [0.529] [0.691] [0.453] [0.524] [0.496]
N 369 361 459 447 416 416
Pseudo R
2
0.050 0.016 0.148 0.058 0.087 0.077
45

Table V
Effects of Hedge Funds on Unsecured Creditors Committee
This table presents the effect of hedge fund presence on the unsecured creditors committee (HFCreditorsCommittee) on Chapter 11 outcomes, including (1) emergence (Emerge), (2) the logarithm of
the number of months in bankruptcy (Duration), (3) the debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a plan of reorganization after 180 days in bankruptcy (LossExclusivity), (4) APR deviation for secured
creditors (APRCreditor), (5) average recovery rate of all corporate debt at plan confirmation (DebtRecovery), (6) CEO turnover during Chapter 11 reorganization (CEOTurnover), and (7) adoptions of
key employee retention plan (KERP). Variable definitions are provided in Table I. Panel A presents results from a simple probit (when the outcome variable is binary, in Columns (1), (3), (4), (6), and
(7)) or an OLS (when the outcome variable is continuous, in Columns (2) and (5)) regression model. Panel B presents results from a binary outcome model with a binary endogenous explanatory
variable (when the outcome variable is binary) or a treatment regression model (when the outcome variable is continuous), as shown in equation (1). Instrumental variables in the selection equation
are the lagged return on an index of distress-investing hedge funds (DistressHFRet) and the lagged monthly return on the S&P 500 index (SP500Ret), coefficients on which are reported. Also
reported at the bottom of Panel B is the sign of , the correlation coefficient of the residuals from the selection regression and the outcome regression, as well as the
2
statistic and the associated p-
value from a likelihood ratio test for the null H
0
: = 0. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Probit/OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emerge Duration LossExclusivity APRCreditor DebtRecovery CEOTurnover KERP
HFCreditorsCommittee 0.373** 0.173** 0.259 0.379** 0.011 0.158 0.324**
[0.161] [0.081] [0.172] [0.185] [0.037] [0.152] [0.152]
Ln(Assets) 0.023 0.031 -0.474*** 0.035 -0.020 0.140** 0.270***
[0.072] [0.036] [0.100] [0.081] [0.017] [0.066] [0.071]
Leverage 0.893*** -0.133 0.006 -0.592* -0.023 0.055 0.453**
[0.289] [0.118] [0.231] [0.302] [0.052] [0.237] [0.225]
Cash -1.712** -0.920** -0.455 -0.127 0.204 -1.905** 0.178
[0.863] [0.444] [0.961] [1.044] [0.211] [0.909] [0.881]
Tangibility 0.162 -0.213 0.539 -1.331*** 0.208*** -0.242 -0.416
[0.337] [0.167] [0.350] [0.411] [0.074] [0.319] [0.321]
ROA 0.167 0.019 -0.138 -0.066 0.327** -0.222 1.650**
[0.663] [0.335] [0.654] [0.897] [0.149] [0.621] [0.703]
SecuredDebt 0.055 -0.264 -0.319 1.847*** -0.010 -0.325 0.171
[0.360] [0.161] [0.340] [0.375] [0.070] [0.324] [0.309]
Institution 0.121 0.149 0.356 -0.088 0.092 0.449 0.700**
[0.319] [0.160] [0.343] [0.366] [0.071] [0.288] [0.303]
NumClasses 0.149*** 0.024* -0.003 0.073** 0.006 -0.001 0.038
[0.033] [0.014] [0.029] [0.031] [0.006] [0.026] [0.026]
Prepack 1.230*** -1.228*** -0.089 0.325* 0.195*** -0.357** -1.212***
[0.194] [0.087] [0.181] [0.192] [0.038] [0.171] [0.178]
Delaware -0.297* -0.088 -0.356** 0.237 -0.020 -0.010 0.100
[0.155] [0.079] [0.166] [0.181] [0.035] [0.149] [0.150]
Constant -2.229*** 2.588*** 2.192*** -1.918*** 0.448*** -1.439*** -2.829***
[0.594] [0.283] [0.688] [0.648] [0.130] [0.522] [0.556]
N 369 369 369 369 321 362 369
Pseudo-R
2
or R
2
0.242 0.449 0.112 0.154 0.131 0.062 0.218

46


Panel B: Binary Outcome with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable Model/Treatment Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emerge Duration LossExclusivity APRCreditor DebtRecovery CEOTurnover KERP
HFCreditorsCommittee 0.779 0.365 1.884*** 0.743 0.500*** 1.306*** -0.085
[1.056] [0.490] [0.109] [1.148] [0.141] [0.379] [1.036]
Ln(Assets) -0.004 0.019 -0.363*** 0.011 -0.059** 0.046 0.290***
[0.100] [0.046] [0.071] [0.110] [0.023] [0.074] [0.079]
Leverage 0.837** -0.150 -0.179 -0.616** -0.067 -0.057 0.480**
[0.346] [0.125] [0.182] [0.303] [0.066] [0.222] [0.227]
Cash -1.918** -1.030** -1.334* -0.325 -0.155 -2.247*** 0.404
[0.966] [0.520] [0.745] [1.205] [0.278] [0.824] [1.039]
Tangibility 0.118 -0.234 0.017 -1.352*** 0.167* -0.331 -0.365
[0.357] [0.174] [0.268] [0.407] [0.092] [0.295] [0.352]
ROA 0.035 -0.040 -0.735 -0.169 0.158 -0.493 1.740**
[0.748] [0.364] [0.544] [0.945] [0.189] [0.584] [0.713]
SecuredDebt 0.153 -0.217 0.265 1.909*** 0.088 -0.013 0.067
[0.441] [0.198] [0.265] [0.386] [0.090] [0.324] [0.407]
Institution 0.148 0.162 0.374 -0.060 0.143 0.458* 0.654*
[0.322] [0.162] [0.266] [0.375] [0.088] [0.270] [0.336]
NumClasses 0.144*** 0.023* -0.007 0.070** 0.005 -0.007 0.040
[0.039] [0.014] [0.022] [0.034] [0.007] [0.024] [0.026]
Prepack 1.234*** -1.214*** 0.091 0.347* 0.244*** -0.218 -1.220***
[0.199] [0.093] [0.138] [0.197] [0.049] [0.171] [0.180]
Delaware -0.264 -0.076 -0.110 0.257 0.019 0.070 0.071
[0.184] [0.084] [0.128] [0.186] [0.045] [0.140] [0.167]
Constant -2.138*** 2.607*** 1.305*** -1.851*** 0.533*** -1.073** -2.819***
[0.689] [0.285] [0.506] [0.709] [0.162] [0.540] [0.571]

IV: DistressHFRet 2.499 2.486 2.180* 2.445 2.953** 2.512* 2.428
[1.627] [1.626] [1.169] [1.643] [1.306] [1.521] [1.659]
IV: SP500Ret 1.561 1.665 0.851 1.594 0.493 1.952** 1.613
[1.024] [1.050] [0.624] [1.027] [0.871] [0.927] [1.028]

Sign of +
LR Test of = 0:

2
(2) 0.146 0.140 8.819*** 0.090 1.940 3.158* 0.164
p-value 0.702 0.709 0.003 0.764 0.163 0.076 0.685

47

Table VI
Hedge Funds on Equity Committee
This table presents the effect of hedge fund presence on the equity committee (HFEquityCommittee) on Chapter 11 outcomes, including (1) emergence (Emerge), (2) the logarithm
of the number of months in bankruptcy (Duration), (3) equity holders receiving positive payoffs (DistEquity), (4) average recovery rate of all corporate debt at plan confirmation
(DebtRecovery), (5) standardized equity abnormal monthly returns from two days before filing to plan confirmation (StkRet), (6) CEO turnover during Chapter 11 reorganization
(CEOTurnover), and (7) adoptions of key employee retention plan (KERP). Variable definitions are provided in Table I. Panel A presents results from a simple probit (when the
outcome variable is binary, in Columns (1), (3), (6), and (7)) or an OLS (when the outcome variable is continuous, in Columns (2), (4), and (5)) regression model. Panel B presents
results from a binary outcome model with a binary endogenous explanatory variable (when the outcome variable is binary) or a treatment regression model (when the outcome
variable is continuous), as shown in equation (1). Instrumental variables in the selection equation are the lagged return on an index of distress-investing hedge funds
(DistressHFRet) and the lagged monthly return on the S&P 500 index (SP500Ret), coefficients on which are reported. Also reported at the bottom of Panel B is the sign of , the
correlation coefficient of the residuals from the selection regression and the outcome regression, as well as the
2
statistic and the associated p-value from a likelihood ratio test for
the null H
0
: = 0. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A: Probit/OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emerge Duration DistEquity DebtRecovery StkRet CEOTurnover KERP
HFEquityCommittee 0.390 0.160 1.246*** 0.182*** 0.157*** 0.684** -0.178
[0.298] [0.149] [0.281] [0.068] [0.043] [0.268] [0.287]
Ln(Assets) 0.035 0.046 -0.075 -0.031** -0.011 0.162*** 0.312***
[0.064] [0.033] [0.073] [0.015] [0.010] [0.062] [0.064]
Leverage 0.841*** -0.090 -0.025 -0.053 0.011 0.090 0.276
[0.229] [0.100] [0.208] [0.047] [0.034] [0.212] [0.188]
Cash -0.898 -0.931** -0.376 0.145 0.041 -1.567* 0.215
[0.774] [0.398] [0.906] [0.193] [0.127] [0.825] [0.768]
Tangibility 0.201 -0.116 0.883*** 0.219*** 0.019 -0.108 -0.260
[0.293] [0.148] [0.312] [0.067] [0.046] [0.292] [0.280]
ROA 0.911* 0.001 -0.307 0.301** 0.043 0.109 1.010**
[0.491] [0.243] [0.550] [0.123] [0.087] [0.515] [0.483]
SecuredDebt 0.038 -0.326** -0.347 -0.037 -0.011 -0.659** 0.288
[0.276] [0.131] [0.285] [0.061] [0.044] [0.290] [0.251]
Institution 0.124 0.152 0.112 0.009 0.033 0.213 0.714**
[0.291] [0.148] [0.332] [0.068] [0.050] [0.279] [0.278]
NumClasses 0.126*** 0.015 0.044* 0.012** 0.002 0.005 0.020
[0.028] [0.012] [0.026] [0.006] [0.004] [0.024] [0.023]
Prepack 1.154*** -1.242*** 1.205*** 0.193*** 0.027 -0.383** -0.978***
[0.171] [0.078] [0.157] [0.035] [0.026] [0.159] [0.155]
Delaware -0.204 -0.117* 0.140 0.008 0.021 0.001 0.188
[0.136] [0.070] [0.151] [0.032] [0.023] [0.137] [0.132]
Constant -2.152*** 2.616*** -1.526*** 0.509*** -0.048 -1.591*** -2.870***
[0.508] [0.250] [0.557] [0.116] [0.079] [0.483] [0.489]
N 459 459 459 388 334 442 459
Pseudo-R
2
or R
2
0.210 0.435 0.199 0.155 0.054 0.079 0.163
48




Panel B: Binary Outcome with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable Model/Treatment Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Emerge Duration DistEquity DebtRecovery StkRet CEOTurnover KERP
HFEquityCommittee 1.205* -0.548* -0.334 0.186 0.135** 2.332*** 0.279
[0.661] [0.324] [0.470] [0.224] [0.065] [0.166] [0.961]
Ln(Assets) 0.020 0.056* -0.031 -0.031** -0.011 0.127** 0.304***
[0.065] [0.034] [0.071] [0.015] [0.010] [0.058] [0.068]
Leverage 0.878*** -0.123 -0.115 -0.052 0.009 0.140 0.296
[0.229] [0.102] [0.207] [0.048] [0.034] [0.207] [0.191]
Cash -0.762 -1.032** -0.538 0.146 0.037 -1.309* 0.281
[0.778] [0.405] [0.875] [0.191] [0.125] [0.784] [0.776]
Tangibility 0.246 -0.161 0.730** 0.220*** 0.018 -0.043 -0.229
[0.291] [0.151] [0.311] [0.068] [0.046] [0.281] [0.286]
ROA 0.898* 0.013 -0.207 0.301** 0.043 0.189 1.002**
[0.491] [0.246] [0.541] [0.121] [0.086] [0.506] [0.483]
SecuredDebt 0.001 -0.302** -0.268 -0.038 -0.009 -0.690** 0.269
[0.276] [0.133] [0.278] [0.061] [0.043] [0.273] [0.254]
Institution -0.037 0.285* 0.459 0.008 0.038 -0.116 0.628*
[0.316] [0.160] [0.334] [0.082] [0.050] [0.266] [0.331]
NumClasses 0.123*** 0.016 0.043* 0.012** 0.002 0.001 0.019
[0.028] [0.013] [0.024] [0.005] [0.004] [0.023] [0.023]
Prepack 1.106*** -1.227*** 1.160*** 0.193*** 0.028 -0.375** -0.980***
[0.179] [0.079] [0.158] [0.035] [0.026] [0.152] [0.155]
Delaware -0.179 -0.132* 0.093 0.008 0.020 0.046 0.196
[0.137] [0.071] [0.146] [0.032] [0.023] [0.132] [0.132]
Constant -2.075*** 2.598*** -1.612*** 0.509*** -0.049 -1.374*** -2.838***
[0.513] [0.253] [0.528] [0.115] [0.078] [0.460] [0.500]

IV: DistressHFRet 10.134*** 9.414*** 10.542*** 8.962** 9.383** 9.671*** 10.035***
[3.691] [3.477] [3.165] [4.116] [3.965] [3.210] [3.674]
IV: SP500Ret 4.066** 4.216** 3.348** 5.100** 4.366** 3.624*** 4.058**
[1.742] [1.661] [1.575] [2.103] [1.942] [1.389] [1.739]

Sign of + + +
LR Test of = 0:

2
(2) 1.220 2.210 4.129** 0.001 0.180 9.815*** 0.204
p-value 0.269 0.138 0.042 0.985 0.674 0.001 0.652

49

Table VII
Hedge Funds Loan-to-Own
This table presents the effect of hedge funds adopting a loan-to-own strategy (HFLTO) on Chapter 11 outcomes, including (1) the logarithm of the number of months in bankruptcy
(Duration), (2) debtors loss of exclusive rights to file a plan of reorganization after 180 days in bankruptcy (LossExclusivity), (3) APR deviation for secured creditors
(APRCreditor), (4) equity holders receiving positive payoffs (DistEquity), (5) average recovery rate of all corporate debt at plan confirmation (DebtRecovery), (6) CEO turnover
during Chapter 11 reorganization (CEOTurnover), and (7) adoptions of key employee retention plan (KERP). Variable definitions are provided in Table I. Panel A presents results
from a simple probit (when the outcome variable is binary, in Columns (2), (3), (4), (6), and (7)) or an OLS (when the outcome variable is continuous, in Columns (1) and (5))
regression model. Panel B presents results from a binary outcome model with a binary endogenous explanatory variable (when the outcome variable is binary) or a treatment
regression model (when the outcome variable is continuous), as shown in equation (1). Instrumental variables in the selection equation are the lagged return on an index of
distress-investing hedge funds (DistressHFRet) and the lagged monthly return on the S&P 500 index (SP500Ret), coefficients on which are reported. Also reported at the bottom
of Panel B is the sign of , the correlation coefficient of the residuals from the selection regression and the outcome regression, as well as the
2
statistic and the associated p-value
from a likelihood ratio test for the null H
0
: = 0. The numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Panel A: Probit/OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Duration LossExclusivity APRCreditor DistEquity DebtRecovery CEOTurnover KERP
HFLTO 0.050 -0.084 0.668*** 0.328** 0.059 -0.141 0.298*
[0.085] [0.182] [0.182] [0.166] [0.037] [0.165] [0.159]
Ln(Assets) 0.048 -0.391*** 0.069 -0.092 -0.035** 0.153** 0.271***
[0.035] [0.089] [0.078] [0.074] [0.016] [0.063] [0.067]
Leverage -0.118 -0.029 -0.390 -0.214 -0.042 0.144 0.324
[0.111] [0.217] [0.271] [0.226] [0.050] [0.222] [0.206]
Cash -0.934** -0.111 0.082 -1.046 0.135 -2.114** 0.064
[0.414] [0.845] [1.013] [0.940] [0.199] [0.861] [0.792]
Tangibility -0.199 0.434 -1.506*** 0.740** 0.204*** -0.248 -0.308
[0.158] [0.325] [0.402] [0.318] [0.070] [0.301] [0.296]
ROA -0.092 -0.311 -0.132 -0.839 0.326** -0.127 0.902
[0.295] [0.550] [0.772] [0.613] [0.140] [0.593] [0.553]
SecuredDebt -0.333** -0.476 1.730*** -0.308 0.017 -0.543* 0.390
[0.147] [0.310] [0.329] [0.304] [0.064] [0.304] [0.277]
Institution 0.147 0.065 -0.203 0.694** 0.095 0.542** 0.757***
[0.153] [0.324] [0.356] [0.317] [0.067] [0.276] [0.285]
NumClasses 0.021 -0.001 0.054* 0.029 0.005 0.004 0.023
[0.014] [0.028] [0.030] [0.026] [0.006] [0.026] [0.026]
Prepack -1.233*** -0.064 0.170 1.172*** 0.190*** -0.331** -1.197***
[0.084] [0.172] [0.182] [0.165] [0.036] [0.164] [0.169]
Delaware -0.113 -0.400*** 0.286* 0.112 -0.027 -0.048 0.103
[0.074] [0.155] [0.171] [0.153] [0.033] [0.141] [0.138]
Constant 2.594*** 1.952*** -2.105*** -1.128** 0.573*** -1.510*** -2.626***
[0.273] [0.635] [0.624] [0.569] [0.124] [0.505] [0.524]
N 416 416 416 416 359 407 416
Pseudo-R
2
or R
2
0.434 0.093 0.174 0.166 0.143 0.067 0.191
50




Panel B: Binary Outcome with a Binary Endogenous Explanatory Variable Model/Treatment Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Duration LossExclusivity APRCreditor DistEquity DebtRecovery CEOTurnover KERP
HFLTO 0.328 1.604*** -0.179 1.106 0.709*** 1.086*** -0.176
[0.569] [0.285] [0.771] [0.737] [0.0704] [0.389] [0.781]
Ln(Assets) 0.032 -0.381*** 0.116 -0.129* -0.074*** 0.065 0.290***
[0.046] [0.079] [0.084] [0.077] [0.022] [0.068] [0.070]
Leverage -0.148 -0.172 -0.256 -0.286 -0.103 0.012 0.367*
[0.127] [0.192] [0.299] [0.224] [0.068] [0.209] [0.213]
Cash -0.872** 0.012 -0.169 -0.865 0.280 -1.670** -0.054
[0.432] [0.776] [1.012] [0.929] [0.270] [0.830] [0.810]
Tangibility -0.240 0.110 -1.248** 0.581 0.107 -0.363 -0.234
[0.179] [0.298] [0.512] [0.355] [0.095] [0.283] [0.322]
ROA -0.100 -0.374 -0.114 -0.820 0.328* -0.033 0.899
[0.295] [0.498] [0.732] [0.601] [0.190] [0.560] [0.550]
SecuredDebt -0.285 -0.140 1.442*** -0.147 0.127 -0.300 0.299
[0.177] [0.283] [0.495] [0.337] [0.087] [0.297] [0.318]
Institution 0.153 0.116 -0.209 0.665** 0.109 0.482* 0.729**
[0.153] [0.279] [0.340] [0.314] [0.091] [0.264] [0.291]
NumClasses 0.014 -0.042* 0.074** 0.007 -0.012 -0.031 0.035
[0.020] [0.025] [0.032] [0.034] [0.008] [0.026] [0.031]
Prepack -1.266*** -0.201 0.262 1.015*** 0.133*** -0.416*** -1.113***
[0.107] [0.149] [0.190] [0.259] [0.050] [0.152] [0.248]
Delaware -0.116 -0.328** 0.280* 0.103 -0.045 -0.044 0.106
[0.074] [0.139] [0.166] [0.148] [0.045] [0.132] [0.137]
Constant 2.727*** 2.191*** -2.440*** -0.706 0.878*** -0.714 -2.792***
[0.382] [0.541] [0.629] [0.695] [0.170] [0.574] [0.548]

IV: DistressHFRet 4.466** 3.871** 5.013*** 4.697*** 4.803*** 5.072*** 4.568**
[1.919] [1.719] [1.757] [1.736] [1.312] [1.654] [1.786]
IV: SP500Ret 0.590 -0.121 0.136 0.476 0.250 0.635 0.575
[1.099] [0.934] [1.067] [1.036] [0.700] [0.972] [1.069]

Sign of + +
LR Test of = 0:

2
(2) 0.210 4.637** 1.089 0.615 18.210*** 4.023** 0.385
p-value 0.646 0.031 0.297 0.433 0.000 0.045 0.535

51

Table VIII
Market Reactions to Chapter 11 Filing
This table presents OLS regression results examining the determinants of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs, adjusted by
the CRSP equal-weighted return) measured over two event windows around Chapter 11 filing. Columns (1) and (3) present
univariate regression results, and Columns (2) and (4) include control variables. Variable definitions are provided in Table I.
Numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.

(1) (2) (3) (4)
CAR[-5, +5] CAR[-5, +5] CAR[-10, +10] CAR[-10, +10]
HFLargestCreditors 0.168** 0.220** 0.247** 0.323***
[0.085] [0.100] [0.099] [0.115]
AssetsChange 0.311** 0.245
[0.142] [0.164]
CBLenders -0.084 -0.015
[0.106] [0.121]
Ln(Assets) -0.048 -0.065
[0.036] [0.042]
NumClasses 0.010 0.010
[0.014] [0.016]
Prepack 0.066 0.076
[0.099] [0.113]
Delaware -0.029 0.070
[0.091] [0.104]
Constant -0.185*** 0.165 -0.315*** 0.042
[0.044] [0.273] [0.051] [0.315]
N 274 202 277 205
R
2
0.014 0.068 0.022 0.077


52

Table IX
Ordered Probit Analysis of Chapter 11 Outcomes
This table presents the ordered probit regression results examining the determinants of Chapter 11 outcomes. The outcome
of emergence and no re-filing is coded as the high outcome (= 3), emergence with later re-filing is coded as the medium
outcome (= 2), and liquidation (or acquisition) in the first round is coded as the low outcome (= 1). Variable definitions are
provided in Table I. Numbers in brackets are standard errors. ***, **, * correspond to statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.

(1) (2) (3)
HFCreditorsCommittee 0.354**
[0.138]
HFEquityCommittee 0.422
[0.270]
HFLTO 0.931***
[0.152]
Ln(Assets) 0.047 0.052 0.03
[0.064] [0.059] [0.063]
Leverage 0.411** 0.511*** 0.443**
[0.205] [0.179] [0.198]
Cash -1.422* -0.703 -0.818
[0.765] [0.702] [0.734]
Tangibility 0.123 0.163 -0.102
[0.290] [0.259] [0.278]
ROA -0.221 0.591 0.182
[0.557] [0.429] [0.497]
SecuredDebt -0.002 0.028 0.206
[0.281] [0.233] [0.258]
Institution 0.163 0.167 0.289
[0.275] [0.258] [0.269]
NumClasses 0.133*** 0.117*** 0.105***
[0.028] [0.024] [0.028]
Prepack 0.805*** 0.752*** 0.644***
[0.152] [0.137] [0.147]
Delaware -0.258* -0.209* -0.290**
[0.133] [0.121] [0.129]
N 369 459 416
Pseudo-R
2
0.122 0.114 0.157





1
See Hedge Funds Turn up the Volume, by Aaron Siegel in Investment News, September 14, 2006:
http://www.investmentnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20060914/REG/609140707/1094/INDaily03&ht=.
53



2
See Rosenberg (2000) (especially Chapter 1) and Harner (2008a) for a discussion of the history of distress investing, and
how distress-investing hedge funds have evolved beyond their vulture predecessors over the past decade.

3
Holding a large position in a portfolio firm and/or being involved in the management of the firm brings legal uncertainties
and obligations to an investor and often imposes restrictions on the latters trading due to insider trading considerations. This
is one major reason cited by Black (1990) for why most mutual funds (for whom liquidity is important) and institutional
fiduciaries (to whom legal risks can pass through) remain passive shareholders.

4
The list of studies includes: Eisenberg and LoPucki (1999), Lopucki and Doherty (2002), Dahiya, et al. (2003), Ayotte and
Skeel (2004), LoPucki and Doherty (2004), Adler, Capkun, and Weiss (2006), Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), Adler, Capkun,
and Weiss (2007), Kalay, Singhal, and Tashjian (2007), Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007), Capkun and Weiss
(2008), Ayotte and Morrison (2009), and Lemmon, Ma, and Tashjina (2009).
5
The Internet Appendix is available on the Journal of Finance website at http://www.afajof.org/supplements.asp.

6
We use the filing dates of the parent companies if there are also filings by subsidiaries. In practice they usually get
consolidated in the same court. We manually check the related filings in LoPuckis database and find that fewer than 5%
of the cases have affiliate filings elsewhere on the same day or before.

7
We use market values of equity and warrants at emergence to calculate debt recovery.

8
Our sample statistics are consistent with Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner (2007) and Capkun and Weiss (2008) using
more recent data.

9
The duration statistics for 2007 are not included to mitigate the truncation bias toward the end of our sample.
10
In most Chapter 11 cases, the United States trustee appoints seven of the debtors largest unsecured creditors to the
unsecured creditors committee as dictated by the U.S. Bankruptcy Codes Section 1102. An appointment to the committee
can enhance controlling creditors involvement in the debtors restructuring and further their investment agenda (Harner
54


(2008a)). The committee usually hires professionals (counsels and financial advisors) to serve as its representatives. Though
it does not directly vote on a reorganization plan, the committee makes recommendations to creditors. On the other hand, it is
rare to have secured creditors form a committee of their own given that their claims are already collateralized.

11
The reorganization plan does not identify whether a particular creditor receives equity distribution. Instead, we infer this
information from statements that indicate a certain class of creditors receives equity distribution.

12
A recent example is General Growth Properties Inc. in 2009. Farallon Capital Management LLC offered DIP financing
that can be converted into 8% to 10% of the common stock on the effective date of the reorganization plan. For recent
examples and related discussions, see KKR Turns Vulture Investor as Distressed Debt Beckons, by Bravo and Hester in
Bloomberg News, September 3, 2009.

13
Unlike the unsecured creditors committee, the equity committee is not common (see Bharath, Panchapegesan, and Werner
(2007) and our statistics in Table II Panel A). Parties (usually the seven largest equity holders as dictated by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Codes Section 1102) that have intention to form the equity committee need to submit motions to the court. Once
approved by the court, these parties will most likely become members.

14
One of Harners (2008b) survey questions is how often does your firm invest in a companys distressed debt to try to
acquire the company or a controlling ownership position in the company, and how often is your firm successful in acquiring
at least a controlling ownership position? Thirty-two percent of the respondents indicate that they engage and succeed in this
practice.

15
It is worth noting that adding year and industry (based on two-digit SIC codes) fixed effects does not qualitatively change
our main findings in the paper. Further, under most model specifications, these fixed effects are not individually statistically
significant.

16
The different classes of claims include, for example, tax claims, secured claims, priority non-tax claims, bank loan claims,
secured debt claims, unsecured debt claims, worker compensation claims, general unsecured claims, litigation claims,
55


intercompany interests, convenience claims (smaller amount unsecured claims), subordinated claims, equity claims, and
warrants and unexercised options.

17
See, for example, Riding the Fulcrum Seesaw; How Hedge Funds Will Change the Dynamics of Future Bankruptcies, by
Mark S. Lichtenstein and Matthew W. Cheney in New Jersey Law Journal, January 1, 2008.

18
See Li and Prabhala (2007) for an overview of self-selection in corporate finance.

19
For more detailed stories, see Allied Holdings Creditors Object to a 5-month Exclusivity Extension, by Marie Beaudette
in Dow Jones Newswires, April 7, 2006, KCS Energy/Plan -2: CSFB, Creditors Have Alternative Plan, in Federal Filings
Newswires, August 15, 2000, and Sunbeam Creditor Committee Wants to Propose Another Plan, in Associated Press
Newswires, April 18, 2002, respectively.

20
Gilson and Vetsuypens (1993) show that KERPs tie managers pay to creditors recoveries and the restructuring progress.
See also Worldcom Judge Approves Plan to Keep Employees, by Rebecca Blumenstein in Wall Street Journal, A7,
October 30, 2002.

21
We could not use our default measure of hedge funds presence on the unsecured creditors committee because the
committee is usually formed during Chapter 11.

22
Two major changes have been brought by BAPCAP. First, BAPCPA curbs the usage of KERP. Second, debtors have
exclusive rights to file a reorganization plan for only 18 months after a Chapter 11 filing, instead of enjoying potentially
unlimited extensions.

23
For a more detailed story, see Worldcom Judge Approves Plan to Keep Employees, by Rebecca Blumenstein in Wall
Street Journal, A7, October 30, 2002. Movies Gallery Inc. is another example. Its 2008 10K filings stated that the company
expect[s] to make cash payments during the course of fiscal 2008 of approximately $13 million for employee retention and
56


severance programs related to changes in our management team and consolidation of certain corporate functions. On the
other hand, the former chairman/CEO/founder, Joe Malugen, was replaced by C.J. Gabriel Jr. on May 20, 2008.