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Physical Fitness for Tactical Success

Elaine M Blount, Dr. Andreas Tolk, and Dr. Stacie I. Ringleb
shooting ability, low crawl, high crawl, and the 3-5 second rush [8-11]. A soldier must rush from one cover to the next in almost every engagement to fix the enemy. The faster a soldier can run, the more distance he can travel in a given period of time. The longer a soldier is in the line of fire, the more likely the soldier will be hit by the enemy. The 3-5 second time is actually the maximum time a soldier could be in the line of sight, not the minimum. If a soldier can advance with no time in the enemys line of sight: that should be the choice. But often, time in the enemy line of sight is required for advancement within a mission. Lack of physical fitness also affects the low and high crawl speed and endurance, and may decrement a soldiers shooting ability after fatigue[12]. Thus, physical fitness can affect performance within a variety of tasks. II. OPERATIONAL RELEVANCE Physical fitness is generally accepted to influence the likelihood of success in battle. Lieutenant-Colonel H. Jones focused on fitness and skill-at-arms training which enabled his men to fight for seventy-two hours and win despite being outnumbered by defending Argentineans[13]. The battle fought at Goose Green was very conventional in nature, but what about more recent battles? Lt Kyle T Trottier describes the three most important skills for his infantry brigade in Iraq as physical training, marksmanship, and medical skills. He trained his infantry brigade by having his soldiers sprint, crawl, and carry their buddy to a spot where they would then fire prone, standing, or kneeling, depending upon the drill[11]. The Train as you fight principle is encompassed in Lt Kyle Trottiers methods and is described by ODonnell as necessary to prepare soldiers for the physical demands of the battlefield[7]. Todays modern battlefields include Military Operations in Urban Terrain such as found in Iraq as well as rural engagements. Both include tasks where physical fitness can determine the success of the mission or soldier. In an urban terrain, crossing wide streets or climbing stairwells quickly can be part of advancement routes toward the enemy. The same fitness challenges exist in the rural environment where climbing toward higher ground or crossing a danger area such as a field may be necessary. Often the dangers or risks in open crossings can be mitigated by advancing via a different route, employing smoke grenades for movement concealment, or using different fires to destroy the enemy before advancement. Sometimes this is not possible, and the danger area must be crossed on foot with risks mitigated using cover fire from a fellow soldier.

AbstractTactical simulations assume that all participants have the same level of fitness and the same capabilities in all battlefield tests. This article discusses the importance of including data from physical tasks performed on the battlefield and the importance of physical fitness to perform these tasks successfully. It focuses on the 3-5 second rush and the rate of travel necessary for various chances of a successful rush given enemy shooter accuracy of 20% and cadence of one shot per .5 seconds. It continues to discuss potential shooter reaction time from visualization and human performance studies. The final simulation incorporates multiple rush scenarios based upon the width of streets in Lashkar Gah, Afghanistan. Index TermsMilitary Physical Fitness, Battlefield Fitness, Battlefield Tasks

I. INTRODUCTION

military organizations in the U. S. measure physical fitness using standard physical fitness tests such as the number of pushups, pull-ups, and sit-ups that can be performed in a specific period of time, body mass index, and the time to complete a distance run[1]. These tests indicate the endurance, body fat, and aerobic capability of the soldier[2]. A combat fitness test was recommended for Marines [3-4] and has now been implemented as described in [5]. The Marine Combat Fitness Test (CFT) includes sprinting for 800 meters, ammunition can lifts, and maneuver under fire components to test tasks similar to those performed on the battlefield. There have been studies that have tried to determine the correlations between these physical fitness tests and actual performance on the battlefield [6], and some studies have analyzed the muscles used in the APFT to those used in standard combat tasks[2, 7], but no actual research has been performed using a battle simulation. There are few predictive models for battlefield performance based upon physical fitness. Predictive models including physical fitness parameters to predict battlefield performance are needed to: 1) aid in planning by knowing the capabilities of the troops 2) help with selection of appropriate personnel for specific tasks, 3) identify the physical abilities most essential to battlefield performance to aid in training, and 4) aid in evaluation of military physical training programs[6]. Four of the most important tasks of an infantryman are
Manuscript prepared for the VMASC Capstone Conference 2010. Elaine M. Blount is a PhD student in Modeling and Simulation at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA (e-mail: eblou002@odu.edu). Dr. Andreas Tolk, is an associate professor in the Department of Engineering Management and Systems Engineering at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA 23529 USA. (e-mail: atolk@odu.edu). Dr. Stacie I. Ringleb is an assistant professor in the Department of Mechanical Engineering at Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, 23529 USA, (e-mail: sringleb@odu.edu).

URRENTLY,

2 There are many physical demands necessitating different types of fitness while on the battlefield which include lifting from the ground, lifting overhead, pushing forward, pulling and climbing, controlled rotation, jumping and landing, lunging, marching with and without heavy loads, and running[2, 14]. U.S. AR 611-201, Enlisted Career Management Fields (CMF) and Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) specifies that infantrymen (CMF 11) must be able to perform the following tasks: raising and carrying a 160 lbs person on your back, walking, running, crawling, and climbing over various terrains for up to 25 miles, and finally to carry a minimum of 65 lbs evenly distributed over the entire body[7]. ODonnell also gave the following 8 individual tasks as performed on the battlefield: foot march, climb, sprint, high/low crawl, carry, dig, perform 3-5 second rush, and run[7]. While physical fitness can contribute to increased performance in all these tasks, in order to show that Modeling and Simulation means can be applied to evaluate the effect of physical fitness on tactical success, this paper will concentrate on the 3-5 second rush or an infantry rush across an area that is visible to the enemy. Army Field Manual 3-21.8 describes 3 tactical movement techniques: high crawl, low crawl, and the 3-5 second rush[9]. A rush should be used when suppressive fires are sparse or sporadic or you are sure the enemy is not aiming at you specifically [10]. A rush consists of getting to your feet, rushing quickly to the next covered position, then ducking behind cover at the next location [10]. III. CROSSING ENEMY LINE OF SIGHT A soldier that is more physically fit can generally cover a longer distance in a shorter time period than someone who is less fit, reducing the time in the enemys line of sight. Two examples of open areas crossed in battles are fields (rural) and streets (urban). The speed with which a soldier can cross an open area directly affects his chance of success. Crossing the open area does not include only the running portion, but also time to initiate and end the movement. A soldier in prone position uses time to get into upright position to rush, and upon reaching his destination may need to take time to become prone again. The time it takes for a soldier to change position, rush, and change position will be longer if the soldier is wearing Personal protective equipment and weapons body armor, helmet, gun, grenades. Note the weight of standard equipment as listed in Table 1 from [15]. This equipment, while necessary for soldier protection will slow the soldiers movement. The average weight of equipment has increased through the years requiring more strength from the soldier in battle and slowing his ability to rush quickly[15]. SAPI Plates Weapon Ammunition Sustainment Pack Assault Pack Total 18 lbs 8.79 lbs 6 lbs 101.4 lbs 50.7 lbs 196.39 lbs 0 lbs 8.79 lbs 6 lbs 85 lbs N/A (ALICE Pack) 113.79 lbs

A. Rush Testing in Lab Seven subjects were timed for a 12 yard rush in a lab setting. Each subject started in prone position, rushed twelve yards, and ended in prone position while wearing a weighted vest to simulate the weight of Interceptor body armor, a helmet, and carried a weighted rubber M16 for a total of 31.75 lbs of extra weight. The rates of travel for these seven subjects varied from 2.34 to 3.78 meters per second and they took between 2.3 and 5.18 seconds to rush 12 yards three times. Table 2 shows the averages scores, standard deviation, and average rate of travel in meters per second for the three trials of the subjects. Table 2 - Subject Rush Time Statistics Subject Average Standard Dev Rush Time 1 3.45 .159 2 2.90 .523 3 3.10 .085 4 3.02 .42 5 4.62 .49 6 3.95 .072 7 4.69 .153

Rate in Meters / Sec 3.18 3.78 3.54 3.64 2.38 2.78 2.34

B. Survival Table for Instantaneous Enemy Reaction Time For certain conditions, a soldier will be successful (i.e., the probability of survival will be 100%) regardless of fitness level and in other situations, the probability of survival will be 0%, regardless of fitness level. We hypothesize that for the remaining situations, increased fitness will improve a soldiers probability of survival (Figure 1). Using meters traveled per second, accuracy or percentage of kill on a shot, and cadence or speed of shots, Table 3 was constructed to determine the survivability of a specific rush. Equations 1, 2, and 3 were used where: Distance: meters to be rushed, Meters/Second: velocity at which the soldier travels, Time: time it takes to rush Distance, Shots/Second: rate at which enemy shoots, Shots: number of times enemy shoots at friendly, Probability (kill): probability a shot will kill friendly, Survival: probability soldier will survive rush. Equation 1

Table 1-Equipment Weight from [15] Equipment Weight (2008) Weight (1997) Kevlar 3.5 lbs 4 lbs Body Armor 8 lbs 10 lbs

Equation 2

3 Equation 3 reaction is dependent not only on the task, but also where the item appeared in the field of view, according to Khan[17], whose studies of reaction times based upon varying visual angles produced times from 259 to 514 milliseconds. Zajda [18] discusses reaction time based upon simple and complex tasks to find mean reaction times between 580 and 678 milliseconds. There are various interactions discussed in Zajdas work that include the subjects sex, dominant hand, etc., that will not be taken into account here. Research performed in complex visual processing by Thorpe found that complex pictures were recognized in a median reaction time of 0.445 seconds, although this varied from 0.382 to 0.567 seconds. Wellbrink [19] models reduced human performance with regard to reaction time in vigilance performance as a complex adaptive system. In a low workload experiment, during the first 10 minutes, reaction time averaged around 0.81 seconds, the reaction during the second 20 minutes was 0.96 seconds, and the final thirty minutes showed an average reaction time of 0.83 seconds. During a high workload vigilance task, the reaction time increased to 1.05 seconds during the first 10 minutes, 0.96 at 20 minutes, and 0.98 at 30 minutes. Wellbrink also discusses false alarms and error rates, but these will not be a part of this study. The average of all the given reaction times in Wellbrinks study is 0.902, which will be used as the reaction time for the enemy to notice and begin firing upon the soldier performing a rush. In Table 4, the reaction time of .902 is subtracted from the time spent traversing the open area to calculate the time span during which the enemy can shoot. All of the other calculations and input parameters are the same as above. The shape of the survivability graph changes slightly as shown in Figure 2. Both soldiers have a higher chance of survival and can rush for up to 4 meters with almost no risk. The difference in survivability for the subjects exceeds 10% for distances between 6 and 70 meters. The probability of surviving a 6 meter rush is 83% and 93% and the number of times they will be shot at in 6 meters will be between 0.83 and 0.34 for a participants with the slowest and fastest rush times, respectively It is important to note that this spreadsheet assumes that this is a rush where the shooter may not be looking exactly at the spot from which the soldier emerges necessitating the use of reaction time. If the shooter was watching the exact spot in expectation of the soldiers emergence, the extra .902 seconds might be too high. Table 4 - Survival Probabilities with Reaction Time

In Table 3, the probability of a killing shot is 20% and a shot is taken every 0.5 seconds. The slowest and fastest average traveling rates of 2.34 m/sec and 3.78 m/sec are displayed. The slowest subject rushes 12 meters in 5 seconds and the faster person can rush approximately 19 meters in 5 seconds for a distance of 7 meters more than the slower person. The difference in survivability for the subjects exceeds 10% for distances between 7 and 65 meters. The probability of surviving a 6 meter rush (approximately the width of a single lane street), is 75% and 84% and the number of times they will be shot at in 6 meters will be between 1.28 and 0.79 for a participants with the slowest and fastest rush times, respectively. A plot comparing the survivability of the two subjects is shown in Figure 1. Table 3 - Survival Probabilities

Figure 1 - Survivability for No Reaction Time, Dashed Line is Slower Rush 1

C. Survival Table for 0.9 Second Enemy Reaction Time Human beings do not have instantaneous reaction time. From [16], there are three steps to a reaction: 1) perception and identification of the stimulus 2) selecting the appropriate response 3) performing the response. The experiments described by Ishihara et al. measure both the reaction time for a hand to leave a button measured from the initial presentation of a stimulus and the movement time or time for a hand to move from a button to a new manual aiming location[16]. Manual aiming took from roughly 220 ms to 240 ms to initiate a response. The movement took from 280 to 300 seconds for a total of .5 to .54 seconds. Visual

4 Figure 2- Survivability for Reaction Time of 0.902 Seconds, Dashed Line is Slower Rusher capital of the Helmand province [20]. To determine the distance for a rush to review for this study, Google Earth was used to review maps from Lashkar Gah and these maps were analyzed to determine reasonable rushing distances. Figure 4 - Lashkar Gah, Afhanistan from Google Earth

The difference in survivability between slow and fast soldiers is shown in Figure 3 for when the enemy has no reaction time and when the enemy has a reaction time of .902 seconds. Note that while both soldiers have a higher probability of surviving when there is a reaction time, the difference in survival rate between the slower soldier and faster soldier is more pronounced when there is a reaction time. For both scenarios, the survivability difference between the slowest and fastest soldiers is greatest in the 2530 meter distances with a survivability difference of approximately 17% when there is no reaction time and 19% with a reaction time or .902 seconds. A difference of 10% in survivability occurs between 10 and 65 meters when the enemy has no reaction time at 7 and 70 meters when there is a reaction time of .902 seconds. Figure 3 - Survivability Difference = fastest - slowest rusher with and without Reaction Time of .902 seconds (i.e., when the RT was included, the shooter could not fire until 0.902 s after the rush began).

D. Survival Table for Multiple Rushes The spreadsheets and graphs above show differences in survivability for only one rush. Not every battle has only one rush. Suppose that during the course of an engagement a soldier must cross a street or small open area three times. As of the writing of this paper (February 2010), there is a major offensive in Afghanistan. A report from NATO announces the death of six militants during an assault on Lashkar Gah,

Below in Figure 5 is a fairly uniform city block in Lashkar Gah. The scale shown in the lower left corner is for 145 feet or 44.2 meters. Based upon this scale, the roads running East/West are roughly 6.3 meters in width. The North/South routes appear to be 10.5 meters in width. The widths of the rows of houses are about 6.3 meters and the lengths range from 4 to 6 meters. The areas similar to front and back yards are from 6 to 10 meters. Not all of the areas of Lashkar Gah are so uniformly designed. Figure 6 shows a slightly more chaotic layout of buildings and streets with a roadway of about 7 meters width across the top and various alleys and streets between the buildings that are as small as 1.7 to 3.5 meters. The buildings in all of these pictures are lighter in color than the surrounding fields. Not all rushing will be across streets, but crossing a street is a component of moving through an urban area. Given these pictures, it is not unrealistic to assume a battle condition where a soldier may need to cross up to three open areas that vary from six to twelve meters per crossing. Most of the crossings will be less than 10 meters. The exact distribution of crossings and distances is unknown. For this paper, three consecutive rushes of 6 meters will be performed. It is assumed that after each rush, the soldier rests to catch his breath and that the enemy shooters do not know exactly when the soldier will make the next crossing. This enables use of .902 second reaction time for each rush.

5 Figure 5 - Organized Blocks of Buildings Figure 6 - Less Organized Blocks of Buildings 7 meters

10.5 meters 4-6 meters

Varies from 1.7 to 3.5 meters

6.3 meters 6-10 meters

6.3 meters

Equation 4 - Total Survival Table five shows the calculations for the success rate of three successive 6 meter rushes. The equations used for all the rows downs to Survival (Each Rush) are the same as used before. New calculations are given in Equations 4 through 8. Given the input, after three rushes, the faster soldier has an 80% chance of survival while the slower soldier has a 57% chance of survival. Graphs displaying the visual relationships of the 1) chance of survival 2) the time differences spent in the line of fire and 3) survivability differences are given in Figures 7, 8, and 9. The total survivability plots for the slow and fast rushers diverge with each rush as shown in Figure 7. The difference at three rushes is 22%. The distances giving maximum differences for 3 consecutive rushes were 24% and found at approximately 8 and 9 yards. Note the similarity in the initial curve for the Total Rush Time and the Survivability in figures 8 and 9. Time in line of sight is linear, and as more rushes are presented, the survivability will not be by virtue of its calculation as seen in Equation 3 which depends upon the number of shots based upon time in line of sight calculated in Equation 2.

Equation 5- Single Rush Difference Equation 6 - Total Rush Difference Equation 7 - Single Rush Time Difference Equation 8 - Total Time Difference

Table 5 Three Successive Rushes at 6 Meters

6 Figure 7 Survival Rates for Each Rush and Successive Rushes carried by the subjects as they rushed 12 yards from prone position to prone position. It is assumed that full gear will slow the soldier even more. Another implication of these results is that physical fitness increases the degrees of tactical freedom of the decision maker. As it can be seen from the comparison, certain conditions result in the same effects for trained as well as untrained soldier, namely where their probability curves measuring the success are close to each other. These areas can be observed in all examples given in this study. Of interest, however, are the areas where a significant difference can be observed for trained and untrained (or fit and unfit) soldiers. A decision maker in charge of less trained soldiers has obviously less options for decisions resulting in successful outcomes. If, for example, the task is to bring a group of soldiers to a certain building in the city, the group of trained soldier can choose more ways to approach the building than the untrained group. All ways broader than a threshold defined by the operational metrics cannot be crossed by the untrained soldiers and are not an option. Therefore, it can be hypothesized that the degree of tactical freedom is smaller for untrained soldiers than it is for trained soldiers. IV. FUTURE STUDIES This excel simulation represents the use of Monte-Carlo methods and demonstrates the importance of increased fitness on the battlefield. The next step in this research is to utilize more complex simulation categories, such as discrete event simulations or agent based simulations, and incorporate fitness as a component of movement speed to determine its affect on survivability and mission success. We assume that the results of this first relatively simple study will be supported, plus the hypothesis regarding tactical freedom can become objective of research as well. Fitness for rushing is not the only variable that can affect mission success on the battlefield. Other tasks that require fitness include strength to carry and maneuver special equipment or aid fellow soldiers and the ability to crawl. By modeling performance of these tasks and determining criteria necessary for success, standards necessary for success of soldiers on the battlefield can be set and maintained for their protection and safety. ACKNOWLEDGMENT The following people contributed towards finding and testing subjects and without their help, this effort would not be possible: Courtney Butowicz, Corbet Weller, and Christopher Vause. REFERENCES
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Figure 8 - Single and Consecutive Time Difference in Line of Sight

Figure 9 - Survivability Difference between Fast and Slow Person for Single Rush and Consecutive Rushes

TACTICAL USE OF SURVIVABILITY RESULTS The results from the successive survivability statistics from three rushes emphasize the need for fitness and speed within infantry soldiers. There are mitigations that will improve the survivability of slower soldiers such as smoke grenades, cover fire, and indirect fires. But these may not always be available. So it is to the advantage of every soldier to maintain fitness with respect to rushing speed on the battlefield and to understand the effect of speed on survivability. Please note that the lab tests were not performed using a fighting load and so the ability to run with a backpack or full gear is not incorporated into this test: only a weighted vest representing body armor, helmet, and weighted simulated M16 were

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Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Development Command. Stansberry, C.L.M., Combat Fitness Test: Testing to Reality. 2008, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College, Marine Corps Combat Develop. Lance Cpl Cristina Noelia Gil, D.o.P.A. Marines showcase Combat Fitness Test. 2008 8/20/2008 [cited 2010 1/27/2010]; Describes Marine Combat Fitness Test and physical fitness standards for marines]. Available from: http://www.marines.mil/unit/hqmc/Pages/MarinesshowcaseComba tFitnessTest.aspx. Everett A Harman, D.J.G., Perter N Frykman, Marilyn A. Sharp, Bradley C. Nindl, Joseph A. Alemany, Robert P. Mello, Prediction of Simulated Battlefield Physical Performance from FieldExpedient Tests. Military Medicine, 2008. 173(1): p. 36-41. Frederick Mark O'Donnell, M.U., Physical Training Programs in Light Infantry Units: Are They Preparing Soldiers for the Rigors of Combat?, in West Point. 1990. Army, H.D.o.t., Combat Skills of the Soldier. 1984. Army, H.D.o.t., The Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad. 2007: Headquarters Department of the Army. Larsen, C.E., Light Infantry Tactics For Small Teams. 2005, Bloomington Indiana: Author House 3/16/05. 243. Colonel John Antal, P.P., ed. Attack the Enemy's Strategy Lessons from Counterinsurgency Operations. 2009, Elbit Systems of America, Historical Explorations. M. A. Ito, M.A.S., R. F. Johnson, D. J. Merullo, R. P. Mello, Rifle Shooting Accuracy During Exercise Recovery From Fatiguing Exercise, in 2000 ASC Proceedings. 2000: 22 Army Science Conference, 11-13 December 2000, Baltimore MD. Connaughton, R., Modern Warfare, The True Story of Coonflict From the Falklands to Afghanistan. 2008: Constable & Robinson Ltd. 452. Forman, M.M.R., Too Fat to Fight - Too Weak to Win, Soldier Fitness in the Future? 1997, School of Advanced Military Studies. Wright, C.T.D., Combat Conditioning: The Need for Stronger Marines, in EWS Contemporary Issues Paper. 2008, United States Marine Corps, Command and Staff College. p. 15. Masami Ishihara, K.I., Shuji Mori, Lateralized effects of target location on reaction times when preparing for manual aiming at a visual target. Human Movement Science, 2002. 21: p. 563-582. MD. R. Rotab Khan, S.A.N., Simulation Study of Reaction Times at varying Visual Angles. Computers in Engng, 1994. 28(3): p. 467-472. Radoslaw Zajdel, D.N., Simple and Complex reaction time measurement. A preliminary evaluation of new approach and diagnotic tool. Computers in Biology and Medicine, 2007. 37: p. 1724-1730. Wellbrink, J., Modeling Reduced Human Performance as a Complex Adaptive System, in Naval Postgraduate School. 2003, Naval Postgraduate School: Monterey, California. p. 214. Gamel, K., NATO: 3 Americans Killed in Eastern Afghanistan. The Associated Press, 2010.

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Elaine M. Blount has a B.S. in Computer Science from Virginia Tech, an M. B. A. from Frostburg State University, M. S. in Computer Science from the College of William and Mary, and is currently pursuing her PhD in Modeling and Simulation at Old Dominion University. She has written software for various companies and most recently wrote flight simulation software for researchers at NASA for seven years before leaving to pursue her PhD. Dr. Andreas Tolk received a PhD (1995) as well as a M.S. (1988) in Computer Science, both from the University of the Federal Armed Forces in Munich, Germany. Including his reserve assignments, he has 16 years of experience as an officer in the German Army. He teaches Courses on Engineering Principles for Combat Modeling and Distributed Simulation for app. 10 years in adjunct and faculty positions. Dr. Stacie Ringleb received a B.S. in biomedical engineering from Case Western Reserve University (1997), a M.S.E. in mechanical engineering from Temple University (1999) and a Ph.D. in mechanical engineering from Drexel University (2003). She is currently an assistant professor in Mechanical Engineering at Old Dominion University. Her research interests include joint and muscle biomechanics, modeling and simulation of human performance and rehabilitation engineering.