Professional Documents
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WEEK 2: ELEMENTS OF QUASI-DELICT/ BREACH OF CONTRACT Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a) Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. (n) Art. 2178. The provisions of Articles 1172 to 1174 are also applicable to a quasi-delict. Art. 1172. Responsibility arising from negligence in the performance of every kind of obligation is also demandable, but such liability may be regulated by the courts, according to the circumstances. (1103) Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) Art. 1174. Except in cases expressly specified by the law, or when it is otherwise declared by stipulation, or when the nature of the obligation requires the assumption of risk, no person shall be responsible for those events which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were inevitable. (1105a) Art. 1170. Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay, and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages. (1101) Art. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted. In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. Elements of Quasi-Delict: - Andamo v IAC, PNR v Brunty and BPI v Lifetime practically identified the same three elements for quasi-delict except that the Court in Andamo v IAC and BPI v Lifetime made the mistake of using the word damages instead of damage - Gregorio v CA includes a 4th element which is that there must be no preexisting contractual relation between the parties Quasi-delict and Delict: - A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. - An employers liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the employers liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. - The words primary and direct as contrasted with subsidiary, refer to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability under Article 2180 originates from negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. - While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity for the employees criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable directly and separately for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. Quasi-delict and Breach of Contract - Cangco v Manila Railroad has a very good discussion on the difference between a quasi-delict and a breach of contract. - What must be proved for liability to attach in a culpa contractual are:
Spouses Andamo v IAC and Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette (1990) Within the land of the Missionaries, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artifical lake, were constructed which allegedly inundated and eroded the land of Spouses Andamo thereby causing a yong man to drown, damaged crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of the spouses and their laborers during rainy days. Spouses Andamo initially filed a criminal action for destruction by means of inundation. They subsequently filed a civil case for damages. Civil case was dismissed by the lower court as the criminal case which was instituted ahead of the civil case was still unresolved. The SC ordered the reinstatement of the civil case holding that the TC and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing civil case since it is predicated on a quasidelict. DOCTRINE(S): A careful examination of the aforequoted complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasidelicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff.
Spouses Batal v Mrs. San Pedro-Tominaga and Tominaga (2006) Spouses Tominaga contracted the services of Frank Batal who represented himself as a sureveyor to conduct a survey of their lot. They based the construction of their perimeter fence on the boundaries identified by Batal. In 1996, complaint was lodged against San Pedro and Tominaga before the barangay on the ground that the northern portion of their fence allegedly encroached upon a designated right-of-way. Upon verification with another surveyor it was discovered that their wall indeed overlapped the adjoining lot and it was also discovered that it was not Frank but his wife Erlinda Batal, who is a licensed geodetic engineer. Court held Spouses Batal liable for damages for failing to carry out their contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence. DOCTRINE(S): Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses: either as culpa aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not formally bound by any other obligation, or as culpa contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases the liability from such already existing obligation. Culpa aquiliana is governed by Article 2176 of the Civil Code and the immediately following Articles; while culpa contractual is governed by Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for damages suffered by the respondents in accordance with Articles 1170 and 2201 of the Civil Code.
Air France v Carrascoso (1966) Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France forced Carrascoso to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff refused but, after a commotion, eventually reluctantly gave his "first class" seat. Court ruled in favor of Carrascoso. It declared that the employee of Air France violated Art 21 and consequently, held the employer liable for the tortuous act of the employee. Nonetheless, Court also awarded moral damages as the evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract with plaintiff in bad faith. DOCTRINE(S): Quoted the case Austro-American S.S. Co. vs. Thomas: And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
Fores v Miranda (1959) Miranda was one of the passengers on a jeepney which, while descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, hit the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly. Fores was sued for damages. Her defense was that she sold the jeep a day before the accident. The
PSBA v CA and Spouses Bautista (1992) Far East Bank v CA and Spouses Luna (1995) Mrs. Luna lost her supplemental credit card. Far East was forthwith informed and, the bank recorded the lost card, along with the principal card, as a "Hot Card" or "Cancelled Card" in its master file. Mr. Luna tendered a despedida lunch at Intercon. He presented his card which was promptly verified through a telephone call to the bank's Credit Card Department. Since the card was not honored, Mr. Luis was forced to pay in cash and naturally, felt embarrassed by this incident. Court held Far East Bank liable for nominal damages only. Did not award moral damages as there was no showing of bad faith on the part of the bank. DOCTRINE(S); In culpa contractual, moral damages may be recovered where the defendant is shown to have acted in bad faith or with malice in the breach of the contract. The Civil Code provides: Bad faith, in this context, includes gross, but not simple, negligence. Exceptionally, in a contract of carriage, moral damages are also allowed in case of death of a passenger attributable to the fault (which is presumed) of the common carrier. Similarly, Art 21 contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. Thus, even if we are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a breach of A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor premises of PSBA prompted the parents of the deceased to file suit for damages against PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school. Court ruled that CA was correct in denying the Motion to Dismiss but not because cause of action was predicated under Art. 2180 as held by CA but because the cause of action is culpa contractual. DOCTRINE(S): Art 2180, in conjunction with Art 2176, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. Jurispurdence provides that under 2180, the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their
LRTA and Roman v Navidad and Prudent Security Agency (2003) Syquias v CA and Manila Memorial Park (1993) Plaintiffs are the parents and siblings of deceased Syquia. They filed a complaint against Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract (to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains from desecration) and/or quasidelict (gross negligence conformably to Art 2176 in failing to seal the concrete vault) after discovering that the concrete vault had a hole approximately three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls. Court upheld the dismissal of the case. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the Rules and Navidad, a paying passenger then drunk, entered the LRT station. While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. An altercation between the two ensued that led to a fist fight. Navidad fell on the tracks and an LRT train operated by Roman struck and killed Navidad. Court held that LRTAs liability stemmed from the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the extraordinary diligence required of the common carrier.
New Civil Code Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of Articles 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply. If the law or contract does not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance, that which is expected of a good father of a family shall be required. (1104a) Negligence Omission of diligence required by the nature of the obligation, as defined by the ordinary prudent person Gen. rule: diligence required is that of a good father of a family Exceptions: Common carrier, pharmacists, children, medical professionals, medical providers Test to determine negligence Ordinary prudent person Standard of Conduct Reasonable care which an ordinary prudent person would exercise under like circumstances 1) in light of human experiences, and 2) facts of the case
Children Below 9 y.o. presumed incapable of negligence (Jarco v. CA, 1999) 9-15 y.o. presumed incapable of negligence, but rebuttable through evidence (Taylor v. Manila Electric, 1910) Above 15 y.o. can be negligent, if proven to have discernment
Article 2231. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.
If the owner was not in the motor vehicle, the provisions of Article 2180 are applicable.
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
1. Slight negligence failure to use ordinary care Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
2. Gross negligence failure to exercise even that care which would be used by a careless person Article 2188. There is prima facie presumption of negligence on the part of the defendant if the death or injury results from his possession of dangerous weapons or substances, such as firearms and poison, except when the possession or use thereof is indispensable in his occupation or business.
3. Willful, wanton and reckless Looks into the actors real or supposed state of mind Article 1734. Common carriers are responsible for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods, unless the same is due to any of the following causes only: (1) Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
Article 2184. In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is solidarily liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle, could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune. It is disputably presumed that a
Article 1735. In all other cases other than those mentioned in Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the preceding article, if the goods are lost, destroyed or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence, as required in Article 1733.
Notorious negligencewant of even slight care and diligence; entire want of care, giving rise to the presumption that she is aware of the probable consequences and is indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others; reckless disregard of the safety of person or property
Must-Read Case:
Ramos v. CA 321 SCRA 584 Marinduque Iron Mines Agents, Inc. v. Workmens Compensation June 30, 1956
*Be able to compare this case with Cruz v. CA, regarding the necessity of expert testimony in medical malpractice suits and standard of care to be afforded patients
QUICK FACTS: Deceased Mamador and his coworkers rode the petitioner corporations truck, on their way to work. The truck, while trying to overtake another truck, turned over and hit a coconut tree, killing Mamador and injuring the rest. SC held that the heirs of Mamador are entitled to damages, because mere riding on a haulage truck or stealing a ride thereon is not negligence, ordinarily.
QUICK FACTS: Plaintiff Elena Amedos son was a seaman. Her son died while on board defendants vessel, M/S Pilar II, after jumping into the sea to retrieve his 2-peso bill. Amedo sought compensation from defendant for her sons death. SC ultimately denied her claim, because the Court found that the accident did not arise out of his employment. More importantly, her son was found to be notoriously negligent for jumping into the sea, which caused his death.
Notorious negligencepursuing a course of conduct which would naturally lead to injury Ilao-Oreta v. Ronquillo
QUICK FACTS: Dr. Ilao-Oreta is a gynecologist who was supposed to perform a laparascopy on Eva Ronquillo. She missed her appointment with them because she just came from her honeymoon and claims that she totally forgot to consider the time difference between Hawaii and Manila. She called the spouses Ronquillo right away when she got back and apologized, but the spouses sued her, asking for actual, moral and exemplary damges. SC held that there was only negligence on her part. The spouses were awarded only actual damages.
COMMENT: In this case res ipsa loquitur was being used as a defense, which is baliktad and makes the case unusual, because the doctrine is supposed to be used for the benefit of the plaintiff.
Gross negligenceimplies a want or absence of or failure to exercise slight care or diligence or the entire absence of care; acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference insofar as other persons may be affected.
QUICK FACTS: Layugan v. IAC November 14, 1988 Erlinda Ramos, who was supposed to be operated on to remove a stone in her gall bladder, ended up comatose instead. SC, in finding Delos Santos Medical Center, Doctors Orlino Hosaka and Perfecta Gutierrez liable, applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The Court, in citing Voss v. Bridwell, said that brain damage is an injury which does not normally occur in the process of a gall bladder operation.
QUICK FACTS: Pedro Layugan filed an action for damages against Godofredo Isidro, because the latters driver bumped him, thereby causing his left leg to be amputated. Isidro, in his defense, utilized res ipsa loquitur and argued that it was Layugan who was negligent and he should therefore bear the consequences of his negligence.SC held that Layugan is entitled to actual and moral damges plus attorneys fees.
DOCTRINE:
The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:
GENERAL RULE: Expert testimony is necessary in determining whether or not there was medical negligence, but this can be dispensed with when the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is invoked and applicable because the injury itself provides the proof of negligence (meaning, kapag masyadong obvious and with the use of common knowledge, you can tell that there was negligence).
Ramos v. CA is an exception to Cruz v. CA (G.R. No. 122445, week 3) because in the former, the Court is not trying to figure out the standard of care required. In Cruz v. CA, expert testimony is required when the standard or degree of care is one that is considered, because in that case, the expert testimony is the only way to establish what the standard of care should be, vis--vis the actual degree of care exercised by the medical practitioner.
NOTES: Res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive law. It is regarded as a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of the burden of producing specific proof of negligence.
QUICK FACTS: Petitioner Luz Tan sued Jam Transit, Inc. for the loss she suffered after the jitney she owns, which contained balut and salted eggs, was bumped by a bus owned by the latter. Tan claims that due to the bus drivers negligence, she suffered actual damages amounting to 543K. SC applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and awarded Tan temperate damages worth 250K.
The doctrine is not automatically applicable in medical malpractice cases. It does not apply to suits which involve the merits of a diagnosis or a scientific treatment. It is also not applicable in a case where the only showing is that the desired result of an operation or treatment was not accomplished or achieved.
DOCTRINE: (Citing Ramos v. CA) The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked:
Finally, the Court ratiocinated that while res ipsa loquitur is applicable in this case, we are not saying that the doctrine is applicable in any and all
1. Nature of the accident - the accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence.
QUICK FACTS: Petitioner Dr. Batiquin was sued by Mrs. Villegas for damages because she left a piece of rubber inside the latters uterus, which resulted to an infection inside the claimants abdominal cavity. SC found Dr. Batiquin negligent and granted damages to Mrs. Villegas.
QUICK FACTS: Spouses Go sued Dr. Cantre due to the wound suffered by Nora in her right arm while she was giving birth, which resulted in an ugly scar. The injury was caused by the droplight in the operating room, which was used to keep Nora and her baby warm when Nora went into hypovolemic shock while giving birth. SC awarded the spouses moral damages, after finding Dr. Cantre negligent.
DOCTRINE: (Citing Layugan v. IAC) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as a rule of evidence, is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It can be invoked when and only when direct evidence is absent and not readily available.
DOCTRINE: (Also citing Ramos v. CA) The following are the requisites before res ipsa loquitur may be invoked: 1. The accident is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someones negligence (as you dont normally suffer from arm wounds when giving birth). 2. It is caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant (within the doctors control). 3. The possibility of contributing conduct which would make the plaintiff responsible is eliminated (because the patient was unconscious while she was giving birth). Notes: RIL applicable because there was no other means for the rubber to be deposited beside the vagina (pwede pa sana kung inside kasi in that case, may means aside from surgery).
QUICK FACTS:
RULE: Under the Captain of the Ship rule, the operating surgeon is the person in complete charge of the surgery room and all personnel connected with the operation. (Note: SC found that Dr. Ampil was the lead surgeon, i.e. captain of the ship)
Notes: Dr. Fuentes was not even at the hospital so he cant be held liable; he was not the one in control and under the captain of the ship doctrine, the lead surgeon should be the one liable.
QUICK FACTS: Petitioner CAP, who was leasing 2 floors of Belfranlt, was sued for damages by the latter, for causing the fire which destroyed the 3rd floor of the building. CAP argued that the fire was a fortuitous event, for which it cannot be held liable. SC found that the fire was not a fortuitous event because there were negligent acts committed by CAP. SC awarded temperate damages to Belfranlt.
DOCTRINE: QUICK FACTS: Petitioner DMCI was sued for damages by the widow of one of its construction workers who fell to his death from the fourteenth floor of the building he was working on. DMCI, as defense, tried to introduce proof that it exercised due care and diligence. SC ruled that DMCI is liable for the death of its worker and ordered DMCI to pay the heirs damages. Res ipsa loquitur applies when the following requisites concur: 1.) The accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent. 2.) The cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge. 3.) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.
i.
Relevant note(s):
Force majeure Acts of God/fortuitous event General rule: NOT LIABLE. Exception: A1174 (above). Is a tire blow-out a fortuitous event? IT DEPENDS. Case law is actually
inconsistent, but the trend is to say that it often occurs with human intervention (e.g., overspeeding).
Art. 2214. In quasi-delicts, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall reduce the damages that he may recover. Relevant note(s): Mere reiteration that contributory negligence is a mitigating factor in the award of damages. Recommended case(s):
Sub-topic: Volenti non fit injuria (Sangco, pp. 81-84) This maxim applies to non-contractual relations, PROVIDED: 1. Plaintiff had actual knowledge of the damage; 2. He understood and appreciated the risk from danger; 3. He voluntarily exposed himself to such risk. Recommended case: Exception to the rule - Ilocos Norte v. CA
Rakes v. Atlantic I just remember that Prof. Casis bookmarked this case as important he even asked somebody to draw the scenario on the board (which, unfortunately, I wasnt able to copy). Case where there was contributory negligence but the SC did not mitigate the damages awarded PNR v. Brunty.
Sub-topic: Prescription According to Art. 1146, an action based on a quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. // Prescriptive period commences from the day the quasi-delict is committed. Case: Kramer v. CA. Sub-topic: Plaintiffs negligence is proximate cause
Quick Facts: Magno was electrocuted to death when he was repairing the media agua (shed roof or alulod) just below the window of the 3rd storey of a house. The lower end of the galvanized iron sheet he was holding came into contact with an uninsulated wire of the MEC. The SC exonerated MEC, ruling that the proximate cause of Magnos death was his reckless or negligent act in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. To hold MEC liable, its supposed negligence in failing to properly insulate the wire (although, it was an unrefuted claim of MEC that it was impossible to make the insulation of that kind of wire) should have been the proximate and principal cause of the accident. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: A prior & remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if between such prior/remote cause and the injury, there intervened a distinct, successive, unrelated & efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasionif an independent negligent act/defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act/condition is the proximate cause. Manila Electric can be held liable if it placed the wires in a public place where persons come to stroll, etc. (Astudillo vs. Manila Electric). The media agua can hardly be considered a public place. Casis insight(s): SC: Perhaps he was a tinsmithand had training & experience for the jobhe could not have been a stranger to electric wires & the danger. Casis: There was nothing in the evidence that proved him to be really a tinsmith. The Court merely assumed that Magno was an expert.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty
of negligence in attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury. Citing Picart vs. Smith: the test is: Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff, at the time he alighted from the train, which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train, under the conditions then existing, was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence. In this case, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that Cangco was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. However, the place was dark or dimly lighted which is also a proof of failure upon Manila Railroad in the performance of its duty to afford its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains.
Sub-topic: Contributory negligence of plaintiff NPC vs. Heirs of Casionan November 27, 2008 Quick Facts: Noble Casionan, 19 y.o. and a pocket miner in Benguet, was electrocuted to death when the tip of the 14-ft.-long bamboo pole he was carrying (for his pocket mining) touched one of the sagging and dangling high-tension electrical transmission lines installed by NPC. The SC found no contributory negligence on the part of Noble because the trail where he was electrocuted was (1) regularly used by the community even before the transmission lines were installed, and (2) the only viable way from where he came from to where he was going; hence he should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to other workers in the area. That the pocket miners were unlicensed and prohibited by DENR were not justifications for NPC to leave their transmission lines dangling, posing great threat to passers-by who were
Quick Facts: The jeep of Spouses Esteban ran over a mound of earth and fell into an open (uncovered) trench, which was an excavation undertaken by PLDT for the installation of its underground conduit system. Both spouses sustained injuries, and the jeeps windshield was shattered. The SC held that based on the evidence on record (showing unexplained abrupt swerving of and failure to take the jeep into a halt due to fast speed), the lack of diligence (or negligence) of Antonio Esteban was the proximate cause of the accident (not only contributory), hence he is solely responsible for the consequences of his imprudence. By
Genobiagon v. CA October 12, 1989 Quick Facts: Gregorio Genobiagon was driving a rig (a large two-part truck) which bumped an 81-y.o. lady who died thereafter. He was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. In his petition for review, he alleged that the reckless negligence of the victim while she was crossing the street was the proximate cause of the accident. The SC affirmed his conviction, saying that the alleged contributory negligence of the victim, if any, does not exonerate the accused. The defense of contributory negligence does not apply in criminal cases committed through reckless imprudence, since one cannot allege the negligence of another to evade the effects of his own negligence.
Quick Facts: Rakes was at work transporting iron rails which slid off when the track sagged and caught his leg, which was later on amputated. Atlantic alleged carelessness on Rakes part because (1) he continued his work despite having noticed the depression in the track, and (2) he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car despite a general prohibition. The SC held that (1) Rakes lack of caution in continuing his work after noticing the slight depression of the rail wasnt so gross as to constitute negligence. Besides, hed been on the job for less than 2 days thus he could not have perceived the displacement; (2) his disobedience in placing himself in danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, but not as its primary cause. His act did not contribute to the principal occurrence (accident) but only to his own injury, therefore, he may recover damages less the amount fairly attributable to his negligence. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Doctrine of Comparative Negligence plaintiff may recover even if his own act contributed to his injury, PROVIDED, his negligence was slight compared to that of the defendant. In American jurisprudence: Contributory Negligence, however slight, is an absolute bar to recovery. Theory of Proportional Damages reducing the award to a plaintiff in proportion to his responsibility for the accident.
Lambert vs. Heirs of Ray Castillon February 23, 2005 Quick Facts: Castillon, who was driving a motorcycle at a high speed, without a helmet, and after having imbibed one or two bottles of beer, instantaneously died in a collision when the motorcycle he was driving sliced into the side of the jeepney which abruptly and sharply made a left turn. The SC held that the proximate cause of the mishap was the abrupt and sudden left turn by the jeepney driver, because if not for that left turn executed with no precaution, the mishap would not have happened. The SC agreed that Castillon was likewise guilty of contributory negligence, thus it equitably increased the ratio of apportionment of damages on account of his negligence (50% as sustained by the SC in previous cases). Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The SC has sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes vs. Atlantic, etc. Casis insight(s):
PNR vs. Brunty (supra) November 2, 2006 Quick Facts: The car being driven by Mercelita, with passengers Brunty and Garcia, smashed into a PNR train. PNR was found negligent for failing on its legal duty to provide the necessary and adequate safety devices and equipment within the intersection. PNR insisting on Mercelitas contributory negligence, that he had the last clear chance to avoid the accident and he disregarded the warning signs, whistle blasts & flashlight signals to stop. The SC held that Mercelita was indeed guilty of contributory negligence, but did not mitigate liability. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured part, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and body.
Sub-topic: Fortuitous Events Juntilla vs. Fontanar (franchisee) Omega watch case May 31, 1985 Quick Facts: Juntilla was a front-seat passenger of a public utitlity jeepney which turned turtle and jumped into a ditch immediately after its right rear tire exploded. He sustained injuries and lost his Omega watch. The SC held that Fontanar, et.al. are liable because the cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence was not independent of the human will, thus not a fortuitous event" under Art. 1174. Evidence showed that the jeepney was overloaded and was running at a very fast speed. On the other hand, no evidence was presented to show that the accident was due to adverse road conditions, or that precautions were taken by the driver to compensate for any conditions liable to cause accidents. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Southeastern College vs. CA (and the Dimaanos) July 10, 1998 Quick Facts: The roof of the U-shaped building of the Southeastern College was partly ripped off and blown away during the Typhoon Saling. It landed on and destroyed portions of Dimaanos house. The SC held that the proximate cause of the damage suffered by the Dimaanos was the typhoon which is a fortuitous eventa natural occurrence which may be foreseen but is unavoidable despite any amount of foresight, diligence or care. Southeastern has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the construction and maintenance of its school building. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Lasam vs. Smith (MEMORIZE!): 1. The cause of the unforeseen and unexpected occurrence, or of the failure of the debtor to comply with his obligation, must be independent of the human will. 2. It must be impossible to foresee the event which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid. 3. The occurrence must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner. 4. The obligor (debtor) must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.
1. An event which takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen 2. An unexpected event or act of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted 3. May be produced by 2 General Causes: a. By nature earthquake, storms, floods, epidemics, fires, etc. b. By the act of man armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery (note:robbery is not FE per se in Sicam v. Jorge), etc. Negligence is defined as a conduct which naturally or reasonably creates undue risk or harm to others. It may be the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, or the omission to do something which a prudent and reasonable man, guided by considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do. In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned.
Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: Where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides: Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case. Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756. Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
The maxim volenti non fit injuria does not apply in this case. Emergency Rule: a person is excused from the force of the rule (i.e.,
assumption of risk), that when he voluntarily assents to a known danger he must abide by the consequences, if (1) an emergency is found to exist or (2) if the life or property of another is in peril, or (3) when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.
Calalas vs. CA (supra) May 31, 2000 Quick Facts: Sunga was seated on an extension seat in the jeepney of Calalas, which was already overloaded. She was injured when a truck bumped the jeepney after letting another passenger off. Calalas was contending that Sunga's taking an "extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. The SC held that such was the result of his negligence in transporting his passengers. The accident was likewise not Nikko Hotel vs. Roberto Reyes (a.k.a. Amay Bisaya) February 28, 2005 Quick Facts: Reyes gate-crashed into the birthday party of Nikko Hotel Manilas hotel manager. Ruby Lim, the hotels executive secretary, told him to leave the party. Hotel Nikko and Lim contended that under the
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (to which a person assents is not
esteemed in law as injury) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent to injury, which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so. Assumption of risk = precludes recovery for damages Art. 19, NCC: principle of Abuse of Rights not a panacea for all human hurts & social grievances. The provisions objective is to set the following standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights and in the performance of ones duties: (1) Act with justice, (2) Give everyone his due, and (3) Observe honesty & good faith.
instituted within four (4) years. The prescriptive period begins from the day the quasi-delict is committed (i.e., the day of collision in this case). The prescriptive period must be counted when the last element occurs or takes place, i.e., the time of the commission of an act or omission violative of the right of the plaintiff. Immediately after the collision, the aggrieved party can seek relief from the courts by alleging such negligence or fault of the owners, agents or personnel of the other vessel. Casis insight(s): They waited allegedly because the investigation involved technical matter in maritime law. Perhaps the reason why they waited for the BMI report is because it would have been easier for them to sue using the said report in filing the case. However, the SC said you dont need this to file a case. The cause of action arose upon the happening of the collision (1976).
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FAR EASTERN SHIPPING v. CA (1998) Quick Facts: M/V Pavlodar, owned by Far Eastern, was docking with Kavankov as shipmaster, Gavino of Manila Pilots Assoc. (MPA) as pilot. Gavino ordered the engine stopped and the left anchor dropped. Kavankov relayed the orders to the crew of the vessel on the bow. However, matters did not happen as expected and the the bow of the vessel rammed into the apron of the. Held: The proximate cause was the concurrent negligence of Gavino (for acting belatedly) and Kavankov (for his unconcerned lethargy / concurring to Gavinos commands). Negligence in order to render a person liable need not be the sole cause of an injury. It is sufficient that his negligence, concurring with one or
GABETO v. ARANETA (1921) Quick Facts: Araneta stopped a carromata (carriage), by holding the reins connected to the bridle inside the mouth of the horse; the driver
Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; except when some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the intervening cause. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent among other reasons, because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. Note: Dionisio was contributory negligent here so the Court mitigated the liability of Phoenix to 80% only based on Art. 2179, NCC.
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION v. IAC (1987) Quick Facts:Coming from a cocktails meeting, Dionisio was driving when his light suddenly failed. When he switched it on, he saw a dumptruck that was parked askew on the right side of the road, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no early warning devices and it was too late to avoid it. Held: The proximate cause was the wrongful or negligent manner in which the dump truck was parked by Phoenixs driver. Dinisios negligence was not an efficient intervening cause but a foreseeable consequence of the proximate cause. Cause and condition:So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish between active
DYTEBAN v. JOSE CHING (2008) Quick Facts:A prime mover, carrying a bulldozer, was parked on one side of the road but the tires on the left occupy a portion of the road. A bus was approaching from the rear, it tried to avoid the mover so it went to the left; however, a van was also approaching from the front. Both collided with the mover. There were no early warning devices at both ends. Held:The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the collision. There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or
URBANO v. IAC (1988) Quick Facts: Because of an irrigation dispute, Urbano hacked Javier on the right palm of his hand. The 2 later entered into an amicable settlement. But 22 days later, Javier was rushed to the hospital where he died a day later. Urbano was convicted. Held:There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with which Urbano had nothing to do. The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. The medical findings lead to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. Note: The Court also said that Urbano may still be civilly liable because the discussion of proximate cause and remote cause is limited to the criminal aspects of the case.
MANILA ELECTRIC v. REMOQUILLO (1956) Quick Facts:Standing on media agua, Magno turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet he was holding came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company strung parallel to the edge of the media agua and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution. Held:The principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervenedbetween such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause. Remoquillo cannot recover damages for the death of Magno since Magnos negligence was the proximate cause of his injury. Note: The doctrine of remote cause in this case was affirmed by Urbano v. IAC above.
MCKEE v. IAC (1992) Quick Facts:Two boys darted across the lane of the car that McKees family was riding. To avoid hitting the boys, the driver blew the horn of the car, swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. Held: Car driver was not negligent. Even assuming arguendo that the driver is negligent, it cannot be said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Applying the doctrine of proximate cause, although it may be said that the act of the driver, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy.
RODRIGUEZA v. MANILA RAILROAD (1921) Quick Facts:As one of Manila Railroads trains passed over Daraga, a great quantity of sparks were emitted from the smokestack of the locomotive, and fire was thereby communicated to the houses nearby belonging to Rodrigueza et al, and the same were entirely consumed. Held:The proximate and only cause of the damage that occurred was the negligent act of Manila Railroad in causing this fire. Assumption of risk:A person cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from the unlawful negligence acts of the defendant. Nobody is bound to anticipate and defend himself against the possible negligence of another. Rather he has a right to assume that the other will use the care of the ordinary prudent man. The circumstance that Rodrigueza's house was partly on the property of the defendant company and therefore in dangerous proximity to passing locomotives was an antecedent condition that may in fact have made the disaster possible, but that circumstance cannot be imputed to him as contributory negligence destructive of his right of action, because, first,
PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. CA (1990) Quick Facts: The jeepney where Pascua et al were riding as passengers was running when its right rear wheel was detached. The jeepney driver applied the brakes after which the jeepney made a U-turn in such a manner that it inverted its direction.The jeepney stopped on the western
AMADO PICART v. FRANK SMITH, JR. STREET, J. | G.R. No. L-12219 | March 15, 1918 Quick Facts: This is the case of an automobile (driven by Smith) hit and fatally injured the horse of Picart. Doctrines: As [Smith] started across the bridge, he had the right to assume that the horse and the rider would pass over to the proper side; but as [Smith] moved toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this would not be done; and [Smith] must in a moment have perceived that it was too late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not (sic) longer within the power of [Picart] to escape being run down by going to a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had
ROGELIO ENGADA v. CA and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 140698 | June 20, 2003 | QUISUMBING, J. QUICK FACTS: A man was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan, the registered owner of the Tamaraw. The Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, driven by petitioner Engada. The pick-up had just negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up. Iran swerved to his left but the pickup also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw, hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped diagonally astride the center of the road. Engada was invoking the doctrine to exonerate himself from liability. DOCTRINE: The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by Engada to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Engadas act of swerving to the Tamaraws lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for quasi-delict is solidary. (n)
Worcester v Ocampo Facts: "Birds of Prey" Worcester filed an action against owners, directors, writers, editors, administrators of newspaper for a libelous article. The lower court sentenced them joint and severally (solidarily) to pay Worcester. The court found that a preponderance of evidence shows that the defendants were the co-owners of the newspaper. Held: Since the basis of the action is tort and by virtue of the universal doctrine that joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit, the person injured may sue all of them, or any number less than all.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY FAMILY CODE Art. 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the following person shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child in the order indicated: (1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214; (2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and (3) The child's actual custodian, over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified. Whenever the appointment or a judicial guardian over the property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of preference shall be observed. (349a, 351a, 354a) Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes,
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of Article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fears shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution. Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments. In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
REVISED PENAL CODE Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in subdivision 4 of Article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced subject to the following rules:
RA 9344 JUVENILA JUSTICE SYSTE ACT OF 2006 SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
NEW CIVIL CODE Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
Defense available to parents: Prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage, which in this case the father failed to prove. Why the school is not liable.(Casis discussed this in relation to next topic, v.liability of schools) "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution. Balintawak Elementary school is not a student of institution of arts and trades but an academic educ. institution. Hence, head of the school nor city school supervisor is not liable. Dissenting opinion of JBL Reyes (with regard liability of school): There is no reason to limit application to teachers of arts and trades and not academic institutions as there is no substantial difference between them. The father should not be held liable for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent, and which he had every right to assume the school authorities would avoid. Having proved that he trusted his child to the custody of school authorities that were competent to exercise vigilance over him, the father has rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the burden of proof
Held: Yes. Under Article 101, RPC father may be civilly liable only if the child acted without discernment. RPC is silent as to liability if the child acted with discernment. Court said that it would be absurd to hold that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent. Hence, resort must be made to the Civil Code. Citing Exconde v. Capuno, Court held that the civil liability imposed upon parents is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil Code). The only way by which they can relieved themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code.) This defendants failed to prove.
Tamargo v CA 03 June 1992 Facts: October 20 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, 10y.o., shot Jennifer Tamargo which resulted in her death. A civil complaint for damages was filed by Macario Tamargo, Jennifer's adopting parent, and Celso and Aurelia Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living. In the Criminal case against Adelberto, he was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Subtopic: Teachers Mercado v CA 30 May 1960 Facts: Kids quarreling over a pitogo. Augusto Mercado and Manuel Quisumbing quarreled over a pitogo, Augusto, who started the aggression, gave successive blows and wounded cheek of Manuel with a razor. Complaint was filed against parents of Mercado by parents of Quisumbing. Mercados arguing that since the incident occurred in the school, no fault to be imputed against the parents as the teacher or head of schooled was then responsible. Held. Citing Exconde v Capuno, "teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damage caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any academic educational institution In 2180, "Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody" contemplates a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the parents. In these circumstances the control or influence over the conduct and actions of the pupil would pass from the father and mother to the teacher; and so would the responsibility for the torts of the pupil. Such a situation does not appear in the case at bar; the pupils appear to go to school during school hours and go back to their homes with their parents after school is over. The situation contemplated in the last paragraph of Article 2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of said article, which makes father or mother responsible for the damages caused by their minor children. the responsibility does not pass to the school.
Salvosa v IAC 05 October 1988 Facts: BCF is an academic institution and one of arts and trades. Within its premises is an ROTC unit under the control of AFP. Abon, AFP-appointed and employed armorer and a commerce student of the BCF. In the pasking space of BCF, Abon shot Castro, a student of UB with an unlicensed firearm from the armory. Heirs of Castro sued Abon, BCF officials, and BCF. WON BCF officials may be held solidarily with Abon for damages under A2180.
Phil Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. 25 March 1975 Quick Facts: The driver was injured when the bus (Phil Rabbit) was hit by a truck owned by Phil-Am that was driven recklessly. The manager of PhilAm, along with the truck driver, was impleaded in the quasi-delict suit filed by Phil Rabbit. TC dismissed the case against the manager. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The manager of a corporation is not included in the terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise used in Art. 2180 of CC. It may be gathered from the context of Art. 2180 that the term manager (director in the Spanish version) is used in the sense of employer. xxx
Philtranco v. CA 273 SCRA 562, supra Quick Facts: The victim was riding a bicycle along Gomez street while the bus was allegedly being pushed by several people in Magsaysay Blvd. which is a road perpendicular to Gomez St. The bus allegedly abruptly started, bumped the victim and ran over him. After running over the victim, the bus driver did not stop until a police officer jumped into the bus, identified himself and told the driver to stop. Philtranco also argued that it exercised diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees and the driver exercised the diligence of a very cautious person in driving the bus. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Spouses Jayme v. Apostol 27 Nov 2008 Quick Facts: Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pickup truck driven by Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, when it hit a boy crossing the highway causing the latters death. The parents of the deceased impleaded the Mayor, that the latter is vicariously liable as the drivers superior. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The law on the matter is clear: only the negligent driver, the drivers employer, and the registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle. It was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no momentAn employer-employee relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the employee subsists. xxx Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Requisites, vicarious liability of employers: 1. That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; 2. That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and 3. That the illicit act of the employee was of the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him. Significantly to make the employee liable under par. 5 and 6 of Art. 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions.
The liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct (Art 2180), and joint and several or solidary (Art 2194) with the driver. The recourse of the employer is to recover what was paid from the employee.
Lampesa v. De Vera, Jr. 14 Feb 2008 Quick Facts: TC and CA found that the truck driver was negligent in his maneuvering of the truck (owned by Lampesa) when it hit the jeepney, which caused the injury sustained by De Vera, a passenger of the jeepney. Lampesa was also held liable because he failed to exercise due diligence in the supervision of his driver. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The owner of the truck should not have been satisfied by the mere possession of a professional drivers license, when it was presented when the driver applied for his job.
Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez 21 Dec 1999 Quick Facts: Abad was a manager of Castilex; he was issued a company car. Abad did OT work in Castilex. He left the office, stopped by a seedy place to meet friends and get snacks. On his way home, while driving his company-issued car, the car collided with a motorcycle causing the death of the latters driver. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: Par. 5 is an expansion of par. 4 of 2180 NCC in both (1) employer coverage and (2) acts included. Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service in the of the branches nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.
The mere fact that Abad was using a service vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge Castilex with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. xxx Abad was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. Using his vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of fringe benefit attached to his position. Hence, Castilex is not liable. Daddy! Daddy!
Professional Services, Inc. v. Agana 31 Jan 2007 Quick Facts: Two pieces of surgical sponges were left inside the body of the patient during a hysterectomy operation. This caused infection that led to the death of the patient. Dr. Ampil was the surgeon in charge of the operation and PSI is the owner of the hospital where the surgery was conducted. PSI was held vicariously liable as employer of Dr. Ampil.
Valenzuela v. CA 7 Feb 1996 Quick Facts: Li, an Assistant Manager of Alexander Commercial, Inc., was driving his company-issued car collided with the vehicle of Valenzuela, causing injuries to the latters person. Li was coming home from a visit to his officemates house. SC held his employer solidarily liable in the damages caused by his negligent act. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The privilege of unlimited use of a company car serves important business purposes either related to the image of success an entity intends to present to its clients and to the public in general, or to enable its managerial and other employees of rank or its sales agents to reach clients conveniently. Since important business transactions and decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of situations and under all kinds of guises, the provision for unlimited use of a company car therefore principally serves the business and goodwill of a company and only incidentally the private purposes of the individual who actually uses the car. As such, in providing for a company car for business use and/or for the purposes of furthering the companys image, a company owes a responsibility to the public to see to it that the employees to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a company issued car are able to use the company issue capably and responsibly. Your Insights, if any: Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
For the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-employee relationship exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians. (Ramos v. CA) Control test: Private hospital hire, fire, and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants are not technically employees, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the important hallmarks of an employeremployee relationship, with the exception of payment of wages.
Doctrine of ostensible agency or agency by estoppel: By Accrediting Dr. Ampil and advertising his qualifications, PSI created the public impression that he was its agent. PSI publicly displays in the lobby of the Medical City Hospital the names and specializations of the physicians associated or accredited by it. Its act is tantamount to the public that Medical City, through its accredited physicians, offers quality health care services. Doctrine of corporate negligence or corporate responsibility: PSI committed a serious breach of its corporate duty when it failed to conduct an immediate investigation into the reported missing gauzes.
Quick Facts: A collision between an ambulance of the General Hospital (State) and a motorcycle resulted in the injuries of the latters driver, Merritt. Merritt is suing the Government for damages, as the employer of the ambulance driver. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: That the responsibility of the State is limited by Art. 1903 to the case wherein it acts through a special agent (and a special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order of commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special official) so that in representation of the state and being bound to act as an agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. The state is not responsible for the damages suffered by private individuals in consequence of acts performed by its employees in the discharge of the functions pertaining to their office, because neither fault nor even negligence can be presumed on the part of the state in the organization of branches of the public service and in the appointment of its agents Your Insights, if any: This case is important for its definition of special agent
However, in this case, there was insufficient evidence that PSI exercised the power of control or wielded such power over the means and details of the specific process by which Dr. Ampil spplied his skills in the treatment of the deceased. (Note: PSI was still held liable using the agency by estoppels doctrine)
Mercury Drug Corp. v. Huang 22 June 2007 Quick Facts: A 6-wheeler truck owned by Mercury Drug collided with the car driven by Huang. Huang suffered injuries and caused his paralysis. The driver was found negligent and Mercury as the employer of the driver was found solidarily liable. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: How to show diligence in the hiring and supervision of employees: In the selection of its prospective employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. With respect to the supervision of its employees, the employer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish compliance with these requirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
Rosete v. Auditor General 31 Aug 1948 Quick Facts: Buildings of petitioner was destroyed by fire that originated from the adjacent property, the Emergency Control Association (ECA, a government agency) warehouse. The fire was caused by negligence of ECAs employee. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Under the meaning of [par 5 Art 1903], the word official comprises all officials and employees of the government who exercise duties of their respective public offices. All others who are acting by commission of the government belong to the class of special agents, whether individual or juridical bodies. ECA is not a branch or office of the government, i.e., not legislative, executive, or judicial. It is one of groups of special agents created by the government for activities ordinarily non-governmental in character.
Officers of municipalities charged with the administration of patrimonial property of a municipal corporation are liable for mismanagement of its affairs as are directors or managing officers of private corporations; not for mere mistakes of judgment, but only when their acts are so far opposed to the true interests of the municipality as to lead to the clear inference that no one thus acting could have been influenced by any honest desire to secure such interests xxx.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman 27 Feb 1991 Quick Facts: Son of the petitioners were killed by the driver of NIA. They filed a case for damages against NIA. In thi MR, the Sol Gen maintains that NIA does not perform solely and primarily propriety functions but is an agency of the government tasked with governmental functions and is therefore not liable for tortuous act of its driver Hugo Garcia, who was not its special agent. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as compulsory; the latter connotes merely exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as optional. NIA was not created for purposes of local government, but for the purpose of constructing, improving, rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines xxx. Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by their services, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency, which is the irrigation of lands. The NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government but a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore, it may
Mendoza v. De Leon 11 Feb 1916 Quick Facts: The defendant councilors (De Leon, et al.) regularly leased an exclusive ferry privilege to the plaintiff (Mendoza) for two years. After continuous use of a little more than one year, they forcibly evicted him on the pretext that he was not operating the ferry leased to him. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: Under the evidence of record, there is no manner of doubt that this pretext was absolutely without foundation and as there was therefore no occasion whatever for rescinding the contract, the defendant councilors are liable personally for the damages resulting to the lessee by their wrongful action. The Municipal Code confers both governmental and business or corporate powers upon municipal corporations. For the exercise of the former it is not liable to private persons. Its liability to them for the wrongful exercise of the latter is the same as that of the private corporation or individual. Officers and agents of municipal corporations charged with the performance of governmental duties which are in their nature legislative, judicial, or quasi-judicial are not liable for the consequences of their
1. Freedom of religion; 2. Freedom of speech; 3. Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical
publication; 4. Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention; 5. Freedom of suffrage; 6. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law; 7. The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use; 8. The right to the equal protection of the laws; 9. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures; 10. The liberty of abode and of changing the same; 11. The privacy of communication and correspondence; 12. The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law; 13. The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances; 14. The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form; 15. The right of the accused against excessive bail; 16. The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf; 17. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness; 18. Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and
indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible also has to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights... Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse using good faith as an excuse. SILAHIS V SOLUTA 20 February 1996 Quick Facts: The General Manager (GM) of the security agency of Silahis Hotel allegedly received information of illegal activities including sale of marijuana, dollars smuggling, and prostitution going on in the Union Office at the hotel. GM with other security personnel allegedly entered the Union Office with the permission of the union officers and found marijuana, prompting the hotel file a case for violation of the dangerous drugs act against the union officers. According to the union officers, the drugs were planted by management and the search was done without their permission and despite their protest. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
Quick Facts: Cigarette brands of Fortune were reclassified to another category which subjected it to a higher ad valorem tax, as ordered by the RMC issued by CIR Chato-Vinzons 2d prior to the effectivity of RA 7654. Fortune filed a motion for reconsideration calling for the recall of the RMC but was denied and instead assessed for a tax deficiency of P9.6M. The CTA ruled that the RMC is defective, invalid, and unenforceable. CA and SC affirmed. Based on the decision in the tax case, Fortune filed a complaint for damages against the CIR in her private capacity under Article 32 of the Civil Code, on the ground that the issuance of RMC violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
The Code Commission thus deemed it necessary to hold not only public
officers but also private individuals civilly liable for violation of rights
person may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasksas it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent. o Exception: A public officer is by law not immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions. There are cases in which it has been stated that civil liability in tort is determined by the conduct and not by the mental state of the tortfeasor, and there are circumstances under which the motive of the
civil liability. It cannot apply to an action against the employer to enforce his subsidiary civil liability as stated above, because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case. Any action brought against him before the conviction of his employee is premature. While a separate and independent civil action for damages may be brought against the employee under Article 33 of the Civil Code, no such action may be filed against the employer on the latter's subsidiary civil liability because such liability is governed not by the Civil Code but by the Penal Code, under which conviction of the employee is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. If the court trying the employee's liability adjudges the employee liable, but the court trying the criminal action acquits the employee, the subsequent insolvency of the employee cannot make the employer subsidiary liable to the offended party or to the latter's heirs. MADEJA V CARO 21 December 1983 Quick Facts: Carmen Madeja filed a criminal case against Dr. Japzon for homicide thru reckless imprudence, after the formers husband died after an appendectomy. Madeja reserved her right to file a separate civil action for damages. While the criminal case was still pending, Madeja filed a civil action for damages against Japzon alleging that her husband died due to the doctors gross negligence. Judge Caro dismissed the case ruling that: The civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered on the criminal action.
delictoThe underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. General Rule: When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. o Exception. Under Art 33 -> When the offense is defamation, fraud, or physical injuries, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been terminated. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries as defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide. -> Considering that defamation and fraud are used in their ordinary sense which have no specific provisions in the RPC. ARAFILES V. PHIL JOURNALISTS 5 March 2004 Quick Facts: Despuig, an employee of Natl Institute of Atmospheric Science and a student of Feati University, filed a complaint against Arafiles, NIAS Director, for forcible abduction and rape. After she filed her sworn statement in the police statement, a certain Morales interviewed Despuig and after the interview tried but failed to contact Arafiles. Morales then wrote an account of Despuigs complaint and submitted it to his editor. The article appeared as the headline of Peoples Tonight the following day. One year after the publication, Arafiles filed a complaint for damages against Morales, his editor, and the publisher for grossly malicious and overly sensationalized reporting in the news item based on Art33. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
In actions for damages for libel, it is axiomatic that the published work alleged to contain libelous material must be examined and viewed as a whole. The article must be construed as an entirety including the headlines, as they may enlarge, explain, or restrict or be enlarged, explained or strengthened or restricted by the context. Whether or not it is libelous, depends upon the scope, spirit, and motive of the publication taken in its entirety. A civil action for libel under this article shall be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment and proved by preponderance of evidence separately from and entirely independent of the institution, pendency, or result of the criminal action because it is governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code and not by the Revised Penal Code governing the criminal offense charged and the civil liability arising therefrom. MVRS V. ISLAMIC 28 January 2003 Quick Facts: Islamic DaWah Council of the Philippines and 3 individual Muslims filed a complaint in the RTC of Manila in their behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS and 3 of its employees/officers for publishing an article related to the prohibition of not eating pigs allegedly because they treat pigs as gods. Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes:
injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. o Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual The Muslim Faith is too fragmented -- one cannot determine the effect to each and every member of that group.
CORPUS V. PAJE 31 July 1969 Quick Facts: A passenger bus of the Victory Liner, driven by Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to two other persons. An information for homicide and double serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje wherein the latter was found guilty and convicted of the crime charged. The heirs of Clemente Marcia reserved their right to institute a separate civil action for damages.
DULAY V. CA 3 April 1995 Quick Facts: An altercation between Torzuela and Atty. Dulay occurred at the "Big Bang Sa Alabang," as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Dulay. Dulays widow filed a claim for damages against Torzuela, the Safegaurd and Superguard alleged employers of Torzuela. Superguard alleged that the there is no cause of action because the shooting was beyond Torzuelas scope of duty and that the filing of the complaint was premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability Doctrines and/or Quotable Quotes: The filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement of express reservation. There is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts that are voluntary and intentional. In the case of Andamo v IAC: Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 has already been construed to include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide.
injuring a person's character, fame or reputation through false and malicious statements. o Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff. Words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable individual The Muslim Faith is too fragmented -- one cannot determine the effect to each and every member of that group.
Art. 19 Abuse of rights Art. 21 Acts Contra Bonus Mores/ Against Good Morals Common element under Arts. 19 and 21: acts are intentional. Art. 20, on the other hand, does not distinguish: the act may be done either willfully or negligently. It is the general sanction for all other provisions of law which do not provide their own sanction. (Albenson v CA, 1993) Elements of Abuse of Right (LES) 1. Legal right or duty 2. Exercised in bad faith 3. Sole intent of prejudicing another (Casis: this is a very high threshold, breach of promise per se not applicable) Standard of Conduct (AGO) 1. Act with justice 2. Give everyone his due 3. Observe honesty and good faith These standards limit the exercise of ones rights.
a. Breach of Promise to Marry; Seduction Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong Seduction: 1) there must be inducement by deceit 2) woman must yield because of the inducement
Magbanua v CA Feb. 12, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J. Magbanua, who worked as a housemaid in Junsays house, was charged with robbery. The prosecution relied on her alleged confession. She was later acquitted after it was found that she was physically maltreated in an attempt to extract the confession from her. Her father filed a suit for damages. Held There was no malicious prosecution because there was no proof of sinister design on the part of Junsay to vex or humiliate Magbanua. Junsay, who was robbed of her jewelry, could be expected to bring the matter to the authorities. Mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. c. Public Humiliation Casis: In public humiliation, it seems that there should be imputation of a crime. It is not necessary whether other people believed the accusations against the person who was humiliated. It is about the manner of attacking the person.
Thrown/Falling from a Building Article 2193. The head of a family that lives in a building or a part thereof, is responsible for damages caused by things thrown or falling from the same.
Article 1712. If the death or injury is due to the negligence of a fellow worker, the latter and the employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If a fellow worker's intentional or malicious act is the only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or supervision of the plaintiff's fellow worker. AFABLE v SINGER SEWING MACHINE Quick Facts: LeopoldoMadlangbayan was a collector for the Singer Sewing Machine Company in San Francisco del Monte and was supposed to be residing in his district according to the records of the company.One afternoon, while riding a bicycle was run at the streets of Manila by a truck driven by Sumoay (convicted of reckless impru resulting in homicide). Madlangbayan had moved to Manila without notifying the company, and that at the time of his death he was returning home after making some collections in San Francisco del Monte. According to the practice of the company, if collectors made collections on Sunday they were required to deliver the amount collected to the company the next morning.Widow and children brought action to recover from the corporation under Act No. 3428, as amended by Act. No. 3812 Issue: WON Singer liable (N) Held: 1. Case at bar: Accident not due to and in pursuance of his employment. 2. Recovery depends on the nature of his employment. (Here, not within scope of work see reasons below) To come within the term "injury received in the course of employment " it must be shown that the injury originated in the
Interference with Contractual Relations Article 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. (n) GILCHRIST vs. CUDDY, ET AL. Quick Facts: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zigomarwhich he rented to Gilchrist for a week.A few days prior to specified dates, Cuddy sent Gilchrist his money back, saying that he had made other arrangements with his film. The other arrangements was the rental to these defendants Espejo.Injunction was asked by Gilchrist against these parties from showing it for the said week.Cuddyaccepted offerby Espejobecause latter was paying about three times as much as he had contracted with Gilchrist for. CFI: An ex parte mandatory injunction was issued on the 22d of May, 1913, directing the defendant, E. A. Cuddyto send to the appellee a certain cinematograph film Issues: WON Espejo wrongfully interfered with contractual relations and WON injunction is proper. Held:ESPEJO WRONGFULLY INTERFERRED BUT NO MALICE, NO DAMAGES Appellants knowingly induced Cuddy to violate his contract with another person. But the only motive for the interference was a desire to make a profit by exhibiting the film in their theater. HOWEVER, while Court does not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the expense of others, however, it finds that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to
Another view: some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferer's interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self-protection.
And yet another: Justification for protecting one's financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. Gilchrist vs. Cuddy:Where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the impulse behind one's conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Case at Bar: 1. So Ping Buns Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived TekHua Enterprises of the latter's property right. Clearly, the 3 elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present. 2. So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of TekHua Enterprises. Though So Ping Bun took interest in the property of TekHua Enterprises and
QC v. DACARA Quick Facts: The son of Dacara was driving a car when he rammed against an earth mound in a street being repaired by the SC government and the car turned turtle. Son sustained bodily injuries. Car was damaged.Dacara, in behalf of his minor son, filed for damages. The city governments defense was they exercised due care by putting up warning devices like the visible reflectorized paint with sticks. TC ruled in favor of Dacara holding that the city government was negligent under Art. 2189 The city government assailed the decision of TC, inter alia, the application of Art. 2189 which supposedly applies only to liability for the death or injuries suffered by a person, not for damage to property.
Subtopic: Interest Rules: 1. Interest upon delay in obligation for the payment of sum of money that agreed upon or, in the absence of stipulation, legal interest at six percent per annum. (Article 2209) 2. Legal interest shall be earned from the time judicially demanded (Article 2212) 3. Interest upon breach of contract allowable upon discretion of the court (Article 2210). 4. Interest in crimes and quasi-delicts adjudicated in the discretion of the court (Article 2211). 5. Interest upon unliquidated claims or damages cannot be recovered except when demand can be established with reasonable certainty (Article 2213).
PNOC VS. CA (1998) Doctrines: Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or injury sustained. They proceed from a sense of natural justice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the injury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. In actions based on torts or quasi-delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. Two kinds of actual or compensatory damages: (1) Loss of what a person already possesses (dao emergente); (2) Failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him (lucro cesante). To enable an injured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is required to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available.
Subtopic: Mitigation of liability Source: The party suffering loss or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the damages resulting from the act or ommission in question (Article 2203) Rules:
GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM (1991) The Thames minibus owned by Arsenio Delim turned turtle and fell into a ditch injuring several passengers including Reynalda Gatchalian. Among her injuries was a lacerated wound on her forehead which, she claimed, caused her to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She then sued Delim and claimed P10,000 for loss of employment and other opportunities and P10,000 for the cost of plastic surgery for removal of the scar on her forehead. Gatchalian lost in the trial court, which ruled that damages cannot be awarded because she signed a waiver which Delims wife asked the injured passengers while they were in the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts ruling denying the Gatchalians claim for damages but decided that the cited waiver was not valid. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision of the CA and granted the award for actual damages covering the cost of plastic surgery in the amount of P15,000. It did not grant the claim for damages for loss of employment opportunities since her employment as a substitute teacher was merely sporadic and she was no longer employed when the incident happened. Doctrines/quotes: A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the
CANDANO VS. SUGATA-ON (2007) M/V David, Jr., a passenger vessel owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank together with its cargo and several crew members. Melquiades Sugata-on, who was working on board as Third Marine Engineer with a monthly salary of P7,800, was missing, prompting his wife, Florentina Sugata-on to go to the office of Candano Shipping to claim death benefits which the latter refused to pay. This urged her to file an action seeking indemnity for the death of Melquiades before the Manila RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Florentina and awarded P988,400 in actual damages, using the formula in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs CA. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but reduced the award for the cited damages to P608,400, using the standard in Article 194 of the Labor Code. The Supreme Court reinstated the award given by the RTC. Doctrines/quotes: Formula in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs CA: The annual expenses of the deceased are deducted from his gross annual income and multiplied by life expectancy (gross annual income annual expense x life expectancy) Standard in Article 194 of the Labor Code: The System shall pay to the primary beneficiaries upon the death of the covered employee under this Title an amount equivalent to his monthly income benefit, plus ten percent thereof for each dependent child, but not exceeding five, beginning with the youngest and without substitution Provided, however, That the monthly income benefit shall be guaranteed for five years: Provided, further, That if he has no primary beneficiary, the System shall pay to his secondary beneficiaries the monthly income benefit not to exceed sixty months; Provided, finally, That the minimum monthly death benefit shall not be less that fifteen thousand pesos.
Sulpicio Lines vs. Curso Are the surviving brothers and sisters of a passenger of a vessel that sinks during a voyage entitled to recover moral damages from the vessel owner as common carrier? Held: No. As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract, unless there is fraud or bad faith. As an exception, moral damages may be awarded in case of breach of contract of carriage that results in the death of a passenger The conditions for awarding moral damages are: a. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly substantiated by the claimant b. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established
Expert Travel vs. CA Facts: - CA and RTC issued judgment: 1. Pay defendant Ricardo Lo moral damages in the amt. of 30K 2. Attorneys fees 10K Expert Travel sued Lo alleging that he did not pay four round trip tickets he ordered. Lo says that he paid the amount to Ms. De Vega, who was authorized to deal with clients of Expert Travel. -
Is moral damages properly awarded to Lo. YES Held: Petition meritorious. Award for moral damages require certain conditions to be met: 1. There must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by defendant 2. There must be a culpable act or omission factually established 3. The wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant 4. The award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stipulated in Art. 2219 Moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage In a quasi-delict, moral damages may be recovered if: 1. An act or omission causes physical injuries -
Mijares vs. CA Facts: Metro Drug sued Mijares, owners of Aklan Drug, for the total value of various products they ordered which they refused to pay despite demand. Aklan Drug interposed a counterclaim for malicious prosecution. RTC dismissed the case and ruled for the defendants; ordering the plaintiff to pay 30k moral damages, 10k attorneys fees and cost of suit. CA reversed the decision of the RTC. SC reinstates RTC decision, affirming only the dismissal of the complaint Held: Trial court however erred when it awarded moral damages in favor of petitioners. Petitioners have failed to show that private respondent was motivated by bad faith when it instituted the action for collection. Unfounded civil suits encompasses malicious prosecution. Malicious prosecution requires: 1. Malice 2. Absence of probable cause
Casis: The elements of malicious prosecution is a mistake because it would mean it is the same as an unfounded civil suit. They are not the same. Industrial Insurance vs. Bondad Facts: collision between three vehicles a gallant sigma car driven by Morales, a packed jeepney driven by Bondad and a DM Transit Bus. Industrial Insurance Company and Morales filed complaint for damages to the RTC against DM Transit, Diaz and Bondad. RTC and CA ruled that the plaintiff had no valid cause of action against Bondad. CA however deleted the expenses for attending the hearings since it was not sufficiently proven Issue: Whether the award for moral and exemplary damages is proper Held: petition not meritorious Petitioner knew that respondents were not the cause of the accident. This is evident from its failure to even make a prior formal demand on them before initiating the suit. Indeed, the cause of the accident was the negligence of DM transit driver. In impleading the respondents, petitioner clearly acted in wanton disregard of the facts that were as obvious then as they are now. The careless and lack of diligence of petitioner destroys its claim of good faith. Accordingly, award for attorneys fees should be sustained. SC affirms the award for moral damages. To sustain this award, it must be shown that: 1. The claimant suffered injury -
Triple 8 vs. NLRC Facts: The contractor-employee agreement between Osdana and 888 was for her to be employed as waitress in KSA for 12 mos for $280. She was made to work long hours and under harsh conditions. She was dismissed from work without separation pay and she was not paid her salaries for the period when she was not allowed to work. NLRC ordered 888 to pay Osdana her salaries for the unexpired portion of her contract, unpaid salaries, salary differential, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. Held: With respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is proper but should be reduced. Moral damages is recoverable
Lopez vs. Pan American Facts: Senator Lopez reserved first class accommodations in Flight 2 of Pan-Am from Tokyo to SanFo. Pan-Ams head office confirmed said reservations. Tickets were thereby issued and the total fare for all of them was paid before tickets were issued. However, when they arrived in
ABS-CBN vs. CA Facts: ABS-CBN and Viva Films entered into an agreement whereby Viva gave ABS an exclusive right to exhibit some Viva films. Negotiations broke down and the package was sold to RBS. ABS CBN sued RBS and Viva Films. RTC ruled in favor of RBS, ordering ABS-CBN to pay, among others, attorneys fees and P5M moral damages. As regards moral and exemplary damages, RBS asserts that ABS-CBN filed the case and secured injunctions purely for the purpose of harassing and prejudicing RBS. Pursuant then to Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, ABS-CBN must be held liable for such damages. Citing Tolentino, damages may be awarded in cases of abuse of rights even if the done is not illicit, and there is abuse of rights where a plaintiff institutes an action purely for the purpose of harassing or prejudicing the defendant. RBS avers that they