CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES

their verified answer dated 20 June 1988, and that the other matters not admitted, denied and/or clarified were either irrelevant or improper. On 18 November 1988, petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment, claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the request and that the answer was not under oath; that, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court. ISSUES: 1. w/n there is a need for Mag isa to deny/admit again issues she already admitted/denied? - No 2. w/n there it was proper service for request for admission? No. HELD: 1. A party should not be compelled to admit matters of fact already admitted by his pleading and concerning which there is no issue nor should he be required to make a second denial of those already denied in his answer to the complaint. A request for admission is not intended to merely reproduce or reiterate the allegations of the requesting party's pleading but should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to establish said party's cause of action or defense. . . . Moreover, under Section 1, Rule 26 of the Rules of Court, the request for admission must be served directly upon the party; otherwise, the party to whom the request is directed cannot be deemed to have admitted the genuineness of any relevant document in and exhibited with the request or relevant matters of fact set forth therein, on account of failure to answer the request for admission. 2. The general rule as provided for under Section 2 of Rule 27 (now Section 2, Rule 13) of the Rules of Court is that all notices must be served upon counsel and not upon party. This is so because the attorney of a party is the agent of the party and is the one responsible for the conduct of the case in all its procedural aspects; hence, notice to counsel is notice to party. The purpose of the rule is obviously to maintain a uniform procedure calculated to place in competent hands the orderly prosecution of a party's case. However, the general rule cannot apply where the law expressly provides that notice must be served upon a definite person. In such cases, service must be made directly upon the person mentioned in the law and upon no other in order that the notice be valid. In the present case, it will be noted that the request for admission was not served upon the private respondent Magisa but upon her counsel, Atty. Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa, therefore, cannot be deemed to have

BRIBONERIA vs. CA Rule 26 Section 2 FACTS: On 23 May 1988, petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, as 2 plaintiff, filed a complaint for Annulment of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa. On 13 September 1988, after issues in the case had been joined, petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-isa a request for admission as follows: ATTY. ALFREDO A. ALTO Counsel for Defendant Mag-isa Balaga-Luna Building Malolos, Bulacan Greeting: Plaintiff, through counsel, respectfully requests your admission within ten (10) days from service hereof pursuant to Rule 26, Rules of Court of the following: 1. That plaintiff, together with his wife Nonita A. Briboneria, are the registered owners of a parcel of land located at 59 Amsterdam Street, Provident Village, Marikina, MetroManila. 5. That defendant Mag-isa knows that plaintiff works abroad but he (plaintiff) regularly comes home and stays with his family at their residential house abovementioned. 8. That plaintiff had never authorized his wife or anybody for that matter to sell or to dispose of the property covered under TCT No. N-29895. 9. That plaintiff never executed the alleged Special Power of Attorney dated November 14, 1984. 12. That plaintiff never sold or disposed of, and never consented to the sale or disposition of properties covered under TCT No. N-29995. 13. That plaintiff never received the consideration of the alleged sale, and he never benefited therefrom in any manner. On 10 November 1988, the private respondents filed with the court a quo their Answer to Request for Admission, alleging that most if not all the matters subject of petitioner's request for admission had been admitted, denied and/or clarified in

admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the request.

BONGCAC vs. SB Rule 36 Section 1 FACTS: The Mayor of Tagbilaran City, Jose V. Torralba, designated his secretary, Panfilo D. Bongcac as the "Mayors representative to the City Market Committee. In January 1991, respondents Engr. Fortunato Lim (Lim) and Toribio Bon (Bon) applied for stalls or tiendas in the Cogon Public Market in Tagbilaran City and were referred to petitioner. Accordingly, Lim issued and delivered to petitioner a BPI check, pay to cash, in the amount of P62,000. Bon issued and delivered to petitioner two Metrobank checks, pay to cash, in the amounts of P30,000 and P10,000. Petitioner issued handwritten receipts to Lim and Bon. Petitioner assured Lim that his stalls would be finished on or before 30 June 1991 and promised Bon that his stall would be finished before the fiesta in Tagbilaran City. The checks were subsequently encashed. Petitioner was "sacked" as market body consultant and was terminated as secretary to the Mayor. They looked for him and demanded that he either make an accounting of the money he received or deliver the stalls or tiendas already constructed. Petitioner failed to do so. Thus, he was charged with two counts of Estafa . On 28 March 2001, the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of estafa No motion for reconsideration was filed. Consequently, the Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002.6 On 10 January 2003, the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Criminal Case Nos. 18005 and 18006 denying, for lack of merit, petitioners Manifestation and Very Urgent Motion to Suspend Further Proceedings. It further directed the issuance of a bench warrant of arrest against petitioner to serve the sentence imposed upon him. Petitioner likewise sought to suspend the final execution of the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision until after the resolution of the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. ISSUE: whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to hold in abeyance the execution of judgment?

HELD: No. The Resolution of 20 February 2002 became final and executory on 2 April 2002 after petitioner failed to file a timely motion for reconsideration. Consequently, the 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision likewise became final and executory. Petitioner could no longer seek a reversal of the judgment of conviction rendered by the Sandiganbayan, as what petitioner did when he filed the Very Urgent Petition for Extraordinary Relief. Petitioner cannot perpetually file any petition or pleading to forestall the execution of a final judgment. Execution of a final judgment is the fruit and end of the suit. While a litigants right to initiate an action in court is fully respected, once his case has been adjudicated by a competent court in a valid final judgment, he should not be permitted to initiate similar suits in the hope of securing a favorable ruling. The 28 March 2001 Sandiganbayan Decision has attained finality. Every litigation must come to an end once a judgment becomes final, executory and unappealable. For just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of his case by the execution and satisfaction of the judgment, which is the "life of the law."

Sec. 2. Time to intervene. - The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court. SPOUSES MAGAT vs. SPOUSES DELIZO Rule 19 Section 1 FACTS: Spouses Albert and Carmina Delizo filed a complaint for specific performance against Slim Realty and Construction Inc. (SLIM) and Simon Lim. The complaint alleged that SLIM, represented by E. Lim, sold a piece of property to respondent spouses. The complaint also alleged that private respondents had almost completed payment of the purchase price so that by 4 April 1993 the remaining balance was only P4,543.28, but Simon Lim declined to receive the amount until he delivered the title of the property to them. To the surprise and consternation of private respondents, they found out that the subject property had been mortgaged on 8 March 1993 to one Consolacion Coronel Maglalang. At the pre-trial on 7 April 1994 the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement which read The plaintiff shall pay the balance of P4,543.28 and the defendant shall deliver the title of the property subject matter of this case within 45 days from today, while the balance above-mentioned shall be paid within 10 days from today. In its order dated 7 April 1994, the lower court approved the Compromise Agreement and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on 10 August 1994. Thereafter, the property was sold to Sps. Delizo as the only bidders. Even as the judgment on compromise was already substantially executed, herein petitioners Crisostomo Magat and Editha A. Magat filed on 1 October 1997, a Motion to Intervene and Urgent Motion to Hold Writ of Possession in Civil Case No. Q-93-18214. Hence, it was error for the trial court to entertain the motion for intervention when it was filed after the case had not only been submitted for decision but was in fact partially executed. The intervention unduly delayed and disrupted the smooth operation of the trial and prejudiced the adjudication of the rights of the principal parties, especially so since the intervenors rights could be fully protected in a separate proceeding. More so, the motion for intervention should have been denied it appearing clearly and succinctly that a Compromise Agreement had already been entered into by spouses Delizo and SLIM. It is axiomatic that a compromise agreement once approved by the court has the force of res judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of consent or forgery. Being in effect the contract between the parties, a compromise agreement cannot be set aside by the trial court if the parties acted in good faith. In fact, it is immediately executory and not appealable. Such being the case, it was the ministerial duty of the public respondent to enforce the order or judgment upon compromise; any grievance by the intervenor spouses Magat should have been ventilated in a separate proceeding.

ISSUE: w/n Spouses Magat can still be allowed to file a motion to intervene?

HELD: No. We agree with the appellate court that the filing of the motion for intervention after the judgment of compromise was final and executory and in fact substantially executed was improper. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:

In the instant case, petitioners refused to answer the whole set of written interrogatories, not just a particular question. Clearly then, respondent bank should have filed a motion based on Section 5 and not Section 3(c) of Rule 29. Section 5 of Rule 29 reads: SPS. ZEPEDA vs. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION Rule 29 Section 3, 5 SEC. 5. Failure of party to attend or serve answers. If a party or an officer or managing agent of a party willfully fails to appear before the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or fails to serve answers to interrogatories submitted under Rule 25 after proper service of such interrogatories, the court on motion and notice, may strike out all or any part of any pleading of that party, or dismiss the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or enter a judgment by default against that party, and in its discretion, order him to pay reasonable expenses incurred by the other, including attorneys fees. Due to respondent banks filing of an erroneous motion, the trial court cannot be faulted for ruling that the motion to expunge was premature for lack of a prior application to compel compliance based on Section 3. The imposition of sanctions under Section 5 is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, in Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals,17 we held: The matter of how, and when, the above sanctions should be applied is one that primarily rests on the sound discretion of the court where the case pends, having always in mind the paramount and overriding interest of justice. For while the modes of discovery are intended to attain the resolution of litigations with great expediency, they are not contemplated, however, to be ultimate causes of injustice. It behooves trial courts to examine well the circumstances of each case and to make their considered determination thereafter.

FACTS: On February 18, 2003, spouses Zepeda filed a complaint for nullification of foreclosure proceedings and loan documents with damages against respondent Chinabank before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur,. They alleged that on June 28, 1995, they obtained a loan in the amount of P5,800,000.00 from respondent secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-23136. Petitioners subsequently encountered difficulties in paying their loan obligations hence they requested for restructuring which was allegedly granted by Chinabank. Hence, they were surprised when respondent bank extrajudicially foreclosed the subject property on October 9, 2001 where it emerged as the highest bidder. ISSUE: whether the complaint should be dismissed for failure of petitioners to answer respondents written interrogatories as provided for in Section 3(c), Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. HELD: YES. It should be noted that respondent bank filed a motion to expunge the complaint based on Section 3(c) of Rule 29 which states: SEC. 3. Other consequences. (c) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party; and As we have explained in Arellano v. Court of First Instance of Sorsogon,14 the consequences enumerated in Section 3(c) of Rule 29 would only apply where the party upon whom the written interrogatories is served, refuses to answer a particular question in the set of written interrogatories and despite an order compelling him to answer the particular question, still refuses to obey the order.