Professional Documents
Culture Documents
When laws become effective Tanada v. Tuvera Facts: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Lorenzo M. Tanada, Abraham F. Sarmiento and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (Mabini) seek a writ of mandamus to compel Juan C. Tuvera (in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President), Joaquin Venus (in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. de la Cruz (in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing), to publish, and or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders. Issue: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates Held: NO. Generally, publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2 of the New Civil Code, however, does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further, publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. The publication of laws has taken so vital significance when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. The publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. However, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an operative fact, which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Garcillano v. House of Representatives Facts: The Hello Garci tapes came out.They allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress. On June 8, 2005, House Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, setting in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by respondent House Committees. NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the House Committees seven alleged original tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually played in the chambers of the House. On August 3, 2005, the hearings were suspended indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons. Garcillano then filed a petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for a TRO (the first of the two petitions in this case), asking that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using these tape recordings. He also asked that they be stricken off the record of and that the House desist from further using the recordings. The House discussion and debates on the Garci case then stopped. Two years after, Sen. Lacson delivered a privilege speech reviving the issue. The speech was referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security.The following day, in plenary session, a lengthy debate ensued when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42001(An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire-Tapping) if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the Hello Garci tapes. However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.
An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of the Privacy of Communications and for Other Purposes.
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION vs. GMA NETWORK G.R. No. 164026 FACTS On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA), a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000. Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SECs Corporate and Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00. On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term. The following month, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term. The following year, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioners Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed. But GMA requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term. Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C.
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Exceptions to irretroactivity of laws LIAM LAW VS. OLYMPIC SAWMILL FACTS: Liam Law loaned 10k to Olympic Sawmill Corporation and Ellino Lee Chi. The loan became due but the debtors failed to pay and asked for an extension of 3 months instead. Law agreed but added an additional obligation of 6k to the principal amount. The debtors failed to pay again. Because of this, Law instituted a collection case against the debtors. The trial court ruled in favor of Law. ISSUE: WON the additional obligation of 6k constituted usurious interest??? RULING: NO. Usury has been legally non-existent. Interest can now be charged as lender and borrower may agree upon. The Rules of Court in regards to allegations of usury, procedural in nature, should be considered repealed with retroactive effect.
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9. Chato v. Fortune Tobacco RA 7654 was passed in June 10, 1993. Prior to its enactment, cigarette brands Champion, Hope and More were considered local brands subjected to a lower ad valorem tax rate. 2 days before RA 7654 took effect, Chato issued RMC 37-93 which reclassified the same cigarette brands resulting to the imposition of a higher ad valorem rate. In effect, the RMC subjected the cigarette brands to the RA even before it took effect. In a separate case (CIR v. CA), RMC 37-93 was held to be not valid for having fallen short of the requirements for a valid admin issuance. Fortune (the cigarette manufacturer) filed a complaint for damages against Chato in her private capacity. It contended that Chato violated Art. 32 of the CC by depriving it of its property without due process of the law and in violation of equal protection. To this, Chato argued that she issued the RMC in the performance of her official functions and within the scope of her authority so she cant be liable. She filed motion to dismiss. Via petition for certiorari, the denial of the motion to dismiss reached the SC. In its June 19, 2007 decision it ordered the trial court to proceed with the case. Chato moved for the reconsideration of that decision. Issue: w/n Chato can be held liable in her personal capacity for having issued the RMC NO Ruling: To determine whether a public officer is liable for improper or nonperformance of duty, it must be first determined what kind of duty is involved. There are 2 kinds of duties exercised by public officers. One is the duty owing to the public collectively and duty owing to particular individuals. The former pertains to officers who act for the public at large and are ordinarily paid out of the treasury. Ex. Governors duty to the public is to see to it that laws are properly executed, that competent officials are appointed by him, etc. Legislators owe a duty to the public to pass wise and proper laws. For this kind of duty, no one individual could single himself out and assert that the duties are owed to him alone. The second kind covers those who perform duties to an individual by reason of their employment by a particular person to do some act for him in an official capacity. They usually receive their compensation from that particular individual. Ex. A sheriff in serving civil process for a private suitor, a recorder of deeds in recording a deed or mortgage in favor of a private individual, a notary public in protesting a negotiable paper, etc. When what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual can have no cause of action for damages against the public officer. The exception to this is if the individual suffers a particular or special injury on account of the public officers improper or non-performance. The principle may now translate into the rule that an individual can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act
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12. Baksh vs. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115) Facts: Baksh, an Iranian citizen, courted respondent Gonzales. She accepted his love on the condition that they will get married, so he promised her that he will marry her. Gonzales parents made preparations by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors. Without getting married, Baksh and Gonzales lived together. Gonzales cherry got popped. Thereafter, Baksh began maltreating Gonzales and eventually told her that he no longer wanted to marry her and that he was already married to another woman. Gonzales filed a complaint for damages. Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may be awarded? Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter become the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Unjust Enrichment at the expense of others 13. GARCIA V PHILIPPINE AIRLINES FACTS: Petitioners Juanito Garcia and Alberto Dumago are employees of PAL who have been dismissed after being caught in the act of sniffing shabu in the toolroom.
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15. Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, Feb. 17 1997 Facts: Tabuena, Gen. Manager of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), was instructed by Pres. Marcos to pay directly to the presidents office and in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. (PNCC) in the amount of P55 million. The order was done both through phone and through a Presidential Memorandum, received through Gimenez, Marcos private secretary. With the help of the Asst. Gen. Manager, Dabao, and Acting Manager of the Financial Services Department, Peralta (they were the ones authorized to make withdrawals), Tabuena was able to release the amount of P55 million by means of 3 withdrawals. The money was delivered to the presidents office through Gimenez. Cases were filed against Tabuena and Peralta in the Sandiganbayan, charging them of malversation (Dabao was still at large). SB convicted them, saying that MIAA did not have any outstanding obligations to the PNCC. Tabuena and Peralta appealed to the SC, alleging the defense of good faith. Issue: Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta criminally liable? Held: NO. The withdrawals were ordered by Pres. Marcos himself, first through phone, and then through a Pres. Memorandum. Even though Tabuena and Peralta had both thought that the disbursements were out of the ordinary and not based on normal procedures, they both had no choice but to follow such order. Marcos was undeniably their superior, being President of the Phil. who exercised control over government agencies like the MIAA and PNCC. Marcos has a say in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and transactions, such as directing payment of liability of one entity to another and the manner in which it should be carried out. As a recipient of such kind of directive coming from the highest official of the land, good faith should be read on their compliance, without hesitation nor any question, with the Marcos Memorandum. They are entitled to the justifying circumstance of Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose. However, Tabuena though acting in good faith, should still be administratively or civilly liable. The disbursements were made out of the ordinary and not based on normal procedures. True, the deviation was inevitable under the circumstances that Tabuena was in. He did not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures considering the fact that the Memorandum called for his
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PIMENTEL V PIMENTEL FACTS Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner) before the RTC QC. Petitioner received summons to appear before the RTC Antipolo, for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC QC on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of the case filed in RTC Antipolo would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC QC. The RTC QC held that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question. Petitioner filed a MR. RTC QC denied the motion. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. CA dismissed the petition. Petitioner filed a petition for review before the SC. ISSUE W/N the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner? HELD The petition has no merit. Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question in Criminal Case for Parricide. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim.
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22. Republic v. Cagandahan Topic of SEX under Legal Capacity/ Doctrine: Change of Gender not a mere typographical or clerical error, hence subject to judicial order. Facts: In her petition, she alleged that she was born as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. Petitioner further alleges that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. (She has both male and female organs!) Court granted petition, to which the OSG countered, saying among others, that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondent's claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male, and that the local civil registrar should be impleaded as an indispensable party . Issue: whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from "Jennifer" to "Jeff," under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Held: Petition denied. Cagandahan wins.
5 Art. 407. Acts, events, and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register. Art. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)acknowledgements; (10) naturalization; (11) loss or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
2 No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority 3 Clerical Error Law 4 Section 4, Republic Act 9048.
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24. TY v. CA FACTS: Private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties. Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila. On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a civil case praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979. Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and, according to petitioner, are therefore
LILIA contested validity of the pre-trial order and asked the court for an opportunity to present evidence that: (1) 1st marriage was vitiated by force exercised upon both her and Maxion and (2) Maxion, at the time of their marriage, was already married to someone else. Hon. Sempio-Dy ruled against the presentation f evidence because the existence of force exerted on LILIA and Maxion had already been agreed upon. LILIA assailed Sempio-Dys Orders (compelling to submit the case for resolution based on agreed facts and denying motion to present evidence in her favor) through a Petition for Certiorari alleging GADALEJ.
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Joselano Guevarra vs. Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007 Facts: On March 4, 2002 a complaint of disbarment was filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala for grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyers oath. In the Complaint, Guevarra first met the respondent in January 2000 when his then fiance Irene Moje introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to Marianne Tantoco with whom he had three children. After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, Complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent Cellphone calls, as well as messages some which read I love you, I miss you, or Meet you at Megamall. He also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and Respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house. On April 22, 2001 complainant went uninvited to Irenes birthday celebration at which he saw her and the respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings. Complainant later found a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2007, the day of his wedding to Irene, Complainant soon saw respondents car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B11 Street, New Manila where as he was later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant. Issue: Whether Concubinage or Adulterous relationship, be the reason for the disbarment of Atty. Jose Emmanuel Eala. Held: Lawyers oath stated that a lawyer should support the Constitution and obey the laws, Meaning he shall not make use of deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct, grossly immoral conduct, or be convicted in any crime involving moral turpitude. In the case at bar Atty. Eala was accused of Concubinage, under ART. 334
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27 Aranes v Occiano Facts: Merceditas Aranes charged Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law in a letter complaint because said judge solemnized her marriage (Feb. 17, 2000) with Dominador Orobia outside of his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite marriage license. She and Orobia relying on the marriage lived together as husband and wife for many years but on his death she was deprived of inheriting from him because their marriage was a nullity. She was likewise deprived of receiving Orobias pension from the navy. In his comment, the Judge said that on Feb. 15, 2000, a Juan Arroyo asked him to solemnize the marriage between the parties on the assurance that all the necessary documents were complete.He agreed to conduct the wedding at Nabua because Orobia suffered from a stroke and couldnt travel to Balatan. On the day of the wedding, he noticed that no marriage license was presented and he informed the parties that their marriage will be a nullity and had wanted to move the date of the wedding but out of human compassion decided to continue because the visitors were already coming in, the delivery of provisions for the reception, the possibility of further aggravating Orobias condition (nastroke) and the parties assured him that they will give him the license the afternoon of the same day. No license was ever delivered. Aranes later desisted upon realization that it was her fault BUT the Office of the Court Administrator still found the judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside his territorial jurisdiction and was fined 5K. ISSUE: Whether the decision is correct? HELD: Tama! Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court. Judge Occiano only had jurisdiction to solemnize marriages in Balatan and not Nabua and he should be held administratively liable for violating the law on marriage. He should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license because thats considered a gross ignorance of the law. The fact of desistance of Aranes doesnt exculpate him from liability. Disciplinary actions like this arent private matters, the Court has the power to discipline judges.
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REINEL ANTHONY B. DE CASTRO, Petitioner, vs. ANNABELLE ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, Respondent. Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony, petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and wife. Respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court. In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the latter has failed on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna Tricia as his child. Petitioner denied that he is married to respondent, claiming that their marriage is void ab initio since the marriage was facilitated by a fake affidavit; and that he was merely prevailed upon by respondent to sign the marriage contract to save her from embarrassment and possible administrative prosecution due to her pregnant state; and that he was not able to get parental advice from his parents before he got
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BORJA-MANZANO V. SANCHEZ Herminia Borja-Mariano was married to the late David Manzano on May 21, 1966. They had four children. However, on March 22, 1993, David contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before Infanta, Pangasinan MTC Judge Roque Sanchez. During that time, Payao was also married to Domingo Relos. Payao and David issued an affidavit stating that they were both married however due to incessant quarrels, they both left their families and they no longer communicated with them. They have lived together as husband and wife for 7 years. Judge agreed to solemnize the marriage. Herminia filed charges of gross ignorance of the law against Sanchez. ISSUE: Whether or not David Manzanos marriage with Payao is valid? RULING: For Article 34 of the Family Code (legal ratification of marital cohabitation) to apply, the following requisites must concur: 1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage; 2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other; 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;
The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to marry each other]; and 5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage. Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits executed on March 22, 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself. David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both were separated. Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage null and void. In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him. The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to
4.
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Anonuevo vs Intestate Estate of Rodolfo Jalandoni Facts: Rodolfo Jaladoni died intestate. Bernadino Jalandoni (Rodolfos brother) filed a petitioner for issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners and their siblings filed a manifestation that they were the children of Sylvia who in turn was the child of Isabel Blee with one John Desantis. Note however that Isabel Blee was allegedly legally married to Rodolfo Jalandoni at the time of the latters death (hence, petitioners are supposedly Rodolfos grandchildren). Petitioners presented 2 marriage certificates between Isabel and Rodolfo and Sylvias birth certificate. Petitioners assert that these pieces of evidence are enough to establish that Isabel was the spouse of Rodolfo and as such, they are the lawful representatives. However, Bernardino begged to differ. Notably, the birth certificate of Sylvia stated that she was the legitimate child of Isabel and John Desantis which would negate the claim that Isabel was legally married to Rodolfo. The intestate court allowed the petitioners to intervene because it was convinced that the evidence adequately established Isabels status as Rodolfos wife. CA reversed this ruling of the trial court. Issue: whether the evidence was sufficient to establish Isabels marriage to Rodolfo? NO! Held: While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a persons birth certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage of ones parents. Here, the birth certificate of Sylvia serves as the competent evidence to prove Isabels marriage to John Desantis and not Rodolfo. The entry of being a legitimate child of Sylvia and John in the birth certificate is accorded prima facie weight and will be presumed to be true unless rebutted. Petitioners did not rebut this. They merely tried to explain that these were untruthful statements. This birth certificate shows that Isabel was previously married to John Desantis. Consequently, absent any proof that that such marriage was dissolved leads to the inescapable conclusion that Isabels marriage to Rodolfo was void ab initio. Note: important consideration in this case is the fact that the marriage certificate showed the marriage between Isabel and Rodolfo to have taken place in 1953while Sylvia was born in 1946. Thus, it would really appear that Isabel was originally married to John Desantis. No evidence was shown to prove that such marriage was terminated before the marriage to Rodolfo in 1953. Foreign Divorce
REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married. Later on, Jose filed a complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham. There was no marriage ceremony; his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud; the affidavit of marital cohabitation was false. However, the petition was dismissed. The CA likewise affirmed. But then it changed its mind and ruled in favor of Jose. ISSUE: WON the falsity of the affidavit of marital cohabitation rendered the marriage void ab initio??? RULING: YES. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage. It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted Felisa's testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisa's own testimony that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house. Non-Essential Requirements: Marriage Certificate
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Garcia vs Recio Recio, a Filipino, married Samson, an Australian, here in the Philippines. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. A few years later, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. After a few years, Recio became an Australian citizen. He married a Garcia in Cabanatuan. However, they separated without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. Garcia filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy. She contends that Recios marriage with Samson was still subsisting when they got married. Garcia: based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the FC, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationis). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed. Issue: SC: case REMANDED in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, so that respondent can present evidence that he had the legal capacity to marry petitioner - Before a foreign judgment is given preseumptive evidentiary value, the document must be 1st presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. In this case, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the pertinent rules on evidence must be demonstrated6. But since Garcias counsel did not object to its admissibility, then the LC was correct in admitting the evidence of the divorce decree issued by the Australian court. Burden of Proving Australian Law: The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. The legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the
6 Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven
as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
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38. Amor-Catalan v. CA Felicitas Amor-Catalan married Orlando Catalan on June 1950 in Pangasinan. They migrated to the US and became naturalized American citizens. They divorced in 1988. 2 months after the divorce, Orlando married Merope in Pangasinan. Felicitas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage against Merope, contending that she had a subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol. She also wanted damages, claiming that the marriage brought her embarrassment. RTC ruled for Felicitas. It declared the Orlando-Merope marriage null and void for being bigamous and awarded damaged to Felicitas. CA reversed. Issue: Does Felicitas have standing to question the nullity of the Orlando-Merope marriage? Ruling: This issue may not be resolved without first determining whether Felicitas and Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually been divorced. Other than allegations in the complaint, records are bereft of evidence to prove their naturalization. Felicitas merely alleged in her complaint that they had acquired American citizenship and Orlando also only alleged their divorce. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Also, the kind of divorce obtained is important, since there is an absolute divorce (vincula matrimonii) which severs the marital ties, and a limited divorce (mensa et thoro), which leaves the bond in full force. Under the NCC which is the law in force at the time Orlando and Merope were married, and even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage. Only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest and must be based on a cause of action. Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
39. BAYOT V. COURT OF APPEALS Foreign Divorce FACTS: Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in the Philippines. The marriage certificate stated that Rebecca was an American citizen. Later on, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings against her husband in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Court issued a decree ordering the dissolution of their marriage and joint custody and guardianship over their child. Over a year later, the court issued another decree settling the couples property relations. Less than a month from the issuance of said decrees, Rebecca filed with the Makati RTC a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. She later on withdrew said petition and filed another for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicentes psychological incapacity. She also sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix (child). Vicente filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred the prior judgment of divorce. Rebecca insists on her Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ and that therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of. RTC denied the motion to dismiss and granted Rebeccas application for support pendente lite. ISSUE Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects? YES, REBECCA WAS AN AMERICAN CITIZEN AT THE TIME DIVORCE WAS RENDERED. SAID JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE WAS VALID. HELD There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. At the time of the divorce, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship.
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Remo v. Secretary of Foreign Affairs Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose Philippine passport was expiring. Her passport stated her name as Maria Virginia Remo Rallonza (her given name, middle name, and husbands last name). Remo, whose marriage still subsists, applied for the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) with a request to revert to her maiden name and surname in the replacement passport. This was denied by the DFA on the ground that the use of ones maiden name is allowed in passport applications only if the married name has not been used in previous application. The Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996 (RA 8239) clearly define the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage, divorce and death of the husband. Remo contends that Art. 370 of the Civil Code states that the use of a husbands surname is permissive and thus she should be able to use her maiden name in her passport. The Office of the President, then the CA, however did not agree with her. Issue: Can Remo revert to the use of her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence of her marriage? Decision: No. In its decision, the SC stated that a woman is not prevented from using their maiden name in their passport. In fact, one may opt to use her maiden name in initially obtaining a passport. However, once a married woman opts to adopt her husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of her maiden name, except in the cases enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239. These instances are: (1) death of husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage. In this case, Remos marriage to her husband subsists and she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married woman's reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only on the severance of the marriage. In justifying such strict requirements, the SC said that the issuance of passports is impressed with public interest. A passport is an official document of identity and nationality issued to a person intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued by the Philippine government to its citizens requesting other governments to allow its holder to pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give him/her aid and protection
41. Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas (GR No. 186571, August 11, 2010)
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Held: No! Given the rationale and intent of the provision to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse only the Filipino spouse can invoke the 2nd paragraph of Article 26. The said provision bestows no rights in favor of aliens. However, the unavailability of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 does not necessarily strip Corpuz of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to the rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Corpuz, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. In other words, although an alien spouse cannot avail of the 2nd paragraph of Article 26, he/she can still avail of Section 48, Rule 39. Void and Voidable Marriages 42. CARLOS v SANDOVAL FACTS: The spouses Felix Carlos and Felipa Elemia died intestate leaving 6 parcels of land. In order to avoid to inheritance taxes, Felix, during his lifetime, transferred to his son, Teofilo, lots 1, 2 and 3 with the condition that Teofilo will transfer petitioner Carlos (another son of Felix) share. Parcel 4 was registered in the name of Carlos. Teofilo died intestate. Parcel 5 and 6 was registered in the name of the heirs of Teofilo including herein respondents Felicidad Sandoval who was his surviving spouse and son Teofilo Carlos II. Petitioner sues claiming that the marriage between Teofilo and Felicidad was null and void for lack of marriage license. Furthermore, petitioner contends that Teofilo Carlos II was neither an adoptive or natural son of Teofilo Carlos. Respondent submitted an affidavit of the justice of peace who solemnized marriage and the certificate of live birth of Teofilo Carlos II wherein it was stated that
2.
43. Ablaza v Republic Can a person bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code? Facts: The petitioner alleged that the marriage between his brother Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated is void because there was no a marriage license at the time the marriage was celebrated (the license was given a week later). The marriage was in 1949. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest. He also
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DINO V. DINO Difference of Void and Voidable: Necessity of Court Declaration 46. Weigel vs. Sempio-Diy Lilia Olivia Wiegel got married to Karl Heinz Wiegel on July 1978 at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church in Makati. Karl, upon learning that Lilia had a subsisting marriage, filed for a declaration of nullity of their marriage. Lilia contracted her first marriage with Eduardo Maxion on June 25, 1972. She claims that the first marriage is not valid because they were forced to enter the union and Maxion was married to someone else at that time. ISSUE: WON Lilias first marriage is void? HELD: No. Its voidable. Petition dismissed. RATIO: There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first marriage was vitiated by force committed against both parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married
44. Bolos v. Bolos, Oct. 20, 2010 Facts: Danilo and Cynthia Bolos were married on Feb. 14, 1980. On July 2003, Cynthia filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Art. 36 of the FC (psychological incapacity). RTC granted the petition. Danilo filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied due course to the appeal for Danilos failure to file the required motion for reconsideration or new trial, in violation of Sec. 20 of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (The RULE) (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC). Danilo then filed for certiorari (Rule 65) in the
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Lolita D. Enrico v. Heirs of Eulogio B. Medinaceli - September 28, 2007 Facts: Petitioner, Lolita D. Enrico, is the second wife of Eulogio Medinacili. They were married on August 24, 2004. This marriage was celebrated 4 months after Eulogios first wife died on May 2004. On February, 2005, or six months after his second marriage, Eulogio died. The respondents are Eulogios heirs and seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage of Petitioner Lolita and Eulogio on the ground that the marriage was celebrated without a valid marriage license. And that 5-year cohabitation exception could not apply since Eulogio was a bachelor for only 4 months. Petitioner answered the complaint and alleged that they have been living as husband and wife for 21 years as in fact they had 2 children. Further, petitioner contended that it is only the contracting parties while living can file an action for declaration of nullity of their marriage. RTC dismissed the complaint but on reconsideration reinstated the case. Petitioner Enrico directly filed for Rule 65 in the SC. Issue: Do the heirs have standing to file the action for the declaration of nullity? NO. Ruling: SC grants the petition and dismisses the petition for declaration of nullity filed by the heirs. First, Void marriages solemnized under the Family Code are governed by the A.M. 02-11-10 of the SC, that is, marriages entered into on and after August 3, 1988. The A.M. of the SC provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. It is clear. Thus, the heirs have no standing. Case Dismissed! Second, as to the Ninal v. Badayog ruling that allows heirs to file a petition for declaration of nullity, this applies only to those marriages under the Civil Code. What is the remedy now of the heirs? Remember that a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, hence since they only seek to protect their property rights they can always impugn the legitimacy of the marriage of petitioner and their father in the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their deceased faither. Void Marriages: Grounds Lack of essential/formal requirements REPUBLIC V CA
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Noel Baccay v. Maribel Baccay Topic under Psychological Incapacity/ Doctrine: Unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage per se, must clearly establish true incapability to perform basic marital covenants. Facts: Noel and Maribel were college sweethearts. Then, sometime in November 1998, Maribel informed Noel that she was pregnant with his child. They immediately wed days after before RTC QC. After the marriage ceremony, both agreed to live with Noel's family in their house. During all the time she lived with Noel's family, Maribel remained aloof and did not go out of her way to endear herself to them. She would just come and go from the house as she pleased, She never contributed to the family's coffer leaving Noel to shoulder all expenses for their support, she refused to have any sexual contact with Noel. Surprisingly, despite Maribel's claim of being pregnant, Noel never observed any symptoms of pregnancy in her! Trouble ensued and so Noel filed for declaration of nullity of the marriage, to which the Court granted, stating that Maribel failed to perform the essential marital obligations of marriage, and such failure was due to a personality disorder called Narcissistic Personality Disorder characterized by juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability as determined by a clinical psychologist. CA reversed, hence this petition. Issue: Marriage null and void under Article 36? Psychological incapacity? (in short, will the personality disorder and no sexy-time merit the nullity of marriage?) Held: Petition denied! Totality of evidence by Noel fails to prove P.I. Ratio: First, Santos v. Court of Appeals that the phrase "psychological incapacity" is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. The intendment of the law Enrique Agraviador v. Erlinda Amparo-Agraviador G.R. No. 170729, December 8, 2010 Facts: PETITIONER (Enrique) met RESPONDENT (Erlinda) in 1971 at a beerhouse where RESPONDENT worked. PETITIONER, at that time, was a 24-year old security guard of the Bureau of Customs, while RESPONDENT was a 17-year old waitress. PETITIONER and RESPONDENT eventually became sweethearts. They soon entered into a common-law relationship. In 1973, PETITIONER and RESPONDENT married in a ceremony officiated by Reverend Reyes at a church in Tondo. PETITIONERs family was apprehensive because of the nature of RESPONDENTs work and because she comes from a broken family. Out of their union, they begot four children: Erisque, Emmanuel, Evelyn, and Eymarey. In 2001, PETITIONER filed with RTC a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. PETITIONER alleged that RESPONDENT was psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as she was carefree and irresponsible, and refused to do household chores like cleaning and cooking; stayed away from their house for long periods of time; had an affair with a lesbian; didnt take care of their sick child; consulted a witch doctor in order to bring him bad fate; and refused to use the family name Agraviador in her activities.
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CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO) b. Molina Doctrine (Republic v. Court of Appeals): Guidelines in PETITIONER further claimed RESPONDENT refused to have sex with
him since 1993 because she became very close to a male tenant in their house (Enrique also discovered their love notes to each other, and caught them inside his room several times). RESPONDENT moved to dismiss petition on the ground that the root cause of her psychological incapacity was not medically identified. RTC denied motion. In her answer, RESPONDENT denied engaging in extramarital affairs and maintained that PETITIONER refused to have sex with her. PETITIONER allegedly wanted to have their marriage annulled because he wanted to marry their former household helper, Gilda Camarin. Lastly, PETITIONER maintained she took care of her sick son (who eventually died). RTC ordered city prosecutor and Solgen to investigate if collusion existed between the parties. Aside from his testimony, PETITIONER presented Certificate of True Copy of their Marriage Contract and the psychiatric evaluation report of Dr. Juan Cirilo L. Patac. Dr. Patac: (1) PETITIONER psychologically capable to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage; (2) RESPONDENT failed to fulfill the essential obligations of marriage, manifesting inflexible maladaptive behavior even at the time before their marriage; and (3) RESPONDENT suffers from a Personality Disorder.
Issue: Whether there is basis to nullify the petitioners marriage to the respondent on the ground of psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations? Held: No. Petition denied. 1. TOTALITY OF EVIDENCE presented failed to establish RESPONDENTs psychological incapacity. Psychological incapacity under Art. 36 is not vitiation of consent; it does not affect the consent to the marriage. Summary of Jurisprudential Guidelines:
interpreting Art. 36 of the Family Code: i. Burden of Proof belongs to the Plaintiff. Doubt should be resolved in favor of existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. ii. Root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified; (b) alleged in the complaint; (c) sufficiently proven by the experts; and (d) clearly explained in the decision. iii. Incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage (exchanged I dos). iv. Incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Incurability may be absolute or relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolute against everyone of the same sex. v. Illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of the marriage; it should not be merely a refusal, neglect, difficulty, or ill will. Ergo, the natal/supervening disability effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to the marriage. vi. Essential marital obligations = Arts. 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife & Arts. 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code w/ respect to the children vii. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines, while not controlling, should be given great respect by the courts. viii. The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the SolGen to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the SolGen issues a certification stating his reasons for agreeing or opposing the petition. SolGen shall discharge the equivalent function of defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
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CIVREV DIGESTS MIDTERMS (DEAN DEL CASTILLO) In his Report, Dr. Patac attempted to establish the juridical e. Ting v. Velez-Ting & Suazo v. Suazo: clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina, it simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements. Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity of marriages based on PI. 3. Summary of Evidence a. Petitioners testimony: Petitioners theory that the respondents psychological incapacity is premised on her refusal or unwillingness to perform certain marital obligations, and a number of unpleasant personality traits such as immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be distinguished from the difficulty, if not outright refusal or neglect, in the performance of some marital obligations that characterize some marriages. Petitioners testimony failed to establish that the respondents condition is a manifestation of a disordered personality rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition that makes her completely unable to discharge the essential marital obligations. If at all, the petitioner merely showed that the respondent had some personality defects that showed their manifestation during the marriage; his testimony sorely lacked details necessary to establish that the respondents defects existed at the inception of the marriage. In addition, the petitioner failed to discuss the gravity of the respondents condition; neither did he mention that the respondents malady was incurable, or if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the respondents means to undertake. The petitioners declarations that the respondent does not accept her fault, does not want to change, and refused to reform are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, grave, or incurable as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. b. Psychiatric Evaluation Report: fell short in proving that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital duties. Dr. Patac did not personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact, recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to undergo the same examination [that the petitioner] underwent. We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory. If a psychological disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and given credit. No such independent evidence appears on record, however, to have been gathered in this case.
antecedence of the respondents condition by stating that the respondent manifested inflexible maladaptive behavior before marriage, pointing out how the respondent behaved before the marriage the respondent defied her parents and lived alone; rented a room for herself; and allowed the petitioner to sleep with her. These perceived behavioral flaws, to our mind, are insufficient to establish that the incapacity was rooted in the history of the respondent antedating the marriage. This is an area where independent evidence, such as information from a person intimately related to the respondent, could prove useful. In the absence of such evidence, it is not surprising why the Psychiatric Report Evaluation failed to explain how and why the respondents so-called inflexible maladaptive behavior was already present at the time of the marriage. Dr. Patacs Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to prove the gravity or seriousness of the respondents condition. He simply made an enumeration of the respondents purported behavioral defects (as related to him by third persons), and on this basis characterized the respondent to be suffering from mixed personality disorder. At best, the personality flaws mentioned in the Report, even if true, could only amount to insensitivity, sexual infidelity, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, which do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The Psychiatric Evaluation Report likewise failed to adequately explain how Dr. Patac came to the conclusion that the respondents personality disorder had no definite treatment. It did not discuss the concept of mixed personality disorder and failed to show how and to what extent the respondent exhibited this disorder in order to create a necessary inference that the respondents condition had no definite treatment or is incurable. A glaring deficiency, to our mind, is the Psychiatric Evaluation Reports failure to support its findings and conclusions with any factual basis. The standards used in Court to assess the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but these are proper, in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
OCHOSA v. ALANO G.R. NO. 167459, JANUARY 26, 2011 Soldier love story FACTS: It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-old first year college dropout. They had a whirlwind romance that culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27 October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
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Cojuango v. Palma FACTS: Eduardo Cojuangco filed with the court the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Leo Palma alleging as grounds deceit, malpractice, gross misconduct in office, violation of his oath as a lawyer and grossly immoral conduct. Cojuangco and Palma met sometime in the 70s . Cojjuangco was a client of ACCRA and Palma was the lawyer assigned to handle his cases. Consequently, Palmas relationship with Cojuangcos family became intimate. He traveled and dined with them abroad. He frequented their house and even tutored Cojuangcos 22-year old daughter, Maria Luisa, then a student of Assumption Convent. Without the knowledge of Cojuangco, Palma married Lisa in H.K. It was only the next day that Conjuangco was informed and Palma assured him that everything is legal. Cojuangco was shocked, knowing fully well that Palma is a married man and has 3 children. ISSUE: Whether or not Palma should be held liable. HELD: YES. Palma married LIsa while he has a subsisting marriage with Elizabeth Hermosisima. Undoubtedly, Palmas act constitute grossly immoral conduct, a ground for disbarment. He made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity. His act of contracting a second marriage is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. The circumstances here speak of a clear case of betrayal of trust and abuse of confidence. Moreover, he availed of Cojuangcos resources by securing a plane ticket from Cojuangcos office in order to marry his daughter in H.K. without his consent. Palmas culpability is aggravated by the fact that Lisa was 22 and was under psychological treatment for emotional immaturity. Palma is disbarred from the practice of law.
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Antone v. Beronilla Facts: Antone executed a complaint for bigamy against Beronilla, alleging that her marriage with respondent had not yet been legally dissolved when the latter contracted a second marriage with Maguillo. Beronilla moved to quash the information because his marriage with Antone was declared null and void by the RTC. Absent a first marriage, he cannot be charged with bigamy. The court quashed the information. MR denied. CA dismissed the case as well. Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it sustained the motion to quash on the basis of a fact contrary to those alleged in the information Held: Yes A motion to quash an information is a mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or information against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the information.
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ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA 424 SCRA 725 FACTS Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959 and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children. Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement where the petitioner got among others a nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated. Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default. The Supreme Court reiterates: The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.
YU VS. YU FACTS: Eric Jonathan Yu filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA, alleging that his estranged wife, Caroline Tanchay-Yu, unlawfully withheld from him the custody of their minor child, Bianca Yu. The petition included a prayer for the award to him of the custody of Bianca.
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Antionio Macadangdang vs. CA, Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang Effect of death of one of the parties Antonio and Filomena got married in 1946 after living together for 2 years. Their business grew from a humble buy-and-sell business and sari-sari store operation into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill businesses, abaca stripping, real estate, and others. They have 6 children. While their financial stabilized, their marriage became shaky up to 1965 when they split up and the wife, Filomena, left for Cebu. When she returned to Davao in 1971, she learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband and she decided to file a complaint for legal separation. The judgment was rendered ordering the legal separation of the spouses. Since there is no complete list of the community property which has to be divided, pending the
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67. Sabalones v. CA Petitioner Samson Sabalones was a member of our diplomatic service assigned to different countries during his successive tours of duties. He left to his wife, herein respondent Remedios, the administration of some of their conjugal properties for 15 years. When Samson retired as an ambassador, he came back to the Philippines but not to his wife and kids. 4 years later, he sought judicial authorization to sell a lot and building in Greenhills. It belonged to the conjugal partnership, but he claimed that he
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68. SIOCHI V. GOZON Effects of Legal Separation Pendente Lite/After Finality Facts: This case involves a 30,000 SQ.M. parcel of land (property)registered in the name of the Spouses Gozon. Elvira filed with Cavite RTC a petition for legal separation against her husband Alfredo. Elvira filed a notice of lis pendens, while the legal separation case was still pending. Meanwhile, Alfredo and Mario Siochi (Mario) entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell involving the property for the price of P18 million. They stipulated that Alfredo was to remove the notice of lis pendens on the title, to have the land excluded from the legal separation case and to secure an affidavit from the wife Elvira that the property was the exclusive property of Alfredo. However, despite repeated demands from Mario, Alfredo failed to comply with these stipulations. After paying the P5 million earnest money as partial payment of the purchase price, Mario took possession of the property in September 1993. Meanwhile, the courts declared the Gozon spouses legally separated. As regards the property, the RTC declared it conjugal. Alfredo also executed a deed of donation over the said property in favour of their daughter Winifred without annotating the notice of lis pendens. Alfredo, by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney executed in
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Held: No! The order of the lower court violated Section 26 of CA186 (GSIS Charter) which prohibits the attachment, garnishment or freezing of any benefit granted by the Act. The order was in effect, a freeze order. The directive to deliver of the retirement benefits to Norma makes the default judgment doubly illegal because retirement benefits have been adjudged as gratuities or reward for lengthy and faithful service of the recipient and should be treated as separate property of the retiree-spouse. Thus, if the monetary benefits are given gratis by the government because of previous work (like the retirement pay of a provincial auditor in Mendoza vs. Dizon, L-387, October 25, 1956) or that of a Justice of the Peace (Elcar vs. Eclar, CA-40 O.G. 12th Supp. No. 18, p. 86), this is a gratuity and should be considered separate property (Art. 148, Civil Code). NB. See the comment in page 144 of the reviewer, differentiating contributory and non-contributory retirement plans. The latter forms part of the separate property while the former, which is given by most private companies where EEs contribute to their own retirement plans, should form part of the conjugal partnership. Charges upon the Obligations of Absolute Community/Conjugal Partnership 71. WONG V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT FACTS: Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda were married. During their marriage Romarico bought a parcel of land from his father using money borrowed from an officemate. Most of the time, the spouses were living separately; Romarico stayed in Angeles while Katrina was in Manila. One time, while Katrina was in Hong Kong, pieces of jewelry were consigned to her by Anita Chan. Katrina issued a check for 55,000 as payment for the jewelry but was dishonored for insufficiency of funds. Thereafter, Anitan Chan, assisted by her husband Ricky Wong , filed a complaint for estafa. However the lower court dismissed the complaint on the theory that estafa cannot be committed when the issuance of the check was for the payment of a preexisting obligation. Hence, the liability was only civil. Thus, petitioners filed a civil case for collection of a sum of money. The lower court ruled in favor of petitioner and ordered that the property of the spouses Romarico and Katrina be levied upon. Take note that during the hearing only Katrina was represented by counsel. Romarico assails the levy of the parcel of lands belonging to him saying that (1) he was deprived of his day in court and (2) he had nothing to do with the transaction. Lower court sustained this contention.
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2.
72. Ayala Investments v CA Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, what debts and obligations contracted by the husband alone are considered for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are chargeable against the conjugal partnership? Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the said provision? Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a P50.3M loan from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation. As added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching, Executive Vice President of PBM, executed security agreements making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. PBM failed to pay the loan, Ayala sued, and the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the principal amount with interests. Spouses filed a case of injunction against petitioners with the court to enjoin the auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against the conjugal partnership levied on the ground that, among others, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership.
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73. Ching v. CA, Feb. 23, 2004 Facts: The Phil. Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan of P9M from the Allied Banking Corp. (ABC). By virtue of the loan, PBMCI executed a promissory note through Alfredo Ching (Alfredo), its EVP. As added security, Alfredo, together with 2 others, executed a continuing guaranty with the ABC binding them to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of all PBMCIs obligations owing to ABC to the extent of P38M. After a year, PBMCI contracted another loan with ABC for P13M. Thereafter, PBMCI defaulted in the payment of its loans. ABC filed a complaint for sum of money with prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against PBMCI to collect the amounts due to it, impleading as co-defendants Alfredo and the
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Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals 266 SCRA 627 January 27, 1997 Munoz v. Ramirez, G.R. 156125, August 23, 2010. Facts: This case involves a dispute of ownership over a parcel of land between Munoz and the spouses Erlinda Ramirez and Eliseo Carlos. 1989: Eliseo Carlos obtained a P136,500 housing loan and constructed a 2 story residential house over the subject parcel of land. This was secured by a real estate mortgage over the land. 1993: The land was purportedly sold to Munoz via deed of absolute sale for the total consideration of P602,000. Munoz claims that under the said sale, the spouses were given a chance to repurchase the lot within 1 year but they failed to do so. The spouses allege that the deed of sale is void for being falsified because what they entered into was a mortgage contract and not a deed of sale. They claim that they asked Munoz for a loan of P602,000 pesos. Munoz agreed but gave them P200,000 only and promised to give the P402,000 after they cancel the GSIS mortgage. The spouses cancelled the GSIS mortgage and turned the TCT over to Munoz but he refused to give the balance. He also had the TCT of the spouses cancelled and a new one issued for himself depriving the spouses of their property. The spouses claim that the results of an NBI examination show that the signatures of Eliseo on the purported deed of sale are all forgeries. Munoz claims that even though these signatures are forged, they would be immaterial because the property was the parphernal property of Erlinda and therefore, the consent of Eliseo, manifested by his signature, was immaterial. The CA applied art. 158 of the CIVIL CODE, and ruled that since improvements were made over the parcel of land using conjugal funds, the parcel of land was converted from paraphernal to conjugal therefore the consent of Eliseo was needed in order to validate the sale. Issue: W/N the parcel of land is conjugal? W/N the sale with right to repurchase is an equitable mortgage? 1. The land is paraphernal. The CA erred in applying the Civil Code because what properly applies in this case is art. 120 of the FAMILY CODE that states that if the improvements made with conjugal funds have a higher value than the paraphernal property, the paraphernal property will become part of the conjugal partnership subject to reimbursement in favor of the spouse who lost property. In this case, the house had a value less than the lot. Because of this, the property remained parphernal. The signatures of Eliseo are therefore immaterial. 2. It was an equitable mortgage. Ownership, Administration and Disposition of ACP/CPG: Presumption of Ownership/Effect of Registration in name of one of the spouses Facts: A lot was owned by Santiago Garcia, who has 9 children and a wife named Consuelo Garcia. Santiago already died when this controversy arose. Petitioners, the spouses Estonina, filed a case against Consuelo Garcia and was able to obtain an attachment over the land. While the case was pending, the 9 children sold their 1/10 share in the lot to Spouses Atayan, who are the respondents here. Estonina were able to obtain a favorable judgment against Consuelo Garcia. The land was sold at public auction and a TCT was issued in the name of Estonina. Atayan however filed a complaint for annulment of the sheriff sale and the TCT claiming that they own 9/10 of the land. The RTC said that the land was presumed to be conjugal hence Consuelo Garcia owned 50% of the land plus 5% as her share in the intestate estate of her husband Santiago Garcia. RTC ordered the amendment of the TCT to show that Estonina owns 55% while Atayan owns 45%. Both parties appealed. The CA modified the judgment. The CA held that lot was the exclusive property of Santiago Garcia and not conjugal. It held that Estonina only owns 1/10 or 10% and Atayan owns 9/10 or 90%. Issue: Is the property exclusive or conjugal? Exclusive share of the deceased Santiago Whats the real share of Estonina and Atayan? 10% and 90%, respectively. Ruling: SC affirms CA in toto. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. Here, Estonino failed to present any proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Estonino merely relies on the certificate of title which was issued during the marriage. The TCT does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property. Acquisition of property and registration of title are two different acts. Registration does not confer title but merely confirms one already existing. Thus, the property is the exclusive property of the deceased Santiago and when he died leaving 10 compulsory heirs, each one got 10% of the lot. Hence, what the Estonino spouses purchased in the public auction was merely the rights of Consuelo Garcia consisting of 10% of the lot.
CRUZ V LEIS
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Anno v. Anno G.R. No. 163743 (480 SCRA 419) Facts: Petitioner Dolores Pintiano-Anno (Dolores) and respondent Albert Anno (Albert) were married in 1963. Dolores claims that during their marriage, they acquired a 4-hectare agricultural land in La Trinidad, Benguet. In 1974, the land was declared for tax purposes solely in the name of her husband, respondent Albert. Dolores further claims that without her knowledge, Albert executed two documents of transfer covering the subject land: 1) Affidavit of Waiver where Albert waived and quitclaimed in favor of Dolores first cousin, respondent Patenio Suanding, his rights over a portion of the land; 2) Deed of sale where Albert conveyed to Suanding the remainder of the land more than a year later. In both documents, Albert declared that he is the lawful owner and possessor of the land. Thus, the documents of transfer did not bear the signature and written consent of Dolores as the wife of the vendor. The land was transferred by Suanding to third persons, Myrna Nazarro and Silardo Bested. Dolores filed a case against Albert and Suanding for Cancellation of the Waiver of Rights, Deed of Sale and Transfer Tax Declarations, and Damages. She alleged the land belongs to their conjugal partnership and thus could not have been validly conveyed by Albert to Suanding without her written consent as spouse. Suanding testified that Albert represented to him that the land was his exclusive property as the land was part of his inheritance and he had been in possession thereof prior to his marriage to petitioner. MTC ruled in favor of Dolores. RTC reversed the MTC. CA affirmed the RTC. Issue: whether the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without the consent of the other. Held and Ratio: Land belongs to Albert not to the conjugal partnership of gains of the spouses. All property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal in nature. However, for this presumption to apply, the party who invokes it must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua non to the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. However, a careful examination of the records shows that Dolores evidence (their marriage contract and the initial 1974 tax declaration over the property) failed to prove that the subject land belongs to their conjugal partnership.
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Uy v. CA Topic under Joint Administration; Sole/Transfer of Administration Doctrine: Incapacitated spouse warrants Judicial Guardianship under Rules of Court, not under the Family Code. Facts: Ernesto Jardeleza suffered stroke, so his son Teodoro filed a petition for guardianship of his father. Son averred that there was a need for a court-appointed guardian to save his fathers properties and assets, and further added that in the meantime, no properties shall be alienated or mortgaged to third persons. Ernestos wife then filed petition declaring Ernestos incapacity and assumption of powers as sole administrator of conjugal properties, and prayed to Court that she be granted permission to dispose of a land for the medical expenses of her husband. Court granted. Teodoro opposed, saying that such assumption as sole admin is in effect a petition for guardianship over person and properties of Ernesto, and should be covered by Special Proceedings under the ROC. Also, Ernesto already acquired vested rights as a conjugal partner and thus cannot be impaired without consent. He also averred that the CPG has sufficient assets to cover the medical expenses! Nonetheless, Ernestos wife still sold land to her daughter Glenda Uy. TC affirms, but CA reverses, ordering sale of land void. Issue: Comatose condition of husband warrants the assuming of sole power of administration over properties and dispose of land with court approval? Held: Petition denied. Ratio: the condition of her husband makes the Rule on Art. 124 of CC inapplicable (covers only absence, separation in fact, abandonment, or withheld consent). And so Rule 93 of the Rules of Court 1964 applies, as this covers a non-consenting spouse due to incapacity or incompetence to give consent. As such, ernestos wife should observe procedure for sale of wards estate required of judicial guardians under the Rules of Court, not the summary proceedings under the Family Code. In the case at bar, RTC failed to comply with procedures of the ROC, and even FC (no notice to incapacitated spouse and to show cause why petition should not be granted). Dispositions/Donations SIOCHI V. GOZON
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Fuentes v. Roca Facts: Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358-square meter lot in Canelar, ZamboangaCity. In 1982, she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. But Tarciano did not for the meantime have the registered title transferred to his name. In 1988, Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes spouses). They later signed an agreement to sell prepared by one Atty. Plagata dated April 29, 1988, which agreement expressly stated that it was to take effect in six months. The agreement required the Fuentes spouses to pay Tarciano a down payment of P60,000.00 for the transfer of the lots title to him. And, within six months, Tarciano was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale. Upon Tarcianos compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take possession of the lot and pay him an additional P140,000.00 orP160,000.00, depending on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the lot without any further formality and payment.
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Homeowners Bank v. Miguela Dailo Facts: Miguela C. Dailo and Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on August 8, 1967. During their marriage, they purchased a house and lot situated at Barangay San Francisco, San Pablo City. The Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was executed only in favor of the late Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof to the exclusion of his wife, Miguel. On December 1, 1993, Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing her to obtain a loan from Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank to be secured by the spouses Dailo's house and lot in San Pablo City. Pursuant to the SPA, Gesmundo obtained a loan in the amount of P300,000.00 from Homeowners. The house and lot served as the security for the Real Estate Mortgage. Miguela had no knowledge of the SPA and of the REM. The loan was not paid and the house and extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings followed. At the sale, Homeowners ended up being the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued to Homeowners. A year passed and the property wasnt redeemed so Homeowners consolidated the ownership thereof by executing on June 6, 1996 an Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership and a Deed of Absolute Sale. Marcelino died on December 20, 1995. In one of her visits to the subject property, Miguela learned that Homeowners had already employed a certain Roldan Brion to clean its premises and that her Ford sedan was razed because Brion allowed a boy to play with fire in the compound Claiming that she had no knowledge of the mortgage constituted on the subject property, which was conjugal in nature, Miguela filed a case with the RTC for declaration of nullity of the mortgage and its subsequent sale, and for reconveyance.
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Abing vs. Waeyan Facts: Petitioner John Abing and respondent Juliet Waeyan cohabited as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. Together, they bought a 2-storey residential house. Later on, Juliet left for overseas employment in Korea. While there, she would still send money to John who deposited the same in their joint account In 1992, the original 2-storey residential house underwent renovation. To it was annexed a new structure which housed a sari-sari store. In 1995, she went back from Korea and lived with John. She also managed the sari-sari store. However, their relationship did not last. They decided to partition their properties. In the Memorandum of Agreement, they both settled that while John should leave his share of the properties, Juliet should pay him the amount of P428,870.00 which she failed to pay fully. Hence, John demanded that Juliet vacate the annex structure. When she refused, John instituted an ejectment case. The two lower courts ruled in favor of the petitioner, saying that the construction of the said structure solely came from his exclusive funds. On appeal, the Court of Appeals decided on the contrary stating that the property is owned in common by both of them. Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit pertains to the exclusive ownership of petitioner, John. Ruling: No. Art 147 of the Family Code reads: When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
SAN LUIS VS. SAN LUIS FACTS: Felicisimo contracted 3 marriages. Felicisimo married Virginia Sulit but she died [6 children]. Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin but divorced later on [one son]. Felicisimo married Felicidad San Luis but this time, Felicisimo died [no children]. Thereafter, Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate before the RTC. However, one of the children of Felicisimo in the first marriage, Rodolfo San Luis, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Felicidad has no legal personality since she was just a mistress of Felicisimo, the latter being legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled in favor of Rodolfo. However, CA reversed. ISSUE: WON Felicidad has the legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration??? RULING: YES. Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
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Cario vs Cario Facts: Santiagio Carino contracted 2 marriages during his liftetime. The 1st was with Susan Nicdao and the 2nd was with Susan Yee (hindi sya mahilig sa mga Susan eh noh? Haha). When Santiago died, both Susan Nicdao and Susan Yee filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance from the offices in which Santiago worked for (he was a police). Susan Yee filed a case for the collection of a sum of money against Susan Nicdao for some benefits she received. Susan Nicdao did not file her answer and was declared in default. Susan Yee admits that her marriage to Santiago took place without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity on the marriage of Santiago to Susan Nicdao. However, Susan Yee argued that the 1 st marriage was void ab initio because it was solemnized without the required marriage license. She presented the marriage certificate of Santiago and Susan Nicdao which bears no marriage license number. In addition, a certification from the local civil registrar showed that they had no record of the marriage license. Issue: Whether Susan Yee is entitled to the monetary benefits she is claiming from Susan Nicdao? Held: 1) In this case, the marriage of Susan Nicdao and Santiago does not fall within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. Despite this however, the records reveal that their marriage was solemnized without a marriage license. As such, their marriage is void ab initio. However, this does not automatically mean that the 2nd marriage is already valid. Under art40 of the family code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage. Even though the 1st marriage is void, the parties will still have to wait for the declaration otherwise the 2 nd marriage will also be void. Hence, since Susan Yees marriage to Santiago was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the earlier marriage void, theirs is also void ab initio. 2) One of the effects of the declaration of nullity is the separation of property of the spouses. Considering that the 2 marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime wont be absolute community nor conjugal partnership. The
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