Crew Resource Management CRM is a concept involving three main elements:

Indoctrination and awareness training Practice, feedback and recurrent training Continuing reinforcement

This CRM course and manual utilize plain language in a nontechnical format. Individual participation is imperative to gain maximum benefit from the course. The key to the success of a CRM program is the mutual respect and confidence that is created among crew members which fosters an environment that is conducive to openness, candor, and constructive critique. The result is a more professional performance due to the synergy that is achieved in the cockpit, thereby decreasing the risk of an accident or incident. Course Objective

To gain a greater awareness of the concepts, philosophies and objectives of resource management training To enable students to utilize more resource management tools To enhance students abilities to utilize their most valuable resource - THEMSELVES

History Today's flight and cabin crews are much different than they were during the early years of commercial aviation. The captain of the aircraft was once considered "God" and his decisions were always the "right" ones. There was little, if any, input from the other

pilots because they assumed the captain knew what he was doing. It was also considered somewhat disrespectful to question the decisions of a superior. Part of this thinking had its genesis from the military. At one time the military was the biggest producer of pilots, and along with military training came a good dose of machismo, ego, and autocratic decision-making processes (many military fighters were single pilot aircraft and therefore lacked the redundancy of, and decision inputs from, another crewmember). This attitude did not transfer well into civilian cockpits. The problems began to manifest in pilot error related airline accidents that claimed hundreds of lives:

1978, United 171 ran out of fuel over Portland, Oregon and no one noticed until it was too late. 1972, Eastern 401 gradually descended into the Everglades as all three crewmembers became fixated on a landing light indication and the autopilot became disengaged. 1982, Air Florida 90 was not properly de-iced and crashed shortly after takeoff from Washington, D.C. In addition, standard operating procedures were violated by an inexperienced flight crew. 1985, Delta 191 was caught in an unreported windshear on final approach to the Dallas/Fort Worth airport.

It was obvious that something needed to be done to address the human aspect of flying an aircraft. Airlines were noticing that although pilots were technically competent, their people skills were deficient. In other words, the captain could fly a perfect Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach, but could not work in a synergistic environment to effectively accomplish tasks. This can create a potentially dangerous and antagonistic situation.

Crew Resource Management (CRM) was developed as a response to new insights into the causes of aircraft accidents which followed from the introduction of flight recorders and cockpit voice recorders into modern jet aircraft. Information gathered from these devices had suggested that as many as 70% of accidents had little to do with technical aspects of flying; it appears instead that they were caused by the inability of crews to respond appropriately to the situation in which they find themselves. The result of this research led to the first workshop on CRM; this was sponsored by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in 1979 CRM Defined CRM encompasses a wide range of knowledge skills and attitudes including communications, situational awareness, problem solving, decision making and teamwork. The elements which comprise CRM are not new but have been recognized in way or another since aviation began, usually under more general terms such as Airmanship, Captaincy, Crew cooperation etc. These terms have not previously been defined in a formal way and now CRM can be seen as an attempt to rectify this deficiency. CRM can therefore be defined as a management system that makes use of all available resources equipment, procedures and people to promote safety and enhance the efficiency of flight operations.

CRM therefore involves:

Flight Crew Cabin Crew

Engineering Operations Ramp Workers Air Traffic Control etc

The resources that we have available are:

Ourselves Others Our Aircraft

CRM is not limited to multi-crew pilots; CRM is a concept affecting the way you think and the way you act, it is intended to heighten attitudes and behavior, not change personalities. All pilots whether they be in a multi crew environment or single pilot along with cabin crew, operations , engineering and Air Traffic Controllers can all benefit from CRM training. What CRM IS and IS NOT CRM IS

A comprehensive system for improving crew performance A process addressing the entire crew and other related staff A system that can be extended to all forms of air crew training A concentration on crew member attitudes and behaviors and their impact on safety An opportunity for individuals to examine their behavior and make individual decisions on how to improve cockpit teamwork A utilization of the crew as the unit of training Active participation training that focuses on safety improvement

Is self-convincing

CRM IS NOT

A quick fix that can be implemented overnight A training program administered to only a few specialized or "fix-it" cases A system that occurs independent of other ongoing training activities A psychological assessment or personality profile A system where crews are given a specific prescription of how to work with others on the flight deck Another form of individually-centred crew training A passive lecture-style classroom course An attempt by management to dictate cockpit behavior

Following is an example of what CRM IS NOT!

Information Processing Introduction

This section provides an overview of mental human performance characteristics which flight crew use, it examines the way in which information gathered by the senses is processed by the brain. The limitations of the human information processing system are also considered. The basic theory of decision making is also covered, although not in depth.
Basic Theory of Information processing Information Processing defined

Information processing is the process of receiving information through the senses analyzing and making it meaningfull. Decision making is the choice between two or more alternatives. Information Processing Model Information processing can be represented as a model. This shows the main elements of the process from receipt of information from the senses, to outputs such as decision making and actions. One such model is shown in Figure 1.

Human Error, Reliability and Error Management Introduction Human error is inevitable what is important is to ensure that human error does not result in adverse events such as air accidents. This can be addressed in two ways: reducing errors in the first place, and controlling errors such that they, or their immediate effects, are detected early enough to allow remedial action. CRM addresses both types of mitigating strategies, but concentrates particularly on error detection, especially in the multi-crew situation. Human reliability is the science which looks at the vulnerability of human beings to make errors (or less than perfect performance) under different circumstances. One could argue that it is more of an art than a science, since it is very difficult to predict, in quantifiable terms, human reliability in different situations, and from individual to individual. However, there are certain

conditions under which humans are more likely to make errors (e.g. during circadian lows, when stressed, when overloaded, etc).

Human Error, Reliability and Error Management Introduction Human error is inevitable what is important is to ensure that human error does not result in adverse events such as air accidents. This can be addressed in two ways: reducing errors in the first place, and controlling errors such that they, or their immediate effects, are detected early enough to allow remedial action. CRM addresses both types of mitigating strategies, but concentrates particularly on error detection, especially in the multi-crew situation. Human reliability is the science which looks at the vulnerability of human beings to make errors (or less than perfect performance) under different circumstances. One could argue that it is more of an art than a science, since it is very difficult to predict, in quantifiable terms, human reliability in different situations, and from individual to individual. However, there are certain conditions under which humans are more likely to make errors (e.g. during circadian lows, when stressed, when overloaded, etc).

Introduction

This Module deals with 'readiness to cope' in some sense, in terms of an individual's physical and mental ability to cope with work demands, and how he manages those work demands. The ideal would be for flight crew to be at peak fitness and alertness all the time, and to be able to manage the workload such that work demands never exceed ability to cope. However, life isn't like that, and there are times when individuals are fatigued, or stressed, and workload sometimes exceeds ability to cope. CRM aims to help flight crew to plan their workload as far as they are able, making best use of the team, and taking into account the fact that some individuals may be performing below peak levels (e.g. due to fatigue, etc.). It is also important for managers to be aware of such human performance issues when planning, e.g. rosters.

Situation Awareness Introduction Situation Awareness (SA) is knowing what is going on around you its the big picture and is fundamental to correct decision making and action. Information processing tends to be the term used for the psychological mechanism of receiving and analyzing information; situation awareness is a description of an individual's, or team's, understanding of the aircraft state and environment, based on perceived and processed information. SA is more than just perception - it is understanding the meaning of what you perceive, how it might change in the future, and the implications.

Decision making is based on situation awareness; therefore if you have poor SA, you are likely to make poor decisions. SA has sometimes been referred to as "perception of reality" and it is quite possible for different crew members to have different perceptions of reality. The aim of SA training should be to ensure that all flight crew members have good SA and a common (and correct) perception of the state of the aircraft and environment. This can be achieved by good team working and communication. Breakdown of situation awareness is the root cause of so many aircraft incidents that eliminating it would dramatically reduce the accident rate. SA is, therefore, an important element of CRM. Excerpts from the cockpit voice recorder prior to the tragic accident in Cali, Columbia emphasize this point. The flight crew turned their aircraft into a mountain. First Officer: "Uh, where are we... we goin' out to ..." Captain: "Lets go right to, uh, Tulua first of all. OK?" First Officer: "Yeah, where we headed?" A few seconds later, Captain identifies Tulua. Captain: "Just doesn't look right on mine. I don't know why." Two minutes later they impacted a mountain.

Communication, Teamwork, Leadership,Decision Making and Managerial Skills

Introduction One of the basic underlying premises of CRM is that a team can, and should, perform better than two (or three) individuals in the cockpit. The aim of CRM is to ensure that 1+1>2, as opposed to 1+1<2 (in a two pilot cockpit), and that team performance takes precedence over individual performance. Good CRM is getting the balance right as a team, whilst recognising that the Captain has the final say and responsibility for the safety of the aircraft. In order to be effective, team members must be able to talk to each other, listen to each other, share information and be assertive when required. Commanders should take particular responsibility for ensuring that the crew functions effectively as a team. Whilst the emphasis in CRM is primarily upon the cockpit crew, and how they work as a team, it is also important to look at wider team effectiveness, namely the whole flight crew. CRM principles may also extend to situations where ATC, maintenance, company experts, etc., are considered to be part of the team (especially in emergency situations or in a single pilot environment). A UK based study of 249 F/Os reported that nearly 40% of them had on several occasions failed to communicate to the Captain their proper doubts about the operation of the aircraft. The most common reason being the

desire to avoid conflict and deference to the experience and authority of the Captain.

Introduction Automation in the aviation domain has been increasing for the past two decades. Pilot reaction to automation varies from highly favorable to highly critical depending on both the pilots background and how effectively the automation is implemented. Modern aircraft feature a variety of automation technologies to help the pilot with such things as checklist execution, navigation, descent planning, engine configuration, and system monitoring. Older aircraft can be retrofitted to incorporate many of these features by replacing older radios with modern units, replacing traditional gauges with computer monitors, and linking everything with computer processors. One of the goals of automation is to improve the pilots situational awareness. A related goal is to decrease the workload required to maintain a given level of awareness. Technologies assist the pilot with awareness of position, terrain, traffic, fuel usage and remaining aircraft range, engine operating characteristics, etc. Pilots have various reactions to automation. They may find it superfluous (the real pilots dont need an autopilot perspective), helpful (the autopilot can fly an approach much more accurately than I; a real plus in bad weather), or confusing (the whats it doing now?).

It is believed that to make automation helpful, it needs to fulfill a pilots need, fit seamlessly into the flying tasks, and be easy enough to understand to earn a pilots trust. CRM in highly automated aircraft presents special challenges, in particular in terms of situation awareness of the status of the aircraft.

CRM for Single Pilots CRM has been around in different forms since the early years of aviation. What has changed is the increased reliability of aircraft and aircraft systems; the percentage of accidents caused by human factors; the subsequent recognition of the part played by the human element and the attempt to define good and poor CRM practice. The natural development of CRM has, not surprisingly, been mainly on multicrew aircraft as this was supported by flight and cockpit voice recorders, and the use of simulators facilitated scenarios where CRM situations could be practiced and discussed. Some high profile accidents involving multi-pilot aircraft also drew public attention to the subject. It is not surprising, therefore, that CRM tended to be regarded as being mainly applicable to multicrew operations. This focus is understandable as much of the written material produced on CRM has been specifically written for multi-crew situations and has, to some extent, concentrated on the communication and relationships between Mailing List

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pilots. Single Pilot operations do exist in an airliner from time to time. If one crewmember should leave the flight deck for a short time it will leave only one pilot at the controls leaving that person with what essentially is single pilot skills. However it should be recognised that CRM encompasses many elements which are applicable to both multi and single pilot operations. Much of this will be recognised as airmanship which has now developed into non-technical skills. These nontechnical skills can be defined and assessed to facilitate improvement. The intent of this module is to highlight best practice, to define the various elements of CRM to enable analysis (particularly self-analysis), to facilitate debriefing and create an improvement in operating performance of single pilot crews. Single Pilot operations can be less complex with respect to certain aspects of CRM compared to Multicrew operations. There is no inter-crew communication and there are no flight deck issues involving authority and leadership. However, in other areas such as error management, decision making and planning, the lack of an additional crewmember can make the situation more demanding. The single pilot does not have the advantage of learning from the experience of other crewmembers on the flight

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deck and often has to learn from his own mistakes. The only debriefing and evaluation available to the single pilot during normal operations is self-evaluation. Communication Whilst communication across the flight deck may not be relevant to pilots of Single Pilot operations, there are many situations in which communication is equally important. Such situations would include keeping the passengers and other non-flying crew members informed during normal and abnormal operations, liaising with ground crew and communications with ATC. The latter being particularly critical for flight safety as the cross check of instructions between crews on multi-pilot aircraft may not be available in the single pilot situation. It is absolutely vital, therefore, that if there is any doubt at all about ATC instructions, clarification is sought. Standard RT phraseology should always be used particularly when talking to ATC units that do not have English as their first language. Other factors which may affect the correct understanding of communications are:

High workload Fatigue Distractions and interruptions Pre-conceived ideas.

It must also be recognised that communications with the company by way of keeping up to date with changes in procedures, new information, additional airport and route information etc. is more demanding as there is no one else on the flight deck with whom to crosscheck the information. However, much can be gained from liaison with fellow crewmembers before and after flights in the crew room and operations/ planning rooms. Health Incapacitation procedures have reduced the accident statistics for multicrew operations. However, these procedures are not available to safeguard Single Pilot operations in the case of incapacitation of the pilot. It is even more important, therefore, that pilots ensure that they are in a properly fit condition to fly if they are the only member of the flight crew. In the event of feeling unwell during flight do not press on but land at the nearest suitable airport making use of all assistance available by declaring an emergency and making full use of any automation. Workload Management Workload management is probably the most important item of single pilot CRM. There is no opportunity to delegate tasks in the air and there is a greater potential for the single pilot to

become overloaded especially during an unusual, abnormal or emergency situation. Maintaining situational awareness and preserving mental capacity for planning and decision making is more difficult. Attention to, and being aware of, the process of prioritisation is one way to try to maintain some spare capacity. Comprehensive self-briefing and pre-flight planning are essential. The aim should be to have a thorough understanding of all the aspects of the flight, weather conditions, airport procedures, routeing, aircraft serviceability etc. and that as much of the work as possible should be carried out on the ground, prior to flight. Problems should be anticipated and what if? procedures thought through so that in the event of any unplanned events the contingencies can be put into place without the workload increasing to an unmanageable level. In the event of an abnormality or emergency it is even more important to comply with standard operating procedures. This will help one to stay calm, make proper diagnosis of the problem and take the appropriate action. Reduce workload as much as possible, engage the autopilot if available, advise ATC and request for radar positioning. Many accident investigations highlight the fact that the checklists were not used and that inappropriate action was taken which prevented or reduced the likelihood of reaching a successful conclusion.

Error Management Much of the error management in a multi-crew environment relies on cross checking of vital data and actions by the other crewmember. This facility is not available to the single pilot and therefore other techniques have to be employed. In an ideal world the system will have eliminated latent errors. However, in the real world latent errors ready to trap the unwary pilot do exist in many guises. Therefore one needs to be constantly alert for these traps and be conversant with the aircraft and the operation to the greatest extent possible. Adherence to SOPs is again one of the main defences and all pilots should be alert to situations which are new, untried, distract from normal operations or are outside SOPs. The pilot should be comfortable with the operation. If not then it is probably necessary to take action to restore the comfort factor even if this means a decision to delay or cancel the flight. Workload planning will allow the pilot to make decisions in good time and to self cross check any critical actions before implementation. Decision Making There are a number of guides and mnemonics which are designed to assist the decision making process for multi-pilot crews such as the PILOT model. These generally

involve:

Assessing the situation and gathering data Considering options Deciding on the best option Communicating your intentions Carrying out the actions Checking/reviewing the situation Adapting to new information or changing situations.

Research shows that experienced pilots use previous experience of similar situations to short cut the decision making process. However, no two situations are exactly the same and it is important to recognise that the decision making process is driven by the pilot's situation assessment. In the Single Pilot operations case there is usually no one to help gather the information and cross check actions. Also, facing an abnormal or emergency situation alone can be a frightening and traumatic experience. A natural reaction can be one of shock (surprise) or disbelief, which is called startle reflex. This is a completely normal and instantaneous phenomenon as the brain can absorb information about an emotionally significant event (such as fear) before we are consciously aware of it. This initial startle reflex can provoke a desire to try to resolve the situation quickly - perhaps leading to incorrect actions being taken. Therefore, one should try to

stay calm and above all continue to fly the aircraft. There are some situations which require immediate action but the majority of incidents will tolerate a short delay while you gather your thoughts and assess the situation. Situational Awareness Situational awareness relates both to the status of the aircraft and its systems and to the geographical position of the aircraft. Careful monitoring of the aircraft systems together with a good technical knowledge will help the pilot maintain situational awareness and to stay ahead of the aircraft. This, combined with good workload management, will increase spare capacity and allow better anticipation of potential problems. Geographical position and lowest safe altitude should be constantly monitored and crosschecked using all available aids . Environmental influences such as bad weather should also be anticipated and a plan of action formulated in case the planned flight path, destination etc. has to be changed. A mental picture of the aircrafts position should be maintained at all times. Situational awareness is particularly critical in the departure/approach and landing phases of flight. Many Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) type accidents have occurred due to loss of situational awareness and proximity of terrain. Statistics indicate that this is a high risk area to the Single

Pilot. The risk may be increased due to the aircraft being fitted with less sophisticated equipment but lack of planning, press on itusetc, also aggravate the situation. Commercial Pressures In the single-pilot environment commercial pressures may be greater and more personalised. The pilot may be persuaded by the operator who may also be the owner of the business. With no one else to share the burden one may be more prone to accede to such pressures and accept a situation which is against your better judgement. Such pressures may also come from passengers who may be anxious to get to an important meeting or simply want to get home. Summary Airline pilots are trained to use cockpit resource management (CRM) as a vital decision-making tool. The CRM concept goes beyond just seeking input from crewmembers. All resources at the airline pilots command are tapped to help manage the flight with sound decisions. Single Pilot operations are faced with virtually the same decision-making tasks as are captains of jumbo jets. The only difference is that theyre scaled down in altitude, payload, speed and distance. And even a single pilot in the smallest cockpit can make use of CRM tools to help

manage the flight with sound decisions. Here are several tips on CRM that help define the concept as it applies to the GA cockpit. (Plane & Pilot 2003) You have a CRM team of FSS specialists and ATC controllers at your beck and call. These professionals have the resources and have been trained for the task of knowing how to assist your in-flight decision-making. Dont wait until a situation of concern turns into a crisis to call for information or advice. Once you allow an issue to grow into a true emergency, your options are often so limited that assistance from the ground has minimal value. In general, you should put out a call anytime: a. Your fuel supply comes into question and youre uncertain about the exact location of an airport within easy reach b. A malfunction of needed equipment arises for which you cant achieve a ready fix c. You become unsure of your position d. You feel like youre coming down with something that may impair you (like the flu) e. The weather starts to look a bit scary. Certainly call before clouds force you below 2,000 AGL, visibility drops below five miles or it

looks like you may be forced to enter an area of precipitation, fly above a ceiling or get caught by darkness in deteriorating weather. Call upon your CRM when youre faced with a precautionary landing. FSS can help you select an appropriate airport. If your concern is a rough engine, for example, youll want to land at an airport with adequate repair facilities. If your problem suggests a hazardous landing (such as gear up), youll want an airport with fire and rescue equipment. If weather is a problem, FSS or ATC can quickly determine the easiest route to the best airport within your reacha decision that often cant be determined on your own. Or, should a passenger be stricken with a serious medical problem, your ground CRM team can help find the closest airport with a nearby hospital. If finding the remedy to an in-flight mechanical problem confounds you, call a nearby FBOs Unicom. Ask to speak with their mechanicanother CRM team member. Knowledge is power when making decisions. Stay abreast of the weather surrounding your flightpath, but beyond your range of visibility.

Tune in frequently to the ATIS and AWOS/ASOS stations lying ahead and to either side of your route. These automated reports will keep you aware of surface winds, visibilities, cloud coverage and precip occurring in the area. Frequencies are displayed on your sectional chart at the station locations. Reception range is about 70 miles for ATIS, 30 miles for AWOS/ASOS. Keep an extra set of eyes aboard. No matter how hard we try, we simply dont see all significant traffic. Thats where requested ATC radar traffic advisories come into play as a part of your CRM. There may be times when the controllers IFR workload prohibits them from issuing VFR advisories. Time permitting, however, ATC wants to be a part of your flight management and encourages your participation. If you dont see the traffic reported by ATC (a common occurrencedont feel bad), advise ATC with: Negative contact. ATC will then provide progressive reports until you advise: Have contact. If youre still unable to spot the traffic by the time its reported three miles, request a clearing vector. VFR traffic advisories are normally available from ATC Approach Control when youre within 20 or 30 miles of the airport they serve. En-route traffic advisories are available from ATC Control Center. Approach Control frequencies are

displayed on the communications panel of your sectional chart. FSS will provide the ATC Center frequency appropriate to the route segment youre flying. By all means, stay in working touch with an instructor youve come to know and trust, one who knows you and your flying skills. The plane and sky is a CFIs workplace and an experienced instructor knows it well. By also knowing youyour limitations and strengths as a pilota good instructor becomes a valuable decision-making resource and advisor to call upon when a proposed flight might test your airmanship. Imagine, for example, a different outcome had JFK, Jr., phoned for an outside opinion and advice before his ill-fated flight. Professionally-minded pilotsno matter the size of plane they flyuse every tool at their command and cockpit resource management becomes a natural part of their lives aloft.