Avelino vs Cuenco

AVELINO V CUENCO PER CURIAM; March 4, 1949 RESOLUTION on Original action in the SC

FACTS - Summary: The Avelino I case illustrates judicial review of internal affairs of the legislature. The Court refused to look into the legality of the election of a Senate President, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the Senates constitutional power to elect its own president Before the opening of a morning session of the Senate, Senators Lorenzo Taada and Prospero Sanidad prepared a resolution enumerating charges against the then Senate President Jose Avelino. AVELINO presided the session and called the meeting in order, and except for a senator who was confined in a hospital and another who is in the United States, all the Senators were present. - TAADA sought to be recognized, but AVELINO and his followers prevented TAADA from delivering his privilege speech. A commotion later ensued, upon which AVELINO and 9 other senators left the session hall. Subsequently, the Senate President Pro-tempore took the Chair and proceeded with the session. The remaining senators unanimously approved, among others, a resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and designating Mariano Jesus Cuenco Acting President of the Senate." The next day the President of the Philippines recognized CUENCO as acting Senate President. - Hence, the present petition, AVELINO asking the Court to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust CUENCO. ISSUE WON SC has jurisdiction over the subject matter
1 2

BRYAN SJ: Among which were advocacy of the graft and corruption in the government (particularly those committed by the Liberal Party, to which AVELINO was a member); questionable possession of checks totaling more than P500,000 after AVELINOs assumption of office; and justification of electoral fraud.
2

Similar to the 1987 Const, the Senate is composed of 24 senators under the 1935 Const.

HELD NO (6-4 vote) Ratio The issue of the validity of the election of the new Senate President is a political question. Reasoning - The answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If the majority of the Senators want AVELINO to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall, not in the Supreme Court. - The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to intercede might lead into a crisis, even a revolution. No state of things has been proved that might change the temper of the Filipino people as peaceful and law-abiding citizens. It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to CUENCO makes it advisable, to adopt the hands-off policy enunciated by this Court in matters of similar nature. Decision Petition dismissed. SEPARATE OPINION PERFECTO [dissent] - There was illegal adjournment of the morning session. The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. The functions of the Senate and its opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic social order.

- There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to decree motu propio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in this country and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize the existence of such a provision. - AVELINO alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of a senator to said effect was properly made and met with no objection. The evidence, however, fails to support AVELINOs claim. The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of AVELINO and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying, action on the proposed investigation of the charges against AVELINO and of his impeding ouster, by the decisive votes of CUENCO's group. - The rump session (i.e. the session after the AVELINO group walkout) had no valid quorum to transact business. The Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business [cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The majority mentioned in the provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership of each chamber of Congress. The Senate is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than 13. 12 is only half of 24. Nowhere and at no time has one-half ever been the majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half. FERIA [concur] - If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? Yes. At the beginning of the rump session there were at least 14 senators. Also, in view of the absence from the country of one senator, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorum, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. There is a difference between a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.

RESOLUTION on Motion for Reconsideration

FACTS - In Avelino II, the Court, in light of events subsequent to Avelino I (i.e., refusal of the Avelino group to return to the session hall despite the compulsory process served upon them), reversed its original decision and now assumed jurisdiction over the case ISSUES 1. WON SC will assume jurisdiction over this case 2. WON election of Cuenco as Senate President is valid HELD 1. The Court has resolved (7-4 vote) to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. 2. Partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and partly upon the grounds stated by Feria [and] Perfecto, JJ. in their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where CUENCO was elected acting Senate President. Chief Justice [Moran] agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement on the quorum, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum would result in CUENCO's election as Senate President, and that the CUENCO group has been trying to satisfy [the constitutional] formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the AVELINO group, but to no avail, because of the latter's persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, [the Chief Justice] believes that the CUENCO group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and that the majority's ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest. Decision The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that CUENCO has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed. SEPARATE OPINION FERIA [concur]

I maintain my opinion that there was a quorum in the (rump) session. Among others, the amendment of the quorum provision from "the majority of all the members of the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business," into "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the House or for other causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive process which each House is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. PERFECTO [concur] - The words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of the quorum of the National Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the Houses of Congress, because they were a mere surplusage. I, as Member of the Second National Assembly and in my capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members. The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exact mathematical meaning. A majority means more than one-half (1/2). It can never be identified with one-half (1/2) or less than one-half. The Senate is composed of 24 senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less than thirteen 13. 12 do not constitute the majority in a group composed of 24 units. No amount of mental gymnastics or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of two equal numbers constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The 5 fingers of one hand cannot be the majority of the combined 10 fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatible with equality. It implies the idea of superiority. Majority presupposes the existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of 24 senators composing the Senate.

- The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of choosing CUENCO merely as Acting Senate President, the presence of the 12 senators was enough quorum. The Constitution provides: A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide" [again, cf Art. VI, Sec. 16 (2), 1987 Const]. The "smaller number" referred to has to act collectively and cannot act as collective body to perform the functions specifically vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by one among their number. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take measure to "compel the attendance of absent members," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber. Said "smaller number" may be 12 or even less than 12 senators to constitute a quorum for the election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored. - At the hearing of this case, CUENCO manifested that he was looking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting Senate President, and that if AVELINO should attend the sessions of the Senate and insist on claiming the presidency thereof, CUENCO would allow AVELINO to preside over the sessions. AVELINOs refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding CUENCOs commitment to allow him to preside over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of office.

Santiago vs Guingona
SANTIAGO V GUINGONA PANGANIBAN; November 18, 1998

FACTS - On July 27, 1998, the Senate of the Philippines convened for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. Elections for the officers of the Senate were held on the same day with Fernan and Tatad nominated to the position of Senate President. Fernan was declared the duly elected President of the Senate. The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Drilon as majority leader. - Senator Tatad manifested that he was assuming the position of minority leader, with the agreement of Senator Santiago. He explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the "majority," while only those who had voted for him, the losing nominee, belonged to the "minority." - On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. - On July 31, 1998, Senators Santiago and Tatad instituted an original petition for quo warranto to seek the ouster of Senator Guingona as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader. They allege that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad. ISSUES 1. WON the Court have jurisdiction over the petition 2. WON there is an actual violation of the Constitution 3. WON Guingona is usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader 4. WON Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Guingona as the minority leader HELD

1. Yes, the court has jurisdiction. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abuse their discretion in exercise of their functions and prerogatives - The petitioners claim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. - Avelino v. Cuenco tackled the scope of the Court's power of judicial review; that is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal "finds constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies or previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.: - "Judicial power includes the duty of the court of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." 2. No, there was no actual violation of the Constitution.

- While the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority", who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader. - While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary." The method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court. - Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is bound to protect and uphold - the very duty that justifies the Court's being. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. 3. No, Respondent Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader. - Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law. In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners did not present sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader. 4. No, Respondent Fernan did not act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.

- By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. - Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader.The latter belongs to one of the minority parties in the Senate, the LakasNUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints. - Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.

Arroyo et. al. vs. De Venecia

ARROYO V HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL FRANCISCO; July 14, 1995

FACTS - Petition for review of the decision of the HRET - 11 May 1992: Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr. (AS) & Joker P. Arroyo (JA) ran for congressman for the lone district of Makati. Board of canvassers proclaims A as winner. AS files an election protest before HRET, seeking revision and recounting of ballots in 75% of the precincts. His grounds: alleged irregularities/anomalies in the tabulation and entries of votes & massive fraud. JA files counter-protest questioning residence qualification of AS; dismissed by HRET. - HRET undertakes revision of ballots. Serious irregularities found. Justice Gancaycos Report and Recommendation confirm irregularities and anomalies engineered by some HRET officials and personnel: Arroyo votes were consistently reduced while Syjuco was always constant - Revision completed. Reception of evidence followed. JA submits certified true copies of the Revision Reports and election returns. AS submits over 200,000 pages of documentary evidence, mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated by comparison with the original documents or identification by any witness." - In his memorandum cum addendum, AS changes his original posture (revision and recount of ballots) to what he calls a truly innovative and NON-TRADITIONAL process" the PRECINCT-LEVEL DOCUMENTBASED EVIDENCES. - By reason of the new allegations and substantial amendments (which broaden the scope of his protest, change his theory of the case or introduce additional causes of action in violation of Rule 28 Revised Rules of the Tribunal), HRET ordered him to show cause why his protest should not be dismissed. - 15 February 1994: by a 6-3 vote (the six Congressmen-members as against the three Justices-members), HRET resolved not to dismiss the protest, to continue with the examination and evaluation of the evidence on record, and thereafter to decide the case on the merits. - JA moved to dismiss the protest but to no avail. No hearings were conducted thereafter.

- 25 January 1995: HRET, by the same 6-3 vote rendered its now assailed Decision annulling JA's proclamation, & declaring AS as the duly elected congressman. Said decision also refers the case to COMELEC & the Office of the special Prosecutor for appropriate actions. - Without filing MFR, JA files the present case before SC. ISSUES 1. WON HRET committed grave abuse of discretion in a. proceeding to decide the protest based on AS precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory; b. rendering judgment on the kind of evidence before it and the manner in which the evidence was procured; & c. annulling election results in some contested precincts. 2. WON Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt

HELD 1. YES HRET committed grave abuse of discretion a. The "precinct level document based anomalies/evidence" theory - This innovative theory broadened the scope of the election protest beyond what AS originally sought. This is clearly substantial amendment of the election protest expressly proscribed by Rule 28 of the HRET internal rules. Impropriety of private respondent's belated shift of theory was sensed by majority members of HRET but they still resolved not to dismiss the protestthis a clear indication of grave abuse of discretion. No further hearings were conductedJA's right to due process was clearly violated. - Substantial amendments to the protest maybe allowed only within the same period for the filing of the election protest 15 which, under Rule 16 of the HRET Rules, is ten (10) days after the proclamation of the winner. The rule in an election protest is that the protestant or counterprotestant must stand or fall upon the issues he had raised in his original or amended pleading filed prior to the lapse of the statutory period for the filing of protest or counter protest. A party is bound by the theory he adopts and by the cause of action he stands on and cannot be permitted after having lost thereon to repudiate his theory and cause of action and adopt another and seek to relitigate the matter anew either in the same forum or on appeal. <principle of estoppel> b. The kind of evidence used and how they were procured - Photocopies violate the best evidence rule: no evidence shall be received which is merely substitutionary in its nature so long as the original evidence can be had. Certain vital election documents (such as certified xerox copy of the number of registered voters per precinct and photocopies of statements of votes) were procured at the sole instance of the ponente of the majority decision, never offered in evidence by either of the parties. - Majority congressmen-members of the Tribunal by themselves without the participation of any of the three (3) remaining Justicesmembers, declared that 10,484 of the contested signature are fake. This grossly violates Rules 68 &5 of HRET Rules (all questions shall be submitted to the Tribunal as a body; and presence of at least one (1) Justice-member is required to constitute a valid quorum). c. Nullification of election results

- HRET proceeded to annul votes without a dint of compliance with the 2 mandatory requisites for the annulment of election returns based on fraud, irregularities or terrorism: i. that more than fifty percent (50%) of the total number of votes in the precinct or precincts were involved, & ii. that the votes must be shown to have been affected or vitiated by such fraud, irregularities or terrorism. - Elections should never be held void unless they are clearly illegal; it is the duty of the court to sustain an election authorized by law if it has been so conducted as to give a free and fair expression of the popular will, and the actual result thereof is clearly ascertained. Absent fraud, mere irregularities or omissions committed by election officials which do not subvert the expression of popular will cannot countenance the nullification of election results. Corollarily, the misconduct of election officers or irregularities on their part will not justify rejecting the whole vote of a precinct (as was done in this case) where it does not appear that the result was affected thereby, even though the circumstances may be such as to subject the officers to punishment. 32 These omissions are not decisive since actual voting and election by registered voters had taken place in the questioned precincts. - General rule: a tribunal rendering a decision must be given an opportunity to rectify its error through a motion for reconsideration. BUT partiality of the majority of the members of the Electoral Tribunal having been shown, recourse for a reconsideration of its decision becomes nugatory and an immediate recourse to this Court can be had based on the fundamental principle of due process. A prior motion for reconsideration can be dispensed with if petitioner's fundamental right to due process was violated. - Persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified by simply invoking that procedural rules should be liberally construed. Rule 80 of the very same internal rules expressly makes the Rules of Court, Supreme Court decisions, and Electoral Tribunal decisions of suppletory application.

- Unwavering reverence to the rules of evidence as provided by the Rules of Court and jurisprudence is because they have been tested through years of experience as the most effective means of ferreting out the truth in any judicial controversy. Rules and uniformity of procedure are as essential to procure truth and exactness in elections as in anything else. - Thus, with the patent nullity of the entire proceedings before HRET and its majority decision in the election protest filed by AS, Joker Arroyos proclamation as the winning congressman of the then lone district of Makati is deemed not to have been challenged at all. 2. YES Syjuco should be cited for indirect contempt - Since his statements in his Addendum which he prepared without aid of counsel appear to seriously undermine the integrity of some members of the Court - Want of intention to undermine the integrity of the Court is no excuse for the language employed by private respondent for it is a wellknown and established rule that derogatory words are to be taken in the ordinary meaning attached to them by impartial observers Decision WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED, and public respondent HRET's majority decision dated January 25, 1995 is SET ASIDE. Private respondent Augusto L. Syjuco, Jr., having been found guilty of indirect contempt, is hereby fined the amount of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) to be paid within five (5) days from receipt of this decision.

Osmena vs Pendatun

FACTS - On June 23, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmea, Jr., in a privilege speech delivered before the House,

OSMENA V PENDATUN BENGZON; October 28, 1960

made the serious imputations of bribery against the President. The House of Representatives, through Resolution No. 59, created a special committee of 15 members to investigate the truth of the charges against the President. It summoned Osmea to appear before it to substantiate his charges. - On July 14, 1960, Osmea filed with the Supreme Court a petition for "declaratory relief, certiorari and

prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salipada Pendatun and the fourteen other members of the Special Committee. He asked that said resolution be annulled and that said members of the special committee be enjoined from proceeding in accordance with it, particularly the portion authorizing them to require him to substantiate his charges against the President, with the admonition that if he failed to do so, he must show cause why the House should not punish him. Osmea alleged: (1) the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behaviour for which he could be punished; and (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House took up other business, and Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of the House provides that if other business has intervened after the Member had uttered obnoxious words in debate, he shall not be held to answer therefor nor be subject to censure by the House - Aware of the petition, the special committee continued to perform its task, and after giving Osmena a

chance to defend himself, submitted its report on July 18, 1960, finding said congressman guilty of serious disorderly behavior. Acting on such report, the House approved on the same day-before closing its session-House Resolution No. 175, declaring him guilty as recommended, and suspending him from office for fifteen months. - Thereafter, Osmea took the additional position that the House has no power, under the Constitution,

to suspend one of its members. - On July 19, 1960, the respondents filed their answer, challenged the jurisdiction of the Court to

entertain the petition, defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension, upheld House Resolution No. .175 and then invited attention to the fact that Congress having ended its session on July 18, 1960, the Committee-whose members are the sole respondents-had thereby ceased to exist. ISSUES WON the Constitution gives members of Congress complete parliamentary immunity for words spoken in

the House WON the Speech of Osmea constituted unruly behavior for which he could be punished WON Osmea can be held to answer for or be censured by the House, given that other business had

intervened after gave the speech in question WON the House has the power to suspend its members

 HELD 1. NO. Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution which provides that "for any speech or debate" in

Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representatives "shall not be questioned in any other place." This section was taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause I of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States, wherein the provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. - Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every

legislative assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. 2. YES. The House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only because the

Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if this Court assumed the power to determine whether Osmea's conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would thereby have assumed appellate jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the Government. The theory of separation of powers fastidiously observed by this Court, demands in such situation a prudent refusal to interfere. Each department, it has been said, has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere. - "The Legislative power of the Philippine Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are

found in the Republic's Constitution. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Philippine Congress, unless the Constitution provides otherwise." (Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192, 212.)

3. YES. Resolution No. 59 was unanimously approved by the House, such approval amounted to a

suspension of the House Rules, which according to standard parliamentary practice may be done by unanimous consent. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action when the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure."

4. YES. For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or of Congress have been, or could be

censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. The practice and the traditional power of legislative assemblies to take, disciplinary action against its members, including imprisonment, suspension or expulsion have been recognized in the United States. The Rules of Philippine House of Representatives provide that the parliamentary practices of the Congress of the United States shall apply in a supplementary manner to its proceedings.

Decision Petition DISMISSED.

Paredes Jr. vs Sandiganbayan

Congressman Paredes was charged with violations of the Anti-Graft Law allegedly committed while he was still a governor. The Sandiganbayan put the case on trial when he was already at the House of Representatives and suspended him from the House. Paredes went to the Supreme Court to petition his case, claiming that only the House could suspend him. Court held that the power of Congress to suspend its members was quite distinct from the preventive suspension provided by the Anti-Graft Law, and so applied to him not as a member of the House of Representatives.

US vs Pons

Facts: Juan Pons and two others, were charged with the crime of illegal importation of

United States v. Pons

August 12, 1916, (Patty Miranda)

opium. The three were accused of conspiring and plotting among themselves, bringing in 520 tins containing 125 kg of opium from Spain to the Philippines on board the steamer Lopez y Lopez. Each were found guilty of the crime charged and Pons was to be confined in Bilibid for 2 years, to pay a Php 1,000 fine and suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Petitioners Arguments: That Act N0. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not

passed or approved in Feb. 28th but on March 1st of that year, and this may be proven by extraneous evidence That whatever inconsistencies may arise from the journal, that is a little evil compared to altering the probative force and character of the journals, thus allowing legislative action to depend on oral evidence. I.e. that Pons will have to rely on the memory or recollection of witnesses to establish his contentions, while the legislative journals are acts from the sovereign itself. Respondents Arguments: That the contents of the legislative journals are conclusive evidence to the date of That the same act was null and void since the factual findings of the trial courts to establish Pons guilt is inconsistent with the journal.

adjournment.

Issue/Held/Ratio: (1) WON the legislative journals can be used to prove the date of adjournment of

the legislature. Yes. The journals clearly and explicitly show that that the legislative adjourned at

12 midnight on Feb. 28to inquire upon the veracity of the documents would violate both the letter and spirit of organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence by allowing the Judiciary to invade and interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. (2) WON the SC can take judicial notice of the journals. Yes. It is a well-settled US doctrine that authenticity of laws should rest upon

public memorials of the most permanent character, such as the legislative journal of proceedings which are useful not only for authenticating the proceedings but also for the interpretation of laws through the study of the debates hereon.

Casco vs Phil. Chemical Co. vs. Gimenez

Casco v Gimenez 1963 (Emma Maglaque)

Facts: Casco prays for the review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund for urea and formaldehyde separately, given that the law provides for urea formaldehyde. Issue/Held/Ratio: Can the SC directly amend the law to capture its legislative intent? No.

Enrolled bill is conclusive upon the courts, and the remedy in case of mistake in the printing of bills relies in the Congress.

Astorga vs Villegas

FACTS - Original Action in the SC. Mandamus, injunction and/or prohibition with preliminary mandatory and

ASTORGA V VILLEGAS MAKALINTAL; April 30, 1974

prohibitory injunction

- HB No. 9266 was filed and was passed on the third reading without amendments in the House of

Representatives (HoR). It was referred to the Senate Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by Sen. Roxas. Sen. Roxas suggested a minor amendment on HB 9266. However, this recommendation was not acted upon by the Senate during its second hearing, and instead, approved in toto Sen. Tolentinos substantial amendment on the section definig the powers and duties of the VM.

- After that the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the HoR that HB. No. 9266 had been passed by

the Senate with amendments. However, the attached amendments were not Sen. Tolentinos but Sen. Roxasamendments. The HoR signified its approval of HB No. 9266 (with Roxas amendment) and printed copies of it which were certified and attested by the Secretary of the HoR, the Speaker of the HoR, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Senate President. The Secretary of the House transmitted 4 copies of the bill to the President of the Philippines, who affixed his signatures by way of approval enacted the bill into R.A. No. 40653 - The respondent mayor (Villegas) publicly denounced the RA, then Sen. Tolentino made a press

statement that the enrolled copy of HB 9266 signed by the President is not the version passed by the Senate since it did not contain the amendments he made. The Senate President then informed the President that the enrolled copy of the signed HB 9266 was not the bill duly approved by Congress and that his signature is invalid and had no effect, and could not validate the bill which was not the version approved by the Congress. The President then withdrew his signature on the HB 9266. - With the withdrawal of signatures of the Senate President and the President of the Philippines, Villegas

issued circulars ordering city government officials and operators of business establishments to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise ordered the Chief of Police to recall the police officers assigned to the vicemayor presumably under the said RA. - As a reaction, the petitioner vice mayor (Astorga) filed a petition for Mandamus, Injunction and/or

Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction to compel respondents to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. - Respondents argued that RA 4056 never became law since (1) it was not the bill approved by

Congress and (2) entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. Since Mayor Villegas was going abroad on an official trip, Court issued restraining order for Astorga to not exercise the powers vested to him as Acting Mayor under the RA 4065. ISSUES

An Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further Amending for the Purpose Section 10 and 11 of RA No. 409, Otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

WON the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine WON the attestation of the presiding officers of the Congress approves the bill and validates it into a law WON in the absence of the attestation of the presiding officers, the journal entry in the Journals of

Congress could constitute proof of due enactment HELD Ratio YES. The enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the WON RA 4065 was duly enacted and therefore did not become a law

Courts under Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as evidence for the due enactment of a bill. Obiter - compared this case to the Mabanag v. Lopez Vito where the Court denied to resolve the issue of WON

a resolution of both Houses of Congress proposing an amendment to the 1935 Constitution to be appended as an ordinance thereto had been passed by a vote for three-fourths of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives pursuant to Article XV of the Constitution, saying that it involved a political question (enrolled bill doctrine) which is not in the province of the judiciary. - using J. Bengzons separate opinion in the same case, J. Makalintal said that the case at bar is

justiciable since enrolled copy of the resolution and the legislative journals are conclusive upon the courts based on Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act. No. 2210 as proof of due enactment of provisions of acts. - basis of the enrolled bill theory: respect due to coequal and independent departments which requires the judicial department to accept, as having passed the Congress, all bills authenticated by it.

Ratio NO. The final passage of the bill ends the lawmaking process and the certification/attestation of

the bill is only a mode of authentication devised by the Congress which does not add the validity of the bill nor cure any defect already present upon it.

Obiter effects of Attestation of the bill: just a mode of authentication; signify the Chief Executive that

the bill being presented to him has been duly approved by Congress and is ready for his approval or disapproval Ratio YES. If attestation is absent and is not mandated in the Constitution for the validity of a statute,

the courts may resort to the journals and other records of Congress for proof of its due enactment. Obiter Attestation by the presiding officers is not mandated in the Constitution as a proof of due

enactment of a bill, but requires a Journal of the Congress proceedings [comparison of Constitutions: 1935 consti vs 1987 Consti: Sec 10(4) = Art VI, sec 26 (2); Sec. 21(2) = Art VI, sec 27(1)]

Ratio NO. Given that (1) the Court could resolve the issue regarding the enrolled bill doctrine, (2) that

the Court could use the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress and, in the absence of the latter, the records of the proceedings of the Congress entered into the Journals of Congress as proof of the due enactment of RA 4065 since the law is deemed enacted after the passage of the bill in the 3rd reading and the attestation of the presiding officers just serve as a mode of authenticating the bill, (3) that, upon referring to the journal entries of the proceedings of congress, the Court discovered that substantial and lengthy amendments were introduced to the HB but were not incorporated in the printed text which was signed by the President of the Philippines, and (4) that the President of the Philippines and of the Senate already withdrew their signatures, then RA 4065 was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a law.

Decision RA 4065 was declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become law. TRO

made permanent. [8 concur, 2 no part, 1 did not take part (I dont know the difference), 1 on leave = 12 only]

Angara vs Electoral Commission

ANGARA

ELECTORAL COMMISSION [63 PHIL. 139 1936]

Nature of the Case: Original Action to the SC. Petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the ELECOM from taking further cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua against the election of the petitioner as a member of the NA Facts of the Case: The new constitution for the Independent Philippine Commonwealth was just promulgated. The petitioner, Angara, ran for the position of representative of the First District of the Province of Tayabas to the NA Septmeber 17, 1935 against Ynsua (one of the respondents) and others. On October 7, he was proclaimed by the provincial board of canvassers as the candidate who won the most votes and thus the winner. He took his oath of office on Novermber 15 (the start of the Commonwealth) and was confirmed by the NA on December 3 as an uncontested member of the NA. Also on this day, Res#8 was passed by the NA, confirming the membership of nonprotested elections of members of the NA and, in effect, limiting the time for presentation of protests. However, there was the ELECOM, which was a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide all cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the NA, was just being formed on December 4 and 6 and just met for the first time on December 9, fixing that day as the last day for the filing of election protests. Ynsua filed his Motion of Protest to the ELECOM on December 8, a day before the said body ended the period for filing of election protest. After that, Angara filed a Motion to Dismiss the Protest to the ELECOM on the grounds that he was already confirmed a member of the NA through the Res#8 and through that resolution, the prescribed period for filing of protests had already ended on December 3, and the respondent was late in filing his protest because he filed the protest after December 3. Ynsua filed an Answer to the Motion of Dismissal arguing that there was no constitutional or legal provision which stated that members of the NA cannot be contested after confirmationof the NA. Angara replied to this Answer but the ELECOM promulgated a resolution denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss the Protest. The Petitioner now files a protest to the SC, questioning the jurisdiction of the ELECOM over the case, arguing that:

the ELECOM has jurisdiction over the merits of contested elections to the NA but the NA has the power to regulate the proceedings of the NA, granted that ELECOM is part of the NA. ELECOM could only regulate its proceedings if the NA did not provide for it. Res#8 is valid and should be respected, granted that NA is the only body that could regulate the proceedings of the ELECOM Under Par13 of 1 of Ordinance appended to the Constitution and par6Art7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law as well as 1 and 2 of art VIII of the Constitution, SC has jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental questions raised in this issue because it involves the interpretation of the Constitution of the Philippines The Solicitor-General responded on behalf of ELECOM arguing that: ELECOM is a constitutional body invested with the jurisdiction to decide all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualification of the members of the NA and that Dec 9 was the date fixed by ELECOM as the last day of filing for protest and its resolution dated January 23, 1936 was an act of its legitimate exercise of quasi-judicial functions. Said act is beyond cognizance or control of SC. Res#8 did and could not deprive ELECOM of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the limit that the ELECOM would set. ELECOM is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, or board, or person Ynsua filed an anwer arguing that: Res#8 did not limit his filing for protest for ELECOM fixed the deadline on Dec 9 and not on the passage of Res#8, which was on Dec3 Respondent filed protest before ELECOM ended the period for filing election complaints ELECOM acquired jurisdiction over election protest and Jan 23 resolution of ELECOM denying the Motion to Dismiss the Protest was not reviewable by the SC by means of a writ of prohibition since it was part of ELECOMs jurisdiction No constitutional nor legal provision requires the confirmation of members of the NA and that the said confirmation could not limit the period for filing protest

ELECOM is an independent constitutional entity with quasi-judicial functions and thus, its decisions are final and unappealable; also ELECOM is a constitutional creation which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person and is not subject to a writ of prohibition from the SC Par6,art7 of Tydings-McDuffie Law is not applicable Issues: WON the SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM and the subject matter of the controversy WON, if ever the first is granted, ELECOM acted within or without its jurisdiction in assuming cognizance of the protest filed against the election of Angara Held & Ratio: Yes. The SC has jurisdiction over the ELECOM: separation of powers granted by Consti (through separate articles for each branch) but check and balances maintain coordination among the branches. When there are conflicts between the boundaries of powers and functions of each branch, the Judiciary has the power to review and resolve these conflicts through Judicial Review (referred to as Judicial Supremacy). This however is limited to actual cases and controversies. Yes. ELECOM acted within its jurisdiction since ELECOM is recognized as an independent quasi-judicial body which is not an inferior tribunal, or corporation, board, or person, and is granted the powers to be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the NA. The present constitution granted the ELECOM with all the powers exercised by the legislature relating to the said function of ELECOM, and this includes the regulation of the rules and procedures of election protests. The confirmation of NA of its members is not required and does not limit the ELECOM of its power to fix dates for election protest, or else this would undermine the power and functions of the ELECOM. DECI: petition for writ of prohibition denied, with costs against the petitioner.

Abbas et. al. vs Senate

166 SCRA 651 October 27, 1988 EN BANC/ Gancayco, J. Petitioners: Firdusi Smail Abbas et al. Respondent: The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)

Nature: Special Civil Action for certiorari to review the resolutions of the Senate Electoral Tribunal Facts: On October 9, 1987 the petitioiners filed before the SET an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in May 11, 1987 congressional elections by COMELEC. SET was composed of 3 Justices of the SC and 6 Senators. (Justices Yap, Narvasa and Gutierrez; Senator Estrada, Gonzales, Guingona, Lina Jr., Tamano and Ziga). Senator Joseph Estrada resigned from the SET, and was replaced by Senator Enrile. On November 17, 1987 petitioners filed with the SET a motion for disqualification or inhibation of the Senator-members thereof from the hearing and resolution of the election contest on the ground that they are all interested parties to the case.

Some members of the SET voluntarily inhibited themselves from participating in the hearing and deliberations of the tribunal in the cases against them. After the filing of respective memorandas and oral arguments, the motion for disqualification or inhibition and motion for consideration of the petitioners were denied. Hence, the present case. Issue: Petitioners contend that consideration of public policy, fair play and due process require the mass disqualification of the SETs Senatormembers. And that the SETs rules of procedure should be amended in order to permit the contest to be decided only by the 3 Justice-members. Ruling: The petitioners proposal is constitutionally infirm. 1. By providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty and uthority of deciding all contests relating ti the election, returns and qualifications of Senators. 2. The said intent is clearly signalled by the prescribed membership of the SET which is 2 to 1 (6 senators, 3 justices). It is an unmistakable indication that the legislative component cannot be totally excluded. 3. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the Tribunal, Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.

4. Every member of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective or partial judgment. RATIO The Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justice-Members alone the power of valid juirsidiction of a senatorial election contest. Dispostion: The petition for certiorari is dismissed for lack of merit. Vote: 11; 3 took no part members of SET

Lazatin vs COMELEC I
Lazatin v. House Elec. Tribunal December 8, 1988, Cortes, J. (Mars Veloso)

Facts: Lazatin and Timbol ran for the office of Representative in the 1st District of Pampanga. Because of Timbols objection to the inclusion of certain electoral returns, COMELEC initially ordered the suspension for proclaiming the winning candidate but later recanted this order and allowed the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim Lazatin as congressmanelect. Timbol filed two petitions: one to declare proclamation as void ab initio and the other to prohibit Lazatin from assuming office. Regardless of the petition, Lazatin was able to assume office on June 30, 1987. COMELEC later declared the proclamation to be void ab initio on Sept. 15 of the same year. Lazatin challenged the COMELEC resolution in the SC, which subsequently set aside the COMELEC proclamation on Jan. 28, 1988. On Feb. 8, 1988, Timbol filed in the HRET an election protest. Lazatin, upon being denied by the HRET to dismiss the petition, again brought the case to the SC challenging the jurisdiction of HRET on the ground of the petition being filed late [See Issue]. The first issue being resolved as discussed below, Timbol filed a counter-case in the SC to annul the resolution of the HRET. However, SC ruled that jurisdiction for such a petition lies within the HRET itself. Issues/ Held/Ratio: WON the protest was filed on time and thus allowing HRET jurisdiction to try the case. Lazatin, petitioner: Period for filing protests governed by Sec. 250 Ombnibus Election Code. Since the effective date of the proclamation was on Jan. 28 and the said section only allows 10 days, the petition is therefore late and the HRET should have no jurisdiction.

Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. HRET, respondent: Sec. 9 of HRET is applicable. Since it allows 15 days, the protest was filed on time and is thus cognizable by the HRET. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections shall be filed with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or mailed at the post office as registered matter addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together with twelve (12) legible copies thereof plus one (1) copy for each protestee, within fifteen (15) days from the effectivity of these Rules on November 22, 1987 where the proclamation has been made prior to the effectivity of these Rules, otherwise, the same may be filed within fifteen (15) days from the date of the proclamation. Election contests arising from the 1987 Congressional elections filed with the Secretary of the House of Representatives and transmitted by him to the Chairman of the Tribunal shall be deemed filed with the Tribunal as of the date of effectivity of these Rules, subject to payment of filing fees as prescribed in Section 15 hereof. Court: Sec. 250 of the Omnibus Election Code is inapplicable because it pertains to petitions filed before COMELEC contesting election of members of the Batasang Pambansa: not the HRET, nor the House of Representatives. It must be read in conjunction with Sec. 249 of the same code which defines COMELEC as the sole judge of contests relating to electoral returns and qualifications. No HRET existed during the 1973 Constitution. Even though petitioner would contend that provisions of the Omnibus Election Code were used in the 1987 congressional elections, it does not imply that all the provisions are applicable.

An examination of the Omnibus Election Code and the executive orders specifically applicable to the May 11, 1987 congressional elections reveals that there is no provision for the period within which to file election protests in the respective Electoral Tribunals. Thus, the question may well be asked whether the rules governing the exercise of the Tribunals' constitutional functions may be prescribed by statute. The power of the HRET, as the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives, to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before it, is beyond dispute.

Lazatin vs COMELEC II