TEL-AVIV UNIVERSITY Faculty of Humanities Department of Philosophy

THE CAUSAL STRUCTURE OF ACTION

This work is presented as a thesis towards the M.A. degree

by

Asher Idan 1982

This work has been carried out under the supervision of Prof. Marcelo Dascal

December 1981

1 ABSTRACT

"The problem of causality lies at the foundation of all the sciences which attempt to provide a systematic explanation of human behavior (such as economics, sociology, psychology and history)". J. Raz, Practical Reasoning

The central question which will be discussed in my work is: What are the causes which cause, or the reasons which bring about the beginning of an action? The terms "cause", "reason", "brings about", "beginning", "creation" and "action" are problematic. They have many meanings and uses which point to different theories and presuppositions. These terms were used in domains such as the philosophy of action, the philosophy of science, ethics, metaphysics, theology, psychology, etc. At this point, I will not define these terms; I will only present a few examples and show some of the presuppositions behind them.

Causes and reasons: One of the formulas in everyday language to which these terms are connected is "P because q". Examples are: 1. The dam has been destroyed (natural event) because of the heavy rain (natural event). 2. I bought an umbrella (human action) because of the heavy rain (natural event). 3. I left the class (human action) because I thought that the teacher doesn't understand the subject (a proposition). 4. I concluded that the teacher is not an expert (a proposition) because I thought that he doesn't understand the subject (a proposition).

In the formula, as well as in the examples, the term "because" is ambiguous. Sometimes "q" is a cause (example 1) and sometimes it is a reason (example 4). It is common to say that the connection between events is causal (example 1) and the connection between propositions is logico-semantical (example 4). Thus, we find two "kinds" of because: "causal because" and "logico-semantical because". Examples 2 and 3, however, are problematic since there we find a mixture of an event and an action (example 2), or of a proposition and an action (example 3). What are the kinds

2 of "because" in 2 and 3? 2 is not pure causal as in 1 since we have an intuition that the heavy rain didn't cause deterministically and exclusively the bringing of an umbrella. We must at least add my decision to buy an umbrella, because in the same situation, I could decide to buy a coat. In 3 the "because" relation is not purely logicosemantical as in 4, since we have an intuition that my opinion (or thought) about the teacher can be regarded as a reason that caused me to leave the class. In 3 my opinion had some causal function, it moved my body out of the class.

The presuppositions which stand behind the problematic explanation of examples 2 and 3 can be explicated by pointing to the following three "paradigms" in the philosophy of action: A. There are no differences between causes and reasons. Either by reducing causes to reasons (Schopenhauer and, in a sense, Spinoza, too, both of whom argue that all kinds of "because" are of a logical kind) or by reducing reasons to causes (radical behaviorists who will say that all kinds of "because" are of a causal kind). B. There are differences between causes and reasons of the following kind: 1) I, as an actor, have an experience of my reason while I, as an observer, can only conclude that "9 is the cause of P" (Taylor, 1974). 2) Reasons are parts of a rule-governed human activity while causes are not (Wittgenstein). 3) Reasons are usually connected with normativity while causes are connected with descriptivity (Bar-On, 1975). I think that this "paradigm" doesn't have a clear answer to the question of what kinds of "because" occur in examples 2 and 3 (Why?). C. Actions are connected with events and with propositions. Only an action can bridge the gap between the physical-causal and the intentional (or mental)logical. Thus, the "because" in examples 2 and 3 is of a dual kind: it is a causallogical relation (Danto 1976, and mainly Marx, Bergson, and other philosophers of praxis).

Creation and beginning: The creation of x can be regarded in some theories as a simple sum of the parts of x, while in other theories as more than the simple sum of the parts of x. Theories about the beginning have connections with theories about causes, reasons and creation. Thus, "x began because y" can mean either that x was created by y, or that at a certain point in time or space y has triggered an already existing x to appear.

Action: Action is usually distinguished from the following things: A, a natural event. B, a human movement which was physically caused by a natural event (man that falls because of a strong wind), or by another human being, or by a nervous spasm. C, a spontaneous movement of a limb (heart's beats). D, a human situation (like fear of hunger). Here I characterize an action only negatively. Since an action is the central concept in my work, I will characterize it positively throughout my presentation of the different solutions to the central problem. I will do the same about the presuppositions which stand behind the different meanings and uses of the term "action". In the course of my work, actions will be discovered as complex entities of different kinds. Each kind has a characteristic combination of components and "mechanisms". * * * I will discuss, compare and criticize the different solutions to the central problem. The objectives are two-fold: A, to bring together the main points made in the wide and renewed philosophical discussion, conducted mainly in the current century, especially after World War II. B, to point to what, in my opinion, are the most

comprehensive and adequate solutions. I conclude my analysis with an outline for a unified theory of the causal structure and dynamics of action. * * *

Chapter 1 includes both a primary clarification of the central question and a summary of the main answer to it.

In Chapter 2 I begin by introducing Ryle's and Wittgenstein's criticism of traditional volitional theories of action (and of mentalistic theories in general). Ryle argues that the theories which claim that volitions are the causes of actions, are vague and inconsistent. Wittgenstein sharpened the central problem by asking: What remains from "I raise my arm" after we subtract the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm? I see Wittgenstein's question as a version of our central problem since it can be formulated as: What is the cause (or reason) which begins the raising of my arm? An answer to Wittgenstein's question can be that "what remains" is a certain x (The question, of course, is what is this "x"!!), and this x (reason, intention, experience, etc.) can be the cause which we are looking for in our central question.

4 Danto and Davidson were two of the first philosophers who tried to cope with the challenge of Ryle and Wittgenstein. Danto presents the concept of basic action in order to avoid the need for causes which begin every action. Basic actions can be performed or can begin but can not be caused by something. Davidson answered that reasons can cause actions, although they are not causes of a physical kind. Reasons are less deterministic causes than physical causes. By pointing to reasons as the causes of actions, Davidson can answer mot of Ryle's questions. To Wittgenstein he can say that "what remains" is the reason. Chisholm and Taylor answer to Ryle's and Wittgenstein's questions by their theories of immanent causality of the agent. According to their theories, the agent has a special "power" of "immanent causality". Thus, the agent is the cause of his/her actions.

Nevertheless, we can go on and ask about these three answers. But what is in a reason, or in an agent, or in a basic action, that causes my limb (or part of it) to wave, and how the process of this causing happens? I think that this is analogical to the fruitful question: But what is the atom that can scatter particles so widely, and how the process of scattering happens? The answers to these questions are no less than Bohr's theory, which was the beginning of nuclear physics.

In Chapter 3, I present Leibniz's solution to the central problem. I argue that Ryle's criticism and the answers considered in the preceding chapter, were concerned mainly with the "Cartesian paradigm" which in philosophy. modified But by there is a

competitive

"Leibnizian

paradigm"

was

"pre-analytical"

philosophers like Bergson, Husserl and Schutz. Ryle's criticism is a partial one since it is directed to volitional theories within the "Cartesian paradigm". Ontologically, Leibniz argues that every body of particle has inherent movements in different degrees (against Descartes who relied on a strict dichotomy between the inert and the moving). Epistemologically, he argues that every body or particle has "small perceptions" in different degrees of consciousness (against Descartes who relied on the dichotomy between the mental which is conscious and the physical which is unconscious). Praxiologically, Leibniz argues that an action can begin or be cause as a result of combinations of more conscious and less conscious processes and events (process is a serial and/or structural event). There is no exclusive cause which begins an action from a "resting situation" (Leibniz directed this argument against Locke, and I also apply it against Danto), or from a balanced situation (against Bayle). Leibniz thinks that an action neither begins nor is created absolutely. It is a result of a gradual process of growth in the degree of movement and of

5 consciousness. Intentions or volitions alone can not cause limbs to move. The "mental" (in Descartes' paradigm) is not always the "mover" of the "physical" and vice-versa. There is a special kind of connection between the "mental" and the "physical". This connection is gradual and two-directional. The "mental" is intensified by the growth of consciousness to the "small perceptions", and the "physical" is intensified by the growth of the degree of movement. A little growth of the one contributes to a little growth of the other and vice-versa. Thus, we have here a kind of "feedback process".

In Chapter 4, I present solutions of preanalytical philosophers. Bergson modifies Lebniz's theory of the small and unconscious perceptions, and emphasizes movement as a primary quality of every organism. Action is not a result of intentions or volitions which precede an action (against J.S. Mill). Philosophers belonging to the "cortesian paradigm" do not investigate action in its "natural" and everyday context (a person who goes to work, a dancer in his performances, etc.), but in an "artificial context", typical of an introspective philosopher or of a scientist in a laboratory (the raising of an arm, an isolated movement of a finger) or in hospital. In the "natural context" there are a series of movements with many causes before them and with many purposes towards which these movements are directed. In this context, action is a result of an emergetic enlargement of a whole which is composed of many components. It is like an apple (or like drops of rain/ or like a snowball) which grows gradually as a result of many components and at a certain point falls from the tree. Of course, our intentions, volitions, reasons, beliefs, etc., are components in that process. But they are only partial causes. Later, in chapter 7, I shall show how Apostel explicates this "emergentic entity".

Husserl made an important contribution to the philosophy of action by emphasizing the importance of Brentano's notion of intentionality. According to Husserl, the person has an intentional-hierarchical field where the lower level is directed to the higher level and the higher level "organizes" the lower level. This structure leads from plurality in the lower levels to a relative unity in the higher levels. In a given situation, we can find in the higher level a unity which is the object of internationality towards which the action is directed and intended. An action begins after a gradual process of concentration of the agent from peripheral and imfocussed intentionality to a central and focussed one, which is directed to the object of intentionality.

6 Schulz adds social factors to the "Leibnizian paradigm". He emphasized the importance of the biography of a person and of his society to the causal structure of his actions, by introducing two central notions: a system of typicality and a system of relevance.

In chapter 3, I return to the discussion of volitional theories belonging to the analytical tradition. These are sophisticated volitional theories since they try to cope with the challenges of Ryle and Wittgenstein. Goldman's theory is particularly sophisticated since it goes a long way towards a synthesis between ideas from the analytical philosophy of action and ideas from preanalytical philosophy of action (especially W. James). Sellars characterizes action by two factors: A, it is something which is caused by a volition. But, a volition x to do y will not necessarily cause y; it can cause another action z. B, violitions are a kind of talk without sound. Goldman begins by criticizing Sellars' "correspondence theory" which connects volitions to actions. Goldman argues that: 1, An agent does not fit a propositional volition (like: "I will do x now".) for every action, or for a "whole" set of actions. 2, There is a need for distinguishing between propositional volitions which usually are the focus of the phenomenal field and nonpropositional volitions which are in the periphery. (In chapter 6, I show that this distinction is parallel to Searle's distinction between Intention-before-action and Intention-in-action.) 3, An action can be caused by a primary volition or by a

secondary volition. Primary volition is a kind of memory (which can be voluntary) of an accidental action which was performed earlier (W. James called it an ImageResponse).

Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 are the central chapters of this thesis. In chapter 6, I discuss Searle's analysis and use of certain concepts from the phenomenological tradition, especially the concept of Intentionality. He makes a synthesis of ideas from phenomenology with ideas from analytical philosophy and clarifies the conceptual background for our central problem. Searle distinguishes between two kinds of intentions: A, intention-before-action which is very important for understanding the causal structure of action. This kind of intention has the property of self-reference of the representational content of the intention-before-action. This property enables the agent to begin. B, Intention-in-action which is less explicit than the first kind of action by ordering himself ("self-order"). Only combinations of all three components: intentional experience, body movement, and an external event (like the falling of a stone), can be regarded as an action. The existence of only one or two components

7 does not generate an action. A lack of closeness between the content of the intention and the description of the (movement + event, which is caused by this intention) makes the process to be a non-action, according to Searle.

Dascal and Gruengard think that not only semantics (closeness between content and description) can be used as a criterion for demarcation between action and nonaction, but also syntax and intonation. They have also extended the domain of the reference of intentionality from references to international objects to references to intentional subjects.

I begin Chapter 7 by presenting Apostel's simple model of action, by means of which he begins to explicate the causal structure of action. Apostel modifies some of Searle's ideas by his analysis of non-verbal contents (pictorial) of intentions and by pointing to the dynamical character of intentions. Intentions, reasons, volitions, etc, are only partial causes of an action. Only combinations of many partial causes can cause an action in a natural context (Bergson). The relations between intentions and limbs and between limbs and objects are like relations between instrument and material (e.g. a hammer and a wall). Only when certain combinations of partial causes which serve as instruments are directed to certain materials, a coherent structure of field or gestalt can be created (coherent structure is a structure which, at a certain point, has no "conflicts"; e.g., when, in a given situation we don't have a feeling of hunger and a reason or a will to be thin). Only a coherent structure can cause an action according to the following scheme:

8 In a similar way to a given electric field which can organize particles of metal in a characteristic structure in space, the intentional field can organize and combine intentions, beliefs, volitions, feelings, etc, in a characteristic structure in a certain situation. Among the constraints and causes of the combinations of the intentional field there are reasons, roles, and the self. Apostel does not define exactly how constraint x causes combination y. I think that these are very complex relations and connections, which future research, using statistical and/or fuzzy methods, will clarify.

From the point of view of the analysis of Searle and Apostel, the previous theories seem to be partial solutions to the central problem, i.e., "partial causes". Some of the theories see only the "tree" (volutional theories) and others see only the "forest" (agent theories). Apostel's view is a mereological one which investigates the relations between wholes and their parts in two levels: I. The levels of the objects of research which are the actions, their structure, and their causes: Here the parts are intentions, actions, volitions, reasons, limbs, objects, etc., and the whole is the person. The mereological analysis enables Apostel to investigate action not in a dichotomic way but in a hierarchical one. The whole in level n functions as a part in relation to level n+1. In the following scheme we can see that intention-before-action (IBA) can

Function as a whole in comparison to some intention-in-action (IIA), and simultaneously as a part in comparison to the agent. We can continue hierarchy up and down. The person can function as a part in comparison to the family, and a family as a part to society, etc. IIA can also function as a whole in comparison to its sub-intentions (as Searle showed), and sub-intentions to synaptic transfers, etc. The question of the upper and the lower limits has been discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. This hierarchial structure is connected to the complexity and heterogenity of the structure of action. Ryle, for example, writes:

9 "the higher-grade dispositions of people with which this inquiry is largely concerned are, in general, not single track dispositions but, . . . , indefinitely heterogeneous." (1949:44)

These characteristics of the structure of action enable the person to be flexible and 'creative' in his actions. In a given situation, for example, a person can have, in an organized way, in level n1: a hand, an intention, a volition and a representation. A certain reason can function in level n as an organizer.

Apostel closes the discussion of the "object level" by defining the connection between person and action: An agent a has an intention i and he performs behavior b which realizes i, if the personality of a (the organized and directed gestalt) causes the organization of I and if the connection between the different parts of the personality of a causes this intention to be executed by the body of a.

II.

The methodological level of Apostel's mereological discussion: Most of the previous theories can be combined as parts of a comprehensive

theory (as a whole). This theory will regard a person as a whole with the following parts: agent, thinker, user of symbols, receiver of social roles, user of tools, etc. By this comprehensive and synthetic theory, Apostel leads to what I call a universal progmatics or a philosophical theory of the person which includes: 1, pragmatics of action that investigates the relations between actions, intentions, etc., and the person, and through the person to the world. 2, Semantics of action that investigates the relations between actions, intentions, etc. and the world (without reference to the person). This semantics can include semantics of language (or of symbols) which investigates the relations between representations (which can be parts of intentions)

10 and the world. 3, Syntax of action which investigates the relations between actions, intentions, reasons, etc. (without reference to the world or to the person). 4, Mereology which investigates the formal relations between parts and wholes. 5, Logico which will be adequate for discussing actions, intentions, and other extralinguistic entities. 6, Theory of causality which will investigate the relations

between events, actions and persons. 7, Theory of time and change (Nowakowska's theory, 1981). 8, Theory of personality which will integrate existing theories from psychology and phenomenology.

In chapter 8, I outline a unified-procedural theory of action which will integrate some of the ideas from the previous chapters. Procedures are a kind of rituals which organize physical, linguistic and intentional elements in a hierarchical, directional, dynamical and modular way. In a given procedure we can find in an organized way: intentions, wills, reasons, unconscious processes, intentional objects and subjects, etc. In the structure of a procedure, level n can function as a tool which directs the material in level n-1. The structure is dynamical because what functions as a tool for purpose p1 can "change" and become material for purpose p2. Thus, the structure is also modular (as in modular furniture where a shelf of a library can function as a table or can be used as a part of a closet).

Before presenting the outline for a procedural theory, I have summarized the findings of my work about physical actions, linguistic (or semiatic) actions, and "epistemic actions". I try to explicate their structure and their components. I think I found the common structure of semiatical and physical actions by using the ideas of Dascal and Gruengard for extending the scope of the intentionality from objects to subjects. Thus, not only action is dual but intentionality too. In the case of self-intentionality (which includes self-reference) the intentionality is directed to my self or to my body (subject or object). Thus, the causes of an action can be the "other" (or a group of "others", e.g., society), or the physical world, or myself. My own intentions can also be used as instruments which can be directed to three causes (the physical, the social and myself), which can be regarded as materials of actions. Thus, a person is a dual being in two aspects: A, He can move himself and can be moved by causes. B, He is an object and a subject. As an object he can take part in causal processes of a physical kind. As a subject he can take part in causal processes of some other kind ("logico-semantical" in terms of Danto (1976), "rule governed", Wittgenstein (1953), "psychological", Davidson (1974), "immanent", Chisholm (1976) and Taylor (1974), "intentional", Brentano, Husserl and Searle (1981), "normative" Bar-On (1975).

11

internal self-causality External physical or socialcausality

Object I raise my arm Someone or something raise my arm

Subject I intend to change my opinion about x Someone (something) changes my opinion about x

I conclude the discussion dealing with the human duality, which is related also to the issue of freedom and determinism by quoting Goffman:

". . . face-to-face interaction provides an admirable context for executing a double stance the individual's task actions unrebelliously adhere to the official definition of the situation, while gestural activity that can be sustained simultaneously and yet noninterferingly shows that he was not agreed to having all of himself defined by what officially is in progress." (1969:85)