People vs Que Po Lay FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money

orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties. HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio. FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect. HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. FACTS: Que Po Lay is accused of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank requiring those who are in possession of foreign currency to sell the same to the Central Bank. Que Po Lay alleges that said circular was not published in the Official Gazette before he committed the act and therefore, it had no force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 has no force and effect HELD: Yes, the said Circular has no force and effect because it was not published. Article 2 of the new Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. While Central Bank Circular No. 20 is not of a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. Rules and regulations which prescribe a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. The public cannot be held liable for violations of laws or regulations unless they are informed of its contents and penalties for violation.

Garcia-Recio vs. Recio Facts: Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government. Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia. March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to Samson in November 1997. In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. Issues: 1. Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by Philippine Laws. 2. Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian decree of divorce. 3. Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad. Held: 1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 2. No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient. 3. Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties marriage on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs. SO ORDERED. FACTS: Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May 18, 1989. On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia. Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November 1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson. ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and absolved him of bigamy. HELD: The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a

foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either: (1) An official publication or (2) A copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be: (a) Accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) Authenticated by the seal of his office. Thus, the Supreme Court remands the case to the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City to receive or trial evidence that will conclusively prove respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner and thus free him on the ground of bigamy. FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and on January 12, 1994, he married Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent live separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. Their conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996 in accordance with their statutory Declarations secured in Australia. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. On July 7, 1998, respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Australia. The court admitted the evidence and declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce decree issued in Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. ISSUE: The two pivotal issues are (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner. RULING The petition is partly meritorious. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. The court ordered a REMAND of the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and falling in that of declaring the parties marriage void on the ground of bigamy. FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, married an Australian citizen named Editha Samson in 1987. Two years later a decree of divorce was released by the Australian government. On June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen and married a certain Grace Garcia in 1994 in Cabanatuan City with the former declaring that he was single and Filipino. Garcia filed a declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of bigamy alleging that Recio had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her and only had knowledge of it in 1997. Recio countered wifes claim asserting that he disclosed the previous marriage to her in 1993. Moreover, he contended that his first marriage had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in1989 making him legally capacitated to marry. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in Australia by Recio ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with Garcia. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that the divorce decree obtained by Recio does not ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Samson on the account that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. Article 15 and 17 of the Civil Code establish the rule that a marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. The Court highlights that before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. FACTS: Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, respondent entered into marriage with petitioner a Filipina on

January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Responded contended that his prior marriage had been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry petitioner. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent dissolved and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by respondent in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry. HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court cannot conclude that respondent who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry petitioner. Neither can the court grant petitioners prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry petitioner as result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.

D.M. Consunji vs. CA and Juego FACTS: On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable. Held: The decision of the CA is affirmed. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund FACTS: Around 1:30PM of November 2, 1990, Jose Juergo, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji Inc. fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City. He was immediately rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig City. The attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo, pronounce Jose dead on arrival (DOA) at around 2:15PM. Jose Juergo, together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo, performing their work as carpenter at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building were on board a platform. Jose was crushed to death when the platform fell due to removal or looseness of the pin, which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. Luckily, Jessie and Delso jumped out of safety. PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed report dated Nov. 25, 1990. Maria Juergo, Joses widow filed a complaint on May 9, 1991 for damages in the RTC and was rendered a favorable decision to receive support from DM Consunji amounting to P644,000. DM Consunji seeks reversal of the CA decision. ISSUE: Whether Maria Juergo can still claim damages with D.M. Consunji apart from the death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund. HELD: The respondent is not precluded from recovering damages under the civil code. Maria Juergo was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She filed the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners personnel. Supreme Court remanded to the RTC of Pasig City to determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC). Should the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. Facts: On Nov. 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a compliant for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition. Issue: WON the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable. Ruling. The decision of the CA is affirmed. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Facts: On May 9, 1991, private respondent Maria Juego filed in the Pasig Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner for the death of her husband Jose juego. Jose was employed by petitioner as a construction worker. While working on November 2,1990, Jose fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower in Pasig. He died. Maria availed of

the death benefits form the State Insurance Fund. Petitioner is claiming that she can no longer recover damages under the Civil Code because her prior availment of the benefits form the State Insurance Fund. The trial court and CA decided in favour of maria. Issue: Whether Marias availment of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code amounts to a waiver of her rights to claim for damages from petition under the Civil Code? Held: No because maria was not only ignorant of the fact but of her rights as well. Marias election of the death benefits does not bar any action inconsistent with the elected remedy. For a waiver to become valid, there must be an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a rights, there is no basis upon which waiver of its can rest. Waiver requires acknowledge of the right waived with an awareness of its consequences. Thus ignorance of material fact negates waiver

CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY Facts: Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the end of every semester. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to finish his last term in law school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued unless he pays the amount of the tuition fees that were returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest. Issue: Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid or not. Held: The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void. Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered. FACTS: Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. He finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year. During all the time he was studying law in defendant University, he was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total of P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and agreement which provides that in consideration of the scholarship granted to him by the University, he waives his right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash. For the last semester of his law studies, plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad Santos University and graduated therefrom. After graduating in law he applied to take the bar examination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant university to issue to him the needed transcripts. However, the defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case. ISSUE: Whether the said provision of the contract is valid. HELD: No. The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void. The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim. Facts: Plaintiff Emeterio Cui, studying law, received scholarship grants for scholastic merit at Arellano University. During his last semester of his fourth year, he left the defendant university and enrolled at Abad Santos University, wherein he finished his law degree. After graduating, he applied for the bar examinations. To secure to take the bar examinations, he needed the transcript of records from the defendant university. Defendant refused to give him a transcript until he paid back the tuition that the university returned when he was granted scholarship. According to the contract signed by the plaintiff, scholarships are good only if the student should continue in the same school. This contract was followed from Memorandum No. 38 made by the Director of Private Schools. Issue: Whether or not the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash valid or not? Held: The contract between plaintiff and defendant is not binding since the memorandum made by the Director of Private Schools is not a law. The provisions are only advisory and not mandatory in nature. Furthermore, the said officer had not authority to issue such memorandum and that provisions were not published in the Official Gazette.

Miciano vs Brimo Facts: Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and the testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in connection with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were the following: (1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition, (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business, and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws. Issue: Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippines. Held: Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, where it was provided, nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated. However, the oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testatrix was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous. Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen. ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph Brimos estates. HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions. The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees. Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen, though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Pilapil vs Ibay-Somera Facts: This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI. Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7 September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manilawhere their only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage. 27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. Several motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Issues: (1. Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former husband. (2. Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery against the petitioner. Held: (1. The petitioners family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound to Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However, Philippine laws recognize decrees validly and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse who obtained a divorce decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law. (2. As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the action for adultery under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other. WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. FACTS: Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983. The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued. HELD: The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. FACTS: On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at Friedenweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983. Pilapil, petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before RTC of Manila on January 23, 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case. On January 15, 1986, the local Court of Germany

promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to respondent, petitioner had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspend further proceedings thereon. Respondent judge merely reset the date of the arraignment but before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the suspension of proceedings. On September 8, 1987, respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and fined. ISSUE: Whether or not the case for adultery should prosper. RULING: The petition entered dismissing the complaint in criminal case was upheld for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case was made permanent. The law provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is admitted. Private respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Short summary: After obtaining a divorce decree in Germany, German ex-husband of Filipina wife sued the latter for adultery. The court held that since they were already divorced, there's no marital relationship to protect and the exhusband has no COA. Facts: -IMELDA MANALAYSAY-PILAPIL (fil) and ERICH GEILING (german) were married in Germany, stayed in RP -marital discord >>> separation de facto -GEILING initiated divorce proceedings in GERMANY. Pending decision of German courts, Imelda filed action for legal separation, support and separation of property. -GERMAN COURT granted DIVORCE. -Afterwards, GEILING sued IMELDA for ADULTERY Imelda had affairs w/ 2 other men during their marriage >>>initially dismissed for lack of sufficient evidence >>>Reconsidered, refiled -IMELDA filed MOTION TO QUASH: no jurisdiction, as the complainant is not the "OFFENDED SPOUSE" there being a final decree of divorce already >>denied. This case is the special civil action for the annulment of the order denying the motion to quash. Issue: WON COURT HAS JURIDICTION OF THE ADULTERY CASE, IT BEING THAT FOREIGNER EX-HUSBAND ALREADY OBTAINED A FINAL DECREE IN HIS COUNTRY GRANTING THEIR DIVORCE? Held: NO -in adultery charge, status of the complainant as the "OFFENDED SPOUSE" important -offended spouse: still married to accused at the time of filing of complaint -since here, already divorced, then not the offended spouse which the law requires -ON ALLEGATION THAT HE DID NOT KNOW ABOUT THE AFFAIRS WHEN THEY WERE STILL MARRIED SO HE COULD NOT HAVE FILED IT THEN: no matter. >No longer a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of marriage is decreed. >No danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family (rationale for adultery law) -ON ARGUMENT THAT RPC INTENDED TO PUNISH ADULTERY ALTHOUGH THE MARRIAGE IS AFTERWARDS DECLARED VOID: can't file adultery charge after divorce, which declares the marriage void ab initio. The case used to support such argument contemplated a situation when the adultery charge was filed before a judicial declaration for nullity ab inition of the marriage was rendered (or in this case, if it was filed before the judicial decree of divorce was final). Facts: On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births, marriage and deaths in Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where they had a daughter. After three and a half years of disharmonic marriage, private respondent Geiling initiated divorce proceedings against petitioner in his native Germany. He claimed that there was failure of the marriage and they had been living apart since 1982.While petitioner filed an action for Legal separation, support and separation of property before the

Regional Trial Court in Manila. On January 15, 1986, the Schoneberg local Court of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. On June 27, 1986, five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before theCity Fiscal of Manila alleging that during the marriage Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia and another man named Jesus Chua. After corresponding investigation, the assistant fiscal recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However upon review of the respondent City fiscal a resolution was approved and the cases were raffled to two branches of the RTC of Manila. On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice that the cases be dismissed. The Secretary of justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed city fiscal to inform the DOJ if the accused have already been arraigned and if not, to move to defer further proceedings and to elevate the entire record of the cases to his office for review. Pilapil filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer arraignment and to suspend further proceedings. As a result, one of the criminal cases was suspended, while the date of arraignment of the other was merely reset. During the arraignment of the criminal case, the William Chia pleaded not guilty while the petitioner refused not to be arraigned. The petitioner was then held in contempt and was detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. She later entered a plea of not guilty. On October 27, 1987 petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari on the ground that the court is without jurisdiction to decide and try the case. On March 29, 1988, the Secretary of Justice issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines and if the private respondent can file a complaint of adultery against the petitioner. Ruling: Yes, the divorce decree is valid in the Philippines. In the present case, the fact that the private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concern in view of the nationality principle on our civil law on the matter of the status of persons. Under this consideration, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The allegations of the private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other.

ROEHR V. RODRIGUEZ Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country. Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr, a German citizen, married a Filipina, Carmen Rodriguez in Germany. The marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC of Makati. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by the trial court. The petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Cout of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. Issue: Whether or not the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as support and custody of the children can be determined in our courts Held: Yes. In order to take effect, a foreign judgement must clearly show that the opposing party has been given ample opportunity to do sounder the Rules of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, the respondent was not given the opportunity to challenge the judgement of the German Court, therefore, legal effects of divorce must be determined in our courts. The court held that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody.