History of Modern Philosophy 10/24/11 Essay Topic 5 Leibniz The first thirteen of Leibnizs discourses on philosophy contain many

issu es such as the nature of God, the notions of substances and the nature of human free will. His ideas upon the nature of free will are perhaps the most interesti ng, for he seems to hint toward a metaphysical sense of the free will of man ins tead of actual free will. One begins to wonder if he was trying to apologize for the contradictory relationship between an omnipotent, omniscient deity and its o rdering of events when compared to the idea of human choice. How could a mortal have any sort of choice when such a pervasive entity exists dictating the condit ions of the universe, and that being said could Caesar have chosen to not cross the Rubicon? To examine this argument one must explore the discourses statements befor e the thirteenth which contains the actual story of Caesar and his expedition ac ross the Rubicon. Leibniz explains at length what God is, and the nature of perf ection in accordance with an amazingly powerful being. The first discourse state s, God, possessing supreme and infinite wisdom acts in the most perfect manner, n ot only metaphysically but also morally (Modern Philosophy 224). This idea is ver y important for now one has an example as to what exactly God is to Leibniz, an infallible being, which is a paragon of perfection. This God, who can never perf orm in any sense other than utter perfection, would therefore only create in the utmost fashion, since acting in a perfect manner would also extend to Gods craftsm anship. Leibniz furthers this claim, to act with less perfection than one could ha ve is to act imperfectly. To show that an architect could have done better is to find fault with his work (Modern Philosophy 225). Since this God we are speaking of is perfect than any design or intent he has manufactured he could never be c onsidered faulty, therefore this being would no longer be God. That being said s ince this being is God, it follows that humanity can never find anything at faul t with these designs or else they would be raising issue with God as to its own divine essence. This follows that the whole of events that have ever happened in the history of the universe have a proper and perfect design authored by God an d created to accomplish whatever their notion compromises. Therefore no substance could ever be able to produce an effect that was not considered to be the best and most perfect outcome possible. If this could h ave become the case than as mentioned earlier the architect has failed, but this architect cannot fail for God in his perfection would not be able to author an imperfection. If he had indeed fostered some sort of imperfection, this event wo uld in fact no longer be imperfection, but instead would be the most perfect out come possible. God has chosen the most perfect world and if Leibniz ascribes to th is, than whatever happens surely coincides with this perfect world (Modern Philo sophy 227). This is true for God creates and has knowledge of the notion of ever ything that exists. According to Leibniz, the nature of an individual substance is to have a notion so complete that it is sufficient to contain and allow us to d educe all the predicates of the subject to which this notion is attributed (Moder n Philosophy 228). A subjects notion is what defines it and determines all the predicates which are associated with it, and thus God knows the notions of all things and this allows him to know all the predicates that follow. It is thus impossible for a subject to deny its notion and therefore not fulfill itself to completion because God a lready has prior knowledge. Thus with this knowledge, the supposed idea of the c orrect or incorrect choice becomes immaterial, for whatever choice is made it ha s already been seen and therefore it automatically becomes the most perfect even t imaginable simply because it happened. One is confronted with the massive cont radiction inherent within Leibnizs defense of free will; he relies on metaphysica l permutations of reality that cannot ever exist. Once an event happens, any oth er event that could have existed instead is no longer necessary, for it has no t

angible reality. Furthermore it actually seems that Leibniz is calling into ques tion Gods own omnipotent plan, for he seems to allow for all these other occurren ces that lay outside of Gods realm. The thirteenth discourse explains fully how Leibnizs believes human will can stil l function in a universe designed and fully revealed to an omniscient being. The problems that arise with his theories are many however, and run afoul of contra dictions such as those mentioned earlier. Leibniz attempts to divide happenstanc e into what is contingent and what is necessary. However if God has foreseen the notions and therefore all that shall and will happen to an individual, and it i s based upon a perfect world that he has himself designed then it would have to follow that anything else is necessary. The future is contingent and based upon ones notions but those vary notions have already been determined and thus will ha ppen so in order for this world to remain orderly and perfect they also become n ecessary. This is the fatal flaw in Leibniz; he cannot after mentioning Gods powe r and perfect design in creating the world suddenly divorce them from humanity a s well. It is as if God is a direct tinkerer when it comes to celestial bodies, but the second humanity is involved he takes a step back, and does nothing. If h e is indeed omnipotent and omniscient you cannot then make exceptions to the rul e, or else the rule in the case of the words used, means nothing. God has freely chosen, a sequence based on Gods first free decree always to do wha t is most perfect and on Gods decree with respect to human nature, following out of the first decree, that man will always do (Modern Philosophy 231). For Leibniz human nature is a constant struggle to attain the utmost perfection that is pos sible given our notions and conditions. This idea is Gods will, and has been manu factured into the divine order of the universe, which is fitting for as mentione d God has chosen the most perfect world and thus inhabited with perfection seeki ng beings. Julius Caesar was a master of warfare and an adept politician, and conqueror alw ays hungering for more power. These characteristics are contained within his not ion and therefore are things he has to do as ordained by his creator, God (Moder n Philosophy 231). Caesar was simply acting upon his notions and those notions w ould lead him to conqueror the Roman Empire, however they were never his own act ions and he never had any semblance of free will in the slightest. If humans can be simplified into perfection seeking machines at their core, given a certain d irective and then told to accomplish it at all costs, it leaves no room for will whatsoever. God developed Julius Caesars notions and therefore the predicates that would foll ow, for example crossing the Rubicon and assuming the dictatorship of Rome. This outcome was the most perfect for him in order to accomplish his God ordained pr edicate, and he being a human and thus a perfection seeker had no choice but to comply. There are many other events that could have taken place for instance he did not have to cross the river, and in doing so not assume control of Rome. How ever that would prove that this order God has developed was not the best possible world and does not exist as Leibniz has argued. Since the event did happen histo rically one can argue against Leibniz that that was the most perfect outcome sin ce it happened, for had it not then surely one is not ,using Leibnizs own words, living in the most perfect would. Contingency suffers from an issue of consistency, for while the events are conti ngent on factors, as soon as they become reality they cross into the realm of th e necessary for God has decreed a certain event and therefore it becomes a part of the perfect world envisioned by Leibniz. Furthermore, if these events have be en decreed by God they are not exactly contingent, they are completely necessary for God is the author of all things and since he is omniscient and omnipotent w hatever he desires becomes reality. For example the crossing of the Rubicon illu strates this; Leibniz would argue that Caesar while he is dependent on following his God given notions of attaining the most perfect outcome has other options o pen to him. This does not prevent something less perfect from being and remaining possible will not happen since it is not is impossibility but its imperfection which causes i t to be rejected nothing is necessary whose contrary is possible (Modern Philosoph

y 231). This idea of imperfection is exactly what makes it impossible; this inhe rent contradiction makes any remaining defense Leibniz could muster useless. Hum ans seek perfection, it is Gods decree as Leibniz says of human nature, and there fore anything blatantly imperfect is pure metaphysics for it has no chance of ex isting in the real. Nothing is necessary whose contrary is possible is too broad a s tatement to be used in such a context. For example one could say, nothing is the contrary position to everything which exists, therefore nothing in all existence is necessary. Leibniz would likely argue that God is necessary for he is the ma ster and creator of the universe. That being said anything he has created would also be necessary since he was the author, thus everything that follows is neces sary according to his plan and there are no contingencies because they would be incompatible in this world of authorship. The counter argument, that one could imagine a more perfect outcome depending on what example one wishes to invoke is still moot, unless they wish to question G ods divine plan. The whole idea hinges on the reasoning that God still could imag ine a million different other outcomes that do not coincide with what actually h appened in history. It is true that Caesar physically did not have to cross at t hat moment over the Rubicon; the act of crossing that particular river is of no consequence however. The conqueror known as Caesar did contain within him a noti on to become dictator of Rome, no matter the costs for that is how he was create d. Arguing over which method, or the date he could have chosen is nonsensical, h e was eventually going to fulfill the perfection he was created for as all human s strive to, in whatever method was deemed the best at the moment. Thus the rive r crossing occurred because it was simply a means to an end, and not a choice ma de of free will as Leibniz would argue from the examination of all possibilities . There existed no possibilities as Leibniz would explain them, anything less than the perfect execution of events, such as crossing the river would be deemed imp erfect, but had they happened they then would be perfect because this reality on ly leaves room for the most perfect events based on notion. The principal of nec essary truths is incompatible with Gods ordered world for it is based upon a cont radiction of events that simply cannot happen realistically. If any sort of ques tion of contradiction in Gods order can be found then it loses all legitimacy and becomes moot. Simply, everything Caesar endured during his life time had to be necessary for if any individual event changed then he would never have been lead to that river, making the entire point useless. He was brought there meaning th at no contingent choices had been made concerning his life due to such a nuanced set of events which would be needed in order for that culminating crossing to h appen. Julius Caesar acting in accordance to his purpose as a perfection seeking human and his notion as the dictator of Rome had at no time the ability to not cross t he Rubicon. His action was preordained and was fated to happen due to how he was molded per se, and he had no ability at any time to deny this action or turn fr om his nature. Even though Leibniz attempts to provide space for human free will while maintaining a Judeo-Christian religious ethos, he fails due to his circul ar arguments and metaphysical scenarios. One cannot ascribe to an overbearing om nipotent deity that has control over every aspect of the universe and still conv ince oneself of free will. He does still provide valuable insight into the human condition, labeling humanity as perfection seeking individuals which seems quit e an accurate description if one but glances at the precession of human history.