TAKASAKI JIKID

Thoughts on Dhtu-vda and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies

T AKASAKI Jikid

HE FIRST THING that comes to mind in considering the major trends of the past ten years in Buddhist studies is the claim made by Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shir that the idea of tathgata-garbha (which happens to be my area of specialization) is a pseudo-Buddhist way of thinking, or is not Buddhist at all.1 Frankly, the claim came as something of a shock to me, and even now continues to weigh heavily on my mind. Since I have known Hakamaya and Matsumoto from the days when they attended my lectures as students and have kept up friendly relations with them ever since, I was not altogether unaware of their way of thinking and the path by which they arrived at their conclusions. The idea that tathgata-garbha thought has much in common with the teachings of the mainstream of Indian thought as represented by the Upaniads and Vednta philosophy is a point I have often made myself, and was hardly any cause for alarm. But it is quite another thing to conclude that such a way of thinking is not Buddhist simply because it is similar to the mainstream of Indian thought. Here I part company with them. As a form of Indian thought, it is only natural that Buddhism should have certain things in common with the mainstream of Indian thought that it would not, for example, have in common with Christianity or Islam. The problem, as I see it, is how one denes Buddhism. Some denitions may even permit one to speak of non-Buddhistic forms of Buddhism. But such talk is relative to the world of intra-Buddhist theoretical debate and should not be taken as absolute. But when I rst heard the claim that the doctrine of tathgata-garbha is not Buddhist I was reminded of Nichirens attack on other Buddhist schoolsthat

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nenbutsu leads to hell, Zen followers are devils, Shingon is the ruin of the nation, members of the Ritsu school are traitors, and so forthand dismissed them as having nothing to do with normal academic debate. Leaving to one side the question of whether or not tathgata-garbha thought is Buddhist (a gesture to which the proponents of the idea will no doubt object), I would like to have a brief look at Matsumotos proposed neologism dhtu-vda as pointing to the specic structure of the doctrine of tathgata-garbha. Tathgata-garbha thought and Buddhist Vijptimtravda thought in many ways stand opposed to each other. For instance, the doctrine of tathgata-garbha teaches the practice and attainment of a single vehicle (ekayna), while the Vijaptimtravda teaches three vehicles (triyna). Even so, I nd the term dhtu-vda a rather accurate expression of the common structure found in both. In this sense, it is a useful tool for discussing that question. The idea of dhtu-vda takes as its model terms such as andhiklikodhtu (a beginningless substance or basis), as expounded in the verses of the Mahyna-abhidharma Sutra,2 or eko dhtu (the one realm), as found in the even older Annatvpuratvanirdeaparivarta.3 These terms refer to the idea that samsara and nirvana exist together or share a single place or realm. This place is the context within which one passes, through practice, from samsara to nirvana. Those who experience this place as samsara are ordinary sentient beings; those who experience it as nirvana are Buddhas. For ordinary sentient beings, the tathgata-garbha refers to the hoped-for result of Buddhahood, from the perspective of that potential. The laya-vijna (store consciousness) has as its basis the causes of samsara, and these must be overturned or converted for one to attain nirvana. In the tathgata-garbha tradition, the manifestation of the bodhi-wisdom of the Dharma Body, which remains unmanifested in ordinary sentient beings, is called the Dharma Body that bears the mark of the conversion of the ground (of enlightenment). Certainly one may speak of this way of thinking as a dhtvasti-vda rather than a nya-vda. Nonetheless, the way of being (asti) referred to here is not of a substantialist or essentialist sort, but existential. It is a kind of being that lacks selfhood (antman). This is clearly the case at least in the teachings accompanying the two examples I have given. I refer to this idea of the continuity of samsara and nirvana through practice as ekadhtu-vda.4
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What, then, is the basis for this ekadhtu-vda, the unity or continuity of samsara and nirvana? This is where the idea of the dharmadhtu enters into the picture. The interpretation given in the Yogacara tradition is that the dharmadhtu is equivalent to causality (prattyasamutpda); in this sense it is the ground of the noble Buddha Dharma, the teachings of the Buddha.5 If one pursues the question further, one nds that this idea is based on the teaching of dharmadhtu in the Avatasaka Sutra, where the term was used in an attempt to explain the meaning of the Buddhas attainment of enlightenment. Still further back one discovers in the Sayuttanikya of the Pli canon the term s dhtu in the sense of the nature of all dharmas (dharmat).6 There is yet another, distinct, meaning of dharmadhtu given in the Abhidharma tradition, that is, as the things or phenomena that are the direct and indirect objects of our consciousness (as one of the eighteen categories of things). The term dhtu, then, has at least two meanings: the sense of realm or place (or the collection of things in that place), and the sense of a cause (or the common features that allow the classication of all the things into a single group). This double meaning is basic to the notion of dhtu-vda. Such double (or multiple) meanings are not uncommon in Buddhist terms. One need look no further than the word dharma, which can refer as well to a phenomenon itself as to the nature of a thing that distinguishes it from other things. The original Indian meaning was closer to the second meaning of the nature of a phenomenon. Grammatically speaking it is more accurate to use the term dharmin to refer to the phenomenon itself. Or again, consider the term prattyasamutpda. Originally it referred to the causal side of the process of conditioned arising, in contrast to prattyasamutpanna, which refers to the resultant side of the process. Tachikawa Musashi has pointed out recently that in Ngrjunas Mlamadhyamakakrik, the term prattyasamutpda must be understood as including the meanings of both the causal and the resultant side.7 Tachikawa goes on to note that Ngrjuna deliberately avoids distinguishing between these two meanings so as to preserve them both in his use of the term. Ngrjuna recognized that prattyasamutpda expresses the nature of all phenomena (dharmat), and that this is the meaning of emptiness (nyata). He did not, however, use the term dharmadhtu in its causal sense because he did not wish to acknowledge an independent dharma-nature apart from the phenomena themselves. In this sense
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Ngrjunas position could be called adhtu-vda, though he did not deny dharma-nature in the sense of prattyasamutpda or emptiness, nor did he deny nirvana as the goal of Buddhist practice. In the Vijptimtravda tradition, the relationship between phenomena (dharmas) and the dharmadhtu is spoken of in terms of the unity of samsara and nirvana, that is, as the realm (dhtu) that is the basis for conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. This realm is none other than the unconditioned dharma of nirvana. The tathgata-garbha tradition follows the same structure, except that it speaks in terms of the dharmakya and Buddha; that is, a Buddha is one who has correctly perceived dharmas (or the dharmadhtu), and such a one is called a Dharma Body because he has the Dharma as his body. Examples can be found in the gama Sutras, where this Bahuvrhi compound is used adjectivally, but it is the tathgata-garbha tradition that rst uses Dharma Body as an independent technical term. It is interesting to note that this term is also used in the sense of the accumulation of dharmas to mean the whole of the Buddhas teachings, or sarvadharma, such as in the teaching of the collection of dharmas in ve parts, of which the Buddhas qualities consist.8 The tendency to perceive the Buddha as one with the Dharma he has realized shares the same conceptual structure as the Upaniads, which teach that one becomes something by coming to know it. The problem comes down to this. Is dhtu-vda, or the way of thinking that is associated with dhtu-vda, an essential element of Buddhism? If it is essential, how far back in the history of Buddhist thought can it be traced? Can its origin be found in the thinking of the Buddha kyamuni himself? The reference to s dhtu in the Sayuttanikya mentioned above speaks of the establishment of this dhtu (that is, dependent origination as the regular nature of dharmas) as a law or truth in such a way that it is established from the outset, whether or not a Tathagata appears in the world to discover and perceive it correctly. But this particular passage seems to stem from a period after prattyasamutpda had become established as the basis of the Buddhas teaching. The same idiomatic phrase (whether or not a Tathagata appears in the world) is used in the Aguttaranikya to speak of the three characteristics of dharmas, beginning with the transience of all things, as the established law or truth, but this also appears to be a later development.9 Hence it is difcult to prove that the idea of dhtu as prattyasamutpda is directly connected
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with the Buddha himself. There is, however, a passage in the Sutra of the Castle City [Nagara] of the Sayuttanikya that, while not linked to the doctrine of prattyasamutpda, refers to the Buddha as simply one who has discovered the Dharma.10 In this context the Eightfold Path is presented as the same path that all Buddhas from time out of mind have trod. The same may be said of the discovery of the truth of prattyasamutpda. The opening Chapter on the Buddha of the Nidna-Sayutta (section XII of the Sayuttanikya) claims that the Seven Buddhas of the Past all realized the teaching of prattyasamutpda, and that eyes, wisdom, insight, and light were aroused concerning the undiscovered Dharma.11 While these may not be the direct words of the Buddha, it is certainly true that the Buddha did not present himself as the author of the Path but only as one who discovered what was already there, one who saw the Dharma and thus awoke as a Buddha to become himself a teacher of that same Dharma. The Dharma is what the Buddha saw and what he taught. It is the foundation of Buddhism. In this sense Buddhism is different from the Indian mainstream that takes the idea of atman=brahman as its foundational doctrine, which is where we nd the origin of dhtu-vda in Buddhism.12 After the Buddha passed away, he was idealized and apotheosized, and this process of religious divination expanded the concept of dhtuvda. Mahayana Buddhism, in turn, emphasized the Buddha more than the Dharma, in contrast to the Abhidharma tradition, which maintained a central focus on the Dharma.13 Mahayana Buddhism was also in closer contact with day-to-day life in Hindu society. These factors may have contributed to making Mahayana Buddhism more susceptible to inuence by Hindu ways of thought. Matsumoto bases his discussion on the assumption that Buddhism should not permit inuence from other Indian ways of thinking. This may explain why he tries to proscribe any teaching that even slightly resembles non-Buddhist Indian thought or that seems to smack of dhtu-vda tendencies. This leads him to reject samadhic concentration as well as the ideas of liberation and nirvana as non-Buddhist, and explains why he connes Buddhism to insight into prattyasamutpda. Still, the Buddha did experience both samadhic concentration and nirvana, and it cannot be denied that he instructed his disciples on these matters. There is also no evidence that he ever taught anything that would refute these teachings.
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We might note that one of the reasons Matsumoto insists that tathgata-garbha thought is not Buddhist is that it holds to seemingly substantialist ideas such as a Great Self or the four positive traits of nirvana as eternal, blissful, selfhood, and pure. These ideas are undeniably similar to the idea of an atman, and it is hardly surprising that they should come up for question. An even stronger reason for Matsumotos claim is that the tathgata-garbha tradition served as the source of the development of the thought of original enlightenment (hongaku shis) in Japanese Buddhism. His critique of the doctrine of tathgata-garbha gives him the wedge he wants to drive into contemporary Japanese Buddhism and pry open the minds of its scholars. This aspect of Matsumotos work runs parallel with the efforts of Hakamaya, and has provided his colleage with support for his own arguments. Of late Matsumotos critique has been aimed at the source of Japanese Buddhism, namely, Chinese Buddhism and in particular the Chan tradition.14 His arguments are sharp, but at times he lets his expectations overshadow the evidence and forces the facts to t his theories. Hakamaya, meantime, has focused the sights of his critique of hongaku shis on Dgen, claiming that the twelve-fascicle Shbgenz written by Dgen in his later years contains his true position, and that the earlier writings should be rejected in favor of the later ones.15 Dgen specialists have not been convinced.16 Even Matsumoto criticizes Hakamaya for having over-idealized Dgen and argues that the dhtu-vda way of thinking found in early works of Dgen such as the Bendwa were not rejected by Dgen even in his later years. I must say, I agree.

There are further undercurrents to Hakamayas and Matsumotos criticism of the present state of Buddhist studies. One senses a dissatisfaction with the strong emphasis that has been put on objective textual studies in mainstream Japanese Buddhology. In the same vein, one cannot fail to feel a disillusionment with religious studies in general for having taken the ideal of value-free judgments to the point that almost anything claiming to be a religion deserves equal scholarly attention. Hakamaya and Matsumoto have taken the approach that Buddhology should concern itself with the question What is Buddhism? and pursue the truth of Buddhism from a subjective perspective, rejecting what is non-Buddhist
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or anti-Buddhist. They call this Critical Buddhism. It is my view that such judgments may serve to advance the cause of particular schools or sects within Buddhism, but that they are not the stuff of Buddhology. But now I understand that this very view has become the target of criticism.
[Translated by Paul L. Swanson]

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